Soviet Domination - A Red Dawn story

[lordroel]

Feb 18, 2018 14:39:01 GMT James G said:

No Bradley.
B-1A instead of B-1B. The whole programme is a mess.

So the M113 has to soldier on thus.

Wonder if this will also effect the B-2 bomber program.

[James G]

Feb 18, 2018 14:42:20 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 18, 2018 14:39:01 GMT James G said:

No Bradley.
B-1A instead of B-1B. The whole programme is a mess.

So the M113 has to soldier on thus.

Wonder if this will also effect the B-2 bomber program.

I'm not so sure about the B-2 yet.

[James G]

(27)

October 1979:

Should the Nicaraguan National Guard give up the fight with the Sandinistas, there was a widespread belief among those conscripts that the revenge from the guerrillas would be to kill them and their families as well. This had already happened, they had been told that. Captured prisoners and deserters had faced the vengeance of the rebels, with their loved ones suffering too. The only thing to do was to fight and keep fighting. Defeat meant death. So they carried on the fighting, getting even more brutal than before. Captured rebels were executed on the spot and villages which had been supporting the Sandinistas were given a good going over. There was no indication in any members of the National Guard – the low- and middle-ranking members rather than those at the top – that they had been manipulated on this issue with clever lies and careful propaganda used to keep their morale up. The guerrillas were truly taking the fight to the Nicaraguan military now while supported as strongly as they were from aboard: everything was being done to avoid defeat by Somoza and his regime.

That everything included making a serious effort alongside the CIA to capture a live Cuban solider. Those few Cubans active in the country were sought so that one could be taken prisoner and shown to the White House as proof of overt, direct Cuban involvement in Nicaragua. There was a red line that Ford had on that issue, such was how it was understood down in Nicaragua, and once Cuba could be shown to have crossed it, then things would change. The hunt was ongoing. The hunters lost men during it too with several Nicaraguan commandos killed and one of the CIA paramilitary officers – a man ‘lent’ by the US Green Berets – later dying from wounds inflicted in a firefight. Still, it went on. The Cubans weren’t ghosts, they weren’t going to stay invisible for long. Eventually, they would be caught up with.


Across the Caribbean far from Nicaragua, there was Cuban involvement beginning in the island nation of Grenada too. A violent seizure of power had taken place back in March by insurrectionists who proclaimed a People’s Revolutionary Government. Grenada was led by power-mad militarists not to the exact political tastes of neither Havana nor Moscow. Regardless, there was an opportunity seen by Castro – still recovering from his wounds in that botched assassination – to have an impact there. The future direction of Grenada could be beneficial if things were done right.

Castro had sent a diplomatic team to Grenada last month and now he sent his brother. Raúl was treated like a visiting king though was rather alarmed at some of the harsh measures taken by his hosts to suppress opposition. Grenada was still rather chaotic but much of what he was told about was unnecessary. He politely explained to Maurice Bishop that there was a better way of doing things; Bishop in turn spoke of crushing counter-revolutionaries before they knew that they were counter-revolutionaries. That issue was pushed aside for time being. There were other matters, those of cooperation between Havana and St. George’s, which Fidel’s brother came to talk about. Raúl spoke of opening up connections between Grenada and the rest of the world, the socialist world in particular. What would be the best way to do that? That would be by expanding the transport links of Grenada first. St. George’s had a viable port but only a small airport. Cuba could help with developing the latter.

[lordroel]

Feb 18, 2018 16:07:33 GMT James G said:

(27)

October 1979:

Should the Nicaraguan National Guard give up the fight with the Sandinistas, there was a widespread belief among those conscripts that the revenge from the guerrillas would be to kill them and their families as well. This had already happened, they had been told that. Captured prisoners and deserters had faced the vengeance of the rebels, with their loved ones suffering too. The only thing to do was to fight and keep fighting. Defeat meant death. So they carried on the fighting, getting even more brutal than before. Captured rebels were executed on the spot and villages which had been supporting the Sandinistas were given a good going over. There was no indication in any members of the National Guard – the low- and middle-ranking members rather than those at the top – that they had been manipulated on this issue with clever lies and careful propaganda used to keep their morale up. The guerrillas were truly taking the fight to the Nicaraguan military now while supported as strongly as they were from aboard: everything was being done to avoid defeat by Somoza and his regime.

