What if the first US ground operations in the ETO are augmentation of the 8th Army in the Western De

[raharris1973]

What if, rather than opening up a fresh invasion front, the first US ground operations outside the Pacific of any scale were direct reinforcement of the British 8th Army in the existing Egypt-Libya front and escalating support to combined operations there?

At what point could the first combat-ready US Division or Divisions be sent and supported around the Cape to Egypt to help that fight? By the time of OTL's Operation Torch (8 November, 1942), earlier than that, or only later? Could smaller component units, Brigades, be readied and deployed there for combat on any faster schedule than that?

To meet the political demands of Americans being seen "doing something" against Germany on land in 1942, I imagine that the US would want to eventually have at least a full Division engaged and send plenty of war correspondents.

Supposing this were the case, what would be the extra cost to the Allied freight fleet? What could the Allies do with the landing craft not needed in North Africa or its vicinity (at least not yet)?

How would the timetable of the final stoppage of Rommel at 2nd El Alamein (Oct '42 in OTL) and retreat through Libya to Tripoli, and finally over to the Mareth line in Tunisia (Jan '42 in OTL) be altered by all the Anglo-American effort hitting him from his east, and no Anglo-American landings in French Northwest Africa during Nov, Dec '42 and Jan '43?

Do Axis forces make a last stand in Tripoli and points west in Libya? Or do they retreat to Tunisia and internment? After the victorious Allied forces have all of Libya and forces on the land border of Tunisia and Algeria, do those Vichy governments remain staunch Vichy collaborationist/formal neutrals? Or are they quite ripe for a pro-Free French coup and realignment, opening up their territories bloodlessly to the Allies? Anticipating this possibility, do the German's and Italians do a preemptive occupation of Tunisia before Rommel and Axis final defeat in Africa?

If the timetable for Axis loss of Libya is the same as OTL, it would be lost by Jan. 1943. Assuming no Axis interference or landings in Vichy North Africa, what do the Allies plan for their next move in 1943? What is the impact for that campaigns that year and beyond? Where do the Allies have the Casablanca Summit if FNA remains Vichy and neutral? How much do Allied plans change if FNA proclaims itself Free French and opens its arms to the Allies?

If FNA's neutrality holds, perhaps the Axis forces in Africa hold out longer than January (OTL they could retreat to an Axis-occupied Tunisia). But perhaps the Axis forces surrender, intern themselves, or do a bug-out by boat, or an odd combination of all three by May 1943?

In that case, what are the Allies planned next steps for 1943 and beyond, and the impact?

[steffen]

If you have US forces in egypt, this will hamper the british succsess. They needed every day of training to hope to be competitive. If the USA sends forces (say 2-3 armored/motorized divisions) to egypt, this mean they loose 3-6 months of that training/experience. So if these forces are with Montgomery, they will slow him down or worse, he could loose engagements he won OTL. US forces needed a ton of (negative) experience to learn from, the desert challenging the Afrika corps would not be the best place to do that. For the 8th Army, they would basically be just ballast, troops that have low combat value but cost a ton of supplies. So, a huge loss of performance.

[miletus12]

Nov 10, 2022 16:04:05 GMT steffen said:

If you have US forces in egypt, this will hamper the british succsess. They needed every day of training to hope to be competitive. If the USA sends forces (say 2-3 armored/motorized divisions) to egypt, this mean they loose 3-6 months of that training/experience. So if these forces are with Montgomery, they will slow him down or worse, he could loose engagements he won OTL. US forces needed a ton of (negative) experience to learn from, the desert challenging the Afrika corps would not be the best place to do that. For the 8th Army, they would basically be just ballast, troops that have low combat value but cost a ton of supplies. So, a huge loss of performance.

If needs must, they go. As Lumsden and several others proved in the Second Battle of El Alamein, the British were still not up to Montgomery's specs, either. And they supposedly had the training.  You might throw General Andersen onto that Barbie. 

Americans like Orlando Ward and George Patton were not that "incompetent" and neither were the troops... British or American. They knew their jobs. It was the bozos who led from the rear (Fredendall) who were the problems. Those you have to weed out.

