Eagle Guardian: The War of 2010

[forcon]

Ten

Resistance to the government returned to Russia’s streets in the early summer of 2009. The events of 11-26 had temporarily quelled the original protest movement, as dozens were left dead or dying on the streets of Moscow and St Petersburg. Despite the fact that the movement had begun to resurface in spring, it was quickly dubbed the ‘Autumn Movement’ as homage to those killed in November of last year. What caused the emergence of the movement was debatable, as many western analysts had written off the anti-Medvedev and anti-Putin crusade as a lost cause. The decline in living standards that had resulted from western sanctions imposed on Russia drove people to the streets in flocks, as queues began appearing outside supermarkets. Scenes that resembled the days of the Soviet Union were commonplace in Russian cities as oil prices plummeted. The Russian economy was in tatters both from trade sanctions and from the sharp decline in oil revenues. The effects of the financial crash of last year also took their toll on Russia just like they did the rest of the world. There was little hope of Russia ever being able to attain a significant loan from western powers given their sanctions, and Moscow was hesitant to put itself in China’s debt.

This time, when protestors took to the streets, they were met not by the MVD but by members of the Special Purpose Police Unit, or OMON, who whilst being renound for their brutality, were armed more like policemen than like soldiers. The long, shuffling lines of chanting dissenters were watched eagerly by members of OMON, but there was little violence. Of course, as in every protest, there were scuffles and clashes, even brutal beatings by OMON policemen, but there was no shooting. Troops and policemen on duty in Russian cities were under strict orders not to repeat the terrible events of last November, and Moscow couldn’t afford the poor publicity of another massacre. The protestors – or at least a significant amount of them – wanted nothing less than the resignation of the government and a new general election, one which would be free, fair, and untampered with by the FSB.

On the other hand, the Russian government was desperate to stop that from happening. The security apparatus of Russia was practically an extension of Medvedev and Putin’s power, a tool of repression rather than an apolitical force of national defence. Although the relationship between the Russian President and Prime Minister was beginning to crack, the security forces continued to act on behalf of the President, clashing with the protestors on a daily basis in cities like Moscow. The FSB and the Militsiya continued to make arrests related to the Autumn Movement, as hundreds of senior figures were detained. For many, this would be their third or fourth arrest on charges related to civil unrest. Many had faced fines or only minor jail sentences after being arrested in the violence back in October and November, and by now they were fully able to take to the streets, requiring them to be detained again on similar charges, resulting in a cycle of protest-arrest-release and so on.

Some in the Kremlin, and more outspokenly in the Russian Parliament, wanted to go all the way and put T-72s onto the streets to annihilate the crowds, though these suggestions were dismissed out of hand by President Medvedev. The Russian president himself was fast becoming one of the least popular Russian leaders in history – discounting Czar Nicholas II that was! – and even members of his own security establishment were beginning to doubt his wisdom. The popularity achieved by his victorious war with Georgia had been squandered by the slaughter on 11-26, and by the ongoing corruption within the ranks of the Russian establishment. Even with the use of intense, public violence he had failed to crush the beginnings of the Autumn Movement and, in the eyes of many, Medvedev himself had allowed the efforts of the protestors to grow completely out of hand.

There were others from around the world who were also monitoring the situation; spies.

The intelligence services of many countries were actively observing the ongoing trouble in Russia. The CIA & MI6, along with China’s lesser-known Ministry of State Security, all had a vested interest in the region, albeit for vastly different reasons. The Chinese were very worried by what they saw taking place. There was a large and effective protest movement in the northern neighbour that had failed to allow itself to be crushed even when confronted with all the firepower that the state had at its disposal. Tiananmen Square was still fresh in the minds of many in Beijing, and although those ghastly events had caused huge trouble for China internationally, the protests had been crushed in the end by brute force; what was going on in Russia told Beijing that perhaps force might not be enough to hold onto power in the event of such civil unrest taking place in China.

Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service worked closely with the CIA. Both the U.S. and Britain carried out intelligence operations from their embassies in Moscow and from their consulates dotted around smaller cities across Russia. Intelligence officers operated mostly under diplomatic cover, either as cultural and military attaches, and although their jobs could occasionally contain the odd moment of danger, there was little risk to their safety in general. Should any of these officers be arrested while attempting to conduct espionage activities, they would likely simply be deported back to their home countries and declared persona non grata. American and British intelligence officers eagerly examined and studied the current situation. Neither the United States nor its NATO allies were actively participating in activities to support the protests, but nonetheless, D.C. and London wanted to know what was likely to happen. After all, Russia was a nuclear power with a million-man army and a massive arsenal of conventional firepower. If the country was about to collapse or undergo a sudden, violent change of government, then the west wanted to know about it before it happened. Intelligence was gained both by human sources inside Russia, individuals who talked to western intelligence agencies sometimes voluntarily, sometimes due to blackmail or coercion, and other times due to copious amounts of thick brown envelopes filled with cash. Some of these sources were in the military and others were in the civil service. Some were within the Autumn Movement itself. President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton received frequent briefings from CIA Director Panetta, which often focused on the violence in Russia and the massive number of ‘arbitrary arrests’ being carried out by the Russian security forces.

