Better use of American resources in Midway

[simpleton]

OTL Nimitz knew the time and direction of the 3 naval forces and had strong resources. However, he deployed poor bombers in Midway and sent them without fighters. Although Americans knew that the Alaska force was a decoy and Alaska was quite irrelevant and difficult for Japan to hold and supply, the USN and US air corps deployed a large force is Alaska. Despite knowing the area where search planes should concentrate to find the IJN carrier force, a large part of the search planes went lokking for the other forces. Incredibly, they found the much less dangerous and valuable invasion force, very far from Midway, than the crucial carrier force. Although Niemitz had battleships available to sink damaged ships, attract bombers away from American carriers, etc, they were wasted escorting merchant ships along the west coast.

ATL
1) Nimitz does not send any ships to Alaska. He deploys all the carriers, battleships, cruisers, submarines, destroyers and tanquers west of Midway.

2) Knowing that IJN planes from 4 carriers will strike Midway shortly dawn, Niemitz prepares to wipe out the initial wave with fighters and the AAA from Midway and the fleet.
Along with the Buffalo and Wildcats which took part OTL, Niemitz places 48 wildcats (20 from each carrier) and he uses the Buffalo and the tough, fast 4 B-26 without torpedoes and with plenty of ammo to help shoot down the slow and flammable Kates and Vals. Niemitz does not ask the army to deploy in Midway 4 engine bmbers. He does not deploy the obsolete Marine corps dive bombers, which OTL flew all the way from Hawaii.

3) Nimitz deploys 3 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 14 destroyers 100 miles WSW of Midway. He also deploys 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 9 destroyers 100 miles W of Midway. The rest of the fleet is deployed in an arc just W to NW of Midway.

4) 70% of the Catalinas are sent in the direction of the carrier fleet the day before and every 15 minutes starting 2 hours before dawn on the day of the battle, in order to find the carrier fleet as early as possible. Scout SBD with a 500 lb also take of before 1 hour before dawn from the carriers.

Battle plan.
All Midway fighters and the 4 B-26 will take off from Midway 1 hour before dawn and fly W, so they can be guided to the IJN carrier fleet when it is spotted by the scout planes and so they can intercept the first IJN wave. The Wilcats will concetrate on IJN fighters first, while the Buffalo and B-26 shoot down the bombers. The few bombers breaking through to Midway or the USN battleship or carrier fleets, will be shot down by abundant AAA and carrier fighters.
 While the first wave is anihilated, the USN carrier and battleship fleets head for the IJN carrier fleet and launch all SBD and TBD and 30 fighters. After exhausting fuel or munitions, the fighter carriers which took off from Midway land in the carriers to resupply and take off again. The other planes return to Midway to resupply and take off, the B-26 with torpedoes. When IJN planes leave Midway, the ships around Midway head NW at flank speed and sink the whole carrier fleet (battleships, etc,) and then head toward the invasion fleet to finish it off, together with the USN carrier and battleship fleets.

[lordroel]

Aug 22, 2017 17:28:26 GMT simpleton said:

OTL Nimitz knew the time and direction of the 3 naval forces and had strong resources. However, he deployed poor bombers in Midway and sent them without fighters. Although Americans knew that the Alaska force was a decoy and Alaska was quite irrelevant and difficult for Japan to hold and supply, the USN and US air corps deployed a large force is Alaska. Despite knowing the area where search planes should concentrate to find the IJN carrier force, a large part of the search planes went lokking for the other forces. Incredibly, they found the much less dangerous and valuable invasion force, very far from Midway, than the crucial carrier force. Although Niemitz had battleships available to sink damaged ships, attract bombers away from American carriers, etc, they were wasted escorting merchant ships along the west coast.

ATL
1) Nimitz does not send any ships to Alaska. He deploys all the carriers, battleships, cruisers, submarines, destroyers and tanquers west of Midway.

2) Knowing that IJN planes from 4 carriers will strike Midway shortly dawn, Niemitz prepares to wipe out the initial wave with fighters and the AAA from Midway and the fleet.
Along with the Buffalo and Wildcats which took part OTL, Niemitz places 48 wildcats (20 from each carrier) and he uses the Buffalo and the tough, fast 4 B-26 without torpedoes and with plenty of ammo to help shoot down the slow and flammable Kates and Vals. Niemitz does not ask the army to deploy in Midway 4 engine bmbers. He does not deploy the obsolete Marine corps dive bombers, which OTL flew all the way from Hawaii.

