Cold Warriors: The Essex Class in the Cold War

[oscssw]

Speaking of early 1959 "AWACS" there was the EC-121 (AKA PO-1W & WV1/2). The “Warning Star” entered service in 1955 and the aircraft pioneered the concept of Airborne Early Warning and Control, where the planes could be used for fleet coverage and airborne extension of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. It was fitted with two large radomes including a vertical (sharkfin) dome above and another horizontal below the fuselage. The Warning Star was deployed for intelligence gathering/signals intelligence (SIGINT), and the aircraft provided support for the Apollo Space Program and other force coordination missions.

The aircraft carried a crew of around a dozen, but at times as many as seventeen. The EC-121s were powered by four Wright R-3350 engines, which each provided 3,400 horsepower and allowed the aircraft to reach a maximum speed of 320 mph and a cruising speed of 240 mph. The EC-121 had a range of 4,000 miles and a service ceiling of 25,000 feet.

Not an E-3 but for the time a real force multiplier unmatched by any other.

[cj]

Nov 9, 2021 8:43:36 GMT simon darkshade said:

1.) The Hawkeye was explicitly involved in the overall system of fleet defence that the F6D was based upon.

2.) The Sparrow had issues until the AIM-7E2 and arguably the AIM-7F in the mid 1970s. The shorter ranged IR Sidewinder/Shafrir-2/AA-2s proved to be more operationally effective to that point. However, the concept of missile only warfare was not based on IR missiles, but on SARH. The latter, including but not limited to the Sparrow, showed in their performance that complete dependence on them was, at best, dramatically premature.

The tactical limitations in place in Vietnam are perhaps not salient to the broader issue that VLR AAMs were a bridge too far in the late 1950s.

3.) The F-14 entered operational service in 1974, some 15 years on from the 1959 era. The F6D package (F6D + Eagle + AN/APQ-81 + W2F) was simply too much for that era, with everything being new. In 1974, the F-14 package (a much more capable fighter in the F-14 + AIM-54 + AN/AWG-9 + E-2) was utilising mature technologies developed, troubleshooted and tested over more than a decade. This lead to different results.

I have never seen anything that talked about the Hawkeye being part of the Missileer project.

Then its a good thing the egel missle was to be ARH not SARH, especially sense the sparrow was never allowed to be use like it was designed for.

You have yet to provide any proof that it was to far,only evedice that it didn't take very long after word for this exact platform to be made (even more so thanks to the much faster and more manuferable plane)

[simon darkshade]

1.) I do not have access to my books on the matter as they are in storage, but here we go with online:

www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app1/aam-n-10.html
aviationtrivia.blogspot.com/2015/10/the-douglas-f6d-missileer.html?m=1
www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.php?aircraft_id=1401


2.) Whilst the tactical limitations on the Sparrow were somewhat in the fashion of Sisyphus, they comprise the sole major data set for the use of medium range and beyond AAMs in the 1960s. In combination with written analysis of various missiles in testing, it builds a decent case that VLR AAMs were at the bleeding edge of technology during the first half of the 1960s, at least.


3.) This extract is typical of discussion of the matter:
“ From the outset, the Missileer program was a reach, mainly due to the advanced technologies in play. This product combined many all-new systems in the hope of fulfilling what was essentially an all-new battlefield approach to fleet defense. Beyond the technologies at play, the project also showcased tactical issues in its very concept - once the Missileer had expended its missile load it was essentially powerless against foes having managed to escape its initial attack - even carrier-based fighters of the day still retained an onboard cannon for close-in work, a feature the F6D was to lack. The project was formally scrapped in December of 1960 though some of its components were allowed to endure.”

(Reference the third link in the above list)

Please note that it is not the sole comment to that effect, but simply the first one.

Initiated 1959
Cancelled December 1960
Round 2 begins with TFX in June 1961 and lasts to July 1968, only in a formal sense, though, as…
Round 3, the F-14, begins in 1966, first flies in 1970 and enters service in 1974

One would suggest that 8 years is the antithesis of “it didn’t take very long”, in addition to being 4 times longer than the life of the F6D project.

