World War II Myths, Misconceptions and Surprises Thread

[miletus12]

Jan 2, 2022 8:21:27 GMT lordroel said:

Jan 2, 2022 7:46:18 GMT miletus12 said:

Some fun facts.

1. 2/3 of Americans were drafted to fight in WWII. In Vietnam of the troops in country, 2/3 of the those who fought, volunteered.
2. Nazi death camps killed at least 11 million human beings. Ask an American and if they know about the camps at all, they will tell you 6 million people were killed. They forget the Romani, political prisoners, religiously persecuted, gays, artists, intellectuals, and whoever else fell into categories the Nazis defined as "subhuman" including the mentally and physically challenged. They were mass murdered in the same system.
3. Referring to (2) the Germans killed 13 million Russian civilians. Stalin killed another 7 million. The Japanese killed 14 million Chinese, 1 million Filipinos, an equal number of Koreans, Indonesians and some 50,000 + Allied POWs.
4. Americans head hunted Japanese soldiers in New Guinea. This was in retaliation for the Japanese eating Allied prisoners of war. Seriously, it was a common practice for Japanese cannibals to medically amputate an arm or leg off an Australian or American and eat that as ingesting the spirit of their enemy.
5. How many Axis soldiers reached the United States? 400,000 of them. Many were overflow from British operations.
6. Referring to headhunting in 4? The decapitation rate in Saipan was 60%.

Think 2 and 3 are not fun facts miletus12 .

I tend to be sarcastic about war. There was nothing fun about ANY of the 23 facts listed. 

[lordroel]

Jan 2, 2022 9:27:04 GMT miletus12 said:

Jan 2, 2022 8:21:27 GMT lordroel said:

Think 2 and 3 are not fun facts miletus12 .

I tend to be sarcastic about war. There was nothing fun about ANY of the 23 facts listed. 

Than it is good.

Also at least you did not call the Nazi death camps, Polish death camps as that would got you into trouble in Poland.

[miletus12]

How about a non-American point of view?

10. US won WWII. The presenter makes the Russian case and it is a mostly true one as to combat, but when one looks at the postwar world that emerged, it can be argued that the winner dictated terms. I leave it to you to determine who dictated those terms, but Bretton Woods was not formulated in the Kremlin.

9. Mechanization. The presenter notes that the Germans and Russians were fairly dependent on horses. 1 horse = 200 kg carry and 400 kg haul (wheels). The 2.5 tonne truck = 2.5 tonne carry and 5 tonne haul. Typical march speed of a horse = 30 km/day. The truck if no-one shoots at it can manage 300 km a day. The horse has to eat every 4-8 hours. The truck has to be fueled the same interval. 5 million horses = 2,000,000 million tonnes haulage. 500,000 trucks = 12,500,000 tonnes haulage. Note that the Russians never employed more than 100,000 trucks per operation? Obviously, the fully truck (lorry) mounted British army was the most mechanized army in WWII as they had the highest % of trucks per soldier. As for the Americans, to quote General Devers; "They've got feet. They can march. Save the trucks for the ammunition, food and fuel."

8. Wehrmacht technical and tactical superiority. The presenter correctly states that German technology was not fundamentally superior to their opponents. Neither was their actual war fighting prowess. To elucidate further:

a. French tanks had thicker armor and equivalent guns in 1940.
b. The BF109 was matched by the De520 and Supermarine Spitfire.
c. British tanks, Matilda II and Cruisers A10 and A13 were superior to most of the German Mark IIs and Mark IIIs and 38ts.
d. Later in the war?
--V-1s and V-2s? How about the BAT antiship radar homing missile and WAC Corporal? Did not know the Americans were 6 months behind in fielding a ballistic missile and their version of the Fritz-X unlike the German one, actually was semi-active radar homing and thus could not be spoofed by WWII enemy tech?

What gave the Germans the edge, was radios, close air support and a guy named Mannstein who sold Hitler on the idea of using the traditional invasion route into northern France. It was a repeat of the Franco Prussian War.

