Alt-RN building plan for the 1930s and 1940s

[lordroel]

Sept 20, 2020 19:29:31 GMT stevep said:

Sept 20, 2020 15:49:27 GMT lordroel said:

So you can tell who is which then of this picture.

  Lordroel

  The give away in terms of classes is the quad turret as the KGV class was the only RN capital ship to have that.  It does make Vanguard look relatively under-armed in comparison, especially given its a larger ship.

  Steve

Was it under-armed stevep , ore it just looks like that.

[stevep]

Sept 21, 2020 14:49:03 GMT lordroel said:

Sept 20, 2020 19:29:31 GMT stevep said:

  Lordroel

  The give away in terms of classes is the quad turret as the KGV class was the only RN capital ship to have that.  It does make Vanguard look relatively under-armed in comparison, especially given its a larger ship.

  Steve

Was it under-armed stevep , ore it just looks like that.

  Not really.  The 15" although old was a good  gun, accurate and reliable.  Also with decent max elevation and good electronics as well as more modern shells it packed a decent punch.  The twin turrets just look rather small on such a large ship, especially when sitting alongside a KGV with that quad turret.

[lordroel]

Sept 21, 2020 15:10:20 GMT stevep said:

Sept 21, 2020 14:49:03 GMT lordroel said:

Was it under-armed stevep , ore it just looks like that.

  Not really.  The 15" although old was a good  gun, accurate and reliable.  Also with decent max elevation and good electronics as well as more modern shells it packed a decent punch.  The twin turrets just look rather small on such a large ship, especially when sitting alongside a KGV with that quad turret.

So would it make sense to build Vanguards instead of more KGVs and Lions.

[stevep]

Sept 21, 2020 15:12:09 GMT lordroel said:

Sept 21, 2020 15:10:20 GMT stevep said:

  Not really.  The 15" although old was a good  gun, accurate and reliable.  Also with decent max elevation and good electronics as well as more modern shells it packed a decent punch.  The twin turrets just look rather small on such a large ship, especially when sitting alongside a KGV with that quad turret.

So would it make sense to build Vanguards instead of more KGVs and Lions.

  Would depend on the circumstances.  Vanguards are larger and designed somewhat later than KGVs so are overall superior.  Lions are on average larger still - given that different designs are being developed for something like a decade its a bit of a mobile target in terms of what the actual design is.  However they also have - apart from a few BB-CV hybrids - have 9x16" guns in three triple turrets so pack a larger punch.  However their probably more expensive and would be available later and there is the question of how long BBs are still going to be important so whether Lions or Vanguards is the best choice could depend on the circumstances.  Since neither will be constructed if WWII occurs and goes as OTL ,other than the single Vanguard that was completed.  As such it also depends on what things have changed, what resources are available and what the threats are.

[oscssw]

My second career was in Accounting/Finance which means I often think like a Bean Counter.

At it's core, I think fiscal realities are at the heart of the RN's inability to gear up for WWII.

WWI seriously degraded the British Empire's wealth. The Great depression greatly compounded that problem.

The Washington Naval treaties were an attempt to artificially restrain naval development because the RN knew the exchequer did not have and would not prioritize rebuilding the RN.

It's my jaded advice in all matters to first follow the money. 95% of the time you will find the actual reason things happens is money.

[1bigrich]

Sept 21, 2020 15:12:09 GMT lordroel said:

So would it make sense to build Vanguards instead of more KGVs and Lions.

I would argue up to a point.   If heavy gun production is limited, then yes, you can get more modern hulls with a capable armament to sea with Vanguards.    But building Lions is going to give the fleet much better capability.     Compare the two guns:

www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_16-45_mk2.php

www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_15-42_mk1.php

With the 16in Mk II, III or IV, the RN is getting a very powerful weapon with 40 degrees elevation and about a range of 40,000 yards.   With the revamped 15in Mk I turrets, the range was about 32,000 yards, speculated at over 36,000 if the increased elevation ships were given super-charges (which were never issued to those vessels.  

Regards,

[1bigrich]

Sept 22, 2020 17:11:35 GMT oscssw said:

The Washington Naval treaties were an attempt to artificially restrain naval development because the RN knew the exchequer did not have and would not prioritize rebuilding the RN.

I'm of the opinion the exchequer is responsible for a lot of sailors' deaths, especially among the destroyers without DP armament because of 'costs'....

Regards,

[stevep]

Sept 22, 2020 22:05:07 GMT 1bigrich said:

Sept 22, 2020 17:11:35 GMT oscssw said:

The Washington Naval treaties were an attempt to artificially restrain naval development because the RN knew the exchequer did not have and would not prioritize rebuilding the RN.

