A different Napoleonic strategy

[eurofed]

What follows is my own collection of plausible ideas on how Napoleon could have possibly improved the fortunes of the First French Empire and its European hegemony, assembled in one scenario and semi-coherent strategy.

- His domestic policies get to be a little more liberal: the Constitution of the French Empire incorporates the liberal amendments he enacted IOTL during the Hundred Days.

- He realizes he needs to pre-emptively wipe out Prussia and Austria off the map, since the Hohenzollern and the Habsburg shall never collaborate in good faith even if humbled and shall undermine and betray him as soon as his back is turned. Furthermore he realizes he has to give some satisfaction to the national aspirations of the Germans and the Italians. So he dismantles and partitions Prussia and Austria after he crushes them on the battlefield and occupies their territory in 1805-10. He sets up a Kingdom of Westphalia with himself on the throne which annexes most of northern Germany, including Westphalia, Hanover, Brandenburg, Silesia, and Pomerania. The Duchy of Warsaw gets East Prussia and the Prussian and Austrian partitions of Poland. Saxony gets Bohemia-Moravia. Bavaria gets Austria proper. Hungary is set up as an 'independent' client state of France with a member of the Magyar high nobility on the throne. The Kingdom of Italy annexes most of northern Italy, including Lombardy, Venetia, Parma, Modena, Lucca, Tuscany, and the Papal States. It also gets the Illyrian Provinces. Switzerland is partitioned between France, Italy, and Germany.

- Napoleon crowns himself Emperor of the French, Germans, and Italians. The German and Italian states are merged into Federations that get constitutions broadly similar to the French model, except for their federal character that is broadly similar to OTL German Empire. Member states get similar constitutions, too. France, Germany, and Italy form an European Confederation with a common monarch, separate parliaments, and a common government to deal with issues such as finance, defence, and foreign policy. Napoleon limits direct French annexations to the territories deemed politically necessary to fulfill French nationalist ambitions for 'natural borders' or the acquisitions more or less established before his takeover, such as the Low Countries, the Left Bank of the Rhine, western Switzerland, and Piedmont. Theoretically speaking, the less non-French-speaking territory put under direct French rule, the better for the long-term stability of the empire, although there are probably limits to how much even a foresighted Napoleon would be realistically able or willing to frustrate the expansionist appetites of France to appease the other nationalities of the empire. Outlandish stuff such as annexing half of northwestern Germany or half of northern Italy should be easy to avoid, however.

- He comes to realize continental blockade of British trade won't really work as a way to bring Britain to its knees, at least until European industry isn't able to replace British goods, and trying to enforce it shall buy him more enemies than it is worth. So he organizes his empire in a continental trading bloc that imposes a heavy tariff on British trade and subsidizes European industry but doesn't try to keep all of Europe from trading with Britain at all. He realizes in order to beat Britain he has to play the long game, crush all allies of the British on the continent until there none left, make Europe as economically self-sufficient as possible, and gradually rebuild European naval power to match the Royal Navy.

- He offers Russia a division of Europe and the Near East in spheres of influence, with the Russians getting everything east of the Vistula and south of the Carpathians, and French strategic cooperation for dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire. If Russia accepts the deal, he honors it and doesn't care too much if the Russians keep trading with Britain. If it doesn't, he adopts a defensive maneuver strategy in Eastern Europe, possibly combined with limited offensive thrusts in Russian territory if backed by an efficient logistic chain, and he keeps smashing Russian army after Russian army from a favorable strategic position until the Tsar accepts peace on his terms. An all-out invasion of Russia does not occur, if another war with the Russians happens because the Tsar initiates it, Napoleon fights it much the same way he fought the War of the Fourth Coalition.

- He doesn't mess with the government of Spain unless Spain openly turns hostile to his hegemony or breaks down into chaos. If such middle states as Portugal or Sweden turn hostile and side with Britain, he defeats them in cooperation with allies (Spain, Denmark, possibly Russia) and gives control of them to his clients (Portugal to Spain, Norway and Sweden to Denmark, possibly Finland to Russia). As a result, the Peninsular War (apart possibly from invasion of Portugal) does not take place, and Napoleon uses the spared military resources to dismantle Prussia and Austria and force Russia to accept his preferred kind of peace. He may give the Russians military support against the Ottomans if they turn friendly, but lets them do the bulk of the effort.

- As a separate, independent PoD, the USA got the Canadian colonies as a result of the ARW. The War of 1812 may well get averted since the USA already owns settled Canada, the British are not in a strategic position to organize the Natives against the Americans or keep a reliable, worthwhile hold on western Canada against US penetration (sooner rather than later they shall sell Rupert's Land and the Pacific Northwest to the USA rather than inevitably lose them to American colonization), and the different trade policy of the Napoleonic Empire may make the British blockade policy turn different. On the other hand, the impressment and British blockade issues may well cause it to occur all the same. If it does, different circumstances all but surely turn it into an unconclusive 'wolf vs. whale' strategic stalemate which ends in a white peace. Napoleon sells Louisiana to the USA much the same way as OTL.

- Napoleon divorces Josephine to get an heir soon after he becomes Emperor, but does not marry a princess of the hostile and eventually deposed Habsburg. He instead marries Augusta of Bavaria (who married his stepson IOTL), or less likely Anna Pavlovna of Russia (if the Russians eventually accept the match).

[lordroel]

Oct 15, 2017 17:57:14 GMT eurofed said:

What follows is my own collection of plausible ideas on how Napoleon could have possibly improved the fortunes of the First French Empire and its European hegemony, assembled in one scenario and semi-coherent strategy.

- His domestic policies get to be a little more liberal: the Constitution of the French Empire incorporates the liberal amendments he enacted IOTL during the Hundred Days.

- He realizes he needs to pre-emptively wipe out Prussia and Austria off the map, since the Hohenzollern and the Habsburg shall never collaborate in good faith even if humbled and shall undermine and betray him as soon as his back is turned. Furthermore he realizes he has to give some satisfaction to the national aspirations of the Germans and Italians. So he dismantles and partitions Prussia and Austria after he crushes them on the battlefield and occupies their territory in 1805-10. He sets up a Kingdom of Westphalia with himself on the throne which annexes most of northern Germany, including Westphalia, Hanover, Brandenburg, Silesia, and Pomerania. The Duchy of Warsaw gets East Prussia and the Prussian and Austrian partitions. Saxony gets Bohemia-Moravia. Bavaria gets Austria proper. Hungary is set as an 'independent' client state of France with a member of the Magyar high nobility on the throne. The Kingdom of Italy annexes most of northern Italy, including Lombardy, Venetia, Parma, Modena, Lucca, Tuscany, and the Papal States. It also gets the Illyrian Provinces. Switzerland is partitioned between France, Italy, and Germany.

