Soviet Domination - A Red Dawn story

[James G]

[Part I]



Chapter One – Beginnings


(1)

October 1976: During the second presidential debate, President Gerry Ford almost puts his foot in his mouth but stops himself from saying something that might come back to haunt him later. He recalls a pre-debate brief with his chief-of-staff, the young Dick Cheney, about Soviet Domination over Eastern Europe. There naturally was, and Ford confirms that there is during the debate. He adds that he wishes to see that end one day so that the Poles, the Czechoslovaks and others too no longer feel dominated by the Soviet Union.


November 1976: Ford wins the presidential election. He takes Ohio and Wisconsin by tiny margins after his campaign has continued to improve since a bad start. Jimmy Carter actually wins the popular vote, but Ford wins the only game in town: the Electoral college vote. There is surprise yet everyone agrees that Ford has won fair-and-square.


January 1977: Ford is sworn in for his second term. He is term-limited in 1980 but before then aims to do much domestically and abroad. The president keeps his pre-election cabinet and most senior appointments too. Dole is his VP, Kissinger at State, Rumsfeld at Defence, Simon at Treasury and Bush at the CIA. Critics claim more of the same though Ford declares that there will be positive change with his administration.


June 1977: Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev has a fatal slip-and-fall on the steps in his apartment building in Central Moscow. He cracks his head and bleeds out before anything can be done. The jokes inside his country will say that the weight of his self-awarded medals helped bring the heavy man down.


July 1977: A peaceful struggle for succession to replace Brezhnev sees the KGB Chairman get the nod: Yuri Andropov. His colleagues in the Soviet leadership restrain his powers as the new general secretary though those restrictions are something at once seen as challenges to be overcome by Andropov. He has no intention of being an equal with those on the Politburo. One immediate (non-fatal) casualty of Brezhnev’s demise is his hanger-on Chernenko: he is shown the door.


November 1977: Talks between Panama and the United States over a renegotiation of the status of the Panama Canal come to an abrupt halt when General Torrijos – Panama’s ‘Maximum Leader’ – walks out in a huff. Kissinger denies claims afterwards that Panama was offered nothing as Torrijos says was the case. The US Senate is pleased; Ford is too for his own party especially, but the whole senate as well, doesn’t want to see the transfer of the Panama Canal to Panama led by a military strongman.

[James G]

(2)

January 1978: Violent clashes between religious students and security forces in the Iranian city of Qom. A newspaper of the government of The Shah had published an article defaming the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini: a man whose son everybody ‘knew’ had been murdered by government agents a few months past. Sources differ on the number of killed in Qom, those being anywhere from two according to the government and up to seventy from what it said by senior religious figures.

February 1978: The forty days process begins in Iran. Following traditional customs, forty days after the death of those martyred there will be memorial services for them: Khomeini has called for blood. The first series of memorials see riots nationwide with Qom and Tabriz erupting in violence. The Shah has the army send in and they do a terrible job of containing trouble… they effectively cause more. The riots target symbols of ‘the West’ too. Deaths occur with the numbers officially at six, unofficially in the hundreds. The Shah tries to concede to the demands of what is starting to become an organised opposition by firing members of his intelligence services but differing over a further, real response.

March 1978: Once forty days is up, the memorials-cum-riots start again. Over fifty cities, including the capital Tehran, are hit by trouble. The army is present again, so too are organised rioters. New non-lethal riot control equipment sent by the United States for the soldiers has been misappropriated in the notoriously-corrupt Iran. The use of the army comes alongside promises from The Shah of liberalisation and an end to corruption: this seems to anger everyone. Meanwhile, hundreds are reported dead again by the opposition with the government downplaying the numbers below ten in a ridiculous falsehood.

