What if Australia (or metro Britain) occupies German Micronesia in WWI? How are interwar US & Japane

[raharris1973]

It was well within the realm of physical and political possibility for Australia, or metro Britain, to have beaten Japan to the punch and occupied some or all of the Micronesian island chains that in OTL became the Japanese League of Nations Mandate in the interwar years.

Without changing history much, Australia/Britain is the second-most likely inheritor of these islands after Japan, because WWI, more likely than the USA for instance.

The Japanese occupied the later mandated islands as an afterthought, initially without civilian government or Genro direction, initially thinking of only Qingdao in China when threatening and declaring war on Germany in August-September 1914. The Japanese Navy stretched its orders to work against the threat of German raiders in the Pacific, to occupy the lightly held German islands of Micronesia north of the equator only in October 1914.

In the southern hemisphere, the Antipodean Dominions of the British Empire were much quicker off the mark initially, with the New Zealanders occupying western (German) Samoa, and the Australians occupying northeastern (German) Papua New Guinea and moving on the Bismarck archipelago by no later than mid-September 1914. Rabaul was certainly snatched before September was over. A British force also seized the phosphate-rich island of Nauru before the month was out, the German *South* Pacific was *kaput*. The islands north of the Pacific, scarcely guarded, were still left.

In OTL, I read once that the Australians (and British) did not move further immediately beyond Papua and the Bismarcks primarily because they essentially assumed they had the German Pacific 'in the bag' because New Guinea was the administrative center of it all.

What if they kept on going at their August-September pace?

I imagine as a PoD, the Australian PM Andy Fisher, or in the weeks he was traveling to New Zealand, Acting PM Billy Hughes, out of a mixture of pride and ambition with the capture of the Bismarcks, asks 'what else is next?' and orders the advance to continue, and Australian Captains and commanders, keen for promotion and easy glory, are ready to continue hopping from island to island. Why shouldn't the energetic Australians keep showing what they can do, since they haven't suffered any setbacks so far?

The next logical leap from the Bismarcks/Rabaul is the Carolines chain, the largest, and home to anchorages like Truk (aka Chu'uk), and the German cable and wireless stations at Yap. Next closest would be the Palaus, to the west, nearer to the Philippines. East of the Carolines would be the Marshall Islands and atolls. If the British have any Naval ships with troops or landing parties afloat around their Gilbert or Phoenix Islands possessions--and they may not, those might be much more closely and better positioned to land in the Marshalls than any Australians or New Zealanders.

The furthest of the German island possessions in the central Pacific would be the Marianas. They would be reachable in a step-by-step process after the Australians or British occupied the Carolines, to completely liquidate the German Pacific empire. The Marianas are far closer to Japan's Bonin islands than to any pre-war portion of the British Empire or Dominions, so it probably is a bit more realistic that Japan ultimately would get to the Marianas first and claim them for the post-war, even if the British Empire/Dominions got the rest of Micronesia, but it is not guaranteed.

Let's assume whoever occupies any islands gets them as League Mandates. That is what happened in OTL, and no power really has leverage, or strong motive, to overturn wartime possession.

These islands will all be the @$$-end of nowhere for metro-Britain, and even for Australia's burgeoning sub-empire. Neither interwar Australia, nor interwar Britain will have much budget to invest in any of these island groups or fortify them. However, they will not be available for Japan to fortify with air and naval bases during the interwar era and use as a large, unobserved practice maneuver space.

Without the interposition of multiple Japanese island chains between the US and Hawaii and the Philippines and Guam in the western Pacific, both as an obstacle, and, if conquered, as a highway, step-path, or breadcrumb trail for advancing, how will Japanese and American Navies plan differently for war? Since they mostly planned for a strictly bilateral war, the Micronesian chains would be considered neutral rather than enemy or friendly most of the time. How would British or Australian defense planning change, if at all, in the interwar? Would Australia simply require a larger interwar Navy with some longer-ranged ships?

If we put a butterfly net over the interwar era and World War Two as we know it starts, how does the Pacific War change?

[miletus12]

Jul 20, 2023 1:23:15 GMT raharris1973 said:

Without the interposition of multiple Japanese island chains between the US and Hawaii and the Philippines and Guam in the western Pacific, both as an obstacle, and, if conquered, as a highway, step-path, or breadcrumb trail for advancing, how will Japanese and American Navies plan differently for war? Since they mostly planned for a strictly bilateral war, the Micronesian chains would be considered neutral rather than enemy or friendly most of the time. How would British or Australian defense planning change, if at all, in the interwar? Would Australia simply require a larger interwar Navy with some longer-ranged ships?

If we put a butterfly net over the interwar era and World War Two as we know it starts, how does the Pacific War change?

Not by much, if it is a British administration. The Japanese sweep through the British and bowl them over. The big change would have to be if the Australians got off the dime and became excited enough to put in the work to build defenses and infrastructure in New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago.