- Napoleon crowns himself Emperor of the French, Germans, and Italians. The German and Italian states are merged into Federations that get constitutions broadly similar to the French model, except for their federal character. Member states get similar constitutions, too. France, Germany, and Italy form an European Confederation. Napoleon limits direct French annexations to the territories deemed politically necessary to fulfill French nationalist ambitions for 'natural borders' or the acquisitions more or less established before his takeover, such as the Low Countries, the Left Bank of the Rhine, western Switzerland, and Piedmont. Theoretically speaking, the less non-French-speaking territory put under direct French rule, the better for the long-term stability of the empire, although there are probably limits to how much even a foresighted Napoleon would be realistically able or willing to frustrate the expansionist appetites of France to appease the other nationalities of the empire. Outlandish stuff such as annexing half of northwestern Germany or half of northern Italy should be easy to avoid, however.

- He comes to realize continental blockade of British trade won't really work as a way to bring Britain to its knees, at least until European industry isn't able to replace British goods, and trying to enforce it shall buy him more enemies than it is worth. So he organizes his empire in a trading bloc that imposes an heavy tariff on British trade and subsidizes European industry but doesn't try to keep all of Europe from trading with Britain at all. He realizes in order to beat Britain he has to play the long game, crush all allies of Britain on the continent until there none left, make Europe economically self-sufficient as possible, and slowly rebuild European naval power to match the Royal Navy.

- He offers Russia a division of the continent in spheres of influence, with the Russians getting everything east of the Vistula and south of the Carpathians, and French strategic cooperation for dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire. If Russia accepts the deal, he honors it and doesn't care too much if the Russians keep trading with Britain. If it doesn't, he adopts a defensive maneuver strategy in Eastern Europe, possibly combined with limited offensive thrusts in Russian territory if backed by an efficient logistic chain, and he keeps smashing Russian army after Russian army from a favorable strategic position until the Tsar accepts peace. An all-out invasion of Russia does not occur, if another war with Russia occurs because the Tsar initiates it, Napoleon fights it rather he fought the War of the Fourth Coalition.

- He doesn't mess with the government of Spain unless Spain openly turns hostile to his hegemony or breaks down into chaos. If such middle states as Portugal or Sweden turn hostile and side with Britain, he defeats them in cooperation with allies (Spain, Denmark, possibly Russia) and gives control of them to his clients (Portugal to Spain, Norway and Sweden to Denmark, possibly Finland to Russia). As a result, the Peninsular War does not take place, and Napoleon uses the spared military resources to dismantle Prussia and Austria and force Russia to accept his preferred kind of peace. He may give Russia some military support against the Ottomans if it turns friendly, but lets them do the bulk of the effort.

- As a separate, independent PoD, the USA got the Canadian colonies as a result of the ARW. Because the USA already owns settled Canada, the British are not in a strategic position to organize the Natives against the Americans or keep a reliable hold on western Canada against US penetration (sooner rather than later they shall sell Rupert's Land and the Pacific Northwest to the USA rather than inevitably lose them to American colonization), and the different trade policy of the Napoleonic Empire may make the British blockade policy turn different, the War of 1812 may well be averted. On the other hand, the impressment and British blockade issues may well cause it to occur all the same. If it does, different circumstances all but surely turn into an unconclusive strategic stalemate which ends in a white peace. Napoleon sells Louisiana to the USA much the same way as OTL.

- Napoleon divorces Josephine to get an heir soon after he becomes Emperor, but does not marry a princess of the hostile and later deposed Habsburg House. He instead marries Augusta of Bavaria (who married his stepson IOTL), most likely, or possibly Anna Pavlovna of Russia (if the Russians eventually accept the match).

Always like What if who feature Napoleon, especially if they are not related to the Battle of Waterloo.

[stevep]

Some aspects of this are quite reasonable. Spilting off Hungary from the Hapsburg's is something that could well work quite well, especially if Napoleon avoided imposing one of his brothers on the kingdom. Possibly also waiting until Prussia picks a fight with France, which might occur at some point, rather than brazenly going to war with them. Since their military system has badly atropied their no great threat although they [and probably others at the time] won't see that. Mind you without reforms, both military and otherwise, another nation/kingdom is going to end up championing German unification/independence.

I agree Napoleon needs to be a lot more liberal than he was during the bulk of the empire but that does need a radically different Napoleon. One who isn't a double-crossing egomanic who things the only solution to every problem is to hit it with an army.

Not sure that seeking to impose tariffs on British controlled goods will be that effective. Just as when he tried a total ban on such goods that prompted widespread smuggling of such goods and I can see it happening here. No one will want to pay through the nose for such goods when they can get them a lot cheaper. However trying to impose tariffs and letting local states do this and collect the revenue - will still be a leaky sieve but less so than OTL and won't be as irriating to the people's of those lands dominated by the French. Always the danger when things don't go totally to play - unless you have a drastic change to Boney - he will still seek to annex lands and take them under direct control.

Also if he avoids replacing the Bourbons in Spain, while he's going to keep most of Spain under his control and be in a better position to threaten Portugal. Its still quite possible with competent preparations that Lisbon could possibly be held and definitely Gibraltar while Britain has naval superiority. Ditto Cadiz if there is a Spanish revolt.

The main problem with this route is that it still leaves the Spanish colonial empire vulnerable to British action, either direct intervention or possibly by encouraging unrest. Which is quite possible even if the Bourbon's stay in power, especially if Ferdinard gets his hands on the throne by dubious means.

In the shorter term the problem with arbitarily deposing both the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollern is that as well as making conswrvatives unhappy it also mean no other ruler on the continent is likely to feel safe, with the possible exception of the Romanovs. Especially if the Prussians are as relatively passive as they were until pressed into a corner in 1806-07.

