BURNISHED ROWS OF STEEL: The Great North American War, 1861-

[tfsmith121]

I think Harrison was an entertaining writer (far more so than Turtledove), but his grasp on the history was pretty shaky.

I have purposely not read Tsouras, Conroy, etc because I didn't want to pick up their ideas and re-use them, unconsciously or otherwise.

I replied on the warships thread, by the way.

Best,

[lordroel]

Jul 1, 2016 22:47:13 GMT tfsmith121 said:

I think Harrison was an entertaining writer (far more so than Turtledove), but his grasp on the history was pretty shaky.

I have purposely not read Tsouras, Conroy, etc because I didn't want to pick up their ideas and re-use them, unconsciously or otherwise.

Well it is never a bad idea to get some ideas and beside there was a Union Army Balloon Corps, there where submarine in use during the civil war so everything they created, except the steam tank or whatever Harrison call them where in use in one way ore another.

Jul 1, 2016 22:47:13 GMT tfsmith121 said:

I replied on the warships thread, by the way.

Thanks i will post there as soon as i can.

[tfsmith121]

I think Harrison was a more entertaining writer than Turtledove, for example, but agree, his grasp of the history was slim at times.

I have not read Tsouras or some others so as to avoid using their ideas in BROS.

Best,

[lordroel]

Jul 2, 2016 14:37:22 GMT tfsmith121 said:

BROS.

Best,

Like the abbreviation you gave your timeline.

Also in chapter Chapter 2, Part 1 – On Canada's fair domain it has two British officers talking, i get the impression they already believe the war will not be so easy and that the Union will be a very hard nut to crack.

[tfsmith121]

Thanks - "BROS" can be read as such on two different levels, simply as an acronym but also in the sense that while the Civil War was (historically) fratricidal for the US, the plain truth is brothers tend to be closer than cousins, even at war.

Wolseley, Stanley, and Seymour we, are all historical personages, of course, and while the conversation is authorial fiat, Stanley's father was on of the Cabinet members who questioned Palmerston's policies and Wolseley's comment regarding the British advance guard being at risk of capture is historical, according to Foreman's A World in Flames and Lehmann's A Modern Major General.

The ordeal of HMT Melbourne and HMS Orpheus' convoy is historical, as well.

[lordroel]

Jul 2, 2016 18:20:08 GMT tfsmith121 said:

Thanks - "BROS" can be read as such on two different levels, simply as an acronym but also in the sense that while the Civil War was (historically) fratricidal for the US, the plain truth is brothers tend to be closer than cousins, even at war.

Wolseley, Stanley, and Seymour we, are all historical personages, of course, and while the conversation is authorial fiat, Stanley's father was on of the Cabinet members who questioned Palmerston's policies and Wolseley's comment regarding the British advance guard being at risk of capture is historical, according to Foreman's A World in Flames and Lehmann's A Modern Major General.

The ordeal of HMT Melbourne and HMS Orpheus' convoy is historical, as well.

You mean the British did send troops to Canada to bolster it in case of a British war with the Union.

[tfsmith121]

They did, historically; armed forces in North America were subject to both treaty and strategic/economic/realistic limits in the period after the conclusion of the 1812-15 conflict, however, and for good reason. Despite various alarms and excursions, both the Americans and the British had more important places to spend their resources. Naval forces on the Great Lakes, for example, were severely limited, which essentially meant the British were surrendering control of the Lakes to the Americans, given the size and capacity of the US shipping and shipbuilding industries on the Lakes vis a vis that under the British flag and in British territory - and given the obvious advantages of climate and weather patterns to the US (thaw came from the south, of course) the US would have freedom of navigation before the British/British North Americans ever would in the spring, it's really simply acceptance of reality. Given the time of year the historical Trent Affair blew up, any alternate history using the winter of 1861-62 as the incident as a potential point of departure has to acknowledge the advantages the Americans had in these terms, as - in fact - the British did.

