What If: Operation Hush, the great landing of 1917 that never was
Feb 18, 2019 18:50:41 GMT
James G likes this
Post by lordroel on Feb 18, 2019 18:50:41 GMT
What If: Operation Hush, the great landing of 1917 that never was
Introduction
Throughout World War I, the Royal Navy was extremely concerned about the German occupation of the Belgian coastline. The RN's main bases were positioned to meet a threat from France or Germany, with Belgium relatively uncovered. Ships and submarines operating from Belgian bases were also very close to the vital lifelines of coastal shipping that ran into London from the West Coast ports. This shipping fed London and the South-East of England, and couldn't easily be replaced by rail transport. As a result, neutralising or recapturing the Belgian ports was a major priority as far as the RN was concerned.
As soon as trench warfare settled down in 1914 it became clear that the important 'Triangle' ports of Zeebrugge, Ostend and Bruges were behind German lines. Almost immediately the RN began planning to neutralise them. This would be done by a combination of minelaying, shore bombardment and surface patrols. However, one recurring concept was that of an amphibious landing, to turn the flank of the German position in Flanders, and allow the Allies to recapture the towns. The closest this assault came to being launched was in 1917, with what its architect, Admiral Reginald Bacon, called 'The Great Landing in Flanders', and the official record called Operation Hush.
Prior amphibious plans in Europe
The earliest Royal Navy plans for an amphibious assault on Europe's North Sea coast came in 1913, when Rear Admiral Lewis Bayly was tasked with producing a plan for the seizure of an advanced base somewhere near Germany. He settled on two targets for such an invasion; the German islands of Borkum and Sylt. He also developed what he thought was an amphibious doctrine suitable for the Dreadnought age, focussing on surprise, and putting as large a force as possible onto the beach. He drew up plans for the landing craft and monitors needed for such an attack. These plans were renewed in August 1914, despite the protests of Admiral Jellicoe. Under the influence of Churchill, Sylt was the target decided on. Work continued on producing forces for such an attack, with a provisional date for launch of the 1st of March (or 15th of April if work was delayed).
The Sylt plan had the support of Admiral Fisher, but this wasn't because he was particularly enthusiastic about the capture of Sylt. Instead, he saw it as a stepping stone to the achievement of his own pet project; a naval expedition to the Baltic. He envisioned the capture of Sylt as the bait in a trap that would lure the High Seas Fleet to its doom. With the HSF out of the way, the RN could waltz into the Baltic, sweep aside any remaining German coast defence ships, and land a million Russian soldiers on the Pomeranian coast, a short walk from Berlin. To this end, he began construction on all the ships needed, ranging from the Courageous-class large light cruisers (perfect for destroying the old pre-dreadnoughts defending the Baltic) to some of the first modern landing craft. These were the X-lighters; capable of carrying 500 men, they were powered by diesel engines, armoured against small arms fire, and had a bow ramp. The invasion of Gallipoli put paid to both this scheme, and the Sylt plan. Ships, men and materiel earmarked for these landings were instead diverted to the Dardanelles. However, many of the concepts that went into these plans were recycled in later ones.
The Dover Patrol and Admiral Bacon
The Royal Navy main force opposite the Belgian coast was the Dover Patrol. It was initially set up in October 1914, with the old battleships Revenge (later Redoubtable) and Venerable as its centerpiece. They were accompanied by several old destroyers, and a steadily increasing number of monitors. At first, it was commanded by Admiral Horace Hood, who would retain his command for six months. Under his command, the Dover Patrol's ships made at least four trips to the Belgian coast. These bombardments aimed to degrade the German lines of communication along the coast. However, Hood was pessimistic about their effectiveness. He believed that the difficulty of accurate firing meant that the bombardments were of little military value. In comparison the risks from German surface batteries, mines and submarines were far too high, meaning that he became unwilling to use his ships to full advantage, unless it was in support of a major offensive.