You see, never mind that I do not think the interwar British military understood the mechanics of naval strategy, much less grand strategy in general, it is a more practical problem akin to the same one the Americans faced after they signed the non-fortifications clauses in the 9 Power Treaty. I tend to think the British would honor such commitments and not build a naval base at YAP or CHU'UK or Rabaul as they did not do.

The practical effect is that the British navy and the air force it would ferry to the rescue would face the same handicap as the USN did, trying to come to the rescue of a forward deployed set of colonial garrisons, which would be destroyed by a Japanese island hopping campaign. The Japanese would regard such a move as necessary to cut out the Philippine Islands and to access the Malay Settlements. The British do not have enough navy, or the right kind of navy, to mount such a rescue of their mandates, nor do they have the basing or resources afloat to even make an attempt.

It would be interesting from the American point of view, because this situation would still compel the Japanese to commit their fleet and merchant marine further east than they wanted, within US fleet sortie range. The Japanese did not have enough navy to take the mandates and conduct a Pearl Harbor at the same time. I do not think the USG would do the London desired thingy thing and send the Pacific Fleet to rescue the British, but it might instead see the opportunity to upset the Japanese southern road into Indonesia.  Such a spoiling attack / raid was in Rainbow 2.   The Americans do have just enough navy in the region to accomplish that much.

Kantai Kassen happens and after Kimmel is court-martialed for losing the fleet, it is WWII in the Pacific with a few strange variations.   

[raharris1973]

Very interesting response, thanks!

[stevep]

   A lot might depend on how things change in terms of the status of the region. Assuming something like OTL with fortifications banned until 1035/36 and the collapse of the treaty regime then the region would remain unfortified until then.  Its unlikely there would be a large scale of fortification after the treaty ended as Britain would lack the resources given priorities elsewhere and  while Australia might be more concerned it would have even less resources,  Possibly one or two bases would be fortified more, but likely as with Wake and Guam too little too late.  Especially since while Australian possessions their position is relatively unimportant in the wider war for Australia. - This might change if the US is more inclined to work on plans for an alliance war in the case of a Japanese attack and offers some incentives for Australia to fortify some of the islands for later US use in such a war but this seems unlikely.  As such I would expect the region to fall to the Japanese in the early stages of the war, albeit they would have to commit some forces and wouldn't have the already constructed bases and fortifications of OTL WWII by 1941/42. 

  I would agree with miletus12 that the US would not be interested in a quick victory over Japan, especially after a shock like OTL Pearl - let alone one where say a CV or two are lost.  Plus given the numerical and qualitative edge that the Japanese would have at this stage and the difficulties of USN forces being supplied and supported in the DEI it would be a huge risk.  As such while its the big opportunity available to the USN at this stage of the war in the Far East I can't see them being willing to take it.

  Overall I think the big difference compared to OTL would be that Japan doesn't possess those islands until spring 42.  As such their grip and their ability to project power deeper into the Pacific would be somewhat weakened.  The USN might be tempted to make raids on the forces doing such an occupation, possibly even seeking to take control of some of the islands themselves but this could also be a risk, albeit overall probably not as large as an attempt to challenge the IJN in the SE Asia region.

[miletus12]

Australia...



Do you see what is missing between Alice Springs and Darwin? A railroad.

Now...



Explanation:

The only industrial area worth a dram is on the south and east coast of the continent. Follow the railroads and you follow the economy. From Adelaide to Cairn is about 90% of Australia that matters as far as industry.

Only the Japanese were crazy enough to operate aircraft carriers in the Arafura Sea and the Gulf of Carpententa and they only did it once as they ran Kaga aground in some shallows during the Darwin Raid.   

Referring to the quadrangle...



It took the Americans a major battle (Coral Sea) and a two year naval campaign (CARTWHEEL) to crash through the Bismarck Archipelago. That is the southeast corner of that quadrangle. Failing to hold Rabaul, which was in Australian hands, was a horrible mistake.  

It only takes hours to dig a howitzer pit and only days or a few weeks to prepare a runway.  

Its unlikely there would be a large scale of fortification after the treaty ended as Britain would lack the resources given priorities elsewhere and while Australia might be more concerned it would have even less resources, Its unlikely there would be a large scale of fortification after the treaty ended as Britain would lack the resources given priorities elsewhere and while Australia might be more concerned it would have even less resources,

That is a fighter strip at RABAUL. 



That is ONE "fortified" position prepared by a semi-industrialized power, using mostly hand tools, 5000 men and given TWO MONTHS. What you do not see, is the MASSIVE submarine pen and ship shelter the Japanese also dug by hand into the side of that expletive deleted volcano. 

TWO YEARS... About 15,000 lives and about 40 warships and almost 1,500 aircraft. 


 

[stevep]

   As pointed out and as you admitted the region is not vital to control the Pacific, nor to dominate Japanese supply lines.  Passage through it is important to enable a prolonged use of the Philippines by the US to strangle the Japanese economy but those are two somewhat different things.

