underused after 1900 pods

[stevep]

Oct 3, 2019 23:08:42 GMT Zyobot said:

'No Nukes'. In the short term, there's the question of how fast and bloodlessly the US defeats Japan. But in the long one, it has fundamentally game-changing implications for the Cold War with the communist bloc.

  Well I can see no nukes in WWII because it ends a bit earlier.  Which is likely to mean an invasion of Japan, costly for the US and probably very, very destructive for Japan.

  However no nukes at all would really be an ASB issue as you would need to change some of the basic rules of physics.  If this did occur we're probably had WWIII some time in the last 50-60 years or so and Europe and other areas of the world are quite possibly still recovering.  Not sure how social changes would be affected but could well see a markedly more conservative world with conscription in the west still continuing for markedly longer in the UK and US.  Possibly also at some point a China sized Vietnam!

[Zyobot]

‘No Sputnik’. For starters, I wonder how that’d affect the Space Race going forwards.

[Zyobot]

'John Kerry Wins In 2004'.

[lordroel]

Oct 6, 2019 17:26:14 GMT Zyobot said:

'John Kerry Wins In 2004'.

Of which i think are several TLs on the AH.com if i am right.

[Zyobot]

Oct 6, 2019 18:26:34 GMT lordroel said:

Oct 6, 2019 17:26:14 GMT Zyobot said:

'John Kerry Wins In 2004'.

Of which i think are several TLs on the AH.com if i am right.

Personally, I haven't seen them. Knowing AH.com, I suppose there's consensus that a Kerry presidency would be far better than Dubya's second term was.

[stevep]

   One thing I'm been thinking about given some of the details on the WWI day-by-day is that say the Battle of Mons goes a bit better for the BEF and/or the French 5th Army do somewhat worse to their south. As such the Germans start to threaten the British right flank, forcing them to retire west and north rather than SW to keep in touch with the French allies. 

  Once a big enough gap is established the BEF would probably retire all the way towards the channel ports, which is where their supplies and reinforcements are currently coming in.  The Germans would commit some forces to cover them but probably relatively weak ones, at least at first and their main priority would be seeking to destroy the French army and capture Paris.

  The point of this is that the BEF doesn't have the arduous retreat to the Marne, which even without assorted battles put a lot of strain on the force as well as taking its further away from its supply lines.

  After a regroup its likely to seek to attack eastwards again as there isn't time to link up with the French main forces.  [Ideally for the allies the lack of the BEF on their left flank forces the French to end their frontal assaults earlier and form the 6th Army earlier.]  Even so their likely to retreat a little faster so possibly the Marne starts a bit earlier.  If at about the same time the BEF, boosted by resupplies and reinforcements is able to defeat the probably reserve forces cover it then there is a serious problem for the Germans as even as their fighting and probably still losing on the Marne they have a British army threatening the rear of much of their forces.

  Not thinking it would decided the war quickly but that after some maneuvering and probably linking up with the Belgium army in Antwerp the line when the autumn rains and exhaustion ends movement is possibly along the Meuse-Sambre river through Belgium with Liege and Namur contested and possibly a German wedge/salient from about Maubeuge to Verdun.  This would mean that northern Belgium and most of the OTL occupied region of France would stay in allied hands, given a considerable boost to allied resources in terms of manpower and material resources.  It also puts all the Belgium coastline into allied hands so no short ranged subs operating from there and shipping between Britain and France is more secure.  Possibly also with most of France liberated already and given the heavy losses in the Lorraine offensive the France aren't as driven for massive attackers to drive the Germans from French soil before they have properly equipped forces, especially with a lot more artillery.

  I suspect a chain of events like this could possibly shorten the war by up to a year, perhaps even more.  Which could well make massive changes to the post-war world.  Russia could well survive as a weakened imperial regime or a democratic state.  The war would be markedly less costly in less material terms for Belgium and France so their demands for reparations will be lower and their material and economic position stronger.  Those would be huge butterflies in themselves.

  Anyway what do people think?

[EwellHolmes]

Oct 3, 2019 23:08:42 GMT Zyobot said:

'No Nukes'. In the short term, there's the question of how fast and bloodlessly the US defeats Japan. But in the long one, it has fundamentally game-changing implications for the Cold War with the communist bloc.

It's ASB that nuclear weapons are never invented, although a delayed invention is certainly possible. In a situation where the U.S. doesn't have them ready for August of 1945, I think it's likely the Imperial Japanese pull off a compromise peace with no occupation and the "Core" Empire of the Home Islands, Formosa, Korea and Manchuria is retained.

[EwellHolmes]

Oct 6, 2019 17:26:14 GMT Zyobot said:

'John Kerry Wins In 2004'.

