The Falklands War - Timeline

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The Falklands War - Timeline

The Falklands War - Timeline will cover the Falklands using dates, pictures and YouTube clips, unlike the two previous war in real time, the Falklands war will not be in real time.



Links of interest

BATTLE ATLAS of the FALKLANDS WAR 1982 by Land, Sea and Air

Links used for timeline:

74 days in 1982

Falklands War: Countdown & Conflict 1982

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 19th 1982

10 Argentine worker slipped quietly into the port of Leith on South Georgia Island from the transport ship Bahia Buen Suceso, which means Bay of Good Success. They wore fur-lined coats to stave off the icy South Atlantic autumn cold.

Their announced task was to dismantle the rusting, unused whale rendering factory in the port, a British Overseas Territory that is barely a speck on map 1,350 miles southeast of the Argentine mainland.

From their small tent camp, they hoisted an Argentine flag and sang their national anthem. For food, they hunted reindeer and cooked stew over an open fire.

Fifteen miles away, in Grytviken, a team of British scientists heard of their arrival and decided to pay a chilled, but diplomatic visit. They informed the Argentines they were on the island without permission and had no business raising an Argentine flag.

They also pointed out it was illegal to hunt reindeer.

Stationed at the port of Stanley in the Falkland Islands 900 miles to the east was a lone Royal Navy ship, the Endurance -- with two 20 mm guns, two small Wasp helicopters and 21 Royal Marines aboard.

In London, 8,000 miles to the north, more pressing matters occupied the newpapers and politicians, including a by-election and a European summit.

Photo: ARA Bahía Buen Suceso

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 20th 1982

BAS staff on South Georgia deliver a message from Governor Hunt to the Captain of the Bahia Buen Suceso;

“You have landed illegally at Leith without obtaining clearance. You and your party must go back on board the Bahia Buen Suceso immediately and report to the base commander Grytviken for further instructions. You must remove the Argentine flag from Leith. You must not interfere with the British Antarctic Survey depot at Leith. You must not alter or deface the notices at Leith. No military personnel are allowed to land on South Georgia. No firearms are to be taken ashore.”

Argentina's flag is lowered 15 minutes later. The Customs House at Leith is found to have been broken into.

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams London. 

“I suggest that great restraint be used at least until it is clear whether this is a deliberate challenge authorised at high level, or just a piece of low level bravura combined with Davidoff's well-known fecklessness.”

HMS Endurance is ordered to sail immediately from the Falklands to South Georgia, with its own small detachment of marines, plus reinforcements from Naval Party 8901 (NP 8901).

“The prompt dispatch of Endurance did not accord with the Argentine strategy. Buenos Aires was at this stage unprepared both militarily and diplomatically for a sudden escalation in the Falklands dispute. Yet Argentine citizens were ashore on territory which Argentina claimed as her own. The British were demanding the formal acknowledgement of sovereignty through the obtaining of permits, on pain of removal by force. This would constitute a conspicuous loss of face for Buenos Aires. … The South Georgia incident had come at least six months too soon … Endurance .. should have been safely back in Britain before any invasion. “ 

The British embassy in Buenos Aires sends an urgent signal to the Foreign Office saying there are signs Argentina is preparing a Falklands invasion force under the guise of 'naval maneuvers.'

The message tells of troops and supplies being taken aboard. It also says the Navy is urging the ruling military junta in Buenos Aires to take action on the Falklands -- called the Malvinas in Argentina -- to quash growing Peronist labor opposition.

The implications are clear -- after 149 years of claiming rights to the islands that have been part of the British Empire and years of negotiations between the two countries that sputtered out in New York Feb. 26-27, Argentina is ready to do something about it.

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 21st 1982

Captain Adolfo Gaffoglio, the LADE representative at Stanley, informs Buenos Aires of the departure of Endurance. He also reports that his office has been broken into and the Argentine flag covered with a Union Jack. “Tit for tat you buggers,” is written on the desk in toothpaste and “UK OK” on the office windows.