May 1978: The forty days are up again. Back come the protesters who fast riot and are met by the police then the army. You can set your watch by this now. It is nationwide and cannot be stopped. As to the latest round of riots, they are as vicious as before. The death toll is huge. There is an anti-Western / anti-American tone to the protests which is prominent among the ringleaders. In this round of violence, there are shots fired at the house of the prominent religious leader Ayatollah Shariatmadari – a rival of Khomeini who is across in Iraq – and one of his students is killed. Kissinger had been due to visit, sent by an anxious Ford who was concerned over Iran’s stability, but The Shah wavers back and forth over the impact of that and the US Secretary of State doesn’t come. Andropov, still with one foot in the door at the KGB when he isn’t supposed to, instructs his successor Chebrikov to pay more attention to Iran for any opportunities which might arise to protect the Soviet Union by the possible spread of influence to Iran.

[Dan]

I'm looking forward to seeing how this one progresses.

[lordroel]

Feb 6, 2018 7:53:51 GMT Dan said:

I'm looking forward to seeing how this one progresses.

Second that.

[James G]

(3)

June 1978:
The mood in Iran seemed to change come June. The ‘scheduled’ protests were meant to happen in the middle of the month but the opposition – religious and secular both – had been meeting with the representatives of The Shah. Shariatmadari had been among the leaders and there had come an apology for that shooting of one of his students. When the protests did occur, there was little of the previous violence. Khomeini was furious but he was abroad and not on the ground where he could direct events.

Under Bush’s directorship, the CIA made it’s later infamous pronouncement to the White House that Iran ‘is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation’. The Shah was telling his friends in America that everything was fine: this was believed by those who wanted to hear such a thing. Kissinger came to Tehran for his visit with The Shah yet Iran’s leader still had the time to talk with the opposition and make further concessions to them.

Across in neighbouring Iraq, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko paid a visit to President Al-Bakr and met with the powerful Vice President who was Saddam Hussein. Tensions over the brutal treatment of the Iraqi Communist Party were eased over somewhat. In addition, to further help Iraqi-Soviet relations, Saddam accepted a request from Gromyko when it came to refusing the pleas from The Shah to have Khomeini thrown out of Iraq: Saddam was told this came from Andropov personally who wanted the Iranian exile to stay in Najaf rather than go aboard.


July 1978:
The Shah authorised his government to further treat with the opposition and allowed them to present their case. The secularists – with Sanjabi prominent among them – were given the opportunity to express what they wished to see as the future for Iran with changes made as to how it would be governed. Shariatmadari too was given a voice that Iran’s prime minister had instructed to listen too and treat with respect as the voice of the religious opposition was heard too. Others in Iran – such as the communists – weren’t treated the same way and those that were allowed to air their grievances were promised nothing in return.

In Moscow, the KGB was given express permission by the Politburo to take a more active role in Iran despite the apparent winding down of protests there in the country. There were indications that the Islamic movement was more powerful than suspected and this was seen as an area of concern for the Soviet Union should they manage to do the impossible and bring down The Shah. Andropov had worked to convince his colleagues of this and they prepared to agree for support to be given to the Iranian communists, the Tudeh. Risk on this matter was something seen as of little concern and any fallout from failure would fall upon the Iranians themselves. Security of the Soviet state was at this time the only interest of the Politburo as they aimed to maintain the geo-political balance of power should Iran collapse into chaos.


August 1978:
The pendulum swung back the other way. The troubles across Iran restarted due to unconnected events creating a perfect storm for a month of violence. The government had cut spending and this had the affect of releasing many young men from employment who were angry and ripe for recruitment by extremists to express their anger. There were protests underway in the city of Isfahan over the detention of a local religious leader who attracted many of these new recruits to an element of the religious opposition not linked to Shariatmadari. Tudeh protests too gained some of the disaffected willing to cause trouble and ultimately give the communists a bigger role in the future of the country with numbers that couldn’t be ignored.