This wasn't to the taste of the Admiralty. In April 1915 he was replaced by Admiral Reginald Bacon. Bacon was a technically minded officer, who'd had a major hand in the development of the RN's submarine force. He was Dreadnought's first captain, and following that appointment, became Director of Naval Ordnance. He retired from the service in 1909, to take up a management role with Coventry Ordnance Works. In this role, he spent time working with heavy howitzers in France, before returning to the service. It's not surprising that an officer with such experience produced creative methods of achieving his mission. To solve the problem of inaccurate bombardments, he produced 40ft spotting towers that could be placed at sea, to spot for the bombarding ships. Those ships were kept moving constantly, protected from attack by minesweepers, and by a giant net towed by drifters.
Even with these measures, bombardments weren't the most effective thing at closing the main targets, the ports. To ensure that this was carried out, Bacon began to suggest amphibious assaults. The first such plan came in autumn 1915. It came in two similar variants - a smaller raid on Ostend or a larger attempt to hold the town until relieved. Both centered around the landing of troops directly into Ostend harbour, from trawlers and monitors. The raid was cancelled because it was felt the risk of damage to the harbour facilities was too great. Seizing the town would require an offensive from Nieuport and Ypres in order to relieve the landed force. While the Army wasn't opposed to this, it would be difficult to secure the necessary supplies and shells. When detailed planning for such an operation began, the Army felt that the German coastal defences were too strong, especially after the establishment of the Knocke battery, which could hit Ostend. As a result, the plan was scrapped. Bacon wasn't too discouraged, and retained hope that further assaults might be possible. In December 1915, he discussed landing ideas with Field Marshal Haig. A few months later, Haig invited him to produce a plan for a landing, to be implemented when the military situation was favourable. Ultimately, this would become Operation Hush.
Operation Hush
In order to carry out a successful amphibious operation, Bacon had to solve several major problems. The first problem was to determine a landing site. This had to be in an area with minimum cover from German shore batteries. It also had to be in an area where the Germans weren't expecting a landing - surprise is always key to an amphibious operation. The foreshore around Ostend was the only landing site that fulfilled the first condition. To fulfil the second, Bacon chose the foreshore to the west of the town. This had a 30ft seawall immediately behind the beach. While this would have to be overcome somehow, it also made it an unpromising landing site in German eyes, and so it could be reasonably expected to have lesser defenses than the rest of the coast. A landing to the east would also put the landed troops too far from reinforcements advancing from Nieuport and Ypres.
The second challenge was how to land troops on the beach quickly but en masse, a problem magnified by the innovative choice to land tanks in the first wave (this novel use of armour may have come from a suggestion by Haig). Bacon believed the main lesson of Gallipoli was that troops had to be put ashore in as large a mass as possible, as quickly as possible. It was estimated that for the best chance of success, the attacking force had to be ashore in its entirety within 20 minutes. This ruled out the use of small boats and lighters, which would have been much slower than this, and couldn't carry tanks. To solve these two problems, Bacon chose to land his troops from three massive lighters, each big enough to carry a brigade of infantry, three tanks, an artillery battery, a machine gun battery, and the logistics necessary to support the force ashore. These pontoons ended up being 540-50 ft long, and displaced over 2,500 tons, making them essentially massive unpowered landing ships. Trials with these monsters were carried out in the Swin Channel, in the Thames Estuary. Several methods of moving the pontoons were tested, but the one that worked best saw two of the Dover Patrol's 12in monitors pushing the pontoon from astern, as seen in this photo. Once the pontoons had been moved into position, they could be used like a WW2 Mulberry Harbour, allowing troops to disembark from ships too large to ground and disembark troops over the beach.
These pontoons had to be carefully designed to fit the beach. Ideally, the bow would be just before the seawall, while the stern was in water deep enough for the monitors to maneuver in. Solving this problem required detailed knowledge of how the beach sloped, solved by Bacon in a typically innovative manner. Aerial photography was used to determine the change in beach area with the tide. To determine the height of the tide, a submarine waited on the bottom off the target beaches, taking depth readings every quarter hour. This comparatively primitive beach reconnaissance prefigures the use of more sophisticated beach surveys in the Second World War - the Combined Operations Pilotage Parties would combine similar methods with reconnaissance of beach make-up, quality and suitability. To extend the number of days on which landings could be made, wooden extension rafts were produced, allowing the pontoons to move up to 150ft further offshore.