"There are no bad soldiers; only bad generals / leadership."

--Napoleon Boneparte and George C. Marshall (Pick one.)

[steffen]

Nov 10, 2022 18:10:27 GMT miletus12 said:

Nov 10, 2022 16:04:05 GMT steffen said:

If you have US forces in egypt, this will hamper the british succsess. They needed every day of training to hope to be competitive. If the USA sends forces (say 2-3 armored/motorized divisions) to egypt, this mean they loose 3-6 months of that training/experience. So if these forces are with Montgomery, they will slow him down or worse, he could loose engagements he won OTL. US forces needed a ton of (negative) experience to learn from, the desert challenging the Afrika corps would not be the best place to do that. For the 8th Army, they would basically be just ballast, troops that have low combat value but cost a ton of supplies. So, a huge loss of performance.

If needs must, they go. As Lumsden and several others proved in the Second Battle of El Alamein, the British were still not up to Montgomery's specs, either. And they supposedly had the training.  You might throw General Andersen onto that Barbie. 

Americans like Orlando Ward and George Patton were not that "incompetent" and neither were the troops... British or American. They knew their jobs. It was the bozos who led from the rear (Fredendall) who were the problems. Those you have to weed out.

"There are no bad soldiers; only bad generals / leadership."

--Napoleon Boneparte and George C. Marshall (Pick one.)
Well, the quality of the american troops that landed in tunesia were far below the other forces in combat efficency and in an engagement they sucked in the beginning. That was my point.
If you now move these forces, green and not at standard even 3-6 months EARLIER, they are even less combat efficent. That was my point. So, if Montgomery wants to fight El Alemain but have tons of subpar US forces instead of others, they lack the needed combat value, maybe even lack the chance to win that engagement. 
We see in the moment with the war in the ukraine, what happens if bad trained, bad lead troops engage high motivated and well performing soldiers. It is a blood bath. 

[stevep]

Oct 23, 2022 19:35:58 GMT raharris1973 said:

What if, rather than opening up a fresh invasion front, the first US ground operations outside the Pacific of any scale were direct reinforcement of the British 8th Army in the existing Egypt-Libya front and escalating support to combined operations there?

At what point could the first combat-ready US Division or Divisions be sent and supported around the Cape to Egypt to help that fight? By the time of OTL's Operation Torch (8 November, 1942), earlier than that, or only later? Could smaller component units, Brigades, be readied and deployed there for combat on any faster schedule than that?

To meet the political demands of Americans being seen "doing something" against Germany on land in 1942, I imagine that the US would want to eventually have at least a full Division engaged and send plenty of war correspondents.

Supposing this were the case, what would be the extra cost to the Allied freight fleet? What could the Allies do with the landing craft not needed in North Africa or its vicinity (at least not yet)?

How would the timetable of the final stoppage of Rommel at 2nd El Alamein (Oct '42 in OTL) and retreat through Libya to Tripoli, and finally over to the Mareth line in Tunisia (Jan '42 in OTL) be altered by all the Anglo-American effort hitting him from his east, and no Anglo-American landings in French Northwest Africa during Nov, Dec '42 and Jan '43?

Do Axis forces make a last stand in Tripoli and points west in Libya? Or do they retreat to Tunisia and internment? After the victorious Allied forces have all of Libya and forces on the land border of Tunisia and Algeria, do those Vichy governments remain staunch Vichy collaborationist/formal neutrals? Or are they quite ripe for a pro-Free French coup and realignment, opening up their territories bloodlessly to the Allies? Anticipating this possibility, do the German's and Italians do a preemptive occupation of Tunisia before Rommel and Axis final defeat in Africa?

If the timetable for Axis loss of Libya is the same as OTL, it would be lost by Jan. 1943. Assuming no Axis interference or landings in Vichy North Africa, what do the Allies plan for their next move in 1943? What is the impact for that campaigns that year and beyond? Where do the Allies have the Casablanca Summit if FNA remains Vichy and neutral? How much do Allied plans change if FNA proclaims itself Free French and opens its arms to the Allies?

