The Falklands War - Timeline

[lordroel]

Day 36 of the Falklands War, May 7th 1982

Intelligence indicates that that Peru has supplied Argentina with 4 Exocet missiles. Britain protests.

In Paris President François Mitterrand, is speaking to his doctor. “What an impossible woman, that Thatcher! With her four nuclear submarines on mission in the southern Atlantic, she threatens to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentinians. …. I have been forced to yield. She has them now, the codes. If our customers find out that the French wreck the weapons they sell, it’s not going to reflect well on our exports.“

Germany and Italy call for a ceasefire and the immediate withdrawal of both British and Argentine troops. Turkey's Foreign Minister states that his country supports Britain, as a NATO ally, in the dispute with Argentina.

Press reports in Uruguay state that Argentina is willing to make some exceptions on its ban on payments to London in order to avoid London banks from declaring that Argentina is in default.

In London, the MoD announce, with immediate effect, an extension of the 'Total Exclusion Zone'; “Her Majesty's Government has consistently made clear that the United Kingdom has the right to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its inherent right of self defence under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Her Majesty's Government will take all necessary measures in the South Atlantic in the self defence of British ships and aircraft engaged in operations and in re-supplying and reinforcing British forces in the South Atlantic. Because of the proximity of Argentine bases and the distances that hostile forces can cover undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather, Her Majesty's Government warns that any Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found more than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.”

Argentina claims that the extension of the zone demonstrates; “ … the British insistence on a military solution and desire to obstruct the diplomatic option then under consideration with the Secretary-General.“

HMS Fearless, Stromness, Norland, Europic Ferry and Atlantic Conveyor sail from Ascension.

Peru and Venezuela assure Argentina that they will provide military aid if so requested under the framework of the Rio Treaty.

Argentina complains to the ICRC; “.. the United Kingdom, in carrying out its acts of aggression against the civilian and military personnel in the region, has carried out continuous violations of the most elementary principle of humanitarian law. For example .. lack of information on the fate of the civilians captured in South Georgia; Lack of information on the situation of military personnel captured in South Georgia. In addition the United Kingdom has carried out acts repugnant to the consciences of civilised peoples such as – the incorporation in the Royal Navy Task Force of British military personnel captured by Argentine forces in the Falklands and South Georgia and the repatriated to the United Kingdom; sinking by submarine attack of the cruiser General Belgrano, sailing outside the zone defined by the UK as the maritime exclusion zone and not engaged in hostilities at the moment of sinking; attacks on similar vessels going to pick up people shipwrecked in another incident, the attack on ARA Sobral, one such vessel, was even more blameworthy since it was unarmed.”

On receiving the complaints, the ICRC in Geneva note that the British Government had provided information about the captured Argentine troops within 5 days which “contrasted favourably with Argentine behaviour,” and that the General Belgrano, though outside the TEZ, was within the security zone of British ships in the area; was fully armed and engaged in operations.

At the UN, US Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick, contacts the Secretary-General to complain that his peace initiative is likely to “cut across” others (unspecified) that Secretary Haig is involved with.

[stevep]

May 7, 2019 2:48:45 GMT lordroel said:

Day 36 of the Falklands War, May 7th 1982

Intelligence indicates that that Peru has supplied Argentina with 4 Exocet missiles. Britain protests.

In Paris President François Mitterrand, is speaking to his doctor. “What an impossible woman, that Thatcher! With her four nuclear submarines on mission in the southern Atlantic, she threatens to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentinians. …. I have been forced to yield. She has them now, the codes. If our customers find out that the French wreck the weapons they sell, it’s not going to reflect well on our exports.“

Germany and Italy call for a ceasefire and the immediate withdrawal of both British and Argentine troops. Turkey's Foreign Minister states that his country supports Britain, as a NATO ally, in the dispute with Argentina.

Press reports in Uruguay state that Argentina is willing to make some exceptions on its ban on payments to London in order to avoid London banks from declaring that Argentina is in default.

In London, the MoD announce, with immediate effect, an extension of the 'Total Exclusion Zone'; “Her Majesty's Government has consistently made clear that the United Kingdom has the right to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its inherent right of self defence under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Her Majesty's Government will take all necessary measures in the South Atlantic in the self defence of British ships and aircraft engaged in operations and in re-supplying and reinforcing British forces in the South Atlantic. Because of the proximity of Argentine bases and the distances that hostile forces can cover undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather, Her Majesty's Government warns that any Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found more than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.”

Argentina claims that the extension of the zone demonstrates; “ … the British insistence on a military solution and desire to obstruct the diplomatic option then under consideration with the Secretary-General.“

HMS Fearless, Stromness, Norland, Europic Ferry and Atlantic Conveyor sail from Ascension.

Peru and Venezuela assure Argentina that they will provide military aid if so requested under the framework of the Rio Treaty.

Argentina complains to the ICRC; “.. the United Kingdom, in carrying out its acts of aggression against the civilian and military personnel in the region, has carried out continuous violations of the most elementary principle of humanitarian law. For example .. lack of information on the fate of the civilians captured in South Georgia; Lack of information on the situation of military personnel captured in South Georgia. In addition the United Kingdom has carried out acts repugnant to the consciences of civilised peoples such as – the incorporation in the Royal Navy Task Force of British military personnel captured by Argentine forces in the Falklands and South Georgia and the repatriated to the United Kingdom; sinking by submarine attack of the cruiser General Belgrano, sailing outside the zone defined by the UK as the maritime exclusion zone and not engaged in hostilities at the moment of sinking; attacks on similar vessels going to pick up people shipwrecked in another incident, the attack on ARA Sobral, one such vessel, was even more blameworthy since it was unarmed.”

On receiving the complaints, the ICRC in Geneva note that the British Government had provided information about the captured Argentine troops within 5 days which “contrasted favourably with Argentine behaviour,” and that the General Belgrano, though outside the TEZ, was within the security zone of British ships in the area; was fully armed and engaged in operations.

At the UN, US Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick, contacts the Secretary-General to complain that his peace initiative is likely to “cut across” others (unspecified) that Secretary Haig is involved with.

  Now that I've never heard before.  Suspect she was bluffing but it was a damned good bluff. 

  Like the Red Cross's shooting down of the Argentinian complaints.  Although they may have a legal point if surrendered troops repatriated are actually serving in a fighting role again.

