A True and Better Alamo Redux (Rewrite)

[jon]

Hi Everyone!

I just finished my comprehensive exams for my PhD (passed!) and have once again returned to the land of Alternate History. I'm in the process of continuing my TL "A True and Better Alamo" but before I push beyond July 1942, I decided to change the style into something a bit more readable/publishable (hopefully!) The content is mostly the same (a few minor changes so far), and more content will be coming rapidly. If you haven't read any version of this TL, I hope you enjoy it!

A True and Better Alamo

Part I: Moreel’s Gambit

The strategic usefulness of Wake Atoll had been recognized long before the Second World War by the Americans and the US Navy in particular. As early as 1921 when Hector Bywater in his book Sea-Power in the Pacific wrote:

Of considerably more importance [than Midway] is Wake Island which lies 1,300 miles east of the Marianne group on the direct route between Hawaii, Guam, and Manila. The conversion of Wake Island into a well-defended fueling station would materially assist in consolidating this vital line of communications. (1)

Unfortunately, the immense costs of building a base on the island, budgetary cutbacks, and a desire not to antagonize Japan, resulted in the dismissal of Bywater’s recommended preparations and Wake remaining completely barren for the next 14 years.

When construction did begin on Wake Island in the summer of 1935 the purpose couldn’t have been further from Bywater’s recommendations. Pan-American Airlines, not the American government, was the first to land construction workers on Wake to construct facilities for its fleet of flying boats serving their Trans-Pacific route. Though this was interpreted as American expansionism in the Pacific by the Japanese government, in reality the American government remained largely aloof from Pan-American operations despite recognizing the obvious strategic value of the Atoll. Some surveys followed, yet the nation’s strong isolationist sentiment prevented any efforts at fortification or base improvement even after Japan declared that she would no longer abide by the Washington Treaty. Despite the efforts of Army, Navy, and nascent Air Force planners to incorporate Wake into America’s defensive plans, for several key years the political will to properly establish Wake as a base simply did not exist.

Though not apparent at the time, on December 1st 1938 a board, headed up by Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn delivered a report commissioned six months earlier to the Secretary of the Navy and in so doing provided a turning point. In his report, Hepburn recommended that the Atoll be fortified and transformed into a base capable of supporting a system of other bases conducive to US Operations in the region. Hepburn’s recommendations met with stiff resistance from the isolationist lobby in Congress and a mere month after the submission of the report the battle lines had been drawn in Washington. Initially content with solely excluding Guam from efforts at reinforcements, the isolationist lobby was encouraged by their relatively easy victory and turned their eyes on the planned construction to take place on Wake. It was their hope that by limiting American base construction west of the 180th Meridian they could prevent Roosevelt from “provoking” what was surely to be a costly war with the Japanese. Attacking provisions for Wake in the House Appropriations Committee, they managed to banish “The Wake Project” to military limbo, or so they thought. (2)

Were it not for the cunning actions of Rear Admiral Ben Moreel, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the construction of military facilities on Wake might have languished for months, if not years more. Yet unlike the plethora of isolationists in Congress, Moreel recognized the urgency required to prepare for war. Following the surrender of Japan, Moreel remarked that the race to fulfill Hepburn’s recommendations was “the greatest single construction contract in the history of the world in point of money value, diversity of character, and dispersion over vast distances.” He then continued by stating “I consider it one of my few genuine achievements in life, that in striving to complete this project I contributed to the safety of this nation, its initial victories, and now its ultimate victory over the Japanese.” (3)

Rather than advocate outright for the fortification of Wake, Moreel instead requested that the Army Corps of Engineers receive a million-dollar authorization to develop ship channels at Wake. He hoped that this kind of routine, peacetime work the corps performed at ports all over the United States would be seen as innocuous enough to escape the ravages of the isolationists. Once Congress had given its consent it would be hard pressed to prevent further construction and would be far more amenable to taking measures that ensured its investment did not fall into Japanese hands. (4)

Much to his surprise, even a proposal as innocuous as Moreel’s faced stiff resistance from those opposed to projecting America’s power too far abroad. Still, through some shrewd politicking, Moreel, and by extension the Navy, was able to push the proposal through the House Rivers and Harbors Committee by a single vote and get the requisite funding for their project by a similar margin. With the proper permissions in hand, both the Navy and the Corps of Engineers chose to act before Congress could change its mind, and dispatched the 2000 ton dredge USS Raymond and 150 men to the isolated Atoll to begin work. Little did they know that they would face one of the toughest assignments of their career and that they would be contributing to one of the greatest battles in American history. (POINT OF DIVERGENCE. See Footnote #5)

Upon arriving at the Atoll on June 3rd 1939 after a long journey, the Engineers and Naval officers found it to be inhospitable to say the least. Though they had familiarized themselves with the reports of Pan-Am’s construction teams to prepare for the project only when they saw and began to experience the Atoll did they realize what they were up against. Needless to say, the complex dredging and demolition operations that followed would be the defining moment of many of the engineers’ careers.

Before examining the numerous preparations that took place in 1941, it is prudent to reacquaint ourselves with the physical layout of the atoll itself. A “V” shaped atoll, Wake is divided into 3 islands, Wake proper which forms the “body” of the V and upon which the main airbase was built, and Wilkes and Peale Islands that form the tips of the V. The entire atoll is roughly 2600 acres, most of which was covered in low dense brush unlike many other Pacific island atolls. Despite being a relatively small atoll, Wake possesses over 21 miles of coastline, itself surrounded by treacherous coral reefs that extend from 30-1100 yards beyond it. The coral comprising the reefs and much of the island proved to be a constant irritation for workers on the Island as they proved highly resistant to traditional construction methods and in so doing took a toll on men and machine alike.

