1989 Tiananmen Square protests don't end bloody: what happens?

[James G]

I was listening on the radio today to media reports from Tiananmen Square back in June 1989 when the army moved in.
It got me thinking. What happens if the regime doesn't send in the army? Do the protests grow? Does the People's Republic fall?
What could make the regime decided not to go in?

[lordroel]

Jun 4, 2019 19:16:51 GMT James G said:

I was listening on the radio today to media reports from Tiananmen Square back in June 1989 when the army moved in.
It got me thinking. What happens if the regime doesn't send in the army? Do the protests grow? Does the People's Republic fall?
What could make the regime decided not to go in?

Congratulations James G , i think you just mange to block this forum from being access from mainland China.

To go back to your question, i wonder if Taiwan will get involved.

[James G]

Jun 5, 2019 3:16:14 GMT lordroel said:

Jun 4, 2019 19:16:51 GMT James G said:

I was listening on the radio today to media reports from Tiananmen Square back in June 1989 when the army moved in.
It got me thinking. What happens if the regime doesn't send in the army? Do the protests grow? Does the People's Republic fall?
What could make the regime decided not to go in?

Congratulations James G , i think you just mange to block this forum from being access from mainland China.

To go back to your question, i wonder if Taiwan will get involved.

That is a badge of honour!
'Retaking the mainland' might be difficult.

[lordroel]

Jun 5, 2019 8:41:25 GMT James G said:

Jun 5, 2019 3:16:14 GMT lordroel said:

Congratulations James G , i think you just mange to block this forum from being access from mainland China.

To go back to your question, i wonder if Taiwan will get involved.

That is a badge of honour!
'Retaking the mainland' might be difficult.

Of topic, seems the forum is still accessible from within mainland China.

On topic, if the Army is not send in to crush the Tiananmen Square demonstration, then expect across China to also see these kind of demonstrations, and that is something the Regime can not tolerate.

[stevep]

Jun 5, 2019 14:42:57 GMT lordroel said:

Jun 5, 2019 8:41:25 GMT James G said:

That is a badge of honour!
'Retaking the mainland' might be difficult.

Of topic, seems the forum is still accessible from within mainland China.

On topic, if the Army is not send in to crush the Tiananmen Square demonstration, then expect across China to also see these kind of demonstrations, and that is something the Regime can not tolerate.

  That would be my thought as well.  If the demonstration isn't crushed their likely to spread and the regime must either crack down or fall and I don't think, with the degree of reform showed since Mao's death and the defeat of the gang of four, it was as spent as the Soviet one so I fear even greater deaths would have resulted. 

  If Taiwan expressed an interest that would probably be disastrous for the demonstrators as it would enable the regime to paint them as rebels against the party - which to a degree they were - but be far more likely to present them as enemies to the country rather than just the regime.

[eurofed]

Uhm, I have some serious trouble to devise a way to make the protests succeed in a bloodless way like 1989 Eastern Europe, as others pointed out Deng's reforms has put back some serious life in the regime and broadened its support base. To fall on its own would likely require the reforms to fail and the regime to keep the self-destructive course it had taken with late Mao and the Cultural Revolution, such as if the Gang of Four had won the succession struggle. Even so, I can think of a feasible way to make the pro-democracy movement successful with a 1989 PoD. IMO, what it takes is to create a dynamic similar to the 1991 Soviet coup, with Deng as (a much more influential, but dying) Gorbaciov, Li Peng and the neo-Maoist conservatives as the coupists, and Zhao Ziyang as (a non-alcoholic) Eltsin. Deng and his pro-reform faction need to think of the hard-left conservatives as the worst threat to their interests, and the pro-democracy students as the lesser evil (instead of a return of the Red Guards and Cultural Revolution chaos under a new guise) or potential allies.