Katrina, Iraq going to hell and then, finally, the Recession. Dubya pulls a Cleveland or we get a George Allen (R-VA)/J.C. Watts (R-OK) in 2008 would be my guess. No Obama appointments or support means Homosexual Marriage still isn't legal nationally while it's likely that Allen's SCOTUS picks mean Roe v. Wade has probably been overturned. Foreign policy wise, it's hard to imagine; Arab Spring may still happen but without a "Red Line" on Syria Assad and Russia might be less bold. Same goes for North Korea. 

[stevep]

Oct 8, 2019 20:10:32 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Oct 3, 2019 23:08:42 GMT Zyobot said:

'No Nukes'. In the short term, there's the question of how fast and bloodlessly the US defeats Japan. But in the long one, it has fundamentally game-changing implications for the Cold War with the communist bloc.

It's ASB that nuclear weapons are never invented, although a delayed invention is certainly possible. In a situation where the U.S. doesn't have them ready for August of 1945, I think it's likely the Imperial Japanese pull off a compromise peace with no occupation and the "Core" Empire of the Home Islands, Formosa, Korea and Manchuria is retained.

  Agree with the 1st point.  Unless you change the laws of physics they will turn up at some point.  However can't see such a compromise peace being achieved.  The US was determined on an occupation and by Yalta was it Stalin had agreed to enter the war within 6 months of the war in Europe ending so Manchuria and almost certainly Korea will be lost some way or another.

  Checking Wiki at Yalta

Stalin agreed to enter the fight against the Empire of Japan "in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated", and that as a result, the Soviets would take possession of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, the port of Dalian would be internationalized, and the Soviet lease of Port Arthur would be restored, among other concessions.[16]

  As such the Soviets are going to attack and destroy Japanese possessions on the continent at the very least.  Also with a determination to avenge Pearl Harbour the US wanted an unconditional surrender and the occupation of Japan as with Nazi Germany.

[Zyobot]

Oct 8, 2019 20:15:07 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Oct 6, 2019 17:26:14 GMT Zyobot said:

'John Kerry Wins In 2004'.

Katrina, Iraq going to hell and then, finally, the Recession. Dubya pulls a Cleveland or we get a George Allen (R-VA)/J.C. Watts (R-OK) in 2008 would be my guess. No Obama appointments or support means Homosexual Marriage still isn't legal nationally while it's likely that Allen's SCOTUS picks mean Roe v. Wade has probably been overturned. Foreign policy wise, it's hard to imagine; Arab Spring may still happen but without a "Red Line" on Syria Assad and Russia might be less bold. Same goes for North Korea. 

So, not much better overall--with most of the defining disasters of the decade still occurring under a Kerry administration?

[EwellHolmes]

Oct 9, 2019 15:14:34 GMT stevep said:

Oct 8, 2019 20:10:32 GMT EwellHolmes said:

It's ASB that nuclear weapons are never invented, although a delayed invention is certainly possible. In a situation where the U.S. doesn't have them ready for August of 1945, I think it's likely the Imperial Japanese pull off a compromise peace with no occupation and the "Core" Empire of the Home Islands, Formosa, Korea and Manchuria is retained.

  Agree with the 1st point.  Unless you change the laws of physics they will turn up at some point.  However can't see such a compromise peace being achieved.  The US was determined on an occupation and by Yalta was it Stalin had agreed to enter the war within 6 months of the war in Europe ending so Manchuria and almost certainly Korea will be lost some way or another.

  Checking Wiki at Yalta

Stalin agreed to enter the fight against the Empire of Japan "in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated", and that as a result, the Soviets would take possession of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, the port of Dalian would be internationalized, and the Soviet lease of Port Arthur would be restored, among other concessions.[16]

  As such the Soviets are going to attack and destroy Japanese possessions on the continent at the very least.  Also with a determination to avenge Pearl Harbour the US wanted an unconditional surrender and the occupation of Japan as with Nazi Germany.

Soviets would probably fail to do such, they were logistically weak to the extreme and the Kwantung Army was intact and successfully withdrawing into the Tunghua Defensive Area, which would've allowed them to outlast the Soviets. As for the US, Operation Downfall would fail and the high casualties from that would probably break American political willpower.

[stevep]

Oct 11, 2019 0:56:28 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Oct 9, 2019 15:14:34 GMT stevep said:

  Agree with the 1st point.  Unless you change the laws of physics they will turn up at some point.  However can't see such a compromise peace being achieved.  The US was determined on an occupation and by Yalta was it Stalin had agreed to enter the war within 6 months of the war in Europe ending so Manchuria and almost certainly Korea will be lost some way or another.

  Checking Wiki at Yalta

  As such the Soviets are going to attack and destroy Japanese possessions on the continent at the very least.  Also with a determination to avenge Pearl Harbour the US wanted an unconditional surrender and the occupation of Japan as with Nazi Germany.