Prospects for inter-service rivalry on such a project ran high, yet fortunately, early snags were avoided as the Engineers suggestion to alter the Navy’s original plan for a ship channel were accepted quite quickly. Rather than cut through over a thousand of yards of exposed coral reef to put the channel in the mouth of the “V” of the Atoll, it was decided quite early on to focus on an easier route that enlarged the channel between Wilkes Island and Wake Island into the lagoon. This decision proved to be quite fortuitous given the difficulties involved. Had it gone another way, vital harbor facilities might still lay uncompleted as the final preparations took place in 1941. (6)

As the Raymond’s cutting bit began to break up the dense coral and limestone table of the Atoll, it soon became apparent that this project was an entirely different ball game from the one they’d anticipated. In addition to radically extending their initial timetable, the Engineers on the island found that the persistent wind and salt spray from the surrounding ocean was rapidly corroding their tools. What had began as a fairly modest project soon ballooned in cost as more spare parts were promptly ordered to deal with the constant breakdowns that were sure to happen, along with hundreds of tons of demolition equipment. The arrival of the latter would allow personnel to continue the work begun by Pan-Am of clearing the Lagoon of coral “heads” which prevented flying boats and even small craft from using a large percentage of it. Over the next few months, initial breakdowns were overcome and strategies were formed to deal with the harsh terrain and corrosive climate of Wake. Only in the beginning of Winter 1939 did the work reach its expected pace and the soaring costs of the operation were begin to subside. (7)

Fortunately for Moreel, the mounting costs of the Wake project came at the perfect time politically as Hitler’s annexation of Czechoslovakia and invasion of Poland severely weakened the hand of isolationist politicians. Not only were said politicians unable to halt ongoing work at Wake, they also failed to prevent the slough of defense related legislation that soared through Congress in 1940. This legislation saw over ten million dollars allocated to base improvements at Wake that would allow it to host not only seaplanes, but Marine fighters, Army Air Corps bombers, and submarines. News of the additional workload arrived just as the Engineers were finishing their initial project. Though none of them looked forward to yet more months of battle against the Atoll’s seemingly impenetrable coral, all of them recognized the hefty paychecks that awaited them come the conclusion of their contract. (8)

Fortunately, this new wave of construction required no new learning curve and the experienced men of the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Yards and Docks responded admirably. With remarkable speed, they set about completely transforming the Atoll’s lagoon into what it would later become known for. Though they managed to accomplish little else in the six months prior to the arrival of the first contractors in January 1941, their contributions were absolutely foundational to future events. The extensive dredging and demolition work that occurred over the course of June 1939- January 1941 could only have occurred in times of peace. As they packed up and prepared to leave, they left behind not only an exceptional harbor in Wake’s lagoon, but a well-established base camp, dock and logistic system that considerably sped up the construction of other base facilities. Surprisingly, the Japanese failed to take into account the extensive nature of the American dredging project, regarding it as little more than a minor, albeit expensive, expansion to the Pan-Am facility on the island. As a result their efforts to expand their bases in the Marshalls continued apace and little was done to account for increased American activity on Wake. (9)

When it arrived on January 9th, 1941, the transport William Ward Burrows brought with it, not only more supplies, but 76 civilian contractors under Nathan D. Teters. With the dredging completed, these men ushered in a new era and focused their talents towards constructing the airfield, Navy seaplane base, and other vital facilities. Over the coming months, the Burrows and a few other transports would make the long journey to Wake and unload hundreds more. Taking advantage of the foundational work done by the Corps of Engineers, Teters’ men were able to begin carving a road network and airfield out of the dense brush of the main island almost immediately after landing their supplies and expanding the humble engineers encampment that had been built over a year and a half prior. (10)

Still, in spite of the millions of dollars already poured into the Atoll and the millions already to come, upon the departure of the Corps of Engineers and the Raymond no real defensive measures were present on the island. In fact, the only real military asset on the island was fifty thousand gallons of aviation gas in a recently constructed storage unit near the Pan-Am base as per Hepburn’s original recommendation. Other than that, nothing but a handful of small arms and machine guns kept the strategic atoll out of Japanese hands. Though this certainly played a role in preventing the Japanese from reacting too strongly, it nevertheless presented a striking problem to Admiral Husband J. Kimmel when he replaced Richardson as CINCUS in January 1941. (11)

Footnotes

1. This quote and author is entirely from OTL.

2. All OTL.

3. First half of the quote is from OTL, the second half...

4. Again all OTL.

5. At last we get to the Point of Divergence. In OTL Moreel’s proposal just barely failed to cut the mustard and it was killed by the House Rivers and Harbors Committee by ONE VOTE. Now if that’s not a POD, I don’t know what is!

6. This decision was reached by the civilian contractors for the same reason when their dredging operations began in June 1941. I see no reason why a similar decision wouldn’t be reached in OTL.

7. In OTL Wake presented a number of challenges to construction efforts such as high winds, corrosive sea spray, and effervescent coral dust. In TTL the Engineers have been dealing with these factors for over a year and a half meaning that subsequent construction efforts will be well prepared.

8. Initial plans were for Wake to host six submarines, two dozen PBYs, and one carrier air group. In OTL the plans for the submarine base were only hastily drawn up and assumed that Wake and Midway were identical. In TTL these plans are better thought out and tailored to Wake.

9. Japan didn’t really react to American construction efforts in OTL, seeing their own efforts as satisfactory. I don’t see why it would be different in TTL.

10. Teters’ OTL experience was almost completely different as no dredging work had been done and no base existed at all. As a result, unloading supplies took 19 days and an entirely new base needed to be constructed from scratch. In TTL, Teters has a massive headstart on OTL.

11. Again, similar to OTL in terms of defensive preparations. In OTL, Hepburn recommended that at the very least, the Navy should fund the expansion of Pan-Am’s fuel depot so that Navy PBYs could make some use of the base should war come early. Kimmel is OTL of course.

[jon]

Part II: Finishing Touches

When compared with the tortuous pace of the dredging operation, Teters’ efforts to build the island’s airfield, seaplane base, and road system seemed to fly by. Though this is partly attributable to Teters’ excellent character and managerial skills, it would have been all but impossible to achieve the pace that he did without the port improvements wrought by the Corps of Engineers and the vital experience gained over the year and half they occupied the atoll. Still, in spite of the furious pace of construction in early 1941, military installations remained sorely lacking. Though plans had been drawn up for the defense of the Atoll in 1940, little had been done to put those plans into action. Though the airfield and seaplane base were all but finished by August, no plans existed to move the requisite units into place, nor had any defensive equipment or garrison troops arrived.

