Long-lasting WW3 in the 1980s?

[forcon]

I had an idea regarding a long-term WW3 in the 80's.

Say the Warsaw Pact mounts its offensive in autumn '85. They take Austria, Denmark, a good part of West Germany (though failing to reach the Rhine), some of Holland, and northern Italy; the Soviets successfully occupy Iran and destroy/capture the 82nd/101st Divisions; in Korea, the North Korean advance is halted only by the use of tactical nuclear weapons (with both sides being far more rational in regards to escalation than most people expect).

The Soviet offensive firmly runs out of steam there and then; NATO begins rebuilding its strength over winter and launches a counteroffensive in Spring of 86, liberating northern Italy, Austria, Holland and West Germany and driving to the Oder River before winter, when both sides dig in for round 3.

In the spring of 1987, NATO launches a second offensive aimed at Warsaw, with the intention of liberating all Warsaw Pact countries without setting foot on Soviet soil. NATO launches amphibious operations and uses Turkish and Greek troops to liberate Bulgaria and Romania, with the hole thing over by winter of 1988.

It was just an idea I had, given how most WW3 scenarios are quite short-lived.

[stevep]

Oct 10, 2018 9:13:24 GMT forcon said:

I had an idea regarding a long-term WW3 in the 80's.

Say the Warsaw Pact mounts its offensive in autumn '85. They take Austria, Denmark, a good part of West Germany (though failing to reach the Rhine), some of Holland, and northern Italy; the Soviets successfully occupy Iran and destroy/capture the 82nd/101st Divisions; in Korea, the North Korean advance is halted only by the use of tactical nuclear weapons (with both sides being far more rational in regards to escalation than most people expect).

The Soviet offensive firmly runs out of steam there and then; NATO begins rebuilding its strength over winter and launches a counteroffensive in Spring of 86, liberating northern Italy, Austria, Holland and West Germany and driving to the Oder River before winter, when both sides dig in for round 3.

In the spring of 1987, NATO launches a second offensive aimed at Warsaw, with the intention of liberating all Warsaw Pact countries without setting foot on Soviet soil. NATO launches amphibious operations and uses Turkish and Greek troops to liberate Bulgaria and Romania, with the hole thing over by winter of 1988.

It was just an idea I had, given how most WW3 scenarios are quite short-lived.

  Its definitely a possibility although it may take a bit longer for the NATO forces to gain the initiative and go onto the offensive given how much higher military production is in the eastern bloc.  At least unless the war is so bloody for the Soviets and their 'allies' that their sizeable manpower advantage in ready troops has basically been destroyed.  Otherwise its likely to be a couple of years before the west's larger total manpower pool is actually trained and suitably equipped with new weapons.  Very likely both sides will have to take a pause to replace both manpower losses and also build up stockpiles of munitions as their likely to be consumed far more rapidly than most expect and also than peacetime replenisment rates.  Even the biggest army with the best weapons is impotent if those weapons have no bullets/shells etc.  Especially since for the west those centres in Europe are likely to suffer direct or indirect disruption from Soviet air/missile attacks and anything in N America, while more secure has to be transported across the Atlantic.  [Or Pacific in the case of Japan, S Korea or anywhere else siding with the western powers there.]

  The other point is at what point either side decides its lost enough and says "no further" with a threat of nuclear attack if that warning isn't heeded?  Because neither side is likely to ignore such a threat if they think the other's serious as the risks of escalation to full scale number war is too great.  It could be that the Soviets will accept the failure of their attack and a return to the pre-war status quo but be unwilling to accept the loss of their buffer zone of satellites and unless say there's massive unrest in some of those states being bloodily suppressed I'm doubtful that the western powers would be willing to push beyond that point.