The West wanted to know more about the specifics of how the Autumn Movement planned to achieve its goals. The CIA’s Moscow Station was ordered to achieve this, with its methods of doing so left up to the officers’ own discretion. Soon, the CIA was able to establish contact with a Russian television presenter Leonid Parfyonov, a notable figure in the Autumn Movement. Parfyonov served as the editor of Russky Newsweek, one of Russia’s more open-minded newspapers, before going on to serve as the presenter of a cultural news television show, Namedni. He had spoken against the repression at protests both in the autumn of 2008 and in late spring and early summer of 2009. To meet with Parfyonov directly could in hindsight have been seen as a serious error on the part of the CIA officers involved, but it was felt that a direct conversation between senior American officials stationed in Moscow and a high-ranking figure in the Autumn Movement would help the U.S. better understand the events in Russia. Parfyonov was not a spy or a traitor; he did not even know that those he was meeting with were in the employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. He was told they were members of a political delegation from Georgetown University, in Moscow to write a report on the ongoing unrest.

Leonid Parfyonov met with the American officials in a rented hotel room in Moscow. None of it was particularly clandestine or movie-like. There was something of a ‘James Bond moment’ when CIA personnel swept the room for bugs, finding nothing, but that was that. American intelligence officers weren’t in the habit of running around Moscow waving handguns around or doing anything of that sort. Together, they discussed what the Autumn Movement actually hoped to achieve and how it planned to do so. Parfyonov informed his American colleagues that leaders of the movement wanted to escalate their movement from protests to a general strike, but for this they would need the participating of the factory and dockyard workers, the working class who were typically somewhat older that many of the protestors, as the Autumn Movement was formed largely of idealistic middle class millennials in their teens and twenties.

The Federal Security Service had been watching all of this take place. Though they couldn’t listen in on what was being said, agents of the FSB had followed Parfyonov from his home to his meeting place with the Americans. He had been a person of interest in the authorities’ effort to keep a lid on the Autumn Movement for several weeks now, and by the time of his meeting with the Americans, which took place at the beginning of May, he was under constant surveillance. The Americans had worried about this but it was ultimately decided that it was unlikely the FSB would have the resources to track Parfyonov everywhere he went when there were far bigger fish to fry. The head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, reported to President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin that personnel from the American embassy long since suspected of being CIA officers had been with a known Russian television personality and journalist named Parfyonov, and that this individual was a senior figure in the Autumn Movement. This was proof to the Kremlin that the United States was playing at least some part in the unrest. Why, they asked? Were the Americans attempting to orchestrate a full-scale colour revolution in Moscow? Without more information, they could only speculate.

[hussar01]

As a side observation of my Russia trip in 2017. Maybe an element you can use as to the political game Putin is playing in Russia. He is fostering positive memories of two seemingly opposing sides. On one hand he is really working hard on celebrating the role of the Romanovs in history financing various church and other historical places, palaces, and events connected to keeping the memory of the Romanovs alive and such fostering the Romanovs and the role they made Russia great while making sure no living Romanovs appear anywhere. And then on the opposite specter he is lifitng up and celebrating the role of Stalin especialy in WW2 and his making Russia great. And the result is that those Russians that hate Stalin love Putin because of the Romanov slant and those that hate the Romanovs and celebrate the revolution love him for making Stalin great again. He is going so far as to add the name hero city to any city involved in the Soviet War effort. For example when a train approaches a station in such a city or town, the announce it with "Now approaching the Hero City Vladimira" or "the next station is Hero City Nizhny Novgorod." Another observation is almost every Russian I met hates China. They even favor Americans if compared to anything Chinese. And then culturaly. Even though I live in Europe, I noticed more American fast food joints in Russia in terms of brands then even almost in London. I mean they have a Big Boy just a few meters from Red Square and Krispy Kreme donut joints. Not many Hooters in Europe, but yup even one in Moscow not far from....drum roll please.... Lubyanka FSB HQ. My two cents on just a little bit I observed there. And one final observation. Russians favorite food is Georgian food. Take it for whatever it means.

[James G]

Jan 12, 2019 17:22:50 GMT hussar01 said:

As a side observation of my Russia trip in 2017. Maybe an element you can use as to the political game Putin is playing in Russia. He is fostering positive memories of two seemingly opposing sides. On one hand he is really working hard on celebrating the role of the Romanovs in history financing various church and other historical places, palaces, and events connected to keeping the memory of the Romanovs alive and such fostering the Romanovs and the role they made Russia great while making sure no living Romanovs appear anywhere. And then on the opposite specter he is lifitng up and celebrating the role of Stalin especialy in WW2 and his making Russia great. And the result is that those Russians that hate Stalin love Putin because of the Romanov slant and those that hate the Romanovs and celebrate the revolution love him for making Stalin great again. He is going so far as to add the name hero city to any city involved in the Soviet War effort. For example when a train approaches a station in such a city or town, the announce it with "Now approaching the Hero City Vladimira" or "the next station is Hero City Nizhny Novgorod." Another observation is almost every Russian I met hates China. They even favor Americans if compared to anything Chinese. And then culturaly. Even though I live in Europe, I noticed more American fast food joints in Russia in terms of brands then even almost in London. I mean they have a Big Boy just a few meters from Red Square and Krispy Kreme donut joints. Not many Hooters in Europe, but yup even one in Moscow not far from....drum roll please.... Lubyanka FSB HQ. My two cents on just a little bit I observed there. And one final observation. Russians favorite food is Georgian food. Take it for whatever it means.