Any serious practical thought of fortifying the island was delayed until April 18th 1941 when Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, possessed of a sense of urgency and alarmed at Wake’s defenseless state, petitioned the Chief of Naval Operations in what would later become a prophetic study, saying:

“The strategic importance of Wake is increasingly evident...To deny Wake to the enemy, without occupying it ourselves would be difficult; to recapture it if the Japanese should seize it in the early period of hostilities, would require operations of some magnitude. Since the Japanese Fourth Fleet includes transports, and troops with equipment especially suited for landing operations, it appears not unlikely that one of the initial operations of the Japanese may be directed against Wake.

If Wake be defended, then for the Japanese to reduce it would require extended operations of the naval forces in an area where we might be able to get at them; thus affording us opportunity to get at naval forces with naval forces. We should try, by every possible means, to get the Japanese to expose naval units. In order to do this, we must provide objectives that require such exposure.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, it is considered essential that the construction work now in progress on Wake be proceeded with and that the eventuality of war should not interrupt it. To this end, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, believes that defense installations and defense forces should be established on Wake at the earliest possible date, even at the expense of slowing down construction. It may be pointed out, in this connection, that in the absence of defense forces, construction on Wake, in the event of war, is subject to serious interruption or even complete stoppage, through enemy action.

It is therefore recommended that units of a marine defense battalion be progressively established on Wake as facilities there permit.” (1)

Fortunately, Kimmel’s recommendations, unlike those of the Hepburn Report did not fall completely on deaf ears and on June 23rd 1941, as Hitler’s panzers were rolling into the Soviet Union, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized the establishment of elements of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion on Wake Atoll “as soon as practicable”. This order became the rallying cry for immediate action by the Pacific fleet, and on August 1st 1941, advance elements of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion under Major James Devereux began loading the USS Regulus.(2

Unbeknownst to most people, efforts to fortify Wake Atoll actually began much earlier than the arrival of the Marines on the island on the 19th of August (3). In fact almost immediately after the CNO authorized the establishment of a Marine garrison on the island, work had begun, through backchannels, string pulling, favor calling, and perhaps blackmail, to aid them in their efforts (4). The exchange that occurred between the powers that be and courageous Marine administrators during the summer of 1941 is a testament to the classic quote which reads: “Good generals think about tactics, great generals think about logistics.”

Marine administrators were quick to note that the CNO’s plans were simply unfeasible for the paltry number of Marines being sent to Wake. Not only were the Marines, less than 200 strong at the time, supposed to construct coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, ostensibly using only hand tools, they were to do so without any aid from the civilian contractors on the island who were slated to depart. In addition they were expected to serve as stevedores, as the port facilities had not yet been built, and later refuel Army Air Force B-17 bombers as they transited from Hawaii to Clark Field in the Philippines (5). Such responsibilities would certainly have sucked up more man hours than the Marines had at their disposal and distracted them from their primary duties of preparing to defend the island. Possessed of an urgency uncommon to the administrative apparatus around them, a network of people began to labour to ensure that Wake Island could be adequately defended.

Efforts to aid the Marines in their efforts to fortify Wake began innocently enough, as attempts were made to facilitate cooperation between the lavishly supplied force of 1200 civilian laborers on the island and the Marines. Initial hopes were paltry in comparison to later concessions, the loaning of bulldozers, trucks, and other heavy equipment. (6) Yet the intransigence of some civilian and military authorities provoked an equally drastic response on the part of the Marines. Their insistence on removing all construction personnel and equipment once the airfield and seaplane base were completed, thereby forcing the Marines to ship in their own was simply unacceptable. Though details remain unclear, the results of their actions are not, by the time Major Devereux and the 1st Marines arrived on the island, the 1200 men working on building the naval air base had been effectively placed under Marine control. As both the airfield and seaplane base were nearly finished, Marine projects were to receive the highest priority in regards to men and equipment. In general the attitude of the men on Wake Atoll from August 1941 onward is best summed up in a line from a communique to the island “For all intents and purposes your men are to behave as if the Japanese declared war yesterday.” (7)

This fit in perfectly with the urgency felt by the commander of the 1st Marines, recently assigned Major James Devereux. The urgency felt by Devereux had been a major factor in the decision to put him in charge of the island. Strict and by the book, Devereux was tough but fair. Knowing he was working against the clock, he pushed all of his men, Marine and civilian to their limit in order to prepare for what he saw as a quickly approaching inevitable conflict. Though at only 5’5”, not a man of impressive stature, Devereux surprised many with his willingness to work alongside his men, and subject himself to the same grueling construction work.

It should be noted that much of the feverish work that took place in the late summer and early autumn of 1941 would not have been possible without the cooperation of Lieutenant Elmer B. Greey, the USN’s construction representative and Teters. These men, in addition to the other labourers on the island had no real qualms in aiding the Marines, in fact the real resistance came from officials elsewhere, primarily in Washington. Had they been less cooperative it is highly unlikely that as much work would have been accomplished in fortifying the island. As it was, their willingness to pool everything from construction equipment to food greatly ameliorated the American position on the Atoll. (8)

The arrival of the Marines and the prioritization of defensive works put an end to many of the smaller final projects being undertaken by the civilian workforce, or at the very least severely retarded them. Creature comforts and provisions for the still unfinished seaplane base were put on hold in order to ensure that the island did not first fall into enemy hands. Aided by nearly 1200 civilian workers, work on Wake’s defensive positions progressed rapidly. Though the Marines lacked many critical parts or spares for the guns themselves, the infrastructure surrounding the guns had been largely completed by the end of September 1941. All of the guns had been emplaced camouflaged and sandbagged, large underground magazines had been constructed, and an underground telephone network had been completed linking all the batteries to a central command post. (9)