3) Nimitz deploys 3 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 14 destroyers 100 miles WSW of Midway. He also deploys 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 9 destroyers 100 miles W of Midway. The rest of the fleet is deployed in an arc just W to NW of Midway.

4) 70% of the Catalinas are sent in the direction of the carrier fleet the day before and every 15 minutes starting 2 hours before dawn on the day of the battle, in order to find the carrier fleet as early as possible. Scout SBD with a 500 lb also take of before 1 hour before dawn from the carriers.

Battle plan.
All Midway fighters and the 4 B-26 will take off from Midway 1 hour before dawn and fly W, so they can be guided to the IJN carrier fleet when it is spotted by the scout planes and so they can intercept the first IJN wave. The Wilcats will concetrate on IJN fighters first, while the Buffalo and B-26 shoot down the bombers. The few bombers breaking through to Midway or the USN battleship or carrier fleets, will be shot down by abundant AAA and carrier fighters.
 While the first wave is anihilated, the USN carrier and battleship fleets head for the IJN carrier fleet and launch all SBD and TBD and 30 fighters. After exhausting fuel or munitions, the fighter carriers which took off from Midway land in the carriers to resupply and take off again. The other planes return to Midway to resupply and take off, the B-26 with torpedoes. When IJN planes leave Midway, the ships around Midway head NW at flank speed and sink the whole carrier fleet (battleships, etc,) and then head toward the invasion fleet to finish it off, together with the USN carrier and battleship fleets.

So you goal is to have the United states come much better out of the Battle of Midway than they did in OTL.

[simpleton]

ATL Battle of Midway:

Catalinas find the IJN carrier fleet at dawn and guide scout SBD with 500 lb bombs and the rest of the carrier planes to them. 2 scout SBD, 500 lb bombs hit Kaga and Akagi with decks full of planes, fuel, etc, setting chain explosions. Fighters and B-26 from Midway intercept the 1st IJN wave. the 36 Zeroes shoot down 20 Wildcats and 3 Buffalo, but they are wiped out and the slow Vals and Kates are slaughtered. IJN scout planes report sighting the USN battleship fleet heading for the IJN carriers. Nagumo orders a wave and his surface ships to attack the USN BB fleet and tries to turn around his carriers after asking Yamamoto's battleship fleet for support. Before Nagumo launches and while he is turning the fleet, USN bombers and fighters arrive and attack the undamaged carriers first and then the damaged carriers. All carriers go down. Nagumo's surface ships engage the USN BB fleet and shortly afterwards a second wave form the USN carriers attack the cruisers and destroyers. The IJN BB fleet is sunk by the heavy shells, bombs and torpedoes (from planes, submarines and DD). Then all 3 USN fleets chase the IJN invasion fleet and massacre it. the USN loses 75 planes, 2 DD, a CA a CV and a BB damaged. Japan loses all its aviators and experienced carrier crews and a large part of its surface fleet. It realizes the war is lost.

[lordroel]

Aug 22, 2017 17:52:20 GMT simpleton said:

ATL Battle of Midway:

It realizes the war is lost.

Not going to happen, Japan will not surrender even if it suffers a bigger defeat in Midway than it suffers in OTL.

[simpleton]

I didn't write that Japan surrenders. It realizes that the war is lost and starts using desperate tactics, which lead to heavier losses of aviators, planes, etc, and a shorter war.

Another consequence of Nimitz ATL great success is that he becomes more popular and influential than MacArthur. He prevails in his plan to invade Formosa, instead of MacArthur's plan to invade the much larger and better defended Philippines, further from China and Japan.

Moreover, the extremely successful operation also boosts American confidence, so that instead of gratuitously fighting in French North Africa (just because Churchill was obessed with Rommel and pathologically affraid of the German army in France). Roosevelt heeds his Generals and admirals advice and decides to liberate France. Accordingly, instead of Patton landing in distant and useless Morocco, he lands with a strong force in Sardinia, which becomes the staging area to liberate France. Another force lands simultaneously in Corsica. The Germans have to rush into Vichy France and deploy forces from the eastern front.
Bombers devastate Italian industry, shipping and land transportation from Sardinia. Italy sues for peace, forcing Hitler to send troops to Italy. The Africa Korps is isolated in Tunisia as the USN and Air force attack supply lanes from Sicily.