Soviets would probably fail to do such, they were logistically weak to the extreme and the Kwantung Army was intact and successfully withdrawing into the Tunghua Defensive Area, which would've allowed them to outlast the Soviets. As for the US, Operation Downfall would fail and the high casualties from that would probably break American political willpower.

    I think that's unlikely to occur.  While the Japanese managed to hold off the Soviets a bit, see Battle_of_Mutanchiang, they still suffered heavy losses in an already gravely weakened force.  The peninsula has good defensive potential but the Japanese were very weak and the Soviets had massive superiority in terms of numbers, firepower and air power.

  I can't see Downfall failing given the huge firepower superiority that the US would have.  US losses would have been high but probably considerably less then their worst predictions, as with D Day.  Japanese losses are going to be horrendous. 

[EwellHolmes]

Oct 11, 2019 12:24:50 GMT stevep said:

Oct 11, 2019 0:56:28 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Soviets would probably fail to do such, they were logistically weak to the extreme and the Kwantung Army was intact and successfully withdrawing into the Tunghua Defensive Area, which would've allowed them to outlast the Soviets. As for the US, Operation Downfall would fail and the high casualties from that would probably break American political willpower.

    I think that's unlikely to occur.  While the Japanese managed to hold off the Soviets a bit, see Battle_of_Mutanchiang, they still suffered heavy losses in an already gravely weakened force.  The peninsula has good defensive potential but the Japanese were very weak and the Soviets had massive superiority in terms of numbers, firepower and air power.

  I can't see Downfall failing given the huge firepower superiority that the US would have.  US losses would have been high but probably considerably less then their worst predictions, as with D Day.  Japanese losses are going to be horrendous. 

Alright, so first, let's start with the Soviet element of the war.

At the time of the surrender, the Kwantung Army was intact and retreating in good order. Outside of the First Area Army, its constituent elements had seen little, if any, heavy combat. Even for the aforementioned First Area Army, despite having taken a beating, it remained combat effective. According the Japanese records, the First Area Army's 3rd Army retained two thirds of its original effectiveness, the 5th Army (The force at Mutanchiang) was one half, the 128th Division (detached from 3rd Army) was also at one half and, finally, the 134th Division (under First Area Army HQ) was at two thirds effectiveness. The 122nd and 139th Divisions, meanwhile, had not been affected by the Soviet offensive to any real meaningful extent. To quote from the U.S. Army's JM-155 monograph, based on Post-War analysis of Japanese records:

"The loss ofeffectiveness had not been accompanied, however, by an equal loss of morale, for although the Soviet Army accomplished its objective of defeating the Kwantung Army it did not do so in a true military sense, since the Kwantung Army--much of it still intact--did not surrender because of military necessity but at the command of the Japanese emperor."

The Soviets likewise concurred, as S.M. Shtemenko's "The Soviet General Staff at War" states, on page 354:

"To precipitate a real surrender and prevent unnecessary bloodshed, it was decided to land airborne forces at key points in the enemy's lines - Harbin, Kirin, Mukden, Changchun, and some other cities of Manchuria and Korea. After 17:00 hours on August 18th aircraft carrying the first group of 120 airborne troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Zabelin took off from Horol and set course for Harbin. This force had the task of seizing the aerodrome and other important military installations, protecting the bridges on the Sungari and holding them until the main forces of the First Far Eastern Front arrived. With the first echelon of the airborne force was Major-General G.A. Shelakhov, the Front's deputy chief of staff, who had been appointed special representative of the Military Council. His duties were to present a surrender ultimatum to the command of the Japanese forces in Harbin and dictate its terms to them. We had no precise information about the situation of the city and the Soviet Consulate there. All we knew was that the main forces of the First Front of the Kwantung Army were falling back on Harbin after their defeat at Mutanchiang. They formed a very considerable force."

I should note this particular passage is about the First Area Army in particular, so even in the Soviet's judgement the forces they had engaged heavily were still a potent enemy. This is especially notable as well, given that despite the weakened posture of the Kwantung Army in 1945 compared to previous years, the forces at Mutanchiang inflicted equal losses upon the Soviets, destroyed hundreds of tanks and thereafter remained combat capable while conducting an orderly withdraw in the aftermath!

As previously stated now, the Kwantung Army's planning at the time of the surrender was to withdraw into the Tunghua Redoubt:




Aiding this plan was the withdraw of the China Expeditionary Army into the coastal areas of China, done in order to shorten their own supply lines and allow for a better defense for prepared positions. This allowed IGHQ to detach six divisions and six brigades from the CEA, including the 3rd Tank Division, as reinforcements into Manchuria. All told, this represented about 180,000 to 200,000 Japanese soldiers from well trained, veteran formations would be joining the already 750,000 man Kwnatung Army into the redoubt, which was in a mountain zone with already prepared fortifications. So, all together, you're looking at about just under a million Japanese soldiers against around 1.5 million Soviets, who the former having the advantage of prepared defenses. That the Japanese were consistently achieving a 1 for 1, or even better, ratio against both the Soviets and the Americans, this alone should be telling.

