mullauna
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Post by mullauna on Mar 27, 2019 11:59:32 GMT
What are the consequences of Italy staying neutral? What happens to it's colonial empire? to Albania? To Ethiopia? The Dodecanese is an itch that both Greece and Turkey will want to scratch...
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Post by Deleted on Mar 27, 2019 13:54:25 GMT
Would have been the wisest option, but crediting with Benito with wisdom is too much of a stretch. The approaches of the British government suggested to him they were serious about peace.
Musso eyes Greece and Yugoslavia enviously as its protectors are overrun by the Third Reich.
The temptation is just TOO great.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Mar 27, 2019 15:17:12 GMT
What are the consequences of Italy staying neutral? What happens to it's colonial empire? to Albania? To Ethiopia? The Dodecanese is an itch that both Greece and Turkey will want to scratch... Well according to this What if: Italy accepts the Allied offer in 1940 Italy would be promised by the British/French when the war was over and Germany destroyed that Italy would be ceded the Tyrol, all of Austria, parts of southern Bavaria and that they would make good on the territorial promises which were made to Italy during the First World War but which were never delivered. |
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mullauna
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Post by mullauna on Mar 27, 2019 15:29:35 GMT
I can see the Allies being stupid enough to sodding screw over Italy again - which will lead to a bitterness that will last long after Mussolini dies in the fifties or early sixties.
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Post by eurowatch on Mar 27, 2019 15:35:27 GMT
What are the consequences of Italy staying neutral? What happens to it's colonial empire? to Albania? To Ethiopia? The Dodecanese is an itch that both Greece and Turkey will want to scratch... Well according to this What if: Italy accepts the Allied offer in 1940 Italy would be promised by the British/French when the war was over and Germany destroyed that Italy would be ceded the Tyrol, all of Austria, parts of southern Bavaria and that they would make good on the territorial promises which were made to Italy during the First World War but which were never delivered. If Italy does take up the offer I expect the US to ignore it since they didn't make it so they have no intention of honouring it. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Mar 27, 2019 15:41:25 GMT
What are the consequences of Italy staying neutral? What happens to it's colonial empire? to Albania? To Ethiopia? The Dodecanese is an itch that both Greece and Turkey will want to scratch... Well according to this What if: Italy accepts the Allied offer in 1940 Italy would be promised by the British/French when the war was over and Germany destroyed that Italy would be ceded the Tyrol, all of Austria, parts of southern Bavaria and that they would make good on the territorial promises which were made to Italy during the First World War but which were never delivered.
I must admit that sounds fairly dubious, the idea of all Austria and a chunk of southern Germany being annexed to Italy. It would very likely be a poisoned chalice and earn the enmity of whatever an state(s) emerges. While a defeated German is likely to be weak for a while this is unlikely to be a lasting situation, especially since the sort of war that WWII and the Soviet involvement ending in the partition of Germany was not yet foreseen by anybody I believe.
Would agree with vH that Italy would have been better off staying neutral but that clashes with Mussolini's desires for glory and the apparent certainty of quick and easy gains after the collapse of France in May 40.
A lot would depend on what happened and it might have needed a change of leader in Italy, with Mussolini dying somehow before the war started. However avoiding involvement in the conflict, if possible, would have avoided the devastation that Italy suffered but would probably mean it maintains the fascist system in power for a generation or more.
Continued Italian neutrality, provided its respected by both sides, would have had a considerable impact on the war in Europe and elsewhere. It would mean no fighting in N Africa and that Britain could continue to use the Med, albeit possibly with some losses, for trade and military transportation. You could also see Greece and possibly also Yugoslavia staying neutral. [Although a 3rd option is that Italy doesn't join Germany in fighting the allies but does at some stage attack either Greece or Yugoslavia and Britain, possibly very hard pressed by then, doesn't respond, or Greece say continues to reject British direct support.
This also assumes that butterflies mean Vichy stays neutral and unattacked which could complicate matters in France if/when there's a western invasion of the area. [If the allies were to respect the neutrality of Vichy not only does that leave them very powerful in France post-war but also it greatly shortens the front the Germans have to defend.
While generally very good for the allies, especially Britain it could also help Germany in a Stalingrad type situation, as they wouldn't have had a simultaneous crisis in N Africa. Also without the fighting in N Africa neither Britain or the US are likely to get much combat experience between the retreat from France till their return which could be very nasty.
