WI Gallipoli landing works & progresses but the Turks fight for every bottleneck?

[raharris1973]

WI Gallipoli landing works & progresses but the Turks still fight for every subsequent bottleneck to the limits of the physical capability?

What if the the Gallipoli landing works in terms of the Alled forces establishing their beach-head, getting supplying going, being able to finish taking the peninsula and then expand beyond the peninsula, and destroying the Ottoman guns and forces in the way...
...but not having a 'cooperative' enemy that panics and gives up the war over this.

Instead the Ottoman enemy continues to feed reinforcements from wherever it can to the battle, especially urban warfare, defends additional bottlenecks after Gallipolli and fires upon the Entente from the Asian shore?

Would the Entente need to do a series of consecutive serious operations, from Gallipoli east across Thrace to besiege Constantinople --> storming Constantinople------> crossing the Bosporus into the Asian side at Istanbul Bogazi to clear Turkish infantry and slience Turkish guns ------> cross from Gallipoli to the Asian side in Cannakale to clear the Turkish infantry and silence the Turkish guns----> and possibly unite the Asian wings to seize the back-up Ottoman capital at Bursa, in order to:
1. Restore the straits as a reliably working waterway
2. Destroy completely the Turkish ability to resist Allied terms or to contest the straits

What are the longer and shorter timeframes this might take?

Once the British led Entente forces capture (and repair) any loading docks or wharves at the Bosporus/Black Sea end of the straits, would the Russians transport any infantry units to the city or Thrace to take part in the remaining clean-up of Ottoman resistance? Or to take on garrison duties in areas where fighting is done?

Or would wartime operations and garrisons be left entirely to the British led forces that did most of the conquering, with the Russians awaiting handover of the straits at the end of the war, per treaty.

If the Russians do send reinforcements or garrisons in wartime, would it be more because of them volunteering, or the British asking?

If there is no Entente agreement to send Russians in wartime to the straits, will that be because of Russia being lazy or Britain being exclusionary?

If it is Russia being lazy but still expecting a hand over at the end of the war, is that not super naive on their part?

If it is the British being is exclusionary, what does that mean for Russian morale and Entente relations overall for the rest of the war?

With great achievements come great problems. Or at least questions.

[simon darkshade]

Where is the peninsula at its narrowest? Right at the neck, at the Gulf of Saros. Take that narrow and the Turkish forces behind it in the peninsula wither on the vine.

[lordroel]

May 4, 2023 1:19:49 GMT simon darkshade said:

Where is the peninsula at its narrowest? Right at the neck, at the Gulf of Saros. Take that narrow and the Turkish forces behind it in the peninsula wither on the vine.

You mean where on the map the word Dardanelles is.

[stevep]

May 4, 2023 0:43:32 GMT raharris1973 said:

WI Gallipoli landing works & progresses but the Turks still fight for every subsequent bottleneck to the limits of the physical capability?

What if the the Gallipoli landing works in terms of the Alled forces establishing their beach-head, getting supplying going, being able to finish taking the peninsula and then expand beyond the peninsula, and destroying the Ottoman guns and forces in the way...
...but not having a 'cooperative' enemy that panics and gives up the war over this.

Instead the Ottoman enemy continues to feed reinforcements from wherever it can to the battle, especially urban warfare, defends additional bottlenecks after Gallipolli and fires upon the Entente from the Asian shore?

Would the Entente need to do a series of consecutive serious operations, from Gallipoli east across Thrace to besiege Constantinople --> storming Constantinople------> crossing the Bosporus into the Asian side at Istanbul Bogazi to clear Turkish infantry and slience Turkish guns ------> cross from Gallipoli to the Asian side in Cannakale to clear the Turkish infantry and silence the Turkish guns----> and possibly unite the Asian wings to seize the back-up Ottoman capital at Bursa, in order to:
1. Restore the straits as a reliably working waterway
2. Destroy completely the Turkish ability to resist Allied terms or to contest the straits

What are the longer and shorter timeframes this might take?

Once the British led Entente forces capture (and repair) any loading docks or wharves at the Bosporus/Black Sea end of the straits, would the Russians transport any infantry units to the city or Thrace to take part in the remaining clean-up of Ottoman resistance? Or to take on garrison duties in areas where fighting is done?

Or would wartime operations and garrisons be left entirely to the British led forces that did most of the conquering, with the Russians awaiting handover of the straits at the end of the war, per treaty.

If the Russians do send reinforcements or garrisons in wartime, would it be more because of them volunteering, or the British asking?