After the Midway and Alaska debacle, Japan cannot expand in New Guinea or the Solomons (no Guadalcanal, battle of Santa Cruz, etc, Japan undertakes no offensive operations). Saratoga and Hornet join the fleet in PH, which sails to attack Truk, Japan's main base. The sllower Battleships leave first and meet with the carrier fleet close to Truk. The large surface ship and carrier fleet devastates planes, ships and installations in Truk. The fleet then supports landings in the Marshall Islands in October 1942 and in the Marianas and Formosa in the spring of 1943. Iwojima falls in the summer of 1943. American submarines, planes, DD and CL operating from Formosa anihilate Japanese shipping, so that the IJA in China is poorly supplied and periodically bombed.

US troops land in France in September 1943. Germany has to rush forces from Italy (where the allies didn't land) and the URSS. French forces in North Africa join the US forces to libertae France. Since the German war industry cannot produce enough to replace the rapid losses (Kursk, etc,)and fuel consumption in the USSR and France, the LW and Panzer forces quickly deteriorate. In contrast, Soviet and American planes, cannon, tanks, tanks enter service in large numbers every month.

Patton is given all the fuel, munitions, trucks, tanks, air support, etc, his tanks penetrate rapidly. He reaches the Rhine in January 1944. In the east, Soviet forces have liberated Leningrad and wiped out the army group center and captured the vital coal mines in SIlesia, so German steel and synthetic oil production plummet in the spring of 1944. Seeing the imminent German collapse, Finland and Romania sue for peace and join the allies in March 1944. Several German generals refuse to obbey Hitler's orders and surrender their forces, causing rapid collapse of the Reich. Berlin falls in October 1944. Russia deploys troops to invade Manchuria in December 1944. Bomber from the Marianas and China cause firestorms in several Japanaese cities, killing hundreds of thousands. This and the Soviet attac, cause Japan to capitulate.

[lordroel]

Aug 23, 2017 18:01:01 GMT simpleton said:

I didn't write that Japan surrenders. It realizes that the war is lost and starts using desperate tactics, which lead to heavier losses of aviators, planes, etc, and a shorter war.

If Japan loses all carriers in the Battle of Midway it still has some left.

[simpleton]

OTL Japan rescued many aviators, experienced carrier sailors, officers (Genda, Mataguchi, etc,) and the invasion fleet only had a tanker damaged by a torpedo from a Catalina (the only American one detonating in the whole battle). Shokaku was extremely damaged and it and Zuikaku had lost most aviators and planes. Ryujo sailed all the way to Dutch harbor and the 4 fleet carriers sailed all the way to Midway without even full plane complements (and they were small). That is how scarce IJN planes and pilots were. On the other hand, USN plane losses were very high owing to lack of escort fighters, lack of simultaneous attack by carrier and Midway planes, lack of simultaneous attack by dive bombers and torpedo planes and the loss of Yorktown with her planes and planes some of her planes being discarded to make room when they had to land in other carriers.

ATL the loss of the whole carrier task force and the presence of a large number of American surface ships and submarines in the area prevents any rescue, so the loss is complete. The same happens to the invasion task, so that the number of sailors, aciators, troops, ships, planes, supplies, munitions, etc, is total. A real debacle. On the other hand, the US having all carriers and most aviators and planes makes a big difference. The experience and morale gained by aviators (many more surviving than OTL and attacking more ships) and sailors in the long battle is also invaluable.

OTL It is interesting that while many carrier plane torpedoes detonated on Shoho in the Coral Sea, none did in Midway. The CAP of SHoho was eliminated (some of its few planes being A5M, with fixed landing gear!) and the number of planes attacking simultaneously resulted in limited AAA fire on each one of them. In contrast, only a few torpedo planes attacked at a time in Midway, facing all the Zeroes and AAA. The TBD was not worse than the Kate, it was just deployed deplorably in Midway and with much worse torpedoes than then those of the Kate. USN admirals became very famous, despite poor use of formidable forces and precious intelligence.