The garrison at Wake also received a steady trickle of supplies from the most unlikely of sources. An inventive clerk found a way to ensure that vital parts for the island’s gun batteries made the treacherous journey to the island onboard the dozens of Army Airforce B-17 bombers that transited through the region. Ironically, as most of these bombers would be destroyed on the ground at Clark Field during the opening days of the Pacific War, their task in carrying rangefinders, spare parts, and gunnery director parts, to Wake would prove to be one of their few solid contributions to the war effort. (10)

As the fortifications around Wake began to be completed, work on civilian projects resumed and the task of the Marine garrison began to shift towards preparing for the defense of the island. Standard tables of organization required a force of roughly 1000 men on the island to man the various guns and provide a significant mobile reserve. Even with war on the horizon, this proved to be too much, even for the intrepid body of bureaucrats working to supply the garrison. What could not be supplied quantitatively was made up for in quality, as certain fields were emphasized over others. Rather than request mere riflemen, requests were made for gunnery crews, radar sets and operators, as well as for surplus weaponry. (11)

Having worked under the Marines for over a month, many of the civilian contractors had developed an affinity for the leathernecks. Furthermore, they had been impressed with the need to aid in the defense. It was decided that it would be prudent to be able to defend themselves if the Japanese were to attack, and so as early as October 1941, groups of volunteers began to drill and train with the Marines to help compensate for their lack of manpower. Usually these men served as assistants on the desperately understaffed AA batteries, or as extra riflemen. Civilian authorities also proved helpful in arranging the inclusion of defense related materiel to the islands. (12)

The next large infusion of Marines occurred on the 1st of November with the arrival of the USS Castor. Though the arrival of dedicated gunnery crews and gunnery directors for the 3 and 5 inch batteries should not be discounted, by far the most important were the arrival of the SCR-268 fire-control radar, the SCR-270B search radar, and their operators. All told, roughly 220 personnel were added to the total strength on the island that day. (13) With the arrival of the vital radar sets, Wake’s defensive preparations were roughly finished. After their emplacement, the Marine garrison, less than half its official strength, began to increase the frequency of drills and training exercises. A particular focus was given to the undermanned AA gunnery crews who by this point included a large number of civilian volunteers. As the war loomed ever closer, these drills became increasingly realistic and regular in the hopes of being ready for an inevitable Japanese attack. (14)

What would be the final piece of the initial portion of Wake’s final defenses arrived mere days before the Japanese attack. The men and machines of VMF-211 arrived on the island between November 28th and December 4th. Ground support staff for the squadron arrived first onboard what would be the last peacetime supply shipment to the Marines onboard the USS Wright. On December 4th 12 F4F-3 Wildcats, flying off the USS Enterprise, safely landed on the island with the aid of a PBY Catalina. Unfortunately, these men would only have a few days to familiarize themselves with their new surroundings yet they would not be alone, for the Wright also delivered 63,000 gallons of gasoline, 50 more gunners, and the island’s new commander, Winfield S. Cunningham. As the ranking officer on the island Cunningham assumed the office previously held by Devereux of Island commander, however as he was far less familiar with the defensive situation on the island, Cunningham was prepared to defer to Devereux until such time that he was. (15)

For the duration of 1941, it had felt like the Japanese could attack at any minute. A constant sense of urgency and some help from higher command had enabled Devereux, the 1st Marines, and the often overlooked civilian contractors to do something quite extraordinary. In the course of only 4 months they had managed to complete an impressive set of fortifications. Though they remained critically undermanned at the outbreak of the war, possessing less than half of their authorized strength, they had managed to create a defensive bulwark that would catch the Japanese completely by surprise.

Footnotes

1. Kimmel quote is an abridged one from OTL.

2. In OTL Devereux only became commander of the island on October 15th replacing Major Lewis A. Hohn a friendly but laxidaisical

3. Date is again from OTL, Major Lewis A. Hohn, the original commander of the advance detachment (Replaced by Devereux on October 15th), 4 other officers and 173 enlisted men arrived on the island in OTL on this date.

3. Given the fact that work on the rest of the facilities on the island is almost finished in TTL, such a course of action seems likely and the most efficient way of preparing the island for defense.

4. All of these responsibilities were held by the Marines in OTL and inhibited their work on preparing the island for war.

5. Though there would be some cooperation between the Marines and civilians along these lines in OTL. A strict separation between the two groups was maintained even after the events of December 7th until the island’s surrender on the 23rd. Upon surrendering the civilian laborers were taken prisoner along with the rest of the island’s defenders and subjected to a harrowing ordeal. Most were shipped to China. Those that remained on the island laboured on coastal defenses until an American raid prompted the Japanese to execute them and bury them in a mass grave.

6. Though there was mounting pressure to enact a measure to this end for the duration of 1941, no concrete actions were taken. The Marines were forced to construct the coastal and AA batteries on Wake using little more than hand tools, sweat, and a little ingenuity.

7. Devereux’ urgency, coupled with the fact that much of the civilian contractor’s work had been already accomplished means that fortification work that was neglected in OTL becomes the primary focus. A manpower shortage within the Marine Corps coupled with the need for local expertise is the primary cause for the conscription of the civilian contractors.

8. In OTL both Greey and Teters did as much as they could to try and aid the Marines, lending them equipment to help emplace the 5 and 3 inch guns. However in TTL, cooperation goes far beyond that in order to help put the finishing touches on Wake’s defense.

9. Compare this to OTL where on December 6th 1941, the telephone line was all above ground, and the various batteries, while emplaced, lacked many necessary features and fortifications.

10. In OTL these bombers not only sapped the energy of the Marine garrison which was forced to refuel them using barrels and hand pumps (In TTL it’s done by civilians), but the equipment they are carrying in TTL was not sent until the ill-fated Wake Relief expedition that occurred after the Pearl Harbour attack.

11. In OTL the construction work was not nearly as advanced requiring more brute labour. Wake in TT Lis more prepared and ready to accept said shipments. Furthermore all of the civilians and 20% of the military personnel (non-Marines) were unarmed during the Japanese invasion, not so in TTL…

12. Again there was some degree of cooperation between the civilians and the Marines in OTL. Volunteers helped man machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons beginning in November. More resources, cooperation, and urgency means that TTL’s civilian volunteers get more training for longer and are thus better prepared.