Thank you for this.
It is something I found interesting as a view of Russia. There is only so much myself and Forcon can get from afar: a personal view helps a lot.
Putin will take his country to war - though not see things in black-and-white - and we have discussed his mental state in doing so. This helps in explaining how some of what is done might be sold to the Russian people by his regime when in desperate straits.

[forcon]

Jan 12, 2019 19:35:38 GMT James G said:

Jan 12, 2019 17:22:50 GMT hussar01 said:

As a side observation of my Russia trip in 2017. Maybe an element you can use as to the political game Putin is playing in Russia. He is fostering positive memories of two seemingly opposing sides. On one hand he is really working hard on celebrating the role of the Romanovs in history financing various church and other historical places, palaces, and events connected to keeping the memory of the Romanovs alive and such fostering the Romanovs and the role they made Russia great while making sure no living Romanovs appear anywhere. And then on the opposite specter he is lifitng up and celebrating the role of Stalin especialy in WW2 and his making Russia great. And the result is that those Russians that hate Stalin love Putin because of the Romanov slant and those that hate the Romanovs and celebrate the revolution love him for making Stalin great again. He is going so far as to add the name hero city to any city involved in the Soviet War effort. For example when a train approaches a station in such a city or town, the announce it with "Now approaching the Hero City Vladimira" or "the next station is Hero City Nizhny Novgorod." Another observation is almost every Russian I met hates China. They even favor Americans if compared to anything Chinese. And then culturaly. Even though I live in Europe, I noticed more American fast food joints in Russia in terms of brands then even almost in London. I mean they have a Big Boy just a few meters from Red Square and Krispy Kreme donut joints. Not many Hooters in Europe, but yup even one in Moscow not far from....drum roll please.... Lubyanka FSB HQ. My two cents on just a little bit I observed there. And one final observation. Russians favorite food is Georgian food. Take it for whatever it means.

Thank you for this.
It is something I found interesting as a view of Russia. There is only so much myself and Forcon can get from afar: a personal view helps a lot.
Putin will take his country to war - though not see things in black-and-white - and we have discussed his mental state in doing so. This helps in explaining how some of what is done might be sold to the Russian people by his regime when in desperate straits.

I second what James said. Thanks for this info. I did figure that Putin would play on pro-Soviet nationalism and I remembered some vaguely pro-Stalin commentary from him, but nothing like this; we can certainly use it in later updates.

Speaking of which, another update will be coming from James tonight, then tomorrow from me. Things are starting to heat up!

[James G]

Eleven

The obsession which came from the Kremlin during mid-2009 about locating evidence of the Western-backed conspiracy to bring about a colour revolution in Russia was compared by many members of the siloviki (the men of force; those within the security establishment who’d risen to power and prominence) to that of Operation RYAN conducted in the early Eighties by the KGB. These were men who knew their history. In their mind, the times may have been different but the paranoia was all the same. Under Andropov’s leadership of the then Soviet Union, there had been a hunt to find evidence of the intention of the West to launch a surprise nuclear attack: deemed RYAN at the time. Andropov had been convinced that the West was planning to do so and demanded that the KGB provide evidence of that. The situation in 2009 was that Putin believed that the West was about to deliver regime change in Russia – as they had done elsewhere in the ‘near abroad’ (former USSR states) – and demanded that that evidence then be found to support that. Other current siloviki, those younger ones whom hadn’t served within the KGB but solely in its successor organisations, saw parallels with the situation which the Bush Administration in the United States had been in during its early years where the political will stated that Iraq under Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and so America’s spies were sent to find evidence of that to please their political masters.

The opinions of these people were kept to themselves. The many siloviki enjoyed the privilege of power that they had. Rocking the boat was never a good idea: one only had to look at the bodies of those who had done such a thing beforehand. Alexander Litvinenko was one of those and see what had happened to him? Moreover, that view that it was all paranoia reminiscent of the Eighties was a minority opinion within the ranks of the all-prevalent siloviki. Information was coming to light that Putin was right and this only confirmed the views that many had that once again, the Rodina was targeted by foreign conspiracies. The evidence of this came and it was concrete.


The FSB was the largest and most-influential of the KGB successor organisations yet that didn’t mean that the others were impotent. In second place was the SVR: Russia’s foreign intelligence arm. It was they who sent agents all over the world on espionage and intelligence-gathering duties where they operated with non-diplomatic cover and often faced great danger. The most-recent former director of the SVR, Sergey Lebedev, a close colleague of Putin’s when the two of them served with the KGB in East Germany, had stated that ‘there has not been any place on the planet where a KGB officer has not been’. This senior figure in the siloviki made that remark when talking about the history of the former organisation which he had served in though during his tenure as SVR head (from 2000 until 2007), Lebedev had sent his officers all over the globe. His successor was Mikhail Fradkov, a former prime minister and, on the face of it, not a member of the siloviki. Fradkov was a former intelligence operative though: he just had never been properly exposed. In the tradition of the KGB, and following in the footsteps of what Lebedev had done, Fradkov sent the SVR’s intelligence operatives aboard far and wide.