With the Japanese element laid out, we now turn to the Soviets. According to Shtemenko, at the onset of operations STAVKA directed that the Kwantung Army be destroyed within 8 weeks or else the logistical situation would become "perilous". It's easy to see why they stated this, because the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway was limited to 13 million tons yearly in 1945 and of this only 9.3 million tons could be used for military needs; this is exactly why the Soviets requested MILEPOST deliveries from the United States. According to John R. Deane's "The Strange Alliance", on pages 263-264, the statistics provided by the Red Army to the United States as part of MILEPOST showed that they would be at a monthly deficit of 200,000 tons. Thus, the 1.25 million tons the U.S. provided in the three months between V-E Day and the Soviet invasion in August gave the Soviets a very limited window to achieve decisive results because after that it would become impossible. With official Soviet belligerency eliminating the ability of further MILEPOST shipments (The Japanese only allowed Soviet shipping through their waters while they were neutral) and the inability to expand rail capacity in the Far East (The Soviets started a project to do so Pre-War...and it took until 1984 to complete IOTL), we know the eight weeks limit is firm. 

I should also add that eight weeks might also be way too generous. Their exploitation force was bingo on fuel and thus immobile by day three of combat operations:

Soviet sources do recognize severe short comings in their own logistical planning. The available supply transports were too few to cope with the demand. The road conditions were poor and, together with the rainy weather, caused severe delays in resupply operations. Estimates of fuel requirements were proved to be totally wrong. This severely affected the 6th Guards Tank Army in western Manchuria. This mobile army which was to operate deep behind enemy lines as an operational manoeuvre group (oMG) was in fact out of fuel already on the third day of the operation. It had to be resupplied with emergency air transportation of fuel. one peculiar fact is that the Soviet logistical planning relied heavily on the unrealistic assumption of using enemy railroads for troop and sup ply transports in Manchuria. This raises serious questions of the quality of the Soviet logistical planning. Another explanation is that the Soviet attack actually began before all necessary logistical preparations were in place. However, by launching an attack at an early stage it probably contributed to the creation of surprise.

They ended up not even reaching the outskirts of Mukden with just forward recon units until over a week after the Japanese surrender, and ended up having to use surrendered Japanese trains to occupy strategic areas like Port Arthur. Obviously this wouldn't have been possible with continued Japanese resistance. 

Elsewhere, we saw great Japanese success against the Soviets. At Karafuto (Japanese name for Southern Sakhalin), the Soviet attack was blunted at the border with heavy losses and it took over a week after the 15th for the Soviets to finish clearing out the bitter enders who refused to surrender. Much the same was found in the Kurils, with the one day battle for Shumshu seeing 1,018 Japanese casualties to 1,567 Soviet, an exchange rate of 1 for 1.5 in favor of the Japanese. There might also be an underestimate of Soviet losses, as some Russian sources suggest the total casualties might have been as 2,400. Given total Japanese strength on Shumshu was 8,500 men and the island had extensive fortifications, with 34 concrete/steel fire points, 24 earthen bunkers and 310 machine gun nests, the 87th Rifle Corps was going to be destroyed if fighting continued. It's important to note the Japanese armored attack at the end of the day nearly destroyed the Soviet beachhead on its own. The 101st Rifle Division, meanwhile, was slated for a landing at Paramushiro, but it likewise was heavily fortified and its garrison numbered about 20,000 which likely suggests it [the 101st Rifle] would've been destroyed too. Perhaps more importantly at the strategic level, of the 16 LCIs supplied by the U.S. as part of Operation HULA to give the Soviets amphibious capabilities, five had been destroyed in the one day engagement at Shumshu by Japanese artillery. Likewise, the only means of Soviet naval fire support, the minesweeper Okhotsk with its 130-millimeter gun, was damaged at the battle too by a Japanese plane.

Finally, we turn to Korea. According to Michael Sandusky's America's Parallel, the Soviet offensive found itself, like its counter-parts, stalled out as a result of both logistical difficulties and Japanese resistance. It had barely penetrated the border, reaching Chongjin and was thus still north of the 41st parallel. The Soviet landings, as part of the Seishin Operation, had damn near been a disaster with the timely intervention of the Imperial order to surrender being a major factor in their success. Overall, the Soviets had just two divisions in country facing down nine Japanese, with several of the Japanese being experienced units. Sandusky goes as far as to argue that these facts, and especially the logistical difficulties of the Soviets, mean the U.S. could've easily occupied most of the peninsula after the surrender IOTL had there been no machinations on the part of General MacArthur, who was too focused on Japan. 

That's all for the Soviet element, I'll discuss the American side of this ATL in a separate post.

