Yom Kippur War in real time

[lordroel]

Day 1 of Yom Kippur War, October 6th 1973

04.00: David Elazar, IDF Chief of Staff, notifies Prime Minister Golda Meir of imminent multilateral Arab attack and proposes defensive air strike; Golda Meir rejects this for political reasons.

08.00: Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense, and David Elazar meet Golda Meir; decision to initiate partial mobilization.

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: the war begins

At 14:00, the Egyptian Army launches Operation Badr with a major air strike involving more than 200 aircraft against three airbases, Hawk SAM batteries, three command centers, artillery positions and several radar stations, employing MiG-21s, MiG-17s, and Su-7s, this in concert with artillery strikes starting at 14:05 from nearly 2,000 pieces against the Bar-Lev line and against armor concentration areas and artillery positions, using field guns, howitzers, mortars, tank guns, B-10 and B-11 recoilless rifles. The self-propelled 152 mm howitzers and 130 mm field guns are assigned as counter-battery fire missions against Israeli artillery. The 53-minute-long fire preparation, divided into four barrages with the first being fifteen minutes long is aimed at enemy targets on the eastern bank up to a depth of 1.5 kilometers. An estimated 10,500 shells are fired against Israeli targets in the first minute alone.

Simultaneously, 14 Egyptian Tupolev Tu-16 bombers attack Israeli targets in the Sinai with Kelt missiles, while another 2 Egyptian Tupolevs fire two Kelt missiles at a radar station in central Israel. One missile is shot down by a patrolling Israeli Mirage fighter and the second falls into the sea, the attack is an attempt to warn Israel that Egypt can retaliate if it bombs targets deep in Egyptian territory.

Under cover of the initial artillery barrage, the Egyptian assault force of 32,000 infantry begin crossing the canal in twelve waves at five separate crossing areas, from 14:05 to 17:30, in what becomes known as The Crossing. The Egyptians prevent Israeli forces from reinforcing the Bar Lev Line and proceed to attack the Israeli fortifications. Meanwhile, engineers crossed over to breach the sand wall.The Israeli Air Force conducts air interdiction operations to try to prevent the bridges from being erected, but it takes losses from Egyptian SAM batteries. The air attacks are ineffective overall, as the sectional design of the bridges enabled quick repairs when hit.

Painting: Egyptian assault crossing of the Suez Canal



Despite fierce resistance, the Israeli reserve brigade garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts are overwhelmed. Fifteen strongpoints are captured as Egyptian forces advanced several kilometers into the Sinai. The northernmost fortification of the Bar Lev Line, code-named 'Fort Budapest', will despite repeated assaults by Egyptian forces remained in Israeli hands throughout the war. Once the bridges are laid, additional infantry with the remaining portable and recoilless anti-tank weapons began to cross the canal, while the first Egyptian tanks started to cross at 20:30.

Map: The Egyptian Offensive on October 6th and Israeli counterattacks



The Egyptians also attempt to land several heli-borne commando units in various areas in the Sinai to hamper the arrival of Israeli reserves. This attempt meats with disaster as the Israelis shoot down "several" helicopters with "total loss of life" and that few commandos that did filter through were ineffectual and presented nothing more than a "nuisance".

Egyptian forces advance approximately 4 to 5 km into the Sinai Desert with two armies, by the end of the day some 850 Egyptian tanks will have crossed the canal.

Golan Heights Front: First Battle of Mount Hermon

Syrian attack

At around 13:00, four Soviet-built MI-8 helicopters lifted off near Damascus and flew west into Lebanon, where they circled until forty-five minutes into the Syrian shelling of the Golan. They then headed southeast toward the Israeli outpost. The Israelis detected the helicopters at about 15:00, when the team at the upper ski lift reported the sighting and fired at them until they flew out of sight. At 13:45, the artillery officer, along with other officers, noticed that the Syrian artillery units in the plain below were taking the camouflage nets from their guns.

The Syrians began shelling the outpost at 14:00. All the Israeli soldiers in the outpost concentrated in the central hall of the bunker. The platoon officer and the mortar sergeant climbed up to the observation point but had to come back down due to the heavy shelling. An observation officer, a technical assistant and a driver from the 334th Artillery Battalion left the outpost in a half-track for their planned position in the "tank curve" to help pinpoint the artillery in the northern Golan. Six Syrian MiG-17 aircraft attacked the outpost. Three of the helicopters arrived from the west. Two of them landed about thirty paratroopers on Hill 2072, south of the lower ski lift. Most of the Syrian force deployed above the curve south of the upper ski lift to block access to the outpost. A few of them advanced toward the outpost to provide cover. A third helicopter with sixteen paratroopers, who were supposed to block the "tank curve", crashed (a rotor-blade hit the slope). Only three paratroopers survived and joined their comrades at the upper ski lift. They opened fire on the Israeli half-track, which kept driving. The company commander of the EW unit and his driver, who were riding in a jeep on their way to the outpost, saw the Syrians landing and turned back to their unit at the "tank curve", under fire. Three Golani soldiers at the upper ski lift observation post saw the Syrian landing but failed to fire at them due to a machine gun malfunction. After a few minutes, they abandoned their post, which was equipped with a radio, and went down to the lower ski lift to join a platoon positioned there without informing the outpost of the Syrian landing.

While Joju's troops were taking-up positions, the rest of the 82nd Battalion, two companies under the command of Captains Jassam al Salah and Mahmoud Ma'aleh, advanced on foot from the Syrian controlled Hermon position to the Israeli outpost. They were organized in eight platoon-sized forces. At around 15:15, when the first two forces arrived near the outpost, Syrian artillery opened fire and the covering force directed small-arms fire at the outpost. Meanwhile, the fourth helicopter approached and landed sixteen more commandos. Some of them joined the charge at the outpost while the rest formed a second covering force.

When the shelling subsided small-arms fire could be heard from the central hall, Zidover, Funk and four other Golani soldiers came out to the fighting platform through the upper western opening. They saw dozens of Syrian soldiers advancing on the road toward the outpost gate and a covering force lying on the embankment outside the outpost fence. Of the three machine guns, two were out of action after the shelling. Lacking fighting positions, the outpost commander and the infantrymen opened fire with a machine gun and their personal weapons. The Syrians were surprised by the fire and halted. The machine gunner was killed and the outpost sergeant took the weapon over. The outpost commander realized that ammunition was low and went down to the central hall to contact the 820th Brigade commander, Colonel Zvi Barazani. He explained the situation and asked him to "fire on our outposts". Barazani approved and the 334th Battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Aryeh Schwartz, accepted the mission. The Golani soldiers kept firing at the Syrians and prevented them from entering the outpost until approximately 15:45, when the Israeli shelling began. At this point Barazani ordered the outpost commander to shut his men in the outpost until the shelling was over and break out only on his command. Due to a misunderstanding, the soldiers did not leave the outpost and continued defending its openings from within.