One of the Operation Hush landing pontoons
Finally, the landings had to be made in precisely the right position. The plan called for the monitors and pontoons to make a turn to starboard at prescribed positions. To determine the right place to turn called for a precise knowledge of the distance offshore, but there were no easy positioning marks on the German-held shore. Instead, a method called the 'taut-wire' system was used. Leading lights on the Allied-held shore were used to guide small boats to a known, accurately fixed position. There, they would drop an anchor, attached to a reel of wire. Keeping this wire taut gave the distance to the initial position. This system allowed for the accurate placement of marker buoys all the way up to the water's edge.
Once everyone had worked out how the troops would be landed, they had to work out whether or not the tanks could climb the seawall. The seawall was a formidable obstacle - 30ft high, and with a rounded coping which overhung the wall by three feet. An exact replica of it was constructed at the Tank Corps HQ in France. Several different methods were tried, until they settled on the most effective. The tanks carried a slanting ramp that they could place against the seawall. Extra plates on the tracks allowed them to climb the ramp, and then move over the seawall.
Tanks in training for scaling the coastal sea wall
With all the preparation out of the way, the detailed planning could begin. Once the operation was begun, the monitors and pontoons would be brought over to Dunkirk, a journey taking two nights to complete, in order to ensure complete surprise. Two more nights would be required for equipment to be loaded. On the fifth night, troops would be loaded, and the operation begun. The Harwich destroyer flotilla, and some of the Dover Patrol's destroyers, would prevent any interference from German warships. In order to prevent any interference from German coastal guns, 80 motor launches would be used to lay a thick curtain of smoke in front of the monitors. Meanwhile, three of the Dover Patrol's 15in monitors would be engaging the coastal batteries. Erebus and Terror would be shelling the nearby batteries at Raversyde, while Marshal Soult targeted any more distant battery that attempted to intervene with the landings. Once the pontoons closed to within half a mile of shore, five 9.2in monitors (M23-27) would open fire on the landing beaches. As the pontoons grounded, the pushing monitors would open fire with reduced charges. The landings were to take place at three separate locations, using troops from the Army's 1st Division. Troops would be landed at Westende and Middelkerke, with a third landing between the two. The Westende landing would use the monitors Prince Eugene and Prince Rupert, and the 2nd Infantry Brigade. The 1st Infantry Brigade would land at Middelkerke, from the monitors General Wolfe and General Craufurd. The inbetween landing, using the 3rd Infantry Brigade, would use the monitors Sir John Moore and Lord Clive, the latter of which was the flagship. The 8th of August was picked out as the perfect date for the assault, with a 10 day window either side in case of delay. However, the assault was only to be launched if the Army managed to successfully break out of the Ypres salient, or successfully advance along the coast from Nieuport.
Once it was decided the plan was going ahead, a thick veil of secrecy came down over the whole plan. The crews of the monitors and other craft involved were confined to their ships. The monitors were still practicing with the pontoons in the Thames Estuary. To prevent any German aerial reconnaissance from sighting them, practices were carried out at night, or in cloudy weather. Similarly, the pontoons and monitors were moored in completely different places, to prevent any prying eyes from connecting them. The 1st Division was moved to an isolated camp at Le Clipon, and similarly confined to barracks there. A rumour was spread that they were being quarantined due to infectious disease. Every step was taken to ensure secrecy; when supplies were shipped to the camp, those delivering never met those receiving. Letters were strictly censored, and the camp thoroughly guarded.
The 1st Division didn't spend their time at Le Clipon moping about. Mockups of the monitors, pontoons and seawall were set up. These were used for intensive practice, with troops training until they were completely comfortable scaling the 30 degree incline of the seawall. Practices were made of loading and unloading the pontoons, in an attempt to find the best loading for them. By August, they were able to clear the pontoons in 10 minutes, halving Bacon's original estimate. The troops also received training for the more open warfare expected behind the beaches. To ensure that the battery at Raversyde were properly neutralised, as these were the only guns that could directly fire on the landing beaches, a flying column was trained. This was to use a battalion of bicycle infantry, supported by a motorised machine gun battery and part of a company of bicycle mounted pioneers. Communication arrangements were also planned. Telephone lines were to be run from each brigade group to a buoy offshore laid by the monitors, and to Division HQ. These would be connected by a submarine cable to 4th Army HQ at Nieuport.