As a final point, you come across as extraordinarily belligerent about the circumstances of a niche aircraft project cancelled almost 61 years ago that are ultimately peripheral to this timeline, and in the majority of your posts here to boot.

[cj]

Nov 11, 2021 0:18:47 GMT simon darkshade said:

1.) I do not have access to my books on the matter as they are in storage, but here we go with online:

www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app1/aam-n-10.html
aviationtrivia.blogspot.com/2015/10/the-douglas-f6d-missileer.html?m=1
www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.php?aircraft_id=1401


2.) Whilst the tactical limitations on the Sparrow were somewhat in the fashion of Sisyphus, they comprise the sole major data set for the use of medium range and beyond AAMs in the 1960s. In combination with written analysis of various missiles in testing, it builds a decent case that VLR AAMs were at the bleeding edge of technology during the first half of the 1960s, at least.


3.) This extract is typical of discussion of the matter:
“ From the outset, the Missileer program was a reach, mainly due to the advanced technologies in play. This product combined many all-new systems in the hope of fulfilling what was essentially an all-new battlefield approach to fleet defense. Beyond the technologies at play, the project also showcased tactical issues in its very concept - once the Missileer had expended its missile load it was essentially powerless against foes having managed to escape its initial attack - even carrier-based fighters of the day still retained an onboard cannon for close-in work, a feature the F6D was to lack. The project was formally scrapped in December of 1960 though some of its components were allowed to endure.”

(Reference the third link in the above list)

Please note that it is not the sole comment to that effect, but simply the first one.

Initiated 1959
Cancelled December 1960
Round 2 begins with TFX in June 1961 and lasts to July 1968, only in a formal sense, though, as…
Round 3, the F-14, begins in 1966, first flies in 1970 and enters service in 1974

One would suggest that 8 years is the antithesis of “it didn’t take very long”, in addition to being 4 times longer than the life of the F6D project.

As a final point, you come across as extraordinarily belligerent about the circumstances of a niche aircraft project cancelled almost 61 years ago that are ultimately peripheral to this timeline, and in the majority of your posts here to boot.

You haven't exactly been very nice about this from your very first post to me iv been gust responding to the way you have posted, if it seems like I'm being baligerent then maybe look in a mirror.

Also gust based on those post the Hawkeye was gust considered one of the ways to improve detection range for the Missileer, the navy was getting a new airborne erly warning anyway it had nothing to do with the Missileer project directly.

Calling the sparrow BVR "experience" is disingenuous because it was never allowed to be used in BVR, I'm not saying the Missileer would be any better sense it would probably also be under the same ROE but that has nothing to do with whether the navy would buy it (especially if north vetnam buys some sovet bombers to try to threatened Yankee station, assuming of course the vetnam war even happens)

Also I can find quotes from uasf guy who completely shit on the f-16 befor it was procured, of course its not hard to find quotes claiming the f6 was to advanced with a program that was as divisive as this one, it dosnt really show anything.

It should also be noted that if the Hawkeye was a part of the Missileer program then that means the f6 could have been in service by 1965.

[simon darkshade]

Firstly, I find your tone and use of profanity regrettable. The balance of the interchange does show that you have sustained such an approach from your very first line of “Um how exactly” through to “ You have yet to provide any proof” whereas I have simply responded with argument and fact in clear, coherent fashion set out in logical points.

The W2F was going to be acquired, but it was also required in order for the F6D to approach some modicum of tactical flexibility.

I’m not altogether sure why you emphasise the word “experience”, given that I have not used it in any of my posts. The Sparrow issue is related to that of the Eagle, but only tangentially, given the considerably different roles and place with a combat system.

Your fourth paragraph contributes nothing in either argument or evidence.

Your argument regarding the putative entry by 1965 would require some evidence beyond a vague invocation of the W2F.

[spanishspy]

Y'all need to calm down now.

[simon darkshade]

I can certainly assure that I am quite calm; getting worked up is literally bad for my heart health, so I aim to avoid it. However, the side discussion has gone on for too long.