  Yes if Australia had the resource and will to strengthen the defences of some of those possessions and I think locations like Rabaul or parts of Papua New Guinea are far more likely than any of the proposed possessions further north it could keep those out of the hands of an hostile Japan for a while.  However they are still likely to be fairly easily bypassed by an attack with the sort of overwhelming strength that in a scenario close to OTL Japan would possess in ~1941/42.  Especially since the UK would be unable and the US unwilling to provide aid in a short enough time to support the locations.  Remember that the US itself bypassed Rabaul in the war along with a number of other defended locations.

[raharris1973]

Jul 20, 2023 16:56:56 GMT stevep said:

   A lot might depend on how things change in terms of the status of the region. Assuming something like OTL with fortifications banned until 1035/36 and the collapse of the treaty regime then the region would remain unfortified until then.  Its unlikely there would be a large scale of fortification after the treaty ended as Britain would lack the resources given priorities elsewhere and  while Australia might be more concerned it would have even less resources,  Possibly one or two bases would be fortified more, but likely as with Wake and Guam too little too late.  Especially since while Australian possessions their position is relatively unimportant in the wider war for Australia. - This might change if the US is more inclined to work on plans for an alliance war in the case of a Japanese attack and offers some incentives for Australia to fortify some of the islands for later US use in such a war but this seems unlikely.  As such I would expect the region to fall to the Japanese in the early stages of the war, albeit they would have to commit some forces and wouldn't have the already constructed bases and fortifications of OTL WWII by 1941/42. 

  I would agree with miletus12 that the US would not be interested in a quick victory over Japan, especially after a shock like OTL Pearl - let alone one where say a CV or two are lost.  Plus given the numerical and qualitative edge that the Japanese would have at this stage and the difficulties of USN forces being supplied and supported in the DEI it would be a huge risk.  As such while its the big opportunity available to the USN at this stage of the war in the Far East I can't see them being willing to take it.

  Overall I think the big difference compared to OTL would be that Japan doesn't possess those islands until spring 42.  As such their grip and their ability to project power deeper into the Pacific would be somewhat weakened.  The USN might be tempted to make raids on the forces doing such an occupation, possibly even seeking to take control of some of the islands themselves but this could also be a risk, albeit overall probably not as large as an attempt to challenge the IJN in the SE Asia region.

Also very interesting - thanks!

[raharris1973]

One thing I would be curious about, particularly if it were Australian units doing the occupation of a majority of the island chains rather than British units.

Might the further spreading of Australian forces further afield and need for scattered garrisons, and then the scattering of their experienced personnel, somewhat reduce the numbers of Australian troops available for Middle East and Western Front service in the remainder of WWI?

Perhaps so.

But perhaps not, because garrison needs should be very light with only nominally allied Japanese and neutral Americans as neighbors, especially as all the German cruisers and raiders are chased down.

But post-war, presuming Australia, not Britain, is the mandatory authority over the majority of the island chains, might the need for garrisons in them reduce the numbers numbers of Australian troops for Western Front and Middle East service from 1939-1942 in WWII? At this time, the Australians may feel more pinned down and reluctant to remove whatever minimum garrisons they have, because the 1930s Japanese have a consistently more menacing appearance from the start of the Sino-Japanese War.

[simon darkshade]

Righto. On Australia and stuff:

- More properly, Brisbane to Adelaide is a good 95-96% of Australian industry in the interwar period; Perth was decent in its own right and by reasonable standards, but a long way away from anywhere.
- No real reduction in available forces for the AIF in WW1. 331,000 men volunteered for it over the course of the war, whilst the garrisons for German Micronesia would be ~1000 at most.
- In WW2, there really isn't the scope for mass forward deployment. There would be more than 1 battalion at Rabaul in such a circumstance, but for Truk, it wouldn't even been a battalion. That is too far away to warrant presence except in the latter half of 1941
- Look at what garrisons or defences were put in place in the likes of Fiji prior to December 1941 for the likely outcome: Sweet bugger al
- Why? The simple reason that Britain and Australia, along with the rest of the Empire, were at war with Germany and Italy on the other side of the world. Something has to give in terms of priorities
- No real scope for reduction in the 2nd AIF. What might well happens is an adjustment of the deployment laws/rules for the Militia
- Neither Australia nor Britain are going to attach the same importance to it as Japan or indeed the Americans, as it becomes a northern picket line rather than a jutting southern bastion/part of the Sacred Quadrangle interposed between the Phillipines and the American Pacific.
- Their primary focus will remain on the Malay Barrier and the South China Sea, which will likely leave the 'Central Pacific' as an open flank. This might be a bit of an error, but Britain never has any need or interest in pushing through any quadrangle to the Philippines in a war against Japan
- However, if these areas are in British/Australian hands in 1940, enter the interest of Brother Jonathan
- Destroyers for Bases was in the Atlantic, but if areas that can help secure the Pacific Loc to the Philippines are also in the same friendly and outstretched hands, I can't really see FDR looking a gift horse in the mouth

[miletus12]

Jul 20, 2023 23:22:13 GMT stevep said:

   As pointed out and as you admitted the region is not vital to control the Pacific, nor to dominate Japanese supply lines.  Passage through it is important to enable a prolonged use of the Philippines by the US to strangle the Japanese economy but those are two somewhat different things.