In the longer term, even if Napoleon makes himself the monarch of both Italian and German confederations, he is 1st and formest emperor of France and will continue to give them primarcy. Especially doing things like billiting troops in German and Italians lands to avoid France paying the costs of maintaining them. Also he will want to make sure nobody else approaches France in power. As national identity continues to spread in its new format this is going to make French hegemony difficult and possibly very costly to maintain. Sooner or later either its going to start coming apart or he or his successor, if one can hold things together, will have to have a more equatible distribution of power in Europe.

I can't see the Romanovs agreeing to marrying a Russian princess to Boney, especially not if he's shown his contempt for the traditional dynasties by totally deposing the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollern, and possibly a few others. The Hapsburgs were the best option OTL as it did keep Austria sidelined for a while after Napoleon launched his final disasterous war. The Wittlesbach's are probably the best next choice although Bavaria is already closely committed to the French cause so it gains little and might mean they get dragged down if/when this new empire falls.

The best actual route for Napoleon would be to keep his word more, rather than breaking so many treaties. Especially keeping peace with Britain after the Treaty of Ameins - or TTL equivalent as there are going to be huge butterflies. [If we're assuming Eurofed favourite Brit-Bashing with the loss of Canada to American conquest.]. That would also enable him, other things going the same basic way, to send some of the surplus French population and a fair number of discharged veterans to settle Louisiana. Much better for them and France than killing them in further pointless wars. Simply keeping decent relations with Britain would remove any realistic danger from any coalition because it would lack funds and naval strength. However that would mean Napoleon limits his military expansionism in Europe which as I said above would mean a drastically different Napoleon who doesn't let his ego take such control.

[eurofed]

As it concerns Hungary, I concur it would work much better if Napoleon gives the throne to a friendly member of the Magyar high nobility instead of one of his relatives. Not sure who the best suitable candidate would be but I’m confident someone could be found. There definitely were different degrees of reliability as it concerns the loyalty of the German rulers to Napoleon. The Hohenzollern and the Habsburg backstabbed him at the first perceived good opportunity even after they had been seemingly passive for a while, while the Wettin and the Wittelsbach stayed loyal much longer when he started to experience trouble. So I assume one of the best ways to consolidate his power base in Central Europe would be to dethrone the first two dynasties and rebuild a new settlement of Germany mostly based on a tripartite system: a brand-new Kingdom of North Germany with Napoleon himself on the throne and a competent viceroy (a German analogue of the Kingdom of Italy), expanded Saxony, and expanded Bavaria.

As it concerns the timeline of dismantling Prussia and Austria, I tend to assume politically speaking it would be best done after they pick a fight with France and get their butts handed to them on a plate, say in 1806-07 and 1805/1809 respectively. Instead of granting them the OTL peace terms that allowed the survival of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg states, he imposes harsher ones that ensure their complete dismantlement. Of course, he may only reliably do so once Russia has been driven to accept a Tilsit-style peace, but I think it was entirely doable. The Wars of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Coalitions would give him sufficient justification to dethrone the Hohenzollern and the Habsburg, at least as much as the other European rulers that picked a fight with France and lost their thrones as a result IOTL. If he takes care to leave loyal allies in power and reward them, such as the Wettin, the Wittelsbach, the Spanish Bourbon, and the Danish Kings, TTL settlement in all likelihood would not earn him much more hostility from practical/opportunist European elites than the OTL one.

I agree there were definite limits to how much a recognizable Napoleon might be made downright liberal, but I assume there was room for a few slight but worthwhile improvements in this regard. E.g. the liberal reforms he enacted during the Hundred Days, he gets the foresight to implement them more or less since the beginning of his rule.

I agree there was no perfect solution to the problem of British trade for the Napoleonic Empire, at least until Britain accepts Napoleonic continental hegemony is inevitable and/or Western Europe has industrialized enough that French, German, Italian, etc. goods can reliably replace British ones on European markets. Up to then, artificial scarcity forcibly imposed by a ban is going to create widespread resentment and smuggling. However I notice many Western nations did use reasonable amounts of protectionist tariffs to build up their own agriculture and industry and diminish their dependence on foreign goods, and it usually didn’t create so many problems as an outright ban. So I assume if a foresighted Napoleon adopts the same kind of policy it would create less smuggling and resentment problems than the Continental System.

IMO a big component of what Napoleon needs to do in order to improve the long-term fortunes of his Empire is to acknowledge the other European nations can’t be treated like colonies of France, they have to feel they can profit from hegemony almost as much as the French. This is especially important for the Germans and the Italians (and more down the line, the Spanish) that necessarily form the rest of the core of the Empire. One issue in this regard is to limit unreasonable annexations to direct French rule as much as possible. Optimally France should only get French-speaking territories and grant self-rule in a federal bond to the other peoples.

The latter was relatively easy to implement for Western Europe at large with the right policies. However the French had been trying to expand in the Low Countries, Germany, and Italy so long and so hard since they became a centralized nation I’m not sure even a foresighted Napoleon can entirely frustrate such ambitions when they are within grasp. So I guess the Low Countries, the left bank of the Rhine, and at least some northwestern portion of Italy were more or less inevitable. The other, more geopolitically outlandish annexations OTL Napoleon did to try and contain defiance to the Continental System, such as northwestern Germany, one-half of northern Italy, and the Illyrian Provinces, can be safely and easily avoided.

If the Bourbon are kept on the throne of Spain I don’t see how or why there should be an anti-Napoleonic revolt in Spain, so Cadiz should be safe and the French-Spanish alliance should definitely be able to overrun and occupy most of Portugal. IIRC Gibraltar held out against Spanish siege for several years during the Napoleonic Wars, so I suppose the same would occur ITTL. I’m not so sure Lisbon would be able to do the same if Spain remains quiet, although I remember its defenses were rather strong. I agree lack of the Peninsular War events won’t stop the British from working to undermine the Spanish Empire in the Americas, either by direct intervention or by supporting revolutionary unrest. After Trafalgar, there is little Napoleon or Ferdinand can do to stop them until Napoleonic Europe has rebuilt enough naval power to match the Royal Navy as a equal. It can be definitely done in the long term, since Western Europe has more than enough resources and know-how, but it going to take several years at least.