[vpsoccer]

Aug 23, 2017 18:01:01 GMT simpleton said:

Moreover, the extremely successful operation also boosts American confidence, so that instead of gratuitously fighting in French North Africa (just because Churchill was obessed with Rommel and pathologically affraid of the German army in France). Roosevelt heeds his Generals and admirals advice and decides to liberate France. Accordingly, instead of Patton landing in distant and useless Morocco, he lands with a strong force in Sardinia, which becomes the staging area to liberate France. Another force lands simultaneously in Corsica. The Germans have to rush into Vichy France and deploy forces from the eastern front.
Bombers devastate Italian industry, shipping and land transportation from Sardinia. Italy sues for peace, forcing Hitler to send troops to Italy. The Africa Korps is isolated in Tunisia as the USN and Air force attack supply lanes from Sicily.

Interesting to take something (What?) a month or more before Midway as a POD, and assume Nimitz is allowed to make changes to dispositions, and see how that might play out.  There might be some quite plausible changes that would change the course of the pacific war.

Are you looking to build a fantasy story around OTL events but moving off in new ways, or an alternate history that might have been able to happen with OTL countries, technology, personnel, etc.? 
 
In either case, I just pick out the above para to suggest further study of capabilities and time lines.  The Allies went into North Africa to accomplish several things, not to massage WLSC's ego!  In fact there were lots of reasons to go there, and there was nowhere else in the ETO to employ the available size of forces - far far from adequate to go into France, or even directly into Italy.
Briefly, reasons (IMO) to invade North Africa, in no particular order:

1. bring the French empire into the war on the Allied side
   
2. free up the (estimated) equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of shipping as more and more ships could go through the Med rather than around Good Hope (this would take some time, but would not happen at all if the African shore was not cleared)
   
3. free up a British army in Egypt for other operations (significant in size and with a lot of combat experience, something the UK was low on the the USA devoid of)
4. put pressure on Italy, the weak link in the Axis
   
5. probably reduce the need for troops in the Middle East, where there were several Indian divisions and a number of UK units supporting them
6. practice landing over beaches in large scale operations - there was very little of this and the few with pre-war training were spread thinly
   
7. Probably some others I can't think of right now.........

As for landing directly in Sardinia, WLSC would probably have been a fan of that - he was always looking for more direct ways to take the war to the enemy.  Trouble is, can you bring the forces and support them if the Luftwaffe comes to support the Italian air and marine forces?  Can you support them if North Africa is bristly neutral and nazi-leaning Vichy controlled?  And if/when you have Sardinia, how long to find were to build airfields and get them built?  The place is very rugged, and there is a reason there were few airfields there at the time (not really very many now either).  (Or could you stage a large army from there to attack France?) And look at what is required to build the airfields...how do you get it there via the available ports?  And so on.  You can do that better from Tunisia and Algeria where land is flatter and there are more ports and etc.  But hard to think about knocking Italy out of the war that way - no country was knocked out by air power alone, although Japan was close by the end.

I think you will find that there was lots of reason to be afraid of the Heer in France.  Look how well it did in 1944 against a much larger Allied army with limitless airpower and logistics (not available in 1942/43).  Lots of Allied generals wanted to wait until they could go in and win for sure - not set up a large self-administering prison camp in France, with legions of efficient Germans just outside with tanks. 

Anyway - that's all too much.  I really just wanted to say that there were lots of reasons to go into North Africa.  Maybe just to get some actual battle experience and find out that Patton was a better field commander than Fredendall(sp?), find out how equipment worked in the face of combat conditions, and so on.  I think your Pacific campaign might be interesting if you write up that side of it, but even there it is hard to imagine a bigger and better USN victory than they had, given instructions from Washington, attrition of aircraft, and so on and on. 

[simpleton]

Certainly. The battle of the Coral Sea would have wiped out 3 carriers (including the 2 best carriers) and many surface ships and provided valuable battle experience for Hornet and enterprise aviators and crews.
The only reason it was not, was Roosevelt's tantrum to bomb Japan with 16 planes in the Doolittle raid. The dummy sent his best 2 carriers all the way to Japan (at great risk) to drop 15 tons of bombs all over Japan.
Because Hornet and enterprise were not available, Nimitz had to send his too oldest CV to Coral Sea. Many avaiators were lost heavily damaging Shokaku, only to have it survive.
Had all 4 carriers been there, Shokaku, Suikaku, Shoho and their escorts would have been wiped out. Boosting US morale much more than dropping a few bombs over Japan and damaging the IJN much more.