If FNA's neutrality holds, perhaps the Axis forces in Africa hold out longer than January (OTL they could retreat to an Axis-occupied Tunisia). But perhaps the Axis forces surrender, intern themselves, or do a bug-out by boat, or an odd combination of all three by May 1943?

In that case, what are the Allies planned next steps for 1943 and beyond, and the impact?

  Sorry I missed this earlier - or possibly replied to it on the other site?  I think it would delay matters as without the landings in the west the Axis could occupy Tunisia and possibly all of FNA and reinforce the defensive position in western Libya with a lot less problems.  If they go as far west as Morocco it would make some convoy routes a lot more dangerous as well as the use of Gibraltar bloody difficult and costly.

  Possibly even more important would be the simple question of logistics.  Operating from Egypt everything has to be carried westward by trucks from the ending of the railway at El Alamein and such systems have limits in terms of distance before the fuel the trucks are consuming matches their carrying capacity.

[miletus12]

Nov 11, 2022 8:16:46 GMT steffen said:

Well, the quality of the american troops that landed in tunesia were far below the other forces in combat efficency and in an engagement they sucked in the beginning. That was my point.
If you now move these forces, green and not at standard even 3-6 months EARLIER, they are even less combat efficent. That was my point. So, if Montgomery wants to fight El Alemain but have tons of subpar US forces instead of others, they lack the needed combat value, maybe even lack the chance to win that engagement. 
We see in the moment with the war in the ukraine, what happens if bad trained, bad lead troops engage high motivated and well performing soldiers. It is a blood bath. 

Hmm.

How can I put this? 

[miletus12]

Nov 13, 2022 23:57:34 GMT miletus12 said:

Nov 11, 2022 8:16:46 GMT steffen said:

Well, the quality of the american troops that landed in tunesia were far below the other forces in combat efficency and in an engagement they sucked in the beginning. That was my point.
If you now move these forces, green and not at standard even 3-6 months EARLIER, they are even less combat efficent. That was my point. So, if Montgomery wants to fight El Alemain but have tons of subpar US forces instead of others, they lack the needed combat value, maybe even lack the chance to win that engagement. 
We see in the moment with the war in the ukraine, what happens if bad trained, bad lead troops engage high motivated and well performing soldiers. It is a blood bath. 

You have not made the case. 

Same exact troops.  60 days later.

Question? How did II Corps learn in 60 days what the British desert army had not learned in two years until Montgomery showed up and started to knock heads together?     

[steffen]

Well, combat forces need smart officers and even more important smart NCOs. The americans lacked both in the beginning. To work functional you need combat experience and you need excellent trained soldiers.
The british and germans and italians in that scenario had gained these experiences, by heavy casulties and suffering from the enemy beating them. The americans had zero combat efficency, as we learned as the american tank forces got absolutly slaughtered by a few german at-guns and tanks in tunesia. How could that be, with the übermensch-americans so good?`The truth is, they sucked a long time, that is normal if you come into a war 2 1/2 years later as the others. So, my point is: if the US of A has one or two armored divisions in egypt, they have to move them to this place. Capacities they did not have in that time, so they have to leave seasoned forces with trained officers from the british back. With them arriving in time (at last 1 month there to get known to the location and climate) and the long distance to move (around africa), they have even LESS time to prepare for the combat. We call it logic if such things turn sour. Also, american divisions needed most supply of all war acting nations, in the desert this is a problem. Even for the allies. And so, all together, the americans in egypt is a fat minus for Montgomery. They were later suitable to get slaughtered by the germans and move away essets from the advancing british 8th army. So, mission accomplished, but Kasserine stand for absolute incompetence and that was even after 2 months of fighting (and gaining experiences). Now shorten that by 7-8 months and look into the results.

Oh, Montgomery did not "knock heads together", the 8th army, the survivors of so many defeats caused by inferior german forces got the feeling of dominance, because they had absolute numbers on their side. And Montgomery replaced bad officers, because he had a hand for that. Still the british suffered terrible losses at El Alemain, but they had replacements, the germans and italians, not. The troops itself knew that to beat Rommel meant to accept heavy casulties. Something the americans were not prepared for.