[lordroel]

May 7, 2019 11:31:23 GMT stevep said:

May 7, 2019 2:48:45 GMT lordroel said:

Day 36 of the Falklands War, May 7th 1982

Intelligence indicates that that Peru has supplied Argentina with 4 Exocet missiles. Britain protests.

In Paris President François Mitterrand, is speaking to his doctor. “What an impossible woman, that Thatcher! With her four nuclear submarines on mission in the southern Atlantic, she threatens to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentinians. …. I have been forced to yield. She has them now, the codes. If our customers find out that the French wreck the weapons they sell, it’s not going to reflect well on our exports.“

Germany and Italy call for a ceasefire and the immediate withdrawal of both British and Argentine troops. Turkey's Foreign Minister states that his country supports Britain, as a NATO ally, in the dispute with Argentina.

Press reports in Uruguay state that Argentina is willing to make some exceptions on its ban on payments to London in order to avoid London banks from declaring that Argentina is in default.

In London, the MoD announce, with immediate effect, an extension of the 'Total Exclusion Zone'; “Her Majesty's Government has consistently made clear that the United Kingdom has the right to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its inherent right of self defence under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Her Majesty's Government will take all necessary measures in the South Atlantic in the self defence of British ships and aircraft engaged in operations and in re-supplying and reinforcing British forces in the South Atlantic. Because of the proximity of Argentine bases and the distances that hostile forces can cover undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather, Her Majesty's Government warns that any Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found more than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.”

Argentina claims that the extension of the zone demonstrates; “ … the British insistence on a military solution and desire to obstruct the diplomatic option then under consideration with the Secretary-General.“

HMS Fearless, Stromness, Norland, Europic Ferry and Atlantic Conveyor sail from Ascension.

Peru and Venezuela assure Argentina that they will provide military aid if so requested under the framework of the Rio Treaty.

Argentina complains to the ICRC; “.. the United Kingdom, in carrying out its acts of aggression against the civilian and military personnel in the region, has carried out continuous violations of the most elementary principle of humanitarian law. For example .. lack of information on the fate of the civilians captured in South Georgia; Lack of information on the situation of military personnel captured in South Georgia. In addition the United Kingdom has carried out acts repugnant to the consciences of civilised peoples such as – the incorporation in the Royal Navy Task Force of British military personnel captured by Argentine forces in the Falklands and South Georgia and the repatriated to the United Kingdom; sinking by submarine attack of the cruiser General Belgrano, sailing outside the zone defined by the UK as the maritime exclusion zone and not engaged in hostilities at the moment of sinking; attacks on similar vessels going to pick up people shipwrecked in another incident, the attack on ARA Sobral, one such vessel, was even more blameworthy since it was unarmed.”

On receiving the complaints, the ICRC in Geneva note that the British Government had provided information about the captured Argentine troops within 5 days which “contrasted favourably with Argentine behaviour,” and that the General Belgrano, though outside the TEZ, was within the security zone of British ships in the area; was fully armed and engaged in operations.

At the UN, US Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick, contacts the Secretary-General to complain that his peace initiative is likely to “cut across” others (unspecified) that Secretary Haig is involved with.

  Now that I've never heard before.  Suspect she was bluffing but it was a damned good bluff. 

  Like the Red Cross's shooting down of the Argentinian complaints.  Although they may have a legal point if surrendered troops repatriated are actually serving in a fighting role again.

You can read more about it here:Falklands: “The Sphinx and the curious case of the Iron Lady’s H-bomb” (memoirs of Mitterrand’s psychoanalyst)

[stevep]

May 7, 2019 11:36:53 GMT lordroel said:

May 7, 2019 11:31:23 GMT stevep said:

  Now that I've never heard before.  Suspect she was bluffing but it was a damned good bluff. 

  Like the Red Cross's shooting down of the Argentinian complaints.  Although they may have a legal point if surrendered troops repatriated are actually serving in a fighting role again.

You can read more about it here:Falklands: “The Sphinx and the curious case of the Iron Lady’s H-bomb” (memoirs of Mitterrand’s psychoanalyst)

  Interesting, thanks for that.  I suspect that if it did occur it was a bluff.  Or possibly Thatcher threatened to use tactical nukes - which Britain had at the time - against military targets.  Can't see even her deciding that a strategic nuclear strike would have been politically acceptable internationally. although it might have been popular in Britain if things were going badly given the anger at the attack at that time.  Or possibly since Mitterrand seems to have been a lot more secretive and dishonest than anyone realised at the time he made it up as an excuse for giving Britain the codes to reduce the Exocet threat?

  Definitely a very complex and in places warped personality.

[lordroel]

Day 37 of the Falklands War, May 8th 1982

Peru's Foreign Ministry issue a statement concerning the UK's announcement of a 12 mile limit; “The Peruvian Government considers of the utmost gravity this extension of the area of conflict as far as the waters which, according to Argentine legislation, correspond to its sovereignty and therefore, to the American territorial continent. Faced with this new announcement of belligerent action on the part of the British forces, after the unjustified sinking of the cruiser “General Belgrano', the Peruvian Government repeats its firmest protest and its request for the cessation of hostilities to make way for the peace-making measures foreseen in international law.”

HMS Intrepid sails from Ascension Island.

Argentina announces, via the Swiss, that they have converted a survey vessel, the Bahia Paraiso, into a hospital ship.

Sir Anthony Parsons meets wit the Secretary-General of the UN

“I saw the Secretary-General for an hour at 1530... Pérez de Cuéllar said that both sides agreed with the concept that his proposals were “provisional measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties.”

I confirmed that we agreed with this, but said that we must have 100% precision from the Argentines on the point. Pérez de Cuéllar said that Ros had indicated that the Argentines envisaged a written agreement: their signature would give us the precision we needed. I said that it would depend whose signature was on the agreement. All previous negotiations had foundered at the last minute on Argentine insistence that their claim on sovereignty should be accepted. … On the terminal date for the negotiations for a diplomatic solution, Argentina had proposed 31 December 1982 and you had suggested “perhaps one year”. Pérez de Cuéllar would value your reaction to the Argentine proposals. On transitional arrangements … Pérez de Cuéllar went on to say that Argentina favoured “an exclusive UN role” whereas you had proposed a contact group of States acceptable to both parties. I repeated that we needed to define what we meant.. what did an “exclusive UN role” mean? .. for us this would be a crucial question. .. On the format and venue of the substantive negotiations, Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines wanted them to be conducted either by the Secretary-General or a representative appointed by him and that they should be held in New York. ..” 