One of those was a Sparrow, a ‘well-trained’ young woman, sent in April 2008 to meet with a bed-hopping congressman and gain some pillow talk from him. Representative Anthony Weiner had a steady girlfriend despite his ‘adventures’ with any woman he could convince to share his bed and she, Huma Abedin, was one of the closest aides to the then Democratic presidential contender Hillary Clinton. The pillow talk concerned how Abedin used her email a lot, a private set up connected to the presidential race, in conjunction with campaign work and this sparked the SVR’s interest. That interest was followed up after Clinton lost that primary campaign yet remained in the spotlight especially once Obama nominated her for that leading role in his incoming administration.

Back in early January this year, an SVR team had gone to a small town in New York state called Chappaqua. They had gained access – false identification and a lot of trickery had been employed to get past all the security – to the basement of the building which former President Bill Clinton and the then Senator Clinton had designated as their main home. They weren’t planting a bomb or plotting an assassination; such things weren’t even discussed in hypotheticals back in Moscow. Instead, they accessed the computers located in that basement as they were being set up there. A private email server – mail.clintonemail.com, operating on the Microsoft Outlook service – was run from those computers and accessed by the Clintons plus so many of their extended entourage in both official and non-official roles. There was now a tap on the communications of the incoming Secretary of State where she used this set up (and so did many of her appointed staff at the State Department) to exchange information. Everything which was sent over the server, including countless emails used the Blackberry smartphone often seen in her hands, was sent via a long and complicated chain back to the SVR.

A lot of what the SVR received at first was a load of rubbish: boring political stuff. However, there were soon secrets being sent though which the SVR had access to concerning her duties as Secretary of State. Once Putin instructed Fradkov to have the SVR find evidence of the West plotting to see regime change done in Moscow via a colour revolution, the information coming from Chappaqua become stuff of great importance.


Presented to Putin in June by Fradkov personally was a ton of ‘evidence’ that the West, but Clinton in particular, was plotting that colour revolution to depose the current Kremlin leadership. It was all there. Obama was letting her do this while he focused on his medical insurance bill going through Congress and she was working with people such as Sarkozy in Paris and Miliband in London to see this done. What Putin was told was framed in the manner which Fradkov decided that Putin wanted to hear. There was no dissenting opinion giving a different interpretation of the contents of these emails. That didn’t necessarily mean that it wasn’t true: it was just a case of there being no option presented that it wasn’t all confirmed. Worse than that though, an even more dastardly scheme was being drawn up by the nefarious Clinton: she had offered the hand of friendship to Medvedev (while plotting this simultaneous colour revolution too!) behind Putin’s back and Medvedev hadn’t slapped that hand away.

Using a conduit, Clinton had offered Russia a way out of its current financial predicament and thus the resulting issues which came with that. This could be done by Medvedev ‘fully taking the reins of power for himself’. The evidence was there in those intercepted emails of this offer being recently made. The Americans were trying a carrot-and-stick approach (the carrot being the hand of friendship; the stick being supporting a revolution) when it came to their interference in internal Russian affairs. Medvedev had yet to make a response. But, and crucially but, he had said nothing about this to Putin or anyone else. Putin had put Medvedev into the position which he held. Medvedev owed him everything. They had disputed things last year concerning the ceasefire with the Russo-Georgia war which Medvedev had arranged with Sarkozy and there had come other disagreements between them when it came to dealing with the protesters on the streets of Russia’s cities… yet this was something far different from those divergencies in opinions.

Medvedev was clearly stewing over the possibility of betraying Putin. Now Putin knew all about that.

[James G]

"but her emails!!!!!!!!!!"
Yes, I know. However, senior figures - Mike Hayden, Bob Gates among them - have said that they could have been hacked with Hayden stating that he would 'lose respect' for foreign intelligence agencies if they hadn't been hacking Clinton's emails.

[hussar01]

Medvedev about to star in his own version of the films Final Destination. Another observation from one of my tour guides. On the topic of oligarchs, a former husband of one of out trou guides who used to work for a security service "left" to go work for Abramovich. In between the lines he was a goverment handler of Abramovich. All oligarchs have handlers who over see their activities. He appeared to be usefull and was given a job with real responsibilites. All Russian oligarchs have FSB handlers who oversee them. The oligarchs do not hide their wealth in Russia, it is quite visible in Moscow. Moscow is a very white city. But all the dirty jobs like road construction, street sweeping and such are done by people from the 'Stans. The youth are very orientated towards the west but are quite nationalistic.

[forcon]

Interesting, thanks for this info. And yup, Medvedev had better watch his back.

Next update in an hour or two.

[forcon]

Twelve

As Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin’s duties included the signing of acts imposed by the government, and the reporting to the State Duma of government activities. However, following the end of his own first term as President of Russia, Putin had taken a much more hands-on role in the governing of the nation. He was present at virtually every one of Medvedev’s meetings with his security staff, and Putin, as a former KGB officer, would not hesitate to offer Medvedev his own personal advice. This had gone further in the wake of the Georgia War and the subsequent internal unrest that was being witnessed across Russia over the end of 2008 and sporadically throughout 2009. The crackdown and the events of 11-26 had been ordered personally by President Medvedev, but only after Putin had advised him to send in the MVD, to show the protestors that the government meant business. Putin had wanted it to be done more discretely though, with more actions taken by the Federal Security Service to prevent everything that happened from ending up on CNN. If Putin had his way, the FSB would have had foreign journalists deported and the MVD would have been given the authority to jam cell phone signals. Some had even suggested that internet access be shut off to prevent the posting of ‘anti-government propaganda’ online. None of these suggestions were heeded though, and as a result, Russia was under sanctions and isolated from much of the international community.