Foreign ministers of Argentina Costa Mendez tells Williams that the ARA Bahia Buen Suceso is not in South Georgia officially; that it has no militar personnel on board and that the ship will depart that day. He expresses the hope that the significance of the affair will not be exaggerated. Ambassador Williams makes it clear; “.. that if the party left without regularising their conduct at Gryviken they would have made an illegal landing and be liable to arrest..”

In London, the FCO informs Argentina's charge d'affairs that they accept the explanations provided by Minister Mendez and trust that the ship will depart with the landing party.
A BAS observation point is established overlooking Stromness Bay.

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 22nd 1982

The ARA Bahia Buen Suceso sails away early evening; but some Argentines have been left behind.

“Base Commander has confirmed presence of at least six Argentines still ashore at Leith, in latest report from his observation party.... In addition to launch … they had also seen a landing craft … they also observed a vehicle with a mechanical arm on the jetty...”

Lord Buxton, visiting Stanley, telegrams the FCO to urge the cancellation of Davidoff's contract; “ It has been naïve to regard Davidoff as a casual scrap dealer and it is abundantly clear that every move has been carefully researched, planned and timed throughout… If our reaction is placatory and is not firm and final this time I predict that more unopposed illegal landings will follow and probably next time somewhere in the Falklands. British reactions are being tested.”

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams the FCO; “The Argentines .. appreciate the gravity of the hoisting of the Argentine flag, but say that they have just received reports that there has been a parallel insult to the Argentine flag at the LADE office in Stanley.”

HMS Endurance receives orders from London to remove any trespassers from South Georgia. Captain Barker's instructions clearly state that he is not to use force however and, if resisted, should withdraw and seek fresh instructions.

“Ministers have agreed that HMS Endurance should continue to South Georgia in order to remove the remaining Argentines. The continued Argentine presence at Leith, … leaves us no option but to take this action. … It is hoped that the political consequences, with careful handling on both sides, can continue to be minimised. But it should be quite clear that this situation has not been of our seeking. It has been Davidoff's irresponsible action and the apparent inability of the Argentine Government to take the necessary remedial action which has brought it about.”

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 23rd 1982

In Buenos Aires, Williams copies HMS Endurance's orders to Argentina's Foreign Ministry. On receipt Costa Mendez expresses surprise that the British are proceeding so rapidly to such very grave action, without exhausting the diplomatic options. He gives a warning that, if the action to remove the party on South Georgia is not postponed, those like himself, who are trying to deal with the dispute in a moderate way, will lose control of events. Mendez threatens that harsh action will precipitate a harsh response, and that perhaps the men should be removed by an Argentine vessel in order to take some heat out of the situation.

Ambassador Williams, conveying this to the FCO, adds that he considers the events at South Georgia as “trivial and low-level misbehaviour.” The FCO respond.

“Our intention is to conduct this operation correctly, peacefully and in as low a key as possible. We hope that the Argentine Government will, if they are able to do so, advise the Argentine workmen at Leith to co-operate. … any lesser action than we are now taking would not be defensible to public and parliamentary opinion.”

In Britain, a statement is made to Parliament.

“We were informed on 20 March by the Commander of the British Antarctic Survey based at Grytviken on South Georgia that a party of Argentines had landed at Leith nearby. The Base Commander informed the Argentine party that its presence was illegal as it had not obtained his prior authority for the landing. We immediately took the matter up with the Argentine authorities in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Embassy in London and, following our approach, the ship and most of the personnel left... However, the base Commander has reported that a small number of men and some equipment remain. We are therefore making arrangements to ensure their early departure.”

There is uproar in the House of Commons; “... if she [Mrs Thatcher] doesn’t get the Argentines out by next week there will be a major disturbance.”

HMS Endurance is ordered to 'hold' off Grytviken.

“In view of continued diplomatic activity at ministerial level aimed at allowing Argentine authorities an opportunity to remove party and equipment by Argentine vessel, HMS Endurance should proceed to Grytviken and await further instructions. Pending these instructions, HMS Endurance should not, repeat not, enter nor conduct any Naval operations in the vicinity of Leith harbour.”

Lord Carrington sends a message to Costa Mendez.