I concur one of the most important factors to make the Napoleonic Empire stable in the medium and long term is to avoid giving the Germans and the Italians the feeling they are a colony of the French. Besides limiting annexations of German and Italian territory to direct French rule, this may require Germany and Italy being administered by local elites that are sufficiently loyal and sympathetic to the Napoleonic Empire, as well as balancing out economic benefits and the financial and military costs of the Empire among the main nationalities. France is inevitably going to be the leader of the union but all peoples need feeling they have a worthy place and voice at the table, as well as a share in the political, economic, and strategic benefits of imperial unity.

It requires some care but it seems doable, since history shows European supranational unity is feasible with a federal bond and is going to provide a considerable dividend in terms of political stability and economic prosperity. Romantic nationalism is certainly going a serious potential threat for the Empire but not necessarily an impossible one to overcome. The EU proves a successful supranational ideal and federal system can hold nationalism in check and European culture shares a powerful precedent for imperial unity in Rome and the Carolingian Empire that the Napoleonic Empire can explicitly use as a model, combined with the fruits of modernity, the French Revolution, and evolving liberalism. Moreover, nationalism was in an early, formative stage during the Napoleonic Age. Successful formation of an EU-style continental union from Napoleon's success can easily deviate its development trajectory from a prevalent ethnic-linguistic character to a dominant Pan-European civic-imperial ideal.

I agree the Romanov marriage is the least likely feasible option ITTL. The Wittelsbach option seems a rather gainful choice since the dynasty was loyal to Napoleon and had princesses of suitable age and fertility in this period. Since TTL changes make Napoleonic hegemony rather stronger against external threats and internal subversion by reactionary fifth columns, OTL justifications for the Habsburg marriage seem much less important. Increasing domestic support in the Western-Central European core of the Empire seems much more important. In this context, and combined with Napoleon’s French nationality and Italian heritage, marriage with a German royal house would help solidify the Bonaparte’s credentials as a European Imperial house and their legitimacy as rulers of the continent. Of course the dynasty shall have to continue cultivating a Pan-European image, such as by educating its members to be fluent in multiple languages.

My strong preference for Canada becoming American, in any TL where the American Revolution succeeds and a recognizable USA exists at all, largely comes from my view that the British Empire was the old, outdated, and faultier model of Anglo civilization and American federalism the new, improved, and better version, so much better to make the latter inherit all of British North America when revolution triumphs. In this specific case it is not really so much Brit-bashing, basically it is Yankee-boosting.

A successful Napoleon as commonly understood for AH purposes means continuation and consolidation of the continental hegemony he had established in 1805-1812, even more so as it concerns my AH interests. We all know Britain is not going to accept Napoleonic hegemony of a mostly united continent in good grace, and needs to be dragged kicking and screaming into realization of its inevitability. So the Treaty of Amiens stuff is a red herring. In all likelihood the British shall be the last to lay down weapons and accept the new status quo in Europe, after they realize all conservative powers have been crushed and cannot rise again, Russia can’t or won’t fight Napoleon again in the short term, and new coalitions are impossible. As you point out, the British are likely to reap a significant consolation prize by harvesting the European colonies, either by annexing them or setting them up as client states.

[stevep]

The problem with this idea of presuading the Germans and Italians they are not French colonies is that Napoleon and other elements of the French imperial systen treated them that way. The basing of French troops in such territories, with the locals being required to fund their maintainence was a serious cause of resentment across much of the continent but was essential to Napoleon's systen as it avoided France having to pay much of the costs of empire. This applied to all occupied areas, including ones officially friendly to France and is appart from the brutal indemnities Napleon imposed on states after he defeated them.

Similarly being even harsher on the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollern, especially complete removal of their dynasties, apart from facing problems of loyalties to them will make every other ruler fearful they will run foul of such a capicious dictator.

The idea that Europe will quickly build up an industrial base to rival Britain has two problems. While governmental intervention can be useful for a state in developing its industrial base as history show, it also shows an autocratic top-down rule, as Napoleon is almost certain to try given the centralised nation of his regime causes serious problems and inefficencies. Also the problm is not just British industrial products but also the extra-European items that British control of the seas means only Bitain can supply. That may not seem as decisive a factor as having a massive army and being willing to march it into any state who disagrees with you but it can be very infulential.

Furthermore the only way Britain is going to end its conflict with Napoleon once he's broken the 1801 treaty is by one or the other systens falling. Given the access to massive resources and trained and motivated men the RN is going to take a hell of a long time to outclass, especially when you have someone like Napoleon in charge of the opposition. Referring here to his incresing ego pronlems which meant he was unwilling to take unpleasant advice and also acknowledge his lack of understanding of naval power. Britain knows its own survival is incompatable with such an autocratic and expansionist empire as a neighbour.

Napoloen may avoid deposing the Bourbons, although this does seem strange advice when you wish him to depose other monarchs. However that leaves him with an inefficient and shambolic ally that will continue to be a distraction, albeit nothing like as great as the Spanish ulcer he created OTL.

The conservatives may be cowered but its the liberals and nationalists that will really threaten his power, as 1813-14 showed. Germany especially will not be willing to be a milch cow for Napoleon's ambitions and from 1805-6, while his territorial power contonued to expand the French military superiority over its opponents declined. Prussia in 1806, largely due to itmummified worship of Frenderick the Great's style of run, was his last realtively easy conquest. Russia in 1807 was largely fought to a standstill and even Austria in 1809 could have ended his empire with a bit of luck. Each of those later campaigns say increasing French casulties, declining quality of their troops and also increasing recklessness of his tactics with more and more use of costly frontal assualts.

As such I think that even if he had been a markedly better leader Napoleon's empire would have fallen and Europe not paralysed in its development by an autocratic hegemony. If not under his increasingly erratic rule then in the bloodbath that could follow his death. The French do simply not have the numerical superiority to ruthlessly crush every other community in west/central Europe, even without Britain as an example of opposition.

[eurofed]

I agree a fair-ish division of the military costs of the Empire between the various nationalities would be important to ensure its long-term stability. I do not have specific expertise on this issue but I suppose a few improvements could be done in this field. Also because I assume ITTL the Napoleonic Empire probably won't need exactly as big a military as OTL, so the costs shall be less. ITTL there won't be an insurgency in Spain, and after a while the demise of Austria and Prussia and the federal unification of Germany and Italy shall lessen internal opposition to Napoleonic rule in Western and Central Europe, so the garrison burden shall be lessened, and not significantly different from the standard for 19th century Europe. Basically Napoleonic Europe shall need a strong army for armed defense against Russia and Britain.