“I saw the Secretary-General and his team again at 2130 today. Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had asked Ros for an initial reaction to my request for clarification of what the Argentines meant by “an exclusive UN role” in the interim administration. Ros had replied that Argentina felt that since the interim period was likely to be fairly short it should be possible to adopt arrangements which, while not affecting individual rights, should necessarily come under the authority of the interim administrator, ie. the UN. … She (Argentina) felt strongly that, in order to avoid confusion and so as to ensure that the transitional period was truly transitional, it should be under a clear cut administration, with a presence from both the interested parties. Pérez de Cuéllar commented that this seemed to be a repetition of the position the Argentines had maintained all along on the transitional arrangements. I questioned this: … Their reference to “individual rights” presumably meant existing law on property, family matters, etc. What in effect they were proposing was direct UN administration without any local political structures. This was a very different concept from ours and I did not believe that it would be acceptable.... Pérez de Cuéllar said that Ros had repeated very clearly this afternoon that it was not the purpose of Argentina to prejudge the question of sovereignty, although de Soto added that for the Argentines this depended on agreement on appropriate terms of reference for the negotiations .. we shall have to watch this...”

Parson sums up the day's meetings with the Secretary-General.

“After today's rounds, it is clear that the Argentines have organised their negotiating position very thoroughly. Perez de Cuellat told me in the strictest confidence that Ros has a prepared statement on every topic from which he reads verbatim as appropriate. I think that there are three possibilities. The first, and least likely, is that the Argentines have decided to negotiate in good faith and play it straight … Pérez de Cuéllar is as sceptical about this as I am. I hope we are wrong. The second possibility is that the Argentines have realised that if the search for a diplomatic solution fails because of their insistence on prejudging the sovereignty question, it will be diplomatic game set and match to us.. The third possibility is that they have decided that they cannot get what they want now, and that they should prepare the ground to get it the day after the interim period expires. This would mean that they would genuinely negotiate an agreement with us now .. But would refuse to accept anything in the agreement which envisaged prolongation of the interim period if agreement had not been reached. …

My suggestion is that I take the following line tomorrow (9 May). We are prepared to look more closely at the possibility of UN administration, but we could not accept the total exclusion of the Islanders, as proposed in the latest Argentine formulation: this is a great deal more rigid than the ideas they discussed with Haig where the problem was the disproportionate number of which they required on the two Councils. … I could take this line as an exploratory move without conceding our position on the Contact Group for the time being... I realise that I have not tackled the answer to the third and perhaps most sinister (third) possibility.. It is extremely hard to see a way out of this dilemma. ..”

[lordroel]

Day 38 of the Falklands War, May 9th 1982

At the Falklands, an Argentine spy trawler, Narwal which had been given the task of shadowing the British fleet and performing ELINT operations along with other trawlers, and who was observed for the first time by British air patrols on April 29th is heavily damaged in an attack by British Sea Harriers (Fleet Air Arm 800 Naval Air Squadron) operating from HMS Hermes. Narwal is hit by a 1000-pound bomb, but it failed to explode as it had been released below the lowest prescribed height and did not arm in time. The bomb caused heavy damage and the Harriers then strafed the Narwal with their 30mm guns. A boarding party of Special Boat Service (SBS) men reached the target via a Sea King Mk.4 (846 Naval Air Squadron) and captured the ship dead in the water, taking off all of the men, and the body of Omar Alberto Rupp, the boatswain of the Argentine trawler who was killed by the impact of the bomb.

Photo: Sea Kings hover near Narwal.



HMS Coventry fires two Sea Dart missiles at an Argentine Hercules approaching Stanley airfield. The missiles miss, but in the attempt to get out of the way, the two escorting Skyhawk aircraft collide and crash. An Argentine Puma helicopter is shot down by Coventry.

Drawing: HMS Coventry firing Sea Dart at the Argentine Puma, shot down over Choiseul Sound.



Instructions are relayed to Sir Anthony Parsons following receipt of the previous day's telegrams; “We agree that Britain should demonstrate full willingness to cooperate in the Secretary-General's negotiations. We therefore wish to reply quickly and constructively … You should convey the following British position to the SecretaryGeneral: (a) .. We can agree that time 'T' should be set as soon after signature of an agreement as both parties can guarantee compliance by their forces to a cease-fire. For us, 24 hours after signature is acceptable .. (b) .. We can accept a period of 14 days for withdrawal of all Argentine military personnel from the Islands; half of them should be withdrawn within 7 days. (c) .. The arrangements for British withdrawal must be equal and parallel with those for Argentine withdrawal, thus involving no disadvantage to Britain. We can agree to withdraw all of or naval forces within 14 days, and half of them within 7 days, to outside a zone of 200 nautical miles from the Falkland Islands. (d) .. It is unreal to set an absolute terminal date for negotiations when everyone knows that the parties, with the best will in the world, may not be able to conclude an agreement within a specified time. For this reason we hope that the Secretary-General will return to the expression “target date” which appeared in his original proposal of 3 May. On that basis we could accept that the named date be 31 December 1982. In order however to take account of reality, without stating directly that negotiations might go on beyond the target date, the agreement would have to say that the interim arrangements will continue until an agreement on the future of the Islands is implemented … (e) … negotiations should take place under his (Secretary-General's) auspices … perhaps Geneva or Ottawa...”

In explanation of these instructions references are made to the exclusion zone and economic sanctions being lifted, and an interim UN administration established, on completion of the withdrawal by both sides; ie within 14 days. With regard to the interim administration Parson's instructions are explicit; “ .. we must also insist most firmly that the new Argentine suggestions to the Secretary-General about the interim administration are unacceptable. … What Argentina is now suggesting is unprecedented and unreasonable. We can accept UN interim administration, but on the clear understanding that the Executive and Legislative Councils continue to function...”

And with regard to the Dependencies; “ ... any agreement must be about the Falkland Islands, thus keeping the dependencies out of it.”