13. In OTL this equipment was on a barge being transported to the Atoll when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour. Given the advanced state of Wake’s defenses in TTL, they’re sent a bit early.

14. Having completed their fortification works, the Marines are now free to do something they did precious little of in OTL, actually prepare for the defense of the island.

15. Mostly OTL, however in TTL fewer civilian workers arrive with the Wright due to more pressure for Marine gunners to man the AA batteries. The 50 gunners sent in TTL are above and beyond what was sent in OTL.

[jon]

Part III: The War Begins…

”Men, all that we’ve been working towards these past few months…well…We’re going to see just how good a job we’ve done. I’ve just received word that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor. For months we’ve worked assuming the war would start any day now. That day is today.

Major James. P. S. Devereux on December 8th 1941

Captain Wilson, manning an Army Airways Communication Service van, was the first to hear of the attack on Pearl Harbor in a panicked communique from Hickam Airfield. Immediately, he ran over and informed Major Devereux who was shaving at the time. Devereux in turn, sprang into action, contacting Commander Cunningham, his superior, before telephoning the base communication shack and learning that a coded priority message was being deciphered. This was all Devereux needed, a call to arms was sounded, Wake was going to war.

One of Devereux’s first calls was to Teters to activate the civilian volunteer companies. Within a few hours these men had joined their soon to be brothers in arms and were aiding in defensive preparations be they on the Anti-Aircraft batteries, on the airfield with VMF-211, or on the coastal fortifications. Clever logistical maneuvering had ensured that though the Marines weren’t able to issue gas masks or helmets to any of the civilians, they did have enough rifles for not only the Army and Navy personnel on the island, but most of the civilians as well. None of these rifles were the new M-1 Garands, but they still served their purposes well enough.

While the men of Wake were busy preparing the island for the upcoming attack, VMF-211, though having been on the island for only 4 days, one of which was a holiday, already had a 4 plane combat patrol in the air at the time of the attack on Pearl. This initial patrol would return to base at 0900 and promptly be replaced by a second patrol. Shortly after this patrol launched, Captain Hamilton from Pan-American airways received orders to take the Philippine Clipper on an escorted scouting mission to the south in the afternoon. (1)

All of these preparations, indeed the preparations of the past four months, gained a new urgency when the first reports from the Radar sets arrived at the island command post at 1115. A cluster of contacts was detected coming in from the south and it didn’t take anyone long to guess that they were Japanese aircraft. Within seconds of hearing the report from the radar operators, the remaining 8 planes of VMF-211 were being scrambled, the current patrol was vectored in to intercept, and the AA batteries were being hurriedly manned.

The first shots of the Battle for Wake Island were fired at 1158 as First Lieutenant Lewis manning the 3-inch AA battery on Peale Island sighted the formation of Japanese bombers. Shrewd piloting on the part of the Japanese coupled with the inexperience of VMF-211 had prevented the Americans from intercepting the bombers before they emerged from a rain squall at 2000 feet, right on top of the island. Yet as the bombs fell from the Japanese bombers, they received in response, a withering barrage of AA fire. Wake’s obsolete 3-inch guns managed an impressive barrage that would have been even more effective if they had been equipped with modern ammunition. (2)

Just as the men and machines of the 24th Air Flotilla faced a withering barrage of AA fire in front of them, they were jumped by all 12 Wildcats of VMF-211. Major Putnam, using his squadron’s advantages of altitude and the position of the sun, led the attack with his aircraft’s .50 caliber guns cutting a destructive swath through the Japanese formations. (3) Completely unarmored and unescorted, the 27 Nell bombers suffered heavy losses in their initial attack on Wake. American reports listed 12 planes shot down with a further 7 damaged. 9 kills and 5 damaged from the fighters of VMF-211, with the remainder being credited to the AA guns. A similar comparison of Japanese sources report that of the 27 bombers dispatched to Wake, only 10 returned to Roi. (4)

The success of the Americans can be attributed to a number of factors. First and foremost being the actions of VMF-211. Led by Major Putnam, the squadron’s diving attack at the outset of the battle resulted in 7 of the squadrons’ 9 aerial victories that day. By utilizing not only altitude but the position of the sun, Putnam and his men were able to catch the Japanese completely by surprise and complete the attack with no losses of their own. The men of the AA batteries meanwhile had enough time with the advance warning provided by the radar sets and enough ammunition on hand to lay out a withering barrage against the Japanese.

Yet that success came at a price. By using the low level rain squall to mask their approach, the Japanese had succeeded in dropping their bombs on the American positions. The airfield at Wake suffered a considerable amount of damage. However, though impressive, the massive explosion caused by the destruction of a 25,000 gallon aviation gas storage tank accomplished little as most of the fuel had already been pumped into barrels and stored in protected revetments. The Japanese attack destroyed anything that it could touch including VMF-211’s stock of tools and spares. Fortunately for the Americans, casualties from the attack on the airfield were fairly light, only 5 Marines and 9 civilian volunteers dying in the sudden attack. VMF-211 would suffer its only casualty when the Wildcats began to land and Henry Elrod, having just scored 2 aerial victories and another probable, inadvertently struck a piece of debris with his propeller, damaging the fighter. (5)

The secondary targets of the Japanese attack, chiefly the Pan-Am facilities, were only lightly touched due to the intervention of VMF-211 and heavy AA fire. Minor fires had been started throughout the civilian camp, including the luxury Pan Am hospital. Several Chamorro Pan-Am workers died during the attack as well. Despite having a number of near misses, the Martin M-130 flying boat the Philippine Clipper was largely untouched, suffering from only a handful of bullet holes. Shortly after the attack Captain Hamilton took the flying boat on a series of scouting missions to the south under escort from 2 Wildcats and ensured that no Japanese invasion force was immediately inbound. Having completed this mission, he and the Clipper took off for Hawaii carrying as many civilian personnel as they could.