As far as troops went, the "British" garrison in North America was always going to be a mix of regulars recruited in the UK and on the British establishment and rotated in and out of the BNA garrisons, the same as any other imperial outpost; the small number of regulars recruited in BNA but on the British establishment; and the locally colonial forces, which themselves were a mix of active, part-time, and emergency only "names on a muster list" type militia. There are various assesments of the state of the British North American volunteers and militia in the first half of the Nineteenth Century, but none of them, after the draw down of the forces raised during the 1812-15, are especially impressive. The Canadian DND website has pages of official histories of various elements of the BNA volunteers/militia, but it comes down to - really - about two significant sets of numbers. In 1854-55, the Province of Canada (one of five colonies eastern BNA was divided into at this point, none truly self-governing and none with an executive below the level of the appointed British governor general who could order them to cooperate) raised a force of 5,000 volunteers, equipped at Provincial expense and paid for the drill periods - these were still part-time soldiers, however; they were not regulars, by any stretch of the imagination. In the summer of 1862, even after the war scare, the total number of "BNA" personnel (volunteers and militia) expected in the event of a mobilization, according to the British Army's own published troop lists, was roughly ~25,000 in the Province of Canada, split between ~15,000 volunteers with some official recognition (organization, commissions and seniority lists for the officers, muster lists, paid drills, equipment, etc.) and 10,000 militia with some level of organization and training beyond the level of irregulars - or, in North American terms, a sheriff's posse. That's it, no more, no less; the numbers are from:

Petrie, Capt. Martin (14th F.) and James, Col. Sir Henry (RE - Topographical and Statistical Dept., War Office), Organization, Composition, and Strength of the Army of Great Britain, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; by direction of the Secretary of State for War, 1863 (preface dated Nov., 1862)

and total:

Province of Canada – 10,000 militia (August, 1862); + 1,615 VC; 1,687 VA; 202 VE; 10,615 VI
Colony of Nova Scotia – 269 VA; 2,132 VI (June, 1862)
Colony of New Brunswick – 1850 (VA and I) (March, 1861)
Colony of Prince Edward Island – 1,643 (VA and VI) (June, 1862)
Colony of Newfoundland – 267 (5 cos.) (July, 1862)
Pacific coast colonies (BC and VI, etc.): 44 (August, 1862)

Of course, the issue is that in an emergency, with the populations of the various subdivisions of British North America being what they were in 1862 (see below) that additional troops could have been raised, which undoubtedly is true - however, it is worth noting that in an emergency, the British authorities in BNA would be faced with the unpleasant reality of either mobilizing what passed for the standing reserves for field duty as such (those 5,000 to 15,000 volunteers referenced above) OR using them as cadre for a larger mobilization of the organized and unorganized (or sedentary) militia. Can't do both, and mobilizing after active operations have begun is generally not a net positive, as (for example) Poland learned in 1939 and the Dutch in 1940.

Province of Canada (2.5 million); NB (252K); NS (330K); PEI (80K); NF (122K); BC and VI (85K);

Minor sidelight; the entire census population of BNA in 1861 was roughly 3.3 million people; this is about 100,000 less than the combined populations of Ohio, Michigan, and Vermont, according to the 1860 census. US population in the loyal states in the winter of 1862 (based on the 1860 census) was more than 21 million.

So, realistically, however many hostilities only militia could be mobilized from the population of BNA in 1862, the cadre with any sort of training (by August) totals about 25,000 (according to the British Army), and these are the same 25,000 or so volunteers and trained militia who provide whatever there is in terms of a local contribution to the British field forces in BNA, garrison and lines-of-communications troops, and training cadre for replacements and fillers ... and given the reality the US began to mobilize for the Civil War in April, 1861, the US has (at least) a 9 month lead and more than 21 million people to draw from, plus (historically) an ever expanding number of pro-Union and escaped ex-slaves as the US forces moved south. Total population in the rebel states was roughly 9 million, including more than 3 million enslaved; not exactly a comparable demographic resource for the rebellion.