Your reasons to invade French North Africa make little sense. Invading Sardinia and Corsica and wiping out Italian industry, shipping, etc, is a much better way to induce France to join the allies, than wasting Frenchmen and Americans and lots of resources for months (especially Patton's force, which took long months to see a real enemy. Invading Sardinia and using it to land supplies shortens the route for USN supplies much more than sending them to the eastern Med. I mentioned that the US stops supplying Monty, which goes on the defensive (at which he is not as bad as for offensive operations, for which he consumes enormous resources to advance at snail's pace).

The WM in France did well in 1944 mostly because Monty did very poorly. Had he advanced rapidly on the first day (instead of stopping for tea) and took Caen and the airfield and kept going (before the WM had plenty of time to react), France would have been much different. Time and agian Monty wasted massive carpet bombing, etc, and allowed the Germans to regroup and reinforce.

Taking enemy Sardinia and bombing Italy puts much more pressure on Italy than invading neutral Morocco against stronger forces.

Since WW II was decided by planes and tanks, Patton was obviously better than F., who knew nothing about tanks.

[eurowatch]

Aug 26, 2017 19:30:19 GMT simpleton said:

Certainly. The battle of the Coral Sea would have wiped out 3 carriers (including the 2 best carriers) and many surface ships and provided valuable battle experience for Hornet and enterprise aviators and crews.
The only reason it was not, was Roosevelt's tantrum to bomb Japan with 16 planes in the Doolittle raid. The dummy sent his best 2 carriers all the way to Japan (at great risk) to drop 15 tons of bombs all over Japan.
Because Hornet and enterprise were not available, Nimitz had to send his too oldest CV to Coral Sea. Many avaiators were lost heavily damaging Shokaku, only to have it survive.
Had all 4 carriers been there, Shokaku, Suikaku, Shoho and their escorts would have been wiped out. Boosting US morale much more than dropping a few bombs over Japan and damaging the IJN much more.

Your reasons to invade French North Africa make little sense. Invading Sardinia and Corsica and wiping out Italian industry, shipping, etc, is a much better way to induce France to join the allies, than wasting Frenchmen and Americans and lots of resources for months (especially Patton's force, which took long months to see a real enemy. Invading Sardinia and using it to land supplies shortens the route for USN supplies much more than sending them to the eastern Med. I mentioned that the US stops supplying Monty, which goes on the defensive (at which he is not as bad as for offensive operations, for which he consumes enormous resources to advance at snail's pace).

The WM in France did well in 1944 mostly because Monty did very poorly. Had he advanced rapidly on the first day (instead of stopping for tea) and took Caen and the airfield and kept going (before the WM had plenty of time to react), France would have been much different. Time and agian Monty wasted massive carpet bombing, etc, and allowed the Germans to regroup and reinforce.

Taking enemy Sardinia and bombing Italy puts much more pressure on Italy than invading neutral Morocco against stronger forces.

Since WW II was decided by planes and tanks, Patton was obviously better than F., who knew nothing about tanks.

The Doolittle raid may have been a tactical failure (very little damage was achieved) but it was a strategic success. This raid convinced the Japanese that American strike capability was much better then it actually was and they send significant air assets to defend teh home islands when they could have been useful elsewhere. It also boosted Allied morale in a time when Japan had steamrolled every country that stood against them. 
It is also very easy to look at a map in hindsight and say "in this Battle, I would have done so and so" because you know where the enemy is what they are going to do, two Things the Commanders in the actual Battle did not have (which is why they initially both send planes in the opposite direction of where the enemy was).

[simpleton]

I am not talking about tactics, but about Strategy. Sending the 2 best carriers at the most crucial time of the war as far as Japan, so that the two oldest carriers have to participate in the first battle of its kind (airplanes only) is absurd. As stated, sinking the IJN task forces participating in the battle of the Coral Sea, allowing Hornet and Enterprise pilots to gain invaluable experience is far more sound for strategy, American morale and to damage the IJN and Japanese morale than the Doolittle raid. Had any or both American carriers been damaged or sunk during the raid, the USN would have been in even worse shape that it was after gratuitously losing Lexington (which would not have been lost with the 2 best carriers in the van and a lot more US planes in the air). The Doolittle raid task force included many destroyers, whose lack allowed the U-Boot happy times in the East and Guulf coasts (despite the European theater having peiority over the Pacific.