Then there came the cinema fire in Abadan. Over four hundred died when arson destroyed the building, a symbol of Western culture subverting Iranians, and killed those inside when the doors were locked. At once, the cries of deliberate murder of those inside by ‘agents of The Shah’ came from Khomeini: any suggestion that it was rather convenient for him and his cause apparently had no substance to it. He called for their vengeance from across in Iraq where his voice wasn’t just heard by the faithful there but fast spread by word of mouth and audio recordings into Iran. Those being corrupted by the ideas of the West were now martyrs.

Iran was getting a new government and The Shah had more focus on that. He brought in an old hand who at once cracked down on corruption and promised that there would be democracy: the people would prosper. Sanjabi and Shariatmadari were given more room to have influence by the new prime minister including on how and when elections should commence; once their ideas came to The Shah though, he wasn’t that sure and dithered over whether such things should be carried out.

[lordroel]

Feb 6, 2018 19:18:09 GMT James G said:

(3)

June 1978:
The mood in Iran seemed to change come June. The ‘scheduled’ protests were meant to happen in the middle of the month but the opposition – religious and secular both – had been meeting with the representatives of The Shah. Shariatmadari had been among the leaders and there had come an apology for that shooting of one of his students. When the protests did occur, there was little of the previous violence. Khomeini was furious but he was abroad and not on the ground where he could direct events.

Under Bush’s directorship, the CIA made it’s later infamous pronouncement to the White House that Iran ‘is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation’. The Shah was telling his friends in America that everything was fine: this was believed by those who wanted to hear such a thing. Kissinger came to Tehran for his visit with The Shah yet Iran’s leader still had the time to talk with the opposition and make further concessions to them.

Across in neighbouring Iraq, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko paid a visit to President Al-Bakr and met with the powerful Vice President who was Saddam Hussein. Tensions over the brutal treatment of the Iraqi Communist Party were eased over somewhat. In addition, to further help Iraqi-Soviet relations, Saddam accepted a request from Gromyko when it came to refusing the pleas from The Shah to have Khomeini thrown out of Iraq: Saddam was told this came from Andropov personally who wanted the Iranian exile to stay in Najaf rather than go aboard.


July 1978:
The Shah authorised his government to further treat with the opposition and allowed them to present their case. The secularists – with Sanjabi prominent among them – were given the opportunity to express what they wished to see as the future for Iran with changes made as to how it would be governed. Shariatmadari too was given a voice that Iran’s prime minister had instructed to listen too and treat with respect as the voice of the religious opposition was heard too. Others in Iran – such as the communists – weren’t treated the same way and those that were allowed to air their grievances were promised nothing in return.

In Moscow, the KGB was given express permission by the Politburo to take a more active role in Iran despite the apparent winding down of protests there in the country. There were indications that the Islamic movement was more powerful than suspected and this was seen as an area of concern for the Soviet Union should they manage to do the impossible and bring down The Shah. Andropov had worked to convince his colleagues of this and they prepared to agree for support to be given to the Iranian communists, the Tudeh. Risk on this matter was something seen as of little concern and any fallout from failure would fall upon the Iranians themselves. Security of the Soviet state was at this time the only interest of the Politburo as they aimed to maintain the geo-political balance of power should Iran collapse into chaos.


August 1978:
The pendulum swung back the other way. The troubles across Iran restarted due to unconnected events creating a perfect storm for a month of violence. The government had cut spending and this had the affect of releasing many young men from employment who were angry and ripe for recruitment by extremists to express their anger. There were protests underway in the city of Isfahan over the detention of a local religious leader who attracted many of these new recruits to an element of the religious opposition not linked to Shariatmadari. Tudeh protests too gained some of the disaffected willing to cause trouble and ultimately give the communists a bigger role in the future of the country with numbers that couldn’t be ignored.

Then there came the cinema fire in Abadan. Over four hundred died when arson destroyed the building, a symbol of Western culture subverting Iranians, and killed those inside when the doors were locked. At once, the cries of deliberate murder of those inside by ‘agents of The Shah’ came from Khomeini: any suggestion that it was rather convenient for him and his cause apparently had no substance to it. He called for their vengeance from across in Iraq where his voice wasn’t just heard by the faithful there but fast spread by word of mouth and audio recordings into Iran. Those being corrupted by the ideas of the West were now martyrs.