That everything included making a serious effort alongside the CIA to capture a live Cuban solider. Those few Cubans active in the country were sought so that one could be taken prisoner and shown to the White House as proof of overt, direct Cuban involvement in Nicaragua. There was a red line that Ford had on that issue, such was how it was understood down in Nicaragua, and once Cuba could be shown to have crossed it, then things would change. The hunt was ongoing. The hunters lost men during it too with several Nicaraguan commandos killed and one of the CIA paramilitary officers – a man ‘lent’ by the US Green Berets – later dying from wounds inflicted in a firefight. Still, it went on. The Cubans weren’t ghosts, they weren’t going to stay invisible for long. Eventually, they would be caught up with.


Across the Caribbean far from Nicaragua, there was Cuban involvement beginning in the island nation of Grenada too. A violent seizure of power had taken place back in March by insurrectionists who proclaimed a People’s Revolutionary Government. Grenada was led by power-mad militarists not to the exact political tastes of neither Havana nor Moscow. Regardless, there was an opportunity seen by Castro – still recovering from his wounds in that botched assassination – to have an impact there. The future direction of Grenada could be beneficial if things were done right.

Castro had sent a diplomatic team to Grenada last month and now he sent his brother. Raúl was treated like a visiting king though was rather alarmed at some of the harsh measures taken by his hosts to suppress opposition. Grenada was still rather chaotic but much of what he was told about was unnecessary. He politely explained to Maurice Bishop that there was a better way of doing things; Bishop in turn spoke of crushing counter-revolutionaries before they knew that they were counter-revolutionaries. That issue was pushed aside for time being. There were other matters, those of cooperation between Havana and St. George’s, which Fidel’s brother came to talk about. Raúl spoke of opening up connections between Grenada and the rest of the world, the socialist world in particular. What would be the best way to do that? That would be by expanding the transport links of Grenada first. St. George’s had a viable port but only a small airport. Cuba could help with developing the latter.

The Cubans are busy.

[James G]

Feb 18, 2018 19:02:04 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 18, 2018 16:07:33 GMT James G said:

The Cubans are busy.

They will get even more busy. They can only do this with Soviet help though. All they did in Africa in OTL was aided by the Soviets and while the location changes here, the support is still the same.

Update incoming on Afghanistan-Iran.

[James G]

(28)

November 1979:

There was a delay imposed of one day at the last minute when it came to the opening of the armed interventions into Afghanistan and Iran. Really, more than just one day was needed yet there were so many wheels in motion that any further delay would put the whole planned success of the operation at serious risk. Little could be fixed in that space of twenty-four hours when it came to sorting out the logistical difficulties that had cropped up in the late stage of the preparations, but what could be done was. Instead of on October 31st, the invasions of those two countries by Soviet and Iraqi forces commenced on November 1st.

The invitations from Kabul and Tehran issued for the entry of foreign troops into each nation helped smooth the way along with the sudden surprise assault that caught both Afghanistan and Iran completely unawares. All of a sudden, armoured columns were crossing their borders while deep inside their countries there were airheads established to fly in more troops and armour too. Special forces assaults took over key communications points and also neutralised the elements of the political leadership sought out.