The Syrians charged into the outpost courtyard and some managed to penetrate the upper western opening into the top storey, throwing fragmentation and stun grenades and firing into the work rooms. Their entrance was hesitant and slow, and included calls in Hebrew and Arabic to the Israeli soldiers to surrender. Some went down the staircase leading to the central hall and threw grenades into it. They reached the hall but did not enter the rooms or the connecting tunnels. They may have used a smoke generator operated by a small engine. The hall filled with smoke dust and the sounds of explosions, which induceded panic among the Israeli non-combatant soldiers. Many of them were choking and believed the Syrians were using gas. The room was full of dust, they had to cover their noses with flannelette soaked in urine to breathe. They tried to take cover in the tunnels, some were in a state of shock and remained frozen in the rooms near the central hall. Between 16:00 and 17:00, some of the soldiers returned fire from various corners of the central hall in the direction of the staircase and prevented the Syrians from coming down. The outpost commander tried to concentrate the men from the different tunnels and rooms into a single tunnel. At this point, the outpost lost its connection with the outside world.

At about 17:30, the outpost commander and several infantry soldiers tried to break out through one of the tunnels in order to get out and reach the upper ski lift, but they encountered some Syrians and had to return. Most of the men were now concentrated in the same tunnel, except for the doctor and two Golani soldiers, one of whom was dead and the other wounded. Five others hid in two bunkers in the bottom storey. Since some of the men did not know their way around the outpost, they split-up in the dark into two groups, which remained close to each other. At around 19:00, the Syrians stopped clearing the interior of the Israeli position and it became relatively quiet.

Wadi Si'on

At around 16:50, the men in the "Hedva" observation post, located near the Lebanese village of Shebaa, were ordered to move back to Masada through the lower ski lift with their armored personnel carrier (APC). At about 17:00, the APC, along with an 81mm mortar half-track approached Wadi Si'on, (where the "Tali" observation point was located); both positions came under heavy fire from the ridge above them. The APC was hit by an RPG and stopped in the middle of the road. Three Israeli soldiers were killed instantly, the rest were wounded and took cover. The "Tali" commander, exposed in his half-track, was hit by a bullet in the back, but the driver started the vehicle and sped off toward the lower ski lift.

The attacking Syrians were probably the blocking force from the 87th Reconnaissance Battalion, which was supposed to take-up positions in the "tank curve" that night, but strayed into the area above the road from the lower ski lift and Shebaa farms. The Syrians maintained a constant fire and left without coming down to the road. At nightfall, at around 17:35, after the Syrians left, the "Hedva" observation post reported the encounter to the 902nd Battalion company headquarters at Shebaa farms and asked for assistance. Company headquarters reported to the 820th Brigade headquarters at Nafakh. Putting together a rescue force which included a doctor, a paramedic and five infantrymen, took an hour. The force, advancing in two APCs, moved slowly and carefully with its lights off. At about 18:30, it arrived at the location, treated the wounded and evacuated them. From that moment until the end of the war, no IDF troops entered the territory between Shebaa farms and the Hermon mountainside.

At around 19:30, Barazani ordered the commander of the Hermon Company, Lieutenant Yiftah Sagiv, to head from Masada to the lower ski lift with an APC and a tank platoon from the attached 71st Battalion, to check on the outpost and evacuate the wounded that had arrived in the afternoon. The force reached the lower ski lift at around 21:00. Saqiv saw that everything was in order and reported that fact to the battalion commander. Barazani ordered him to leave the tank platoon to defend the place. The company commander left on his own accord to evacuate the wounded to Nafakh. When he arrived near midnight, he reported to the NC chief and the others about the incidents at the Hermon.

At around 21:00, the outpost commander decided to try to escape to the lower ski lift. Due to a lack of communication with the other men, only he, five officers and eleven soldiers got out. They crossed a minefield, went down the Bul'an valley and headed west toward the upper ski lift. Just before 23:00, as they began to head down a rocky slope from the upper ski lift, the Syrian blocking force saw them and opened fire. The platoon commander and five of his men charged down the hill. Three were killed, including the platoon commander, two were taken prisoner the next day. Other officers and soldiers took cover and returned fire. The observation officer was badly wounded and later died. The other eleven, some of whom were wounded, escaped the encounter and scattered. The escapees ran down the road and encountered three Israeli tanks heading their way. One of the tanks fired at them before they could identify themselves. During the night and the next day, ten of them made their way back to the Israeli lines. A soldier from the Air Force unit in the outpost accidentally entered a 183rd Syrian Battalion position, deployed on high point 1614. He was caught and executed the next day.

Counterattack

At 18:07, NC accepted the suggestion raised by the Golani Brigade commander, Colonel Amir Drori, to try to reach the outpost. While the eleven Israeli soldiers were trying to make their escape, a Golani force – made up of Drori's command half-track, the 51st Battalion command post with companies A and B in fifteen more half-tracks, the 69th Reconnaissance Company in eight other half-tracks and the brigade's battalion collecting station in an ambulance – was on its way to the Hermon. The force left Rosh Pina at 07:01 and reached Neve Ativ at 04:01,[dubious – discuss] but NC ordered Drori to stop, fearing a Syrian breakthrough in the Hadar-Masada sector and ordered him to deploy for a block around bunkers 103, 104 and 105, with the 13th Battalion subordinated to the brigade. Unaware of the situation throughout the Golan, Drori objected, assuming it was best to strike as early as possible and deny the Syrians time to organize. He was denied, and the force started moving back via the Sa'ar Bridge toward Masada. At 04:21, Drori was ordered to organize for a block, and at 05:19 his troops were deployed in their sector.

While the reduced 51st Battalion and the 69th Company were deployed around Masada at around 07:00, a convoy came down from the lower ski lift, having been ordered to do so by the 13th Battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Ze'ev Oren. It included a tank platoon from the 71st Battalion, the infantry platoon from the 13th Battalion manning the lower ski lift in two BTR-152 APCs, the observation officer's half-track and the communications company from the 374th unit in its three vehicles. It also included the five survivors from the outpost. The three tanks remained attached to the Golani Brigade. Thirty-six soldiers were still trapped in the outpost. Two Israeli soldiers wounded in the encounter on the ridge were captured by the Syrians. Six of the soldiers who escaped made their way down the mountain, along with three observation soldiers who escaped from the upper ski lift.

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: First Battle of Fort Budapest

Background to Fort Budapest

Fort Budapest was the northernmost fort of the Israeli Bar Lev Line. Unlike all other Bar Lev Line fortifications, Budapest was not located on or immediately east of the Suez Canal. Rather, it was located on the Mediterranean Sea, 16.5 kilometers  south-east of Port Fouad. Fort Budapest was the strongest of all the Bar Lev positions due to its strategic location; the fort had control over the coastal road connecting Port Fouad to el-Arish to the east. The fort had exceptional engineering preparations and a considerable amount of weaponry. The fort incorporated nine bunkers, and was surrounded by barbed wire and minefields to a depth of 600 metres. On October 6th, the fort was garrisoned by an infantry company and two tank platoons under the command of Captain Motti Ashkenazi.