So then the next question are the available British regular forces, recruited in the UK and BNA; the later number is small - there was only one regiment, the Royal Canadian Rifles, that recruited in BNA at this time, and the total numbers might have provided a battalion for the field and some depot and garrison forces. Historically, the RCR tended to be used in company sized units on the border and as regular garrison at important points. Beyond that, historically, the British had attempted to keep a regular force in BNA that was equivalent to the regular US Army for the first few decades of the Nineteenth Century, but the strategic needs of the war with Russia and the expansion of the imperial garrisons in the 1850s meant that was unobtainable. By the time the US Civil War broke out in April, 1861, the British regular garrison in BNA amounted to four or five battalions of regular infantry, the nominal Royal Canadian Rifles battalion(s) (1 or 2, perhaps); the 1st Btn, 17th Regiment; and the single-battalion 62nd and 63rd regiments, plus some garrison artillery batteries and odds and ends.

And that was it, from Newfoundland to the Canada West district of the Province of Canada, historical Upper Canada and modern day southeastern Ontario.

In the summer of 1861, the British shipped in three more battalions of infantry (37th and 40th regiments, and 4th Battalion, 60th Regiment (KRRC), plus a field artillery battery and some fillers); they arrived in July on the Atlantic coast.

By November-December, when the Trent Affair caused a war scare, the British were considering sending more troops, but had not; in response to Trent, an ad hoc force of eight more infantry battalions (1st GG, 2nd SFG, 1st/15th, 1st/16th, 2nd/16th, 2nd/17th, 1st/RB, and 96th), along with additional field and garrison artillery, engineers, etc. were shipped across the North Atlantic; winter storms delayed a signficant element of the reinforcements, to the point that some of the command staff were actually landed in US territory, and there were various misadventures (some units had to divert from their intended disembarkation points because the weather was so bad). Of course, even once they got ashore in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, they had to be shipped overland by sleigh to Rivière-du-Loup (Quebec), a 300-mile, 10 day trip (at the best) before they could board a train, because there was no rail connection between the Maritimes and Quebec in 1862.

After that, even by rail, it was another 800 miles from Rivière-du-Loup to (for example) the international border between BNA/Upper Canada and Michigan (Detroit); so it's not exactly simple logistics, 3,000 miles+ across the North Atlantic in mid-winter (call it two weeks at best, including loading and unloading, and weather delayed several ships by a week or more) and then another 1100 miles (~1800 km) overland to (for example) the southwestern border of British North America, so that's another two weeks, including both the sleigh and rail movements, and without opposition. It's about 1300 km from Cherbourg to Berlin, for example.

Historically, the British did reinforce Upper Canada overland, with both some of the newly-arrived troops and battalions stripped out of the Maritimes; troops began leaving Halifax, NS for Saint John, New Burnswick on Jan, 1, 1862 (moving by sea, of course) and then overland, by sleigh route and rail; by March 13, a grand total of 6,568 officers and men had made it to Rivière-du-Loup and points west. These included five more battalions of infantry and about a battalion each of field and garrison artillery, which including the two infantry battalions already in the Province of Canada, gave the British about two brigades of regulars; if the organized volunteers were mobilized (they were not, historically) and are thrown in, they might have had 3-4 brigade equivalents for field duty.

Anyway, that's what they were able and chose to send, historically.

In BROS, it is significantly more, but they also have to deal with minor things like a two front war and an enemy that is actively trying to interfere.

As always, thanks for reading and the comments; they are appreciated.

Best,

[lordroel]

Jul 3, 2016 22:58:18 GMT tfsmith121 said:

They did, historically; armed forces in North America were subject to both treaty and strategic/economic/realistic limits in the period after the conclusion of the 1812-15 conflict, however, and for good reason. Despite various alarms and excursions, both the Americans and the British had more important places to spend their resources. Naval forces on the Great Lakes, for example, were severely limited, which essentially meant the British were surrendering control of the Lakes to the Americans, given the size and capacity of the US shipping and shipbuilding industries on the Lakes vis a vis that under the British flag and in British territory - and given the obvious advantages of climate and weather patterns to the US (thaw came from the south, of course) the US would have freedom of navigation before the British/British North Americans ever would in the spring, it's really simply acceptance of reality. Given the time of year the historical Trent Affair blew up, any alternate history using the winter of 1861-62 as the incident as a potential point of departure has to acknowledge the advantages the Americans had in these terms, as - in fact - the British did.