Afghanistan was far easier for the Soviets to take over than its bigger neighbour Iran. There had come the pre-invasion activation of the Soviet 40th Army which took command of the operation: part of the field army had been pre-deployed months beforehand near to the border when the now-deceased Taraki asked for their presence if not inside Afghanistan then on the border ready to come in should they been needed. The 40th Army undertook the border crossing operations and the Kabul airhead (outside the Afghan capital at Bagram Airbase where there were already Soviet forces) mission too. Kabul was taken and then two main drives swept Soviet armour through the country with a destination of Kabul as they took looping routes. Organised Afghan resistance was near non-existent. The Soviets were coming to help, was the belief of so many duped into believing this fallacy. There problems which the 40th Army faced rather than the Afghan Army came from the terrain, the weather and navigation. Afghanistan wasn’t a large country yet neither was it small either. The transport network was a mess and there were few locals who were fast to offer help. The invasion objectives were achieved and at a remarkably low cost but it wasn’t as easy as foreseen. Something else that wasn’t foreseen was how very fast Afghan rebel groups who were fighting the government which the Soviets deposed were able to swing their attention in an instant to fighting the invaders. Afghans started to unite and unite fast, all against the Soviets. With immediate effect, following guidelines set for what to do when facing the expected minimal resistance – rather than what the 40th Army actually got – Soviet forces unleashed strong counterattacks against opposition. They blasted away with immense fire-power at all who dared stand in their way or turn their guns on them. The beginning of the long war in Afghanistan had commenced.

Mobilisation problems within the Trans-Caucasus and Turkestan Military Districts had brought ire down from Moscow where Marshal Ustinov had relieved the commander of the former from his duties and would ensure he was brought up on charges of dereliction of duty & corruption; the commander of the second district would face the same charge months later. It took far too long for the standing 4th Army and the newly-raised 32nd Army to get ready for combat operations to go into Iran. Soviet advisers with the Iraqis informed Moscow that Saddam’s soldiers were prepared to move first if necessary. That might or might not have been true, but, regardless, there was a lot of controversy over the Soviet Army’s internal delays. Thankfully, when they went into Iran, the 4th & 32nd Army’s had little opposition standing in their way. The Iraqis had a far tougher time and boasts from Baghdad turned out to be only true on how fast they could move, not whether they could fight properly. The Iranians were taken completely by surprise and couldn’t stop the Soviets in any meaningful way nor repeat any of the successes which they had with the Iraqis. The Tehran and Tabriz airheads taken by Soviet paratroopers and then expanded upon when airmobile units arrived threw their rear areas into chaos. Soviet tanks raced southwards to link up with those but also take over much of the country. Spetsnaz units helped them (hitting the homes of commanders to kill them in the hours before hostilities opened), more so did the wholescale inability of the Iranian Army to do anything after the devastation in numbers & morale with the revolution. Iranian militias aligned to the regime brought into that umbrella Revolutionary Guard organisation were those who opposed the Soviet Army at first yet they too were paralysed when KGB officers struck deals with them… ones which the Soviet Union had no intention of honouring.

Iraqi troops crossed the western border and took the time to fight Kurdish forces there more than Iranian militias. Their most success was in the north, rather than where it was meant to be down in the southern part of the border area. Iraqi airborne forces did overrun the port of Bushehr and get troops to other harbours along the Persian Gulf: this was their major success which the Soviets were eventually happy with. They were joined in these naval operations by Soviet troops flying to Bandar Abbas the long way around (through Iraq then over the water) to get there and secure the southern access route to Iran should there come any idea of American interference. Deep inside the cordon thrown around Iran, Soviet forces overran the country. It wasn’t easy. They had to resort to the heavy use of fire-power when they encountered small, disorganised but dug-in Iranian resistance. Civilians fled from them but irregular forces like those infernal Maoists made attacks, especially in the rear once the main body of Soviet troops had passed. They were deadly in places yet the Soviets were more-focused on shutting down resistance from Islamists groups before they could rise. Those hadn’t been killed off by the Tudeh regime that Moscow now brought down. Instead, they had just gone quiet after countless defeats in open battle and were beginning an insurgency. Soviet troops were here in Iran to eliminate that early on. Where met – or suspicion of it was encountered – the response was extraordinarily harsh. There was no aim for a long war here in Iran, just a brutal crushing of dissent which the Soviets began early on.