[stevep]

Oct 12, 2019 10:04:10 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Oct 11, 2019 12:24:50 GMT stevep said:

    I think that's unlikely to occur.  While the Japanese managed to hold off the Soviets a bit, see Battle_of_Mutanchiang, they still suffered heavy losses in an already gravely weakened force.  The peninsula has good defensive potential but the Japanese were very weak and the Soviets had massive superiority in terms of numbers, firepower and air power.

  I can't see Downfall failing given the huge firepower superiority that the US would have.  US losses would have been high but probably considerably less then their worst predictions, as with D Day.  Japanese losses are going to be horrendous. 

Alright, so first, let's start with the Soviet element of the war.

At the time of the surrender, the Kwantung Army was intact and retreating in good order. Outside of the First Area Army, its constituent elements had seen little, if any, heavy combat. Even for the aforementioned First Area Army, despite having taken a beating, it remained combat effective. According the Japanese records, the First Area Army's 3rd Army retained two thirds of its original effectiveness, the 5th Army (The force at Mutanchiang) was one half, the 128th Division (detached from 3rd Army) was also at one half and, finally, the 134th Division (under First Area Army HQ) was at two thirds effectiveness. The 122nd and 139th Divisions, meanwhile, had not been affected by the Soviet offensive to any real meaningful extent. To quote from the U.S. Army's JM-155 monograph, based on Post-War analysis of Japanese records:

"The loss ofeffectiveness had not been accompanied, however, by an equal loss of morale, for although the Soviet Army accomplished its objective of defeating the Kwantung Army it did not do so in a true military sense, since the Kwantung Army--much of it still intact--did not surrender because of military necessity but at the command of the Japanese emperor."

The Soviets likewise concurred, as S.M. Shtemenko's "The Soviet General Staff at War" states, on page 354:

"To precipitate a real surrender and prevent unnecessary bloodshed, it was decided to land airborne forces at key points in the enemy's lines - Harbin, Kirin, Mukden, Changchun, and some other cities of Manchuria and Korea. After 17:00 hours on August 18th aircraft carrying the first group of 120 airborne troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Zabelin took off from Horol and set course for Harbin. This force had the task of seizing the aerodrome and other important military installations, protecting the bridges on the Sungari and holding them until the main forces of the First Far Eastern Front arrived. With the first echelon of the airborne force was Major-General G.A. Shelakhov, the Front's deputy chief of staff, who had been appointed special representative of the Military Council. His duties were to present a surrender ultimatum to the command of the Japanese forces in Harbin and dictate its terms to them. We had no precise information about the situation of the city and the Soviet Consulate there. All we knew was that the main forces of the First Front of the Kwantung Army were falling back on Harbin after their defeat at Mutanchiang. They formed a very considerable force."

I should note this particular passage is about the First Area Army in particular, so even in the Soviet's judgement the forces they had engaged heavily were still a potent enemy. This is especially notable as well, given that despite the weakened posture of the Kwantung Army in 1945 compared to previous years, the forces at Mutanchiang inflicted equal losses upon the Soviets, destroyed hundreds of tanks and thereafter remained combat capable while conducting an orderly withdraw in the aftermath!

As previously stated now, the Kwantung Army's planning at the time of the surrender was to withdraw into the Tunghua Redoubt:




Aiding this plan was the withdraw of the China Expeditionary Army into the coastal areas of China, done in order to shorten their own supply lines and allow for a better defense for prepared positions. This allowed IGHQ to detach six divisions and six brigades from the CEA, including the 3rd Tank Division, as reinforcements into Manchuria. All told, this represented about 180,000 to 200,000 Japanese soldiers from well trained, veteran formations would be joining the already 750,000 man Kwnatung Army into the redoubt, which was in a mountain zone with already prepared fortifications. So, all together, you're looking at about just under a million Japanese soldiers against around 1.5 million Soviets, who the former having the advantage of prepared defenses. That the Japanese were consistently achieving a 1 for 1, or even better, ratio against both the Soviets and the Americans, this alone should be telling.

With the Japanese element laid out, we now turn to the Soviets. According to Shtemenko, at the onset of operations STAVKA directed that the Kwantung Army be destroyed within 8 weeks or else the logistical situation would become "perilous". It's easy to see why they stated this, because the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway was limited to 13 million tons yearly in 1945 and of this only 9.3 million tons could be used for military needs; this is exactly why the Soviets requested MILEPOST deliveries from the United States. According to John R. Deane's "The Strange Alliance", on pages 263-264, the statistics provided by the Red Army to the United States as part of MILEPOST showed that they would be at a monthly deficit of 200,000 tons. Thus, the 1.25 million tons the U.S. provided in the three months between V-E Day and the Soviet invasion in August gave the Soviets a very limited window to achieve decisive results because after that it would become impossible. With official Soviet belligerency eliminating the ability of further MILEPOST shipments (The Japanese only allowed Soviet shipping through their waters while they were neutral) and the inability to expand rail capacity in the Far East (The Soviets started a project to do so Pre-War...and it took until 1984 to complete IOTL), we know the eight weeks limit is firm. 