This is a possible event sequence for a 1989 Chinese Revolution: Deng falls seriously ill just before the onset of the pro-democracy protests. This and the start of the protest embolden Li Peng and a neo-Maoist clique of hard-left conservatives and Marxist-Leninist ideologues to try to seize power, usurp the authority of Deng, and stall or reverse his reforms. This alarms Deng and his loyalists, who come to fear the neo-Maoist takeover as a possible comeback to the bad days of the Cultural Revolution, and regard the student protest as a lesser threat. On his deathbed, Deng instructs his loyalists to oppose the Maoists. This causes a serious division in the party and the army between Dengist moderates which wish to avoid disorder and keep the course of economic reforms, Maoist conservatives which favor a hardcore authoritarian regime and a return to a command economy, and reformists such as Zhao Ziyang who support political reforms and a compromise with the students, giving the latter room to maneuver. This division causes the first attempts of the Maoist clique to seize power, impose martial law, and repress the student movement to bungle. Deng dies, releasing a message to denounce the Maoist coup attempt as an usurpation. Rebellion against the Li Peng clique spreads across China, causing Dengist moderates and pro-democracy activists to cooperate in most cases. A few provinces that are especially committed to economic reforms openly rise up, and division in the army hampers the attempts of Li and his allies to crush their opponents in Beijing and elsewhere. In growing desperation, they try increasingly brutal acts of force, that only stir up more opposition. China falls into a brief civil war, which the reformist coalition wins. In the aftermath of the revolution, China becomes a multi-party democracy.

[stevep]

Jun 6, 2019 20:15:45 GMT eurofed said:

Uhm, I have some serious trouble to devise a way to make the protests succeed in a bloodless way like 1989 Eastern Europe, as others pointed out Deng's reforms has put back some serious life in the regime and broadened its support base. To fall on its own would likely require the reforms to fail and the regime to keep the self-destructive course it had taken with late Mao and the Cultural Revolution, such as if the Gang of Four had won the succession struggle. Even so, I can think of a feasible way to make the pro-democracy movement successful with a 1989 PoD. IMO, what it takes is to create a dynamic similar to the 1991 Soviet coup, with Deng as (a much more influential, but dying) Gorbaciov, Li Peng and the neo-Maoist conservatives as the coupists, and Zhao Ziyang as (a non-alcoholic) Eltsin. Deng and his pro-reform faction need to think of the hard-left conservatives as the worst threat to their interests, and the pro-democracy students as the lesser evil (instead of a return of the Red Guards and Cultural Revolution chaos under a new guise) or potential allies.

This is a possible event sequence for a 1989 Chinese Revolution: Deng falls seriously ill just before the onset of the pro-democracy protests. This and the start of the protest embolden Li Peng and a neo-Maoist clique of hard-left conservatives and Marxist-Leninist ideologues to try to seize power, usurp the authority of Deng, and stall or reverse his reforms. This alarms Deng and his loyalists, who come to fear the neo-Maoist takeover as a possible comeback to the bad days of the Cultural Revolution, and regard the student protest as a lesser threat. On his deathbed, Deng instructs his loyalists to oppose the Maoists. This causes a serious division in the party and the army between Dengist moderates which wish to avoid disorder and keep the course of economic reforms, Maoist conservatives which favor a hardcore authoritarian regime and a return to a command economy, and reformists such as Zhao Ziyang who support political reforms and a compromise with the students, giving the latter room to maneuver. This division causes the first attempts of the Maoist clique to seize power, impose martial law, and repress the student movement to bungle. Deng dies, releasing a message to denounce the Maoist coup attempt as an usurpation. Rebellion against the Li Peng clique spreads across China, causing Dengist moderates and pro-democracy activists to cooperate in most cases. A few provinces that are especially committed to economic reforms openly rise up, and division in the army hampers the attempts of Li and his allies to crush their opponents in Beijing and elsewhere. In growing desperation, they try increasingly brutal acts of force, that only stir up more opposition. China falls into a brief civil war, which the reformist coalition wins. In the aftermath of the revolution, China becomes a multi-party democracy.

  That seems to be the least bad option.  Still going to be very bloody and I doubt that China would quickly become a multi-party democracy but you could see major checks on the power of the party.  Then provided you didn't see a backlash with the party seeking to regain total power later on, you could see a steady development of democratic ideas.