With all these preparations complete, all the Dover Patrol and 1st Division had to do was sit around and wait for the Army to reach Roulers. The first delay to the operation came due to delays in launching the Third Battle of Ypres. This didn't start until the 31st of July, just 8 days before the initially planned date for the landing. This was far too early - the advance from Ypres wouldn't be far enough to make the landing feasible. As a result, the date was put back to the 24th of August or 6th September. On the 13th of August, the commander of XV Corps requested that the landing precede his attack. This request was given scant attention by Haig. Nine days later, Haig decided that 5th Army's advance was not sufficiently developed for the landing to be feasible on the 6th. This required a further postponement. This was risky, as the weather was worsening. Some thought was given to the possibility of landing at night, in order to extend the number of days when it was possible to land. However, before this could seriously be trialed, the landing was cancelled on the 15th of October. 5th Army had bogged down at Passchendaele, and it became clear that there was never going to be an advance sufficient enough for Hush to be launched.
German defensive preparations
The Germans were well prepared for a landing. The MarinesKorps Flandern, initially comprised two MarineDivisions, but a third MarineDivision was created on 1 July 1917. The MarinesKorps also included a Sturmabteilung of highly trained stormtroopers. It had built 24 coastal batteries, including eight large calibre naval gun batteries capable of engaging ships up to 30 kilometres off the coast. A line of trenches and wire extended along the coast, supported by 33 concete machine gun nests spaced every 1,000 metres. Mobile infantry and artillery reserves were available from 4th Army. War games were held to simulate invasions and the Germans felt confident they could contain any attempt.
A German minenwerfer (trench mortar) section in action in the dunes on the Flanders Coast, July 1917.
Conclusion
Operation Hush was a hugely complex undertaking, but it was also hugely innovative. The major factors in a successful amphibious assault had been determined - surprise, secrecy, massive firepower, local superiority - and ensured. The landed troops had specialised, specific training for their roles. It was the first amphibious operation to include tanks in the first wave, a feat not accomplished until 1942. Armoured support for landings turned out to be a major factor in their success in WW2. The landing saw one of the first, if primitive, examples of beach reconnaissance, again something that was found to be vital nearly 30 years later. The pontoons also prefigure the use of artificial harbours in WW2. However, there were also flaws in the plan. The pontoons were large, slow targets, that bottlenecked the assaulting force. Had they been going up against a better prepared force, the assaulters could have ended up pinned down in the pontoons. The plan's reliance on an uncertain advance by 4th and 5th Armies was its other major Achilles heel, and the one that eventually brought it down.
Could it have worked? Several major British commanders were confident of success, including Jellicoe and Haig, both of whom had been notably cautious during the planning. Dissenting voices included Roger Keyes, who would succeed Bacon in command of the Dover Patrol, and General Gough, commanding 5th Army (though the latter was based on post-war observations). The British had underestimated the German forces behind the beachhead - British estimates thought it was just two brigades, but there were in fact a division and a half in position. However, these forces were poorly positioned, and complacent. They were expecting an attack on the ports, not a full amphibious landing on a beach. The British would have had superior firepower, with their tanks, artillery and monitors. They also had superior mobility. The ground behind the beaches wasn't the most suitable for moving troops through, while the beach would provide the British with flat, open ground for easy movement of troops. Had the attack succeeded, Ostend would have been rendered useless to the Germans, as it would have been well within the range of British artillery. Long range artillery landed at Westende could have brought the rest of the Belgian coast under fire. Had the attack failed completely, all that would have been lost were a few obsolete monitors, and a division of troops, small losses by the scale of 3rd Ypres. As such, it was a reasonable risk to take in the circumstances, and one with an excellent payoff if all went well.