I should also add that eight weeks might also be way too generous. Their exploitation force was bingo on fuel and thus immobile by day three of combat operations:

Soviet sources do recognize severe short comings in their own logistical planning. The available supply transports were too few to cope with the demand. The road conditions were poor and, together with the rainy weather, caused severe delays in resupply operations. Estimates of fuel requirements were proved to be totally wrong. This severely affected the 6th Guards Tank Army in western Manchuria. This mobile army which was to operate deep behind enemy lines as an operational manoeuvre group (oMG) was in fact out of fuel already on the third day of the operation. It had to be resupplied with emergency air transportation of fuel. one peculiar fact is that the Soviet logistical planning relied heavily on the unrealistic assumption of using enemy railroads for troop and sup ply transports in Manchuria. This raises serious questions of the quality of the Soviet logistical planning. Another explanation is that the Soviet attack actually began before all necessary logistical preparations were in place. However, by launching an attack at an early stage it probably contributed to the creation of surprise.

They ended up not even reaching the outskirts of Mukden with just forward recon units until over a week after the Japanese surrender, and ended up having to use surrendered Japanese trains to occupy strategic areas like Port Arthur. Obviously this wouldn't have been possible with continued Japanese resistance. 

Elsewhere, we saw great Japanese success against the Soviets. At Karafuto (Japanese name for Southern Sakhalin), the Soviet attack was blunted at the border with heavy losses and it took over a week after the 15th for the Soviets to finish clearing out the bitter enders who refused to surrender. Much the same was found in the Kurils, with the one day battle for Shumshu seeing 1,018 Japanese casualties to 1,567 Soviet, an exchange rate of 1 for 1.5 in favor of the Japanese. There might also be an underestimate of Soviet losses, as some Russian sources suggest the total casualties might have been as 2,400. Given total Japanese strength on Shumshu was 8,500 men and the island had extensive fortifications, with 34 concrete/steel fire points, 24 earthen bunkers and 310 machine gun nests, the 87th Rifle Corps was going to be destroyed if fighting continued. It's important to note the Japanese armored attack at the end of the day nearly destroyed the Soviet beachhead on its own. The 101st Rifle Division, meanwhile, was slated for a landing at Paramushiro, but it likewise was heavily fortified and its garrison numbered about 20,000 which likely suggests it [the 101st Rifle] would've been destroyed too. Perhaps more importantly at the strategic level, of the 16 LCIs supplied by the U.S. as part of Operation HULA to give the Soviets amphibious capabilities, five had been destroyed in the one day engagement at Shumshu by Japanese artillery. Likewise, the only means of Soviet naval fire support, the minesweeper Okhotsk with its 130-millimeter gun, was damaged at the battle too by a Japanese plane.

Finally, we turn to Korea. According to Michael Sandusky's America's Parallel, the Soviet offensive found itself, like its counter-parts, stalled out as a result of both logistical difficulties and Japanese resistance. It had barely penetrated the border, reaching Chongjin and was thus still north of the 41st parallel. The Soviet landings, as part of the Seishin Operation, had damn near been a disaster with the timely intervention of the Imperial order to surrender being a major factor in their success. Overall, the Soviets had just two divisions in country facing down nine Japanese, with several of the Japanese being experienced units. Sandusky goes as far as to argue that these facts, and especially the logistical difficulties of the Soviets, mean the U.S. could've easily occupied most of the peninsula after the surrender IOTL had there been no machinations on the part of General MacArthur, who was too focused on Japan. 

That's all for the Soviet element, I'll discuss the American side of this ATL in a separate post.

  Interesting as that contradicts the general reports on the campaign but there is a lot of detail in there so it could well be the case.  A bit surprised that Japanese armour, being as weak as it was would be effective against Soviet forces - although I see now this was against an amphibious assault which would be pretty light forces probably.  As you say logistics is the potential weak point of the Soviet offensive as it would limit/negate their superiority if elements like firepower, air power and armour.  The details you give suggests that the Kwantung army was in a markedly better position than most sources.  Would those units from China have been at full strength however or denuded by the fighting in China?

  You say that the US supplied logistical support would be exhausted within 8 weeks but doesn't that ignore what they could supply themselves?  True the movement of their own forces eastwards would have taken up a lot of that capacity but I suspect there would still be some resources.

