WI the Torch landings were further east per British preference, & North Africa cleared earlier?

[American hist]

I think the allies should have landed in the Balkans if not, at least give it a try. The Italian campaign prove to be bloody and slow . Churchill called Italy the soft underbelly of Europe. It approved anything but. The Mediterranean islands may be necessary but the entire peninsula wasn’t. It is just to remind you if the allies had landed in France in 43 or even earlier and not have done the invasion of North Africa and Cicely. It would’ve been a bloody disaster. The allied army learned to duck down, and many other vital lessons which needed to have been learned on operation torch and the rest of the French campaign.

[raunchel]

Jan 3, 2023 22:33:38 GMT American hist said:

I think the allies should have landed in the Balkans if not, at least give it a try. The Italian campaign prove to be bloody and slow . One hour later called the soft underbelly of Europe. It approved anything but. The Mediterranean islands may be necessary but the entire peninsula wasn’t. It is just to remind you if the allies had landed and 43 or even earlier and not have done the invasion of North Africa and Cicely. It would’ve been a bloody disaster. The allied army learned to dark down, and many other vital lessons which needed to have been learned on the day and the rest of the French campaign.

The Balkans wouldn't actually have achieved all that much and would have been similarly costly. Landing in Italy at least took Italy out of the fight and basically cleared the Mediterranean routes. Those were pretty valuable. Fighting in the Balkans would have been much harder because of the infrastructure there being less developed and even if you take more of the Balkans, you get nothing worth anything towards ending the war.

[Max Sinister]

Many people on the Balcans would have preferred to be liberated by the WAllies instead. But yes, the territory there's difficult.

[raunchel]

Jan 4, 2023 11:08:49 GMT Max Sinister said:

Many people on the Balcans would have preferred to be liberated by the WAllies instead. But yes, the territory there's difficult.

Of course, but that applies to every single place in the world at the time. Unfortunately for the people there, the whole soft underbelly thing was nothing but Churchill's daydreaming.

[stevep]

   I think the key thing would have been taking Sicily, Sardinia and southern Italy which was achieved fairly early and resulted in the collapse of Mussolini's regime then seek to open another front in the Balkans.  The terrain is rough and logistics are very rocky but that works both ways as its a lot more difficult for the Germans to send forces then and supply them even without allied attacks on their logistics.    There are a number of advantages I see:

a)  Once you get north of Greece the front is markedly wider and hence tied down more Axis forces.

b)  As Max said there are a number of areas in the region which would give support or in the case of Bulgaria especially be willing to flip to the allied side.

c)  If you can get most of Bulgaria liberated that means that:

i)  You can close the lower Danube - an important shipment route and also really hammer Polesti, the primary oil centre available to the Axis.

ii)  There's a good chance of getting Turkey to join the allies which would open the straits.  By far the most efficient way of getting aid to the Red Army in terms of shipping needs. 

d) Of course an additional advantage of this would be a safer front line for the post-war period - albeit that neither Britain nor the US could say that at the time.

[miletus12]

You want to know why TORCH happened the way it did?



The major one is geographic. See Spanish Morocco? The Spanish were neutral. If the TORCH planners could have had their way, it would have been invaded along with French Morocco and Algeria, but neutrality would have been violated and Spain would have entered the war bringing the Luftwaffe into immediate action from Spanish airfields. The TORCH landings would have failed.

The TORCH landings were a SPLIT FRONT operation that had to unite quickly. The Western Task Force had to seize the logistics base ports and the Eastern Task Force had to form a hard shoulder to block the Axis in Libya from moving west while Center Task Force moved inland BEHIND and south of Spanish Morocco to seal it off and make linkup with West and East. It would be lunatic not to understand the necessity of speed to accomplish this practical task.

Ideally, the Allies would have loved to seize the airfields at Bone and Philippeville and Djeddjelli, but that was not possible because the LUftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica was in strength at Bizerte and La Calle and immediately started bombing the landings at Algiers as it was. It was "lucky" the Americans had rigged the political game with the French locally (Robert Murphy), and Algiers was virtually handed over as it was.   

It ultimately kept Spain out of the war and the best German weapon east at the Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and Tunisia airfields from whence it operated and savagely pounded Eastern Task Force which was dangerously far forward and exposed as it was.

Any speculation about moving further east as the British incompetently suggested, ignores the one ramshackle railroad in the region, the absolute lack of viable airfields ashore which the Allies could seize and use that far east and the fact that the Allies did not have the airpower in numbers and quality locally to match the Luftwaffe at that moment in time, either afloat or land based that could be thrown in to make a further landing east work at all.