I'm of the opinion the exchequer is responsible for a lot of sailors' deaths, especially among the destroyers without DP armament because of 'costs'....

Regards,

  Not just them.  The serial disaster that WWII was for Britain might have been greatly averted without the WNT. 

[stevep]

Sept 22, 2020 17:11:35 GMT oscssw said:

My second career was in Accounting/Finance which means I often think like a Bean Counter.

At it's core, I think fiscal realities are at the heart of the RN's inability to gear up for WWII.

WWI seriously degraded the British Empire's wealth. The Great depression greatly compounded that problem.

The Washington Naval treaties were an attempt to artificially restrain naval development because the RN knew the exchequer did not have and would not prioritize rebuilding the RN.

It's my jaded advice in all matters to first follow the money. 95% of the time you will find the actual reason things happens is money.

  There's a lot of truth in this but I think it was a failure of the political leadership to consider the needs of the country. WWI strained Britain and the depression and the disastrous response of the British government to it did further damage but even under all those restrictions plus those resulting from the WNT Britain did a hell of a lot to recover, both economically and militarily in time for WWII.  Avoiding the WNT, better management during the depression or better leadership during WWII could have greatly reduced the damage to Britain, in human, social and economic terms of the 2nd conflict.  Even better if all three sets of errors had been avoided.

[simon darkshade]

A few points:

Vanguard
Vanguards only make sense of any kind when compared to nothing at all or continued Rs. As a fully-armoured battlecruiser/fast battleship, it was a fine vessel, but the 15"/42 was at the end of its development life. When first contemplated, the battleship wasn't nearly as dead as some would think. It was in some ways a better deal than 2 supercruisers, but they did have the advantage of there being two of them. The optimal BB for the RN is the Lion.

KGV
The particular situation of the KGVs (12 x 14" then 10 x 14") came from rearming first and fastest. The decision to go for 14" over 16" was driven by finance to some degree, but the difference was not truly substantial - they never had to fight an enemy ship that couldn't be killed by 14" gunfire. However, given the opportunity to choose between the two, the RN would have gone for 16" for the advantages involved. It would not have any substantial bearing on their postwar service life.

Washington Naval Treaty
Washington was an issue, but not an existential one. The treaty that really came back to bite them in the backside was the 1930 LNT and the sheer mistake that was the 1936 LNT. The former constrained warship size artificially and had a negative impact on cruiser numbers, whilst the latter was doomed from before it began. The most striking impact of the WNT in some ways was the blow of the 10 year building holiday on British naval firms and capacity, but the circumstances of the 10 years leading up to 1914 were not in any way normal or repeatable. Washington arrested ship size growth to some extent and froze designs until the 1930s artificially - many will have seen the graph of BB sizes with the general rate pointing towards Yamato sized vessels by the mid 1930s.

British Naval Rearmament
British naval rearmament was governed by the limits of the economy but was the largest in the world and darn impressive in any terms...apart from comparison to the massive USN expansion of 1940 and WW2. 10 fast battleships ordered (only 6 completed) was well in advance of any of the rival states (Germany 2, Japan 2, Italy 4), but wasn't the limit of what was planned. The issue is that the war came earlier than planned and the Fall of France lead to the cancellation of quite a bit of construction plans, among other events; once conflict began, the decision was made to go with the fleet that was possible, rather than what could be built for several years down the line.
Bottlenecks existed in heavy guns/gun pits and armour production, as mentioned in the Crystal Eye thread. This came from a willful destruction of previous capacity, which was considered over-capacity in the circumstances of the 1920s/Great Depression/International Peace and Amity period, but at the end of the day only acted as a constraint on BB production rather than an absolute ironclad refutance.

A shedload of money was spent on the RN in the lead up to war, but much of it ended up not showing its true value due to timing and circumstance. There was no notion that the war would always begin in 1939 or even 1940, certainly not from the position of 1935/36 when rearmament began. If the process is kicked further back by 18-24 months, we'd see some different outcomes.

Conclusion: It isn't that there was no enough money, but that it was spent early and didn't end up showing true bang for buck. There were some decisions driven by finance within an overall prism of rearmament, but it wasn't a true sword of Damocles.

[stevep]

Sept 29, 2020 5:33:24 GMT simon darkshade said:

A few points:

Vanguard
Vanguards only make sense of any kind when compared to nothing at all or continued Rs. As a fully-armoured battlecruiser/fast battleship, it was a fine vessel, but the 15"/42 was at the end of its development life. When first contemplated, the battleship wasn't nearly as dead as some would think. It was in some ways a better deal than 2 supercruisers, but they did have the advantage of there being two of them. The optimal BB for the RN is the Lion.