Medvedev could have fired Putin, in theory. It was his prerogative as the President to appoint and relieve the Prime Minister. That wasn’t possible in practice though. Everybody new that Medvedev was no more than a placeholder for Putin’s return to the presidency. In recent months, President Medvedev had tried to become more than that though. He was ultimately responsible for the decisions he made, and although he received plenty of ‘advice’ from Putin in his capacity as Prime Minister, Medvedev was beginning to act much more independently. There came further disagreements between Medvedev and Putin soon enough. When the FSB had discovered what could only be described as solid evidence of collusion between the leaders of the Autumn Movement and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Russian President was hesitant to take action. How much clearer could it be? Putin had asked his superior, after the Director of the FSB had shown the two men photographic evidence of a meeting between American intelligence officers and a leading figure in the protest movement. On the heels of this event came the revelations from the SVR that Medvedev was preparing to betray Putin. What would he do after that, the security establishment in Moscow wondered? Accede to the demands of the Autumn Movement? Resign and allow weak-willed liberals to take power? There would be an election in two years’ time, Putin new, and he would take power again. By then though it would be too late. If the unrest went on, and if Medvedev was allowed to remain in his post as President, it would only be a matter of time before United Russia was ousted from the Kremlin and its members dragged through the streets.

Prime Minister Putin had decided that Medvedev had to go. Putin was not alone in his conviction that the current President was far too weak to stop what was happening. Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov had previously been a Medvedev ally. The director of the state security apparatus had to be an ally of the political leadership. That was how things worked around the world, not just in Russia. However, since the events of 11-26, Bortnikov had become increasingly disillusioned with Medvedev’s regime. It wasn’t the loss of life that had taken place on that fateful day that had shifted Bortnikov’s support away from the President, but rather the public and visible manor in which it was done, and the subsequent increase in sanctions from the west. In addition, Medvedev’s apparent impotence when it came to taking action against hostile foreign powers who were attempting nothing less than the seizure of the Russian government drove Bortnikov into Putin’s fold.

Over the summer of 2009, both men began plotting a series of actions that could be taken against Medvedev. This was all being done to ensure the survival of the Russian State in the face of the gravest threat to the nation since 1941. At least, that was what Putin and Bortnikov told themselves and others who were brought into the plot. General Nikolai Makarov was the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. That made him the de jure head of the Russian Military. General Makarov was less politically inclined that either Putin or Bortnikov. He was a soldier through-and-through, and his ultimate duty was to the state. The state, and not any individual politician. That was how the Chief of the General Staff was sounded out and then accepted into the coup plot. He was asked whether his duty to the state and to the nation superseded his duty to any individual, and when he answered to the affirmative, Putin and Bortnikov informed him of their plans. He responded positively, announcing that he would indeed take part in the effort to subvert and if necessary remove President Medvedev from power. Finally, another military figure was brought in. Colonel-General Valery Gerasimov held something of a personal political loyalty to Putin, and in addition to that, as the head of the Moscow Military District, he had witnessed the 11-26 atrocity and had been enraged by the failure of Medvedev to keep a lid on the whole thing. Plans were drafted and re-drafted, and a variety of different options were suggested. There was talk of placing Medvedev under house arrest or forcing him to flee into exile. Blackmailing or otherwise coercing the President into resigning was also a possibility that was floated, but when it came down to it, all of these plans had flaws. Even if Medvedev could be persuaded to resign or flee the country, he would still be able to subvert the new government from abroad. General Nikolai Makarov initially wanted to have his troops seize Moscow and arrest Medvedev, but even then this would leave Medvedev alive, if imprisoned, and from there he might be able to tell the truth to the Russian people. No, it was decided; President Medvedev had to die. It was the only way of saving Russia. A plan to kill Medvedev and seize the reins of power was ordered to be put into effect.

By October 2009, Operation THUNDERBOLT was ready.

*

As scheduled, on the morning of October 9th, 2009, President Dmitri Medvedev boarded the presidential IL-96-300 aircraft and flew to Vladivostok International Airport. This trip was for the purpose of visiting Russian navy bases in Primorsky Krai. Really it was a photoshoot opportunity for Medvedev; the chance to look tough while standing on warships and shaking hands with the hard-charging admirals of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Serving as Medvedev’s protection on this trip was the Presidential Security Service, itself a part of the larger Federal Security Service. After landing at Vladivostok, Medvedev would have to travel by car to the city itself. The Presidential Security Service had discussed flying Medvedev there by helicopter, but that option was shut down quickly enough. A four-vehicle convoy left Vladivostok International Airport shortly after the President had landed. There were two limousines – one carrying the Russian President and one as a decoy – along with three SUV’s carrying armed bodyguards of the Federal Security Service in the convoy. There was a lot of firepower there, but it wouldn’t be enough to stop what would happen next. The convoy had been directed to take the scenic route to Vladivostok, driving through the largely desolate countryside rather than taking a more urban course.