  Not surprised that initial attacks on fortified positions are expensive, especially if they fail and the Soviets had relatively limited experience of amphibious assault so not surprised that their attacks on Sakhalin.  Not too surprising that the Soviets take heavier losses there but in other places they seem to have done better, for instance at the Battle of Mutanchiang they suffered markedly higher casualties than the Soviets, as they did in virtually every battle with the US or with British forces after their initial success in 1941-42.  In part because of the much greater firepower of the western powers and also the Japanese tactic of banzai charges which often caused them huge casualties.  This might have been worse in the Kwantung army because it was very short of experienced soldiers by this stage.

  As such you raise some good points and the offensive could well have been costlier and longer lasting than many would have expected. 

 

[EwellHolmes]

Oct 12, 2019 11:46:03 GMT stevep said:

Oct 12, 2019 10:04:10 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Alright, so first, let's start with the Soviet element of the war.

At the time of the surrender, the Kwantung Army was intact and retreating in good order. Outside of the First Area Army, its constituent elements had seen little, if any, heavy combat. Even for the aforementioned First Area Army, despite having taken a beating, it remained combat effective. According the Japanese records, the First Area Army's 3rd Army retained two thirds of its original effectiveness, the 5th Army (The force at Mutanchiang) was one half, the 128th Division (detached from 3rd Army) was also at one half and, finally, the 134th Division (under First Area Army HQ) was at two thirds effectiveness. The 122nd and 139th Divisions, meanwhile, had not been affected by the Soviet offensive to any real meaningful extent. To quote from the U.S. Army's JM-155 monograph, based on Post-War analysis of Japanese records:

The Soviets likewise concurred, as S.M. Shtemenko's "The Soviet General Staff at War" states, on page 354:

I should note this particular passage is about the First Area Army in particular, so even in the Soviet's judgement the forces they had engaged heavily were still a potent enemy. This is especially notable as well, given that despite the weakened posture of the Kwantung Army in 1945 compared to previous years, the forces at Mutanchiang inflicted equal losses upon the Soviets, destroyed hundreds of tanks and thereafter remained combat capable while conducting an orderly withdraw in the aftermath!

As previously stated now, the Kwantung Army's planning at the time of the surrender was to withdraw into the Tunghua Redoubt:




Aiding this plan was the withdraw of the China Expeditionary Army into the coastal areas of China, done in order to shorten their own supply lines and allow for a better defense for prepared positions. This allowed IGHQ to detach six divisions and six brigades from the CEA, including the 3rd Tank Division, as reinforcements into Manchuria. All told, this represented about 180,000 to 200,000 Japanese soldiers from well trained, veteran formations would be joining the already 750,000 man Kwnatung Army into the redoubt, which was in a mountain zone with already prepared fortifications. So, all together, you're looking at about just under a million Japanese soldiers against around 1.5 million Soviets, who the former having the advantage of prepared defenses. That the Japanese were consistently achieving a 1 for 1, or even better, ratio against both the Soviets and the Americans, this alone should be telling.

With the Japanese element laid out, we now turn to the Soviets. According to Shtemenko, at the onset of operations STAVKA directed that the Kwantung Army be destroyed within 8 weeks or else the logistical situation would become "perilous". It's easy to see why they stated this, because the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway was limited to 13 million tons yearly in 1945 and of this only 9.3 million tons could be used for military needs; this is exactly why the Soviets requested MILEPOST deliveries from the United States. According to John R. Deane's "The Strange Alliance", on pages 263-264, the statistics provided by the Red Army to the United States as part of MILEPOST showed that they would be at a monthly deficit of 200,000 tons. Thus, the 1.25 million tons the U.S. provided in the three months between V-E Day and the Soviet invasion in August gave the Soviets a very limited window to achieve decisive results because after that it would become impossible. With official Soviet belligerency eliminating the ability of further MILEPOST shipments (The Japanese only allowed Soviet shipping through their waters while they were neutral) and the inability to expand rail capacity in the Far East (The Soviets started a project to do so Pre-War...and it took until 1984 to complete IOTL), we know the eight weeks limit is firm. 

I should also add that eight weeks might also be way too generous. Their exploitation force was bingo on fuel and thus immobile by day three of combat operations:

They ended up not even reaching the outskirts of Mukden with just forward recon units until over a week after the Japanese surrender, and ended up having to use surrendered Japanese trains to occupy strategic areas like Port Arthur. Obviously this wouldn't have been possible with continued Japanese resistance. 

