What if Stalin just doesn't wanna go to war with Japan in August 1945 and sits it out?

[raharris1973]

What if Stalin just doesn't want to follow-through with going to war with Japan in August 1945, decides to sit it out, blaming 'technical difficulties' for not getting started when talking to the Americans, and starts focusing on peacetime rebuilding and reposturing.

One can argue participation in the war against Japan is all upside and pretty much no downside, but let's just say Stalin thinks differently. Nobody internally contradicts him and he gets his way. Debate over.

What is the range of plausible endgames for the Pacific War?

What are the odds of the Japanese surrendering anyway at the exact same time as OTL?

If the Japanese hold out additional weeks, how soon would the US drop the next atomic bomb? [We should not necessarily expect the third bomb to be automatic upon availability - after Nagasaki, Truman demanded he be consulted for express permission to drop the bomb, because he disliked the 'automatic' nature of the Nagasaki bomb non-decision. Of course, his post Nagasaki decision was in a context where the USSR had also joined the war.]

Assuming individual bomb strikes do not change the Japanese government's position, what is the maximum number of plausible additional weeks or months Japan could go without surrendering?

Could Japan still be un-surrendered in late October 1945/November 1945 with the US readying to execute invasion operations of any of the home islands?
What would the status of British Empire and Dominion operations in Southeast Asia be? Would French or Dutch forces have deployed to Southeast Asia? What about the state of Chinese Nationalist or Communist operations on the mainland, or possibly any American operations in collaboration with the former?

If USSR from August or VE Day relaxes its instructions to western Communist parties to oppose labor strikes, will labor stoppages in North America, Western Europe, and Australia become worse than they already were?

[stevep]

Oct 2, 2022 23:58:52 GMT raharris1973 said:

What if Stalin just doesn't want to follow-through with going to war with Japan in August 1945, decides to sit it out, blaming 'technical difficulties' for not getting started when talking to the Americans, and starts focusing on peacetime rebuilding and reposturing.

One can argue participation in the war against Japan is all upside and pretty much no downside, but let's just say Stalin thinks differently. Nobody internally contradicts him and he gets his way. Debate over.

What is the range of plausible endgames for the Pacific War?

What are the odds of the Japanese surrendering anyway at the exact same time as OTL?

If the Japanese hold out additional weeks, how soon would the US drop the next atomic bomb? [We should not necessarily expect the third bomb to be automatic upon availability - after Nagasaki, Truman demanded he be consulted for express permission to drop the bomb, because he disliked the 'automatic' nature of the Nagasaki bomb non-decision. Of course, his post Nagasaki decision was in a context where the USSR had also joined the war.]

Assuming individual bomb strikes do not change the Japanese government's position, what is the maximum number of plausible additional weeks or months Japan could go without surrendering?

Could Japan still be un-surrendered in late October 1945/November 1945 with the US readying to execute invasion operations of any of the home islands?
What would the status of British Empire and Dominion operations in Southeast Asia be? Would French or Dutch forces have deployed to Southeast Asia? What about the state of Chinese Nationalist or Communist operations on the mainland, or possibly any American operations in collaboration with the former?

If USSR from August or VE Day relaxes its instructions to western Communist parties to oppose labor strikes, will labor stoppages in North America, Western Europe, and Australia become worse than they already were?

  Some interesting points here.  Japan was in dire problems but there were still groups willing to fight to the death, even of most of the population and the fear of Soviet communist is argued to be a strong incentive for the OTL surrender so the surrender is likely to be delayed but for how long is uncertain.  It could be only a few days or a few months.  In the latter case I would expect a 3rd bomb would be used and more if available along with continued carpet bombing of what's left of the Japanese economy and infrastructure.  I would assume however its likely not to be more than 6 months at most and probably less.

  There is an argument that instead of an invasion, because of the expected costs to the allies, they would have continued bombardment and blockade which would be very costly for Japan and you could end up with millions of deaths and potentially a social collapse which would be very destructive, especially since it might make a surrender even more difficult. 

  An even worse potential route is that some plans for the invasion would be to clear beach defences on the planned landing grounds by using nuclear weapons.  That would cause huge casualties, including for the invading forces because of poisoning from the fall-out. 

  If there is no clear surrender there is the possibility that the occupation of China, Korea and much of its remaining empire could last for quite a while.  The British move to liberate Malaya should work but is likely to see a lot of deaths, both allied, Japanese and civilian.  However for the rest of SE Asia its difficult to see how quickly they could be liberated without an orderly surrender.  Of course this could come later than OTL and with a similar result.  Likely to see tension in FIC and large scale opposition to a Dutch return to the DEI.

  In the longer run Korea will be united under a western approved leader but events in China is likely to be more confused.  Without a Soviet occupation of Manchuria the communists are unlikely to get so much equipment and control of the NE but Stalin could still supply them and the KMT have a lot of problems with corruption and leadership issues.  If Stalin heats up the orders for communists to incite unrest, both in the west where France and Italy could see serious problems and also the 3rd world there's going to be a lot of problems.  Its likely to mean the cold war begins earlier as a significant amount of the war-time pro-Soviet propaganda in the west is likely to be nullified by events.

 

[Max Sinister]

Why shouldn't he? Japan's pretty beaten, he has a lot of experienced veterans, Japanese tanks are a joke, and he should know that since Nomonhan.

And why should he leave Mao and Kim Il-sung alone when this is a great opportunity to grab their countries without too much hassle? The WAllies aren't in a position to stop him.

[stevep]

Oct 7, 2022 23:46:29 GMT Max Sinister said:

Why shouldn't he? Japan's pretty beaten, he has a lot of experienced veterans, Japanese tanks are a joke, and he should know that since Nomonhan.

And why should he leave Mao and Kim Il-sung alone when this is a great opportunity to grab their countries without too much hassle? The WAllies aren't in a position to stop him.

  Well they wanted him to.  In fact I think that was a big aim of the US at Potsdam. 

  I do agree with you its in his interests to do so as he gains influence in an area of some importance to him.

[gillan1220]

Either Operation Downfall goes ahead or the U.S. and allies continue the blockade, firebombing, or dropping defoliants to affect Japan's ricefields. It would be messy either way.