[forcon]

I was thinking of some sort of rebellion in Poland or something, so that NATO advanced up to the USSR border, but no further than that. Industry in wartime would certainly be an issue throughout Europe

[lordroel]

Oct 11, 2018 13:48:45 GMT forcon said:

I was thinking of some sort of rebellion in Poland or something, so that NATO advanced up to the USSR border, but no further than that. Industry in wartime would certainly be an issue throughout Europe

I think if NATO gets to close to the Soviet Union then I can assume the will get very nervous.

[stevep]

Oct 11, 2018 13:52:44 GMT lordroel said:

Oct 11, 2018 13:48:45 GMT forcon said:

I was thinking of some sort of rebellion in Poland or something, so that NATO advanced up to the USSR border, but no further than that. Industry in wartime would certainly be an issue throughout Europe

I think if NATO gets to close to the Soviet Union then I can assume the will get very nervous.

  That would be the issue.  If after a long and bloody convention/chemical period the allies are pushing the Soviets back toward the pre-war borders, then say large scale unrest/rebellions in say E Germany and/or Poland occurred then NATO would want to liberate those territories, both to protect the rebels and to seriously weaken the Soviets so they pose less of a threat in the future.  However if Moscow declares that NATO forces crossing the IGB [Inner German Border between East and West Germany] what does NATO do?  Push on and risk a nuclear strike which might escalate to a full scale strategic exchange or restrict themselves to say reaching the IGB and offering refuge to any people who can escape from the eastern bloc?  Very difficult question and I don't know any way we can tell what the leaders of the time might do.  I don't know what my response would be in that situation, no matter how much my inner feelings would be to push on for a liberation of such areas.

[James G]

Something to consider here in terms of a conflict that long: initial stocks of war supplies.
Information I have read says that in the late 80s, NATO forces had very limited numbers of stored munitions: bullets, shells and bombs. The offical figures were apparently 28 days for the US (in Europe and at home) and West Germany, 14 days for the UK and France, and 7 to ten days for others from Canada to Holland. Thing about that. A month or only weeks of stored weapons to fight with. Israel's war in 1973 and the Gulf War in 1991 showed the failing of munitions expenditure predictions. Government officials and army officers also had different ideas on what a stock should hold.
NATO assumed that the Soviets had a month's worth of supply in East Germany: the assumption based on what they (well the US) had so the Soviets must have the same. In wartime, they could cut the supply links back east with air power and also hope for a Polish revolt.
The problem was that upon German reunification, NATO discovered that the Soviets had 90 days - three months - worth of war supplies inside East Germany, let alone more that was at home. The Germans were still blowing it all up in 2000 because the Soviets left so much behind: they took their tanks and guns but left shells and bombs.
In a straight up war, based on weapons use, the Soviets win pretty fast because they have the munitions on hand and NATO doesn't know this.
The trick would be for a war to occur say right before winter and bad weather where NATO manages to hold on until the New Year when domestic weapons production will ramp up.
Otherwise it is Soviet troops in Paris or nukes all round.

[stevep]

Oct 11, 2018 19:30:28 GMT James G said:

Something to consider here in terms of a conflict that long: initial stocks of war supplies.
Information I have read says that in the late 80s, NATO forces had very limited numbers of stored munitions: bullets, shells and bombs. The offical figures were apparently 28 days for the US (in Europe and at home) and West Germany, 14 days for the UK and France, and 7 to ten days for others from Canada to Holland. Thing about that. A month or only weeks of stored weapons to fight with. Israel's war in 1973 and the Gulf War in 1991 showed the failing of munitions expenditure predictions. Government officials and army officers also had different ideas on what a stock should hold.
NATO assumed that the Soviets had a month's worth of supply in East Germany: the assumption based on what they (well the US) had so the Soviets must have the same. In wartime, they could cut the supply links back east with air power and also hope for a Polish revolt.
The problem was that upon German reunification, NATO discovered that the Soviets had 90 days - three months - worth of war supplies inside East Germany, let alone more that was at home. The Germans were still blowing it all up in 2000 because the Soviets left so much behind: they took their tanks and guns but left shells and bombs.
In a straight up war, based on weapons use, the Soviets win pretty fast because they have the munitions on hand and NATO doesn't know this.
The trick would be for a war to occur say right before winter and bad weather where NATO manages to hold on until the New Year when domestic weapons production will ramp up.
Otherwise it is Soviet troops in Paris or nukes all round.