Interviewed on US television, Costa Mendez says that Argentina is not asking the UK to recognise Argentine sovereignty at the beginning of negotiations; provided that those negotiations conclude with confirmation of Argentina's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

Sir Anthony Parsons sees the Secretary-General and sets out the British position; “ ...this brought me on to the all important question of Argentine acceptance that the interim arrangements would be without prejudice to the question of sovereignty. I had been seriously disturbed by Costa Mendez's television interview today. He seemed to me to have been saying that Argentina was not insisting that the UK should actually cede sovereignty before the negotiations started but that she insisted that those negotiations must conclude with confirmation of Argentine sovereignty and that they would therefore be concerned not with sovereignty itself but with how the interests of the Islanders might be protected under Argentine sovereignty. If my reading of Costa Mendez's remarks was right, there had been a major change in the Argentine position as Pérez de Cuéllar had described it yesterday.... I next stated that I wished it to be quite clear that we were talking about the Falkland Islands alone, not about the dependencies....”

Parsons informs London. “Today's military engagements have predictably fluttered the dovecotes here. Roca complained to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council … the Argentines are putting it about that at the Security Council's informal consultations on 5 and 6 May tacit agreement was established that there should be no hostilities while the Secretary-General pursued his initiative. .. I telephoned Pérez de Cuéllar and Ling Qing to remind them that I had made it absolutely clear at the informal consultations that there was no question of our suspending military operations...”

In a further telegram, Parsons adds; “This ball is now firmly in the Argentine Court and Buenos Aires will have to give Ros instructions on the sovereignty question before we come under further pressure. If they come up with the wrong answer, ie an answer unsatisfactory to us, the stage will be set either for a break down of the negotiations or for a final dramatic effort by Pérez de Cuéllar to persude the Junta to think again.”

President Belaunde of Peru announces that he is sending his Prime Minister to Europe to argue for the lifting of sanctions against Argentina. Mexico's President, Lopez Portillo, asks the British Ambassador when he can expect a reply to his suggestion that General Galtieri and PM Thatcher have a face to face meeting.

Pérez de Cuéllar's office issues a statement; “The Secretary-General's discussions with the parties continued today and he met twice on seperate occassions with the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Secretary-General has also informed the President of the Security Council of his talks. Substantial progress has been made on several points but clarifications are still needed on others. The talks will contine tomorrow.”

[lordroel]

Day 39 of the Falklands War, May 10th 1982

Sir Anthony Parsons receives a message from the FCO; “Thank you for .. your sterling efforts with the Secretary-General. I endorse in particular your insistence on smoking the Argentines out on the question of sovereignty and the terms of reference for negotiations about the future of the Islands. If the Secretary-General's efforts were to collapse because Argentina insisted on a transfer of sovereignty or would not agree to a sensible provision about what would happen in negotiations had not succeeded by a target date, Argentine would clearly have been unreasonable and we think we could defend our position satisfactorily in Parliament and internationally. .. The question of the dependencies and of the traditional administration may, as you say, be the ones where the crunch will come. .. Meanwhile, the following comments .. are provided as general guidance for your meetings with the Secretary-General today. Dependencies: .. you should argue that the status quo in the Dependencies is as it was before the unlawful occupation and that our purpose in the present negotiations is to deal with the new situation created by the continued unlawful occupation by Argentina of the Falkland Islands themselves... Sovereignty: You should continue to insist on two major points of substance; (a) that the text of the interim agreement must not prejudice the outcome of negotiations about the future and (b) that the Argentines must state clearly to the Secretary-General that they accept this and will desist from declaring the opposite in public. Interim Administration: .. you should contest the unsupported and erroneous Argentine assertion that the involvement of the islanders in the interim administration would prejudge the outcome of negotiations... and that it would be contrary to the spirit of the Charter to dismantle them. Target Date for Conclusion of Future Negotiations: We see no reason why an interim agreement should not say that: (a) negotiations will start immediately, to produce an agreement by the target date of 31 December 1982; (b) the interim agreements will remain in force until implementation of a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands...”

HMS Sheffield sinks whilst being towed by HMS Yarmouth.

Argentina's news agency, Telam, reports; “British forces attacked and sunk the Argentine fishing boat Narwal which was in the area carrying out specific tasks that did not pose any threat to the British Fleet. The Narwal was sunk by a Sea Harrier which later did not hesitate to machine-gun the rafts that were hurled to the sea by the survivors, and even a raft that was filled with sick and wounded. This is an outrageous attack that violates the most elemental human feelings .. an inhuman deed, a hideous barbarian act that goes against all those values of the free world which the British Government has claimed to defend and uphold.”

In Communique No. 40, Argentina declares the whole of the South Atlantic a 'war zone'.

In Parliament, Francis Pym is asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee about the Government's long term objectives. Pym responds that while now British territory, the Government had never taken the view that the islands were under British sovereignty, “for ever and a day.” Other forms of governance were available to ensure their future, including independence, associate status, condominium, UN trusteeship and others.

Argentina submits a paper to the Secretary-General seeking to amend the proposals as they stand; “(1) This agreement is concluded within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and taking into account Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly. (2) The agreement to which the parties commit themselves shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties. (3) The geographical scope of this agreement shall comprise the three archipelagos considered by the United Nations. (4) The Government and the Administration shall be the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations. The observers of the parties may fly their respective flags. (5) There shall be freedom of transit and residence for citizens of the parties, who shall enjoy the right to acquire and dispose of real estate. (6) The withdrawal of forces shall be effected under the supervision of the United Nations. (7) The parties commit themselves to undertake in good faith negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General with a view to the peaceful settlement of the dispute and, with a sense of urgency, to complete these negotiations by 31 December 1982.”

Pérez de Cuéllar speaks to Sir Anthony Parsons; “ It was a very discouraging meeting. Pérez de Cuéllar said that … Ros had given him a paper... the paper had not originated in Buenos Aires but had been drafted in the course of the discussions here. It was therefore “negotiable.” Ros had told him that the Argentines saw the paper as a “package” and thought it better to discuss all these points at the same time. Pérez de Cuéllar had said that the paper would be unacceptable to us but said he would convey it to me. I said that I was puzzled and disappointed … it went back to general headlines (and, in its paragraph 5, added a major new point), without the detail on which I thought that Pérez de Cuéllar and I had been making progress... At the end of the meeting de Soto1 said that as the Deepndencies had been included in nour earlier negotiations with the Argentines they could not be excluded from the next round. Did he understand that I wanted to exclude them from the interim arrangements? Surely, withdrawal from South Georgia, where we had few troops, would be a “painless gesture”denied this firmly .. as far as we were concerned, the agreement under discussion related to the Falkland Islands alone.... Size of Zones for Withdrawal: A major new problem arose here. Ahmed said that the Argentines had said today that the proposals discussed with Haig had been based on the complete withdrawal of the British Task Force to its bases in the UK. I said … since then, the situation had changed enormously and there was no question of us accepting such an arrangement. It was totally irrelevant to the real situation...”