The Budapest garrison also had the advantage of terrain. Located on a narrow strip of land bounded to the north by the Mediterranean, and to the south by salt marshes, the main route of approach for an attacker was by land over the strip, which spanned 170 metres at its widest. Alternatively, the fort could be attacked via the salt marshes, or by a naval landing. However the marshes could only be traversed on foot and then only very slowly, while a naval landing was subject to sea conditions.

Prelude to the First Battle of Fort Budapest

Capturing Fort Budapest fell within the responsibility of the Port Said Sector, an Egyptian military command independent of the Second Field Army to the south. The commander of the sector, Major General Omar Khalid, assigned the task of capturing the fort to the 135th Independent Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Salah 'Abd el-Halim. The 135th was also tasked with capturing another position, Fort Orkal, so Salah committed one battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ali al-Mezahi to capture Budapest. However, Salah had the following reinforcements: six obsolete T-34 tanks equipped with mine flails to breach the Israeli minefield, eight amphibious armored vehicles, a 120 mm mortar company, and a company of the 128th Sa'iqa Group (Sa'iqa, meaning lightning, were Egyptian commando forces). The Sa'iqa company would join the attack via a naval landing and would be separated into two groups. One group would land four kilometers east of Budapest to isolate it and prevent Israeli reinforcements from reaching the fort. The other group would land one kilometer east of Budapest, and then attack the fort. The main assault would come from the west, to be carried out by the battalion and the six tanks. The battalion would attack from Port Fouad, the only part of the Sinai under Egyptian control.

To allow the Sa'iqa company to perform its landing, the Port Said Sector was to be supplied 24 assault dinghies. Only ten were received however, and on October 3, Second Army informed Khalid that there were no more dinghies available, and that he would have to improvise. Khalid resorted to renting two fishing boats. Consequently, the Sa'iqa company was tasked with simply isolating the fort; no attack from the east would be carried out

First Battle of Fort Budapest

At 14:00 several Egyptian IL-28 tactical bombers attacked Fort Budapest. The bombers were moderately accurate, some of the bombs finding their targets and others landing outside the fort's perimeter. Budapest was also targeted by an artillery barrage, beginning at 14:05. While the fire preparation was underway, the Sa'iqa company moved out of Port Said to conduct its landing east of the fort. At the same time the main attacking force began moving from its positions east of Port Fouad. In the lead were three T-34s with mine flails to breach the minefield, closely followed by combat engineers, and then the advance fireteams. Behind these, forming the first echelon of the battalion, was a platoon in amphibious vehicles supported by the three remaining T-34s.

As soon as the lead T-34s reached the minefield, they came under heavy fire from the fort's garrison. Soon all three tanks were either destroyed or damaged, so the combat engineers proceeded to breach the minefield on their own. Israeli aircraft began strafing and bombing the Egyptian forces for over two and a half hours while encountering no resistance, leading to the destruction of all six tanks and five vehicles. The Israelis bombed Egyptian forces at the minefield and on an area of the strip stretching two kilometers towards Port Fouad. Under fire from the air and from the fort, the attack bogged down to a complete halt before the Egyptians began to retreat. Salah ordered his battalion to assume defensive positions east of Port Fouad to repel any Israeli counterattack and to regroup.

The Sa'iqa company achieved the only discernible success of the attack. It managed to land four kilometers east of the fort without facing any aerial resistance (as the company was sailing in civilian fishing boats). The company managed to prevent Israeli reinforcements from reaching the fort, destroying a number of tanks and vehicles. It also captured six Israeli soldiers.

Salah plans to attempt another attack against Budapest and al-Mezahi, whose battalion would carry out the second attempt begins to take the necessary preparations. 

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Part 1 of the Battle of Marsa Talamat

A force of two Israeli Dabur class Fast Patrol Boats are anchored on buoys at Ras Sudar—then a small Israeli naval anchorage in the northern sector of the Gulf of Suez — part of a routine patrol mission in the Gulf. The Israeli boats, commanded by Navy Lt. Zvika Shahak, have left their base at Sharm al Sheikh a day before. According to Shahak, the intelligence briefing prior to the mission only included a general reference to Egyptian preparation for a possible war

At 14:10, soon after the Egyptian Army launched its surprise attack, the Daburs are ordered to leave the anchorage and to patrol along the coast towards the Israeli oil installations at Abu-Rodeis. Once at sea, the Daburs are able to observe significant traffic of Egyptian helicopters headed towards Sinai. At 15:22 the Daburs were ordered to open fire at any Egyptian helicopters or boats, but are unable to engage any of them.

The Israeli boats continue their patrol with no special events until 22:00 when they were ordered to turn south, towards Ras Zafranah, a naval anchorage used by the Egyptian Navy. Their mission is to seek, engage and destroy any enemy boats they can find. The boats arrive at Ras Zafranah anchorage, and find it empty. By that time The Daburs losses communications with their home-base at Sharm, which unknown by them had been attacked by Egyptian Raduga KSR-2 cruise missiles. Even though he was not ordered to do so, Shahak decides to inspect Marsa Talamat, an anchorage further south from Ras Zafranah

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Battle of Fort Lahtzanit

Plan of attack

The Egyptian 30th Independent Infantry Brigade is tasked with capturing Fort Lahtzanit, located at the Kilometer 19 mark south of Port Fuoad. Fort Lahtzanit is surrounded by minefields and barbed wire to a depth of 600 metres, and incorporated seven bunkers. The commander of the 30th Brigade, Colonel Mustafa el-'Abassi, commits an infantry battalion to capture the Israeli fort. The battalion will cross at three different points, between an area 2 kilometres  south and 1.5 kilometres north of the fort. Initially the battalion will try to encircle the fort and cut it off from north, east and south, before the battalion's assault units will move to attack the fort from several directions. 'Abassi is also tasked with overseeing the defense of the Port Said Sector, and thus has deployed two battalions on the west bank to defend against an Israeli naval landing or canal-crossing. Additionally, 'Abassi is reinforced with a Sa'iqa company (Egyptian commandos). Per planning the company will cross the canal south of the fort, then advance eastward to seize a crossroads located eight kilometers east of the canal, while simultaneously working to intercept enemy reserves headed towards the fort.

Isolation of Fort Lahtzanit

At 1:55, just before the Egyptian attack on the Suez Canal is to to begin a reconnaissance force swam to the east bank of the Suez Canal, two kilometers south of Fort Lahtzanit, and laid two ropes across the canal to facilitate the crossing of friendly forces.

At 2:05 an artillery barrage is initiated against the fort using just the 85 mm guns and B-10 recoilless rifles of the brigade's anti-tank company, the use of high trajectory artillery guns is forbidden since a number of Egyptian aircraft are flying over this area.

The troops tasked with isolating Fort Lahtzanit begin to cross the canal in dinghies at 2:15. Ten minutes later they reached the east bank and proceeded to climb the sand wall. They succeeded in attracting Israeli fire, thereby facilitating the main assault force in its mission to attack the fort later on. The troops tasked with isolating the fort from the east reach and occupied a firing ramp prepared for tanks, and raised the Egyptian flag over it. This severely demoralize the Israeli soldiers inside Fort Lahtzanit. Soon after the Sa'iqa company (less one platoon) arrives at the firing ramp as well.