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Post by Middlesex_Toffeeman on Apr 4, 2019 16:13:31 GMT
I don't think the Italians will want Austria - especially since it and Bavaria are as Italian as a satsuma.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Apr 23, 2019 5:05:23 GMT
Quite possibly Germany wins the Second World War without the diversion to the Balkans. The Yugoslav and Greek campaigns prevented Barbarossa from starting on June 10th (the earliest it could due to spring flooding) and, more decisively, saw 11th Army detached from Army Group South to garrison the new Yugoslavian conquests. Without that AGS was slower in advancing than the other Army Groups and was unable to conduct the same encirclement operations, ultimately leading directly to the diversion to Kiev in August. In this ATL, AGS could take Kiev on its own, while AGC would be in a position to move on Moscow no later than September, meaning the city will fall. The strategic situation could see Stalin decide to send Zhukov to Leningrad at that time like was done IOTL, meaning the three largest cities of the USSR would be taken at almost the same time. Such would be decisive.
Outside of that, a neutral Italy will avoid losing something like 40% of its merchant fleet and probably will wait to complete its modernization of forces before moving on Greece or Yugoslavia, probably around 1942 or so. They'll make a killing in the meantime trading with the Germans, probably in the same manner as the Swiss did which will be a boon for their own war machine in the long run. Libya and Eritrea will become thoroughly Italian in the long run. Italy probably will be France tier by the modern day, complete with nuclear weapons.
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Post by TheRomanSlayer on Apr 23, 2019 5:26:32 GMT
I would agree that a neutral Italy might result in a potential German victory in WWII. However, I would also predict that the Germans would have launched Barbarossa in May rather in June in the absence of the Balkan misadventure that had far reaching consequences even to this day. Another thing too, if Mussolini was shoved aside while Italy remained neutral, it would try to turn Yugoslavia and Greece into its satellite states instead of outright attempting to conquer them, and even Hitler would have preferred a silent front in the Balkans while he is trying to deal with the USSR. In this case the Soviet Union would collapse, communism would be thoroughly discredited and a potential cold war between the Allies and the Axis minus the USSR.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Apr 23, 2019 5:37:19 GMT
I would agree that a neutral Italy might result in a potential German victory in WWII. However, I would also predict that the Germans would have launched Barbarossa in May rather in June in the absence of the Balkan misadventure that had far reaching consequences even to this day. Another thing too, if Mussolini was shoved aside while Italy remained neutral, it would try to turn Yugoslavia and Greece into its satellite states instead of outright attempting to conquer them, and even Hitler would have preferred a silent front in the Balkans while he is trying to deal with the USSR. In this case the Soviet Union would collapse, communism would be thoroughly discredited and a potential cold war between the Allies and the Axis minus the USSR. May was the intended date by significant flooding occurred that spring and the flood waters along the rivers hadn't receded until around June 10th. That, and significant material lackings due to the Balkans campaign were the main reason for the delay. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Apr 23, 2019 11:33:27 GMT
epichistory, TRS Your assuming tha:
a) There's still no diversion of the Germans to the Balkans. While the Italian problems in Greece and the later belatedly accepting direct British forces were important factors in this so was the coup against the pro-Axis leadership in Belgrade and that could still occur. Hitler was enraged - as usual when things didn't go his way - so your likely to see an intervention in this case, although Greece may well survive, at least for the moment. This won't take the same time and resources as the invasion of Greece but will require some resources to both take and garrison, especially since Italian forces won't be available to play a role. Given Italy's desires for the area this might upset Mussolini and push him, or his replacement further into neutrality.
b) That an earlier start and extra army will win the war in the east in one campaign. If AGC doesn't divert part of its armour south it can push on a bit earlier but its also delayed by the need to regroup other units and have the foot infantry catch up a bit to motorised/mechanised spearheads and take over holding pockets and securing supply lines. Also there are very long supply lines. Coupled with mud and winter its still a tall order for Moscow to fall before the Germans run out of steam.
As I've said in other threads there is the great danger here for AGC that they get to the outskirts just as the bad weather hits and with Hitler expectant of an early/easy victory their ordered to push on leading to a bigger and even more disastrous Stalingrad type bloodbath a year earlier.
c) Even if Moscow was captured without largely gutting AGC while it will hurt the Soviets they will fight on, if only because the Germans [or rather the Nazis] will force them too. There's a lot of industry along the Volga and further east and most of that will be well outside German reach in 42. The US might need to send more foodstuff to keep military and factories working but Germany would be a long way from victory still and be stretched very thin.