How about the other stuff: Norway, Poland, the Low Countries, North Africa. The Germans swamped their weaker neighbors. Even at that excuse, the Germans almost flubbed Norway. In France, the difference at the Meuse was 3 days. If Huntziger had not mishandled a simple river defense, we would have a repeat of WWI with French artillery smashing the Germans flat in place until the British blockade starved the Germans to the peace table. It was a much weaker Germany that tried France in 1940. They were lucky. When the Germans tried Russia they were helped by the head Russian (Georgian) Jughashvilli, self-styled as "Stalin". who mishandled his end of the camapaign so badly that the Germans cruised all the way to Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad. 40% of the population, 25% of the industrial output, 80% of the foodstuffs and 50% of the pre-Barbarossa Russian army and 90% of the red air force disappeared. The Rusasian generals (timidly) asked Stalin for permission; that is if they could now try to fight the war "according to sound Marxist (Mikhail Tukhachevsky) principles" and the coward, Stalin, to save his neck from Hitler, agreed. What happened? Moscow repulse, Stalingrad, Kursk and then the Russians roll and trot forward to Berlin as fast as the Americans can supply them. The STAVKA (Russian general staff) ran a sloppy war, but their generals (Zhukov) followed Vladimir Kiriakovitch Triandafillov religiously. The Germans had no answer for it.

That brings up the next myth.

7. Blitzkrieg was, as the presenter represents, actually felt out from 1939 to 1941 as a method of modernized cavalry warfare with tanks and close air support replacing hussars and dragoons. The Germans never had formalized the OODA Loop as part of the doctrine. Rommel seemed to have intuitively understood it, but when one studies German operational planning, there is no attack on communications and command and control embedded in their planning. As an example of how this was lacking, one needs but look at the Battle of Britain, where there was no effort to smash the fighter director system or the radar picket system. So the Germans never understood what made Blitzkrieg work, although Liddell Hart, Adna Chaffee and J.F.C. Fuller did.

6. Lend Lease, in the Soviet view, not significant. This depends on what one's metric is. Up until 1943, the Russians largely fought on their own resource base and lost most of it. They hung onto their oil by the razor thin margins of trading lives and distance and some astute attacking of the weak sectors in the German southern front and the good luck that Stalin was off in his dachas duck hunting, getting drunk; while Hitler was personally directing the German war effort, using Baedeckers and also while higher than a meth-head at the time. (Stalingrad). The Lend Lease arrives after Stalingrad in huge amounts and now American wheat, railroad stock, a good number of aircraft, some tanks (Shermans will equip many Guards tank divisions in the Balkans and later Manchuria campaigns.) but especially trucks, will give the Russians the wherewithal to attack and use their deep battle the way it was supposed to be used. Do not forget the oil refineries and aviation gasoline, the high explosives and the BOOTS. Russian soldiers were expected to march, too. Need I mention Lend Lease in the British context?

5. General winter was a myth. The presenter is correct. Both sides had the same weather. The French trucks the Germans stole and used broke down or were shot up and could not be repaired or replaced. The Russian railroad system took longer to Germanify than expected and the Russians were not quitting. As a result, being 1,200 kilometers from one's supply head while the enemy has a land line of communication and supply 200 kilometers long in most cases, makes for a logistics defeat. Besides, the Nazis in their ideological wisdom, had allocated between 10% and 15% of the German transportation capacity and logistics in east Europe to murdering people in their death camps.

The side effect, of that last policy, was that if you were a Ukrainian and experienced Nazi genocide practices first-hand, as much as one could hate Comrade Stalin, one fights for oneself to defeat the worse menace.

4. Axis as allies was a misnomer. Hitler double-crossed Stalin who was a defacto German ally until Barbarossa. Hitler double crossed Mussolini *(Russian invasion). Mussolini double crossed *(Greece). Tojo double crossed everybody except Stalin. Surprisingly Hitler did not double cross Tojo. Hitler honored his commitment to declare war on the United States.