As far as troops went, the "British" garrison in North America was always going to be a mix of regulars recruited in the UK and on the British establishment and rotated in and out of the BNA garrisons, the same as any other imperial outpost; the small number of regulars recruited in BNA but on the British establishment; and the locally colonial forces, which themselves were a mix of active, part-time, and emergency only "names on a muster list" type militia. There are various assesments of the state of the British North American volunteers and militia in the first half of the Nineteenth Century, but none of them, after the draw down of the forces raised during the 1812-15, are especially impressive. The Canadian DND website has pages of official histories of various elements of the BNA volunteers/militia, but it comes down to - really - about two significant sets of numbers. In 1854-55, the Province of Canada (one of five colonies eastern BNA was divided into at this point, none truly self-governing and none with an executive below the level of the appointed British governor general who could order them to cooperate) raised a force of 5,000 volunteers, equipped at Provincial expense and paid for the drill periods - these were still part-time soldiers, however; they were not regulars, by any stretch of the imagination. In the summer of 1862, even after the war scare, the total number of "BNA" personnel (volunteers and militia) expected in the event of a mobilization, according to the British Army's own published troop lists, was roughly ~25,000 in the Province of Canada, split between ~15,000 volunteers with some official recognition (organization, commissions and seniority lists for the officers, muster lists, paid drills, equipment, etc.) and 10,000 militia with some level of organization and training beyond the level of irregulars - or, in North American terms, a sheriff's posse. That's it, no more, no less; the numbers are from:

Petrie, Capt. Martin (14th F.) and James, Col. Sir Henry (RE - Topographical and Statistical Dept., War Office), Organization, Composition, and Strength of the Army of Great Britain, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; by direction of the Secretary of State for War, 1863 (preface dated Nov., 1862)

and total:

Province of Canada – 10,000 militia (August, 1862); + 1,615 VC; 1,687 VA; 202 VE; 10,615 VI
Colony of Nova Scotia – 269 VA; 2,132 VI (June, 1862)
Colony of New Brunswick – 1850 (VA and I) (March, 1861)
Colony of Prince Edward Island – 1,643 (VA and VI) (June, 1862)
Colony of Newfoundland – 267 (5 cos.) (July, 1862)
Pacific coast colonies (BC and VI, etc.): 44 (August, 1862)

Of course, the issue is that in an emergency, with the populations of the various subdivisions of British North America being what they were in 1862 (see below) that additional troops could have been raised, which undoubtedly is true - however, it is worth noting that in an emergency, the British authorities in BNA would be faced with the unpleasant reality of either mobilizing what passed for the standing reserves for field duty as such (those 5,000 to 15,000 volunteers referenced above) OR using them as cadre for a larger mobilization of the organized and unorganized (or sedentary) militia. Can't do both, and mobilizing after active operations have begun is generally not a net positive, as (for example) Poland learned in 1939 and the Dutch in 1940.

Province of Canada (2.5 million); NB (252K); NS (330K); PEI (80K); NF (122K); BC and VI (85K);

Minor sidelight; the entire census population of BNA in 1861 was roughly 3.3 million people; this is about 100,000 less than the combined populations of Ohio, Michigan, and Vermont, according to the 1860 census. US population in the loyal states in the winter of 1862 (based on the 1860 census) was more than 21 million.