The results of the initial attack on Wake spread like wildfire through both Japanese and American militaries. In America such a resounding aerial victory shone out like a ray of hope to a nation beset by news of grievous casualties. The pilots of VMF-211 became immediate celebrities with nicknames like “Pounding Paul Putnam” and “Hammering Hank Elrod”. Meanwhile, in Japanese circles it quickly became apparent that Wake would be no push over as initially planned. Without aerial superiority a landing would be incredibly difficult and likely the 450 troops allocated to the mission would not be able to accomplish the task of overwhelming the American garrison adjustments needed to be made.

Footnotes:

1). All OTL, the Philippine Clipper was a flying boat with Pan-American Airlines and was at Wake at the time of the attack. In both TLs it launched towards Guam and was recalled after the arrival of news regarding Pearl Harbor. The planned scouting mission is also from OTL…

2) In OTL, no Radar meant that that the defenders of Wake were almost completely unprepared for the attack. Only a handful of AA guns were manned and able to return fire. Those that did often did so without the aid of adequate gunnery directors. In TTL all of the guns are manned and possess the requisite gunnery equipment at the time of the attack. However just like OTL they are firing hopelessly obsolete ammunition.

3).In OTL none of the Wildcats were in the right position to attack the initial Japanese air raids. Only 4 were aloft and the remainder were destroyed on the ground. In TTL they are off the east coast of the island at around 12,000 feet.

4) In OTL the Japanese raid took no casualties. The defender’s readiness at Wake coupled with the long distances involved both contributed to the heavy casualties suffered by the Japanese.

5) In OTL VMF-211 lost 60% of its strength in the attack with 23 men killed and 11 injured. The damage to the tools and spares is OTL. Less fuel is destroyed in TTL as, more of it had been pumped into drums in TTL due to the presence of civilian workers.

[lordroel]

Apr 26, 2016 19:48:52 GMT jon said:

Hi Everyone!

I just finished my comprehensive exams for my PhD (passed!) and have once again returned to the land of Alternate History. I'm in the process of continuing my TL "A True and Better Alamo" but before I push beyond July 1942, I decided to change the style into something a bit more readable/publishable (hopefully!) The content is mostly the same (a few minor changes so far), and more content will be coming rapidly. If you haven't read any version of this TL, I hope you enjoy it!

Welcome on board this humble forum and thank you for posting your timeline here.

[jon]

Part IV: Adjustments

”That’s all?”

-The reported remark of Admiral Kajioka upon hearing of how many bombers returned from the first raid on Wake.

As commander of the 4th fleet, Admiral Inouye was a busy man on December 8th 1941. His command was responsible for operations throughout the Central Pacific ranging from the capture of Guam, to Makin, Tarawa and finally, Wake Island. Though seen as little more than a formality, the surprisingly large number of casualties taken by the 24th Air Flotilla called into question the trivial nature with which the Japanese had assigned the Wake garrison’s defensive forces. Heavy, accurate AA fire, coupled with at least 12 fighters would make further aerial attacks difficult. At the time the A5M Claude fighters currently at Kwajalein, in addition to being obsolete and probably no match for the Wildcats at Wake, did not have the range to accompany the remaining G3M bombers. Even the Navy’s vaunted A6M fighter would not be able to engage in combat operations over the island due to range constraints.

The failure of a second air raid on December 9th to do significant damage, coupled with the loss of another 5 bombers, forced a change in Japanese tactics. Inoue decided that without air superiority, an attack on the island would be foolish. The attack was postponed and instead naval units earmarked for supporting the amphibious assault on Wake were tasked with the nighttime bombardment of the island. Inoue and Kajioka hoped that by bombarding the airfield they could even the playing field for their bombers and ultimately the invasion. On December 11th Kajioka arrived off the southern shore of Wake Atoll and ordered his force consisting of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers to open fire on the American positions. For two hours the Imperial Japanese peppered the island with no response. Unbeknownst to them, Devereux and Cunningham had agreed to issue an order to the batteries not to return fire. Believing their mission to be a success, Kajioka proceeded to reverse course and make for Kwajalein in order to be out of range by daybreak to avert a potential American strike.

The only attempt at retaliation against the Japanese during the first bombardment of Wake was the attack of the USS Triton on the obsolete cruiser Tatsuta. The Triton had been south of Wake, recharging her batteries when a lookout sighted Kajioka’s force and alerted her commander “Philly” Lent. Lent dived and proceeded to attempt to gain a firing position on the incoming Japanese force. Opting for a sonar approach in accordance with standard American submarine doctrine, Lent let loose with a salvo of 6 torpedoes before turning and retreating. Fortunately for the Tatsuta out of the 6 torpedoes, all of them missed due to the faulty detonators and gyroscopes that plagued the American Mark XIV torpedo at the beginning of the war. (1)

The next day, the Japanese found that their optimism regarding the previous night’s bombardment was unfounded. Inadequate intelligence and rough seas severely impeded the accuracy of the Japanese attack. This coupled with the sheer ingenuity and determination shown by the American defenders meant that no fewer than 6 F4F Wildcats were scrambled to meet the incoming Japanese attack the next day. Once again the 24th Air Flotilla was forced to limp back to Roi with fewer aircraft than it departed with. The failure of aerial raids and naval bombardment to reduce Wake led Inoue to request further reinforcements in order to provide air cover.