3. Clean Wehrmacht? The German army was an instrument of Nazi policy. That alone dirtied them. But they mass participated in atrocities against Russian civilians to cite one example of killing 10 "hostages" for every soldier killed by partisans. Indiscriminate artillery and air bombardments. theft, looting, pillage, rape, random murders, and other violations of General Order 100 would be in their record. So why was the myth created? The presenter is correct. The Bundeswehr had to start with something besides the truth and if the Germans were to be trusted, they had to have "some good guy" myths to let them in NATO.

2. Stalin's order 227. It is hard to make this claim is a myth.

Order by the People’s Commissioner of Defense of the USSR

Pertaining measures in order to enhance discipline and order within the Red Army and prohibition to abandon military positions without permission.


Moscow, Nr. 227, July 28, 1942.

The enemy throws fresh units into battle and regardless of his heavy losses, he creeps forward, penetrating deep into the Soviet Union, capturing new territory, destroying our towns and villages, looting, raping and murdering the Soviet population. Fighting is going on near Voronesh, on the river Don and in the south before the gates of the northern Caucasus. The German occupiers have broken through to Stalingrad and aim to capture the Kuban and the northern Caucasus with their riches in oil and grain, whatever the cost. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuiki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-the-Don and half of Voronezh. A number of troops on the Southern Front has abandoned Rostov and Novocherkassk – emulating a number of scaremongers – without putting up any serious resistance or waiting for orders from Moscow and in so doing blemished their banners.

The population of our country, feeling love and respect for our troops, starts to feel disappointment towards the Red Army, looses confidence in the Red Army and many blame the Red Army for leaving our people behind under the yoke of the suppressor while the army itself retreats to the East.

Some unwise people at the front find consolation in talks about the idea we are able to retreat still further east, as we possess a vast territory, lots of land and a large population and because we will always have grain in abundance. In so doing they aim to justify their scandalous behavior at the front. But such talks are utterly false and mendacious and only to the advantage of our enemies.

Every commander, soldier and political officer must realize that our means are not inexhaustible. The territory of the Soviet Union does not consist of just desert but of people: workers, farmers, intellectuals, our fathers, mothers, spouses, brothers and children. The territory of the U.S.S.R. our enemy has captured or attempts to capture, consists of grain and other food stuffs for the army and the rear areas; metal and fuel for the industry, that same industry that provides weaponry and munitions to the armed forces and of railways. After the loss of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic states, the Donetz basin and other areas we are left with a far smaller territory and hence far less people, grain, metal and factories. We have lost over 70 million citizens, over 13 million tons of grain and over 10 million tons of metal each year. We now no longer exceed the Germans in human reserves or reserves of grain. Retreating further means we work ourselves and our motherland into ruin. Each patch of land we abandon will strengthen the enemy and weakens our defense and our motherland.

Therefore it is essential we must once and for all cut off all talk about retreating indefinitely, possessing a vast territory, our country being large and rich, having a large population and always having grain in abundance. Such talk is mendacious and harmful, it will make us weak and the enemy stronger for if we do not put a stop to this withdrawal, we will end up without grain, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and without railways.

It follows from all of this that the withdrawal must be stopped now.

"Not a single step back." That must now be our main slogan.

It is necessary we tenaciously defend every position, every yard of Soviet territory to the last drop of blood, that we cling to every patch of Soviet territory and defend it to the very last.

Our motherland is going through a difficult period. We must stop the enemy, drive him out and destroy him, whatever the cost. The Germans are not as strong as the scare mongers think. They are making a last ditch effort. Withstanding their blow now means we will achieve victory over them within the next couple of months.

Can we withstand such a blow and drive the enemy to the west afterwards? Yes, we can because our factories in the rear areas are functioning very well now and our fronts receive increasingly more aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces and mortars.

But what is still missing?

We miss order and discipline within the companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, within the armored units and within the squadrons of the air force. Herein lies our Achilles heel. Within our armed forces, we must introduce the most stringent order and iron discipline if we want to save the situation and hold on to our motherland.

We shall no longer tolerate that commanders, commissioners, political officers, units and formations leave their military positions without permission. We shall no longer tolerate that commanders, commissioners, political officers allow a number of scare mongers to decide the situation on the battlefield and persuade other soldiers to withdraw and in so doing open the front to our enemies.