There's a slight possibility that Japan might join the war against Russia, as many in the army wants, which would be bad for the Soviets as it would cut the L-L link via Vladivostok but this is a bad idea for the Japanese as it would mean they can't really drive south and assuming the allies have followed the US in economic sanctions the wheels will come off the Japanese war machine in a fairly limited period of time. BY the sort of time Moscow looks endangered its almost certain that the Japanese will already be committed to going south.
This scenario could well delay the US entry into the war, if Japan leaves the western powers alone, although if as likely Britain then declares war on Japan, having reinforced the region 1st that's a further problem for Tokyo and they might then attack the Philippines and other US bases to secure their supply lines.
In the unlikely event of Moscow falling this might persuade Rome that Hitler in on the verge of winning so they then either joins the conflict and/or attacks Greece. If done at the right time, with a lot more British forces in the Atlantic and heading east for war with Japan, if that also happened Britain could become nearly as stretched as OTL but Italy doesn't really have the capacity to take Egypt although a still poorly defended Malta might fall.
Plenty of nasty things that can happen for all sides but Germany is still a long way from winning in the east even if Moscow was to fall which I suspect is highly unlikely.
If any help on YouTube there is a site "military history visualized" which has a lot of good videos about WWII and a wide range of other issues. See his video on Barbarossa - Would an earlier date make a difference? which is quite short but covers the key points of German exhaustion before winter set in. He has a number of others on the 41 campaign, including one which showed how many divs the Red Army actually moblised, about 800 IIRC compared to the about 150-200 the Germans thought were the maximum they would be able to. There's also one about why, although the war against the Soviets was pretty much doomed from the start it would have seemed like a fairly sure thing, not only to the Germans but also to the leaders of other powers - see "Operation Barbarossa - Just a Stupid Idea? An Analysis" A very good site with a lot of information on it.
Steve
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Post by EwellHolmes on Apr 23, 2019 22:12:15 GMT
Without Italian entry into the Axis, there is simply no reason for a German diversion to the Balkans; they have no quarrel with the Greeks and their only land connection is via Bulgaria. OKH and Hitler were already focusing in on the coming campaign in the East, reinforcing the German desire to avoid entanglements in that area.
As for the Eastern Front itself, as stated the diversion of 11th Army left AGS too weak to conduct the Kiev operation itself, forcing AGC to divert its Panzers while conducting a holding action along its own front. Without this diversion, AGC is able to begin an advance upon Moscow in August or early September, giving them two to three months ATL to complete the operation as opposed to OTL's one that still saw them reach the gates of Moscow. As it was, review of Soviet reinforcement deployments show that the first units won't begin arriving until Mid-October, meaning the Germans will have four to six weeks to finish off Moscow before STAVKA can even respond.
As for the strategic implications of such, they are immense. Taking Moscow completely collapses the Northern railway system of the USSR, ensuring Leningrad will fall for one. Between those two cities, the overwhelming majority of Soviet industry and thus capacity to continue resistance is lost; for one example, 62% of airplane engines were built in the environs of Moscow. OTL, the loss of the occupied areas engendered an overall output decline of the machinery and metal goods sector by 40%; here, the decline is on the order of 80%. As it was, Soviet, Western and German strategic planners all recognized that the loss of Kiev, Leningrad, the Donbass and Moscow would be decisive as far as the Eastern Front was concerned for exactly the aforementioned reason.