A reserve of eight M48 Patton tanks are pushed forward to reinforce the fort. They come up against the eastern isolation force, which destroyed one of the tanks at a range of 300 metres. Another tank breaks through the Egyptian position and proceeds immediately north towards Fort Orkal, but is destroyed at Kilometer 14 by the northern isolation force. The remaining tanks retreat eastwards to Baluza.

Attack against Fort Lahtzanit

At around 2:50, the B-10 rifles on the west bank manage to open a breach in the barbed wire surrounding the fort and also destroyed other significant targets, such as the observation equipment. Meanwhile, combat engineers are breaching further openings using Bangalore torpedoes, under heavy small arms fire and hand grenades. The battalion's main assault force was crossing at the same time. The main assault force then funneled through the breaches and entered the Israeli trenches. The Israeli command in Northern Sinai kept receiving frantic calls for help from the fort's radio operator, and gunfire could also be heard. The Egyptians captured the southern sector of the fort by 3:05. Five minutes later, the assault force moved against the northern sector of the fort. Within fifteen minutes, the Egyptians were in control of the fort. The power generator inside the fort was destroyed, and all electricity and communication lines leading to the fort were severed. At 3:30 p.m., Maj. Gen. Khaled was informed that Lahtzanit had been seized and that Israeli soldiers had been captured. The Israelis reported losing radio contact with the fort at around 4:00.

The Egyptians proceeded to clear the bunkers. They utilized flamethrower teams, which had a visible psychological impact on the fort's garrison. At one point, the Egyptians, with the help of a wounded Israeli prisoner, managed to secure a bunker by convincing the panicked Israelis inside to come out and surrender. Soon after losing contact with the fort, the Israelis attempted to reach it once more. By this time, Malhov was dead. A group of tanks from Baluza advanced to Lahtzanit, but the Sa'iqa company occupying the firing ramp managed to destroy two tanks, forcing the remainder to retreat. Another group of tanks and half-tracks tried to break through the southern isolation force, but were ambushed and withdrew after losing a tank.

At 4:00, two anti-tank teams joined the Sa'iqa company on the firing ramp. Both teams, along with the company, were ordered to advance eastward and seize the crossroads. At around 5:00 p.m., the Israeli Air Force began attacking Egyptian forces in the fort and on the west bank of the canal. One group of four aircraft attempted to bomb the fort; the first aircraft dropped its payload of seven bombs, then descended to a low altitude to escape anti-aircraft fire. An anti-air platoon at the Kilometer 17 mark soon shot down an Israeli aircraft (either a Mirage III or an A-4 Skyhawk) with a Strela 2 missile, destroying it. Between 6:00 and 7:00. all bunkers and troop shelters inside the fort were cleared, and the Egyptians transferred 26 Israeli prisoners to the west bank of the canal, and thereafter transferred them to Port Said for intelligence gathering. The Israelis concentrated heavy artillery fire against the fort, once they were sure it had been captured by the Egyptians.

At 9:30., the Sa'iqa company reported an Israeli armored column advancing towards the fort. Two Egyptian tanks on the west bank opened fire, forcing the Israeli tanks and armored vehicles to withdraw. The company continued eastwards, eventually reaching the crossroads, facing no resistance along the way. With the reinforcing anti-tank teams, the company established defensive positions, and el-'Abassi dispatched patrols to secure the roads leading to the fort.

Golan Heights Front: Day 1 of the Tears Battle

At 13:55, while Nafshi's sector came under a heavy artillery barrage, several soldiers along the Purple Line reported that the Syrians were removing the camouflage nets from their tanks and artillery. Ben Shoham ordered his battalion commanders, Nafshi and Oded Erez, to deploy their nearly seventy Centurion tanks in prepared battle positions. Nafshi was at Kuneitra when the order came to deploy his platoons and move his headquarters somewhere safer. He immediately ordered his troops to leave the town, and the tanks to advance while the soft vehicles fell back. Erez's 53rd Battalion was moved to the southern Golan. One of Nafshi's platoons of three tanks was near the Wassett crossroads when Syrian jets attacked Tel Abu Nida. When the jets departed, the crews began moving to the bunker line. After one kilometre, they came under large-caliber artillery fire. Before 14:00, Nafshi reported to his brigade headquarters that his battalion was ready for combat and was manning the Booster ridge.

The Syrian 85th Infantry Brigade assault column reached the Israeli anti-tank ditch before its officers noticed that the engineers were not in the vanguard. They decided to dismount tank crewmen and mechanized infantrymen and rush them on foot to improvise crossings. This halted the attack in full Israeli view and exposed the men to Israeli fire. Nafshi ordered his men to destroy the bridging tanks. During the afternoon the Israelis destroyed most of the Syrian bridging tanks within sight, putting them out of action with shots fired at a range of 1.8 km. Only two of the bridging tanks managed to reach the anti-tank ditch north of A3. The Syrians threw two bridges and a company of ten tanks crossed the ditch. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) was called into action, but many planes were shot down.

The first close combat commenced in the 74th Battalion's northernmost sector, against the Moroccan Brigade of thirty tanks. One Israeli Centurion was hit, and an Israeli platoon that was sent northward to guard the Dan Road was caught between the Moroccans moving against Tel Shaeta and a Syrian battalion closing in from the west. Avner Landau's company, now with seven Centurions, was also threatened and could not help. Nafshi delegated the area north of Hermonit to his deputy, Major Yosef Nissim, and reinforced the sector with Captain Eyal Shaham's company, leaving a company from the Armor School Tank Battalion as a tactical reserve. In forty minutes, every Barak Brigade Centurion in the northern Golan was committed. Nissim ordered Shaham to reinforce the trapped platoon around Tel Shaeta, and ordered his deputy, Lieutenant Asaf Sela, to cover the area south of Tel Shaeta, which could provide easy access to Hermonit, with one platoon. The Moroccans continued to fire at Tel Shaeta, but did not advance, and the Syrian battalion was stopped when its leading vehicles were destroyed on the roadway. The Syrian battalion commander decided to move southward and try to penetrate between the Dan Road and Hermonit. He was unaware that he was moving between the forces of Shaham and Sela, who prepared a trap. They opened fire just before 15:00, using superior positions. After a little more than two hours, the Syrians withdrew, leaving behind their bridging tanks, a bulldozer tank, two BRDMs and six main battle tanks. Shaham's company lost two Centurions. Just before nightfall, Shaham noticed three SU-100 gun carriers and a truck close to Nissim's position, from which Nissim could not engage them. Shaham directed Sela, who could not see the Syrians, to intercept them. Sela, accompanied by one other Centurion, opened fire at the rear of the Syrian force and destroyed them at a range of 200 to 300 meters. Two Syrian tanks attempted to cross the open ground to the anti-tank ditch in the unguarded area south of Nissim's sector. The Syrian companies began moving toward that area, hoping to cross just before nightfall. As darkness fell, Nafshi ordered one company to move forward towards the Syrian bridges across the ditch to destroy the tanks that had crossed. The Syrian company that crossed was hit by Landau's tanks and destroyed after half an hour. The bridgehead was sealed.