So, realistically, however many hostilities only militia could be mobilized from the population of BNA in 1862, the cadre with any sort of training (by August) totals about 25,000 (according to the British Army), and these are the same 25,000 or so volunteers and trained militia who provide whatever there is in terms of a local contribution to the British field forces in BNA, garrison and lines-of-communications troops, and training cadre for replacements and fillers ... and given the reality the US began to mobilize for the Civil War in April, 1861, the US has (at least) a 9 month lead and more than 21 million people to draw from, plus (historically) an ever expanding number of pro-Union and escaped ex-slaves as the US forces moved south. Total population in the rebel states was roughly 9 million, including more than 3 million enslaved; not exactly a comparable demographic resource for the rebellion.

So then the next question are the available British regular forces, recruited in the UK and BNA; the later number is small - there was only one regiment, the Royal Canadian Rifles, that recruited in BNA at this time, and the total numbers might have provided a battalion for the field and some depot and garrison forces. Historically, the RCR tended to be used in company sized units on the border and as regular garrison at important points. Beyond that, historically, the British had attempted to keep a regular force in BNA that was equivalent to the regular US Army for the first few decades of the Nineteenth Century, but the strategic needs of the war with Russia and the expansion of the imperial garrisons in the 1850s meant that was unobtainable. By the time the US Civil War broke out in April, 1861, the British regular garrison in BNA amounted to four or five battalions of regular infantry, the nominal Royal Canadian Rifles battalion(s) (1 or 2, perhaps); the 1st Btn, 17th Regiment; and the single-battalion 62nd and 63rd regiments, plus some garrison artillery batteries and odds and ends.

And that was it, from Newfoundland to the Canada West district of the Province of Canada, historical Upper Canada and modern day southeastern Ontario.

In the summer of 1861, the British shipped in three more battalions of infantry (37th and 40th regiments, and 4th Battalion, 60th Regiment (KRRC), plus a field artillery battery and some fillers); they arrived in July on the Atlantic coast.

By November-December, when the Trent Affair caused a war scare, the British were considering sending more troops, but had not; in response to Trent, an ad hoc force of eight more infantry battalions (1st GG, 2nd SFG, 1st/15th, 1st/16th, 2nd/16th, 2nd/17th, 1st/RB, and 96th), along with additional field and garrison artillery, engineers, etc. were shipped across the North Atlantic; winter storms delayed a signficant element of the reinforcements, to the point that some of the command staff were actually landed in US territory, and there were various misadventures (some units had to divert from their intended disembarkation points because the weather was so bad). Of course, even once they got ashore in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, they had to be shipped overland by sleigh to Rivière-du-Loup (Quebec), a 300-mile, 10 day trip (at the best) before they could board a train, because there was no rail connection between the Maritimes and Quebec in 1862.

After that, even by rail, it was another 800 miles from Rivière-du-Loup to (for example) the international border between BNA/Upper Canada and Michigan (Detroit); so it's not exactly simple logistics, 3,000 miles+ across the North Atlantic in mid-winter (call it two weeks at best, including loading and unloading, and weather delayed several ships by a week or more) and then another 1100 miles (~1800 km) overland to (for example) the southwestern border of British North America, so that's another two weeks, including both the sleigh and rail movements, and without opposition. It's about 1300 km from Cherbourg to Berlin, for example.

Historically, the British did reinforce Upper Canada overland, with both some of the newly-arrived troops and battalions stripped out of the Maritimes; troops began leaving Halifax, NS for Saint John, New Burnswick on Jan, 1, 1862 (moving by sea, of course) and then overland, by sleigh route and rail; by March 13, a grand total of 6,568 officers and men had made it to Rivière-du-Loup and points west. These included five more battalions of infantry and about a battalion each of field and garrison artillery, which including the two infantry battalions already in the Province of Canada, gave the British about two brigades of regulars; if the organized volunteers were mobilized (they were not, historically) and are thrown in, they might have had 3-4 brigade equivalents for field duty.

Anyway, that's what they were able and chose to send, historically.

In BROS, it is significantly more, but they also have to deal with minor things like a two front war and an enemy that is actively trying to interfere.

As always, thanks for reading and the comments; they are appreciated.

Best,

Did the United States before the outbreak of the civil war or during the civil war had any war plans like War Plan Red which was the future plan the United States made in case of war with the United Kingdom laying around.