Cuba's Fidel Castro, holding the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, calls upon the other members to take whatever steps they can to delay further British action against Argentina.

US Ambassador Walters travels to Buenos Aires to; “.. probe the possibilities of an alternative government there; to emphasis to Galtieri the danger of Soviet penetration, and to indicate US economic help would be forthcoming in the event of a UK/Argentine agreement.”

Argentina's Air Force issues a communique listing the names of 10 dead and 4 missing in action over the Falkland islands. 18 more are shown as wounded.

Panama's President, in a telegram to the Secretary-General, condemns; “ … the United Kingdom’s escalating aggression against Argentina as a collective affront to Latin America ...”

[lordroel]

Day 40 of the Falklands War, May 11th 1982

In the UK, the BBC is criticised for its “biased” reporting of the war. Anthony Grant MP complains to the Director-General; “I do not expect the BBC to be biased in Britain's favour but, in the interests of 'balance' if nothing else, need they be so obviously on the side of the enemy?”

The French Government inform London that they had delivered 5 Exocet missiles to Argentina before the start of the conflict; part of an order for ten missiles. They also confirm that they have an order for 4 Exocets for Peru.

Margaret Thatcher writes to the other European Community Heads of Government asking them to support the renewal of the EC's embargo on Argentina due for review on the 17th; “anything less than this could only encourage the Argentines to believe that our resolve is weakening, and that if they maintain their intransigence their aggression will eventually attain its objectives.”

She also responds to President Portillo's suggestion of a face to face meeting with Galtieri by excusing herself on the basis of the Secretary-General's ongoing mission; “ .. I do not believe that it would be right to cut across what is happening in New York.”

Naval supply ship ARA Isla de Los Estados during the first hours in a surface action north of the Swan Islands in Falkland Sound is engaged by HMS Alacrity with her 4.5-inch gun. The ARA Isla de Los Estados blew up after several hits ignited her cargo of jet fuel and ammunition. Only two of the 24 men aboard survived; 15 crew members and seven servicemen (from all three armed forces plus the coast guard) are killed or missing.

Ambassador Henderson in Washington informs London; “State Department have now advised us, with some embarrassment, that Landsat photography of the Falklands area has taken place during the period 7 – 12 May and that the Argentines have obtained the pictures.”

The Junta in Buenos Aires issue a statement; “In view of the United Kingdom's persistence in its aggressive attitude, which is reflected inter alia in the restrictions it has attempted to impose on Argentine marine traffic in the South Atlantic, and in exercise of the right of self-defence established by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it is decided that any vessel flying the United Kingdom flag which is navigating in the aforementioned zone towards the area of operations and/or which may be presumed to constitute a threat to national security shall be considered hostile, and action will be taken accordingly.”

The Secretary-General has a meeting with Sir Anthony Parsons; “Pérez de Cuéllar said that, on reflection, he had decided not to give me the “rough draft” until he had had a reply from Ros on the question of nonprejudgment... There was one point he wished to raise following his conversation with Ros this morning. Ros had told him that the Argentines find it difficult to accept the concept of a target date for the conclusion of the negotiations. .. Pérez de Cuéllar wondered whether we could find other ways to meet our concern about a vacuum occurring if agreement had not been reached by 31 December. .. It was left that the SecretaryGeneral's team would think further on this...”

Later, Parsons is called back to the UN; “Pérez de Cuéllar said that at last he had good news for me. The Argentines had accepted that 31 December should be a target date and that the agreement should state that the outcome of the negotiations would not be prejudged. He the handed me the following text:

“The parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982, taking into account the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties and without prejudgment of the outcome.”

Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had put this text (which is a variant on the language I gave him on 9 May) to Ros as his own proposal. Ros had told him this evening that, “after consultation with everybody” Costa Mendez had instructed him to accept it. I said that this was an extremely encouraging development .. assuming that Ros was acting with full authority.. There still remained a question about what would happen if no agreement had been reached by 31 December. Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines had made a “tremendous concession.” They had also told him, on the interim administration, that they could accept that individual members of the Legislative Council, in their personal capacity, could be used by the administrator for advisory purposes, so long as the administration was also empowered to call on an equal number of other individuals from the Argentine population … they hoped serious consideration could be given to the need to have as few restrictions as possible on communications, the transit of persons and the acquisition of property. .. Finally on zones of withdrawal, the Argentines had expressed the hope that agreement could be worked out on withdrawal distances for the Task Force which would dispel any impression that Argentines were withdrawing under pressure .. I said that, welcome as tonight's news was, there were still major difficulties ahead. One was the Argentines' proposals on representation of the Islanders. I did not believe that you would be able to accept that 1820 Islanders should have the same representation as 30 Argentines....”

Argentina's Ambassador to the United States, Estaban Takacs, approaches William Middendorf, the US representative to the OAS; “He said .. he was afraid the Department misunderstood the GOA's (Government of Argentina's) negotiating position. Takacs said he wanted to emphasize that there had been a definite Argentine change – Argentina has deliberately de-linked the sovereignty issue from the negotiating process and he asked that I pass this message on. He said this de-linkage was a major concession since the Argentine public feels strongly that “nobody should take us out of our islands.” Takacs added that he feels with this display of Argentine flexibility the ball is now in the British court... Takacs claimed that the GOA has been observing a cease-fire for sometime – that the action against the Sheffield was only in retaliation for the Belgrano. He also said that continued British shelling could be a disaster, provoking an escalation, in hostilities. He said thus far ten Islanders had been killed; many more were in peril if the British did not stop. .. He said that if negotiations go on over the next week or longer and the British at the same time show no sign of halting, he would hope the US would weigh in and ask the UK to stop.”

Sir Anthony Parsons seeks instructions from London; I realise only too well that the pressure is now on us (This was inevitable if the Argentines gave way on the fundamental question) and that you face very difficult decisions.

[lordroel]

Day 41 of the Falklands War, May 12th 1982

The QE2 leaves Southampton with the 5th Infantry Brigade of Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas, on board.

Photo: The 'Queen Elizabeth II' leaving Southampton with 5th Infantry Brigade, 12 May 1982



In a 'friendly-fire' incident, Argentine gunners near Darwin shoot down one of their own aircraft.