The F6D is not likely to feature in the USNs response to the tactical engagement that occurred between the Dutch and Indonesians not only because of the limitations of the Missileer as of 1959 but because of the deployment of a better system. Ship board interception, whether in the form of shorter ranged Crusaders, Tigers or what have you or anything longer ranged, is one piece in the defensive puzzle, as it were.

Missile armed escorts, such as the Farragut class frigates (and Leahys under construction) with Terrier, the Talos cruisers and the Tartar destroyers provide another piece, which follows on from the long term USN approach of not putting all its eggs in one basket.

For any action against Indonesia, there is another that is somewhat forgotten on occasions - the tactical flexibility of the carrier task force. Provided that it is out in the open seas and not in the immediate littoral zones of the Celebes and Sulu Seas, then it is very hard for the Indonesians to find them, let alone target. The Indonesian archipelagic seas are not the optimal place for carrier operations, but rather, around its edges.

This would suggest the optimum strategy would be to divide Indonesian fire, as it were, through multiple threat axes - the USN from the Pacific, the RN from the SCS and Indian Ocean and the RAN from the southern Indian Ocean. This would further be complimented by RAF fighters and bombers from Singapore, RAAF and other fighters from Darwin, USAF assets staging out of Mindanao and whatever “Dutch” (hastily transferred USAF planes) forces can continue to operate from Western New Guinea.

They have a limited number of Badgers as their sole real aerial offensive threat; after they are dealt with, they only really have their Sverdlov as a truly offensive platform, and that comes with its issues. The Indonesians have a limited capacity to escalate and their Soviet sponsors lack the strategic interest in going to the wall globally for Indonesian possession of WNG.

Any tactical success of the Badger force will cause a fuss, but not a sea change in the strategy of the great powers. The sinking of INS Eilat in @ is somewhat analogous, in that it lead to a brief frenzy of interest in missile boats, but did not result in them becoming a major part of the Western blue water navies - the counter to the Styx armed missile boat was not in kind, but through carrier aircraft attacking with even short range stand off weapons. It is salient that those planes can then attack other targets and aren’t limited in their fundamental design.

The Fleet Defender role will be one that the USN wants to fill, but with a versatile and flexible (ie supersonic) platform that is capable of more than one role. This ultimately points to something like the F-14, as it can also perform the Interception, Escort and Air Superiority roles; without too much jumping through hoops, an earlier “Bombcat” is not entirely beyond the realms of possibility. In the interim, it makes more sense to pursue weapons and improvements that can be deployed on already present airframes (read Crusader and Phantom) rather than introduce a whole new type.

Looking ahead, one rather interesting possibility is USN development of the F-111B as a strike bomber that can provide the extra range to strike deep into tactically difficult areas such as Indonesia from a stand-off range at speed. This is of course predicated on a move away from the prevailing (1959) war fighting strategy that emphasised atomic strike; this paradigm shift would likely need to come from a Kennedy or non Republican/continuity Eisenhower third termer victory in 1960, as occurred historically.

1959 is an interesting year for US defence programmes, as some of the expansive surface ship plans had yet to be eaten by the SSBN programme’s insatiable appetite.

[lordroel]

Nov 11, 2021 19:32:28 GMT cj said:

Nov 11, 2021 0:18:47 GMT simon darkshade said:

1.) I do not have access to my books on the matter as they are in storage, but here we go with online:

www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app1/aam-n-10.html
aviationtrivia.blogspot.com/2015/10/the-douglas-f6d-missileer.html?m=1
www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.php?aircraft_id=1401


2.) Whilst the tactical limitations on the Sparrow were somewhat in the fashion of Sisyphus, they comprise the sole major data set for the use of medium range and beyond AAMs in the 1960s. In combination with written analysis of various missiles in testing, it builds a decent case that VLR AAMs were at the bleeding edge of technology during the first half of the 1960s, at least.


