stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 5, 2020 14:40:56 GMT
The Battle of Jutland - Clash of the Titans - Part 2 - naval history - 42
You beat me too it. Just finished watching it. So damned frustrating the number of missed opportunities to turn it into a clear victory for the RN. Jellicoe was really screwed over by a lot of his subordinates failing to report contact. 
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 5, 2020 14:50:03 GMT
The Battle of Jutland - Clash of the Titans - Part 2 - naval history - 42 You beat me too it. Just finished watching it. So damned frustrating the number of missed opportunities to turn it into a clear victory for the RN. Jellicoe was really screwed over by a lot of his subordinates failing to report contact. Well there is always this thread What if: German victory in the Battle of Jutland which also says, a German victory would not mean the end of the war. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 8, 2020 11:18:49 GMT
USS Indianapolis - Part 2 - naval history - 43
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 8, 2020 11:58:33 GMT
USS Indianapolis - Part 2 - naval history - 43
Probably the biggest tragedy of the last stages of the Pacific war for the USN because the deaths after the sinking were so easily avoidable if so many people hadn't fouled it up. 
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 8, 2020 12:14:40 GMT
USS Indianapolis - Part 2 - naval history - 43 Probably the biggest tragedy of the last stages of the Pacific war for the USN because the deaths after the sinking were so easily avoidable if so many people hadn't fouled it up. True, it should not have happen but it happen as according to USS Indianapolis (CA-35)Wikipedia page: The Headquarters of Commander Marianas on Guam and of the Commander Philippine Sea Frontier on Leyte kept Operations plotting boards on which were plotted the positions of all vessels with which the headquarters were concerned. However, it was assumed that ships as large as Indianapolis would reach their destinations on time, unless reported otherwise. Therefore, their positions were based on predictions and not on reports. On 31 July, when she should have arrived at Leyte, Indianapolis was removed from the board in the headquarters of Commander Marianas. She was also recorded as having arrived at Leyte by the headquarters of Commander Philippine Sea Frontier. Lieutenant Stuart B. Gibson, the operations officer under the Port Director, Tacloban, was the officer responsible for tracking the movements of Indianapolis. The vessel's failure to arrive on schedule was known at once to Gibson, who failed to investigate the matter and made no immediate report of the fact to his superiors. Gibson received a letter of reprimand in connection with the incident. The acting commander and operations officer of the Philippine Sea Frontier also received reprimands, while Gibson's immediate superior received a letter of admonition.
In the first official statement, the Navy said that distress calls "were keyed by radio operators and possibly were actually transmitted" but that "no evidence has been developed that any distress message from the ship was received by any ship, aircraft or shore station". Declassified records later showed that three stations received the signals but none acted upon the call. One commander was drunk, another had ordered his men not to disturb him, and a third thought it was a Japanese trap.
Immediately prior to the attack, the seas had been moderate, the visibility fluctuating but poor in general, and Indianapolis had been steaming at 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h). When the ship failed to reach Leyte on 31 July, as scheduled, no report was made that she was overdue. This omission was due to a misunderstanding of the Movement Report System.Interested to read about the three stations who received a signal but did not act upon it due one commander being drunk, another having ordered his men not to disturb him, and a third thinking it was a Japanese trap. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 8, 2020 12:20:21 GMT
Probably the biggest tragedy of the last stages of the Pacific war for the USN because the deaths after the sinking were so easily avoidable if so many people hadn't fouled it up. True, it should not have happen but it happen as according to USS Indianapolis (CA-35)Wikipedia page: The Headquarters of Commander Marianas on Guam and of the Commander Philippine Sea Frontier on Leyte kept Operations plotting boards on which were plotted the positions of all vessels with which the headquarters were concerned. However, it was assumed that ships as large as Indianapolis would reach their destinations on time, unless reported otherwise. Therefore, their positions were based on predictions and not on reports. On 31 July, when she should have arrived at Leyte, Indianapolis was removed from the board in the headquarters of Commander Marianas. She was also recorded as having arrived at Leyte by the headquarters of Commander Philippine Sea Frontier. Lieutenant Stuart B. Gibson, the operations officer under the Port Director, Tacloban, was the officer responsible for tracking the movements of Indianapolis. The vessel's failure to arrive on schedule was known at once to Gibson, who failed to investigate the matter and made no immediate report of the fact to his superiors. Gibson received a letter of reprimand in connection with the incident. The acting commander and operations officer of the Philippine Sea Frontier also received reprimands, while Gibson's immediate superior received a letter of admonition.
In the first official statement, the Navy said that distress calls "were keyed by radio operators and possibly were actually transmitted" but that "no evidence has been developed that any distress message from the ship was received by any ship, aircraft or shore station". Declassified records later showed that three stations received the signals but none acted upon the call. One commander was drunk, another had ordered his men not to disturb him, and a third thought it was a Japanese trap.
Immediately prior to the attack, the seas had been moderate, the visibility fluctuating but poor in general, and Indianapolis had been steaming at 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h). When the ship failed to reach Leyte on 31 July, as scheduled, no report was made that she was overdue. This omission was due to a misunderstanding of the Movement Report System.Interested to read about the three stations who received a signal but did not act upon it due one commander being drunk, another having ordered his men not to disturb him, and a third thinking it was a Japanese trap.