  Yes if Australia had the resource and will to strengthen the defences of some of those possessions and I think locations like Rabaul or parts of Papua New Guinea are far more likely than any of the proposed possessions further north it could keep those out of the hands of an hostile Japan for a while.  However they are still likely to be fairly easily bypassed by an attack with the sort of overwhelming strength that in a scenario close to OTL Japan would possess in ~1941/42.  Especially since the UK would be unable and the US unwilling to provide aid in a short enough time to support the locations.  Remember that the US itself bypassed Rabaul in the war along with a number of other defended locations.

I said none of that. Japan had to pass through those quadrangle waters to get to Indonesia. Indonesia was where the oil was.  

[miletus12]

Jul 21, 2023 3:20:08 GMT simon darkshade said:

Righto. On Australia and stuff:

- More properly, Brisbane to Adelaide is a good 95-96% of Australian industry in the interwar period; Perth was decent in its own right and by reasonable standards, but a long way away from anywhere.
- No real reduction in available forces for the AIF in WW1. 331,000 men volunteered for it over the course of the war, whilst the garrisons for German Micronesia would be ~1000 at most.
- In WW2, there really isn't the scope for mass forward deployment. There would be more than 1 battalion at Rabaul in such a circumstance, but for Truk, it wouldn't even been a battalion. That is too far away to warrant presence except in the latter half of 1941
- Look at what garrisons or defences were put in place in the likes of Fiji prior to December 1941 for the likely outcome: Sweet bugger al
- Why? The simple reason that Britain and Australia, along with the rest of the Empire, were at war with Germany and Italy on the other side of the world. Something has to give in terms of priorities
- No real scope for reduction in the 2nd AIF. What might well happens is an adjustment of the deployment laws/rules for the Militia
- Neither Australia nor Britain are going to attach the same importance to it as Japan or indeed the Americans, as it becomes a northern picket line rather than a jutting southern bastion/part of the Sacred Quadrangle interposed between the Phillipines and the American Pacific.
- Their primary focus will remain on the Malay Barrier and the South China Sea, which will likely leave the 'Central Pacific' as an open flank. This might be a bit of an error, but Britain never has any need or interest in pushing through any quadrangle to the Philippines in a war against Japan
- However, if these areas are in British/Australian hands in 1940, enter the interest of Brother Jonathan
- Destroyers for Bases was in the Atlantic, but if areas that can help secure the Pacific Loc to the Philippines are also in the same friendly and outstretched hands, I can't really see FDR looking a gift horse in the mouth

1. The two northern northeastern towns, oF Cairn and Townsville were logistics bases and air defense sites. I added them to the log/path. 
2. WWI; the problem for snapping up the German Pacific garrisons would be STUFT shipping.
3. 3. I expect Chu'Uk to fall, but not Rabaul. The distance factors favor the Australians. 
4. Fiji did not fall. Refer to 3. Also to the MAP.



5. Operation FS was thwarted; a, on the Kokoda Track, and b. at the Coral Sea.  I have seen those two actions compared to Thermopylae and Salamis as a two function outcome example.  I tend to find the mutual intersections, convergences and geographic dependencies of Kokoda Track and Coral Sea to be a convincing case study. Both had to be allied victories. One without the other would be meaningless.   
6.

- Why? The simple reason that Britain and Australia, along with the rest of the Empire, were at war with Germany and Italy on the other side of the world. Something has to give in terms of priorities

The "Why" is Singapore, where 85,000+ Australian, Indian, and British troops were forward exposed within the easy reach of the Japanese who were based in South China and Vietnam. On the other hand; you have to get through the quadrangle to get to Rabaul. Garrison the quadrangle in those areas you control, and you buy additional time and force the Japanese to come at you without the nearby based forces in place to quickly reach Rabaul (About 52 days in the real history.). A brigade for Australia is quite doable. As far as Australia is practically concerned, she threw away 15,000+ men to no purpose based on British promises.  Besides; here is another practical question, what has Britain ever done for Australia?

7. The rules for the "militia" has always puzzled me. The Australians had to raise "Imperial" formations (volunteers) to send troops overseas. As I understand it, this issue was never resolved in WWII or down to the present, as it was in other nations in war, either by "federalization" or a national service act "draft".   

- Neither Australia nor Britain are going to attach the same importance to it as Japan or indeed the Americans, as it becomes a northern picket line rather than a jutting southern bastion/part of the Sacred Quadrangle interposed between the Phillipines and the American Pacific.