If there is no Entente agreement to send Russians in wartime to the straits, will that be because of Russia being lazy or Britain being exclusionary?

If it is Russia being lazy but still expecting a hand over at the end of the war, is that not super naive on their part?

If it is the British being is exclusionary, what does that mean for Russian morale and Entente relations overall for the rest of the war?

With great achievements come great problems. Or at least questions.

  That would depend a lot on the exact details.  At this stage the Ottomans were still physically isolated from the central powers with Serbia being in the allied camp and Greece, Bulgaria and Romania.  neutral.  Also after Enver Pasha's disaster in Armenia the previous winter they were being pressed hard by the Russians, especially along the Black Sea coastline and a British army was advancing up the Euphrates.  If the allied command had been a bit better organised and more forceful in the initial advance then they might have secured a much bigger lodgement that would have been easier to support.

  As I understand it the plan was not to advance overland to Constantinople but to open the straits so that the allied fleet could threaten Constantinople, which at the time contained the only real military arsenal in the empire and also to isolate it from Anatolia.  The expectation I think was to force the Turks to make peace.  Have read that some at least of the Young Turks talked about abandoning the straits area and retreating into the interior as they did for the latter war with Greece.  This would have meant that the war technically continues but such a retreat would cut them off from the bulk of available resources and also prevent them blocking the straits.  Either way its likely to gravely weaken the Turkish opposition to the allies.  However if there is a determination to fight on and no other faction joins the conflict then it could take some time to actually secure the straits for passage.  In such a case once its clear for Russian forces to land I think they would be.  The region had already been promised to Russia and Russian would have been best positioned to supply substantial forces for garrisoning and securing the region.

  The big short term impact could be that one or more local powers take a different route.  Its extremely unlikely that Bulgaria will join the central powers here which means the conquest of Serbia will be a markedly tougher task for the CP and also it won't be a threat to Romania if/when that nation joins the allies, which might be earlier here.  There is a possibility that Greece might also join the allies earlier due to either the chance to secure say the Smyrna region or possibly to protect Greeks under perceived threat of massacre by the Turks.  The other result with that could be that this would open up a clear supply route to Serbia via Salonika which would enable them to be supplied and also reinforced by the allies.  Opening up a route by which Serbia stays in the war and is reinforced would maintain another front for Austria when Italy joins and with a continued threat by Russia and could drastically change the dynamics and duration of the war.

  Given the prior commitment and the probable arrival of Russian forces once practical then unless the war lasts long enough for Russia to still collapse I think that much of the straits will be under their control after the war but how easy it would be to hang onto I don't know.  This could actually prompt Greece into alliance with Britain as the two great powers, with the German threat removed are likely to see their relationship cool.  What would happen in Turkey would depend on circumstances.

[simon darkshade]

May 4, 2023 3:42:04 GMT lordroel said:

May 4, 2023 1:19:49 GMT simon darkshade said:

Where is the peninsula at its narrowest? Right at the neck, at the Gulf of Saros. Take that narrow and the Turkish forces behind it in the peninsula wither on the vine.

You mean where on the map the word Dardanelles is.

Look at the second “s” in Saros. Draw a line from that to where the shoreline bends from a fairly straight line to the east to a sharp NE.

Land a force there and push across to the Sea of Marmara. Bulair could possibly be taken by coup de main if enough troops are landed with support of naval gunfire.

tr.pinterest.com/pin/292734044528276541/

That should show the topography.

[stevep]

May 4, 2023 11:28:33 GMT simon darkshade said:

May 4, 2023 3:42:04 GMT lordroel said:

You mean where on the map the word Dardanelles is.

Look at the second “s” in Saros. Draw a line from that to where the shoreline bends from a fairly straight line to the east to a sharp NE.

Land a force there and push across to the Sea of Marmara. Bulair could possibly be taken by coup de main if enough troops are landed with support of naval gunfire.

tr.pinterest.com/pin/292734044528276541/

That should show the topography.

  IIRC weren't the Turks expecting exactly that so they had the bulk of their defensive forces in that region.  Think there were only 2 divisions in the main part of the peninsula which were nearly overwhelmed by the initial landings.  If you land further north then its a shorter route to isolate the peninsula by land - but not by sea - but your likely to face markedly more forces opposing the landings. 

  Given also there seemed to have been a lack of real experience for the operation, with security being poor and bad loading of men and equipment as well.  As I say it could still have succeeded in the south and quite possibly with a Saros landing as well but there were problems with the organisation and operation of the landings.