KGV
The particular situation of the KGVs (12 x 14" then 10 x 14") came from rearming first and fastest. The decision to go for 14" over 16" was driven by finance to some degree, but the difference was not truly substantial - they never had to fight an enemy ship that couldn't be killed by 14" gunfire. However, given the opportunity to choose between the two, the RN would have gone for 16" for the advantages involved. It would not have any substantial bearing on their postwar service life.

Washington Naval Treaty
Washington was an issue, but not an existential one. The treaty that really came back to bite them in the backside was the 1930 LNT and the sheer mistake that was the 1936 LNT. The former constrained warship size artificially and had a negative impact on cruiser numbers, whilst the latter was doomed from before it began. The most striking impact of the WNT in some ways was the blow of the 10 year building holiday on British naval firms and capacity, but the circumstances of the 10 years leading up to 1914 were not in any way normal or repeatable. Washington arrested ship size growth to some extent and froze designs until the 1930s artificially - many will have seen the graph of BB sizes with the general rate pointing towards Yamato sized vessels by the mid 1930s.

British Naval Rearmament
British naval rearmament was governed by the limits of the economy but was the largest in the world and darn impressive in any terms...apart from comparison to the massive USN expansion of 1940 and WW2. 10 fast battleships ordered (only 6 completed) was well in advance of any of the rival states (Germany 2, Japan 2, Italy 4), but wasn't the limit of what was planned. The issue is that the war came earlier than planned and the Fall of France lead to the cancellation of quite a bit of construction plans, among other events; once conflict began, the decision was made to go with the fleet that was possible, rather than what could be built for several years down the line.
Bottlenecks existed in heavy guns/gun pits and armour production, as mentioned in the Crystal Eye thread. This came from a willful destruction of previous capacity, which was considered over-capacity in the circumstances of the 1920s/Great Depression/International Peace and Amity period, but at the end of the day only acted as a constraint on BB production rather than an absolute ironclad refutance.

A shedload of money was spent on the RN in the lead up to war, but much of it ended up not showing its true value due to timing and circumstance. There was no notion that the war would always begin in 1939 or even 1940, certainly not from the position of 1935/36 when rearmament began. If the process is kicked further back by 18-24 months, we'd see some different outcomes.

Conclusion: It isn't that there was no enough money, but that it was spent early and didn't end up showing true bang for buck. There were some decisions driven by finance within an overall prism of rearmament, but it wasn't a true sword of Damocles.

  simon darkshade,

  I would say that yes Lion class would have been more powerful but Vanguard was seen as an additional option that could be used without noticeably disrupting production of the Lion's because it used old guns modernised rather than requiring new ones which would have been a serious bottleneck.

  Actually, if the RN had had its way while still limited to the 35k limit its preference was for a design with 9x15" in three triple turrets.  However the government was pushing for a reduction in the main armament to 14" so that size had to be adopted by the navy.  [As I understand it that would have been a new solid cast gun rather than copying the old wire wound guns of WWI vintage although probably based closely on them.

  Part of the problem with WNT was that it left the RN with an elderly fleet and a bloc obsolesce problem.  Definitely both the fleet and the construction capacity would have declined greatly from the artificial size that it was in 1914-18.  However it wouldn't have gone as far as OTL and the capacity, both in terms of size and technology of the industry would have been markedly better as well as a slow gradual production rate would have eased the problems for the RN. 

  I have been told that the real problem was the continuation of the construction holiday past 1930, which was partly due to the panic over the depression.  Not only did this stretch the holiday until the British fleet was really struggling in terms of capital ships but the government had provided some subsidies to maintain capacity in both design and construction and those were ended in the early 30's.  Without this while British capacity for new construction would still have been limited it would have been markedly less than OTL.  Especially in terms of the two key bottlenecks of armour and gun turret production.

  Britain did have a big naval programme to make up for the two decades of decline but it was seriously restrained by the loss of capacity.  If limited construction had been allowed through the WNT period, something the RN had argued for but the British government had supported the US government on this or even those subsidies had continued then Britain would have been able to manage things markedly better.  The fact that war came earlier than just about anyone expected and the crisis over the fall of France did throw everything into a spin, especially with the drastically increased threat in the Atlantic but things wouldn't have been quite as bad with earlier production and/or greater capacity.