3 Argentine Skyhawk aircraft are destroyed by HMS Glasgow and HMS Brilliant in a 42-22 deployment.

HMS Glasgow is hit by a 1,000lb bomb which fails to explode, but causes extensive damage.

Photographic reconnaissance of Stanley airfield suggests that while its width had been reduced as a result of British bombing, Argentina's Hercules aircraft can still operate there.

Orders are prepared for Operation SUTTON; “To repossess the Falkland Islands as quickly as possible.” San Carlos is identified as the preferred landing site.

Instructions from Foreign Secretary Pym arrive in New York; “Ministers remain of the view the inclusion of South Georgia in the interim arrangements presents us with very serious difficulties. Quite apart from our title and the fact that we are in possession, there are practical considerations. .. we may need to use South Georgia during the period of withdrawal. Its anchorages will enable us to conduct this operation much more satisfactorily than if they were not available. .. Much the best course is to concentrate on the Falklands only... For your own information, if we were ever to come to contemplate withdrawal from South Georgia in the interim, we should have to insist upon total Argentine withdrawal from Southern Thule.”

In addition, Parsons is to maintain that the British Government have reservations about references to General Assembly resolutions without any mention of 'self-determination'; and remain concerned about the target date of 31 December. Further concerns focus on the arrangements for verifying withdrawal of the two forces, and the role of the UN administrator. Argentine demands about rights of residence and the acquisition of property are to be rejected although a vague reference to the Communications Agreement of 1971 is acceptable. On Tuesday, the war cabinet had been content with Parson's general approach,.. Now on Wednesday, perhaps not appreciating just how much might be assumed in New York to have changed following the Argentine concession, they discussed whether there need be any movement in Britain's position....This was not the positive set of instructions for which parsons had been hoping,..” 

Parsons goes to see Pérez de Cuéllar; “It was a grim meeting. … The Secretary-General and his staff were clearly stunned .. The Argentines were coming to see him … I had given him nothing to pass on to them in return for what they saw as yesterday's major concessions. ... He could not exclude the possibility that they would break off the talks immediately. .. I urged him to look at the problem from the London end. It was not we who had committed the aggression, we had nevertheless already made a number of major concessions .. Any arrangement which appeared to reward Argentine aggression would simply not be accepted in Britain... Bringing the meeting to a close, Pérez de Cuéllar said that he felt obliged to ask me formally to tell you that in his view his whole effort might now collapse if we could not moderate our position.”

Following the meeting, Parsons telegrams Pym; “I explained .. that the basic British view was as follows. The only just outcome was that the aggressor should withdraw, the status quo ante be restored and the negotiations which had so rudely been broken off resumed. ... the plain if regrettable fact is that everyone here sees the situation quite differently. The majority of the Membership sympathise with our reaction to Argentine use of force, but they believe (this includes a number of western delegations) that the Falklands should belong to Argentina provided that the interests of the Islanders are safeguarded. The dominant view here is that the Argentine position is becoming more moderate and that we should respond... if we do not moderate our position … we will be regarded as the culprits.”

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, is reported as saying that all negotiations must lead to a recognition of Argentine sovereignty.

Pérez de Cuéllar asks Secretary Haig to persuade London to make a “comparable concession” to that made by Argentina. However, speaking afterwards to Ambassador Henderson, Haig says that he; “.. fully understands the absurdity of this line of argument when Argentina up to now has made no movement whatsoever, but on the contrary has stepped up its demands,” and that Britain should not give way on South Georgia. At the end of the conversation, Haig adds that; “ ... there was widespread support for us over resistance to aggression. Most Latin American countries understood how impossible the Argentinians were. Their machismo made them intolerable to deal with, but Britain would put itself in the wrong, and as a result inflame the whole American hemisphere, if it attacked the Argentine mainland...”

“Pérez de Cuéllar decided on reflection that the best way to avoid a breakdown was not to describe Britain's position to Ros 'bluntly.'.. He nonetheless asked Parsons to convey his view that unless Britain moderated its position the whole initiative could collapse the next day... Pérez de Cuéllar had only a fairly brief meeting with Ros... told Ros that Britain... already had fresh misgivings because of a recent statement by Costa Mendez.”

Parsons reports; “In the event Pérez de Cuéllar decided not to call me back for a further meeting .. He told me on the telephone that the following points had emerged from his fairly brief meeting with Ros: (1) a private appeal to us ... for military restraint while serious negotiations were continuing, (2) Pérez de Cuéllar told Ros that we were generally satisfied .. with the Argentine statement on non-prejudgement. (3) Ros had nothing further to offer on the nature of the interim Administration, (4) Ros re-opened the question of freedom for Argentines to acquire property in the Falklands and the point about their being able to buy shares in the Falklands Islands Company. You and your colleagues are now faced with an immediate strategic decision. If tomorrow I stick to the positions set out to Pérez de Cuéllar today and he puts the to the Argentines, as he will feel compelled to do, I agree with his assessment that the negotiations will terminate there and then. We can only keep the talks going if we are prepared to make fairly substantial concessions on the nature of the interim administration and on our military withdrawal from South Georgia... “ 

[stevep]

May 12, 2019 7:58:32 GMT lordroel said:

Day 41 of the Falklands War, May 12th 1982


In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, is reported as saying that all negotiations must lead to a recognition of Argentine sovereignty; “Anya’s friend came in for a chat after her ‘O’ level classes this afternoon. Philip Middleton takes a small class in the afternoon at his house, so that the continuity of their course will not be broken. Annie Chater also has children of a younger age group in – just those that live close by, as do Derek Evans, Hulda Stewart and Janice Blackburn in their respective parts of the town. These few remaining teachers are doing a remarkable job under what are now extremely difficult conditions.

  Lordroel

  Should this be two separate paragraphs?  The 1st sentence seems to have no relation to the rest, which I suspect it about continuing schooling in the Falklands during the occupation? 

  Otherwise looking tense, albeit we know that things work out OK, although with some bloody sections.  Didn't realise how tight the diplomatic situation was getting at times.

  Steve

[lordroel]

May 12, 2019 9:08:20 GMT stevep said:

May 12, 2019 7:58:32 GMT lordroel said:

Day 41 of the Falklands War, May 12th 1982


In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, is reported as saying that all negotiations must lead to a recognition of Argentine sovereignty; “Anya’s friend came in for a chat after her ‘O’ level classes this afternoon. Philip Middleton takes a small class in the afternoon at his house, so that the continuity of their course will not be broken. Annie Chater also has children of a younger age group in – just those that live close by, as do Derek Evans, Hulda Stewart and Janice Blackburn in their respective parts of the town. These few remaining teachers are doing a remarkable job under what are now extremely difficult conditions.