I honestly fail to see what would be so sacred in the kingship of the Habsburg and the Hohenzollern in comparison to the other dynasties (e.g. the Savoia or the Naples Bourbon) revolutionary France and Napoleon deposed IOTL that would make their removal from power so outrageous for Europe. Their deposition in 1805-1809 would hardly be arbitrary or capricious since they had been at war with France a half-dozen times in the last 20 years. Removing the leader of a country that had been a recidivist enemy of yours is pretty much standard policy for a victorious power.

I agree that top-down interventionism in the economy can only do so much to accelerate industrialization of a country, but history shows it can be fairly effective in the right conditions, especially if it combines a few subsidies, external tariffs, and creation of a vast (continent-sized) free-trade zone or integrated internal market with good resources, infrastructure, and know-how. It worked fine for 19th century USA and Germany, and 20th Century EU, Napoleonic Europe would not be so different, basically a proto-EU in the long run. British blockade of extra-European resources would be somewhat painful but hardly unbearable for Europe. Napoleon and his successors would hardly be blamed by the Europeans if the cause of shortage is enemy blockade (embargoes rarely work to undermine loyalty to a regime), and Britain can sustain blockade only for so long because smuggling is going to happen and blockades can't airtight in this age, in the long run its naval supremacy is ultimately fleeting (Europe has the resources and know-how to rebuild a navy that can match or even surpass the RN, and the latter can only do so much to delay its development), and development of erzatz resources is going to happen.  

If the Napoleonic Empire (or anything equivalent from the successful Habsburg to the victorious CP, Nazis, or Soviets for that matter) eliminated (or cowed, in the case of modern Russia) all significant resistance to its rule on the continent and can properly harness its resources, Britain shall eventually have to make peace with it and accept Cold War-style co-existence, because indefinite continuation of armed hostility is ultimately suicidal. In pretty much any age since the fall of Rome, a united continent is always going to have much bigger demographic and economic resources than, and similar know-how as, the British Isles. In the long term, it means Europe shall inevitably and substantially outbuild Britain, even with the resources of its Empire, in the naval (and in the 20th century, air) field. The superior naval expertise of the British can only do so much to bridge the quantity gap, and shall be utterly insufficient in the end. It can't be Trafalgar every time. The only thing that could bridge the gap is massive support from a fully-developed, friendly America, and in the Napoleonic Age the Americans were neither able nor willing to save the butts of their former colonial overlords. Eventually either Britain shall accept peace with the continental hegemony, or the hegemons shall pull a 1066 and dictate peace terms in occupied London. Not to mention the fact in the long term indefinite hostility with the continent is going to harm the British economy even more than the European one.

Well, reasonable political and psychological justification for TTL Napoleon to depose the Habsburg and the Hohenzollern (and other hostile European monarchs) but not the Spanish Bourbon (or the Wittelsbach or the Wettin) would be the former had been recidivst enemies of France, while the latter had been sufficiently loyal (if dysfunctional, in the case of Spain) allies. It would be a case of showing consistency, loyalty, and ability to properly reward and punish. I agree there would be easy short-term solution for a foresighted Napoleon to the dysfunctional state of its Spanish ally. If you ask my opinion, however, probably the best course would be to bear with it until serious domestic opposition develops to Bourbon rule. We know Ferdinand was such a screwed-up ruler (one of the biggest ironies of the Peninsular War was in all evidence Joseph would have been a much better king than Ferdinand or any of his close relatives) that a liberal revolution is going to happen against him in a decade or so. Revolutionary instability in Spain would then provide Napoleon sensible political justification to provide a more suitable candidate for the throne, and any Joseph equivalent would be welcomed with much less widespread hostility than OTL, since the new dynasty could harness reformist opposition to the Bourbon as a power base. In all likelihood there would still be some trouble, but more like the Carlist Wars than the Peninsular War.

A big deal of what German and Italian liberal-nationalists wanted was national unity, and they demonstrably were willing to make a few serious compromises to achieve it, including cooperating with rulers that were less than card-carrying liberals at heaert. If the Napoleonic system provides it for them and avoids colonial-style unequality, I'm confident they would be willing to cooperate with a federal European empire. Also because many liberal nationalists were open-minded to Pan-European solidarity ideals (cfr. the statements and writings of Mazzini and Hugo), and nationalism was in its formative period in the Napoleonic age. A successful Napoleonic empire that combines the models of Rome and Charlemagne with modern statemanship and the best fruits of the French Revolution and provides sufficient stability, prosperity, and peace can easily cause European political thought to latch on Pan-European solidarity instead of ethnic-linguistic nationalism. Of course, this also requires Napoleon to become a little more liberal than OTL, but he showed he was leaning to go somewhat down that road in his late years, so he had some potential for that. TTL just requires him to be a little more foresighted and be that way at the apex of his power. Moreover, to be more liberal does not actually requires him to become an European equivalent of Washington. The chaotic state of Europe in this age created a significant political demand for a strong leadership that would restore stability in moderate public opinion. They can be the power base of the Empire in Napoleon's lifetime, and his successor just need not to get in the way of further liberal reforms. To succeed, Napoleonic Europe does not actually to be exactly as liberal as the USA form the beginning, there is room for it to evolve to that standard in a generation or two w/o collapsing.

I disagree with your evaluation of the evolving military prowess of Napoleonic France vs. its enemies. From what I know, the equation did not really come truly close to balance until 1813-14, and the process was significantly accelerated by the destruction of the Grande Armee in Russia. Austria was not any really close to defeating Napoleon in 1809 w/o astonishing amounts of luck, and w/o the Spanish distraction France would have crushed it as easily as it did in 1805, or Prussia in 1806. As it concerns Russia, sure, Napoleon could only exhaust it in a favorable compromise peace as it did in 1807, not crush it as it tried and failed in 1812. But so what? The 1807 standard done again if necessary and Russia kept out of Central Europe is everything a foresighted Napoleon needs to reap strategic success. Without the OTL offensive disaster, Russia was not any more able to invade Europe on its own initiative in 1812 than in 1805-07, a new war started by the Tsar and fought the same way as the previous one would end the same way as Tilsit. Moreover, if Napoleon does not try to interfere with Anglo-Russian trade and encourages Russia to get busy with dismantling the Ottoman Empire it is far from certain Russia would seek again war with the Napoleonic Empire in the 1810s.