  Of course with an even partially new fleet in the 1930's its possible that there could be drastic changes to the path of the 1930's.  For instance if Britain and France had seriously stood up to Italy over Ethiopia.  A reason which was given for not doing so was that with so many elderly ships and a number under reconstruction plus concerns about Germany and Japan the RN wasn't able to confirm it could also handle a conflict with Italy.  A war in 1936 which sees Italy defeated, even if Mussolini's regime survived in charge would have drastically changed a lot of things.  Italy might well have lost its colonial empire and the allies would have had some very recent war experience which could have changed later events.  I'm not saying that would have happened but a lot could change.

  Steve

[simon darkshade]

Steve,

Vanguard and any putative sisters worked because of the availability of slips and guns, but the armour bottleneck is the nasty part that crops up to prevent them being a completely ideal solution. The design of the ship herself with the exception of the main guns was very modern and right up there with late war/early postwar cutting edge battlewagon design.

The 15"/45 was worked on from 1935 onwards, but the 35,000t limit was artificial and extremely limiting on nations that followed the Treaties; on those that were more flexible or cheated outright, it was less of an issue.

Yes, the RN faced block obsolescence, but it only cropped up from the early-mid 1930s, long after the political memory/impact of the high-minded thinking of the Treaty supporters. At that point in the early 20s, the 13 x 15" ships were seen as pretty darn decent. If the Royal Sovereigns were repeat QEs, then the worst part of the block obsolescence of the remaining fleet is butterflied.

Bigger issue: If I might slip into my own terminology, at the WNT, there are 12" dreadnoughts, Gen 1 superdreadnoughts (13.5" and 14") and Gen 2 superdreadnoughts (15" and 16"). The first lot were always going to go and the RN was glad to see them go. In the second category, Britain had 14 (4 Orion, 3 KGV, 4 Iron Dukes; 2 Lions, 1 Tiger), the USA 9 (2 New York, 2 Nevada, 2 Pennsylvania, 3 New Mexico) and Japan 8 (4 Kongo, 2 Fuso, 2 Ise). In the third, Britain had 13 ships, the USA 5 (2 Tennessee, 3 Colorado) and Japan 2 (Nagato and Mutsu). I've taken the liberty of grouping the Big 5 together from the other USN Standards, but the 7 USN ships with all-or-nothing protection are certainly worthy of comparison to the QEs.

From this number, the IJN and the USN kept the lot for service in WW2. They got far better use out of their 14" ships than the RN got out of their 13.5" vessels. However, of that British number, the four Orions and 2 Lions were obsolete or flogged out by 1919 anyhow, which puts them back to effective parity in that category. Without the extention of the WNT, the 13.5" KGVs get replaced by new construction in the early 1930s and the Iron Dukes from the mid 1930s by something better. As you point out, it is the continuation of the building holiday that really hurt the RN more than other powers.

The other big hit on the RN was the Rs being inferior throwbacks that swiftly became second or third line capital ships. This would have been bad enough had the RN retained its 2nd generation ships, but the nature of the Treaty did write them into a corner.

Britain's construction programme wasn't too little, but by nature of the LNT, it was constrained and delayed (I'm looking at the KGV delays here). It ended up being too late, but this only became directly apparent well into the rearmament process. Kicking things off 24 months earlier would change a great deal of how we view the process.

Changing the policy of appeasement and having a go at Italy would dramatically change a great number of factors.

[stevep]

Sept 29, 2020 11:51:04 GMT simon darkshade said:

Steve,

Vanguard and any putative sisters worked because of the availability of slips and guns, but the armour bottleneck is the nasty part that crops up to prevent them being a completely ideal solution. The design of the ship herself with the exception of the main guns was very modern and right up there with late war/early postwar cutting edge battlewagon design.

The 15"/45 was worked on from 1935 onwards, but the 35,000t limit was artificial and extremely limiting on nations that followed the Treaties; on those that were more flexible or cheated outright, it was less of an issue.

Yes, the RN faced block obsolescence, but it only cropped up from the early-mid 1930s, long after the political memory/impact of the high-minded thinking of the Treaty supporters. At that point in the early 20s, the 13 x 15" ships were seen as pretty darn decent. If the Royal Sovereigns were repeat QEs, then the worst part of the block obsolescence of the remaining fleet is butterflied.