Wikipedia article about Operation Hush
Great article about the tanks and how they would deal with the Sea Wall: Operation Hush - Tanks
Article was previous posted on Reddit and called: Bacon's Folly? The (cancelled) 1917 Great Landing in Flanders
Introduction
Throughout World War I, the Royal Navy was extremely concerned about the German occupation of the Belgian coastline. The RN's main bases were positioned to meet a threat from France or Germany, with Belgium relatively uncovered. Ships and submarines operating from Belgian bases were also very close to the vital lifelines of coastal shipping that ran into London from the West Coast ports. This shipping fed London and the South-East of England, and couldn't easily be replaced by rail transport. As a result, neutralising or recapturing the Belgian ports was a major priority as far as the RN was concerned.
As soon as trench warfare settled down in 1914 it became clear that the important 'Triangle' ports of Zeebrugge, Ostend and Bruges were behind German lines. Almost immediately the RN began planning to neutralise them. This would be done by a combination of minelaying, shore bombardment and surface patrols. However, one recurring concept was that of an amphibious landing, to turn the flank of the German position in Flanders, and allow the Allies to recapture the towns. The closest this assault came to being launched was in 1917, with what its architect, Admiral Reginald Bacon, called 'The Great Landing in Flanders', and the official record called Operation Hush.
Prior amphibious plans in Europe
The earliest Royal Navy plans for an amphibious assault on Europe's North Sea coast came in 1913, when Rear Admiral Lewis Bayly was tasked with producing a plan for the seizure of an advanced base somewhere near Germany. He settled on two targets for such an invasion; the German islands of Borkum and Sylt. He also developed what he thought was an amphibious doctrine suitable for the Dreadnought age, focussing on surprise, and putting as large a force as possible onto the beach. He drew up plans for the landing craft and monitors needed for such an attack. These plans were renewed in August 1914, despite the protests of Admiral Jellicoe. Under the influence of Churchill, Sylt was the target decided on. Work continued on producing forces for such an attack, with a provisional date for launch of the 1st of March (or 15th of April if work was delayed).
The Sylt plan had the support of Admiral Fisher, but this wasn't because he was particularly enthusiastic about the capture of Sylt. Instead, he saw it as a stepping stone to the achievement of his own pet project; a naval expedition to the Baltic. He envisioned the capture of Sylt as the bait in a trap that would lure the High Seas Fleet to its doom. With the HSF out of the way, the RN could waltz into the Baltic, sweep aside any remaining German coast defence ships, and land a million Russian soldiers on the Pomeranian coast, a short walk from Berlin. To this end, he began construction on all the ships needed, ranging from the Courageous-class large light cruisers (perfect for destroying the old pre-dreadnoughts defending the Baltic) to some of the first modern landing craft. These were the X-lighters; capable of carrying 500 men, they were powered by diesel engines, armoured against small arms fire, and had a bow ramp. The invasion of Gallipoli put paid to both this scheme, and the Sylt plan. Ships, men and materiel earmarked for these landings were instead diverted to the Dardanelles. However, many of the concepts that went into these plans were recycled in later ones.
The Dover Patrol and Admiral Bacon
The Royal Navy main force opposite the Belgian coast was the Dover Patrol. It was initially set up in October 1914, with the old battleships Revenge (later Redoubtable) and Venerable as its centerpiece. They were accompanied by several old destroyers, and a steadily increasing number of monitors. At first, it was commanded by Admiral Horace Hood, who would retain his command for six months. Under his command, the Dover Patrol's ships made at least four trips to the Belgian coast. These bombardments aimed to degrade the German lines of communication along the coast. However, Hood was pessimistic about their effectiveness. He believed that the difficulty of accurate firing meant that the bombardments were of little military value. In comparison the risks from German surface batteries, mines and submarines were far too high, meaning that he became unwilling to use his ships to full advantage, unless it was in support of a major offensive.