Further speculation about how operations could have developed, ignores the Atlas Mountains and the absolutely atrocious weather of the period, the greenness of the Allied troops (British troops, too.), the incredible incompetence of Kenneth Anderson as an operational artist, the lack of sea lift for sustainment, and the correct, as it proved, American mistrust of British amphibious capability, ALL of which appeared in the TORCH operation and which bedeviled Eisenhower.

That Eisenhower pulled this high risk operation off (Including the Darlan gambit to stop the French interference in the Allied linkup of the split frontages.), in spite of all the previous mentioned obstacles and well ahead of schedules, shows that he was not just a good general, but a GREAT one, who managed to build a solid professional Anglo-American staff who could plan and execute such dangerous operations. It was why he was picked for HUSKY and later NEPTUNE / OVERLORD instead of Montgomery. 

Now, Fredendall and Anderson is out of the scope of the initial OP, but stupid, ignorant, bull headed and cowardly subordinates are a human factor that explains why the exploitation phase after the divided landings and consolidation succeeded in TORCH, are still an IFFY thing that cannot be foreseen in war. Even the best of the best (Montgomery; OTC during Overlord.), can be hung up by juniors who are incapable in performing their mission assigned roles, (Dempsey and Crocker thoroughly bollixed up Goodwood for Montgomery at Caen.).

When attempting to understand why the Americans told the British "no" to landings further east, those are just some of the reasons...

==========================================================

About the Eastern Front. The number of German divisons involved diverted to handle TORCH and later HUSKY is actually small, about 4 infantry and 2 armored. The 22 or so more after AVALANCHE happens, are well after the Germans lose the war in the Mediterranean.  The important thing that was sucked south into the Mediterranean campaign, though, was THE LUFTWAFFE. Before TORCH, the Germans had rough parity in air power in the East. They, despite their Stalingrad bolo, could assert operational initiative against the inept Russians. After they had to send their TACAIR south into North Africa into Tunisia, they lost that capability and force multiplier on the Russian front. The Russians were then able to operate without the LW seeing what they did and bombing their logistics. That and mortars killed the Wehrmacht in the East.   

==========================================================

Balkans? See Map.



Only an amateur strategist would think that it is a good idea to invade the Balkans.  Weather, terrain, tribal hatreds, ultranationalisms, religious bigotries, lack of roads and rails, few airfields, no viable ports and mountains, mountains, MOUNTAINS. 

If Italy was a nightmare campaign, then multiply it by 5 and you get Churchill's "soft underbelly". 
         

[raharris1973]

Jan 4, 2023 17:05:11 GMT miletus12 said:

If the TORCH planners could have had their way, it would have been invaded along with French Morocco and Algeria, but neutrality would have been violated and Spain would have entered the war bringing the Luftwaffe into immediate action from Spanish airfields. The TORCH landings would have failed.

Which TORCH planners?

American ones or British ones?

In any case, none of us here have proposed invading Spanish Morocco and thus provoking Spain in that way. It's obvious political leaders from the US and UK would have vetoed an extra assault on Spanish-held territory that could provoke Spain, the Americans because they overrated the chances of Spain getting into the war at this point, and the British because Churchill and the conservatives were a little soft on Franco

Ideally, the Allies would have loved to seize the airfields at Bone and Philippeville and Djeddjelli, but that was not possible because the LUftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica was in strength at Bizerte and La Calle and immediately started bombing the landings at Algiers as it was.

The bolded assertion was not true as of the first day of the TORCH invasion, or prior.  Those locations, Bizerte and La Calle, were Vichy French, and thus neutral, and thus off-limits to Luftwaffe and especially Regia Aeronautica forces, indeed any German and Italian military formations, by the terms of the Franco-German armistice. Any local exceptions to this had to be specifically approved at the highest level by Vichy authorities in their zone (as was the case for a few Luftwaffe aircraft in Syria in spring 1941) and there were no such exceptions in French North Africa prior to TORCH.  When the Anglo-American TORCH initial landings began, the closest German and Regia Aeronautica operational bases were in Libya, Sicily, and Pantellaria.