In late afternoon, Hofi decided that the Barak Brigade's 65 tanks could not contain the Syrian attack alone, and committed the 7th Brigade's 105 Centurions. Believing that the northern sector was more crucial than the southern sector because of the Kuneitra Gap, he ordered Ben Gal to assume command of the area from Bunker 107 northward. The Barak Brigade was now put in charge of the southern sector, already occupied by Erez's 53rd Battalion. The 74th Battalion was transferred to the 7th Brigade, while the newly arrived 82nd Battalion, under the command of Captain Meir "Tiger" Zamir, and two companies from the newly arrived 75th Armored Infantry Battalion from the 7th Brigade to the Barak Brigade.[clarification needed] Avigdor Kahalani's 77th Battalion, which was familiar with the terrain after having worked there for a week, was returned to the 7th Brigade. Ben Gal decided to create a personal reserve by attaching one company of the 82nd Battalion to the 7th Brigade's headquarters. After an hour, the 82nd Battalion was transferred to the Barak Brigade.

By nighttime, Nafshi was placed under the command of the 7th Brigade. The Syrians kept advancing in columns, using colored lights and flags to distinguish units. Some of them struck Israeli minefields. The Israeli forces did not have adequate optical equipment for night fighting, and had to gauge the position of the Syrian forces by their noise and artillery flares. Nafshi's battalion kept changing positions to avoid tank hunters. The fortifications were under heavy attack by tanks and infantry and were calling for help. Nafshi told them to go underground and provided them with supporting artillery fire.

Abrash committed his division's 78th Armored Brigade in the northern sector at 22:00. He was behind schedule, but expected to make up for it if the 78th Brigade could reach and secure the Kuneitra-Mas'ade Road, four and a half kilometres west of its starting line. It was believed that achieving this mission would cause the Israeli defenses to collapse. Each of the 82nd Brigade's ninety-five T-55's tanks was equipped with a specially designed infrared nightscope. The night was brightly moonlit. The 82nd Brigade moved up the valley just two and a half kilometres from the Kuneitra-Masada Road. Ben Gal used his artillery for illumination, and ordered his men to remain silent until the Syrians were well within range. By 22:00, the Syrian tanks were within 800 meters of the Israeli positions. Both sides lost tanks to the terrain. Captain Yair Swet, a 77th Battalion company commander, was ordered to move to Booster and lost two tanks as a result. One crew managed to extricate its tank and use it to pull the other, but the delay distracted the battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Yosef Eldar, commander of the 75th Armored infantry Battalion and responsible for the area penetrated by the 78th Brigade, was wounded, and Ben Gal ordered Kahalani to assume responsibility. At this point, Kahalani's companies were scattered across seventeen kilometres between Hermonit and Bunker 109. One Syrian tank was discovered only after Kahalani ordered one of the companies to turn off their lights. A Syrian anti-tank unit tried to advance down the Bnot Yaakov Road, in front of Bunker 107, not knowing it was occupied. The Israelis opened fire and after a brief battle the Syrians retreated. The 78th Brigade and its supporting units hunkered down.

[stevep]

Excellent example of the sheer amount of chaos of war, especially at the lower tactical level with both sides split into scattered groups who are desperately trying to link up, find out what's going on and work together to achieve their respective plans.

[lordroel]

Day 2 of Yom Kippur War, October 7th 1973

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Egyptian bridgehead is enlarged

The Egyptian bridgehead is enlarged with an additional 4 km, at the same time repulsing Israeli counterattacks. In the north, the Egyptian 18th Division attacks the town of El-Qantarah el-Sharqiyya, engaging Israeli forces in and around the town. The fighting there is conducted at close quarters and sometimes hand-to-hand. The Egyptians are forced to clear the town building by building. By evening, most of the town will be in Egyptian hands. El-Qantarah is completely cleared by the next morning.

Photo: Egyptian vehicle crosses the canal over one of the bridges, October 7th



Meanwhile, the Egyptian commandos airdropped the day before begin to encounter Israeli reserves. Both sides suffer heavy losses, but the commandos are at times successful in delaying the movement of Israeli reserves to the front.

Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces David Elazar visit Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern front who had only taken the position three months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon and also meets with Israeli commanders. The Israelis plan a cautious counterattack for the following day by Abraham Adan's 162nd Armored Division.

Israeli Air Force carry out Operation Tagar, aimed at neutralizing Egyptian Air Force bases and its missile defense shield with 7 Egyptian airbases being damaged with the loss of two A-4 Skyhawks and their pilots. Two more planned attacks are called off because of the increasing need for air power on the Syrian front. The IAF carries out additional air attacks against Egyptian forces on the east bank of the canal, reportedly inflicting heavy losses. Israeli jets carried out hundreds of sorties against Egyptian targets by the following day but the Egyptian SAM shield inflicts heavy losses. IAF aircraft losses mount to three aircraft for every 200 sorties, an unsustainable rate. The Israelis respond by rapidly devising new tactics to thwart Egyptian air defenses.

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Part 2 of the Battle of Marsa Talamat

The two Israeli Daburs arrive at Marsa Talamat after 01:00 am on the night of October 6th to October 7th. Shahak maneuvers his vessel into the anchorage, while ordering the other to stay outside for cover. Upon entry, Shahak discovered a Bertram class patrol boat and two Zodiacs filled with Egyptian naval commandos in their battle gear and about to depart. The Dabur open fire first and the Zodiacs sink immediately. The Dabur then maneuvered to attack the Bertram, and while doing so runs aground about 20 meters from the coastline. Both engines stopped. As it ran aground, the Dabur comes under heavy gun, rocket and light-arm fire, including from 14.5mm Coastal Guns. Shahak has his men returning fire and at the same time called the second Dabur for support. As the second boat entered the anchorage, it too runs aground. The boats remain aground for over two hours under heavy enemy fire, before they were able to extricate themselves.

During the fight the Bertram is severely damaged but does not sink. The Israelis are only able to sink it by firing a 25 mm flare gun, which ignites the Bertram causing it to explode.

Once back afloat, the Israeli boats retreat and made their way to Abu-Zaneima where they were met at 04:22 by an Israeli Air Force Helicopter which evacuates the wounded. Altogether, 1 Israeli crewman is killed and 7 wounded. The Egyptians loose the Bertram and the two Zodiacs, all loaded with naval commandos about to depart on a mission.