[lordroel]

Feb 18, 2018 19:04:18 GMT James G said:

(28)

November 1979:

There was a delay imposed of one day at the last minute when it came to the opening of the armed interventions into Afghanistan and Iran. Really, more than just one day was needed yet there were so many wheels in motion that any further delay would put the whole planned success of the operation at serious risk. Little could be fixed in that space of twenty-four hours when it came to sorting out the logistical difficulties that had cropped up in the late stage of the preparations, but what could be done was. Instead of on October 31st, the invasions of those two countries by Soviet and Iraqi forces commenced on November 1st.

The invitations from Kabul and Tehran issued for the entry of foreign troops into each nation helped smooth the way along with the sudden surprise assault that caught both Afghanistan and Iran completely unawares. All of a sudden, armoured columns were crossing their borders while deep inside their countries there were airheads established to fly in more troops and armour too. Special forces assaults took over key communications points and also neutralised the elements of the political leadership sought out.

Afghanistan was far easier for the Soviets to take over than its bigger neighbour Iran. There had come the pre-invasion activation of the Soviet 40th Army which took command of the operation: part of the field army had been pre-deployed months beforehand near to the border when the now-deceased Taraki asked for their presence if not inside Afghanistan then on the border ready to come in should they been needed. The 40th Army undertook the border crossing operations and the Kabul airhead (outside the Afghan capital at Bagram Airbase where there were already Soviet forces) mission too. Kabul was taken and then two main drives swept Soviet armour through the country with a destination of Kabul as they took looping routes. Organised Afghan resistance was near non-existent. The Soviets were coming to help, was the belief of so many duped into believing this fallacy. There problems which the 40th Army faced rather than the Afghan Army came from the terrain, the weather and navigation. Afghanistan wasn’t a large country yet neither was it small either. The transport network was a mess and there were few locals who were fast to offer help. The invasion objectives were achieved and at a remarkably low cost but it wasn’t as easy as foreseen. Something else that wasn’t foreseen was how very fast Afghan rebel groups who were fighting the government which the Soviets deposed were able to swing their attention in an instant to fighting the invaders. Afghans started to unite and unite fast, all against the Soviets. With immediate effect, following guidelines set for what to do when facing the expected minimal resistance – rather than what the 40th Army actually got – Soviet forces unleashed strong counterattacks against opposition. They blasted away with immense fire-power at all who dared stand in their way or turn their guns on them. The beginning of the long war in Afghanistan had commenced.

Mobilisation problems within the Trans-Caucasus and Turkestan Military Districts had brought ire down from Moscow where Marshal Ustinov had relieved the commander of the former from his duties and would ensure he was brought up on charges of dereliction of duty & corruption; the commander of the second district would face the same charge months later. It took far too long for the standing 4th Army and the newly-raised 32nd Army to get ready for combat operations to go into Iran. Soviet advisers with the Iraqis informed Moscow that Saddam’s soldiers were prepared to move first if necessary. That might or might not have been true, but, regardless, there was a lot of controversy over the Soviet Army’s internal delays. Thankfully, when they went into Iran, the 4th & 32nd Army’s had little opposition standing in their way. The Iraqis had a far tougher time and boasts from Baghdad turned out to be only true on how fast they could move, not whether they could fight properly. The Iranians were taken completely by surprise and couldn’t stop the Soviets in any meaningful way nor repeat any of the successes which they had with the Iraqis. The Tehran and Tabriz airheads taken by Soviet paratroopers and then expanded upon when airmobile units arrived threw their rear areas into chaos. Soviet tanks raced southwards to link up with those but also take over much of the country. Spetsnaz units helped them (hitting the homes of commanders to kill them in the hours before hostilities opened), more so did the wholescale inability of the Iranian Army to do anything after the devastation in numbers & morale with the revolution. Iranian militias aligned to the regime brought into that umbrella Revolutionary Guard organisation were those who opposed the Soviet Army at first yet they too were paralysed when KGB officers struck deals with them… ones which the Soviet Union had no intention of honouring.