Iran was getting a new government and The Shah had more focus on that. He brought in an old hand who at once cracked down on corruption and promised that there would be democracy: the people would prosper. Sanjabi and Shariatmadari were given more room to have influence by the new prime minister including on how and when elections should commence; once their ideas came to The Shah though, he wasn’t that sure and dithered over whether such things should be carried out.

Wonder if the Shah can hold on to power or he has to depart the country on board his 747 Jumbo Jet filled with gold as he did in OTL i heard.

[James G]

Feb 6, 2018 19:26:33 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 6, 2018 19:18:09 GMT James G said:

Wonder if the Shah can hold on to power or he has to depart the country on board his 747 Jumbo Jet filled with gold as he did in OTL i heard.

Maybe it will crash with the weight of the gold?

[lordroel]

Feb 6, 2018 20:28:30 GMT James G said:

Feb 6, 2018 19:26:33 GMT lordroel said:

Wonder if the Shah can hold on to power or he has to depart the country on board his 747 Jumbo Jet filled with gold as he did in OTL i heard.

Maybe it will crash with the weight of the gold?

Well do not know if that ever happened, heard it in the movie ARGO.

[James G]

Feb 6, 2018 20:30:39 GMT lordroel said:

Feb 6, 2018 20:28:30 GMT James G said:

Maybe it will crash with the weight of the gold?

Well do not know if that ever happened, heard it in the movie ARGO.

I know when he left, he left rich. Everywhere he went, his hosts tried to bleed him dry. Whether it went on the plane, I couldn't find out.

[lordroel]

Feb 7, 2018 9:44:02 GMT James G said:

Feb 6, 2018 20:30:39 GMT lordroel said:

Well do not know if that ever happened, heard it in the movie ARGO.

I know when he left, he left rich. Everywhere he went, his hosts tried to bleed him dry. Whether it went on the plane, I couldn't find out.

I can assume he had a big Swiss bank account.

[James G]

(4)

September 1978:
Summer heat, angry disadvantaged youngsters, long-standing widespread political discontent and agitators wanting a conflict with the forces of the state. Put them all together and what do you get? Answer: a country up in arms and revolution in the air.

The early part of the month saw a series of big marches in Tehran eventually turn violent as their daily presence caused an unauthorised use of force by the local commander in the city. The protesters were shouting for Khomeini, calling for his return from exile. A general disobeyed The Shah’s standing instructions that martial law didn’t mean what it did and had his men open fire when they ‘reacted’ to shots fired against them. They would call it Black Friday. As before, declaration would come afterwards inflating the numbers – Khomeini picked the number four thousand seemingly from the sky – but there had been a lot of killing done regardless of lies.

In response, more marches were planned to protest those deaths and The Shah reaffirmed his orders that they would be ignored so he could continue his process of talking with the opposition. As had been the case all year, this was done through intermediaries as The Shah was an ill man. That was hidden and those engaged in talks with his government were unaware of that. The problem was though that this would all be for naught because following Black Friday, there began the outbreak of strikes. First they were in the oil industry, export revenues which had made Iran rich, then among government workers. These were uncoordinated and only partially effective in the short-term: that wouldn’t be the case if they continued and there was a uniting of common cause.

Soviet interference in Iran’s affairs was now becoming significant. There were KGB spies watching Khomeini in Najaf – which Saddam knew about; he wanted to know what they knew as that was how the game of intelligence affairs was done – while the KGB had its locally-recruited network inside Iran expand and connect better with the Tudeh. Those communists weren’t Moscow-aligned (who needs perfection?) but they would do for now. Information was shared with them and weapons supplied: the latter being stolen Iranian ones, not direct Soviet arms.