On the contrary, the major reason the Germans and Italians were able to bomb ongoing operations in Algeria, and seize airfields at Bizerte and La Calle after TORCH kicked off, and invade and occupy Tunisia from Libya and Syria and get the confused and out-of-communications French commanders there to surrender to them the day *after* the Anglo-American landings, was *because* the Anglo-Americans did not occupy the airfields at Bone, Philippeville, and Djeddjelli in the early hours of their ops and get themselves in a position to menace and contest the German-Italian land and airfield seizures at points further east.

The extra increment of distance east into the Med was not relevant except for a possible couple hours more worth of detection risk. That's because unlike later Allied invasions, most of the TORCH landings were beyond the range of Allied land-based AirPower which just wasn't close enough, and simply had to depend on carrier-based air power only until local airfields could be captured.

At the the very best, Allied land-based air power from Gibraltar might have been able to help ops as far south as Rabat and Port Lyautey, but no further, and as far east as Oran, but no further.  Malta based AirPower might have been able to reach the east coast of Tunisia, but could have been neutralized by Italian air from Libya, Pantellaria and Sicily, and Allied landing weren't going to be attempted east and south Cape Bon in Tunisia.

[miletus12]

Jan 6, 2023 3:18:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

American ones or British ones?

All of them. I did not differentiate. There was a a lot of military arguments against the split front approach.

Jan 6, 2023 3:18:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

In any case, none of us here have proposed invading Spanish Morocco and thus provoking Spain in that way. It's obvious political leaders from the US and UK would have vetoed an extra assault on Spanish-held territory that could provoke Spain, the Americans because they overrated the chances of Spain getting into the war at this point, and the British because Churchill and the conservatives were a little soft on Franco

They did veto the Spanish Morocco assault on political grounds, but insisted that French North Africa be invaded anyway. As early as February 1941, American planners, not British, as claimed in popular British histories were investigating that possibility. Why do you think FDR took the political heat in maintaining ties with "Vichy France"?

Jan 6, 2023 3:18:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

The bolded assertion was not true as of the first day of the TORCH invasion, or prior.  Those locations, Bizerte and La Calle, were Vichy French, and thus neutral, and thus off-limits to Luftwaffe and especially Regia Aeronautica forces, indeed any German and Italian military formations, by the terms of the Franco-German armistice. Any local exceptions to this had to be specifically approved at the highest level by Vichy authorities in their zone (as was the case for a few Luftwaffe aircraft in Syria in spring 1941) and there were no such exceptions in French North Africa prior to TORCH.  When the Anglo-American TORCH initial landings began, the closest German and Regia Aeronautica operational bases were in Libya, Sicily, and Pantellaria.

and I dispute this.

Describing airfields in Tunisia is problematic because of the nature of much of the terrain, at least that part without mountains. The ground was generally level and hard-packed so often aircraft could land and take off from any place that looked suitable. Of the 282 airfields, landing grounds and airstrips identified in Tunisia by 28 November 1943, those few not listed here were too insignificant and void of activity to merit mention.

In short, the LW could mark out an instant landing strip, hop over, forward arm and refuel and BOMB and they did not need the French permission for anything, because the rear area for the DAK and the Italians was functionally Tunisia as sooon as TORCH happened.

And what about Libya? From where did Rommel get his close air support as he retreated to behind the Mareth Line? Pantellaria? (Out of range.)

Jan 6, 2023 3:18:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

On the contrary, the major reason the Germans and Italians were able to bomb ongoing operations in Algeria, and seize airfields at Bizerte and La Calle after TORCH kicked off, and invade and occupy Tunisia from Libya and Syria and get the confused and out-of-communications French commanders there to surrender to them the day *after* the Anglo-American landings, was *because* the Anglo-Americans did not occupy the airfields at Bone, Philippeville, and Djeddjelli in the early hours of their ops and get themselves in a position to menace and contest the German-Italian land and airfield seizures at points further east.

To reach Bone, try tacking on two days (48 houra) steam time and almost instant detection at the projected port that is the airfield location.   

Day after is still being bombed during the unloading of Eastern Task Force at Algiers, which took a week, would you not say? And as the quote I cited points out, the Tunisian plateau was one gigantic aerodrome, whereas further west the few French airfields were coastal or isolated valley strips surrounded or bracketed by the Atlas Mountains, poorly maintained, poorly supplied by barely accessible communications and little better than fighter strips that needed weeks if not months of American improvements and extensions for medium bombers.

Jan 6, 2023 3:18:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

The extra increment of distance east into the Med was not relevant except for a possible couple hours more worth of detection risk. That's because unlike later Allied invasions, most of the TORCH landings were beyond the range of Allied land-based AirPower which just wasn't close enough, and simply had to depend on carrier-based air power only until local airfields could be captured.