  Lordroel

  Should this be two separate paragraphs?  The 1st sentence seems to have no relation to the rest, which I suspect it about continuing schooling in the Falklands during the occupation? 

  Otherwise looking tense, albeit we know that things work out OK, although with some bloody sections.  Didn't realise how tight the diplomatic situation was getting at times.

  Steve

You are right, thanks for the notice.

[lordroel]

Day 42 of the Falklands War, May 13th 1982

On Ascension Island, 187 of the 188 Argentine prisoners captured on South Georgia are handed over to the ICRC before being flown to Montevideo. Lieutenant-Colonel Astiz remains detained on Ascension while a decision is made regarding French and Swedish requests to interview him in connection with murder enquiries concerning their nationals.

Intelligence indicates that Argentina has only 3 AM39 Exocet missiles left.

An Argentine Hercules aircraft successfully lands at Stanley airfield with supplies for the garrison; “This level of activity was still not enough to meet Argentine needs: many requests for supplies were left unmet. The estimate now was that by stretching rations and using local resources the Army could survive beyond 18 may to 26/27 may but if the force was to be fed even on reduced rations for ten days beyond that the some 75 tons of resupply would be necessary.”

President Reagan telephones Margaret Thatcher; “President Reagan said that he understood that the negotiations .. in New York had produced some movement. He believed that the Argentines were willing to enter into negotiations without pre-conditions … The Prime Minister said that she regretted that this was not the case. At least two big questions remained. As regards the interim arrangements, Argentina wanted greaterArgentine participation that we could accept and there were substantial difficulties about ownership of property and freedom of movement. Secondly, there was the problem of South Georgia .. President Reagan said that the United States would continue to do what it could to help the negotiations … ”

General Iglesias tells the Washington Post that Argentina requires that any agreement over a peaceful solution should be a certain and guaranteed means of obtaining complete Argentine sovereignty, “within a reasonable period.”

In London, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym addresses the House of Commons. “I shall not recall now the long and strenuous efforts that we made in co-operation with Mr. Haig, ending in failure because of Argentina's intransigence. … But it is interesting that, in spite of Argentina's rejection then, the elements of an agreement about which I first spoke to the House as long ago as 21 April have remained as elements in subsequent negotiations. In that statement I told the House that they were the arrangements for the Argentine withdrawal, the nature of any interim administration of the islands and the framework for the negotiation for a long-term solution. That is still the case today. The negotiations are now going on under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Senor Perez de Cuellar has shown great determination and diplomatic ability in his lengthy and frequent talks in recent days with the British representative, Sir Anthony Parsons. They have met at least once every day and sometimes more often.

On Tuesday, those talks seemed to make a little progress. Yesterday, things went less well. Hopes have been raised before, only to be dashed, and many very serious difficulties remain. It would be quite wrong for me not to indicate that to the House.

It is not, of course, easy to negotiate with the Argentine authorities. While their representative in New York has appeared to be prepared to recognise many of the realities of the situation, there have been—even within the last two days—a number of unhelpful statements by other Argentine public figures, made in public.... On different occasions the Foreign Minister, one of his senior officials, a general and a junior Minister in another department have all referred to the process of negotiation as if this was designed solely to lead up to a handover of sovereignty to Argentina. That attitude is, I repeat, quite unacceptable to us and we must be absolutely sure that Argentina does not adhere to it, privately or publicly, if a negotiated settlement is to be possible.... the outcome of long-term negotiations about the future of the Islands must not be prejudged in advance in any way. …

Present negotiations in New York are at an important point. Our resolve has not wavered. There have been some indications—actually the first since the crisis began—of genuine Argentine willingness to negotiate on some of the important points. There will have to be more if we are to succeed....”

Ling Qing, President of the Security Council, calls for an informal discussion on the 14th. Pérez de Cuéllar warns Parsons that he considers Ling Qing, “biased and dangerous.”

Parsons telegrams London; “My theatrical performance this morning has helped us get through another day. The price of course was expectations that we will come up with something on the difficult subjects tomorrow. I am working on the assumption that we are on two tracks – genuine search for agreement and, if no agreement is possible, for the negotiations to collapse with us in the least dis advantageous position. I am also conscious of the need to buy as much time as we can.”

Pym responds; “I realise that the negotiations have reached a very difficult position. All here are agreed that our immediate purpose should be to keep the negotiations going, at least for some time yet. … I see the scope for further discussion of certain of the problems with the Secretary-General before Ministers attempt to take a decision about a package covering all the outstanding questions. In particular, please pursue the following matters: (a) you should make full play with the continued statements by Costa Mendez that Argentina insists on having sovereignty... (b) you should say that the risk of a vacuum after an interim period is for us, one of the most important matters, and that more clarity must be achieved as soon as possible... I realise that you also need to say something about South Georgia and about interim administration. ... on South Georgia you may say that we should be willing to refer title over South Georgia to the ICJ, does the Secretary-General think that would help?..”

[lordroel]

Day 43 of the Falklands War, May 14th 1982

3 Argentine Skyhawk aircraft are shot down by Sea Harriers. Stanley airfield is bombed.

In the Falklands, British special forces attack an Argentine base on Pebble Island destroying a large ammunition dump, the fuel stores and 11 aircraft. The Argentine commanding officer is reported killed. There is one British casualty noted as wounded. HMS Glamorgan shells the base as British forces withdraw; “The Argentine version is that only three aircraft were damaged and the attack was repelled. It seems that Chile has offered the research vessel Piloto Pardo to evacuate the Argentine dead and wounded from Stanley, which the (BBC) put as forty-one dead and thirty-eight wounded.”

Photo: Post-raid photo taken from an RAF Harrier showing a T-34 Mentor and a Pucara on the airstrip

\

Information is received that the Bahia Paraiso, a newly converted hospital ship, is loading large quantities of food and weapons at the port of Ushuaia. A decision is taken to request that the ICRC inspect the vessel but that if it has already left, and is found within the TEZ, it should be stopped and searched. Buenos Aires is informed via the Swiss Embassy.