3.) This extract is typical of discussion of the matter:
“ From the outset, the Missileer program was a reach, mainly due to the advanced technologies in play. This product combined many all-new systems in the hope of fulfilling what was essentially an all-new battlefield approach to fleet defense. Beyond the technologies at play, the project also showcased tactical issues in its very concept - once the Missileer had expended its missile load it was essentially powerless against foes having managed to escape its initial attack - even carrier-based fighters of the day still retained an onboard cannon for close-in work, a feature the F6D was to lack. The project was formally scrapped in December of 1960 though some of its components were allowed to endure.”

(Reference the third link in the above list)

Please note that it is not the sole comment to that effect, but simply the first one.

Initiated 1959
Cancelled December 1960
Round 2 begins with TFX in June 1961 and lasts to July 1968, only in a formal sense, though, as…
Round 3, the F-14, begins in 1966, first flies in 1970 and enters service in 1974

One would suggest that 8 years is the antithesis of “it didn’t take very long”, in addition to being 4 times longer than the life of the F6D project.

As a final point, you come across as extraordinarily belligerent about the circumstances of a niche aircraft project cancelled almost 61 years ago that are ultimately peripheral to this timeline, and in the majority of your posts here to boot.

You haven't exactly been very nice about this from your very first post to me iv been gust responding to the way you have posted, if it seems like I'm being baligerent then maybe look in a mirror.

Also gust based on those post the Hawkeye was gust considered one of the ways to improve detection range for the Missileer, the navy was getting a new airborne erly warning anyway it had nothing to do with the Missileer project directly.

Calling the sparrow BVR "experience" is disingenuous because it was never allowed to be used in BVR, I'm not saying the Missileer would be any better sense it would probably also be under the same ROE but that has nothing to do with whether the navy would buy it (especially if north vetnam buys some sovet bombers to try to threatened Yankee station, assuming of course the vetnam war even happens)

Also I can find quotes from uasf guy who completely shit on the f-16 befor it was procured, of course its not hard to find quotes claiming the f6 was to advanced with a program that was as divisive as this one, it dosnt really show anything.

It should also be noted that if the Hawkeye was a part of the Missileer program then that means the f6 could have been in service by 1965.

Okay, this has gone long enough, so i am going to say lets bring this thread back to what it is about in the updates.

[simon darkshade]

As of Feb 1959, the USN has 11 CVS (Yorktown, Intrepid, Hornet, Randolph, Wasp, Bennington, Leyte, Kearsarge, Antietam, Lake Champlain, Valley Forge) and 7 Essex CVA (Essex, Ticonderoga, Lexington, Hancock, BHR, Oriskany, Shangri-La). Essex was reclassified in 1960.

Taking those round figures, the CVS fleet can be pushed out to 1970 or so, but beyond that, the carriers are getting older AND the ASW approach is shifting with the combination of newer, more capable weapons and the retirement of the FRAM’d WW2 DD/DDE fleet. I don’t think the latter can be pushed much beyond 1972 or so without Vietnam due to their size, construction and the changing Soviet threat.

The CVAs appear to be the crux of this timeline. Their last hurrah in @ was off Vietnam in the pure ‘ground attack carrier’ role. Their useful life depends on Vietnam, which perpetuated a need for numbers. Without that same need, I can’t see the A-4 fleet staying in a frontline role much beyond @. The future lay in the larger, longer range planes like the Phantom and Intruder, which puts the minimum carrier size at that of the Midways; there is 3 of them and 4 Forrestals in the fleet, plus Kitty Hawk, Conny and Enterprise under construction, so the Essex CVAs are vital. Once we see all 10 of those flattops joined subsequent construction (whether it be America and JFK as CVAs or more CVANs), then those 6 Essexes become surplus to requirements.

If we do want to see them kept in service, then there will need to be an increase in surface escort production to cater for the extra battle groups as well as other missions.