[stevep]

Oct 26, 2017 18:25:07 GMT eurofed said:

I agree a fair-ish division of the military costs of the Empire between the various nationalities would be important to ensure its long-term stability. I do not have specific expertise on this issue but I suppose a few improvements could be done in this field. Also because I assume ITTL the Napoleonic Empire probably won't need exactly as big a military as OTL, so the costs shall be less. ITTL there won't be an insurgency in Spain, and after a while the demise of Austria and Prussia and the federal unification of Germany and Italy shall lessen internal opposition to Napoleonic rule in Western and Central Europe, so the garrison burden shall be lessened, and not significantly different from the standard for 19th century Europe. Basically Napoleonic Europe shall need a strong army for armed defense against Russia and Britain.

  I'm doubtful that Napoleon will be willing/able to cut his army that much, or alternatively base it in French territory, because it will make the home population very unhappy.  Apart from his paranoia and desire for control he's going to have concerns about Russia and Britain at least, as well as resentment in other areas.  Given the potential size of the Russian army and possibility of disgruntled Germans joining any anti-French move he won't want his forces too small.  The cock-up he made out of Spain didn't increase his army that much in the short term and problems were occurring before then. 

  Also as OTL Russia is unlikely to be willing to pay 2nd fiddle to Napoleon and Napoelon is unlikely to be willing to give them real equality.  In which case sooner or later he's likely to move against Russia with a decent prospect that it ends up as OTL 1812.  Especially if as suggested he has a smaller French army which means he is probably pressing yet more satalites into supplying troops and will try again when he has to rebuild his forces.  Which is likely as OTL to start nationalists in Germany especially to try and get out from under his boot.

 I honestly fail to see what would be so sacred in the kingship of the Habsburg and the Hohenzollern in comparison to the other dynasties (e.g. the Savoia or the Naples Bourbon) revolutionary France and Napoleon deposed IOTL that would make their removal from power so outrageous for Europe. Their deposition in 1805-1809 would hardly be arbitrary or capricious since they had been at war with France a half-dozen times in the last 20 years. Removing the leader of a country that had been a recidivist enemy of yours is pretty much standard policy for a victorious power.

  Both were very old dynasties and also they were more immediately relevant to the other German states, rather than the Bourbons of Naples, who were still holding out on Sicily.  You have some accuracy in that Austria was the continental power that stood up to France the most, hence suffering the most in return.  However I think Prussia fought Napoleon only once, when it was pressurised into war in 1806/07.  A lot of his 'allies' had also been enemies earlier, as also had been Bourbon Spain as well so its an example of how vulerable leaders could be to an increasingly autocratic and paraniod dictator.

I agree that top-down interventionism in the economy can only do so much to accelerate industrialization of a country, but history shows it can be fairly effective in the right conditions, especially if it combines a few subsidies, external tariffs, and creation of a vast (continent-sized) free-trade zone or integrated internal market with good resources, infrastructure, and know-how. It worked fine for 19th century USA and Germany, and 20th Century EU, Napoleonic Europe would not be so different, basically a proto-EU in the long run. British blockade of extra-European resources would be somewhat painful but hardly unbearable for Europe. Napoleon and his successors would hardly be blamed by the Europeans if the cause of shortage is enemy blockade (embargoes rarely work to undermine loyalty to a regime), and Britain can sustain blockade only for so long because smuggling is going to happen and blockades can't airtight in this age, in the long run its naval supremacy is ultimately fleeting (Europe has the resources and know-how to rebuild a navy that can match or even surpass the RN, and the latter can only do so much to delay its development), and development of erzatz resources is going to happen.

  I agree that a balance between internal competition and government support is the best way forward.  However autocratic states tend to fair poorly in the former step, being too often obcessed with control of just about everything and also not wanting any interests to get too powerful or influential.  Furthermore autocratic systems tend to be more vulnerable to corruption and abuse of positional power which is also a big problem in such societies.

  You also seem to totally misunderstand what was happening.  Britain wasn't blockading Europe.  Napoleon was blockading Europe against the import of British controlled goods.  Hence it was Britain that was actively smuggling goods into occupied Europe, with the cooperation of many people in the regions and Napoleon that was trying to stop it.  Hence the 1810 annexations that brought France to the Baltic.  Apart from helping to fund Britain's war machine and pricking his ego [which may have been as important to him ] this was undercutting French attempts to economically dominate Europe as they couldn't counter British manufactured good.  France did suffer badly fron the British blockade of its ports because its western portions had depended heavily in foreign trade which was now cut off.  Also coastal activities were seriously restricted, which prior to the railways were often the only way to move bulk goods efficiently.  To provide a military example Brest was long the major centre for warships in France but being at the end of a peninsula it had long ago used up local woodlands and relied on coastal shipping to move in things like large timbers for ships masts.  Needless to say this wasn't happening with the British blockade.

  True if Napoleon can loosen his reins a lot and avoid bringing his empire down as OTL and a decent and stable succession can occur, in the longer run the sheer resources avoidable to the French empire can make it virtually unchallengable but I'm doubtful he can establish such a stable domination.

If the Napoleonic Empire (or anything equivalent from the successful Habsburg to the victorious CP, Nazis, or Soviets for that matter) eliminated (or cowed, in the case of modern Russia) all significant resistance to its rule on the continent and can properly harness its resources, Britain shall eventually have to make peace with it and accept Cold War-style co-existence, because indefinite continuation of armed hostility is ultimately suicidal. In pretty much any age since the fall of Rome, a united continent is always going to have much bigger demographic and economic resources than, and similar know-how as, the British Isles. In the long term, it means Europe shall inevitably and substantially outbuild Britain, even with the resources of its Empire, in the naval (and in the 20th century, air) field. The superior naval expertise of the British can only do so much to bridge the quantity gap, and shall be utterly insufficient in the end. The only thing that could bridge the gap is massive support from a fully-developed, friendly America, and in the Napoleonic Age the Americans were neither able nor willing to save the butts of their former colonial overlords. Eventually either Britain shall accept peace with the continental hegemony, or the hegemons shall dictate peace terms in occupied London. Not to mention the fact in the long term indefinite hostility with the continent is going to harm the British economy even more than the European one.