Waiting in ambush were members of the FSB’s ruthless Spetsnaz unit known as Alpha Group.

Since its inception in the 1970s, Alpha Group had taken part in a great many operations on behalf of the FSB and its Soviet predecessor, the KGB. The unit was highly covert and little information was available about its activities. In 1979, Alpha Group members had been involved in the assassination of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin during the initial hours of the Soviet invasion of that country. Its operators had stormed Amin’s palace and mercilessly gunned him down, along with anybody else they came across. Furthermore, in the 1980s the unit had served continuously in Afghanistan throughout its occupation, and also in Beirut, where it gained a similar reputation for ruthlessness amongst Islamist terrorist groups. After the Soviet Union fell, Alpha Group operators had once again faced trial-by-fire in the ruins of Grozny and in other locations across the rebellious province of Chechnya. Today, though, members of Alpha Group were going to be conducting an entirely different operation. As Medvedev’s convoy trundled down winding country roads, THUNDERBOLT began. The SUV at the head of the convoy suddenly exploded with a colossal boom, sending flaming shards of shrapnel flying. All four agents in the car died instantly. However well-trained Medvedev’s security guards were, it still took them a couple of seconds to react to the shock of the sudden explosion. Training dictated that in the event of a vehicle ambush, one should never stop, but rather should speed up and get out of the ambush zone. The burning body of the armoured SUV blocked the road though, preventing the convoy from pushing onwards. The vehicle had been destroyed by a shoulder-fired anti-tank missile launched by an Alpha Group soldier hidden in the trees that stood beside the road. A second operator fired off another missile seconds later which obliterated the rear vehicle. Though all of the cars in the convoy were armoured and built to withstand gunfire and even grenades, there was only so much protection a vehicle designed for civilian uses could offer. The use of anti-tank missiles was simply too much for the armoured vehicles to withstand.

Alpha Group soldiers appeared from the woods, advancing by bounds and firing on the three remaining vehicles. The Presidential Security Service was hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned by an assault force that numbered nearly a company’s worth of men. Trapped and with nowhere to go, however, they dismounted their surviving vehicles and counterattacked, firing back at their attackers and attempting to shield Medvedev, who cowered in the back of his limousine as it was racked with automatic gunfire. The bodyguards did well given their hopeless circumstances, killing six of their attackers. It didn’t take long for them to be subdued though. Most were killed where they stood, and those who surrendered were executed on the spot. Orders had already been given to Alpha Group that no prisoners were to be taken. Medvedev was unhurt when he was dragged from the back of his vehicle. A miniscule explosive charge was used to blow the lock off of the vehicle’s door, giving the attacking operators access to their primary target. Along with the surviving bodyguards and aides, Medvedev was shoved roughly to his knees at the side of the road by gloves hands. The commandos, wearing black uniforms and with balaclavas covering their faces, said nothing.

There was no ceremony. Everyone who had been captured was rapidly shot dead by the side of the road.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, other events were taking place in relation to the coup d’état. Soldiers from the 98th Guards Airborne Division, a part of the Moscow Military District under Colonel-General Gerasimov, deployed to the Russian capital by truck and helicopter, under orders to secure vital infrastructure. They did not know the truth about what was happening or that Medvedev had been killed by the FSB. Those paratroopers were informed that a terrorist incident had taken place and that it might have been part of an American-backed attempt to topple the Russian government. Heavily-armed paratroopers secured the Kremlin, the Defence Ministry, and the Communications Ministry as well as Domodedovo International Airport. The troops met no resistance from security forces across the city as the putsch unfolded because for all everybody knew they were acting to put down a coup rather than launch one. In the Kremlin and the Communications Ministry, several civil servants and political aides, appointees of President Medvedev, were arrested by paratroopers and taken rapidly under FSB supervision to Moscow’s Lefortovo Prison. Figures in the military and the government who might pose a threat to the new regime were all detained under the pretence that they themselves had had some involvement in this nefarious – and fictional – CIA plot to overthrow the Russian government.

It was all over by evening, Moscow time.

Men of the VDV had secured the Russian capital and armed soldiers stood guard outside every key government facility. Vladimir Putin, now the President of the Russian Federation, was driven to the heavily-guarded Kremlin, where he stood in front of journalists both from Russia itself and from around the globe. There, the newly-minted Russian President gave an emotional speech in which he informed the Russian people that President Dmitri Medvedev had been assassinated near Vladivostok, and many of his security staff and aides were dead too. He said that there was a terrorist plot, connected to the Autumn Movement, to take over Russia and disband the state, replacing it with anarchism.

He also said that the FSB was investigating the possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency was linked to this heinous conspiracy.

[James G]

RIP Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev; RIP Russian democracy.

[lordroel]

Jan 14, 2019 18:12:47 GMT James G said:

RIP Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev; RIP Russian democracy.

Well i wonder if it would be better for Putin to be RIP, also keep up the updates guys.

[James G]

Jan 14, 2019 18:54:50 GMT lordroel said:

Jan 14, 2019 18:12:47 GMT James G said:

RIP Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev; RIP Russian democracy.

Well i wonder if it would be better for Putin to be RIP, also keep up the updates guys.