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Post by TheRomanSlayer on Apr 23, 2019 22:32:32 GMT
Without Italian entry into the Axis, there is simply no reason for a German diversion to the Balkans; they have no quarrel with the Greeks and their only land connection is via Bulgaria. OKH and Hitler were already focusing in on the coming campaign in the East, reinforcing the German desire to avoid entanglements in that area. As for the Eastern Front itself, as stated the diversion of 11th Army left AGS too weak to conduct the Kiev operation itself, forcing AGC to divert its Panzers while conducting a holding action along its own front. Without this diversion, AGC is able to begin an advance upon Moscow in August or early September, giving them two to three months ATL to complete the operation as opposed to OTL's one that still saw them reach the gates of Moscow. As it was, review of Soviet reinforcement deployments show that the first units won't begin arriving until Mid-October, meaning the Germans will have four to six weeks to finish off Moscow before STAVKA can even respond. As for the strategic implications of such, they are immense. Taking Moscow completely collapses the Northern railway system of the USSR, ensuring Leningrad will fall for one. Between those two cities, the overwhelming majority of Soviet industrial and thus capacity to continue resistance is lost; for one example, 62% of airplane engines were built in the environs of Moscow. OTL, the loss of the occupied areas engendered an overall output decline of the machinery and metal goods sector by 40%; here, the decline is on the order of 80%. As it was, Soviet, Western and German strategic all recognized that the loss of Kiev, Leningrad, the Donbass and Moscow would be decisive as far as the Eastern Front was concerned for exactly the aforementioned reason. I am also wondering if this would mean that the Reichskommissariat Moscowien project would become a reality in this scenario. Given Nazi racial theories about the Russians, I would suspect that it would become the Killing Fields on steroids. Reichskommissariat Kaukasus would also be established as well, although I'm not sure if Hitler would be willing to cede the entire Caucasus Mountain region to Turkey as bait for a Turkish entry into WWII on the German side. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Apr 24, 2019 15:01:26 GMT
Without Italian entry into the Axis, there is simply no reason for a German diversion to the Balkans; they have no quarrel with the Greeks and their only land connection is via Bulgaria. OKH and Hitler were already focusing in on the coming campaign in the East, reinforcing the German desire to avoid entanglements in that area. As for the Eastern Front itself, as stated the diversion of 11th Army left AGS too weak to conduct the Kiev operation itself, forcing AGC to divert its Panzers while conducting a holding action along its own front. Without this diversion, AGC is able to begin an advance upon Moscow in August or early September, giving them two to three months ATL to complete the operation as opposed to OTL's one that still saw them reach the gates of Moscow. As it was, review of Soviet reinforcement deployments show that the first units won't begin arriving until Mid-October, meaning the Germans will have four to six weeks to finish off Moscow before STAVKA can even respond. As for the strategic implications of such, they are immense. Taking Moscow completely collapses the Northern railway system of the USSR, ensuring Leningrad will fall for one. Between those two cities, the overwhelming majority of Soviet industry and thus capacity to continue resistance is lost; for one example, 62% of airplane engines were built in the environs of Moscow. OTL, the loss of the occupied areas engendered an overall output decline of the machinery and metal goods sector by 40%; here, the decline is on the order of 80%. As it was, Soviet, Western and German strategic planners all recognized that the loss of Kiev, Leningrad, the Donbass and Moscow would be decisive as far as the Eastern Front was concerned for exactly the aforementioned reason.
epichistory
a) Not with Greece but if there is a counter coup against the pro-Axis group in Yugoslavia then expect a German reaction.
b) 11th Army would have been a useful boost to AGS but it had a Panzer Army, three other German armies and 2 Romanian ones as it is so counting say the 2 Romanian armies as equal to one German and the Panzer army as one, for simplicity that means adding it would only be a 20% increase in the strength of AGS. Plus with the Germans attacking a bit stronger there will be butterfly which could go in a number of ways. Plus this also means an additional load on the logistics of the region.
c) Assuming that panzer units weren't switched south and others weren't rested while they wait for the infantry to catch up then they might be able to attack as much as a couple of months earlier towards Moscow which about doubles the time before the OTL calling off of the offensive at the start of Dec 41. This makes it a lot more difficult for the Soviets but the Germans are stretching their lines even further even faster. Also taking a city the size of Moscow isn't going to be easy. Its the sort of fighting that's going to be the most demanding for the German forces and they lack the resources to break the defensive lines and then encircle the city.
d) Did you view any of the videos I mentioned, especially the one about logistical constraints on the German forces?
e) Moscow is an important industrial centre and transport hub but even if it was to fall there is still a hell of a lot of production capacity further east. Leningrad is almost certainly doomed and the supply route to Murmansk may no longer be that viable after that but the Russians will continue to put up a hell of a fight simply because their given no choice.