Scare mongers and cowards are to be executed on the spot.

From now, iron discipline must be demanded of every commander, soldier and political officer: not one step backwards without being ordered by a superior.

Commanders of companies, battalions, regiments and divisions and comparable commissioners and political officers who leave their military positions without orders from a higher level are traitors to our motherland. Such commanders and political officers are to be treated as traitors to our motherland as well.

That is the slogan of our motherland.

Putting this slogan into practice means we are defending our territory, save our motherland, kill the hated enemy and gain victory over him.

After their withdrawal in the winter due to the pressure of the Red Army, because the discipline of the German troops was shaking, the Germans took some stern measures to restore discipline which have yielded quite good results. They established over 100 penal companies, made up of soldiers who had damaged discipline by their cowardice or instability, deployed them in the harshest sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with their blood. Furthermore, they formed a dozen penal battalions made up of commanders who had damaged discipline by their cowardice or instability, stripped them of their decorations, positioned them in even more dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with their blood. Finally they formed special barricade detachments, positioned these behind instable divisions and ordered them to execute scare mongers on the spot who attempted to abandon their positions without permission or attempted to surrender to the enemy. As is known, these measures were effective and now, the Germans are fighting better than during the past winter. This gave the German troops a high level of discipline, even though the defense of their motherland is not their ultimate goal. They only have one, predatory aim: subjugation of other countries. Our troops, which have the defense of our dishonored motherland as their ultimate target, do not possess such a high degree of discipline and therefore suffer defeats.

Must we not learn from our enemies in this connection like our forebears did in the past and subsequently gained victory over them?

I think we should.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army hereby orders:
1. the military councils at the fronts and especially the front commanders:
a) to quell the mentality of the troops to withdraw unconditionally and resolutely put an end to propaganda about the idea that we ostensibly can and should retreat further east, that such a kind of withdrawal would ostensibly cause no harm.
b) to strip army commanders of their functions unconditionally who have permitted the illicit withdrawal of their troops without having been ordered by the front command and to send them to Stavka to be handed over to a court martial.
c) to establish one to three (dependent on circumstances) penal battalions (each 800 men strong) on the border of the front sector where junior and senior officers and comparable political officers of all branches who have damaged discipline by their cowardice or instability will be sent, deploy them in the harshest sectors of the front in order to offer them the opportunity to atone for their crimes to the motherland with their blood.
2. the military councils of armies and above all the army commanders:
a) to strip commanders and commissioners of corps and divisions of their function unconditionally who have permitted the illicit withdrawal of troops without orders from army command and to send them to the military council of the front in order to be handed over to the court martial
b) to establish three to five well armed barricade detachments (of no more than 200 men each) on the perimeter of the army sector, to deploy them directly behind unstable divisions and compel them, in case of panic and disorderly retreat of units of the division to execute scare mongers and cowards on the spot to help honest soldiers of the division do their duty towards the motherland.
c) to establish five to ten (dependent on circumstances) penal companies (of 150 to 200 men each), at the border of the army sector where soldiers and non commissioned officers, who have damaged discipline by their cowardice or instability, will be sent and to deploy them in the harshest sectors of the army in order to offer them the opportunity to atone for their crimes to the motherland with their blood
3. the commanders and commissioners of corps and divisions:
a) to strip commanders and commissioners of regiments and battalions of their functions unconditionally who have permitted the illicit withdrawal of units without orders by corps or divisional commanders, to take away their decorations and to send them to the military councils at the front to be handed over to the court martial.
b) to assist the barricade detachments of the army in any way possible and to support them in regard to enhancing order and discipline within the units.
This order is to be read to all companies, squadrons, batteries, command units and staffs.

The People’s commissioner of Defense
I. Stalin

The Americans faced a similar problem in their Civil War. The $300.00 dollar men in 1864 broke and ran when put in against Lee's veterans in the Overland Campaign. Meade adopted a British army practice of "file closers", using combat veterans to stand behind the "bounty men" to catch them on the bayonet or shoot them if they retreated in the face of the enemy. It worked.