[miletus12]

Nov 14, 2022 11:29:55 GMT steffen said:

Well, combat forces need smart officers and even more important smart NCOs. The americans lacked both in the beginning. To work functional you need combat experience and you need excellent trained soldiers.
The british and germans and italians in that scenario had gained these experiences, by heavy casulties and suffering from the enemy beating them. The americans had zero combat efficency, as we learned as the american tank forces got absolutly slaughtered by a few german at-guns and tanks in tunesia. How could that be, with the übermensch-americans so good?`The truth is, they sucked a long time, that is normal if you come into a war 2 1/2 years later as the others. So, my point is: if the US of A has one or two armored divisions in egypt, they have to move them to this place. Capacities they did not have in that time, so they have to leave seasoned forces with trained officers from the british back. With them arriving in time (at last 1 month there to get known to the location and climate) and the long distance to move (around africa), they have even LESS time to prepare for the combat. We call it logic if such things turn sour. Also, american divisions needed most supply of all war acting nations, in the desert this is a problem. Even for the allies. And so, all together, the americans in egypt is a fat minus for Montgomery. They were later suitable to get slaughtered by the germans and move away essets from the advancing british 8th army. So, mission accomplished, but Kasserine stand for absolute incompetence and that was even after 2 months of fighting (and gaining experiences). Now shorten that by 7-8 months and look into the results.

Oh, Montgomery did not "knock heads together", the 8th army, the survivors of so many defeats caused by inferior german forces got the feeling of dominance, because they had absolute numbers on their side. And Montgomery replaced bad officers, because he had a hand for that. Still the british suffered terrible losses at El Alemain, but they had replacements, the germans and italians, not. The troops itself knew that to beat Rommel meant to accept heavy casulties. Something the americans were not prepared for.

1. Combat needs experience, survival and a willingness to learn from mistakes.  The Americans had the personnel but not the battlefield experience. Y&u get that in battle, nowhere else. 
2. The Germans gained their exoerience in years of European warfare. In the runup to France 1940. They had the Spanish Civil War which was actually inapplicable for German maneuiver warfare. Austria and Czechoslovakia were politically engineered prearranged road marches which showed they did not know how to do road marches. Then Poland, where they screwed up in execution of their original plan, had to change it and were lucky the Russians stabbed the Poles in the back. Norway and Denmark for them was hardly a test.      
3. It was France 1940, where a huge battering ram of infantry with a screen and tip of armor managed to find the one gap the French had not covered well, which was the pivot where the Anglo French swung like a hinge at the end of the Maginot line and moved forward into Belgium. The French had a nincompoop named Huntziger who mishandled the local defense and allowed the Germans to rupture that hinge point and cross the Meuse.

Où est votre masse de manœuvre? Where is the reserve? That was Churchill.

Il ne reste rien.  Nothing remains. That was Reynaud.  

Modern scholarship (Particularly by a Martin van Crevald who is an expert on military logistics.) suggests that Mannstein's plan would have backfired in an artillery and air bombardment slaughter in the Ardennes if the French had held the Meuse crossings and shored up their defense as the HUGE German 120 kilometer traffic jam, was a massive target out in the open. But the bewildered French II armee HQ screwed up orders and some units withdrew from some sectors and others failed to execute local counterattack orders. THAT was on Charles Huntzigwer, the Lloyd Fredendall of France and his incompetent boss, Maurice Gamelin, who was the Kenneth Andersen of the armee de la terre.

As for the quality and leadership of the French when the generals were not complete nincompoops? Ever hear of Hannut or Gambieux?