This wasn't to the taste of the Admiralty. In April 1915 he was replaced by Admiral Reginald Bacon. Bacon was a technically minded officer, who'd had a major hand in the development of the RN's submarine force. He was Dreadnought's first captain, and following that appointment, became Director of Naval Ordnance. He retired from the service in 1909, to take up a management role with Coventry Ordnance Works. In this role, he spent time working with heavy howitzers in France, before returning to the service. It's not surprising that an officer with such experience produced creative methods of achieving his mission. To solve the problem of inaccurate bombardments, he produced 40ft spotting towers that could be placed at sea, to spot for the bombarding ships. Those ships were kept moving constantly, protected from attack by minesweepers, and by a giant net towed by drifters.
Even with these measures, bombardments weren't the most effective thing at closing the main targets, the ports. To ensure that this was carried out, Bacon began to suggest amphibious assaults. The first such plan came in autumn 1915. It came in two similar variants - a smaller raid on Ostend or a larger attempt to hold the town until relieved. Both centered around the landing of troops directly into Ostend harbour, from trawlers and monitors. The raid was cancelled because it was felt the risk of damage to the harbour facilities was too great. Seizing the town would require an offensive from Nieuport and Ypres in order to relieve the landed force. While the Army wasn't opposed to this, it would be difficult to secure the necessary supplies and shells. When detailed planning for such an operation began, the Army felt that the German coastal defences were too strong, especially after the establishment of the Knocke battery, which could hit Ostend. As a result, the plan was scrapped. Bacon wasn't too discouraged, and retained hope that further assaults might be possible. In December 1915, he discussed landing ideas with Field Marshal Haig. A few months later, Haig invited him to produce a plan for a landing, to be implemented when the military situation was favourable. Ultimately, this would become Operation Hush.
Operation Hush
In order to carry out a successful amphibious operation, Bacon had to solve several major problems. The first problem was to determine a landing site. This had to be in an area with minimum cover from German shore batteries. It also had to be in an area where the Germans weren't expecting a landing - surprise is always key to an amphibious operation. The foreshore around Ostend was the only landing site that fulfilled the first condition. To fulfil the second, Bacon chose the foreshore to the west of the town. This had a 30ft seawall immediately behind the beach. While this would have to be overcome somehow, it also made it an unpromising landing site in German eyes, and so it could be reasonably expected to have lesser defenses than the rest of the coast. A landing to the east would also put the landed troops too far from reinforcements advancing from Nieuport and Ypres.
The second challenge was how to land troops on the beach quickly but en masse, a problem magnified by the innovative choice to land tanks in the first wave (this novel use of armour may have come from a suggestion by Haig). Bacon believed the main lesson of Gallipoli was that troops had to be put ashore in as large a mass as possible, as quickly as possible. It was estimated that for the best chance of success, the attacking force had to be ashore in its entirety within 20 minutes. This ruled out the use of small boats and lighters, which would have been much slower than this, and couldn't carry tanks. To solve these two problems, Bacon chose to land his troops from three massive lighters, each big enough to carry a brigade of infantry, three tanks, an artillery battery, a machine gun battery, and the logistics necessary to support the force ashore. These pontoons ended up being 540-50 ft long, and displaced over 2,500 tons, making them essentially massive unpowered landing ships. Trials with these monsters were carried out in the Swin Channel, in the Thames Estuary. Several methods of moving the pontoons were tested, but the one that worked best saw two of the Dover Patrol's 12in monitors pushing the pontoon from astern, as seen in this photo. Once the pontoons had been moved into position, they could be used like a WW2 Mulberry Harbour, allowing troops to disembark from ships too large to ground and disembark troops over the beach.
These pontoons had to be carefully designed to fit the beach. Ideally, the bow would be just before the seawall, while the stern was in water deep enough for the monitors to maneuver in. Solving this problem required detailed knowledge of how the beach sloped, solved by Bacon in a typically innovative manner. Aerial photography was used to determine the change in beach area with the tide. To determine the height of the tide, a submarine waited on the bottom off the target beaches, taking depth readings every quarter hour. This comparatively primitive beach reconnaissance prefigures the use of more sophisticated beach surveys in the Second World War - the Combined Operations Pilotage Parties would combine similar methods with reconnaissance of beach make-up, quality and suitability. To extend the number of days on which landings could be made, wooden extension rafts were produced, allowing the pontoons to move up to 150ft further offshore.