  As above.  If the continental empire is established as you suggest then ultimately Britain will fall.  I doubt the US at this age would be wise enough to realise the danger of not assisting Britain, plus it would lack the power as well.  If a successor to Napoleon does complete the conquest of Britain where would he look next?

[eurofed]

I've already stated the ways and reasons why ITTL there shall be much less nationalist resistance to Napoleonic rule among the non-French nationalities of the Empire, so I do not expect German nationalism to be that much of a serious security problem for alt-Napoleon and his successors. And the scenario necessarily includes a personality change to make him more foresighted, and hence necessarily less paranoid. Therefore over time his empire is only going to need the army necessary to ensure armed defence against Britain and Russia and domestic public order. I do not expect the financial effort to support that kind of army would be excessive, since a union/coalition of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Spain would certainly have the resources to support it without a crushing burden. I expect the army (and the navy, once it eventually gets rebuilt) would have to be spread across the empire, and its various nationalities would have to support it as fairly as possible by some kind of federal tax and conscription - de jure for the Franco-German-Italian confederal core, de facto for the Spanish, Polish, and Hungarian allies/satellites. The alternative of keeping it concentrated in France would simply be too inefficient in various ways.

It is questionable if ITTL Russia and Napoleonic Europe would come to blows again in Napoleon's lifetime after achieving the equivalent of Tilsit. IOTL tensions about the Continental System played a substantial role in the genesis of the War of the Sixth Coalition, and TTL Napoleon shall entirely avoid that blunder, and be content with a Tilsit kind of peace settlement. Moreover, if a war happens again because the Tsar starts it, he will get the foresight to avoid the stategic and logistic mistakes of OTL 1812. If he has to fight the Russians again, he shall do it the way he did in the Wars of the Third and Fourth Coalitions. History shows Russia can be defeated without excessive trouble with that kind of maneuver defensive and limited offensive warfare. See also WWI, although of course the technological base for that kind of in-depth penetration in Russian territory does not exist yet, so a foresighted Napoleon won't try.

History indicates authoritarian states that avoid hardcore totalitarianism, embrace meritocracy and the rule of law in non-political matters, cultivate education, and adopt a mixed-economy system with basic market capitalism and some government interventionism usually prosper in economic terms. The Napoleonic system fit all of these requirements, its economic troubles came from different sources and we already discussed how and why TTL version is going to avoid them. This definitely includes the Continental System, ITTL Napoleon gets the foresight to avoid it. He makes a free trade area of his empire, slaps a substantial but liveable tariff on external (especially British) trade, and throws around a few subsidies/incentives at European agriculture and industry. If people want to buy British and extra-European goods and they are available for selling, they can, the tariff may mean some smuggling, hardship, and resentment but much less than the OTL outright ban. If the British enact an embargo of their own goods or a blockade of extra-European goods as a tool of war, the blame is theirs to bear, not Napoleon's.

Regardless of the CS, British blockade of Napoleonic Europe was certainly a thing, or the War of 1812 would not have happened, regardless of American ambitions on Canada (a non-issue ITTL since the USA got Canada in 1783) or the other US grievances. British harassment of European coastal trade was certainly a painful issue, but just as British naval supremacy at large, there is no easy workaround for Napoleon. The basic PoD is his greater foresight, but given his areas of expertise I guess there is little he can do to prevent or undo Trafalgar in the short term, unlike his OTL mistakes in land warfare and imperial statemanship. He can only grit his teeth, gradually rebuild the European navy, and work to improve European infrastructure as much as current technology would allow. At most, given TTL greater insight, he may support Fulton in full, which may give Napoleonic  Europe earlier and easier access to steamships (I don't remember if this would work for railroads as well).

If and when the Bonaparte continental empire is stabilized and ultimately pulls a 1066 on Britain or bullies/exhausts it into accepting a Cold War peace, I guess its next natural target of expansion would be South Asia and East Asia. An attempt to dominate the New World would be a costly fool's errand. There is relatively little to be gained in this age for Europe from conquering Russia as long as the Russians do not make themselves an existential threat. Africa shall still be off-limits to European in-depth penetration and settlement for another 2-3 generations, with the exception of the northern and southern ends that are certainly open to colonization even in this age. Conquest of North Africa would also settle the problem of Barbary piracy for good and make the Med much more secure for European trade. There is some wealth to be gained from controlling the Middle East but it means making Russia a permanent enemy. It is probably better to conquer Egypt to build the Suez Canal and control the shorter trade route to Asia and leave the Balkans and the Near East to Russia as its consolation prize and playground, if the Russians do not make themselves too much trouble. India, Southeast Asia, Japan, Korea, and China are where there is much wealth to be picked w/o excessive trouble to penetrate or dominate for the next century or so, thanks to Europe's superiority. Russia may become a serious rival for part of this area, but not all of it. America shall eventually rise to become a most serious rival in the Pacific, but not for another century or so.

[stevep]

Basically your requiring 20th/21st century insight on Napoleon's failures for him and for his successors. Presuming that and that he is willing to stand up to internal French pressures for imperial advantage this has a decent, even good chance of working. However as I pointed out even easier would be to accept his powerful position in 1801 rather than pushing for even more domination and control. That would save a hell of a lot of bloodshed and destruction all around.

[eurofed]

Oct 27, 2017 20:16:45 GMT stevep said:

Basically your requiring 20th/21st century insight on Napoleon's failures for him and for his successors. Presuming that and that he is willing to stand up to internal French pressures for imperial advantage this has a decent, even good chance of working. However as I pointed out even easier would be to accept his powerful position in 1801 rather than pushing for even more domination and control. That would save a hell of a lot of bloodshed and destruction all around.

The Napoleonic Wars weren't that bloody or destructive and TTL changes are going to cut short their last portion. Much more importantly, if this unification of Europe under a system that has good chances of evolving into a liberal-democratic federal EU analogue works it is going to prevent most European wars of the 19th and 20th century, or at least contain them to a few Euro-Russian general wars, and in all likelihood prevent Europe from developing Nazism or Communism. The total sum of the damage later OTL events created was much, much worse than the Napoleonic Wars. On the other hand, if Napoleon stops in 1801 Europe remains trapped in its cycle of nationalist conflicts and OTL bloodshed and destruction is basically going to occur in some form, even if details may vary (admittedly it is hard to tell if 20th century totalitarianism shall show up or not). You may blame OTL Napoleon for trying and failing to unite the continent, and so wasting the lives he spent in the effort. But TTL Napoleon is basically paying the price of some bloodshed and destruction in his lifetime to prevent much, much worse from occurring a century in the future or so. From my practical and utilitarian PoV, it is not only justifiable but commendable and heroic.