Belgium's Ambassador informs Parsons that the Argentines have been visiting all the EU Ambassadors at the UN to say; “ (a) Argentina was negotiating in good faith, (b) sanctions had not helped the British: their effect had simply been to consolidate Latin American and Third World support for Argentina; their renewal would extend the confrontation and heighten north/south conflict, (c) the sovereignty question had been resolved as a result of an Argentine concession, (d) there remained three main issues, (e) the most important of these was the nature of the interim administration, where Argentina wanted purely UN administration, but the British were insisting on retention of “the colonial structures,” (f) the other two were withdrawal, where the Argentines had accepted the Secretary-General's concept of simultaneous or parallel withdrawal, but the British had not: and the substantive negotiations where the British were refusing to accept a deadline ..”

Information is received from Caracas to the effect that the Venezuelan Government is also sending out a mission at President Galtieri's request. Their itinerary is Spain, the Vatican, West Germany, Belgium, Holland and France and their purpose is to show “solidarity” with Argentina and to seek the lifting of sanctions.

General Walters, on his return from Buenos Aires, telephones Ambassador Henderson; “.. Walters went on to outline his visit to Buenos Aires, the main purpose of which he claimed was to limit the damage to American relations with Latin America which had been brought about by US support for the UK. He had found the Argentine Junta the most difficult people he had had to deal with since his encounters many years ago with MOSSAD... Galtieri told Walters that recent US statements, particularly by Weinberger, had raised strong anti-American feelings in Buenos Aires .. he felt that the Americans could have adopted a less partial course.... if Britain assaulted the Falkland Islands, Argentina would seek help from those friends who had offered it, except the Soviets. The Argentinians had already lost nearly 400 men; they were prepared to lose 40,000 if necessary. ..

Secretary Haig sends a message to Henderson with his “latest thoughts” including; “ .. (1) We should do everything possible to ensure that it was no we who were responsible, or held responsible, for any breakdown in the Secretary-General's efforts .. (2) withdrawal from the Islands should be based on parity of time in terms of the ability of both sides to reinsert their forces... (3) the focus of the discussions should be on the Falkland Islands and not the Dependencies. This had also been the view of President Figueiredo of Brazil. .. “

[lordroel]

Day 44 of the Falklands War, May 15th 1982

Stanley airfield is bombed together with two other targets nearby.

An Argentine cargo vessel, the Río Carcarañá is strafed by two Sea Harriers and set on fire, however, Argentina successfully airlifts two 155mm L33 artillery field guns to Stanley.

Photo: Río Carcarañá burning. 



The Political Committee of the European Community refer the decision to renew the EC's sanctions against Argentina to the Council of Ministers.

The Soviet Union repositions its 1365 satellite over the South Atlantic.

[lordroel]

Day 45 of the Falklands War, May 16th 1982

in a meeting held at Chequers, a decision is taken regarding the terms of an agreement between the UK and Argentina - “the absolute minimum acceptable.” This includes: (1) no prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of either party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of their dispute, (2) no acts or activities taking place while the interim agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty, or create any rights of sovereignty, (3) 24 hours after signature (time 'T') each party undertakes to cease and thereafter refrain from all hostile actions, (4) both countries undertake – (a) to commence withdrawal at time 'T', (b) to withdraw half of her force 150 nautical miles within 7 days, (c) to complete withdrawal within 14 days, (5) exclusion zones to be lifted from time 'T', (6) following completion of the withdrawal each party undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any armed forces within 150 nautical from the Islands, (7) economic measures to be lifted at time 'T', (8) both parties to jointly sponsor a Security Council Resolution to recognise the agreement and the Secretary-General's role, (9) the Secretary-General to appoint an Administrator acceptable to both parties (10) the Administrator to ensure the continuing administration of the Islands in consultation with the representative institutions of the Islands in accordance with Article 73 of the UN Charter, with the exception that one representative from the Argentine population be appointed to each of the two institutions, (11) the UN Administrator to verify withdrawal, (12) each party to have no more than 3 observers on the Islands, (12) negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General, for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of negotiations by 31 December 1982 and without prejudgement (13) this agreement shall remain in force until a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands has been reached and implemented by the parties.

The preamble to the agreement only makes mention of the Falkland Islands, and a separate message for the Secretary-General clearly states that the Dependencies are not included.

Sir Anthony Parsons instructions are that there can be no amendments; “You should tell the Secretary-General that although the right course would have been for the Argentines to implement SC Resolution 502, we have been negotiating in good faith for more than five weeks through various intermediaries. We are very grateful for the Secretary-General's latest efforts but we cannot allow matters to drag on much longer. Midday New York time on Wednesday 19 May is therefore an absolute deadline for the Argentines' reply. If not received by then we shall have to assume rejection...”

Germany's Chancellor Schmidt, and French President Mitterand, meet in Hamburg; “There was clear agreement on the need for solidarity with Britain on the basis of SCR 502. Sanctions involved sacrifices for both France and Germany, but it was clear that they would be renewed..”

US Secretary Haig and Foreign Secretary Pym meet in Luxembourg; “Haig seemed more confident than in earlier meetings of our ability to do the job militarily, and assumed that we would not be able to wait much longer. He argued strongly against action against the mainland, but seemed otherwise undisturbed about the military prospects ..”

Haig also informs Pym that the Argentines in New York are “bragging” that their concession on the pre-judging of sovereignty has thrown the British argument into disarray. In the American press, Costa Mendez is quoted as saying; “that Sir A Parson's return to London proves that responsibility for the delay or the prolongation of the negotiations is certainly not Argentina's, but Britain's.”

An article in the New York Times states; “.. after six successive days, the negotiations were stalled by a British attempt to revive at least a vestige of control over the islands by restoring the Falklands' local council … the Secretary-General had proposed, and Argentina had agreed, that a neutral team of UN officials administer the islands.”

Sea Harriers again bomb Stanley airfield; “The Harriers have really had a field day, bombing mainly in the airport area, but occasionally dropping one somewhere else, so that the Argentine would not become too complacent about things. An unusually large number of folk turned out for Glory Hour in the pubs at lunch time, taking advantage of the sunshine plus the entertainment – not only the British bombing but the Argentine confusion.”

Drawing: The Argentinian supply ship 'Bahia Buen Suceso' at anchor in Fox Bay East, West Falkland Island, comes under attack by two Sea Harrier aircraft of 800 Naval Air Squadron of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm



HMS Alacrity passes through Falklands Sound; reporting no sign of mines.