As a result of this analysis, I have the following conclusions:

- Pushing the 6-7 Essex CVAs hard from 1959 in an increased conflict/crisis isn’t likely to extend their service lives
- Converting decks back from CVS is possible, but costly and possibly time consuming
- A true extension of the Essex class life through to 1980 (the absolute latest I can see them serving) would take the equivalent of SLEPesque refits, taking them away from needed fronts in the 1960s
- The more efficient solution is for more construction between 1961 and 1968 beyond America and JFK. I am drawn towards the 5 cancelled Enterprise class CVANs…

[lordroel]

Nov 12, 2021 3:46:55 GMT simon darkshade said:

As of Feb 1959, the USN has 11 CVS (Yorktown, Intrepid, Hornet, Randolph, Wasp, Bennington, Leyte, Kearsarge, Antietam, Lake Champlain, Valley Forge) and 7 Essex CVA (Essex, Ticonderoga, Lexington, Hancock, BHR, Oriskany, Shangri-La). Essex was reclassified in 1960.

Where are the 3 Midways.

[ssgtc]

Ok, so a few changes here in TTL compared to OTL. First, Independence did her best impression of a barbecue while she was still on the ways and is a total constructive loss. Lake Champlain is currently undergoing the same SCB-125A refit that Oriskany had and will be classified as a CVA going forward once she is recomissioned. Leyte has already been decommissioned and is being sold to Argentina. TTL's USS America will be an Enterprise class nuclear carrier.

Despite popular belief, the Essex class could and did operate both the A-6 and F-4. Their decks and cats were well within spec for them. The "too small" argument had nothing to do with their ability to safely operate from the class, but was solely a result of the restricted fuel and ammunition storage on the class. The A-4 would not last long regardless. The Navy converted attack squadrons to A-7s as fast as they could, regardless of what class carrier they were assigned to.

The surface fleet will be addressed going forward. There will be some changes there as well. But the Navy is about to run straight into a brick wall: the SSBN program. The "41 For Freedom" are about to destroy the Navy's shipbuilding budget. So surface ships and carriers are going to be taking a back seat for awhile. I've got ideas in mind that will give the Navy some more funds for certain things without massive changes in the budget, but those will take some to show up.

[simon darkshade]

That gives 6 big decks plus 3 under construction, so the early 60s Essex window is extended. That works.

LC as a CVA gives 8 and 9 CVS. Also reasonable.

Losing Indy hurts, though, as the Essex aren’t a frontline Hot War carrier at this point, even with Phantoms and Intruders. Prior to big jet CVGs, the 24 Crusaders and 36 Skyhawks/24 Corsairs is good for Vietnam operations or the equivalent.

Whilst you are quite correct that the Essex CVAs could operate F4s and A6s, the limitations on fuel and ammo would cut into their combat endurance. 12 F4B, 12 A6A and a squadron of Skyhawks is better than anything non-USN, but comes with trade offs. They’d also need updated catapults for full operational flexibility. Based on the RAN Essex studies, this could likely consist of 250’ catapults in place of the 211’ and SPS-48 3D radar for the SPS-30. The wooden flight decks also limit some options and flexibility.

Fiddling around with F4 design could have some positive side effects for the RN’s CVA-01 efforts.

The USN ace in the hole option is to give Bunker Hill and Franklin the Full Monty rebuild/reconstruction…

However, spending on the Essexes in the 1960s is a case of approaching diminishing returns. There is a limited amount of capacity and performance that can be wangled out of the ship which does take away money from new construction CVANs, which is the long term preference for the USN. This plays into the SSBN elephant in the room, which was darn expensive as an overall system, yet can’t be avoided because of their strategic necessity for Hot War missions.

I look forward to seeing how you try to square the circle on the issue. My gut feeling is that a two track fleet develops - the big decks with full spectrum capacity and the rump Essex force that is flogged as hard as it can be and pushed to its limits to field as optimum a CVG as can be squeezed out. Avoiding the Vietnam imbroglio would free up funds, but also remove one of the raisons d’être for the ‘Lo’ element of the ‘Hi-Lo’ force mix.

www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/keep-the-essex-class-as-a-strike-carrier.451882/page-86#post-21712275

This provides for interesting reading.

[ssgtc]

Yeah, I know. I started that thread.