8. It is the same naval geography for everybody. Just because the British did not understand it at all, does not mean it functioned any differently for the use and denial of the world ocean in the western Pacific. It is not a picket line, which is land warfare thinking. It is use and denial of transit and access; which is naval / air warfare thinking. 
9. 

- Their primary focus will remain on the Malay Barrier and the South China Sea, which will likely leave the 'Central Pacific' as an open flank. This might be a bit of an error, but Britain never has any need or interest in pushing through any quadrangle to the Philippines in a war against Japan

On 6 December 1941, (local time) ADM Tom Phillips flew to Manila, to meet with ADM Thomas Hart. The subject of that discussion was an attempt by Phillips to convince / coerce Hart to "lend" American warships to aid Phillips in a sweep into the South China Sea.

See MAP. 



Hart knew by this time that Japanese naval forces were massed off Cam Ranh Bay and Na Trang from his own recon, which the British had neglected. He expected that the Japanese convoys at sea already, would enter the Gulf of Siam as it was known then, within 30 hours.   He told Phillips that any idea of forward projection into the South China Sea by an Anglo-American fleet, which was a desperation measure Phillips pitched him that was in turn based on the last war plan that was drawn up by the incompetent British admiralty all the way back to Backhouse, was a non-starter since the Japanese at Hainan, at Taiwan and inside Vietnam were too close and had bath-tubbed the South China Sea making a foray into a landbased airpower crossfire suicidal. From what I read, the admirals had hot words at that point, which does not surprise me, since Hart did not suffer fools at all.  We know the results. Force Z was sunk and Hart's Asiatic Fleet, which fought a delay action through Indonesia and fell back on Australia, became the birth squadron for the 7th Fleet. 

The Japanese were between the Americans and British. Hart knew that Singapore, Malaya and the Philippines were gone. He was trying to figure out how to save Indonesia with what he had in time and ships.

So... as applied, in the "Malay Barrier Defense"; based as it was upon Singapore as a position, and not a sound integrated area use denial naval concept, the British screwed that one up.    
   
And lest you get the idea that I let my own countrymen off, Hart got into it with MacArthur, too. He thought "The Stage Actor" was a nincompoop who would mishandle the Philippine Islands defense with his "meet them at the beaches plan". But not even Hart could foresee that Brereton would be stupid enough to be caught on the ground 8 hours after Pearl Harbor. No air cover and Hart had to run for it, even sooner than he expected.
   
Normally, I would have some empathy for the characters involved; but Brereton, Sutherland and MacArthur should have been relieved "with extreme prejudice", after that one.  

================================================================

I prefer the term; Uncle Sam. Brother Jonathan is an "insult".

Would the USG have taken the transfer of the British controlled elements of the "quadrangle" in exchange for additional aid? Probably. I think it would have been more productive if the British had been less pigheaded at the ABC1 and ABC2 conferences and if the Americans had sent Stark to London earlier to play the cocktail circuit diplomatic fool, while some more sensible men hammered out a more workable American-British-Dutch-Australian scheme of defense instead of boozing it up and making empty promises to "cooperate" with each other.     
 

[simon darkshade]

There isn't always a need to say in many, many words when a few suffice.

1.) They were logistical hubs during WW2 due to location. You didn't mention logistics, but rather industry, twice. There isn't a need to shift the goalposts over such a miniscule matter, by the by.
2.) Not really. Taking German New Guinea with the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force took two ships - Berrima and Kanonwa. Going further up won't need a dramatic increase in shipping.
3.) Absolutely. The Japs were on such a shoestring in @ that pushing through an extra layer will delay and attrit them, figuratively and literally. Truk won't be defended by anything significant, but Rabaul is a decent enough hub directly near Oz that it will get a minimum of the @ force and probably more.
4.) That wasn't my point, which was that even Fiji wasn't defended, so it is unlikely that bally Truk will be. No British islands in the Pacific had garrisons
5.) Correct, but irrelevant as above n 4.
6.) Utterly irrelevant and unrelated to the point, just using the opportunity to go on a pointless anti-British rant. Don't. My point, again, is that the British were at war on the other side of the world, so garrisons in the middle of the Pacific were right down the bottom of the list. My point had nothing to do with bloody Singapore.'
7.) It is a legal issue and the terminology used doesn't need quotation marks, as it is the correct one for the period.

From the Defence Act of 1903, we then had subsequent development in the form of compulsory military training from 1910, which boosted the Militia/Citizen's Military Forces. However, the Defence Act precluded sending conscripts overseas, so there was a need for a volunteer force in WW1 - the AIF. Introduction of conscription was attempted, but the referendum narrowly failed on largely sectarian grounds; this made the idea too much of a hot potato to touch afterwards. Come WW2, the same format was adopted, with volunteers being raised for overseas service and the Militia (perjoratively called the Chockos or chocolate soldiers by the AIF blokes) being enabled for home defence/home service, which included New Guinea. The units weren't under the control of the states, which have no such capacity under the Constitution, so there is no scope for federalisation - the world isn't America. There was conscription in WW2, but considerable opposition to absolute carte blanche conscription, especially within the governing Labor Party, so that the compromise of gradual amendments to the DA were carried out allowing the deployment of conscripts further north.'
8.) No. There was no reason to push north through it or to operate there full stop. As said, they aren't pushing to the Philippines or to the Marianas; the British plans for war with Japan were naturally different to the Americans.