[simon darkshade]

The Turks had two divisions and a cavalry brigade as a strategic reserve, plus one at Maidos and two down towards Helles. The chief reason given was that the RN didn't have charts of the Gulf of Bulair/Saros and were afraid of being 'trapped there'.

At Bulair, they had the 7th Division

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_at_Cape_Helles#/media/File:Map_of_Turkish_forces_at_Gallipoli_April_1915.png

Don't plow the fleet straight into the Dardanelles, but keep back and maintain as much surprise as possible. Suck one of the Turk divisions in as an immediate response to a diversionary landing at Suvla Bay and then hit Bulair with the main landing of ~5 divisions. It would be bloody, but the beaches and topography are far more friendly, with far more gentle hills in the middle to get over compared to Anzac Cove.

[miletus12]

MAPS.





British accounts of this disaster never show you the complete military problem. Besides the hills and forts behind the narrows that defend the one approach to Istanbul, there lies Bulgaria to the north, who hate Britain's stinking guts because of something that happened to them in 1912. And then you have minefields and fortified islands in the sea of Marmara and this little problem.



When you consider that Gallipoli was mounted by the same clown club that split Greece politically down the middle to the present day, and created the WWI Salonika permanent do nothing vacation spot for 600,000+ British, French and Serbian soldiers, that was a 2-year rest home with the side benefits of mud, rotten food, hostile locals and such joys as dysentery, cholera and malaria, (^^^) that might not seem like too much to tackle?    

[stevep]

May 4, 2023 19:48:29 GMT miletus12 said:

MAPS.





British accounts of this disaster never show you the complete military problem. Besides the hills and forts behind the narrows that defend the one approach to Istanbul, there lies Bulgaria to the north, who hate Britain's stinking guts because of something that happened to them in 1912. And then you have minefields and fortified islands in the sea of Marmara and this little problem.



When you consider that Gallipoli was mounted by the same clown club that split Greece politically down the middle to the present day, and created the WWI Salonika permanent do nothing vacation spot for 600,000+ British, French and Serbian soldiers, that was a 2-year rest home with the side benefits of mud, rotten food, hostile locals and such joys as dysentery, cholera and malaria, (^^^) that might not seem like too much to tackle?    

  It was the Russians the Bulgarians were angry at for what they considered a betrayal in 1912-13.  At the same time they knew their position was vulnerable given how many neighbours were unfriendly to them so jumping on what looks the winning side is far from unlikely.  OTL they made the mistake of assuming that the Germans were the winners because allied offensives at Gallipoli and in France had failed while Germany had driven Russia out of its Polish provinces.  Here with different developments they could jump the other way.  The main thing however is that they don't join the CPs.

  I assume that's the Goeben?  It had been significantly damaged by hitting two mines the previous December and given the Turks lacked the dockyards to do proper repairs so the holes were plugged with concrete.  The wiki article on her also mentions failed attempts to hinder the Gallipoli operation then

On 1 May, Yavuz sailed to the Bay of Beikos in the Bosphorus after the Russian fleet bombarded the fortifications at the mouth of the Bosphorus. Around 7 May, Yavuz sortied from the Bosphorus in search of Russian ships as far as Sevastopol, but found none. Running short on main gun ammunition, she did not bombard Sevastopol. While returning on the morning of 10 May, Yavuz's lookouts spotted two Russian pre-dreadnoughts, Tri Sviatitelia and Panteleimon, and she opened fire. Within the first ten minutes she had been hit twice, although she was not seriously damaged. Admiral Souchon disengaged and headed for the Bosphorus, pursued by Russian light forces.[34] Later that month two of the ship's 15 cm guns were taken ashore for use there,[4] and the four 8.8 cm guns in the aft superstructure were removed at the same time.[35] Four 8.8 cm anti-aircraft were installed on the aft superstructure by the end of 1915.[36]

and a bit later in the year

On 21 September, Yavuz Sultan Selim was again sent out of the Bosphorus to drive off three Russian destroyers which had been attacking Turkish coal ships. Escort missions continued until 14 November, when the submarine Morzh nearly hit Yavuz with two torpedoes just outside the Bosphorus. Admiral Souchon decided the risk to the battlecruiser was too great, and suspended the convoy system. In its stead, only those ships fast enough to make the journey from Zonguldak to Constantinople in a single night were permitted; outside the Bosphorus they would be met by torpedo boats to defend them against the lurking submarines.[38] By the end of the summer, the completion of two new Russian dreadnought battleships, Imperatritsa Mariya and Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya, further curtailed Yavuz's activities.[39]

  As such it was of limited value in either the southern or northern approaches to the straits and if direct contact with the CPs by Bulgaria joining them and then the resulting collapse of Serbian resistance hadn't been obtained it would have been even more of a wasting asset.