“.. it is now essential for the Argentine personnel that still remains in South Georgia to be evacuated promptly. If the Argentine Government can order the immediate return of the Bahia Buen Suceso to Leith Harbour to carry out this action, the use of HMS Endurance will not be necessary. If this is not done, we would have no alternative but to proceed. … ”

Argentina's Navy Command orders the ice-breaker Bahia Paraiso to take its marines as quickly as possible to Leith to protect the Argentine workers there. Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo is; “.. directed by the junta to accelerate planning so that an invasion force could launch within 48-72 hours of notification.”

A message is sent from the US Embassy in Buenos Aires to the US State Department reporting a conversation between the Argentine Foreign Ministry and the US Ambassador.

“During a meeting March 23, the Foreign Minister and Under Secretary Ros at their initiative briefed the Ambassador on the Argentine version of this affair. They said a local entrepreneur had entered into a contract in London to take the scrap from the whale “factory.” He then hired a crew of workmen (four they thought) and bought passage for them on the “Bahia Buen Suceso” which deposited them in Leith. Ros emphasized that the ship regularly plies those waters, is unarmed and crewed entirely by civilians. .. HMG protested because permission was not sought to land the workmen. As indicated in the press, the ship has departed; but, contrary to the impression left by the press accounts, the workmen are still there, according to Ros. He was unable to say how long they might remain, that presumably depending on the time required to finish the scrap job and on when the ship might come around again. It would seem, at least, that the incident may not be closed.”

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 24th 1982

Intelligence reports suggest that the forced removal of the workforce at Leith will be used by the Junta as a pretext for military action either at South Georgia, or against the Falkland Islands. Lord Carrington, writes to the Prime Minister; “ … the situation on the dispute has developed to a point where we now face the prospect of an early confrontation with Argentina.”
Bahia Paraiso arrives back at Leith. Lieutenant-Colonel Alfredo Astiz and ten Marines disembark. Three landing craft and a military helicopter are noted by the observation team; shortly after joined by Capt. Barker.

“Tony Ellerbeck flew me to the top of one of the mountains and we landed at 3000 feet on a narrow section of flat ground with excellent binocular vision over Leith Bay... all we could do was to sit and watch. We noted the continuing disembarkation of stores from the Bahia Paraiso and it was clear to us that the operation had been long pre-planned.”

In London, a Parliamentary motion signed by 91 MPs calls for a tough line in the UK's dealings with Argentina.

The US Embassy in Argentina telegrams Washington.

“... we doubt that an attempt at a “military solution” will be made any time soon. Foreign Minister Costa Méndez and others in the GOA are looking for ways to enlist U.S. support for the Argentine cause. This issue is likely to complicate Argentine-U.S. Relations… “

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 25th 1982

In Buenos Aires, Dr. Méndez suggests to Britain's Ambassador that the impasse could be broken if it is accepted that the workers at Leith now comply with the landing formalities by going to Grytviken and having their 'white cards' stamped before returning to work on the whaling stations. Informed of Méndez's proposal, Foreign Secretary Carrington's responds that; “only passports will do.” This is passed on to the Junta.

“A series of progressive demands culminated in the imposition that the Argentine workers of the Davidoff company – who were on land that we consider under a sovereignty dispute – should seal their passports at Grytviken, as if they were entering a foreign territory… “

“Britain's escalation of the dispute – especially its demand about passports – came as a complete surprise … There was unanimous agreement that we could not permit it.”
Well informed, America's Embassy in Buenos Aires reports to Washington.

“It appears likely that the Argentine Navy will in fact act if the Endurance attempts to remove the working party.”

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 26th 1982

ARA Bahia Paraiso is observed to sail away from Leith by the observation team; “Argentine party are still ashore at Leith. Although only two people were actually sighted this morning, smoke was emerging from several buildings and 2 boats were still alongside jetty. 65 blue drums had been stacked at inshore end of jetty. A large quantity of stores and equipment was visible, even dead reindeer. Consider shore party were working late into evening yesterday disembarking stores from Bahia Paraiso and are now established for a long stay at Leith. It is clear that this operation had been preplanned for some time as Bahia Paraiso came from Antarctic and not Argentina.”