I am reminded of the shortest verse in the bible, "Jesus wept"! Especially with those three ships that picked up the warning and for assorted pointless reasons did nothing. Ironic that it was the captain of the Indianapolis that got court marshaled when so many others seem to have deserved that fate. Both on those ships and the assorted shore based facilities.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 8, 2020 12:23:32 GMT
True, it should not have happen but it happen as according to USS Indianapolis (CA-35)Wikipedia page: The Headquarters of Commander Marianas on Guam and of the Commander Philippine Sea Frontier on Leyte kept Operations plotting boards on which were plotted the positions of all vessels with which the headquarters were concerned. However, it was assumed that ships as large as Indianapolis would reach their destinations on time, unless reported otherwise. Therefore, their positions were based on predictions and not on reports. On 31 July, when she should have arrived at Leyte, Indianapolis was removed from the board in the headquarters of Commander Marianas. She was also recorded as having arrived at Leyte by the headquarters of Commander Philippine Sea Frontier. Lieutenant Stuart B. Gibson, the operations officer under the Port Director, Tacloban, was the officer responsible for tracking the movements of Indianapolis. The vessel's failure to arrive on schedule was known at once to Gibson, who failed to investigate the matter and made no immediate report of the fact to his superiors. Gibson received a letter of reprimand in connection with the incident. The acting commander and operations officer of the Philippine Sea Frontier also received reprimands, while Gibson's immediate superior received a letter of admonition.
In the first official statement, the Navy said that distress calls "were keyed by radio operators and possibly were actually transmitted" but that "no evidence has been developed that any distress message from the ship was received by any ship, aircraft or shore station". Declassified records later showed that three stations received the signals but none acted upon the call. One commander was drunk, another had ordered his men not to disturb him, and a third thought it was a Japanese trap.
Immediately prior to the attack, the seas had been moderate, the visibility fluctuating but poor in general, and Indianapolis had been steaming at 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h). When the ship failed to reach Leyte on 31 July, as scheduled, no report was made that she was overdue. This omission was due to a misunderstanding of the Movement Report System.Interested to read about the three stations who received a signal but did not act upon it due one commander being drunk, another having ordered his men not to disturb him, and a third thinking it was a Japanese trap. I am reminded of the shortest verse in the bible, "Jesus wept"! Especially with those three ships that picked up the warning and for assorted pointless reasons did nothing. Ironic that it was the captain of the Indianapolis that got court marshaled when so many others seem to have deserved that fate. Both on those ships and the assorted shore based facilities. Could be something to do with here secret mission, otherwise i do not think this would have happen, it was not the first time a US Naval ship was sunk in action, but the only difference as i have mention in this post is that USS Indianapolis was involved in a very classified mission, but that is me speculating. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 8, 2020 13:16:33 GMT
I am reminded of the shortest verse in the bible, "Jesus wept"! Especially with those three ships that picked up the warning and for assorted pointless reasons did nothing. Ironic that it was the captain of the Indianapolis that got court marshaled when so many others seem to have deserved that fate. Both on those ships and the assorted shore based facilities. Could be something to do with here secret mission, otherwise i do not think this would have happen, it was not the first time a US Naval ship was sunk in action, but the only difference as i have mention in this post is that USS Indianapolis was involved in a very classified mission, but that is me speculating.
To a degree and also that she seemed, by some reports anyway, to have been sunk on the border between two areas of responsibility, so that one thought she had passed into the other zone and the 2nd assumed for some reason she hadn't come through. However even apart from the ignored distress calls made, and the fact the USN tried to cover them up which is a hell of a black mark for it, that it didn't arrive at the port it was due to and no action was taken. A 10kton CA has gone missing in the middle of a fighting war - "Oh never mind, just ignore it"!!!
That it had been carrying very sensitive material should have given it a higher priority if anything. That it had already successfully transported them was probably fatal for its crew. If the ship had been sunk before delivery someone would have been screaming about where it had gone to.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 9, 2020 14:51:48 GMT
Guys another video from Mr D. Its one of his regular Q&A sessions he calls Drydocks, see Drydock 106. As well as some fascinating information there is some classic Drachinifel humour, such as his mention of the behaviour of the French frigate at the Battle of the Nile [1st section] and of the Japanese navies non-carrier [section 4]. The line across near the bottom tells you what each question is and roughly how long it lasts so helps if there's some things your not interested in.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 9, 2020 14:56:32 GMT
Guys another video from Mr D. Its one of his regular Q&A sessions he calls Drydocks, see Drydock 106. As well as some fascinating information there is some classic Drachinifel humour, such as his mention of the behaviour of the French frigate at the Battle of the Nile [1st section] and of the Japanese navies non-carrier [section 4] I like these Drydocks of him as he answers question from his Discord ore Patreon. Of course the In the battle of the Java sea which nation on the allied side had the best force in the fleet? is for me the most inserting to hear in this Drydock. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 12, 2020 13:14:40 GMT
All a) Unreliable shells which meant a lot more German ships made it home b) Almost total lack of intelligence - by so many RN commanders which means Jellicoe received virtually no information. c) Dangerous shell handling to increase firing rates which lost at least Queen Mary, nearly Lion and quite possibly the two older I class ships although their belt armour was so marginal they shouldn't have been in the battle line.
Steve
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 12, 2020 13:14:44 GMT
The Battle of Jutland - Clash of the Titans - Part 3 (Aftermath, Outcome and Lessons) - naval history - 44
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 15, 2020 11:04:50 GMT
IJN Takao - naval history - 45
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 19, 2020 13:58:45 GMT
Kantai Kessen (Japanese Decisive Battle Doctrine) - Method or Madness? - naval history - 46
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 22, 2020 11:03:52 GMT
USS Midway - naval history - 47
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