Roosevelt had formidable forces but always deployed them deplorably, even before war started. He fired Richardson for objecting to placing 8 BB in Hawaii and had only s few ancient 4 stackers, a CA and a CL defending dozens of islands in the Philippines, where the attack was expected. The USN was extremely lucky that the Japanese did not find any CV in PH and concentrated on the tough and slow BB (useless for CV task forces), instead of sinking the more valuable and vulnerable CA, CL and DD, necessary for the CV task forces. The IJN dropped a ridiculously small number of torpedoes in Midway, in order to drop armor piercing bombs for the BB from high altitude, few of which hit their targets and detonate. Had no AP bombs from high altitude and over twice as many torpedoes been used and concentrated on the CA, CV and DD, the fleet would have suffered a lot more damage.

I find it incredible how people fiercely defend using and risking two invaluable carriers and wasting 16 expensive and badly needed B-25 and many elite aviators (which would have been useful in Midway) to drop 15 tons of bombs all over Japan (with orders tnot to hit the imperial palace) and then having to send the 2 oldest US carriers against the 2 best IJN carriers and a light carrier. Yorktown was not lost (or even damaged beyond prompt repair before Midway), thanks to the Japanese deploying Shoho alone (so she could be easily sunk before the main battle) and to incredibly bad Japanese luck locating the US carriers in time.

Just like Churchill, Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler, Roosevelt was lousy at startegy and seldom listened to his best admirals and generals. The leaders' incompetence and meddling resulted in a longer and more deadly war.

[simpleton]

vpsoccer,

Not only was it easier and much more useful to invade Sardinia and Corsica in the autumn of 1942, instead of Morocco and Algeria. The allies could have invaded Pantelleria, Sardinia and Corsica easily in the summer of 1940 (instead of wasting a strong force ifailing to invade neutral, extremely strong French Dakar), when there were no German planes at all in the Med. Thus isolating Libya and bombing Italy and sinking its fleet to force it to capitulate much sooner.

It was also much more difficult and much less productive to invade distant, well defended, neutral Syria in the summer of 1941 with 5 dozen support planes than invading crucial Sardinia and Corsica at the time. It was also asinine to invade neutral Madagascar in the summer of 1942 (wasting RN CVs, etc, when America was strapped for them and inducing Churchill to ask Roosevelt to send Wasp to deliver Spitfires in Malta twice! for lack of RN carriers to do that! and most incredibly Roosevelt obliged!. Instead of invading Sardinia and Corsica, which would prevent supplying Rommel, rendering Malta moot (and easier to supply.

[vpsoccer]

Aug 27, 2017 17:39:25 GMT simpleton said:

vpsoccer,

Not only was it easier and much more useful to invade Sardinia and Corsica in the autumn of 1942, instead of Morocco and Algeria. The allies could have invaded Pantelleria, Sardinia and Corsica easily in the summer of 1940 (instead of wasting a strong force ifailing to invade neutral, extremely strong French Dakar), when there were no German planes at all in the Med. Thus isolating Libya and bombing Italy and sinking its fleet to force it to capitulate much sooner.

It was also much more difficult and much less productive to invade distant, well defended, neutral Syria in the summer of 1941 with 5 dozen support planes than invading crucial Sardinia and Corsica at the time. It was also asinine to invade neutral Madagascar in the summer of 1942 (wasting RN CVs, etc, when America was strapped for them and inducing Churchill to ask Roosevelt to send Wasp to deliver Spitfires in Malta twice! for lack of RN carriers to do that! and most incredibly Roosevelt obliged!. Instead of invading Sardinia and Corsica, which would prevent supplying Rommel, rendering Malta moot (and easier to supply.

I think this discussion is fruitless, since you have a strongly held view of what was possible at the time, and the effects of certain actions.  However I will toss in a couple of facts for thought on my way out the door.  And a reminder that it is a long way from looking at what commanders at the time knew - and what they knew to be correct.

Let's look at a map.  Holding Sardinia and Corsica would have no effect on sending supplies from Italy to North Africa.  Look at the routes to Tripoli (and Benghazi when they held it) and you will see that even if the RAF was based on Sardinia, they could have had little effect in attacking convoys - unless they used Malta because most of the main routes were near or east of Malta. 