[eurofed]

Jun 7, 2019 11:35:24 GMT stevep said:

Jun 6, 2019 20:15:45 GMT eurofed said:

Uhm, I have some serious trouble to devise a way to make the protests succeed in a bloodless way like 1989 Eastern Europe, as others pointed out Deng's reforms has put back some serious life in the regime and broadened its support base. To fall on its own would likely require the reforms to fail and the regime to keep the self-destructive course it had taken with late Mao and the Cultural Revolution, such as if the Gang of Four had won the succession struggle. Even so, I can think of a feasible way to make the pro-democracy movement successful with a 1989 PoD. IMO, what it takes is to create a dynamic similar to the 1991 Soviet coup, with Deng as (a much more influential, but dying) Gorbaciov, Li Peng and the neo-Maoist conservatives as the coupists, and Zhao Ziyang as (a non-alcoholic) Eltsin. Deng and his pro-reform faction need to think of the hard-left conservatives as the worst threat to their interests, and the pro-democracy students as the lesser evil (instead of a return of the Red Guards and Cultural Revolution chaos under a new guise) or potential allies.

This is a possible event sequence for a 1989 Chinese Revolution: Deng falls seriously ill just before the onset of the pro-democracy protests. This and the start of the protest embolden Li Peng and a neo-Maoist clique of hard-left conservatives and Marxist-Leninist ideologues to try to seize power, usurp the authority of Deng, and stall or reverse his reforms. This alarms Deng and his loyalists, who come to fear the neo-Maoist takeover as a possible comeback to the bad days of the Cultural Revolution, and regard the student protest as a lesser threat. On his deathbed, Deng instructs his loyalists to oppose the Maoists. This causes a serious division in the party and the army between Dengist moderates which wish to avoid disorder and keep the course of economic reforms, Maoist conservatives which favor a hardcore authoritarian regime and a return to a command economy, and reformists such as Zhao Ziyang who support political reforms and a compromise with the students, giving the latter room to maneuver. This division causes the first attempts of the Maoist clique to seize power, impose martial law, and repress the student movement to bungle. Deng dies, releasing a message to denounce the Maoist coup attempt as an usurpation. Rebellion against the Li Peng clique spreads across China, causing Dengist moderates and pro-democracy activists to cooperate in most cases. A few provinces that are especially committed to economic reforms openly rise up, and division in the army hampers the attempts of Li and his allies to crush their opponents in Beijing and elsewhere. In growing desperation, they try increasingly brutal acts of force, that only stir up more opposition. China falls into a brief civil war, which the reformist coalition wins. In the aftermath of the revolution, China becomes a multi-party democracy.

  That seems to be the least bad option.  Still going to be very bloody and I doubt that China would quickly become a multi-party democracy but you could see major checks on the power of the party.  Then provided you didn't see a backlash with the party seeking to regain total power later on, you could see a steady development of democratic ideas.

At least as bloody as OTL if not somewhat more so, given there is going to be some patchwork fighting across China, but the fallen revolutionaries shall be openly remembered and honored by a free Chinese people as heroes and martyrs. No doubt post-revolutionary China is going to experience a managed transition to democracy with a power-sharing compromise between the pro-reform faction of the CCP and the liberal revolutionaries. Broadly speaking, it is going to involve the top echelons of the Dengist faction retiring to the private sector as wealthy businessmen or setting up a reasonably influential party, the evolution of the pro-reform section of the CCP that embraces Deng's legacy combined with acceptance of multi-party democracy as its agenda, in all likelihood with Zhao Ziyang as one of its main leaders. I assume it is going to be a compromise acceptable to both sides, and given their respective roles in starting the reforms and waging the revolution in China, one that gets widespread popular acceptance. Also because the revolution would have radically discredited the appeal of CCP authoritarianism and considerably improved the legacy of Dengism. W/o the blood of the students on his hands, and his last act being apparent support of political as well as economic reforms, TTL Deng may get a much less blemished reputation as one of the founding fathers of modern China, together with Sun Yat-Sen and whoever leaders emerge during the revolution. In hindsight, he may come to look like a liberal mole in the CCP who quietly but doggedly struggled all his life to steer China a less destructive path than Mao's blood-soaked tyranny, famine, and crazy experiments, and eventually succeeded in his late years. On the other hand, even at home Mao's memory is going to get all the unquestioned scorn and condemnation it deserves as one of the worst dictators in history. Speaking of Sun, I assume ITTL the mainland and Taiwan can accomplish peaceful reunification w/o any serious difficulty, even if the island is still going to need some serious degree of autonomy. I am not sure what reunified democratic China is going to do about Chiang's legacy, Tibet, and Xinjiang/East Turkestan.