Golan Heights Front: Prelude to the Second Battle of Mount Hermon

Syrian preparations

Following the 82nd Syrian Paratroop Battalion's complete takeover of the Israeli Hermon outpost on October 7th, the 82nd Syrian Paratroop Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Ahmad Rifai al-Joju, spent the morning clearing the site. He oversaw the burial of the Israeli bodies and the transportation of the Israeli prisoners out of the area. In the afternoon, he was ordered to prepare a blocking position downslope of the outpost. The battalion deployed between the upper ski lift and the Israeli outpost, getting ready for an Israeli counterattack. A company, reinforced by the battalion's supporting arms, deployed south of the lower ski lift, mostly west of the road. The fighters deployed along the slopes descending from the curves and built positions by heaping stones between the local rocks. A recoilless gun team took positions in a dugout east of the road. The engineering troops deployed a string of exposed mines on the road about 350 meters north of the "tank curve". The other two companies deployed in the commanding areas west of the outpost and south of the access road, from the landing-field to Hill 2072. one platoon positioned in the outpost, along with twenty engineering soldiers and the twenty-five men battalion mortar company without the mortars. In that area, two B-10 RCLs, aimed at the road leading from the upper ski lift to the outpost, and four Strela antiaircraft operators were also stationed. The battalion commander command post also took position west of the outpost, and a platoon was deployed near it to break counterattacks. Two observation officers were deployed in the outpost itself.

At dawn, the 183rd Commando Battalion was deployed on high point 1614 on the Hermon mountainside, southwest of the 82nd Battalion. The 183rd Battalion was the northern flank along with the 68th Infantry Brigade and the Moroccan expeditionary force in the 7th Infantry Division's breakthrough attempt. Its mission was apparently to capture Bunker 103 in Majdal Shams and then move through the Ya'afuri Valley to block the Majdal Shams-Masada road and later move across the Banias to Ghajar. On the night of October 6th -7th, it moved westward on foot from the Hadar area through the Hermon slopes and deployed on high point 1614. In the afternoon, its reconnaissance company seems to have attacked Bunker 103 and then retreated back to the battalion area. 

Naval battles of the Yom Kippur War: Battle of Latakia (Israel and Syria)

Four Israeli Navy Sa'ar 3-class and one Sa'ar 4-class missile boats headed towards the Syrian port of Latakia in two parallel columns. In the western column were the missile boats Miznak (Blast), Ga'ash (Storm), and Hanit (Lance); the eastern column was composed of the missile boats Mivtach (Reliance) and Reshef (Spark)).

At 22:28 hours the Israelis encountered the Syrian K-123 torpedo boat which was sunk with 76mm cannon fire from Mivtach and Hanit. As they headed toward the shore, the Israeli ships engaged a 560-ton Syrian T43-class minesweeper and also sank it, this time using four Gabriel anti-ship missiles. At 23:30 the Israelis made contact with two Syrian Komar-class and one Osa-class missile boats. The Syrian missile boats fired their Styx missiles at long range, but as the missiles approached, the Israelis employed electronic countermeasures and launched chaff rockets to successfully decoy the missiles. When the Israeli ships closed the range, they fired five Gabriel missiles, sinking one Komar and the Osa immediately and damaging the second Komar. The surviving Syrian Komar tried to escape, but it ran aground in shallow water and was destroyed by 76mm cannon fire at 00:26 hours.

Map of the Battle of Latakia



Golan Heights Front: Day 2 of the Tears Battle

At 07:00, Israeli Skyhawks begin flying over the southern Golan. The first four come down from the southwest and within seconds, they are hit by Syrian surface-to-air missiles. Several minutes later, another foursome approached and two are shot down.

At 08:00, the 78th Tank Brigade of the 7th Division launches a second attack. It advances along a 4 kilometer wide front in the valley in the direction of Wassett. The 75th Battalion is fighting a Syrian brigade, at ranges varying from 9–2,100 m. Meanwhile, the 74th Battalion in the north is attacked by two Syrian battalions, supported by an armored infantry force in APCs, most of which are destroyed. The Syrian objective in this attack is a wadi running in the direction of Wassett along the base of Hermonit. 

The 77th Battalion is moved from south of Kuneitra to the central sector at Hermonit. Kahalani is ordered to leave a small force to the south to protect the brigade flank. The 74th Battalion, having lost about ten tanks, remained in the north. The company Kahalani left behind is attacked in the afternoon, but the attacking Syrian force of about twenty tanks are destroyed. The 7th Brigade lost three company commanders in the morning fighting, and over a dozen tanks were damaged or destroyed, none of which were replaced. Late in the day, Ben Gal met with Kahalani and Eldar, who was wounded, on the southern slope of Booster to review the events. Meanwhile, Kahalani's deputy, Major Eitan Kauli, supported the forces fighting in that sector. With troops from the 75th Battalion, he began rearming, refueling, and salvaging tanks and APCs. Three Centurions at a time were withdrawn from the front-line positions and worked over at Wassett. This gave the crewmen a chance to eat, drink, and rest, and improved the brigade's morale.

The Syrians attacked the central sector again at 22:00 with artillery. The 7th Division was joined by the 64th and 66th Field Artillery Regiments with the 81st Brigade, led by T-62 tanks, which were turned over from the General Headquarters to allow Abrash to mount a new offensive around the Tapline-Wassett crossroads in the north-central Golan. The 81st Brigade arrived five hours after it was ordered out of the Kiswe, Syria Military Base. With 400 artillery pieces, the 85th Infantry Brigade was to commit a company each of tanks and infantry to its divisional northern sector. The 78th and 81st Brigades were to commit over a hundred infantry-supported tanks in the divisional central sector, and the 121st Mechanized Brigade was to press some of its assault on Kuneitra with the help of BRDM-mounted Sagger anti-tank missiles. All units were to be equipped with anti-tank weapons, mostly RPGs. In total, about 500 tanks were to attack at 22:00.[29]

Nafshi's force of five tanks at Bunker 107 was the first to report the new Syrian attack. Given the small size of his force, Nafshi's position was vulnerable when faced with this heavy attack, and his tank's turret was damaged. He decided to allow the T-62s to close in on in order to reduce the Syrian advantages of numbers and night-vision. Close to 22:00, the Syrians approached within 450 meters of the bunker. He hit two tanks and whispered commands through his microphone. After four minutes, 25 Syrian tanks were destroyed and their attack disturbed. Nafshi's force suffered no casualties. Most of the Syrian artillery fire fell on the Israeli units in the north. Kahalani warned his men to remain on the lookout for antitank squads.

The Israeli brigade, with less than 40 tanks, is facing approximately 500 Syrian tanks. Due to the Israelis' lack of night-fighting equipment, the Syrians reach within close range and a battle commence at ranges of 27–55 m. The Syrian tanks and commandos bypass the Israelis and destroyed many tanks with RPGs. At 01:00, the Syrians retreat, trying to evacuate damaged tanks and wounded. Ben-Gal struck the area with artillery and used the interval to refuel and reload. At 04:00, the Syrians renew their attacks. This time, they attack mainly with artillery and do not renew any major tank assaults. Only in the 7th Brigade's southern sector, the 7th Syrian Division 121st Mechanized Brigade was able to hold on.