[miletus12]

1. The Balkan Wars were a complex mishmash of double and triple crosses, broken alliances and broken promises. Bulgaria was the mostly abused, lied and cozened among the participants with the Serbs being the worst liars, cozeners and connivers, closely followed by the Greeks. The BRITISH were playing their usual "clever games" among the participants, trying to jockey for advantage in the region.

The British, from an objective point of view as far as Bulgaria was concerned, since they sided with the Greeks and Serbs, were just as guilty or more so, than Russia.

2. The Goeben was a mobile floating GERMAN gun battery with excellent fire control, available against mostly obsolete, badly designed, badly handled and incompetently crewed Entente pre-dreadnoughts. The good stuff was tied up in the North Sea (British) watching the Germans; or in the western Med, (French) watching the Italians while supposedly containing the Austro-Hungarians.

3. Those two Russian battleships?  Are you kidding? They are RUSSIAN.  

4. Submarine Morzh was bombed, was she not? More than 1 way to skin a Russian. 

[simon darkshade]

Mod hat: The last two interjection posts by Miletus are drifting right off topic and into familiar anti-British territory. Cease and desist.

When there is a WI, work with it, rather than railing at OTL. This does not mean completely being bound by it, as can be seen by my suggested means to achieving the end in the second post, but it does mean not posting a lot of peripheral matters without taking the WI into account.

[raharris1973]

I am not going to deny that Allied success at Gallipoli is going to have pro-Allied effects. Diplomatic: Bulgarian reluctance to join the CP, Ottoman seeking of the exits from the war. Military: At a minimum, a redirection of Ottoman military attention and forces inward, potential bombardment/destruction of Constantinople armory/war industry, potential Ottoman capitulation - if terms can be reached, and opening of the straits to Allied military and commercial traffic.


But, even a full success of the occupation of the peninsula, and the passage of British battleships to bring the Ottoman capital under their guns does not guarantee, all by itself, Ottoman capitulation at the level of the Armistice of Mudros and Treaty of Sevres, as a prompt next order consequence. The Ottomans in OTL accepted those terms after more years of hard fighting and land losses on multiple fronts. Here they would be faced with quicker land losses and force losses at the capital, but fewer overall losses. If the Allies offer softer terms than Mudros and Sevres that get the Turks out of the war and don't overly carve them up a la Sykes-Picot, the Turks would accept and open the straits, but if they see amputations of not just the straits and the Arab provinces but chunks of Anatolia to Greece and Italy they will try to fight on for longer.

Even in OTL, Mudros was a pretty debilitating armistice with pretty comprehensive disarmament and wide permissions for Allied movement, but when the Turks saw different groups like the French, Italians, Greeks, and Armenians encroach beyond what they thought the limits of toleration and the signed treaties were, they rallied resistance and had a successful war of independence to win back Anatolia and Thrace. Even though in theory in wartime, all their military industry was in Constantinople, they must have moved some arms manufacturing and repair into the interior over the course of their war of independence after WWII under the Allies' noses.

So, while not being anything as vast in scale as the OTL Ottoman fronts, or as bad as the OTL Gallipoli disaster, Kut al-Amara disaster, and effects of the closed straits, an early apparent Entente 'victory' against the Ottomans in 1915 or 1916 could be more of a false dawn than meets the eye. Essentially the theater becoming again more of a sideshow and distraction than wanted or expected because of Turkish resistance and rebellion against a set of over-harsh surrender terms, all distracting from higher priority missions for minor Allied powers like the Greeks of liberating Serbia and the other Allies of concentrating against Austria and Germany.

What I've just tried to emphasize is that it is not a single silver bullet and then all Middle East problems disappear, so its not like redeem Gallipoli and its automatically game over for the OE like the:

Wicked Witch Melting


Death Star


Dracula

[stevep]

May 8, 2023 3:21:49 GMT raharris1973 said:

I am not going to deny that Allied success at Gallipoli is going to have pro-Allied effects. Diplomatic: Bulgarian reluctance to join the CP, Ottoman seeking of the exits from the war. Military: At a minimum, a redirection of Ottoman military attention and forces inward, potential bombardment/destruction of Constantinople armory/war industry, potential Ottoman capitulation - if terms can be reached, and opening of the straits to Allied military and commercial traffic.


