Japan uses its fleet much better in the initial months of the war

[simpleton]

OTL The IJN wasted a lot of fuel, carrier, submarine and surface warship time sailing all over the Pacific and Indian Oceans, without striking a significant blow either on the US or on Britain. It did not capture intact the invaluable oilwells and refinery in undefended British Borneo, but allowed the British 2 weeks to sabotage them. It lost 2 destroyers a gunboat and many men trying unsuccessfully to invade irrelevant Wake, without carrier plane or 8" or larger gun support the first time. It wasted a huge force invading Hong Kong (irrelevant and defended by only 2,000 Canadians). It wasted a huge force invading irrelevant Luzon, and small forces invading irrelevant Guam, the Gilberts, etc, Japan forced a reluctant US into the war bythe PH attack, which damaged only the slow BB, useless for CV task forces. But 6 of the 8 BB were repaired and reentered service, so the whole attack was a total waste of the invaluable surprise factor and the mightiest carrier fleet ever assembled by the IJN. Japanese troops wasted 2 crucial months pedaling 700 km down the Malay pensinsulla, driving the British army into Singapore, which had to invade, clearly an absurd campaign, eventhough it was successful.

ATL
Yamamoto knows that the US may enter war if Japan attacks Britain and the DEI, but it may not or it may take a while to decalre war. Even then, if the US declares war, Japan will be justified in defending itself and if it trounces the USN, war become unpopular in the US.
will 
On the first 3 weeks Honk Kong, Thailand and American territories will not be attacked at all (even if the uS does declare war). Britain must be crushed in the Indian and Pacific this time, B. Borneo must fall on the first day with oilwells and refineries intact, to secure oil for and fuel for Japan. Tasmania, the South Island of NZ, Port Moresby, Rabaul aand New Caledonia must fall to isolate Australlia and secure the eastern flank of the empire. Ceylon and other targets in the Indian Ocean Indian must fall and the RN far east fleet wiped out and the RN excluded from the Indian Ocean in 3 weeks. India must become independent and join the axis before a month or war ends.
Accordingly, Yamamoto decides to concentrate all his formidable forces on Dec 7 on Britain and the DEI. This will ensure very rapid British and Dutch collapse in the Indian Ocean and the far east. 
The carrier force will be divided into 3 task forces with 2 CV and a CL each.

Task force center will support the invasions of Sumatra, Malaya, Java and Singapore
Task force west will support the invasions of Ceylon, Penang, Mauritius, Addu, Reunion and Rangoon
Task force east will support the invasions of New Caledonia, Port Moresby, Rabaul, New Zealand, Perth and Tasmania.
In order to save planes and pilots, they will be used only if there is strong resistance to the landings, despite naval gun support.

80% of IJN submarines wil be deployed in the Indian Ocean before the attack begins. They must start sinking warships on the day of the attack and seizing or sinking allied ships as soon as the attack begins. 8 Submarines, 2 BB and 8 DD will coordinate to sink Repulse, PoW & the few DD escorting them in deep waters and Dutch submarines in the area, soon after the RN fleet leaves Singapore. No planes will be wasted attacking the RN BB. Long Lance and submarine torpedoes and heavy shells are much more effective against BB than aerial torpedoes and 250 kg bombs. IJN BB will attack BB only if initial torpedo attacks fail. Planes will be deployed only if a BB is heavily damaged.

  USN warships at anchor in B. Borneo are not attacked, but asked to sail to the PI, since Australia is at war.

South Malaya will be invaded on the first day with strong landing forces. Coastal guns in S. Malaya and Singapore will be subjected to intense dive bombing, strafing, level bombing and shelling. Airports or airfields will be captured in S. Malaya and Sumatra near Singapore on the first day to support the bombing of Singapore and allow IJA planes to wipe out allied planes in Sumatra and Singapore. British troops in central and north Malaya will be isolated from Singapore.
An airfield in Java and Sumatra must also fall on the first day. Japanese forces will try to capture intact oilwells and refineries in Sumatra and Java on the first days.

4,000 troops will land in and near Colombo on the first day, to secure it, its airport and race track (which can also be used to land planes). With the port secure 12,000 more troops will arrive in the following days, while Tricnomalee is bombed and shelled. 4,000 troops land near Trincomalle on the 2nd day. G4M from Malaya land in Colombo and start supporting the land troops' advance (transporting troops and supplies all over Ceylon, bombing, evacuating wounded to Colombo, etc,).