Elsewhere, we saw great Japanese success against the Soviets. At Karafuto (Japanese name for Southern Sakhalin), the Soviet attack was blunted at the border with heavy losses and it took over a week after the 15th for the Soviets to finish clearing out the bitter enders who refused to surrender. Much the same was found in the Kurils, with the one day battle for Shumshu seeing 1,018 Japanese casualties to 1,567 Soviet, an exchange rate of 1 for 1.5 in favor of the Japanese. There might also be an underestimate of Soviet losses, as some Russian sources suggest the total casualties might have been as 2,400. Given total Japanese strength on Shumshu was 8,500 men and the island had extensive fortifications, with 34 concrete/steel fire points, 24 earthen bunkers and 310 machine gun nests, the 87th Rifle Corps was going to be destroyed if fighting continued. It's important to note the Japanese armored attack at the end of the day nearly destroyed the Soviet beachhead on its own. The 101st Rifle Division, meanwhile, was slated for a landing at Paramushiro, but it likewise was heavily fortified and its garrison numbered about 20,000 which likely suggests it [the 101st Rifle] would've been destroyed too. Perhaps more importantly at the strategic level, of the 16 LCIs supplied by the U.S. as part of Operation HULA to give the Soviets amphibious capabilities, five had been destroyed in the one day engagement at Shumshu by Japanese artillery. Likewise, the only means of Soviet naval fire support, the minesweeper Okhotsk with its 130-millimeter gun, was damaged at the battle too by a Japanese plane.

Finally, we turn to Korea. According to Michael Sandusky's America's Parallel, the Soviet offensive found itself, like its counter-parts, stalled out as a result of both logistical difficulties and Japanese resistance. It had barely penetrated the border, reaching Chongjin and was thus still north of the 41st parallel. The Soviet landings, as part of the Seishin Operation, had damn near been a disaster with the timely intervention of the Imperial order to surrender being a major factor in their success. Overall, the Soviets had just two divisions in country facing down nine Japanese, with several of the Japanese being experienced units. Sandusky goes as far as to argue that these facts, and especially the logistical difficulties of the Soviets, mean the U.S. could've easily occupied most of the peninsula after the surrender IOTL had there been no machinations on the part of General MacArthur, who was too focused on Japan. 

That's all for the Soviet element, I'll discuss the American side of this ATL in a separate post.

  Interesting as that contradicts the general reports on the campaign but there is a lot of detail in there so it could well be the case.  A bit surprised that Japanese armour, being as weak as it was would be effective against Soviet forces - although I see now this was against an amphibious assault which would be pretty light forces probably.  As you say logistics is the potential weak point of the Soviet offensive as it would limit/negate their superiority if elements like firepower, air power and armour.  The details you give suggests that the Kwantung army was in a markedly better position than most sources.  Would those units from China have been at full strength however or denuded by the fighting in China?

  You say that the US supplied logistical support would be exhausted within 8 weeks but doesn't that ignore what they could supply themselves?  True the movement of their own forces eastwards would have taken up a lot of that capacity but I suspect there would still be some resources.

  Not surprised that initial attacks on fortified positions are expensive, especially if they fail and the Soviets had relatively limited experience of amphibious assault so not surprised that their attacks on Sakhalin.  Not too surprising that the Soviets take heavier losses there but in other places they seem to have done better, for instance at the Battle of Mutanchiang they suffered markedly higher casualties than the Soviets, as they did in virtually every battle with the US or with British forces after their initial success in 1941-42.  In part because of the much greater firepower of the western powers and also the Japanese tactic of banzai charges which often caused them huge casualties.  This might have been worse in the Kwantung army because it was very short of experienced soldiers by this stage.

  As such you raise some good points and the offensive could well have been costlier and longer lasting than many would have expected. 

 

A few quick notes.

1) Deane's figure of a 200,000 ton monthly deficit was in the context of what the Soviets themselves could supply without American assistance; in other words, they couldn't do it and would have a negative supply inflow in fact. 1939 supports this, as at Nomohan Zhukov conducted a Corps level attack against a single Japanese division (The 23rd) and it literally required the Soviets stripping European Russian of trucks just to make that comparatively tiny maneuver possible. The existing infrastructure of Soviet Far East Asia simply means its impossible for the Red Army of the time to support Army-level formations against the Japanese. 

2) The Battle of Mutanchiang occurred because the 5th Army defied orders to continue the orderly withdraw, but still managed to destroy somewhere between 300 to 400 Soviet tanks and inflicted over 23,000 losses upon the Soviets according to Soviet medical data found after the Russians started allowing access to their archives as the Cold War came to a close. That's a 1:1 for exchange ratio and in line with what was happening at Karafuto, the Kurils and what the U.S. took in Okinawa, Iwo Jima and Luzon.

3) The idea the Japanese consistently used Banzai charges is a propaganda myth and ignores the changed realities of the war by 1945. By 1945, the Japanese were regularly achieving 1:1 exchange rate against their enemies despite their firepower disadvantages. I've already cited Manchuria and the Kurils as an example of this, as well Iwo Jima and Okinawa, with the latter seeing the IJA, just like at Shumshu, inflict more casualties than they they themselves took. For an overall view, it's important to note the Japanese were better than the Germans at inflicting losses upon the United States. The Japanese were able to kill and wound American soldiers around three times faster than the Germans, with 7.45 total casualties per 1,000 men per day experienced in the Pacific as compared to 2.16 total casualties per 1,000 men per day in Europe.