But, even a full success of the occupation of the peninsula, and the passage of British battleships to bring the Ottoman capital under their guns does not guarantee, all by itself, Ottoman capitulation at the level of the Armistice of Mudros and Treaty of Sevres, as a prompt next order consequence. The Ottomans in OTL accepted those terms after more years of hard fighting and land losses on multiple fronts. Here they would be faced with quicker land losses and force losses at the capital, but fewer overall losses. If the Allies offer softer terms than Mudros and Sevres that get the Turks out of the war and don't overly carve them up a la Sykes-Picot, the Turks would accept and open the straits, but if they see amputations of not just the straits and the Arab provinces but chunks of Anatolia to Greece and Italy they will try to fight on for longer.

Even in OTL, Mudros was a pretty debilitating armistice with pretty comprehensive disarmament and wide permissions for Allied movement, but when the Turks saw different groups like the French, Italians, Greeks, and Armenians encroach beyond what they thought the limits of toleration and the signed treaties were, they rallied resistance and had a successful war of independence to win back Anatolia and Thrace. Even though in theory in wartime, all their military industry was in Constantinople, they must have moved some arms manufacturing and repair into the interior over the course of their war of independence after WWII under the Allies' noses.

So, while not being anything as vast in scale as the OTL Ottoman fronts, or as bad as the OTL Gallipoli disaster, Kut al-Amara disaster, and effects of the closed straits, an early apparent Entente 'victory' against the Ottomans in 1915 or 1916 could be more of a false dawn than meets the eye. Essentially the theater becoming again more of a sideshow and distraction than wanted or expected because of Turkish resistance and rebellion against a set of over-harsh surrender terms, all distracting from higher priority missions for minor Allied powers like the Greeks of liberating Serbia and the other Allies of concentrating against Austria and Germany.

What I've just tried to emphasize is that it is not a single silver bullet and then all Middle East problems disappear, so its not like redeem Gallipoli and its automatically game over for the OE like the:

Wicked Witch Melting


Death Star


Dracula

  Fully agree.  A lot depends on the details.  I have read that elements of the government at least planned to abandon Constantinople and retire into the Anatolian heartland, as they did later during the war with Greece.  As such its likely that some would fight on from the interior but:

a)  They would be even more isolated and devoid of supplies than before and this is likely to prompt further allied actions and ultimately demands, which could ultimately end up with a Mudros or Sevres type agreement.  Don't think anything like that was planned at the time although there were ideas for Russia to have control of the straits.  You might see the Basra region carved off as a British protectorate to secure the approaches to the Gulf and the Persian oil supplies at the time or possibly some reaction to reports of the Armenian genocide coming out but if the Turks do give in quickly their likely to get very moderate terms.  After all the primes aim of the allies is defeating Germany as the primary threat.

b)  By withdrawing from the straits region such hard liners would give the allies what they wanted - full access between Russia and the western allies so their obtained their primary aim.

c)  Also such a desertion leaves most Turks with the worse of both worlds, with the straits and the capital, plus probably other regions if fighting continues occupied but no actual peace.  Your likely to see the allies set up an alternative government, possibly based in the Bursa region and help it try and suppress such groups, probably with a decent amount of success.

 

[michelvan]

even wen the Gallipoli landing was different planned
and Kemal Atatürk replaced by total incompetent superior

The issue is to keep it under Entente controle
north are Bulgarian, Austria-Hungary and German Armies, in East Germans and Ottomans
Original planned as supply line to Russia and relief for Russian front
This hier end in stalemate,
The British and French fighting a lost cause in Gallipoli and unable to supply Russia

[miletus12]

May 8, 2023 12:32:54 GMT michelvan said:

even wen the Gallipoli landing was different planned
and Kemal Atatürk replaced by total incompetent superior

The issue is to keep it under Entente controle
north are Bulgarian, Austria-Hungary and German Armies, in East Germans and Ottomans
Original planned as supply line to Russia and relief for Russian front
This hier end in stalemate,
The British and French fighting a lost cause in Gallipoli and unable to supply Russia

That is a succinct description of the geography and the force on force situation, not to mention the weather, the lack of a secure railroad from Greece to the Black Sea or the numbers and cargo volume of shipping to supply the million men needed to hold the route open on the European and Asia Minor shoreline sides of the strait, not to mention the additional sealift to supply the food, munitions and MEN needed to help the Russians stay in the fight. 

It was a fool's errand, when other accessible routes could be developed for far less costs and effort.