Besides the obvious vast advantages for China ITTL, its turn to liberal democracy is going to have huge regional and global positive effects. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma are going to follow similar paths, and w/o the generous PRC subsidies and strategic support, North Korea is pretty much sure to collapse in a half-decade, paving the way to democratic reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The only real issue is whether it happens because of sheer socio-economic collapse during the 1990s famine, some more enlightened member of the elite deciding the Chinese way is the path to survival and couping the Kims, or (perhaps more likely) the Kim dynasty embracing the Samson option and starting the Second Korean War when the USA turns the screws on the NK nuclear program. IOTL the PRC has been the textbook example of how authoritarianism can survive and thrive in the Information Age, a source of support and a model for would-be imitators across the world. Its revolutionary collapse is going to teach the opposite lesson and reinforce the one of 1989 in favor of liberal democracy, no matter what the backlash of globalization and neoliberalism's excesses. Anti-Western dictatorships such as Iran and Venezuela are going to miss an important source of support and may well collapse when they face their own domestic crises. Even Putin's Russia, assuming it still keeps the same main course ITTL, is going to be much weaker and forced to be more cautious on the global stage w/o soft-spoken but effective Chinese backing. Anti-Western dictators, far-right/left populist extremists, and fans of illiberal democracy can still try to tap Russia as a sponsor and model, but it simply won't be the same thing by any means. 

[stevep]

Jun 7, 2019 15:27:44 GMT eurofed said:

Jun 7, 2019 11:35:24 GMT stevep said:

  That seems to be the least bad option.  Still going to be very bloody and I doubt that China would quickly become a multi-party democracy but you could see major checks on the power of the party.  Then provided you didn't see a backlash with the party seeking to regain total power later on, you could see a steady development of democratic ideas.

At least as bloody as OTL if not somewhat more so, given there is going to be some patchwork fighting across China, but the fallen revolutionaries shall be openly remembered and honored by a free Chinese people as heroes and martyrs. No doubt post-revolutionary China is going to experience a managed transition to democracy with a power-sharing compromise between the pro-reform faction of the CCP and the liberal revolutionaries. Broadly speaking, it is going to involve the top echelons of the Dengist faction retiring to the private sector as wealthy businessmen or setting up a reasonably influential party, the evolution of the pro-reform section of the CCP that embraces Deng's legacy combined with acceptance of multi-party democracy as its agenda, in all likelihood with Zhao Ziyang as one of its main leaders. I assume it is going to be a compromise acceptable to both sides, and given their respective roles in starting the reforms and waging the revolution in China, one that gets widespread popular acceptance. Also because the revolution would have radically discredited the appeal of CCP authoritarianism and considerably improved the legacy of Dengism. W/o the blood of the students on his hands, and his last act being apparent support of political as well as economic reforms, TTL Deng may get a much less blemished reputation as one of the founding fathers of modern China, together with Sun Yat-Sen and whoever leaders emerge during the revolution. In hindsight, he may come to look like a liberal mole in the CCP who quietly but doggedly struggled all his life to steer China a less destructive path than Mao's blood-soaked tyranny, famine, and crazy experiments, and eventually succeeded in his late years. On the other hand, even at home Mao's memory is going to get all the unquestioned scorn and condemnation it deserves as one of the worst dictators in history. Speaking of Sun, I assume ITTL the mainland and Taiwan can accomplish peaceful reunification w/o any serious difficulty, even if the island is still going to need some serious degree of autonomy. I am not sure what reunified democratic China is going to do about Chiang's legacy, Tibet, and Xinjiang/East Turkestan.

Besides the obvious vast advantages for China ITTL, its turn to liberal democracy is going to have huge regional and global positive effects. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma are going to follow similar paths, and w/o the generous PRC subsidies and strategic support, North Korea is pretty much sure to collapse in a half-decade, paving the way to democratic reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The only real issue is whether it happens because of sheer socio-economic collapse during the 1990s famine, some more enlightened member of the elite deciding the Chinese way is the path to survival and couping the Kims, or (perhaps more likely) the Kim dynasty embracing the Samson option and starting the Second Korean War when the USA turns the screws on the NK nuclear program. IOTL the PRC has been the textbook example of how authoritarianism can survive and thrive in the Information Age, a source of support and a model for would-be imitators across the world. Its revolutionary collapse is going to teach the opposite lesson and reinforce the one of 1989 in favor of liberal democracy, no matter what the backlash of globalization and neoliberalism's excesses. Anti-Western dictatorships such as Iran and Venezuela are going to miss an important source of support and may well collapse when they face their own domestic crises. Even Putin's Russia, assuming it still keeps the same main course ITTL, is going to be much weaker and forced to be more cautious on the global stage w/o soft-spoken but effective Chinese backing. Anti-Western dictators, far-right/left populist extremists, and fans of illiberal democracy can still try to tap Russia as a sponsor and model, but it simply won't be the same thing by any means. 