Governor Hunt telegrams London regarding Mendez's proposal; “After all the offences committed by Davidoff and his men, letting the shore party return to Leith after proper clearance at Grytviken will go down like a lead balloon with the Islanders … I am more than ever convinced that this whole exercise was carefully planned … Proper documentation does not (repeat not) mean stamping of white cards. I am instructing the base commander to ask for passports and, if produced, to stamp them in the normal way with an entry permit...”

Marines arrive at Port Stanley to relieve the garrison which is at the end of its tour. Ministers decide that both detachments should remain for the time being.

The Junta in Buenos Aires meet again; “Costa Mendez's view was that, from 1956, Britain's behaviour was always to deal, but not on the basis of force. Rhodesia was the most recent example. There Britain had abandoned 600,000 British subjects. The sum of perceptions led to the conclusion that Britain would not respond with force. .. Mendez explained the situation and said British actions required military action in order to get them to negotiate seriously. .. How could we doubt his judgement?”

After the meeting, Dr. Costa Mendez makes a public statement; “a firm decision has been taken to give the men on South Georgia all necessary diplomatic protection…nor is this protection diplomatic only, since there is a navy ship called Bahia Paraiso in the area to provide any necessary protection.”

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 27th 1982

Ambassador Williams reports his fears that Dr. Costa Mendez has been less than honest with him; that Argentina had been “playing us along” and that the Bahia Paraiso had armed marines on board; “ .. I cannot, however, discount the possibility that any action on our part to disrupt the Argentine working party at Leith will be taken as a trigger for armed action by the Argentines.”

Naval vessels, accompanied by a submarine, are seen to sail from Buenos Aires by the British defence attaché, Stephen Love.

Margaret Thatcher considers taking the sovereignty issue to the ICJ; ”if we win or if we lose, at least we know where we are.’

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 28th 1982

Lord Carrington telegrams US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig in Washington to appraise him of the situation; “ … I should accordingly be grateful, if you would consider taking the matter up with the Argentines. Stressing the need to defuse the situation and find a solution we can all accept. … I fear the gravest consequences.”

All leave for military and diplomatic staff is cancelled by the Junta.

Argentina's Foreign Ministry sends a message to the British Ambassador; “The activities of the group of workers disembarked at Leith are of a private and peaceful character based on the undisputed fact that they were known in advance by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and in any case on the fact that they are being carried out on territory subject to the special regime agreed in 1971 between the Argentine and Great Britain. It is moreover within Your Excellency's knowledge that these territories are considered by the Argentine Republic as her own .... However the British Government has reacted in terms which constitute a virtual ultimatum backed by the threat of military action in the form of the despatch of the naval warship Endurance and a requirement for the peremptorily immediate evacuation of the Argentine workers from the Island. ... a disproportionate and provocative response aggravated for having received wide diffusion in the press ...

In light of this attitude my Government can only adopt those measures which prudence and its rights demand, in this context the Argentine workers in South Georgia must remain there since they have been given the necessary documentation to do so..."

Military aircraft overfly Port Stanley.

Ambassador Williams reports that Costa Mendez is insisting that South Georgia is included in the white card scheme.

Governor Rex Hunt's response is swift; “The 1971 Communications Agreement does not apply to the Dependencies .. (and) .. does not absolve the holder of the requirement to present himself to an immigration officer as a recognised port of entry and .. Davidoff knew that the recognised port of entry for South Georgia was Grytviken. I am appalled at the arrogance of the message which confirms my previous fears that the Argentine Government are using Davidoff as a front to assert with a physical presence their sovereignty claim over South Georgia.”

Vessels from the Argentine fleet sail out of Puerto Belgrano, including the Cabo San Antonio, a tank landing ship, and the troop carrier, Islas de los Estados. Intelligence indicates that the Argentine submarine, Sante Fe, is making a reconnaissance of the beaches near Stanley.

The Bahia Paraiso is observed holding station, 15 miles off the north coast of South Georgia.