Let's look at why the UK asked the USN to provide a carrier to fly Spitfires to Malt in bulk: the lifts on the RN's modern armoured carriers could not fit Spitfires.  HMS Eagle and HMS Furious were the only RN carriers that could fit them into the hanger.  They were elderly ships in need of frequent repair, and in any event unless both were available at the same time they could not deliver enough to Malta in one trip to let the Spitfires get established in the face of the Luftwaffe.  USS Wasp had large enough elevators to get the Spitfires into the hanger.

Oh one more: why did they invade Syria at that time?  Look it up.  It was not for fun, or to find things for idle troopers to do.  The force was scraped up in the Mid East, and rushed in from India, to solve a critical problem. They did not want to have a hostile Syria sitting behind their backs and threatening the oil sources and the vital pipeline to Haifa.

[simpleton]

Sardinia is much closer to Tunisia (where the AK received reinforcements in 1942 and supplies) than Tunisia is to Malta. In 1941 and 42 Axis planes from Sardinia and torpedo boats from Pantelleria did most of the devastating damage to British convoys supplying Malta. Supplying Malta while holding Sardinia is much easier (though unnecessary). OTL by far most RN BB, CA and CV turned back to Gibraltar after launching fighters (many of which ran out of fuel and never arrived in distant Malta) in order to avoid passing between Tunisia and Sardinia-Sicily. Tanker to supply the planes in Malta were lost in large numbers, resulting in chronic fuel shortage and limited plane deployment.

It was absurd to supply Malta with huge convoys and mighty escort (only as far as Tunisia) for years, at a ridiculously high cost in ships, sailors, planes, etc, Malta a tiny island, extremely far from Gibraltar, beyond the narrow and shallow (minable) waters between Tunisia, Sardinia and Sicily and with limited airfields and very close to Sicily. It makes much more sense to ferry planes and supply them in huge Sardinia and Corsica, much closer to Gibraltar and between France and Italy.

With strong air, submarine and surface fleets in Sardinia, not a single Italian ship would have sailed even close to Tripoli in 1941-first half of 1942 or close to Tunisia in the second fall of 1942.

Actually, with the allies in Sardinia, Hitler would have forgotten completely about North Africa, where he sent troops only because the Americans landed there.

The Spitfire was no larger than the Hurricane, hundreds of which were ferried to Malta by RN CV between 1940 and 1942. The planes were carried on deck and launched from extreme range. The CVs wasted for long months invading Madagascar were perfectly capable of ferrying Spitfires to Malta or fighting in the Pacific.The first batch of Spitfires launched off Wasp wre wiped out in minutes, because Sicily was extremely close, the Spits were concentrated in a small area and there was no time to refuel and scramble them. In contrast Spitfires, P-40, etc, in distant Sardinia they could be dispersed and would have plenty of time to refuel. Moreover, large numbers of P-38, Mosquitoes, Beaufighters, B-26, etc, could be easily flown from Gibraltar to Sardinia with plenty of airfield capacity. Whereas in Malta only limited numbers of twin engine planes could be deployed owing to very limited fuel and airfield area.

Britain was receiving far more oil from the US and Venezuela than from the middle east (which took very long months and a lot of fuel to arrive in Britain). The far RN fleet and RAF had unlimited fuel supplies from Burma, British Borneo and the DEI. Iraq was perfectly under control and southern Iran was easily invaded by Indian forces when Stalin easily invaded northern Iran in 1941. There was no more real justification for invading Syria than for the absurd attack on Mers el Kebir (instead of attacking the enemy Italian fleet) and the invasions of Dakar, Madagascar (a million times more difficult for Japan to take, supply and hold than for the allies to bomb from Africa, bombard and liberate, if invaded by Japan (which could easily invade Reunion and Madagascar, while Britian wasted long months in MAdagascar), Morocco or Algeria or the blockading French Somalia or invading Iceland or Iran. Churchill much rathered attacking neutral territories and understake silly raids (Tobruk and Dieppe),suppported with DD guns, than attacking valuable enemy fleets and positions, even poorly defended ones like

Only an ass would attack distant, strongly defended, neutral Dakar, Morocco or Syria (using a few planes), when he can take weak and invaluable Sardinia with a huge air and surface fleet and twin engine planes from Gibraltar.