1. Sea Lion. The presenter adopts the professional opinion that the Germans lacked the means. Could it have worked as popular myth still suggests if the Luftwaffe gained the two weeks air superiority needed? No. The Germans could not air bridge supplies across the English Channel. They lacked the sea lift as well. It would have wiped an army group from the German order of battle and amounted to no more than a failed large raid. Mostly, though, it would have brought the Americans into the war immediately and probably resulted in an unrecognizable history as a result if the Germans had tried.

[miletus12]

There are a lot of things about the ways the 1940 French campaign actually developed that do not fit the popular conceptions. That is except for the bit about Huntziger being incompetent and the lack of radios. I did know that the Panzer generals were running away from higher headquarters to avoid being commanded to stop and wait for the infantry that they left far to the rear. Hitler finally intervened and ordered them to stop just as the jaws around Dunkirk were to close shut, but that is a Luftwaffe story I may attend at a later date.

See MAP.



Description.

Huntziger screwed up. It is that simple. The lesson is that the 18 hours delay and those idle 7 French divisions that awaited orders while the courier got himself lost (or drunk), were the reason France fell. Reason? No radios.

[miletus12]

The WWII "myths", that nations teach their children, can result in some negative future outcomes. So far, the Japanese have not run afoul of their myth mistakes.

The source of the education derailment might have started with MacArthur's reforms. The Japanese have not faced their true history head on.

[miletus12]

I get tired of the Horton Brothers and their so-called flying wing. Those people were not Jack Northrop!



I cannot wait for Werner von Braun to be debunked.

[miletus12]

Red Army myths are put to the tests.



Further explanation:

1. Unlimited manpower for the Russian army. The Germans had killed 4 MILLION Red Army soldiers in 1941 and 1942. And the conquered Russian territories the Germans seized contained 40% of the pre-Barbarossa manpower the Red Army expected to draft. That was gone. Throughout most of the war, the Russians fought off a population base of about 100 millions instead of the 170 millions the Americans estimated they had.

2. German armor was destroyed by the Red Army tank hordes at Kursk and thus the Wehrmacht lost its offensive punch. This myth was propagated by the Fuchida of German generals, Heinz Guderian. The actual "factors" that neutered German fighting power in the east, was the constant attrition of German infantry and the loss of overall logistics sustainment. A simple increase in the distribution of smoothbore mortars and Katusha rockets among the direct support Soviet artillery goes a long way towards an explanation in the rise of German overall casualties and attendant logistics collapse. Lots of ammunition did not reach the Herr, when the horse drawn wagons were blown up in Soviet barrages. Having an incompetent veterinary service that allowed 2 million horses to freeze to death or die from grazing on poorly stored and poisoned fodder, did not help the Germans hiding in their fox holes either.

3. Stalin order and the "blocking detachments". These are "file closers" to the Americans. The Soviet "file closers", were "party loyalists". They ran for the rear faster than the frontline combat troops and at least of the NKVD variety, the combat troops despised these cowards. The Americas were actually more ruthless in this practice by sealing off retreat avenues. But they officially only shot 540 or so soldiers running to the rear. The Russians actually shot 2% of their troops and 10% were ARRESTED sent to penal battalions, where they were spent the troops in hazardous assaults.  

4. Soviet human wave assaults. The Russian attacked with speed and violence with their first echelons and it was the second echelons. This was part of the doctrine of deep battle. Tactically, the small unit leaders of the Soviet army were amateurs who fought out of the drill book.

5. The Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive spoiling attack to prevent the Russian attack on Rumanian oil. The Germans had no intelligence on this subject. The Russian army had no readiness capability and their logistics was a joke.  The Russians could not even move in defense due to lack of fuel. The Russians were not even able to fight with guns.

6. Germans claim it was the weather that stopped them in 1941.  The Red Army still managed to kinetically inhibit and inflict attrition on German combat formations. The Red Army gets the credit for stopping the Wehrmacht.