  If that did happen it would be a big boost to China and make E Asia even more dominant in the near future.  Also a stable reunification with Taiwan and Hong Kong is likely and would feed back into helping liberalisation in China.  How this state would view its colonies is difficult to say but you might have a decent level of self-government and less heavy handed repression in both areas.

  Your still going to get a reaction against the failure of triumphalist and reckless capitalism in Russia, very likely leading to Putin or some other dictator gaining power.  It could be worse if similar excesses lead to a melt-down in China as well.  Don't forget in this scenario, without a strong autocratic system to suppress dissent and disaffaction with gross economic mismanagement its possible it could go pear shaped there, although far from certain. 

  Alternatively, without the emergence of a politically opposing China and with possibly a weaker Putin would we get someone like Bush junior or then a Trump earlier and a US and EU probably throwing their weight around more, especially as western economic domination declines even more rapidly if China does stay democratic and sees dramatic economic and social growth?

  There are always things that can go right but also things that can go wrong and whatever happens someone's nose will be put out of joint.

[eurofed]

Jun 7, 2019 21:23:36 GMT stevep said:

If that did happen it would be a big boost to China and make E Asia even more dominant in the near future. Also a stable reunification with Taiwan and Hong Kong is likely and would feed back into helping liberalisation in China. How this state would view its colonies is difficult to say but you might have a decent level of self-government and less heavy handed repression in both areas.

Your still going to get a reaction against the failure of triumphalist and reckless capitalism in Russia, very likely leading to Putin or some other dictator gaining power.  It could be worse if similar excesses lead to a melt-down in China as well. Don't forget in this scenario, without a strong autocratic system to suppress dissent and disaffaction with gross economic mismanagement its possible it could go pear shaped there, although far from certain.

Alternatively, without the emergence of a politically opposing China and with possibly a weaker Putin would we get someone like Bush junior or then a Trump earlier and a US and EU probably throwing their weight around more, especially as western economic domination declines even more rapidly if China does stay democratic and sees dramatic economic and social growth?

No doubt a 1989 extended to China is not going to mean the onset of Utopia nor the "end of history" and serious problems, OTL has been an eloquent lesson about this kind of naive triumphalism. The excesses of mismanaged globalization, runaway hyper-capitalism, and predatory finance, not to mention mounting environmental trouble, are in all likelihood cause serious socio-economic problems and political backlash just the same way if they are not properly dealt with. In a world with a democratic China, this would probably mean the rise of far-right populism and nationalism in China much the same way as in the Western world, India, and Brazil, since I assume the far-left brand of the poison would have close to zero appeal for the Chinese after the PRC experience, not to mention the strong nationalist undercurrent of Chinese culture. It might go both ways, but I tend to assume it would probably not go all the way back to dictatorship as in Russia since thanks to Deng's reforms the socio-economic state of post-communist China would not be nearly so bad as in Russia. Perhaps if things go really bad it might be an illiberal democracy government as in Hungary or Poland, otherwise the usual Trump-like screwups as in North America or Western Europe. Managing the 1990s transition to capitalism better in Russia and hence avoiding the backlash that empowered Putin was theoretically possible but far from easy, and I do nto see how this divergence would create any especially favorable conditions for that. On the other hand, it may well be TTL includes political butterflies that avoid the Bush jr. presidency, say as a consequence of the USA fighting and winning the Second Korean War, and/or Saddam avoiding triggering the whole Gulf War-Iraq War sequence. Trump is just the American manifestation of a global problem, you need deal with the underlying issues to avoid it for sure. I am not even entirely sure managing the 1990s better in Russia is sufficient to avoid a Putin-like backlash, there is also the sore loser refusal of the Russians to accept the fall of the USSR and the consequent loss of their empire and superpower status as inevitable and beneficial for their downtrodden subjects and the rest of the world, but perhaps a less traumatic transition to capitalism would have been enough to balance their wounded pride.