[simpleton]

A list of absurd, pointless British and American operations and campaigns, against worse odds than invading Sardinia.

Shelling the French neutral French fleet in Mers el Kebir in 1940.

Trying to invade extremely strong, neutral  Dakar with few planes in 1940.

Mining Norway and sinking a German ship in neutral Norwegian waters, but without simultaneously invading Narvik, Tromso, etc, (the strong allied landing forces arriving after Germany had seized Narvik, etc,). So that the violation of Norwegian neutrality induced Hitler to occupy Norway and Denmark and allied forces left with their tail between their legs to fight in France and the allies lost Norway, many planes, pilots, ships (including a carrier full of RAF and her pilots and planes, sunk by naval shells!), etc, for no gains at all.

Attaking the huge Italian force stranded in Sidi Barrani, Egypt in 1941, where Italy could not supply it. Instead of forcing Italy to supply it there and invading Sardinia to cut off Libya from Italy, dooming the large force in Egypt.

The transfer of a large number of troops, but few planes (the decisive factor in WW II operations) to Greece in 1941 and then their evacuation to Crete, which Churchill expected to defend without any planes and very limited AA and field artillery. Not only was Britain trounced in mainland Greece and Crete, the removal of experienced troops from Libya to Greece and Somalia prevented the capture of Tripoli and allowed Rommel to arrive in Africa.

The Bardia raid in 1941.

The campaign to capture IEA in 1941, which was completely isolated and presented no threat at all. It was in effect a huge self feeding, self guarded prison camp for nearly 200,000 men.

The campaign to invade neutral, remote Syria in 1941, against strong forces and with ridiculously few planes.

The Dieppe raid in 1942 supported with few and poorly armed destroyers only against stronge German defenses. This force plus a few BB, CA and modern destroyers could certainly have taken Sardinia at the time with strong naval and twin engine plane support (from Gibraltar).

The deployment in 1941 of over 100,000 troops but no tanks, limited AA, AT and field artillery, few and obsolete planes and 2 BB with ridiculously few, small DD (no cruisers) to Malaya, whose long peninsula made it untenable without planes, cruisers, tanks, etc, only to lose Malaya and Singapore in record time (despite must IJA troops pedaling 700 km down the peninsula, without Japanese supplies but with planty of British supplies and thanks to British airfields and fuel for air support!.

The Tobruk raid in 1942, supported by tribal class destroyers, much better armed the small DD used to raid Dieppe!

The invasion of neutral, useless and remote, but well defended Morocco-Algeria in 1942.

The defense of untenable PI with a ridiculous fleet of 2 cruisers and a dozen 4 stackerslandings. Instead of concentrating the American troops from the PI, the British troops from untenable Malaya and the Dutch droops from all the Islands in perfectly defensible Java and Sumatra, far away from Japanese planes in Formosa and close to India and Australia and valuable sources of oil, rubber, nickel, tin, etc, for the allies (instead of for Japan).

costly and pointless operations in Tarawa, Guadalcanal, New Guinea (within range of bombers, P-38. Beaufighters in Australia) and the reinforcement of and construction of a riciculously expensive road in Alaska, which Japan could not defend or supply and which was irrelevant for war in the Pacific and Atlantic. The construction of an extremely expensive and difficult road in Burma, which was finnished when it was no longer needed, instead of simply taking Rangoon and attacking the Japanese from Rangoon and China simultaneously, withou the Japanese receiving any supplies.


The invasion of extremely well defended Sicily in 1943, extremely close to Italy, so reinforcements arrived easily and the bulk of German forces could be withdrown rapidly when it fell. In contrast, Sardinia and Corsica were hell for the axis to reinforce or to withdraw.

The invasion of Italy in 1943, the most defensible place in Europe, with mountains and dozens of rivers and a narrow peninsula that prevent outflanking. Infinitely more difficult terrain than Sardinia and Med France.

the invasion fo Normandy, with the Atlantic wall, hedgerows and close to Germany. In contarst the delayed invasion of Med France resulted in ridiculously low allied casualties and rapid advance.

The allies always attacked where defenses were strong and neglected strategically valuable areas, which were untenable for the axis.

The campaign to take the Dodecanese in 1943, again with a strong navy and land force but with few planes, operating from far away, so the force was trounced (one of the few German victories in 1943).