At dawn, 130 Syrian tanks and many APCs were lying in the valley, many of them behind or between the Israeli positions. During the night, two Syrian infantry battalions attacked the position on Hermonit and were fought off by less than twenty Israeli infantry troops from the Golani Brigade. Dozens of bodies are left lying on the battlefield.

[lordroel]

Day 3 of Yom Kippur War, October 8th 1973

Israel: Going nuclear

Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir authorize the assembly of thirteen 20-kiloton nuclear warheads on Jericho missiles and F-4s, which are prepared for action against Syrian and Egyptian targets, their preparation is made easily detectable, likely as a signal to the United States.

Golan Heights Front: Second Battle of Mount Hermon

At 08:00 the Golani forces started making their way up the road from Masada to Majdal Shams and from there to the lower ski lift. Their movement coincided with a heavy Syrian shelling aimed at the road crossing Majdal Shams, but most of the shells landed between the houses and the ridges above it, did not hit the forces and did not interrupt their advance. The column was headed by the two tanks, followed by the 51st Battalion Company B's half-tracks, the reconnaissance half-tracks and finally the 17th Battalion half-tracks. When the 51st Battalion column reached 1,500 meters from the village, where the road crosses the dirt road ascending from Neve Ativ, the column stopped. The fighters dismounted and organized for a climb up the ridge. The tanks, Drori's command post and the 17th Battalion forces kept slowly driving up the road. At about 08:15, right before the climb, Peled briefed his Company B's commander and the reconnaissance deputy commander about the mission. The communication was conducted on the battalion frequency, and only Peled had another radio unit tuned to the brigade frequency. After several minutes, they began moving in the following order: the reconnaissance force of thirty-three fighters under the deputy company commander, Lieutenant Shaul Lev, moved first on the path climbing up the ridge. The leading force moved on the ridge east of the path, on which the rest of the force moved. A few dozen meters behind the reconnaissance force was the command post. About 200 meters behind it the command post were columns of Company B, under Lieutenant Dov Schechter's command, with fifty-six fighters. The battalion collecting station under Lieutenant Doctor Sidi Yehezkel was last.

During the climb, Syrian artillery shells kept falling. Drori ordered the forces to try and spot the enemy while moving. The sky was clouded with medium-strength wind. Every once in a while, a low cloud passed, narrowing the sight. At around 09:45, after an hour and a half's climb up the ascent, when the lead force reached about 350 meters from the foot of Hill 1614, the Syrian 183rd Commando Battalion deployed on the hill opened fire. Soon, several soldiers were hit. The battle continued until around 16:00, with Peled first trying to flank the Syrians from the right (east) with a reduced Company B. The flanking failed, and the company medical aidman was killed and three fighters wounded during the retreat. After that, a platoon was sent to flank from the west, again covered by the reconnaissance company, but the commander was killed and the force retreated. From the "tank curve" Drori sent down the Hermon mountainside a force of sixteen fighters under the 17th Battalion Company B deputy commander, Lieutenant Moti Rosen, to attack the Syrian force from behind. The force succeeded in sneaking up the Syrians undetected and opened fire, causing many casualties but one of its fighters was killed and three wounded. At around 12:30 the 51st Battalion started getting artillery support from a 334th Battalion 155mm self-propelled gun deployed near Bukata. At about 14:30, under artillery cover, the battalion charged the Syrian force from southwest and captured high point 1614, chasing away the last Syrians left on it. The Company B commander was wounded in the charge. Meanwhile, the battalion was ordered to retreat to the "bus parking" due to the 17th Battalion's failed attack near the upper ski lift. In the battle of high point 1614 four Israeli fighters were killed and thirteen wounded. The IDF estimated the Syrian casualties at twenty killed and an unknown number of wounded.

While the 51st Battalion was climbing up the Hermon mountainside, the motorized column with two tanks kept advancing up the road toward the outpost. The tanks were followed by the 17th Battalion forces in the following order: Company C, under Captain Yaakov Sela, the reconnaissance company's squad commanders course company, totaling at thirty-three fighters on three half-tracks. The fourth half-track was the 17th Battalion commander's command post. Drori's command half-track, followed by Company B, with eighty fighters on seven half-tracks. The brigade doctor, Captain Doctor Shraga Myblum, with two paramedics from the brigade infirmary, joined one of the half-tracks. The advance was uneventful until the lower ski-lift position. The tanks deployed in the parking lot south of the ski lift and fired at the constructions, which were empty since the 13th Battalion fighters left them on Sunday. The constructions were searched and it turned out the Syrians did not reach them. The Israeli flag was removed to be hoisted on the outpost after its recapture. A tracked bulldozer belonging to a contractor who had worked on the upper ski lift was started on Drori's order and attached to the column in case a roadblock was needed. At 09:20, Drori reported to NC that he had passed the lower ski lift and was heading toward the upper ski lift.

The Syrian blocking commander spotted the Israeli motorized column as it passed the "bus park". He briefed his men to the possibility of an assault and reported to the 82nd Battalion commander on its advance. Due to the terrain and low visibility that morning, the column was unseen by him until it reappeared as it ascended from the lower ski lift on its way to the "tank curve". When the Israeli column reached the sharp curve where the road crosses Wadi Guvta, about 750 meters from the "tank curve", the B-10 RCL team fired at it. The two shells missed and exploded on the wadi slope. Only the 17th Battalion commander's command post returned fire in the general direction, since no one identified its source. The column kept moving until the two tanks and the two Company C half-tracks passed the "tank curve" and stopped about 100 meters to its north. It stopped there in order to disembark a force from Company C to scan the ridge and secure its flank. A force commanded by the Company B commander was also left there to assist the 51st Battalion, after being personally briefed by Drori. While the motorized column was heading toward the "tank curve", at 09:30 a pair of aircraft form Squadron 110 attacked the Syrian forces on the Hermon. The planes had been waiting for a long time over Northern Israel. A Strela missile was fired at one of them, but missed. The aerial attack was not coordinated with Drori, and he was not updated when it took place. At that time the sky was very clouded, and the planes may have attack the Syrian Hermon.

At around 10:00, while the 51st Battalion's leading force was exchanging fire with the Syrian force on high point 1614, and the Company B deputy commander force started moving down the range to assist the battalion, Dror ordered the Company C commander to ascend on foot to on the dirt road with two teams from his company from the "tank curve" up the ridge above the road leading to the upper ski lift, to secure the motorized column's flank, which was planned to arrive from behind. About twenty-two fighters including the company commander started moving on for on the dirt road leading through the ridgeline toward high point 2072. At that time, low clouds began to cover the landscape, and visibility was limited to a few dozen meters. A team under a platoon commander deployed right of the ridgeline and another team was deployed left of it. The company commander moved with another soldier in the center, slightly behind. After a few minutes of climb, when the first team had ascended about 200 meters up the ridge, and ahead the terrain was starting to slant, the leading force suddenly spotted below and to the right a group of ten to fifteen soldiers on the move. When they identified them as Syrians, they ran to capture the commanding area. The Syrians were also running there while opening fire. The Syrians charged several times while throwing grenades at the Israeli force, who took cover. In a very short range encounter, the Syrians were stopped and lost several soldiers. Another Syrian contingent, already located in hidden positions inside a commanding mound, fired RPG-7 shells and accurate sniper fire at them. The Israeli force was caught in a crossfire and could not advance. The Israelis were completely exposed and could not raise their heads. The Syrian force was the counterattack force of the 82nd Battalion commander with about twenty fighters. They were armed with AK-47s, RPD submachine guns, RPG antitank weapons, antitank grenades and hand grenades. The battalion commander sent it after the blocking force reported that the motorized Israeli column had reached the "tank curve". It took positions in a rocky mound about 500 meters north of the "tank curve", commanding the string of mines the Syrians had laid on the road two days earlier.