4,000 troops also land in Rangoon to secure it on the first day, so that 8,000 more men land there in the following days.

1,200 troops land in Mauritius, Reunium, Addu. 2,000 troops in Penang. 

30,000 troops land each in S. Malaya, Sumatra and Java within 3 days.

When Ceylon, Burma, Mauritius, Reunion, etc, fall in 3 weeks, Japan declares Indian independence and induces India & Thailand to join the axis (a strong deterrant for US isolationists and an incentive for China to sue for peace, rather than fight a million Indian and Thai troops).

[simpleton]

Chiang cannot receive supplies nor fight alone the strong axis, he receives a short strip of coast as an incentive and he joins the axis.

[simpleton]

OTL pointless IJN operations in the first months of the war:
1) The largest carrier fleet ever assembled was deployed to raid PH, which produced no territorial gains nor caused any decisive damage, wasted the surprise factor and forced the US into the war. The task force consumed enormous amounts of fuel to launch a single wave, with a ridiculous number of planes and torpedoes, dropping more 800 kg AP bombs from medium altitude, than torpedoes. Most 800 kg bombs failed to atrike a BB or to detonate. Nagumo than fled, as if his mighty fleet could be damaged by by at most 3 carriers, probably returning piecemeal (as the USN often deployed task forces with single carriers). Had Nagumo been ordered to launch a second wave and remain in the area, until a US carrier was sunk, at least the raid would have been some use. Moreover, had the mighty fleet supported tha invasion of valuable and poorly defended Kauai, to land IJA planes and twin engine bombers from the Marshalls there and isolate Oahu, Japan would have struck a decisive blow. However, had Japan not attacked US territories at all and used the fabulous PH raid fleet to quickly defeat Britian and Holland and secure intact oilwells and Ceylon, it could have easily raided PH and invaded Kauai, Maui and Niihao with a huge fleet (including all CV and CL), if the US declared war), since the US would be the sole enemy.

2) The invasion of Honk Kong, Wake, Guam, Thailand, N Malaya, the Gilberts and the PI at the beginning of the war with very strong land forces, engaged months in the PI and Malaya-Singapore (weakening the IJA in China considerably, so that it lost the battle of Chansha, the only allied victory in early 1942). Attacking all these non critical and in many cases strongly defended areas, resulted in Japan not capturing intact oilfwells and refineries. B. Borneo, Port Moresby, Tasmania, New Caledonia Ceylon, Sumatra, Rabaul and Java were less strongly defended and far more important than the above areas. Japan invaded B. Borneo without casualties, but after the oilwells and refinery had been sabotaged. It invaded Rabaul after it was reinforced with planes, etc, It attempted to invaded Port Moresby after it was much reinforced and USN carriers were in the area (battle of Coral Sea, which costed the IJN a a CV heavily damaged, a CL sunk and a devastating number of scarce pilots and planes).

3) The Darwin raid in Feb, 1942 involved 4 CV, a large support fleet, two waves of carrier planes (compared to a single wave in much stronger PH, caught with its pants down!), and a large number of twin engine bombers and did not yield any territory or cause any decisive damage. Instead, the mighty fleet could have easily supported in Feb the invasions of then still weak Port Moresby, New Caledonia (before US reinforcements arrived, after being embarked on the east coast!), New Zealand, etc, Not seizing Port Moresby with the fleet wasted raiding Darwin cost Japan dearly: Shoho sunk, Zuikaku damaged, Shukaku's and Zuikaku's air complement devastated, so they could net be deployed in Midway, which cost 4 CV and a fatal loss of aviators and planes), great losses in men, ships, planes, etc, in the battles of Milne Bay, Kokoda Track and Guadalcanal.

4) the Alaska campaign, which only weakened the carrier force in Midway and produced no gains at all. The idea of a diversion, when the IJN fleet is much stronger than the USN fleet is absurd. When one looks at the meandering route Ryujo followed in the first, critical 8 months of the war, one realizes the wasted time and fuel sailing all over the Pacific and Indian Oceans, instead of attacking a few vital areas with overwhelming force in rapid campaigns. It is reminescent of Guderian's, Hoth's and Kleist's meandering paths in Barbarossa and time, fuel, good weather and tank wear wasted travelling long distances, instead of breaking through to Moscow in a couple of months, when it was weak.