Almost immediately, Japanese High Command recognized the problem posed by a strong American presence on Wake Island. If the garrison there would not succumb to the initial Japanese attack, more resources must be allocated in order to establish a defensive bulwark in the Central Pacific. Seeing that more air assets were required, on December 12th, orders were issued to the Kido Butai now returning from the successful raid on Pearl Harbour. Carrier Division 2, consisting of the carriers Soryu and the Hiryu, the cruisers Tone and Chikuma, and a pair of screening destroyers, was detached from the main body and sent to rendezvous with elements of the 4th fleet. (2)

The importance of Wake also necessitated the allocation of more conventional forces as well. 4 older cruisers from Cruiser Division 6, along with over a thousand additional troops, both fresh from taking the island of Guam were sent to rendezvous with the original invasion force, now deemed insufficient for the task at hand. (3)

Unbeknownst to anyone in the Japanese high command, the Americans were also making adjustments to the unexpected resistance shown by the First Marines and the aviators of VMF 211. As most of the preparatory works that had taken place in 1941 had escaped popular notice, many Americans, even those in High Command positions, were taken by surprise. The fact that a handful of fighters and AA guns could inflict such heavy losses on Japanese aircraft if properly warned stood in stark contrast to the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Had the initial radar reports from Opana point been interpreted properly, perhaps the losses could have been fewer and perhaps the Japanese carrier forces would have been mauled as badly as the strikes above Wake. Ironically, though Kimmel had played a large role in preparing Wake to withstand a Japanese attack, it was precisely this resistance that exacerbated the perception of his failure at Pearl Harbor.

Kimmel quickly became determined to do something, anything, to ameliorate or aid the American situation on Wake. This was only reinforced as news of Wake’s resistance reached the populace. The aerial victories of VMF-211, the cocky swagger of “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and Devereux’s mythological ending to his request for reinforcements and supplies “Send us more Japs!” all became prominent in American discourse despite the latter being a coding error. To leave Wake to “wither on the vine” would have been tantamount to political and popular suicide for Kimmel, and by the same measure, to relieve Wake would allow Kimmel to begin to repair the damage of Pearl Harbor.

Initially, Kimmel had planned to send a carrier taskforce centered around the USS Saratoga to provide not only additional planes to the island, but also reinforcements and spare parts onboard the Tangier. Yet the Saratoga’s delays in arriving at Pearl Harbour prevented Kimmel from moving as quickly as he wanted to. Problems with refueling the Lexington and a lack of modern aircraft to reinforce VMF-211 also inhibited quick action.

During these early hours of the war in the Pacific, Kimmel must be credited with a great deal of prescience. On the 11th, after receiving the latest combat reports from Wake, he surmised, as did Admiral Inoue and Kajioka, that Japanese aircraft carriers were the only way the Japanese could subdue the island and its stubborn defenders. Though he desperately wanted to strike back, Kimmel had no idea how many carriers the Japanese would commit to the invasion. He simply couldn’t risk sending in a single carrier alone at this point, or even a pair of carriers. (4) At some point on the 11th Kimmel and his staff came up with the idea of using destroyers to ferry supplies and reinforcements to Wake. Apparently, a junior officer cited similar British actions in the Mediterranean with Malta and Kimmel seized upon the idea. A group of destroyers might be able to reach Wake before the Japanese if they maintained high enough speeds. In Kimmel’s mind, an infusion of men and equipment might buy enough time for a later relief expedition. Though part of him must have known that in all likelihood he was sending everyone to their death he pressed on nonetheless.

Though several possibilities were raised, in the end, Kimmel opted to use the 4 obsolete Wickes class destroyers of Destroyer Division 80 as his “fast transports” for the initial Wake Island Relief convoy. They in turn would be escorted by several other destroyers, as, in order to carry as much cargo as possible, they would be stripped of most combat equipment, and be operated by skeleton navy crews. Kimmel’s decisions would be echoed months later as the USN pulled back a number of obsolete destroyers for the same purpose, only giving them far more thorough modifications. (5)

Work proceeded at a breakneck pace on the 4 destroyers as the Wake relief convoy became one of the highest priority tasks at Pearl. Though each destroyer was stripped of features deemed “excessive” such as torpedoes, excess ammunition, and “excess” crewmembers, additional features such as additional AA machine guns were installed. Work began almost immediately and within 48 hours the 4 destroyers were deemed “ready” and loading began. As the Saratoga sailed into Pearl Harbor on the 15th, the “Tin Can Convoy” sailed out making full speed for Wake Island.

Though contemporaries criticized Kimmel for not sending the Saratoga on a similar mission to deliver the aviators and planes of VMF-221 to the island. Later events would prove him right in this regard. Knowing the poor logistical situation on Wake and the supplies sent to the island, he must have known that the impact of sending VMF-221 and its F2A Buffalo fighters to the island would have been minimal. For though the facilities existed on the island to support far more aircraft, requisite levels of fuel, parts, and maintenance staff had not yet reached the atoll making operating anything more than the battered Wildcats of VMF-211 extremely different. Fortunately, the real strength of the island was not in its aerial strength, though that had indeed been prominent in the initial days. Once the Japanese carriers arrived the Marines would need as much help as possible to dissuade or delay a Japanese naval assault.

The first Wake relief convoy would brought valuable reinforcements and supplies to the island even if it was less than what Devereaux had requested. Each converted destroyer left Pearl Harbor with 70 Marines and 5 Navy Corpsmen onboard. In barrels stacked on the decks of the ship and in every nook and cranny were ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts. The latter mostly for the gunnery batteries as Kimmel held no illusions about keeping the fighters of VMF-211 flying much longer.

The real question plaguing the Americans was whether the convoy of destroyers would reach Wake before the arrival of the Japanese carriers. Though not crippling, the loss of 8 destroyers, albeit only half of them being modern combat effective craft, would impede further efforts to pursue offensive operations in the Pacific. In fact, many expected the mission to be recalled after Kimmel’s relief on December 17th. However Kimmel’s replacement, Admiral Pye, also saw the importance of at least trying to relieve Wake. Furthermore, the decision to push the elderly destroyers to their limit and maintain a speed of nearly 25 knots meant that once Pye took command, the convoy had nearly reached its destination.