=====================================================================

4. The contention that US tanks were slaughtered is nonsense. One defeat does not equal a slaughter. The equivalent of 2 combat commands in equipment were abandoned in the short rout. The local failures in place were about the same as the France 1940 example. EXCEPT that there were Americans who were in that place to plug the hole Frfedendall caused and who knew how.  If only the French had done the same near Sedan in 1940? They left a pair of nincompoops in command for far too long.   
5. US lift at the time was equivalent to at least 2 divisions minimum. How do I know this? It was what we used in New Guinea and Guadalcanal. Was there lift in the Atlantic? We were moving troops to Iran, to the UK and a full 2 division set of equipment to Montgomery in  Egypt. Troops with them were no biggee. For we sent an entire air force with the tanks. All across distances and circumstances, you said we could not, I might add. 
6. TORCH.
7. Logic is it? Points 1-6. 
8. 

Oh, Montgomery did not "knock heads together"

 Kenneth Andersen

The II Corps later suffered a serious loss at Kasserine Pass, where Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel launched a successful offensive against Allied forces, first shattering French forces defending the central portion of the front, then routing the American II Corps in the south. While the lion's share of the blame fell on Fredendall, Anderson's generalship abilities were also seriously questioned by both British and Allied commanders.[22][32][33] When Fredendall disclaimed all responsibility for the poorly-equipped French XIX Corps covering the vulnerable central section of the Tunisian front, denying their request for support, Anderson allowed the request to go unfulfilled.[32][34] Anderson was also criticised for refusing Fredendall's request to retire to a defensible line after the initial assault in order to regroup his forces, allowing German panzer forces to overrun many of the American positions in the south.[32] Furthermore, the U.S. 1st Armored Division commander, Major General Orlando Ward, vehemently objected to the dispersal of his division's three combat commands on individual assignments requested by Anderson which he believed diluted the division's effectiveness and resulted in its heavy losses.[32][35]



In particular, his American subordinate, Major General Ernest N. Harmon (later to replace Ward as commander of the U.S. 1st Armored Division) and Major General George S. Patton (who briefly replaced Fredendall in command of the U.S. II Corps) thought little of Anderson's ability to control large forces in battle.[35][36] Major General Harmon had been in Thala on the Algerian border, witnessing the stubborn resistance of the British Nickforce, which held the vital road leading into the Kasserine Pass against the heavy pressure of the German 10th Panzer Division, which was under Rommel's direct command.[35] Commanding the British Nickforce was Brigadier Cameron Nicholson, an effective combat leader who kept his remaining forces steady under relentless German hammering. When the U.S. 9th Infantry Division's attached artillery arrived in Thala after a four-day, 800 miles (1,300 km) journey, it seemed like a godsend to Harmon. Inexplicably, the 9th Division was ordered by Anderson to abandon Thala to the enemy and head for the village of Le Kef, 50 miles (80 km) away, to defend against an expected German attack. Brigadier Nicholson pleaded with the American artillery commander, Brigadier General Stafford LeRoy Irwin, to ignore Anderson's order and stay.[35] Harmon agreed with Nicholson and commanded, "Irwin, you stay right here!"[35] The 9th Division's artillery did stay, and with its 48 guns raining a whole year's worth of a (peacetime) allotment of shells, stopped the advancing Germans in their tracks. Unable to retreat under the withering fire, the Afrika Corps finally withdrew after dark.[35] With the defeat at Thala, Rommel decided to end his offensive.

Montgomery was asked about Andersen. "We do not need him." Andersen was fired on his recommendation. This was after Montgomery sacked several division commanders, before, during and after El Alamein and during the pursuit. Montgomery rebuilt 8th Army after Ritchie and Aukinleck had infected it with defeatism, starting with the private soldiers and NCOs, working his way up the officers and taught them the Montgomery way. If they did not get with his program, they were fired, reassigned, or disciplined.

"I am bloody well tired of those who speculate about what Rommel will do to us. It is time this army thought about what we are about to do to him." That is almost a verbatum repeat of General Grant's first order to the Army of the Potomac. Substitute Lee for Rommel and the general order is almost a phrase for phrase match. 

Montgomery did knock heads together in that he ruined careers and reputations and ended men he did not need or want to get the job done.   

You can ask Omar Bradley, who screwed up the Bulge and who needed Montgomery and Patton to fix his mess, about that one.