For a lot of innocent people, yes it would be.
More of the story coming tomorrow.

[James G]

Thirteen

In light of the heinous conspiracy which had purportedly taken the life of President Medvedev, his successor (and predecessor) announced that martial law was to be enacted nationwide. President Putin told the Russian people that the outrage which had taken the life of the nation’s democratically-elected leader had been constructed by those with wide-ranging connections countrywide. These were dangerous people. They would be caught soon enough and justice delivered to them. However, the Rodina thus needed defending at a time like this before that justice could come and for the security of the Russian people there would be a military presence throughout the country. No end date was given as to when martial law would end and there were no details forthcoming on the particular shape which it would form.

Putin had promised justice and that was quick to be done. The initial arrests of people around the deceased Medvedev had taken place before Putin addressed the nation where he made sure that the most-dangerous were detained. The follow-up arrests came overnight and through the next morning while Russia was witnessing troops on the streets of its cities and towns. The Autumn Movement was decimated by the wide-ranging detentions of countless figures from the big fish to the small fry. The FSB grabbed the most-important members of the resistance to the Kremlin though soldiers did the majority of the grunt work with many others. These people were detained without charge and without any access to legal advice nor contact with their families. They were all connected to the assassination of the president, it was said, and at times like these, the security of the Russian people as a whole was paramount over the freedoms of a few… ‘a few’ being a few thousand soon enough. The arrests of the big fish, the ones who demanded the attention of FSB agents and saw those detained not put in military holding sites but instead into secret prisons ready for interrogation, contained some people of high position and importance. There were multiple Deputies from the State Duma among them and even some from the upper house of the Russian parliament (the Federation Council) too. Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin was one of the senior people arrested, someone not in anyway connected to the protest movement but instead an ally of Medvedev who’d been put into a terrible position while trying to save the national economy as it was under assault from Western sanctions. In addition, the Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, was likewise detained by the FSB and whisked away into a dark & lonely basement. Luzhkov was a hardliner who had been at the forefront of urging for the crackdowns against protesters and he was also a political opponent of Medvedev too. His detention came due to his private business interests having been affected by those international sanctions and Luzhkov’s double-dealing where he had been involved as part of the conduit to Medvedev from Washington in trying to get him to turn against Putin. The new president wanted rid of him for that betrayal and knew too that the arrest of the capital’s mayor – this was announced with much fanfare – on charges of corruption would actually be quite popular with the people.

The Speaker of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, rammed through parliamentary support for Putin’s actions (after the event of course) and then was at the forefront of securing the granting of the president ‘extraordinary emergency powers’ at this time. The turkeys hadn’t voted for Christmas but the Duma voted to remove most of its own powers and concentrate them in the hands of the president. They would only be a rubber-stamp whereas he would rule by decree. There had been arrests of several members then others either didn’t show up to vote or unexpectedly cast supporting votes for this when the Duma met. There had been Deputies who had been blackmailed with kompromat, others had been frightened or induced into action. These parliamentarians also cast supporting votes for Putin’s government reshuffle with ministerial appointments made and others removed from office. The Duma voted to elevate first deputy prime minister Sergey Ivanov to the role of prime minister and also approved the new roles for others such as Dmitri Kozak replacing Sergey Lavrov as foreign minister when the latter was asked to stand aside after being called before Putin in the Kremlin personally to be told he was no longer needed. Viktor Zubkov stayed at his positioned he gained last year as defence minister and Igor Shuvalov remained as first deputy prime minister (Russia had two first deputy prime ministers before this reshuffle; it made sense in Moscow just not elsewhere). Elvira Nabiullina replaced Kudrin and the role of finance minister was expanded to cover her previous ministerial briefs with economic development and trade though for this woman at the top ranks of the government, the influential Shuvalov had most of the power in that field. Also gaining new responsibilities was Sergey Shoygu who stayed on as the minister for emergency situations; the ministerial brief was just as advertised and had no real counterpart in the West. Shoygu would oversee extra areas of nationwide security though that didn’t include the intelligence services.

Of this deck shuffling, the Kozak appointment was the most-important. Lavrov was not a foreign minister that Putin felt he needed at this time. Kozak would present a very different face of Russia in foreign relations with the world. However, despite everything with the new government under Prime Minister Ivanov, real power was no longer there like it wasn’t with the Duma either. Martial law and the emergency powers granted to Putin gave him full authority. The Security Council of Russia, headed by Nikolai Patrushev (the previous FSB head before Bortnikov), was where real power now lay. The generals whom Putin had called upon to support him in the removal of Medvedev – giving Zubkov little input in that process – were now members of the Security Council. That was what mattered.


Following Putin’s putsch and the announcement of martial law, many people had tried to flee. They fast caught on that the fate awaiting them for opposing the Kremlin as long as they had was looking fatal now. Medvedev’s death hadn’t been foreseen but once word of it came, there was a realisation of the truth of the matter: Putin had done this. Next, he would send his killers for them. There were people detained rapidly who didn’t even get a chance to make an effort to run. Of note among those who did manage to attempt to leave Russia were the Duma Deputy Gennady Gudkov, the one-time deputy prime minister (back under Yeltsin) Boris Nemtsov and the chess champion Garry Kasparov. Gudkov was fatally shot by an FSB officer – no shots were meant to be fired – after getting out of a bathroom window and running down an alleyway. Nemtsov managed to escape Russia after donning a disguise and reaching the Ukrainian border; he had help getting over the frontier when the border guards were on the alert for crossings and those who aided him would later be punished. Kasparov was a man with worldwide name recognition and had been thought by many to be thus untouchable. He ran though, fearing that wasn’t going to be the case. Yet, unfortunately, Kasparov was detained at the airport and arrested on a charge of using a false passport: there were witnesses to this among the foreign travellers also departing Russia.