October 1978:

President Ford had been most-displeased at the turn of events in Iran. He had been assured by the CIA and then Kissinger had given him an indication too – though the Secretary of State hadn’t committed himself there like Bush had – that the situation earlier in the year was getting better. Then it went worse than before. With revolution in Iran before being impossible and now looking possible, Ford was concerned. He met with his advisers and spoke with foreign leaders. There was consensus everywhere that things were doomed for The Shah but no one had ‘the answer’ to solve all of this. Contact with Iran’s leader itself was never the best too: the crazy man saw foreign conspiracies everywhere, especially from those whom had previously before interfered in Iranian affairs… like the United States. The inability to act in any meaningful way along with trying to deal with an unreasonable supposed ally frustrated the president.

The Shah declared an amnesty for exiles abroad, Khomeini included. No one in Iran seemed to care. He too ordered the army and the police not to break up strikers nationwide who were now coordinating despite geographical and political differences into a country-wide general strike. His latest idea was to wear them down. Concessions had been given to the opposition leaders and he believed that would satisfy them; with the strikers, they would go back to work soon… just because. Some of those strikers, like many of the unemployed, were joining with extremists though. There were also deserting soldiers: the Iranian Army was bleeding them, many who left with their weapons. Those extremist organisations growing in strength were religious radicals committed to the idea of Khomeini (his true motives not revealed) and the Tudeh. There were secular, constitutional and student groups as well, those opposed to the rule enforced by The Shah on principle and they were gaining support, yet nothing like the numbers of the preceding two. Opposition to Iran’s leader as multi-faceted and the only thing they had in common was to be rid of him. Supposedly keeping a check on all of this was the Iranian secret police. Where were they? The SAVAK had been hit with supposed reforms and been a political football that included a marked weakening of its previous power in some matters yet an unreasonable strengthening elsewhere. As with everything, The Shah was incapable of deciding anything firm on them and what he wanted from the SAVAK now.

Far away, unrelated to events in Iran, but with significance elsewhere to many, a new Pope was elected. The Polish national chosen to be the head of the Catholic Church after the unexpected death of his predecessor took the name John Paul II. His country was under Soviet Domination. He would want to do something about that in the future. The Soviet Union would later pay attention to him like they were with another religious leader at the moment: one being discussed much in Moscow.

[lordroel]

Feb 7, 2018 19:26:19 GMT James G said:

(4)

September 1978:
Summer heat, angry disadvantaged youngsters, long-standing widespread political discontent and agitators wanting a conflict with the forces of the state. Put them all together and what do you get? Answer: a country up in arms and revolution in the air.

The early part of the month saw a series of big marches in Tehran eventually turn violent as their daily presence caused an unauthorised use of force by the local commander in the city. The protesters were shouting for Khomeini, calling for his return from exile. A general disobeyed The Shah’s standing instructions that martial law didn’t mean what it did and had his men open fire when they ‘reacted’ to shots fired against them. They would call it Black Friday. As before, declaration would come afterwards inflating the numbers – Khomeini picked the number four thousand seemingly from the sky – but there had been a lot of killing done regardless of lies.

In response, more marches were planned to protest those deaths and The Shah reaffirmed his orders that they would be ignored so he could continue his process of talking with the opposition. As had been the case all year, this was done through intermediaries as The Shah was an ill man. That was hidden and those engaged in talks with his government were unaware of that. The problem was though that this would all be for naught because following Black Friday, there began the outbreak of strikes. First they were in the oil industry, export revenues which had made Iran rich, then among government workers. These were uncoordinated and only partially effective in the short-term: that wouldn’t be the case if they continued and there was a uniting of common cause.

Soviet interference in Iran’s affairs was now becoming significant. There were KGB spies watching Khomeini in Najaf – which Saddam knew about; he wanted to know what they knew as that was how the game of intelligence affairs was done – while the KGB had its locally-recruited network inside Iran expand and connect better with the Tudeh. Those communists weren’t Moscow-aligned (who needs perfection?) but they would do for now. Information was shared with them and weapons supplied: the latter being stolen Iranian ones, not direct Soviet arms.