[stevep]

Oct 28, 2017 17:55:30 GMT eurofed said:

Oct 27, 2017 20:16:45 GMT stevep said:

Basically your requiring 20th/21st century insight on Napoleon's failures for him and for his successors. Presuming that and that he is willing to stand up to internal French pressures for imperial advantage this has a decent, even good chance of working. However as I pointed out even easier would be to accept his powerful position in 1801 rather than pushing for even more domination and control. That would save a hell of a lot of bloodshed and destruction all around.

The Napoleonic Wars weren't that bloody or destructive and TTL changes are going to cut short their last portion. Much more importantly, if this unification of Europe under a system that has good chances of evolving into a liberal-democratic federal EU analogue works it is going to prevent most European wars of the 19th and 20th century, or at least contain them to a few Euro-Russian general wars, and in all likelihood prevent Europe from developing Nazism or Communism. The total sum of the damage later OTL events created was much, much worse than the Napoleonic Wars. On the other hand, if Napoleon stops in 1801 Europe remains trapped in its cycle of nationalist conflicts and OTL bloodshed and destruction is basically going to occur in some form, even if details may vary (admittedly it is hard to tell if 20th century totalitarianism shall show up or not). You may blame OTL Napoleon for trying and failing to unite the continent, and so wasting the lives he spent in the effort. But TTL Napoleon is basically paying the price of some bloodshed and destruction in his lifetime to prevent much, much worse from occurring a century in the future or so. From my practical and utilitarian PoV, it is not only justifiable but commendable and heroic.

a)  Costs of the war.  Wiki says that the 12 years inflicted the following losses, see Napoleonic Wars costs ,~120,000 Italians, ~900,000 Spanish, ~300,00 British, ~1.2M French soldiers, 600,00 civilians [French?, killed by whom?] and 65,000 French allies.  Those figures are odd in that there are no mentions of Germans, Russians or other east Europeans.  The 65,000 French allies figure is also far too small.

  Given the losses of the Grand Army in Russia and then again in 1813 and the French losses in Spain then the 1.2M figure seems reasonable.  The Spanish one would fit in with reports of the devastation of the fighting in Spain and you would expect proportionally similar losses for the Portuguese.  British losses are probably reasonably accurate, many coming from disease in the colonies especially.  However would expect losses from the rest of Europe to at least approach doubling those figures.  Even without the material devastation Napoleon's wars were bloody and destructive.

b)  Again your assuming that an autocratic state is going to evolve into a "liberal-democratic federal EU".  Staying an autocratic and oppressive state sounds far more likely.  Napoleon is a dictator with a well built police state and a military system that was built around conquest.  Assuming he avoids the OTL trap of thinking that war is the answer to all his 'problems' France is still going to be an autocratic state and its empire in central and southern Europe will see desires for independence, in part or all so either some system to appease such desires is going to be needed or more likely the system will rely on military force and we're back to square one.

c)  Yet again your assuming that some sort of continental dominating bloc will avoid the wars and social/political conflicts of OTL without any reason to assume this.  Just possible it might but again, given the tensions in such a system it could be even bloodier.

d)  If Napoleon stops in 1801 there is likely to be more national conflicts, human nature being what it is.  However their going to occur anyway.  In other posts in this thread your assuming massive imperial campaigns against much of Asia, even apart from what would be needed to suppress any groups that expressed discontent with their position in the system. All we know for sure is that if Napoleon stopped in 1801 more than a decade of bloody and destructive conflict IS avoided.  Austria and Prussia aren't going to agree to risk attacking such a France when they have their own rivarlies while lacking British funds this would be even more pointless.

  There is an old adage about the most dangerous thing being a fanatic with a machine gun.  Its false.  What is far more dangerous is a fanatic with an idea they won't give up, no matter how much evidence is stacked against them.  Such as an autocratic state established by force is the best way of governing a large area, regardless of what the population of that area think.

[marshalsoult]

The Napoleonic wars were the bloodiest ever until the world wars.

[lordroel]

Dec 18, 2017 11:54:55 GMT marshalsoult said:

The Napoleonic wars were the bloodiest ever until the world wars.

I do think 3,500,000 casualties is a lot if we go by this Wiki article called Napoleonic Wars casualties but what about the Dungan Revolt (1862–77)
somewhere between 8,000,000–12,000,000 died there ore the Taiping Rebellion (1850- 1871) which saw 20–30 million dead or do we only count war and no uprisings, revolts and rebellions.

[stevep]

Dec 18, 2017 11:54:55 GMT marshalsoult said:

The Napoleonic wars were the bloodiest ever until the world wars.

  Probably the bloodiest in Europe but there are a number of candicates, especially in Asia that probably costs more lives.  As Lordroel mentioned the Taiping Revolution is the most famous while other revolts in China and the wars of Genghis Khan and Tamerlain are probably also a good bit bloodier than even the ~3.5M figure meantioned for the Napoloenic period.  As the article mentions some figures are even higher.  Note also that those figures are only for 1803-1815, i.e. excluding the earlier French Revolutionary period.

[lordroel]

Dec 18, 2017 18:53:02 GMT stevep said:

Dec 18, 2017 11:54:55 GMT marshalsoult said:

The Napoleonic wars were the bloodiest ever until the world wars.

  Probably the bloodiest in Europe but there are a number of candicates, especially in Asia that probably costs more lives.  As Lordroel mentioned the Taiping Revolution is the most famous while other revolts in China and the wars of Genghis Khan and Tamerlain are probably also a good bit bloodier than even the ~3.5M figure meantioned for the Napoloenic period.  As the article mentions some figures are even higher.  Note also that those figures are only for 1803-1815, i.e. excluding the earlier French Revolutionary period.

But going of track here on this thread, can we consider the Napoleonic Wars one single war with periods of peace ore must we consider it several separate wars.