Leonid Parfyonov, the television personality with whom the CIA had met with in a Moscow hotel room, was detained by the FSB. They made a public arrest with (specially-selected) invited journalists in attendance. The charge was treason. Russian television audiences were soon treated to footage recorded of that meeting and subtitles to what was said. There were parts of what was broadcast which had been doctored with an actor’s voice used to dub over part of what he said though there remained much truth to the whole thing despite the exaggeration done to highlight some elements for the sake of ‘public consumption’. What was done here with Parfyonov was done elsewhere with high-profile public arrests made. There was a trial by television for key figures in the Autumn Movement starting with their detentions on charges of treason. Any political arrest in Russia could never by bias free but what was being done now was far different. Nonetheless, there too remained those who were swooped up and not to be seen again whom the Russian people heard nothing of.

SVR Director Fradkov went to see Putin and Bortnikov concerning the ‘Chappaqua Connection’: his agency’s intelligence operation against the American secretary of state. There had been talk of leaking the Clinton emails and that didn’t just include the recent ones concerning contacts with Medvedev and the plans for a colour revolution if that failed. The thinking was that this would help to firm-up the public case against their enemies. Moreover, there was a lot of juicy gossip contained within them which could do a lot of damage to their opponents abroad. Some of the comments made in emails during the US Democratic Party primaries in 2007-2008 were very interesting… Fradkov strongly urged them not to do that. It would burn his whole operation. Within hours, the FBI and the NSA would undercover everything. The access to information for the future would be shut off. He won them over on this when they considered what he said. Keeping the window into the private communications of Hillary Clinton – and it went wider too through her circle (including former President Bill Clinton) – plus the State Department staffers also using the network, was to be retained. At any time, and that one of our choosing, Fradkov told them, we can make use of exposing what we know through selective leaking, doctoring what we need to too, but not now.


Medvedev was given a full state funeral. He and those killed alongside him (his security and aides) were honoured by the Russian state with full pageantry. Putin attended the funeral overseen by the Patriarch of Moscow. Svetlana Medvedeva and the Medvedev’s fourteen years old son were physically comforted by Putin in front of the cameras. There were foreign dignitaries present as befitting the status of Medvedev before his assassination and the show that the Kremlin wanted to put on for the world. However, there were many notable invited attendees from abroad who failed to make an appearance. Heads of state, heads of government, royalty and foreign ministers from multiple countries across the West were all absent.

This was due to the international reaction to what was called in many places ‘Putin’s putsch’; very few nations were willing to play with the charade that Russian anarchists connected to the democratic freedom movement, allied with the American CIA, had assassinated him. It was Putin and the siloviki who were responsible.

France had done so first, rapidly followed by the United States and Britain before others, in withdrawing their ambassador from Moscow. Diplomatic relations were downgraded at embassies in Russia’s capital to the chargé d'affaires level. Consulates had been shut across many Russian cities outside of Moscow as well. There were consequences at groupings of international bodies too: the suspension of Russia from the G8 made at the very end of last year was transformed into a full removal from that collection of the world’s leading industrial nations. Of course, not all countries had done so. This included certain important nations within the traditional West who didn’t go this far but also the ‘usual suspects’ of Russia’s allies aboard. There were some who were either willing to buy the lie about the demise of Medvedev, and Russian democracy too, or at least look the other way to all that had happened.

[hussar01]

I wonder what the Germans are thinking. They are torn between their addiction to Russian energy and their wish to be the leader of Europe. But their "addiction" will be the factor no one trusts them to lead. The Germans are desperate for there to be as little as possible disruption to supply. I can imagine others looking to knock them down a notch. And if there is one thing we can count on German politics at this point is to dither. The wish to lead combined with the fear of responsibility. Greek debt crisis kicked in late 2009/early 2010. Imagine the Russians can use this to work the Greeks against the Germans with the Germans asking for their money back. In real life the Germans won, here the Russian extra effort can be used to sow confusion and distrust within the EU.

[James G]

Jan 15, 2019 20:30:25 GMT hussar01 said:

I wonder what the Germans are thinking. They are torn between their addiction to Russian energy and their wish to be the leader of Europe. But their "addiction" will be the factor no one trusts them to lead. The Germans are desperate for there to be as little as possible disruption to supply. I can imagine others looking to knock them down a notch. And if there is one thing we can count on German politics at this point is to dither. The wish to lead combined with the fear of responsibility. Greek debt crisis kicked in late 2009/early 2010. Imagine the Russians can use this to work the Greeks against the Germans with the Germans asking for their money back. In real life the Germans won, here the Russian extra effort can be used to sow confusion and distrust within the EU.

Germany and its role as the international crisis will play out soon enough. Germany hasn't withdrawn its ambassador either.