[tfsmith121]

There was some limited planning (historically) which is referenced various places in the Official Records (available on-line for free thanks to Cornell, at ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html ); what's worth noting is that the US had set up the joint service (Army-Navy-Coast Survey) Blockade Strategy Board in 1861 and they produced a series of detailed reports between July and September that laid out the strategy and operational planning that led to the US expeditions to Hatteras Inlet (August, 1861); Port Royal (November, 1861); Roanoke (February, 1862); and New Orleans (April, 1862). Hatteras amounted to a brigade-sized expedtionary force, Port Royal and Roanoke both reinforced divisions, and New Orleans a division, all supported by naval squadrons and transport forces... so the expectation is the same panel or a similar one could react quickly to plan any necessary operations in or with regards to BNA. The other points worth noting are the Americans had the experience of 1775-77 and 1812-15 on the northern fronts, which included the US occupation of Montreal in 1775-76, as well as operations against Quebec in 1776 and in both Maine and upstate New York and Vermont in both conflicts. There was also the Aroostook Valley crisis in 1839-39, and various border crises, surveys, and explorations going back to the beginning of the Nineteenth Century and before...

How that would play out, of course, is what BROS is all about...

As always, thanks for reading and the comments. I appreciate it.

Best,

[lordroel]

Jul 4, 2016 4:56:16 GMT tfsmith121 said:

There was some limited planning (historically) which is referenced various places in the Official Records (available on-line for free thanks to Cornell, at ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html ); what's worth noting is that the US had set up the joint service (Army-Navy-Coast Survey) Blockade Strategy Board was set up in 1861 and produced a series of detailed reports between July and September that laid out the strategy and operational planning that led to the US expeditions to Hatteras Inlet (August, 1861); Port Royal (November, 1861); Roanoke (February, 1862); and New Orleans (April, 1862). Hatteras amounted to a brigade-sized expedtionary force, Port Royal and Roanoke both reinfocred divisions, and New Orleans a division, all supported by naval squadrons and transport forces... so the expectation is the same panel or a similar one could react quickly to plan any necessary operations in or with regards to BNA. The other points worth noting are the Americans hadt the experience of 1775-77 and 1812-15 on the northern fronts, which included the US occupation of Montreal in 1775-76, as well as operations against Quebec in 1776 and in both Maine and upstate New York and Vermont in both conflicts. There was also the Aroostook Valley crisis in 1839-39, and various border crises, surveys, and explorations going back to the beginning of the Nineteenth Century and before...

How that would play out, of course, is what BROS is all about...

As always, thanks for reading and the comments. I appreciate it.

Best,

Thanks for the answering i always wondered if the United States after the war of 1812 had some plans prepared for a future war with the United Kingdom.

In Chapter 2, Part 2 – On Canada's fair domain…we see the the USS Monitor for the first time, i have a feeling she will have a major battle again a Royal Navy ships instead of the famous battle against CSS Virginia or am i mistaken.

[tfsmith121]

You are quite welcome, and you are not mistaken.

Thanks for the questions; the "views" count keeps going up, so people are reading it over there, but the discussion is you and I.

Thanks again.

Best,

[lordroel]

Jul 4, 2016 16:28:43 GMT tfsmith121 said:

You are quite welcome, and you are not mistaken.

Thanks for the questions; the "views" count keeps going up, so people are reading it over there, but the discussion is you and I.

Thanks again.

Best,

For now it is only you and i, i hoop that with the forum growth it will increase, the subject of a alternate civil war has always been a favorite of mine.

[tfsmith121]

Thanks - will do. Going to try and post again later today.

[lordroel]

Jul 5, 2016 0:37:04 GMT tfsmith121 said:

Thanks - will do. Going to try and post again later today.

Can the British trust the Quebecois for remaining loyal to the crown.

[tfsmith121]

That is an interesting question; the short answer is yes for some, no for others, and a lot of general "leave me out of it" for others.

Best,