9.) Here you are just waffling off on a ranting tangent. Regardless of accuracy, once we strip away the personal bias, it does not change the point nor counter it. It is the epitome of an unnecessary coda to what had largely stuck to the topic at that point.

10.) Brother Jonathan wasn't meant as an insult, and its employment by me here came from an old quote from a book that sprang to mind as I was typing it. I think that it likely that the islands in question would have come up prior to the ABC conferences.


Mod Hat on: A couple of things that can be potentially rethought is adding in maps to many posts where they aren't needed and putting in a plethora of links, many of which are of borderline relevance or, in a number of cases, none at all. In other topics, you've put in links that do not make the point you are trying to argue. It can come across as trying to browbeat a point across, which isn't really necessary

Whilst there is a time and place for both, not every single thread requires a vehement and heated argument to the death with supporting links, pictures and maps unto the tenth generation. It doesn't increase the strength of your argument and case, nor does it gather any groundswell of support or laud from the very small audience here. We are, in many ways, akin to a small bar or cafe, where almost all of the patrons are known to each other. We know the positions and opinions of other posters and that some aren't likely to share a table readily, as they have tended to disagree on a lot of things in the past. That is fine, as there are enough tables for all.

When you come across as charging into even small topics with the same verve, vim and vehemence as if it were for sheep stations, it is a bit like standing up and raising your voice in that figurative cafe. There's a time and place for it, but when it is done all the time, it can be counterproductive. Not everything needs to be a hill to fight on.

[miletus12]

Jul 21, 2023 6:37:16 GMT simon darkshade said:

There isn't always a need to say in many, many words when a few suffice.

1.) They were logistical hubs during WW2 due to location. You didn't mention logistics, but rather industry, twice. There isn't a need to shift the goalposts over such a miniscule matter, by the by.
2.) Not really. Taking German New Guinea with the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force took two ships - Berrima and Kanonwa. Going further up won't need a dramatic increase in shipping.
3.) Absolutely. The Japs were on such a shoestring in @ that pushing through an extra layer will delay and attrit them, figuratively and literally. Truk won't be defended by anything significant, but Rabaul is a decent enough hub directly near Oz that it will get a minimum of the @ force and probably more.
4.) That wasn't my point, which was that even Fiji wasn't defended, so it is unlikely that bally Truk will be. No British islands in the Pacific had garrisons
5.) Correct, but irrelevant as above n 4.
6.) Utterly irrelevant and unrelated to the point, just using the opportunity to go on a pointless anti-British rant. Don't. My point, again, is that the British were at war on the other side of the world, so garrisons in the middle of the Pacific were right down the bottom of the list. My point had nothing to do with bloody Singapore.'
7.) It is a legal issue and the terminology used doesn't need quotation marks, as it is the correct one for the period.

From the Defence Act of 1903, we then had subsequent development in the form of compulsory military training from 1910, which boosted the Militia/Citizen's Military Forces. However, the Defence Act precluded sending conscripts overseas, so there was a need for a volunteer force in WW1 - the AIF. Introduction of conscription was attempted, but the referendum narrowly failed on largely sectarian grounds; this made the idea too much of a hot potato to touch afterwards. Come WW2, the same format was adopted, with volunteers being raised for overseas service and the Militia (perjoratively called the Chockos or chocolate soldiers by the AIF blokes) being enabled for home defence/home service, which included New Guinea. The units weren't under the control of the states, which have no such capacity under the Constitution, so there is no scope for federalisation - the world isn't America. There was conscription in WW2, but considerable opposition to absolute carte blanche conscription, especially within the governing Labor Party, so that the compromise of gradual amendments to the DA were carried out allowing the deployment of conscripts further north.'
8.) No. There was no reason to push north through it or to operate there full stop. As said, they aren't pushing to the Philippines or to the Marianas; the British plans for war with Japan were naturally different to the Americans.

9.) Here you are just waffling off on a ranting tangent. Regardless of accuracy, once we strip away the personal bias, it does not change the point nor counter it. It is the epitome of an unnecessary coda to what had largely stuck to the topic at that point.

10.) Brother Jonathan wasn't meant as an insult, and its employment by me here came from an old quote from a book that sprang to mind as I was typing it. I think that it likely that the islands in question would have come up prior to the ABC conferences.