Bigger issue: If I might slip into my own terminology, at the WNT, there are 12" dreadnoughts, Gen 1 superdreadnoughts (13.5" and 14") and Gen 2 superdreadnoughts (15" and 16"). The first lot were always going to go and the RN was glad to see them go. In the second category, Britain had 14 (4 Orion, 3 KGV, 4 Iron Dukes; 2 Lions, 1 Tiger), the USA 9 (2 New York, 2 Nevada, 2 Pennsylvania, 3 New Mexico) and Japan 8 (4 Kongo, 2 Fuso, 2 Ise). In the third, Britain had 13 ships, the USA 5 (2 Tennessee, 3 Colorado) and Japan 2 (Nagato and Mutsu). I've taken the liberty of grouping the Big 5 together from the other USN Standards, but the 7 USN ships with all-or-nothing protection are certainly worthy of comparison to the QEs.

From this number, the IJN and the USN kept the lot for service in WW2. They got far better use out of their 14" ships than the RN got out of their 13.5" vessels. However, of that British number, the four Orions and 2 Lions were obsolete or flogged out by 1919 anyhow, which puts them back to effective parity in that category. Without the extention of the WNT, the 13.5" KGVs get replaced by new construction in the early 1930s and the Iron Dukes from the mid 1930s by something better. As you point out, it is the continuation of the building holiday that really hurt the RN more than other powers.

The other big hit on the RN was the Rs being inferior throwbacks that swiftly became second or third line capital ships. This would have been bad enough had the RN retained its 2nd generation ships, but the nature of the Treaty did write them into a corner.

Britain's construction programme wasn't too little, but by nature of the LNT, it was constrained and delayed (I'm looking at the KGV delays here). It ended up being too late, but this only became directly apparent well into the rearmament process. Kicking things off 24 months earlier would change a great deal of how we view the process.

Changing the policy of appeasement and having a go at Italy would dramatically change a great number of factors.

  simon darkshade,

  Agreed, even with the old 15" guns for the Vanguard's the armour issue, plus the developing crisis of the war especially after the fall of France that really caused problems in replacing the old fleet.  It definitely didn't help that the UK didn't cheat and that the government were reluctant, largely for fiscal reasons, to even upgrade as much as they could.

  Not sure having the Royal Sovereigns as repeat Queen's would have removed or even greatly mollified the bloc obsolescent problem.  If the money and will to do that had been available to do that but make them improved versions, as the original Queens had some problems, that would have made a big difference but they were meant to be cheaper ships for North Sea use mainly.  At that time the idea that Britain would have shot itself in the foot by legally preventing itself from building new ships when required would have seemed facial.  At the time it was thought that any new ship would only be in front line service for 10-15 years at the most before being replaced.

  Agree that the 9 US with 14" guns were more parallel with the 15" ships Britain produced.  They did have some shortcomings, most being coal fired originally and having a lower max elevation and hence range but the USN was able to remove those problems by extensive refits in most/all of them during the 1920's and 30's.  Britain of course did get two more ships in Nelson and Rodney under the treaty, which were very good after some problems had been resolved but far more was needed to keep the RN battlefleet [and supporting construction industry] up to the sort of strength needed for any real crisis. 

  One problem of course with understanding this period is that too often people only compare the RN with the USN and the IJN.  Britain's problem was that with other powers in close proximity also had substantial forces and that it was so dependent on SLOC, a position only matched [or exceeded even] by Japan.  It turned out that neither Italy nor Germany could be ignored, especially again after the sudden fall of France and that prevented Britain being in a position, by land or sea to oppose Japan in Dec 41 onwards. 

  Definitely there would be butterflies if there had been war with Italy in 36.  Some of which might have been negative but if it had happened and especially if the ships had been available to make it a practical idea it changes a hell of a lot.

  Steve

[oscssw]

Reading the thoughts of Steve and Simon sure is an education.

Have either of you ever worked with a real BB?

Now this is no Sh!t

In 1968, when I was on my first enlistment, my Can was part of Operation Sea Dragon

along with New Jersey.  We were inshore with our 4 5"38's she was father out.

You could sometimes hear those 16 inch rounds passing close by.  They sounded like a freight train.

We could sometimes see those High Capacity 16 inch shells tearing up the country side.  Damn impressive.

I never had much use for the Big Boys. A short time aboard a CV convinced me it was too much

"chicken sh!t", like the army with saluting, pressed uniforms and far too much brass getting into your way.

Give me the small boys every time. The Tin Can Navy was good blue water sea duty. 

But that's just me.  I'm funny that way!

   

[simon darkshade]

No, nor have I seen one; it is on my list of things to do if I ever get to travel.

It is great to hear about firsthand experiences of battleships, like any good sea stories.

I have seen a good USN documentary on destroyers from 1970 that this remind me of: and some home movies from a DD off Vietnam