One of the Operation Hush landing pontoons
Finally, the landings had to be made in precisely the right position. The plan called for the monitors and pontoons to make a turn to starboard at prescribed positions. To determine the right place to turn called for a precise knowledge of the distance offshore, but there were no easy positioning marks on the German-held shore. Instead, a method called the 'taut-wire' system was used. Leading lights on the Allied-held shore were used to guide small boats to a known, accurately fixed position. There, they would drop an anchor, attached to a reel of wire. Keeping this wire taut gave the distance to the initial position. This system allowed for the accurate placement of marker buoys all the way up to the water's edge.
Once everyone had worked out how the troops would be landed, they had to work out whether or not the tanks could climb the seawall. The seawall was a formidable obstacle - 30ft high, and with a rounded coping which overhung the wall by three feet. An exact replica of it was constructed at the Tank Corps HQ in France. Several different methods were tried, until they settled on the most effective. The tanks carried a slanting ramp that they could place against the seawall. Extra plates on the tracks allowed them to climb the ramp, and then move over the seawall.
Tanks in training for scaling the coastal sea wall
With all the preparation out of the way, the detailed planning could begin. Once the operation was begun, the monitors and pontoons would be brought over to Dunkirk, a journey taking two nights to complete, in order to ensure complete surprise. Two more nights would be required for equipment to be loaded. On the fifth night, troops would be loaded, and the operation begun. The Harwich destroyer flotilla, and some of the Dover Patrol's destroyers, would prevent any interference from German warships. In order to prevent any interference from German coastal guns, 80 motor launches would be used to lay a thick curtain of smoke in front of the monitors. Meanwhile, three of the Dover Patrol's 15in monitors would be engaging the coastal batteries. Erebus and Terror would be shelling the nearby batteries at Raversyde, while Marshal Soult targeted any more distant battery that attempted to intervene with the landings. Once the pontoons closed to within half a mile of shore, five 9.2in monitors (M23-27) would open fire on the landing beaches. As the pontoons grounded, the pushing monitors would open fire with reduced charges. The landings were to take place at three separate locations, using troops from the Army's 1st Division. Troops would be landed at Westende and Middelkerke, with a third landing between the two. The Westende landing would use the monitors Prince Eugene and Prince Rupert, and the 2nd Infantry Brigade. The 1st Infantry Brigade would land at Middelkerke, from the monitors General Wolfe and General Craufurd. The inbetween landing, using the 3rd Infantry Brigade, would use the monitors Sir John Moore and Lord Clive, the latter of which was the flagship. The 8th of August was picked out as the perfect date for the assault, with a 10 day window either side in case of delay. However, the assault was only to be launched if the Army managed to successfully break out of the Ypres salient, or successfully advance along the coast from Nieuport.
Once it was decided the plan was going ahead, a thick veil of secrecy came down over the whole plan. The crews of the monitors and other craft involved were confined to their ships. The monitors were still practicing with the pontoons in the Thames Estuary. To prevent any German aerial reconnaissance from sighting them, practices were carried out at night, or in cloudy weather. Similarly, the pontoons and monitors were moored in completely different places, to prevent any prying eyes from connecting them. The 1st Division was moved to an isolated camp at Le Clipon, and similarly confined to barracks there. A rumour was spread that they were being quarantined due to infectious disease. Every step was taken to ensure secrecy; when supplies were shipped to the camp, those delivering never met those receiving. Letters were strictly censored, and the camp thoroughly guarded.
The 1st Division didn't spend their time at Le Clipon moping about. Mockups of the monitors, pontoons and seawall were set up. These were used for intensive practice, with troops training until they were completely comfortable scaling the 30 degree incline of the seawall. Practices were made of loading and unloading the pontoons, in an attempt to find the best loading for them. By August, they were able to clear the pontoons in 10 minutes, halving Bacon's original estimate. The troops also received training for the more open warfare expected behind the beaches. To ensure that the battery at Raversyde were properly neutralised, as these were the only guns that could directly fire on the landing beaches, a flying column was trained. This was to use a battalion of bicycle infantry, supported by a motorised machine gun battery and part of a company of bicycle mounted pioneers. Communication arrangements were also planned. Telephone lines were to be run from each brigade group to a buoy offshore laid by the monitors, and to Division HQ. These would be connected by a submarine cable to 4th Army HQ at Nieuport.