Mod Hat on: A couple of things that can be potentially rethought is adding in maps to many posts where they aren't needed and putting in a plethora of links, many of which are of borderline relevance or, in a number of cases, none at all. In other topics, you've put in links that do not make the point you are trying to argue. It can come across as trying to browbeat a point across, which isn't really necessary

Whilst there is a time and place for both, not every single thread requires a vehement and heated argument to the death with supporting links, pictures and maps unto the tenth generation. It doesn't increase the strength of your argument and case, nor does it gather any groundswell of support or laud from the very small audience here. We are, in many ways, akin to a small bar or cafe, where almost all of the patrons are known to each other. We know the positions and opinions of other posters and that some aren't likely to share a table readily, as they have tended to disagree on a lot of things in the past. That is fine, as there are enough tables for all.

When you come across as charging into even small topics with the same verve, vim and vehemence as if it were for sheep stations, it is a bit like standing up and raising your voice in that figurative cafe. There's a time and place for it, but when it is done all the time, it can be counterproductive. Not everything needs to be a hill to fight on.

1. Nuance.
2. Time element. You need to beat the Japanese. 20 targets = 20 ships.
3. Glad we agree on time / distance factors.
4. If the British understood Mahan, there would have been presence in their plans. You will see that there was none.
5. Operation FS became possible after Rabaul fell. Use denial again. The Japanese were able to forward stockpile resources for the 4th Fleet to sortie from Rabaul and take Tulagi and Guadalcanal. If they had been able to consolidate before they were interrupted by WATCHTOWER, they would have made a lunge for Fiji and Samoa for the fertilizer they were after.  Kokoda Track and Coral Sea, plus some Yamamoto stupidity to go for Midway where the Americans were locally strong, all contributed to that denial.   
6. I rephrase that to the British methods and approaches and attitudes to the Pacific War (naval war) were 100% wrong. They did not understand naval geography or air power or the logistics. As for the Singapore issue, the British plans for war with Japan were based on the simple geographic naval fact that the fleet reinforcements they intended to send to fight the Japanese had to come from either Force H, the Home Fleet or from the Mediterranean Fleet. All would pass through the Indian Ocean and forward base at Singapore. From there; the British intended a single axis advance into the South China Sea until they met the Japanese along the way in a Pacific Jutland. After the Japanese were sunk, the British would seize an island base (Presumably Okinawa) and institute a blockade. Called the "Singapore Plan". It was unworkable when formulated in 1927, less credible in 1935 as reworked and sheer fantasy in 1938 when Tom Phillips updated it.  There was no way that an unsupported fleet, centered on battleships, was going to move up the East Asia coast and not be slaughtered by land based air power. And since the British had to pass through American controlled adjacent waters, according to their planning, the Philippine Islands were very much involved.          

-- WAR PLAN ORANGE was based on a different approach axis and had a different logic after 1935 showed the 10% loss of fleet for every 1000 nautical miles traveled logistical bleed out. It was a slow methodical advance through the quadrangle until a blockade could be mounted (Again Okinawa). It would take three years, and it was estimated that the USN would have to build to 2x its treaty size to gain a 3 to 1 superiority. The army element would be at least a million men for air garrisons and logistics support across the "Pacific Desert" behind the fleet. The Philippine Islands and its initial garrisons were assumed "written off".   
7. I use quotations to differentiate systems; being British, Spanish and French. Much of the world operates (outside of the British sphere) according to the French martial system. That part of it includes the United States. Our formal "federal" military traditions, laws and customs are French-originated and rather Napoleonic.  
8. Refer to 6. 
9. Admiral Tom Phillips was the last supervisor of the last British war-plan staff drafted for use against Japan, the 1938 version. He was put in charge of Force Z. to carry out a rump bluff version of that plan. He should have had the professional judgment to understand that the Japanese cannot be bluffed. He was not alone in that mistake, for Churchill, Pound, Stark, FDR and Turner were also wrong about that one. It was the collective professional judgment of the competent component of the United States Navy (That would be O'Richardson, Hart, McCain, and Ingersoll among others.)  that once the Japanese started, there was not a whole lot that could be done to stop an initial successful offensive as the Japanese had the logistics, numbers and war experience to go wherever their tanker support and air cover allowed them. Hart, realistic, fell back and tried to harass and delay the Japanese with some success dueing rthe ABDA campaign. Hart made that offer to Phillips, to join up once war started and fight a combined delay back towardsa Australia. Or alternately, Phillips could have retreated out of Japanese airpower reach to Sri Lanka or the Andaman Islands.  Instead he tried to "break uyp landings upon the Kra Peninsula despite Brook Popham telling him the RAF would not be there to cover him.  
10. The history of the perjorative term goes back to the American Revolution, when British officers mocked the Continental Line, and even further back to Cromwell when the Cavaliers mocked the "Roundheads". 

I use maps to give visual representation since most readers have no idea what something like the "quadrangle" means or where Rabaul is, or how even on a Mercator distortion a single glance will give an idea of who operates on interior lines, exterior lines or what air coverage looks like, or how shallow seas inhibits capital ship operations.