[lordroel]

Sept 2, 2017 21:21:10 GMT simpleton said:

Chiang cannot receive supplies nor fight alone the strong axis, he receives a short strip of coast as an incentive and he joins the axis.

He was friendly with Germany in OTL before the German-Japanese axis happen so that might happen.

[simpleton]

Chiang would definitely benefit from joining the axis to receive oil, rubber, armament, etc, unify China, liberate Xinjiang (invaded by the Soviets in 1937, weakening Chiang) and expand into Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Russia.

5) The 3rd battle fo Changsha in early 1942 with the same 120,000 men and fewer planes than had failed to take the same city in 1941! The failuree to take Changsha for years rendered moot the over 100,000 Japanese casualties taking Wuhan in 1939, since without Changsha the Japanese advance inland stalled for years. Only in 1944 did Japan take Changsha, with over 300,000 men in the campaign and when Xue (Chiang's best general had been sent away, He had repelled the IJA trice in Changsha). In 1944 it was pointless to take it. Japan shoudl have either forgotten about Changsha or attacked it with 250,000 men in early 1940, when it was not fighting the allies and had a strong air force in China.

6) The Ceylon raid involved a huge fleet and achieved nothing permanent. The IJN expelled the RN from the Indian Ocean temporarily (if fled to Kenya, but returned when IJN carriers left the Indian Ocean). Had this fleet been used to support the invasion of Ceylon, Mauritius and Reunion and liberate India, so it could join the axis, Britain would have lost the middle east, Egypt, etc, to Indo-Japanese troops and the axis would have linked up and invaded together the USSR.

7) The Milne Bay and Kokoda Track campaigns in New Guinea and the Guadalcanal campaign, which were costly, extremely poorly supported by air (experienced IJN aviators and planes being extremely scarce already) and pointless (they would have been avoided by simply taking Port Moresby, New Caledonia, Rabaul, etc, in Feb 1942 with the same carrier fleet, which raided useless Darwin for no gains.

Just India joining the axis would have tipped the balance against the allies. However, if both India and China join the axis, the USSR doesn´t stand a chance.  The huge army wasted occupying China, defending Manchuria, etc, would not only have wiped out Soviet forces in the east (reinforced by Indians and Chinese), it could easily invade California, Washington State, Oregon, Panama, etc, provided the IJN wiped out the smaller USN Pacific fleet and seized a large number of ships in the Indian and Pacific Oceans to transport troops and materiel, thanks to very efficient use in the early months.

[simpleton]

OTL the IJN suffered enormously for lack of refined fuel. It used crude oil in its ships. Sulfur caused a lot of boiler damage and the volatile fraction made the fuel far more explosive when struck by torpedoes or bombs. The only reasons that Japan did not have refined oil and did not produce any oil months into the war were that 1) By not invading undefended British Borneo on the first day, the British sabotaged the 150 oilwells and the oil refinery, during the 2 weeks Japan took to occupy it. 2) among the very few US submarine torpedoes to shink a ship in the first month of the war (US submarine and aerial torpedoes were lousy) a transport was sunk en route to the DEI, carrying most of the Japanese oil crews and experts.
Accordingly, British Borneo was the first oilfield occupied and the first to enter production, but only after several months of work. The refinery was so damaged, it could not be repaired.
Therefore, the whole purpose of the war: securing fuel, was not achieved, owing to lousy planning. Moreover, by attacking the US without declaring war on the first day, Japan ensured that AMericans united instantly and US industry and armed forces entered into overdrive, while Japanese industry was not receiving fuel and many factory workers were deployed by the army and navy in distant, useless locations. The Japanese did not produce Kates or Vals once the war started and began losing them very fast, so carrier fighting ability soon deteriorated (by Midway even the 4 CV present had reduced air complements).

By capturing B. Borneo intact, not forcing the US immediately into the war and seizing Ceylon at the beginning, the Japanese position in the Pacific is much better. Also in China, if the large forces wasted attacking Hong Kong, Guam, Wake, the Gilberts and other useless territories and the large air fleet deployed to bomb Luzon had been deployed in Changsha, to boost the 120,000 IJA troops and few planes there, Changsha would have fallen with fewer Japanese and more Chinese casualties, deteriorating Chiang's situation considerably. Instead, the Japanese debacle in Changsha doomed war in China for Japan.