The Americans’ ingenuity, and sheer determination were aided by indecision on the part of the Japanese. Though it was apparent that Wake would only be able to be subdued by the use of carrier borne aircraft, the Japanese High Command wasted precious time ordering Carrier division 2 to launch a raid on Midway. Japan’s initial offensive was literally running on a shoestring and even the minor reallocation of resources to deal with Wake needed to be couched in efficiency. It was hoped that en-route to its rendezvous with the 4th fleet, Carrier division 2 could launch an aerial raid on Midway Island. Poor weather, coupled with the decision to press on with the attack gave the relief convoy and the defenders of Wake much needed breathing room. Much to the chagrin of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the raid did little to damage the American garrison on the island resulting in only a few casualties and putting some planes out of action for the coming raids against Wake. (6)

On the island of Wake itself, the days preceding the arrival of the relief convoy were oddly quiet. The 24th Air Flotilla was simply in no position to launch major air attacks after the events of December 8-11. The first 3 raids on Wake had resulted in the loss of nearly two thirds of the unit’s prewar strength. Though reinforcements were incoming, any major raids on Wake were delayed until adequate escort could be requisitioned. Instead, only a handful of reconnaissance missions were launched. These too were often the target of American fighters, with several being shot down prior to the arrival of the Japanese fleet.

Henry “Hammering Hank” Elrod’s destruction of a G3M Nell on December 18th gave him his 5th aerial victory and made him the first American “ace” of the war. Something that was met with considerable celebration in America, and consternation as he later refused to leave his comrades. While the aviators of VMF-211 were busy chasing Japanese reconnaissance planes, Devereux and the men of Wake Island were busily preparing for the inevitable Japanese assault. Like Kimmel, Devereux believed that Wake was simply too important to be left alone. The same Japanese carriers that raided Pearl would eventually arrive and be accompanied by an amphibious landing force. Plans were made and a number of plans were made for the eventual Japanese landing. In a move that would foreshadow later Marine Defense Battalions, at the insistence of Teters, Devereux ordered the conversion of several pieces of heavy equipment into a makeshift armored unit. Though only armed with machine guns, the bolted on pieces of scrap metal provided adequate protection from small arms fire without decreasing their speed too much. (7)

“Where are the transports?” was the whisper going through the garrison as the relief convoy arrived off Wake on the night of December 18th. Though it wasn’t everything they wanted, even the surliest of Marines had to marvel of the ingenuity as barrel after barrel of supplies were rapidly offloaded from the destroyers as one by one they entered Wake’s harbor and disgorged much needed supplies before beginning their journey back to Pearl Harbor. When the final tallies were reached, over 300 Marines, millions of rounds of .30 and .50 caliber ammunition, a 2 thousand modern 3-inch AA shells, valuable spares and supplies had been offloaded. (8)

What followed remains one of the most memorable moments of the Pacific War. From the inception of the convoy, the intent was to evacuate at least some of the civilians from the island. Devereux had made this known to the civilians, though he did not take any immediate action in this regard. An unspoken agreement existed that the wounded received priority on the ships. However, by the 18th this only comprised less than 50 people. A decision had to be made quickly and in the end it was made by none other than Teters. The de facto commander of the civilian contractors, Teters approached Devereux and Cunningham on the airfield, rifle in hand and spoke lines that would go down in history. “We’ve fought with you so far Colonel. I don’t know about you, but my men and I like to finish what we start. If you’ll have us, we’d like to stay and finish the job.” Though remaining on Wake was not a compulsory decision, as demonstrated by the 17 healthy civilian contractors who opted to leave with the convoy, the majority’s decision to remain behind and fight made waves throughout the United States. The civilians would stay, integrating themselves into the Marine battalion and steeling themselves for the coming Japanese assault.

The relief convoy departed as quickly as it had arrived in the hopes of avoiding a Japanese aerial attack. In a stunning display of efficiency, the four primitive APD’s had all been unloaded and were one their way well before sunrise. By dawn of the 19th they had managed to put considerable distance between themselves and the atoll. Though they were theoretically within range of Japanese aircraft from Kwajalein, by the morning of the 20th they had reached a safe distance and reduced speed to a more manageable 17 knots. The relief expedition to Wake Island had succeeded without a single combat casualty.

The Marine reinforcements which arrived on the 18th wouldn’t have to wait long for their first taste of combat. They had barely begun to unpack the supplies brought by the convoy when on the 20th, the report from the radar sets came in. The real battle for Wake was about to begin...

Footnotes

1) The Triton was one of the subs patrolling the area in OTL around Wake and Pilly Lent did make an attack in OTL with similar results though it remains unknown if she really encountered Japanese ships.

2) 3 days earlier than OTL due to the absolute trouncing of the 24th Air Flotilla by VMF-211. In TTL the Japanese see that there’s simply no chance in hell that they’re taking Wake without significant air support.

3) Also requisitioned earlier than OTL. Inoue and Kajioka both knew that the 450 men originally allocated to take Wake was far too few right from the start. Given that the troops are available, needed, and that the invasion date has been pushed back in TTL due to a lack of air support I don’t think this is too farfetched.

4) Perhaps I’m giving Kimmel too much credit. In OTL he launched the relief expedition without knowing that the Japanese were going to send in carriers. Given the fact that in TTL Wake has suffered almost no losses to enemy action, besides a handful of damaged planes. Coupled with the massive losses inflicted on the 24th Aerial flotilla I think his reasoning in TTL is sound.

5) Kimmel’s just jumping the gun here on what the USN would do a couple months later. Mind you, these APD’s aren’t nearly as efficient, but they’ll do in a pinch. I’m thinking along the lines of the infamous “Tokyo Express” brought about by desperation on the American side. Reinforcing Wake would be a huge propaganda coup given the fact that it was an instant bright spot on the rather dim news of Pearl Harbour.

6) The Japanese attempted such a raid in OTL on the 15th but were dissuaded by poor weather. In TTL they arrive earlier and thus the weather is better, they think they have a bit more time, and thus go through with the raid, inadvertently buying the Americans much needed time.

7) No such actions were undertaken in OTL due to the fact that there was a strict separation between the civilians and Marines as previously mentioned, and that Wake was under constant aerial attack. Without radar, or effective AA guns in OTL the Japanese bombers faced far fewer casualties. In TTL the defenders of Wake have over a week of relative peace in which they get to be…inventive.

8) The completion of the ship channel and harbor means that the loading and offloading of supplies is infinitesimally easier in TTL and that a quick drop and dash operation like this one is possible.

[lordroel]

So this timeline is about a very different battle of Wake and everything that happens afterwards.