October 1978:

President Ford had been most-displeased at the turn of events in Iran. He had been assured by the CIA and then Kissinger had given him an indication too – though the Secretary of State hadn’t committed himself there like Bush had – that the situation earlier in the year was getting better. Then it went worse than before. With revolution in Iran before being impossible and now looking possible, Ford was concerned. He met with his advisers and spoke with foreign leaders. There was consensus everywhere that things were doomed for The Shah but no one had ‘the answer’ to solve all of this. Contact with Iran’s leader itself was never the best too: the crazy man saw foreign conspiracies everywhere, especially from those whom had previously before interfered in Iranian affairs… like the United States. The inability to act in any meaningful way along with trying to deal with an unreasonable supposed ally frustrated the president.

The Shah declared an amnesty for exiles abroad, Khomeini included. No one in Iran seemed to care. He too ordered the army and the police not to break up strikers nationwide who were now coordinating despite geographical and political differences into a country-wide general strike. His latest idea was to wear them down. Concessions had been given to the opposition leaders and he believed that would satisfy them; with the strikers, they would go back to work soon… just because. Some of those strikers, like many of the unemployed, were joining with extremists though. There were also deserting soldiers: the Iranian Army was bleeding them, many who left with their weapons. Those extremist organisations growing in strength were religious radicals committed to the idea of Khomeini (his true motives not revealed) and the Tudeh. There were secular, constitutional and student groups as well, those opposed to the rule enforced by The Shah on principle and they were gaining support, yet nothing like the numbers of the preceding two. Opposition to Iran’s leader as multi-faceted and the only thing they had in common was to be rid of him. Supposedly keeping a check on all of this was the Iranian secret police. Where were they? The SAVAK had been hit with supposed reforms and been a political football that included a marked weakening of its previous power in some matters yet an unreasonable strengthening elsewhere. As with everything, The Shah was incapable of deciding anything firm on them and what he wanted from the SAVAK now.

Far away, unrelated to events in Iran, but with significance elsewhere to many, a new Pope was elected. The Polish national chosen to be the head of the Catholic Church after the unexpected death of his predecessor took the name John Paul II. His country was under Soviet Domination. He would want to do something about that in the future. The Soviet Union would later pay attention to him like they were with another religious leader at the moment: one being discussed much in Moscow.

I am not sure, is the Iranian Crisis/Revolution in Iran worse than OTL at this moment ore the same as we know it.

[James G]

Mostly the same, apart from a few things.

Khomeini has not be expelled from Iraq: he went to Paris where he had better connections with the world there in Europe, in this story he stays.
Inside Iran, the KGB has a relationship with the small Iranian communists: they didn't in the way it all went in RL. With this, The Shah always believed in foreign conspiracies to topple him (it happened to his father) and no one listened. Here there is the beginnings of a real one though he has always cried wolf before so no one will listen.

[lordroel]

Feb 7, 2018 19:40:42 GMT James G said:

Mostly the same, apart from a few things.

Khomeini has not be expelled from Iraq: he went to Paris where he had better connections with the world there in Europe, in this story he stays.
Inside Iran, the KGB has a relationship with the small Iranian communists: they didn't in the way it all went in RL. With this, The Shah always believed in foreign conspiracies to topple him (it happened to his father) and no one listened. Here there is the beginnings of a real one though he has always cried wolf before so no one will listen.

So i am starting to wonder, will we see a Soviet intervention in Iran instead of Afghanistan, but them much more bloodier, if one thing that is left for the Shah to have the Iranian people unite and support him is a Soviet Invasion.

[James G]

Yes but also no.
The Shah will depart but what will follow won't be as it went in the history books.
The answer to that shall come very soon: I'm just figuring out how it all goes.