Iraqi troops crossed the western border and took the time to fight Kurdish forces there more than Iranian militias. Their most success was in the north, rather than where it was meant to be down in the southern part of the border area. Iraqi airborne forces did overrun the port of Bushehr and get troops to other harbours along the Persian Gulf: this was their major success which the Soviets were eventually happy with. They were joined in these naval operations by Soviet troops flying to Bandar Abbas the long way around (through Iraq then over the water) to get there and secure the southern access route to Iran should there come any idea of American interference. Deep inside the cordon thrown around Iran, Soviet forces overran the country. It wasn’t easy. They had to resort to the heavy use of fire-power when they encountered small, disorganised but dug-in Iranian resistance. Civilians fled from them but irregular forces like those infernal Maoists made attacks, especially in the rear once the main body of Soviet troops had passed. They were deadly in places yet the Soviets were more-focused on shutting down resistance from Islamists groups before they could rise. Those hadn’t been killed off by the Tudeh regime that Moscow now brought down. Instead, they had just gone quiet after countless defeats in open battle and were beginning an insurgency. Soviet troops were here in Iran to eliminate that early on. Where met – or suspicion of it was encountered – the response was extraordinarily harsh. There was no aim for along war here in Iran, just a brutal crushing of dissent which the Soviets began early on.

This is not going to be healthy for the oil prices, also wonder what Saudi Arabia and the United States will do.

[James G]

Feb 18, 2018 19:08:29 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 18, 2018 19:04:18 GMT James G said:

(28)

November 1979:

There was a delay imposed of one day at the last minute when it came to the opening of the armed interventions into Afghanistan and Iran. Really, more than just one day was needed yet there were so many wheels in motion that any further delay would put the whole planned success of the operation at serious risk. Little could be fixed in that space of twenty-four hours when it came to sorting out the logistical difficulties that had cropped up in the late stage of the preparations, but what could be done was. Instead of on October 31st, the invasions of those two countries by Soviet and Iraqi forces commenced on November 1st.

The invitations from Kabul and Tehran issued for the entry of foreign troops into each nation helped smooth the way along with the sudden surprise assault that caught both Afghanistan and Iran completely unawares. All of a sudden, armoured columns were crossing their borders while deep inside their countries there were airheads established to fly in more troops and armour too. Special forces assaults took over key communications points and also neutralised the elements of the political leadership sought out.

Afghanistan was far easier for the Soviets to take over than its bigger neighbour Iran. There had come the pre-invasion activation of the Soviet 40th Army which took command of the operation: part of the field army had been pre-deployed months beforehand near to the border when the now-deceased Taraki asked for their presence if not inside Afghanistan then on the border ready to come in should they been needed. The 40th Army undertook the border crossing operations and the Kabul airhead (outside the Afghan capital at Bagram Airbase where there were already Soviet forces) mission too. Kabul was taken and then two main drives swept Soviet armour through the country with a destination of Kabul as they took looping routes. Organised Afghan resistance was near non-existent. The Soviets were coming to help, was the belief of so many duped into believing this fallacy. There problems which the 40th Army faced rather than the Afghan Army came from the terrain, the weather and navigation. Afghanistan wasn’t a large country yet neither was it small either. The transport network was a mess and there were few locals who were fast to offer help. The invasion objectives were achieved and at a remarkably low cost but it wasn’t as easy as foreseen. Something else that wasn’t foreseen was how very fast Afghan rebel groups who were fighting the government which the Soviets deposed were able to swing their attention in an instant to fighting the invaders. Afghans started to unite and unite fast, all against the Soviets. With immediate effect, following guidelines set for what to do when facing the expected minimal resistance – rather than what the 40th Army actually got – Soviet forces unleashed strong counterattacks against opposition. They blasted away with immense fire-power at all who dared stand in their way or turn their guns on them. The beginning of the long war in Afghanistan had commenced.