  Ouch.  I was assuming both sides would run out pretty much at the same time so there would be a pause before they manufractured new stockpiles for use, a bit like in WWI.  However that does sound grim for the allies.  Even if they had managed to fight off the 1st couple of waves of Soviet forces [say because modern weapons and NATO tactics proved very effective] following on waves would probably have overwhelmed the defenders simply because they ran out of ammo.  Then as you say it depends on whether the Soviets call the French/NATO bluff on nukes and whether its a bluff or not.

[mullauna]

What does world culture look like during and after the war, even *without* nukes? How does Hollywood react, forex?

[James G]

Oct 11, 2018 22:22:51 GMT stevep said:

Oct 11, 2018 19:30:28 GMT James G said:

Something to consider here in terms of a conflict that long: initial stocks of war supplies.
Information I have read says that in the late 80s, NATO forces had very limited numbers of stored munitions: bullets, shells and bombs. The offical figures were apparently 28 days for the US (in Europe and at home) and West Germany, 14 days for the UK and France, and 7 to ten days for others from Canada to Holland. Thing about that. A month or only weeks of stored weapons to fight with. Israel's war in 1973 and the Gulf War in 1991 showed the failing of munitions expenditure predictions. Government officials and army officers also had different ideas on what a stock should hold.
NATO assumed that the Soviets had a month's worth of supply in East Germany: the assumption based on what they (well the US) had so the Soviets must have the same. In wartime, they could cut the supply links back east with air power and also hope for a Polish revolt.
The problem was that upon German reunification, NATO discovered that the Soviets had 90 days - three months - worth of war supplies inside East Germany, let alone more that was at home. The Germans were still blowing it all up in 2000 because the Soviets left so much behind: they took their tanks and guns but left shells and bombs.
In a straight up war, based on weapons use, the Soviets win pretty fast because they have the munitions on hand and NATO doesn't know this.
The trick would be for a war to occur say right before winter and bad weather where NATO manages to hold on until the New Year when domestic weapons production will ramp up.
Otherwise it is Soviet troops in Paris or nukes all round.

  Ouch.  I was assuming both sides would run out pretty much at the same time so there would be a pause before they manufractured new stockpiles for use, a bit like in WWI.  However that does sound grim for the allies.  Even if they had managed to fight off the 1st couple of waves of Soviet forces [say because modern weapons and NATO tactics proved very effective] following on waves would probably have overwhelmed the defenders simply because they ran out of ammo.  Then as you say it depends on whether the Soviets call the French/NATO bluff on nukes and whether its a bluff or not.

And NATO would just keep assuming up until they were defeated that any minute now the Soviets would run out bullets & bombs!
Perhaps, NATO bombing in Poland or a revolt could stop the second and third waves of troops but that would be hard to do.

A count of mine of numbers of available Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions put the number at 120~ compared to maybe as many as 50 for NATO if they threw everything in. Those Soviet forces included all their A/B/C formations west of the Urals (not including below the Caucasus or in the Leningrad MD), not unmanned reserve units: the same with the Eastern Euros. The NATO ones would be unmanned reserve formations to get them that high. When WarPac forces moved into battle, each was a heavy division too. Half of those NATO divisions - which I include the French who do - will not have a tank contingent to them. The WarPac ones have a TOE of two hundred tanks for a motor rifle division, three hundred for a tank division. The lower-readiness units may take a month or so to get to the fight and turn up with old T-54/55s but if NATO troops have nothing to fire at them and only have bayonets then those tanks are gods of the battlefield and will be going to Paris.