Drachinifel - naval history

[lordroel]

HMS Hotspur - naval history - 218

[lordroel]

The Suez Campaign and Life in the Royal Navy - From someone who was there! - naval history - 219

[lordroel]

HMS Arethusa - naval history - 220

[lordroel]

Jersey - Millennia of Maritime Defence Preserved - naval history - 221

[lordroel]

KMS Gneisenau - naval history - 222

[lordroel]

The Zeebrugge Raid - naval history - 223

[lordroel]

USS Bainbridge - naval history - 224

[lordroel]

The Alaska class - Large/Super/Battle/Mega/Hyper/Ultra Cruisers - naval history - 225

[lordroel]

IJN Shimakaze - naval history - 226

[lordroel]

US Navy Fleet Problems - Taking the ships out for exercise (I-VII) - naval history - 227

[miletus12]

Mar 30, 2022 14:27:00 GMT lordroel said:

The Regia Marina - Guns, Naval Policy and Early History - naval history - 211

The Americans had a lot of trouble with shell dispersion between the wars. This was seen especially in the treaty heavy cruisers. It was so "unacceptable" that in 1933, the USN staged experiments in Manila Bay to solve the dispersion issue. The choice of Manila Bay was due to the fact that the whole bay was zeroed in and dispersion measurement was easy. (Almost unique on earth was such a huge gun range. The only other body of secure waters with such pre-surveyed and pre-registered range measurement was Chesapeake Bay.) Anyway, the USN learned time delay fire, barrel wear, and propellant quality control would solve the problems.  When the Richelieus fell into US hands, the French shell dispersion problem they found was easy to solve. 

I think the Italians followed the same problem solution process, but during wartime. At least that was the takeaway *I found when I talked it over with an Italian defense contractor a few years ago when we discussed the problems our navies had in the 1930s.  .      

[lordroel]

IJN Kitakami - naval history - 228

[miletus12]

May 28, 2022 14:34:25 GMT lordroel said:

IJN Kitakami - naval history - 228

Drachinifel is not fully accurate here. The original intent with the massive torpedo refit; was to turn Kitikami class cruisers into general support torpedo attack platforms. The IJN intent was that in (艦隊決戦) Kantai Kessen, these three cruisers would fan salvo against the American battleline with Type 93 torpedoes in a manner similar to the Cold War Kynda and later Kresta class one shot to glory suicide ships, that tailed USN CTFs. Nobody Japanese expected these "cadet cruisers" to last more than five minutes once (決戦) 'decisive battle' began and American gunnery took effect. The Japanese actually were frightened of American naval artillery. Why, beats me. Until late 1942, the USN's shooting was "unacceptable".     

[lordroel]

IJN Akagi - naval history - 229

[miletus12]

Jun 4, 2022 11:02:51 GMT lordroel said:

IJN Akagi - naval history - 229

1. Drachinifel does not report that if Somerville had gotten into a surface battle with Nagumo, his chances of survival were ZERO. Kido Butai was well drilled in gun and torpedo tactics. Somerville's ragtag hastily thrown together fleet was not trained for it. Somerville's only chance was with his flattops and their air wings. Besides, I have a very low opinion of D. W. Boyd, who I consider "unacceptable" as an aircraft carrier ops commander.  I have little use for Somerville as a naval tactician, either. He completely bungled the merge and timing of his attempted strikes.    
2. The British traitor, Lord Sempell, passed along a lot of Royal Navy experience with their own multi-flight-deck aircraft carriers, especially HMS Furious, to the Japanese that led to Kaga's rebuild and then Akagi's refit.   
3. The Akagi's port island arrangement was an attempt to solve the air traffic control stacking problem. The Japanese had found that one could not operate more than two aircraft carriers together without the landing circuit loops becoming entangled and mutual interference in traps occurring. Their solution was to have a clockwise landing circuit with a port island in addition to the standard anti-clockwise circuit of a starboard island carrier. The loops would this be kept separate. The American solution was to stagger the aircraft carrier divisions and to have a parking and holding orbit for the trail division of flattops wait while the van division launched or landed their birds. Then the trail division launched or landed theirs. It took three times longer than the Japanese system, BUT, no US carrier died using it, due to the air traffic control chaos and mistakes the Japanese made during their fleet air defense at Midway.  Cycling their CAPS, the Japanese lost stack discipline and their CAP fighters ignored altitude assignment and coverage arcs as they plonked down to refuel/rearm or launched to rejoin the battle in progress over their flight decks. This still happened during the 20-30 minute interlude between the American torpedo plane massacre and the arrival of the American dive bombers. Eighty years later Americans are still at a loss for why that happened, but Parshall and Tully suspect that the opposite air loops setup, and scattering of the Japanese flattops out of the rhomboid formation the opposite loops system required, combined with the split air traffic control port and starboard management and the frankly primitive fighter director comms by cruiser guns firing blank charges in the direction of the threat axis, and signal rockets and blinker lights flashing from Japanese aircraft carriers at aircraft overhead confused and befuddled the Zero pilots. Few Japanese fighters carried radios; this being restricted to the flight leads in their three plane elements. Ship to plane chatter and vice versa was restricted to air traffic controllers and these flight lead pilots. Those pilots tended to ignore Japanese ATCs.        
4. Whilst the one in the belly, Richard Best dropped on Akagi, burned her down, Ensign Frederick Thomas managed an Akagi rudder jam mission kill that still would have doomed Akagi to a forced scuttle.