Mobilisation problems within the Trans-Caucasus and Turkestan Military Districts had brought ire down from Moscow where Marshal Ustinov had relieved the commander of the former from his duties and would ensure he was brought up on charges of dereliction of duty & corruption; the commander of the second district would face the same charge months later. It took far too long for the standing 4th Army and the newly-raised 32nd Army to get ready for combat operations to go into Iran. Soviet advisers with the Iraqis informed Moscow that Saddam’s soldiers were prepared to move first if necessary. That might or might not have been true, but, regardless, there was a lot of controversy over the Soviet Army’s internal delays. Thankfully, when they went into Iran, the 4th & 32nd Army’s had little opposition standing in their way. The Iraqis had a far tougher time and boasts from Baghdad turned out to be only true on how fast they could move, not whether they could fight properly. The Iranians were taken completely by surprise and couldn’t stop the Soviets in any meaningful way nor repeat any of the successes which they had with the Iraqis. The Tehran and Tabriz airheads taken by Soviet paratroopers and then expanded upon when airmobile units arrived threw their rear areas into chaos. Soviet tanks raced southwards to link up with those but also take over much of the country. Spetsnaz units helped them (hitting the homes of commanders to kill them in the hours before hostilities opened), more so did the wholescale inability of the Iranian Army to do anything after the devastation in numbers & morale with the revolution. Iranian militias aligned to the regime brought into that umbrella Revolutionary Guard organisation were those who opposed the Soviet Army at first yet they too were paralysed when KGB officers struck deals with them… ones which the Soviet Union had no intention of honouring.

Iraqi troops crossed the western border and took the time to fight Kurdish forces there more than Iranian militias. Their most success was in the north, rather than where it was meant to be down in the southern part of the border area. Iraqi airborne forces did overrun the port of Bushehr and get troops to other harbours along the Persian Gulf: this was their major success which the Soviets were eventually happy with. They were joined in these naval operations by Soviet troops flying to Bandar Abbas the long way around (through Iraq then over the water) to get there and secure the southern access route to Iran should there come any idea of American interference. Deep inside the cordon thrown around Iran, Soviet forces overran the country. It wasn’t easy. They had to resort to the heavy use of fire-power when they encountered small, disorganised but dug-in Iranian resistance. Civilians fled from them but irregular forces like those infernal Maoists made attacks, especially in the rear once the main body of Soviet troops had passed. They were deadly in places yet the Soviets were more-focused on shutting down resistance from Islamists groups before they could rise. Those hadn’t been killed off by the Tudeh regime that Moscow now brought down. Instead, they had just gone quiet after countless defeats in open battle and were beginning an insurgency. Soviet troops were here in Iran to eliminate that early on. Where met – or suspicion of it was encountered – the response was extraordinarily harsh. There was no aim for along war here in Iran, just a brutal crushing of dissent which the Soviets began early on.

This is not going to be healthy for the oil prices, also wonder what Saudi Arabia and the United States will do.

Added oil prices into my update for tomorrow: thank you for the reminder. As to the Gulf Arab Monarchies and the US, we shall see with the next update. I have two days off work and intend to write a lot.

[lordroel]

Feb 18, 2018 22:44:33 GMT James G said:

I have two days off work and intend to write a lot.

Nice.

[James G]

(29)

November 1979:

The long-standing United States policy when it came to Iran – starting under presidents long before Ford – was that the country would be defended against outside threats: the Soviet Union in effect. The Shah had faced internal troubles and told the Americans that he didn’t need their help. Then he changed his mind and said he did need help: that wasn’t an external threat though, the Soviets weren’t rolling into Iran. By that point, Imperial Iran was finished anyway. The new revolutionary government cut ties with the United States after the revolution. Tehran moved towards the Soviet Union and the communists denounced any relations with the Americans. Soviet forces were then ‘invited’ into Iran with a flimsy excuse given and they very quickly overran the country. The United States did nothing to stop this invasion because it came on the back of the series of developments in Iran over the past year. In addition, there was nothing that could be done short of a full-scale war with the Soviet Union.