7. Lend Lease? The Soviet historians actually have admitted Lend Lease was crucial. The Lend Lease was the difference. It is western historians who downplay the importance. Radios, av-gas, trucks, American aircraft, food, and explosives, for example, tipped the balance early in 1943 and later supported the 1944 Soviet offensives.  Otherwise, it is a gamble. The western allies knew that Stalin was both incompetent and a double crosser. Lend lease was their bribe and the supplement to keep the Russians in the game as the anvil. The West was the hammer.    
  

[ukron]

From May 10 to June 25, 1940, the German army deplored 212,000 soldiers put out of action (49,000 killed and 163,000 wounded), 1,800 tanks destroyed or damaged out of 3,039 engaged, not to mention 1,559 planes shot down or damaged out of 3 900 engaged.

the camapgne of France was far from being a military walk for the German army, contrary to what some historiography would have us believe.
It is interesting to note that one of the main protagonists, Adolf Hilter himself would be surprised by the request for the French arministice, attesting that the defeat of France was much more a political defeat than a real military defeat:
Free French Forces will achieve real tactical success in East Africa and Libya (Koufra) with much lower human and technical resources compared to those deployed by the French army in May 1940.

[miletus12]

Eight myths. The facts.

1. The French invaded first.
2. The Maginot Line worked.
3. French troops defeated the Germans routinely when they had any chance at all. It turns out that Methodical Battle (Also used by the Americans who learned it from the Franch.), defeated Schnelle Manöverkriegsführung when the practitioners knew what they were doing which Huntziger and Gamelin did not.
4. French troops fought hard and skillfully during the French 1940 campaign.
5. The French resistance was more "myth" than reality.
6. The French fought hard against the Anglo Americans and the Russians. They fought the Thais and the Japanese and the Chinese, too. They even fought against Koreans and Mongols. It is hard to find another nation that fought so globally in WWII. I do not believe the Americans fought the Mongols, unless there were some in New Guinea.
7. The French were not heavily outnumbered in the Battle of France. The French eventually put 3 million men into the line against the 3.5 million Italo-Germans. The manpower was misused. That is an unfortunate truth.
8. The French were not purely French. Large numbers of soldiers before and especially after the Fall of France in 1940 were Africans or Arabs (Technically Senegalese, Berbers, Mali, Moroccans and Algerians, etc.),. As the British discovered at Dakar, the Germans discovered at Monte Casino and in the Rhone valley, these "French" troops were well officered, well trained and fiercely loyal to France.).

[miletus12]

Do not use this guy as an expert.



Let us take the errors apart.

First of all, the F4F Wildcat and A6M Zero were designed at about the same time AFTER the Spitfire. Both planes carried engines which came within 50 kW (70 HP) of each other at altitude. Neither plane had self-sealing fuel tanks or cockpit armor in 1941. Both, as issued, had very heavy radios. The Japanese radio was superior to the American one.

The Grumman bird used flush rivets.

The Japanese alloy WAS duralumin. The alloy was known to ALCOA in 1940 but not generally to the American aviation community.

The Zero did NOT use a drop tank in 1941.

Japanese pilots did not wear parachutes for the same reasons American infantry ditched the body armor in Afghanistan. It was USELESS as a survival aid against enemy bullets and explosives; and it interfered with their ability to move in combat situations where the binding of the rig-ups prevented free movement of arms and legs to work controls.

The F4F had a wing loading of 139 kg/m^2. The power/mass was 0.282 kW/kg.

The A6M had a wing loading of 107.4 kg/m^2. The power/mass was 0.294 kW/kg.

Guess what the difference was? The wing and drag coefficient.

And yet the Grumman bird had a 2,000 meter altitude advantage while the Zero could climb 50% faster.

The Zero could not stay in a corner turn with a Wildcat at speeds above 460 km/hr. The Zero could turn onto the tail of a Wildcat in 1.5 turns, under 350 km/hr.

So why did the Zero claim 4 to 1 kills against Allied pilots in 1942?