Convoy rates of advance were averaged at 8-10 knots during WWII, and unloading an attack transport took 2 to 3 days minimum to a full week if there were no quays, lighters or stevedores and crane support at the final destination. This is a very time-lengthy operation where the freighter is a sitting duck. Please explain how a British aircraft carrier, which has never done this kind of static immobile off the beach fleet air defense is supposed to counter Fliegerkorps X, who admittedly are incompetent, or the Regia Aeronautica, who are not, when it comes to antiship work?

On the opposite side of the world, a much better fleet, with recent battle experience against enemy land based air, was having a very hard time conducting an amphibious operation at a little island. Admittedly, the Japanese were a lot better at naval air warfare than the Germans, but then the Japanese were 580 nautical miles further away at Rabaul, and WATCHTOWER was a lot smaller and not as exposed as the Eastern Task Force was to Ju-88s only 440 nautical miles away. And now it is proposed to steam 200 nautical miles closer to the Germans, allowing FULL BOMB LOAD Ju-88s instead of half bomb load Ju-88s to reach the ships trying to land troops off the beaches of Bone, now known as Annaba, Algeria.

Let us look at that suicide operation shall we?



How about the harbor?

Do you see any breakwater or weather break? How about over the one accessible sheltered beach?



You know of what that reminds me? Massacre Valley on Attu. There is a reason Massacre Valley was named Massacre Valley, an obvious one.

Jan 6, 2023 3:18:36 GMT raharris1973 said:

At the the very best, Allied land-based air power from Gibraltar might have been able to help ops as far south as Rabat and Port Lyautey, but no further, and as far east as Oran, but no further.  Malta based AirPower might have been able to reach the east coast of Tunisia, but could have been neutralized by Italian air from Libya, Pantellaria and Sicily, and Allied landing weren't going to be attempted east and south Cape Bon in Tunisia.

Out of range; there was not enough hardstand space on Gibraltar for medium bombers. Malta was similarly handicapped. You need medium bombers to make those distances with counterairfield missions.    

[stevep]

   Actually the funny thing was that Franco was panicking until the bulk of the forces sailed through the straits and then landed in FNA as he was fearing fascist Spain was the target.

  As raharris1973, other than a few logistics forces for supplying Rommel and the Italians in Tunisia - which was already a breach of the armistice terms and had upset a lot of the Vichy military in FNA there were NO Axis forces in Tunisia.  If allied forces land and assuming that the local forces put up no resistance - as they did everywhere other than ironically on the Atlantic coast against the American forces - then how would the Axis get forces into Tunisia to establish even the most primitive of bases, let alone bringing over ground crew, fuel, munitions, spares etc for operation from those bases?  As miletus12, said

because the rear area for the DAK and the Italians was functionally Tunisia as sooon as TORCH happened.

  i.e. after the landings occupied the ports that the Axis would need to get people across to set up and guard those airfields.

  At the time the Germans were somewhat distracted by a small event in the lower Volga area i.e. the counter attack that was isolating 6th Army in the ruins of Stalingrad.  The main forces in N Africa were something like a thousand miles away retreating in disorder from 2nd El Alamein.  They did manage to commit a lot of air and a fair amount of ground forces to Tunisia but that was because they were able to land unopposed there and then push to gain the region before British forces could cross from the landing areas in eastern Algeria.

  Yes its a gamble but any operation in war had an element of risk.  It would also have doomed the forces retreating from Egypt very quickly and clear N Africa probably by the end of the year as those in Libya would have been forced to surrender or simply isolated.

  There would have been down sides.  The inexperience of a lot of the forces exposed by the OTL operation wouldn't have been exposed and also there would have been a smaller total 'bag' of captured forces as well as markedly lower Luftwaffe losses.  Which could have made things costlier for the Soviets and possibly later operations in Italy or in the Bomber Offensive.  On the other hand Hitler could have wasted most of those additional forces on trying to hold the over-extended line in the east as he did OTL.

[miletus12]

Jan 6, 2023 15:43:24 GMT stevep said:

i.e. after the landings occupied the ports that the Axis would need to get people across to set up and guard those airfields.