With all these preparations complete, all the Dover Patrol and 1st Division had to do was sit around and wait for the Army to reach Roulers. The first delay to the operation came due to delays in launching the Third Battle of Ypres. This didn't start until the 31st of July, just 8 days before the initially planned date for the landing. This was far too early - the advance from Ypres wouldn't be far enough to make the landing feasible. As a result, the date was put back to the 24th of August or 6th September. On the 13th of August, the commander of XV Corps requested that the landing precede his attack. This request was given scant attention by Haig. Nine days later, Haig decided that 5th Army's advance was not sufficiently developed for the landing to be feasible on the 6th. This required a further postponement. This was risky, as the weather was worsening. Some thought was given to the possibility of landing at night, in order to extend the number of days when it was possible to land. However, before this could seriously be trialed, the landing was cancelled on the 15th of October. 5th Army had bogged down at Passchendaele, and it became clear that there was never going to be an advance sufficient enough for Hush to be launched.
German defensive preparations
The Germans were well prepared for a landing. The MarinesKorps Flandern, initially comprised two MarineDivisions, but a third MarineDivision was created on 1 July 1917. The MarinesKorps also included a Sturmabteilung of highly trained stormtroopers. It had built 24 coastal batteries, including eight large calibre naval gun batteries capable of engaging ships up to 30 kilometres off the coast. A line of trenches and wire extended along the coast, supported by 33 concete machine gun nests spaced every 1,000 metres. Mobile infantry and artillery reserves were available from 4th Army. War games were held to simulate invasions and the Germans felt confident they could contain any attempt.
A German minenwerfer (trench mortar) section in action in the dunes on the Flanders Coast, July 1917.
Conclusion
Operation Hush was a hugely complex undertaking, but it was also hugely innovative. The major factors in a successful amphibious assault had been determined - surprise, secrecy, massive firepower, local superiority - and ensured. The landed troops had specialised, specific training for their roles. It was the first amphibious operation to include tanks in the first wave, a feat not accomplished until 1942. Armoured support for landings turned out to be a major factor in their success in WW2. The landing saw one of the first, if primitive, examples of beach reconnaissance, again something that was found to be vital nearly 30 years later. The pontoons also prefigure the use of artificial harbours in WW2. However, there were also flaws in the plan. The pontoons were large, slow targets, that bottlenecked the assaulting force. Had they been going up against a better prepared force, the assaulters could have ended up pinned down in the pontoons. The plan's reliance on an uncertain advance by 4th and 5th Armies was its other major Achilles heel, and the one that eventually brought it down.
Could it have worked? Several major British commanders were confident of success, including Jellicoe and Haig, both of whom had been notably cautious during the planning. Dissenting voices included Roger Keyes, who would succeed Bacon in command of the Dover Patrol, and General Gough, commanding 5th Army (though the latter was based on post-war observations). The British had underestimated the German forces behind the beachhead - British estimates thought it was just two brigades, but there were in fact a division and a half in position. However, these forces were poorly positioned, and complacent. They were expecting an attack on the ports, not a full amphibious landing on a beach. The British would have had superior firepower, with their tanks, artillery and monitors. They also had superior mobility. The ground behind the beaches wasn't the most suitable for moving troops through, while the beach would provide the British with flat, open ground for easy movement of troops. Had the attack succeeded, Ostend would have been rendered useless to the Germans, as it would have been well within the range of British artillery. Long range artillery landed at Westende could have brought the rest of the Belgian coast under fire. Had the attack failed completely, all that would have been lost were a few obsolete monitors, and a division of troops, small losses by the scale of 3rd Ypres. As such, it was a reasonable risk to take in the circumstances, and one with an excellent payoff if all went well.
Wikipedia article about Operation Hush
Great article about the tanks and how they would deal with the Sea Wall: Operation Hush - Tanks
Article was previous posted on Reddit and called: Bacon's Folly? The (cancelled) 1917 Great Landing in Flanders