Back home, the president and his administration got it right in the neck. Opponents of all stripes savaged the inaction and also how this situation had been allowed to come to pass too. There had been enough warnings. Why had nothing been done before? Why was nothing being done now? Newspaper editorials & opinion pieces, commentators on the television & radio news programmes and politicians making statements kept on coming throughout the month. The Soviets had been joined by the Iraqis and there was the invasion of Afghanistan as well as Iran. The whole of the Middle East was under the threat of Soviet tanks! Meanwhile, in the White House, ‘Ford the Fool’ did nothing. When Kissinger went to the UN up in New York and made a statement there before the General Assembly where there was a (non-binding) motion to condemn the twin invasions, his words were meant to stop the attacks on the Ford Administration. They didn’t. No one cared what the secretary of state had to say. He had lost his relevance in the eyes of so many. It had been him who had been at the forefront of détente with the Soviets and Moscow had shown what it thought of détente. Ford asked Kissinger to fall on his sword. They parted on good terms personally though Kissinger wasn’t about to forget what happened and how it actually wasn’t his fault… in his opinion anyway. Meanwhile, the Soviets overrun Iran and the United States could only watch from afar with impotence.


USS Ranger, a US Navy aircraft carrier, was in the Arabian Sea during November along with her battle group plus a flotilla of amphibious ships laden with US Marines. This deployment followed one earlier in the year by another carrier which had been active near to Iran. In an off-the-cuff remark to a journalist, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld said that the Ranger’s air wing could destroy Soviet and Iraqi naval forces in the Persian Gulf ‘in thirty minutes’. That was an exaggeration but the thinking behind it was true. Should the political will come, the US Navy could clear the waters off Iran of the ships there which supported the invasion. Naturally though, such a move would open up a Soviet reaction elsewhere in the world where the United States wasn’t as strong. Moreover, those warships weren’t of great importance in the invasion of Iran and nor were they doing anything else such as threatening neutral shipping through the Straits of Hormuz – where the Persian Gulf met the Arabian Sea – where all of those tankers carrying oil were moving. World oil prices suddenly went through the roof due to the fighting in Iran though that was a vast overreaction. Iranian oil had been cut off for some time now and the supply of oil from elsewhere in the Middle East was unmolested.

Pakistan neighboured Afghanistan and the former had long been supporting the insurgency inside the latter. Pakistani interference in Afghanistan had predated Taraki and his communists too, going back into the mid-Seventies. Weapons and training were given to anti-Kabul rebels and a safe refuge offered back inside Pakistan. The CIA had been involved through mid-1979 when there had come moves to hurt Soviet regional expansion through Taraki: Afghan insurgents had lots of indirect supporters though had to do everything themselves. Now Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan and there was air support for them. Those MiGs were soon present in the skies near to the Pakistani border and Pakistani aircraft couldn’t match them in capabilities when there were (non-shooting) incidents with Soviet direct intimidation. That came alongside a message sent to Islamabad at the end of the month delivered in diplomatic terms but one full of menace too. Stop supporting rebels in Afghanistan, Pakistan was told, or else. ‘Or else’ wasn’t specified, but Pakistan had to take note of the extraordinary strong Soviet forces inside Afghanistan along with a sudden upsurge in Soviet-Indian relations that they perceived as all part of the intimidation against them. Islamabad went running to the Americans for help, giving dire warnings of what could come their way. Help us!

[lordroel]

Feb 19, 2018 12:40:22 GMT James G said:

Islamabad went running to the Americans for help, giving dire warnings of what could come their way. Help us!

Wonder if they get the help the want.

[stevep]

Feb 19, 2018 14:56:26 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 19, 2018 12:40:22 GMT James G said:

Islamabad went running to the Americans for help, giving dire warnings of what could come their way. Help us!

Wonder if they get the help the want.