24 hours as actually historically happened in Tunisia. Not once but many times, we see the Germans do these things; espcially the Luftwaffe from which the USAF copied its postwar REDHORSE construction and airfield setup doctrine and operational methods. The Germans may have been overall logistics nitwits, but they were always tactically in movement on land much faster than the allies in WWII as Norway, Denmark, southern France, Italy and Yugoslavia proved when it came to speed of takeover of a country unable to mount much of a defense.

[stevep]

Jan 6, 2023 17:55:13 GMT miletus12 said:

Jan 6, 2023 15:43:24 GMT stevep said:

i.e. after the landings occupied the ports that the Axis would need to get people across to set up and guard those airfields.

24 hours as actually historically happened in Tunisia. Not once but many times, we see the Germans do these things; espcially the Luftwaffe from which the USAF copied its postwar REDHORSE construction and airfield setup doctrine and operational methods. The Germans may have been overall logistics nitwits, but they were always tactically in movement on land much faster than the allies in WWII as Norway, Denmark, southern France, Italy and Yugoslavia proved when it came to speed of takeover of a country unable to mount much of a defense.

  So the Germans fly in engineers and ground crew to be captured.  Can live with that.

[American hist]

the alllies could have landed in more east as the british prefered while leaving a much smaller western Africa task force.

[miletus12]

Jan 7, 2023 12:49:00 GMT stevep said:

Jan 6, 2023 17:55:13 GMT miletus12 said:

24 hours as actually historically happened in Tunisia. Not once but many times, we see the Germans do these things; espcially the Luftwaffe from which the USAF copied its postwar REDHORSE construction and airfield setup doctrine and operational methods. The Germans may have been overall logistics nitwits, but they were always tactically in movement on land much faster than the allies in WWII as Norway, Denmark, southern France, Italy and Yugoslavia proved when it came to speed of takeover of a country unable to mount much of a defense.

  So the Germans fly in engineers and ground crew to be captured.  Can live with that.

How will they be captured?

See map.



If you look hard at the road net, you will see that inald from the coast, there is none, except the one that passes through Tabessa and Kasserine. The Allies tried that route. How did that work out? NOT TOO GOOD. 

See picture. 



I did mention that Tunisia was a plateau? (^^^). in 1942, it was colder and there was more of that white stuff. Also the roads were worse.  Just because the place is North Africa does not mean it is flat, or not akin to Tennessee.





Pay careful attention to Eisenhower's words.

MUD, lack of trucks, faulty (British) intelligence and (British) tactical dispositions, and a cowardly yellow American general, (Fredendall), combined. Note that American casualties at Kasserine were not just caused ny German kinetics, but by weather. Our soldiers suffered from frostbite, trenchfoot and the usual weather induced and aided medical problems.

I should point out that the lessons about weather and logistics and terrain effects were not just German mistakes.       



  

  

[raharris1973]

Here is a time-lapse view of the action in November for the first 8 days - it's a shame it is not hour by hour:


The Allied eastern task force in OTL landed in the Algiers region at its furthest extent starting Nov 8th. They start an uninterrupted daily expansion in Algeria. The Axis show up in Tunis (like literally just the city in the far north) on the 9th. The Axis solidify control over all Tunisia by the 11th and 12th, but the Allies succeeded in doing a lodgment in Algeria nearly at the Algerian-Tunisian border (so likely at Bone, if not at Bone, then probably Philippeville) on Nov 12th. On the 15th, the Allies controlled the entire Algerian coast road and crossed over a little into Tunisia.

If the Allies shift each task force that lands on the 8th eastward, skipping the Morocco Atlantic landing entirely, as the British were proposing, because they didn't think Spanish entry at this late date was realistic, then the Allies are landing as far east as Bone and possibly La Calle on day 1, Nov 8th, 24 hours before the Axis are touching Tunisia, and 48 to 72 hours before the Vichy French in Tunisia are completely surrendered to the Axis.

The Axis may try to get into Tunisia, and they may succeed in grabbing a chunk of it. As Miletus said, they were pretty skilled muggers against unprepared countries, but they are trying to do it by flying and shipping in.  Over the 10th through 12th, the Vichy commander in Tunisia may well have surrendered, but to the *Allies* and now be cooperating with them.  Plus, in avoiding the Moroccan coast landing, the Americans are avoiding the only place where the French fought hard, everywhere else, Vichy resistance was desultory and faded within a couple hours.

So, there's a chance that Tunis could be surrendered and occupied by the 12th for the Allies and the rest of Tunisia by the 16th, without the Axis having a chance to get in edgewise, based on historically shown rates of Allied advance shown in the animation.