The links are for historical background. I supply the points that the background fleshes out. 

Finally; the incident between Hart and Phillips was a contrast and compare for attitudes about the OP situation made manifest in real history. Only someone who did not understand how things actually worked, (Phillips was not a line officer, nor was he a war college trained officer in the American manner.) would dare presume a foreign (American) admiral would disobey GO100 and start a war without orders, written orders from Washington. Hart told Phillips that much.  It was meetings like this one and subsequent similar ABDA interactions that set the tone for the Anglo-American war in the Pacific. If Montgomery rightly thought the American army, he saw, was a clown show, then the American navy, who thought the same exact same about the American army, thought the British navy was the whole circus and an amateur one at that.

One specific point... needs elaboration;

6.) Utterly irrelevant and unrelated to the point, just using the opportunity to go on a pointless anti-British rant. Don't. My point, again, is that the British were at war on the other side of the world, so garrisons in the middle of the Pacific were right down the bottom of the list. My point had nothing to do with bloody Singapore.'

It is not an anti-British rant to point out that the British promised to defend Australia against the Japanese and used Singapore as their proof of their commitment. Never mind that the British asked for and recieved 3/4 of the Australian "Imperial" formations for the EuropeaN war, never mind that post hoc analysis shows this was not the proper plan of defense for Australia, never mind that the British collapsed. never mind what "I" think about the whys and wherefores that caused about that collapse or about imperialists of any stripe. Think strictly like Curtin must have thought after the British surrender. 

Would you not want your troops to come home? Would you not scramble to try to repair the mess your too trusting predecessor left you?   

Singapore was not the place to defend Australia. The quadrangle and by extension the Americans in the Philippine Islands were. if the British had figured that one out, they would have made the proper arrangements and adjustments. But the reason the British fixated on Singapore was because it was the barrier to INDIA, a country they wished to continue to exploit.   

Sure they were fighting the Germans, but they had millions of available corvee labor. They used Indian troops in the Middle East and North Africa. Why not for Pacific garrisons?   

These were facts well known to the Canberra government, especially after Curtin was disappointed by Churchill's explanation to him for why Singapore fell. 

Was Churchill going to officially tell Curtin, "My admiralty lied to me. I believed what they told me." Surely not. So Churchill blamed it on an intelligence failure.    

So, that is why Singapore fits into this narrative and is on point. It was the British plan. It was the wrong plan. It was a stupid plan, even from the British point of view.

It was a Corbett type plan.      


            
    

[simon darkshade]

I’ve got a very rare thing called a ‘weekend off’, so will leave it at this:

- Please try to keep the pictures and links to the most relevant
- Please ride your hobby horses in either your own paddocks (threads) or appropriate paddocks (threads on those specific topics). Bringing multiple threads into the same old topics and positions is a bit like riding a horse through an indoor mall - it certainly gets you to where you need to go, but might not be the most considerate option. This leads to the most significant request:

Can we please try to focus on Raharris’s topic rather than drifting away from it?

Mod hat off and Simon hat on:

I’m as guilty of this as anyone, but thread drift can be exacerbated by responding to every point.

One of the more relevant points to emerge is the issue of Australian CMF/Militia. They would be the ones supplying any forward Pacific garrisons on the usual basis.

[stevep]

Jul 21, 2023 1:46:43 GMT raharris1973 said:

One thing I would be curious about, particularly if it were Australian units doing the occupation of a majority of the island chains rather than British units.

Might the further spreading of Australian forces further afield and need for scattered garrisons, and then the scattering of their experienced personnel, somewhat reduce the numbers of Australian troops available for Middle East and Western Front service in the remainder of WWI?

Perhaps so.

But perhaps not, because garrison needs should be very light with only nominally allied Japanese and neutral Americans as neighbors, especially as all the German cruisers and raiders are chased down.

But post-war, presuming Australia, not Britain, is the mandatory authority over the majority of the island chains, might the need for garrisons in them reduce the numbers numbers of Australian troops for Western Front and Middle East service from 1939-1942 in WWII? At this time, the Australians may feel more pinned down and reluctant to remove whatever minimum garrisons they have, because the 1930s Japanese have a consistently more menacing appearance from the start of the Sino-Japanese War.

  This is a distinct possibility in WWII I suspect as with Japan being increasingly aggressive as the 30's passed I could see elements in Australia suggesting that such a process would be a/the Australian role in defending the empire/dominions world trade.  Although as pointed out there isn't a lot of trade passing through this period and trying to defend multiple locations would spread forces too thin and offer up too many men as hostages.

  Less so with WWI as there's no real hostile forces in the Pacific once von Spee's force is crushed at the Falklands.  The big fight is definitely in Europe - and to a much lesser degree once the Westerners become fully dominant the ME and what happens in the Pacific or elsewhere militarily doesn't make a passive difference.  Plus the only real threat is disguised raiders and a small garrison on a island a long way from anywhere is unlikely to be useful in stopping those raiders.