  If they do things could get very hot very quickly.  If they don't the US will look even weaker.  A nasty situation either way.

[lordroel]

Feb 19, 2018 15:50:26 GMT stevep said:

Feb 19, 2018 14:56:26 GMT lordroel said:

Wonder if they get the help the want.

  If they do things could get very hot very quickly.  If they don't the US will look even weaker.  A nasty situation either way.

Well if Pakistan does not get aid, then it will mean that the Soviet Union will in one way ore another will from the Bay of Bengal to the Persian Gulf half major influence.

[James G]

Feb 19, 2018 15:55:01 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 19, 2018 15:50:26 GMT stevep said:

  If they do things could get very hot very quickly.  If they don't the US will look even weaker.  A nasty situation either way.

Well if Pakistan does not get aid, then it will mean that the Soviet Union will in one way ore another will from the Bay of Bengal to the Persian Gulf half major influence.

There will be problems otherwise.
Zia might have to do what he told the Soviets in OTL that he would do: stop supplying the rebels. He played a very dangerous game in OTL when lying to Moscow.
Here in this story, he can't be sure that the US will always have his back as the politics are different.
Pakistan isn't a focus of this story but it is one of many countries in the background.

[James G]

(30)

November 1979:

A Cuban paratrooper was caught alive in Nicaragua after a shoot-out with Somoza’s special forces. He was wounded but patched up fast and flown to Managua where, under armed guard, his injuries were treated better. The prisoner was also given a different kind of ‘treatment’ by the Nicaraguans too so that he would talk: CIA personnel were not present as they had left the room when that happened. The Nicaraguans found out what they wanted. Undeniable proof was given of Cuban participation with troops in the Nicaraguan Civil War by what the prisoner said after torture. That civil war continued elsewhere in the country with Somoza having ordered a major offensive against the Sandinistas throughout the month. Finishing off the rebels was desirable though it was understood that that was unachievable at this time. The Americans were yet to throw everything they had at the fight – Somoza hoped that would change once Ford’s red line on Cuba was shown to have been crossed – and the intention was to display to them that Nicaragua was committed to this and just needed them to come in and help bring about a final victory. It wore down the numbers of the National Guard as Somoza gambled on this strategy of winning by bringing in full United States involvement. He believed that his approach was justified now that he had met the conditions set by what he was told were what Washington wanted: there was a certainty that Ford would hold up his end of the bargain.

Up in Guatemala, the fight against the rebels had died down after the big victory which the Guatemalan Army had won. The war with the guerrillas wasn’t over, it had just gone away for some time. Meanwhile, the military fought amongst themselves. Lucas García was deposed in a bloody coup d’état by his defence minister, General Guevara, though Guevara had been pushed into that by his junior officers and had hesitated many times before doing it. Days later, a counter-coup took place. Ríos Montt – a failed presidential candidate in self-imposed exile – made a return to Guatemala and the violence with the first strike against the country’s leader was exceeded by that against the interim replacement with triple the death toll inside Guatemala City when Ríos Montt made his move. Ríos Montt was back, all Guatemalans would discover his revenge for how he had been mistreated (in his eyes) before. He had a long list of opponents – the Catholic Church, the country’s Mayan minority and many military officers – with the guerrillas at the bottom of that list.

One of early acts by Ríos Montt after his initial bloodlust was that Guatemala was for the time being to step back away from its regional leadership role. Guatemala, pushed by Washington on this through the years, had taken a guiding role in aiding its neighbours across in El Salvador and down in Honduras with their fights against guerrillas too… Nicaragua was a different case with Somoza not a man to listen to his fellow Latinos. From out of El Salvador came Guatemalan troops and more left Honduras too: in the former they were there to fight while in the latter they provided technical support. Generals Romero and Paz García were told for the time being that they were on their own. Guatemala had its own needs. Ríos Montt had no idea of the long-term implications of this with his neighbours but his mind wasn’t on those countries, it was on his internal revenge upon his enemies.