Or, if Germany still gets a decent lodgment in Tunisia, that stretches out combat, like it was in OTL, but the Anglo-Americans have more of their force forward from earlier in the fight, they don't need any units to catch up from Morocco because they are already in Algeria, so the Axis should ultimately be ground out earlier.  

There's nothing about the geography of this situation that should expose landing forces to more fatal doses of AirPower in the first crucial 24 hours since the Axis weren't in Tunisia yet. Where are the Axis going to hit from? Sardinia? Based on your range of estimates of how Gibraltar fighters couldn't reach Port Lyautey, I don't think Sardinia has the range to Algeria.

----The Battle of Kasserine Pass, over 4 months later than this PoD, in different weather, with the involvement of Rommel, with high-ground geography that may be bypassed and made irrelevant by events on the coast road and political events, is neither here nor there for the purposes of this discussion.---
 

[raharris1973]

Jan 4, 2023 17:05:11 GMT miletus12 said:

Balkans? See Map.



Only an amateur strategist would think that it is a good idea to invade the Balkans.  Weather, terrain, tribal hatreds, ultranationalisms, religious bigotries, lack of roads and rails, few airfields, no viable ports and mountains, mountains, MOUNTAINS. 

If Italy was a nightmare campaign, then multiply it by 5 and you get Churchill's "soft underbelly". 

Interesting how you arrive at the scientifically precise value of "5 times worse" than Italy.

In any case, here are the two alternative proposals I am judging between, because its important to compare a proposal with its alternatives, not some ideal:

The Balkan invasion proposal on the table is stevep's, which does not kick in until *after* securing Sicily and southern Italy. So that means it can't really start until December 1944 or November 1944 at the earliest, because the invasion of Italy was in September and consolidation of the south, Naples, and Foggia airfields took through October. Stevep want's to do it on a wide front (because that's one of the advantages) and get operations going ultimately north of Greece.

The alternative that this competes against, is using the same forces to keep pushing directly northward up the Italian peninsula, aided by the landing at Anzio in January 1944, OTL's Italian front course of action.

stevep is saying his alternative could be better, Miletus is saying the balkan choice would be 5 times worse.

Miletus helpfully gives us a list of factors:

Weather, terrain, tribal hatreds, ultranationalisms, religious bigotries, lack of roads and rails, few airfields, no viable ports and mountains, mountains, MOUNTAINS

Weather - I'm not sure, but as Southern European peninsulas, I figure the weather in Italy, and the Balkans south of the Save and Danube rivers would be about the same in the different seasons between November 1943 and the end of the war in May 1945. - I'd count weather as a wash, maybe slight advantage to the more thoroughly sea-moderated Italy.

Tribal hatreds & ultranationalisms & religious bigotries - The Balkans has more of these, especially the western Balkans and Yugoslavia. This means it's hard to get people to cooperate if that is your goal. But at the same time, this is not specifically an anti-Allied factor, it works against the Axis too, for every enemy or ally they get, you get one too. If you look like you're the ascending power, groups will be looking out for themselves first, but competing for your favor, which can be used. Everybody is using everybody cynically.

- to provide a balance or comparison, Italy isn't 100% non-problematic- it is a formerly enemy country with a war weary population that hates the Germans mostly, but is not entirely enthused about engaging actively on the Allied cause, and there is still an Italian Fascist puppet movement.

To sum these up, all these political factors are messy, but they cut both ways, against both the attacker and defender

lack of roads and rails - Italy's infrastructure, especially in the center and north, is truly more dense and developed than the Balkans. That is more convenient for an invader. It cuts both ways for defender reinforcement. But I'll grant this as advantage for the Italian venue for the party on the strategic offensive, the Allies. Advantage Italy, but not 5x.

few airfields - similar effect to roads and rails, basically Balkan operations will consume more Allied engineering resources to build more of these as ops go on. Advantage Italy, but not 5x.

no viable ports - I'll rephrase to fewer, lower capacity, further between ports - similar effects to fewer roads and rails. Balkans will consume more Allied engineering resources. Advantage Italy.

Mountains, mountains, mountains (and I saved terrain for this part too)- Look at the map, the Balkans, Italy, they're all mountainous! There's no way the Balkans are 5x more mountainous though, or even more mountainous per square kilometer or as a percentage of national territory (except in comparison with Albania).

Mountains and terrain are worth a whole other post to unpack-more to come on that, but Italy does not come out well in the comparison with Balkans, and it gets worth the further north and closer to Germany you go.