Steve
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Post by EwellHolmes on Apr 24, 2019 20:18:13 GMT
There was indeed the Anti-Axis coup IOTL, but without an Axis Italy I find it questionable whether it would occur or, if it did, provoke an Axis response. For one, without an active Balkan Front there is no real reason for the Germans to attempt to pressure the Yugoslavs into joining the Axis (Which provoked the coup itself) and, even if they still do, without Italy in the Axis doing such will be much more amendable to Yugoslav interests than IOTL; there's no pressure to allow Italo-German forces to cross through to fight in Greece and, most critically, there is no danger of Berlin applying pressure on Rome's behalf for territorial concessions. IOTL the Yugoslavs were pretty wary of the situation, given the obvious precedent of Germany forcing territorial concessions on behalf of Hungary from Romania while Italian territorial demands were well know. Here, not only are these two threats to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia removed, Belgrade can find a clear benefit in the deal as it could supply resources to the Germans at the premium while achieving security against Italy. If they still don't end up joining the Axis or even still the coup, I don't see it as an issue. Yugoslavia won't be opening up a new front against Germany due to the fact the Italians, with their aforementioned demands and not currently fighting in Greece or Libya, will be ready to pounce; as well, the allure of economic gains from trade deals are still there with regards to the Germans. I think the Yugoslavs will realize the moment they prove troublesome to Berlin, Hitler will give Mussolini his full support for an attack and Belgrade knows there is not much the Western Allies can do about it because they don't wish to bring the Italians into the war. Speaking of the Allies, Belgrade will be further deterred from hostile actions given there isn't any Allied troops in Greece. IOTL, they could at least hold to the idea that the British could provide reinforcements to support them, as well as that Thessaloniki would be open to them for resupply purposes. Here, Greece is neutral, Bulgaria is still in the Axis and the Italians control both sides of the Strait of Otranto with their main fleet actually based in the area. Belgrade here will be under no illusions as to the ability of the West to support them. Now, as to the matter of Army Group South and Operation Barbarossa, allow me to correct myself first as I erroneously said 11th Army when it's actually 12th Army in question. With regards to the points you raise with regards to force size, IOTL Army Group Center diverted 3rd Panzer Group to Army Group South which is a comparable force deployment as 12th Army would be. Logistics is also not as much of an issue, as the dual campaigns of Yugoslavia and Greece expended vast amounts of material that had to be replaced. Here, that doesn't occur and instead such supplies are being stockpiled behind the front for the coming invasion. It's also far easier to supply 12th Army on the Ukrainian Steppe, even despite the difference in distances as compared to Yugoslavia, given that Ukraine is largely flat and not mountainous and rail connections are far better. There's also the fact that the detachment of 12th Army combined with the logistical issues of the Balkans Campaign meant Army Group South had a staggered start, while the issue of combat power meant von Rudenstedt had to fight mainly a frontal war punctuated by only occasional penetrations and relatively small encirclements besides Kiev. Here, neither of these causes for this in play, so Army Group South is going to overall have a much better, effective campaign. With regards to the effects on Army Group South, IOTL the diversion of 3rd Panzer Group was logistically draining as AGC's supply lines were East-West instead of North-South. A further complication was that the Battle of Kiev was concluded and Guderian's forces attacked for Operation Typhoon in less than a week, leaving no real time to rest, build up more supplies or further plan. Army Group Center also spent most of August wasting resources in fighting around Yelnya due to a desire to maintain a bridgehead to keep Soviet forces more readily pinned in the area while AGC was in a lull. Here, all but Yelnya are definitely solved and, given the Germans did end up abandoning Yelnya anyway in September anyway, I'd imagine they'd never get involved in that quagmire in favor of focusing in on the drive to Moscow. Soviet forces are still in the early stages of building up defenses in the region and reinforcements outside of whats on hand aren't available until November in serious numbers; outside of a few thousand NKVD troops, even as late as October there was nothing to actually fight in the city itself. Indeed, the situation even IOTL as late as October at one point saw Zhukov reduced to less than 100,000 troops in a single defensive line to the West of the City that nearly got cracked open by 2nd SS and 10th Panzer at Borodino; here, however, there is no 32nd Rifle Division arriving literally a day before combat for the Soviets in September. To put things into perspective of what the loss of Moscow and Leningrad would mean, I think a review of the material situation is in order. The loss of the Ukraine and other occupied areas engendered shortages of coal (The Donbass was home to roughly 60% of Soviet output by itself), aluminum (Main Soviet facility was along the Dnieper, about 60-80% of production), iron ore (60% of production), steel (50% of production), electric power (30% of output), manganese ore (30% of production), and nickel (30% of production). Overall output of the machinery and metal goods sector had fallen by 40%. In addition, the USSR was also unable to meet the demand for copper, tin, zinc, lead, aluminum, and nickel with remaining sources. Antimony, tungsten, cobalt, vanadium, molybdenum, tin, and magnesium were also almost entirely lacking. Even before the loss of the two major cities in the ATL, as previously cited, overall output decline of the machinery and metal goods sector by 40%; here, the decline is on the order of 80%. The loss of Moscow and Leningrad means that steel, aluminum and nickel have essentially entirely collapsed in production; the loss of Moscow also removes, IIRC, something like a a further 20% of Soviet electrical power given the immense hydro-electric resources in the area. Aircraft production has now collapsed, both due to the lacking of aluminum, steel, nickel and electric power, but also due to the fact that, again, the actual physical elements of production were around Moscow. As for Leningrad: |
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