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 29th 1982

The Admiralty in London direct a nuclear powered submarine, HMS Spartan, to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar and send the support vessel, RFA Fort Austin from Gibraltar to resupply HMS Endurance. Defence Secretary John Nott advises the Prime Minister that it will take a week to ready a “viable” naval force, then three more weeks to get them to the Islands; although a group of 7 destroyers and frigates, on exercises near Gibraltar, could be in the South Atlantic in two weeks.

Argentine press reports refer to the cancellation of all military leave, and announce that 5 Argentine warships are now heading towards South Georgia. Clarin says that all of Davidoff's working party had been issued with white cards before departure.

Ambassador Williams, in Buenos Aires, writes to London; “I am receiving gestures of sympathy … but I fear that in general, the Argentine Government will not only gain in popularity by playing the jingoist drum, but be accepted as doing the right thing in taking even the most extreme measures.”

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 30th 1982

Demonstrations in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires call for democracy.

4 more Argentine warships are reported as sailing from Puerto Belgrano.

A message is sent to the Argentine Foreign Minister from the FCO; “ .. The potentially dangerous position which has now developed has in no way been of our seeking. .. our objective throughout has been to seek a solution which both our Governments can accept. A confrontation, which could have far-reaching consequences and which would seriously prejudice our attempts to resolve the whole Falklands issue through peaceful negotiation, is in neither of our interests. ..”

In London, the Defence Operations Executive meets and receives intelligence regarding a naval task force lying 800 miles north of the Falklands, consisting of an aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers and an amphibious landing craft.

A further British nuclear powered submarine, HMS Splendid, deploys from Faslane and a third, HMS Conqueror, is readied.

Intelligence reports suggest that the Junta do not believe it likely that Britain will send naval reinforcements.

US Ambassador Shlaudeman calls on Minister Méndez and offers to mediate over South Georgia.

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Prelude to The Falklands War, March 31st 1982

Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse is ordered to make covert preparations for a military reaction if there is an invasion.

The defence attaché in Buenos Aires reports that all the Argentine fleet is now at sea.

After articles appear in the British press, publishing the departure of the nuclear submarines, Dr. Mendez is widely quoted as saying that; “Argentina would not give way to threats of force ..” that the workers at Leith are; “.. Argentine workers working on Argentine soil.”

Intelligence suggests that April 2nd is the day of 'action' and that a marine infantry brigade is being prepared for an invasion. There is evidence of an unusual level of co-operation between the three Argentine military services.

GCHQ Cheltenham reports Argentine radio traffic ordering the submarine, Sante Fe, to take reconnaissance troops to Mullet Creek, near Stanley.

Prime Minister Thatcher speaks to President Reagan on the 'hot-line' requesting his immediate intervention with General Galtieri.

Admiral Sir Henry Leach advises Margaret Thatcher that Britain could, and should, send a task force if any of the Islands are invaded; ”Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little.”

Governor Hunt, informed of the probability of an invasion, reviews his options. At his immediate disposal are the marines of NP 8901, their replacements, 11 Royal Navy personnel onshore from HMS Endurance and one Islanders who was an ex-Royal Marine and who promptly re-enlisted: a total of 69. Of the Falklands Defence Force, 21 men report for duty.

“Major Gary R H Noot, the outgoing commanding officer, and his replacement, major Mike J Norman, were halfway through the administrative handover when the first hints of the impending invasion were received. The handover meant that the defending force was about twice what might otherwise have been expected, ...”

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Prelude to The Falklands War, April 1st 1982

At the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons, demands from the Security Council a Resolution calling on the Argentine Government to refrain from the use of force in the South Atlantic.

“.. we had never been to the Security Council before with this dispute. It had only touched the Fourth Committee; it had scarcely been to the plenary of the General Assembly and it hit everyone by surprise. The day before the invasion I got word to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council which I did. I rang up colleagues in turn personally, saying would you be down at the Council in an hour's time, the invasion of the Falklands is pending. My American colleague (Jeanne Kirkpatrick), who was very mixed up with Latin American policy, said that I had gone mad and that she would block the vote.. I said that if you are going to block me from having a meeting you will have to do it in public and I shall insist on a public meeting so ..? My Russian colleague said: it is April 1st and I know this is an April Fool's joke, the kind of thing you do the whole time, but you don't know your own rules; it is after mid-day. I had quite a problem persuading him that this was serious … Eventually we got the Council in action...”