First of all, that is based on Japanese statistics. Japanese planes did not come with gun cameras in 1942, so it was Human eyewitnesses. Neither did Allied planes as a general rule until 1943 carry cameras. The other factor is that most of those Zero kills were by China veterans against rookie allied pilots in flying garbage such as the Brewster Buffalo or in war-weary Hurricanes and Spitfires. When the Japanese pilots came up against near peer aviators, either Commonwealth RAAF veterans or the USNAS, the exchange was EQUAL even when flying garbage like the Wildcat or Spitfire V.

Oddly enough the RAF did not do well against the Japanese, even in Spitfires or Seafires. It was not the planes, It was the pilot training. Teamwork lads. Two on one and come out of the sun. Also: the RAAF and the USN taught deflection shooting as part of the pilot syllabus.

At 1500 kW one can grow heavy fighters with armor plate and self-sealing fuel tanks. Guess what a 20 mm cannon does to that weight? BOOM. Zeros carried 20 mm cannon that defeated self-sealing fuel tanks and armor from the start. The reason the F6F and F4U overmatched the Zero was because they could go vertical with the Zero and kill the Japanese plane at the stall when its supercharger quit at the top of the climb. Plus that pilot training thing.

[miletus12]

More on the Zero and the Wildcat.



The Zero outperformed the Wildcat in speed, maneuverability, and armament. The Wildcat's only advantages was that it could take more gee-load, could out-dive and did not lock-up controls under high acceleration loads. The Zero would come apart at critical load stress points whether flown to frame limit or hit by bullets. The Wildcat did not.

Opinion? This person you can trust. He cites first sources and battle reports so one can fact check his conclusions.

[lordroel]

Jan 8, 2022 20:49:54 GMT miletus12 said:

More on the Zero and the Wildcat.



The Zero outperformed the Wildcat in speed, maneuverability, and armament. The Wildcat's only advantages was that it could take more gee-load, could out-dive and did not lock-up controls under high acceleration loads. The Zero would come apart at critical load stress points whether flown to frame limit or hit by bullets. The Wildcat did not.

Opinion? This person you can trust. He cites first sources and battle reports so one can fact check his conclusions.

Toughed i recognize that voice, the Military Aviation Historian, a good channel, as is the Military History Visualized channel on YouTube.

[miletus12]

The Sherman tank was an evolved 1930s tank that started almost 10 years before 1942.

1. The thing is that the Sherman started with a great reputation with the British. Veteran tank operators appreciated the ergonomics, the RADIOS, the dual-purpose gun and the reliability.

2. The Sherman's reputation takes a nose-dive because the Americans misuse it at Kasserine.

3. The Sherman's reputation, among the British, turns left because the British overstuff the Sherman with ammunition. What is omitted in the video, though, is that the British are using locally manufactured AP shot, using captured German 75mm AP shells with American propellant cases and BRITISH hotted up and unstable propellant.

4. The Americans fixed that problem with cased stowage and then wet (glycol) stowage.

5. Weak gun. By 1944, the German tanks grow thick hides, and it "appears" the Sherman 75 will not pierce a Panther's hide. The Sherman 75's gun will pierce a Panther. You just have to flank or ambush it. It comes down to training. The Sherman showed up and it fought 90% of the time. Reliability was a function of easy maintenance.

6. Belton Cooper presented a false picture of the Sherman.

7. Five Shermans to kill one Panther. Common sense. If you have the tanks and can fight unfairly, fight unfairly. The Americans were logical. They fought unfairly and won.

8. HVAP. The Americans were short of Tungsten. They needed it for submarines and drill bits more than they needed it for throwaway ammunition. If they had known about depleted uranium in 1943, they would have used THAT.

[miletus12]

I wonder who was the expert who was the technical advisor for this farce of a fairy tale?

[miletus12]

I am plowing through this book. Just how American was the Stalinist miracle? How vital was American lend lease, and how vital was American help? Oh, I have had to revise my estimate of how little importance it was.

Roosevelt should have cut the Russians' collective communist throats. Roosevelt was let down by his incompetent state department-especially Henry Morgenthau. This was also true of Commerce, Treasury. And there was the TRAITOR, Davis.