And just as an FYI, the Essex class routinely deployed with 2xF-8 squadrons, 3xA-7 squadrons, 4xE-1s, 2-4xEKA-3s, some helos and 1-2xC-1s on board. By every metric I could find, that air wing shouldn't fit on board. But the Navy did it. The only thing I can chalk it up to is, the 1960s-1970s USN was absolutely insane and would do things at sea, AND CONSIDER THEM NORMAL, that other navies refused to even try.

There are other options other than new cats as well. And quite frankly, you're not fitting longer cats on the bow. The starboard JBD is right in front of the island and the port JBD is barely clear of the landing area. Not to mention that the Midway class managed just fine with the exact same C11 cats (at best, they managed 4 knots more WOD than the Essex class during flight ops). Hell, the C11 could, in theory, launch a Tomcat as long as it was clean.

In theory, a 1980s CVW assigned to the Essex class could look something like this:

2xF-4 squadrons (10 aircraft each)
2xA-7 squadrons (12 aircraft each)
1xE-2 squadron (4 aircraft)
1xVAQ squadron (4xProwlers+4xKA-6Ds)
1xSH-3 detachment (4 helicopters)

That's a total of 60 aircraft. Even against the Soviet first team, that's not a bad force. Especially when you consider that it was not USN doctrine to have their carriers operating alone when going up against the really hard targets (like direct attacks on Soviet naval bases for instance)

[simon darkshade]

There was a lot in there.

Yes, the Essex did cram a lot of planes onboard in the 1960s, but under the circumstances of what they had to do rather than what they’d ideally prefer. Necessity is the mother of invention and all that.

I think that it would be a process of trying to squeeze blood out of a bloodied stone, ultimately. A Phantom/Corsair air group of 42 combat aircraft isn’t bad, but isn’t the ~60 + 10 Vikings that a full sized super carrier deck could operate; the A-7 was at best marginal for the 1980s for taking on the Red First XI. They wouldn’t be good for going up north with Strike Fleet Atlantic, paying a visit to Kamchatka or being in the frontline in the Med, but in every other theatre, that type of air group is superior to any other carrier apart from the USN super carriers. So, yes, I think it would be viable, if it was

A.) Afforded without cutting the “first team”
B.) Operated in the right way in concert with other systems

It would be a second rate CVG by the late 1960s/early 70s and a third rate one by the 80s, behind the Midways.

Getting 4-5 CVNs rather than 1 CVN and 2 CVAs in the 1960s and 4 CVNs in service from 1968-1979 as compared to 2 would be the optimal outcome, along with a couple of other tweaks/allied force multipliers such as getting the Andrew to stay in the big deck game with new 1960s ships.

Extending the Essex window from ~1975 to 1985 can be done, but comes with trade offs.

Perhaps adding a modernised Essex to a battleship SAG would give bang for buck.

The other issue coming to mind is juggling block obsolescence of the necessary surface ship/escort numbers needed to safely support an Essex CVBG.

[cj]

Nov 12, 2021 0:37:28 GMT simon darkshade said:

Firstly, I find your tone and use of profanity regrettable. The balance of the interchange does show that you have sustained such an approach from your very first line of “Um how exactly” through to “ You have yet to provide any proof” whereas I have simply responded with argument and fact in clear, coherent fashion set out in logical points.

The W2F was going to be acquired, but it was also required in order for the F6D to approach some modicum of tactical flexibility.

I’m not altogether sure why you emphasise the word “experience”, given that I have not used it in any of my posts. The Sparrow issue is related to that of the Eagle, but only tangentially, given the considerably different roles and place with a combat system.

Your fourth paragraph contributes nothing in either argument or evidence.

Your argument regarding the putative entry by 1965 would require some evidence beyond a vague invocation of the W2F.

Ok seriesly "profanity" what the hell did i put in that post that you considered profanity?
I thought this was a nice calm discussion untill you out of the bule called me baligerent.
Apologize for that and were done here sense we clearly aren't going to agree on this (even if I did think the conversation was nice untill the end)