Argentina's Representative responds that: “It was ironic and inadmissible for the Council to be convened by the United Kingdom on that day to consolidate the spoils of colonial plundering. Argentina rejected being accused when in fact what should be judged, if justice was to be served and peace preserved, was the conduct of the accuser.”

The President of the Council appeals to Argentina not to invade.

US Secretary Haig, sends a message to Lord Carrington, indicating that the United States Government will do all it can to help.

In Buenos Aires, the British Ambassador asks for, and is given, a written statement of the Argentine position; “Since the problem raised is disregard of Argentine sovereignty, – I judge pointless the despatch of a person to examine the events in the Georgias since Argentina considers this incident resolved. In fact the workers there are carrying out their tasks under normal lawful conditions without any breach of the agreement previously reached between our two countries – bearing in mind the antecedents and course of the negotiations undertaken from 1964 to today we would have accepted the despatch of the representative proposed by Great Britain if his task had been to negotiate the modalities of transferring sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and their dependencies to the Argentine Republic which is essentially the central cause of the present difficulties. I cannot omit to draw attention to the unusual British naval deployment towards our waters reported in the international press which can only be interpreted as an unacceptable threat of the use of military force. This obliges us to refer to the UN organization where Argentina will circulate a note on the antecedents of this case.” Intelligence reports suggest that an invasion force will be assembling off Stanley during the night. This is relayed to Governor Hunt by the FCO; “ We have apparently reliable evidence than an Argentine task force will gather off Cape Pembroke early tomorrow morning 2 April. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly."

Governor Hunt warns the population of the Islands, and places his small force of Royal Marines, together with elements of the Volunteer Defence Force, on stand-by. British forces in the UK are put on immediate notice of deployment.

Secretary Haig speaks to the Argentine Ambassador in Washington. He tells him that Britain would respond to any action, and that the use of force; ”Would reverse our cooperation in Central America and the hemisphere. The reaction of the American people will be overwhelming, we will have to side with the British, and US-Argentine relations will be back to the worst days.”

ARA Guerrico, a corvette with two helicopters and 40 marines aboard, joins the Bahia Paraiso at South Georgia.

Governor Rex Hunt reports his dispositions; “(1) Royal Marines disposition will be made near expected landing beach and will do what they can to contain landing and to defend airport. (2) FIDF will round up Argentines in Stanley before dawn tomorrow and bring them to Government House for safe-keeping. They will then deploy at probably helicopter landing sites. (3) Marines will fall back to outskirts of Stanley but will not fight in Stanley. Survival party will take off to the hills as Argentine forces reach Stanley. I shall remain at Government House. ..”

The British Ambassador in Washington receives a message; “The State Department have just told me that their Ambassador has informed them from Buenos Aires of his meeting with the Argentine President. The latter would not say what the Argentines were going to do. The Americans have deduced from this that the Argentinians are therefore planning to go through with their military operation. The Argentine President muttered some mumbo-jumbo, to use the State Department's phrase, about the need for the British to talk about surrendering sovereignty. The State Department are now asking President Reagan to telephone the Argentine President personally...”

President Reagan telephones Galtieri, before contacting PM Thatcher with the result; “I have just talked at length with General Galtieri about the situation in the Falklands. I conveyed to him my personal concern about the possibility of an Argentine invasion. I told him that initiating military operations against the Falkland islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina and I urged him to refrain from offensive action. I offered our good offices and my readiness to send a personal representative to assist in resolving the issues between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The General heard my message, but gave me no commitment that he would comply with it. Indeed, he spoke in terms of ultimatums and left me with the clear impression that he has embarked on a course of armed conflict. We will continue to cooperate with your Government in the effort to resolve this dispute. Both in attempting to avert hostilities and to stop them if they should break out. While we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of military force.”