Since the encounter the two Company C teams were practically separate. The commander of the first team and its sergeant moved upfront with about half the team, got into a battle with a small Syrian force and were wounded. The Syrians charged at them but were stopped, mostly by the team's machine gunner, who was killed in the battle. When their ammunition started to run out, the first team retreated. The dead soldier was left on the spot. Meanwhile, the company commander tried to advance with the rest of the first team, but was wounded twice during the advance. He asked for artillery support, but was denied. When he felt he was losing control of the battle, he asked for permission to retreat. His request was approved after about an hour and fifteen minutes of fighting. The second team moved between the ridgeline and the road and heard the fire aimed at the first team. The commander and his sergeant moved ahead to look for the source of the fire. After about 100 meters up the ridge, they too drew fire from the rocks commanding the road. They called the team to join them and started moving, covering each other, until they spotted Syrian soldiers firing and throwing grenades at both the half-tracks on the road and the first team. The commander, the sergeant and the machine gunner charged, and entered the Syrian formation. In a very short range battle they succeeded in killing and wounding approximately ten Syrians, but the commander and two fighters were killed and their bodies were left on the spot. The sergeant and the other fighters kept charging northward and arrived at the western slopes of Hill 2072, where they exchanged fire at medium range with the Syrians located on the slopes. After a while the team began to retreat toward the "tank curve", evacuating the wounded. Two fighters who were killed could not be evacuated were left on the spot due to the Syrian fire. Because of the debacle and the fact that the commanders were hit, the battalion frequency became disorderly, with hysterical reports of casualties and requests for assistance. The commanders switched to the brigade frequency and could not understand the actual situation. The artillery officer's request for artillery support to aid the 17th Battalion was answered a few shells at the upper ski lift, before the battery was moved to a different sector. At about 11:30 Drori authorized the Company C force to retreat to the "tank curve". Out of the twenty-two company fighters who ascended the ridge, four were killed and nine wounded. The four dead bodies were left on the spot, on Drori's permission. The wounded were evacuated to the "tank curve" and then taken by half-tracks to the brigade medical corps company deployed west of Masada.

While the two Company C teams were fighting up the range leading to high point 2072, Drori ordered Dror to take his tanks and Company B on half-tracks toward the upper ski lift. The string of mines laid on the road and the Syrian blocking force stopped them. Dror, his Intelligence officer and the 334th Battalion artillery officer were killed during the mine clearing, and the brigade doctor and operations officer were wounded. After the mines were cleared, the two tanks and three half-tracks moved ahead, under the command of Captain Aryeh Peled. About 500 meters after the "tank curve", the Syrian blocking force fired antitank and sniper fire at the Israelis, and stopped them. Eight Company B soldiers were killed and many wounded near the upper ski lift. A Company B platoon sent parallel to the motorized column to assist Company C was climbing the ridgeline uncoordinated with the Company C commander arrived at the lower part of Hill 2072. An attached officer and two fighters were killed and left on the spot. When Drori ordered a retreat, the rest of the platoon retreated with its wounded down the hill. Under the cover of the heavy fog, all the armored vehicles were evacuated backwards, and all the Israeli forces retreated to the tank curve, and later to the "bus park". Drori remained in the "tank curve" until the 51st Battalion stopped fighting on Hill 1613 and the Company B force got there. The Brigade Training Base staff company was ordered to stay around Masada, but followed the column up to the lower ski lift. It retreated to the "bus park" along with the others. Only the 12th Battalion command post and his Company A, who were ordered during the battle to reinforce the motorized column, remained at the "tank curve" until about 16:15.

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: failed Israel attack

With Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces David Elazar having left, Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern front changes the plans on the basis of unduly optimistic field reports. Adan's 162nd Armor Division was composed of three brigades totaling 183 tanks. One of the brigades was still en route to the area, and would participate in the attack by noon, along with a supporting mechanized infantry brigade with an additional 44 tanks. The Israeli counterattack was in the direction of the Bar Lev strongpoints opposite the city of Ismailia, against entrenched Egyptian infantry. In a series of ill-coordinated attacks, which were met by stiff resistance, the Israelis suffered heavy losses.

That afternoon, Egyptian forces advance once more to deepen their bridgeheads and as a result the Israelis loose several strategic positions. Further Israeli attacks to regain the lost ground proved futile. Towards nightfall, an Egyptian counterattack is repulsed with the loss of 50 Egyptian tanks by the Israeli 143rd Armored Division, which is led by General Ariel Sharon, who has been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war.

Golan Heights Front: Day 3 of the Tears Battle

The 7th Brigade fought against elements of the 7th Infantry Division, the 3rd Armored Division and independent units, including the Assad Republican Guard. On the brigade's southern flank, Zamir's company fought an armored force that had entered the area during the night. Zamir's force of seven tanks held the attack and eliminated about thirty Syrian tanks, two APC companies and twenty vehicles. In the afternoon, three individual Syrian tank battalion concentrations with armored infantry tried to break through in the Hermonit area. The Syrian artillery identified the Israeli positions and inflicted most of its casualties. The 7th Brigade lost about 50 dead and many wounded, and were left with less than 45 working tanks. Ben-Gal decided to create a reserve of five tanks under the command of his operations officer, whom he ordered to move back about half a kilometre away and prepare to block a Syrian breakthrough.

At dusk, Abrash's tank was hit just as he was getting it ready for a new attack, and he was killed. At night, the Syrians attacked the central sector towards Booster. Ben-Gal ordered Zamir's company to counterattack from the flank and the rear of the enemy. Zamir's seven tanks managed to break the attack

Map: battle of the Golan heights, October 8th



Naval battles of the Yom Kippur War: Part 1 of the Battle of Baltim (Israel and Egypt)

Background to the Battle of Baltim

On the third day of the war, the Israel Defense Forces launched a counterattack in the Sinai in an attempt to push the Egyptian Army back across the Suez Canal. Israeli naval command expected ground pressure on Port Said to prompt a withdrawal of Egyptian naval assets from the local harbor to Alexandria, 180 kilometres to the west. A flotilla of Israeli missile boats was therefore ordered to proceed to Port Said. The boats, having just arrived back in Haifa after the Battle of Latakia, had not yet completed refueling. Nevertheless, within twenty-five minutes eight boats were heading south at thirty knots. These arrived off Port Said five hours later, meeting Commander Michael Barkai who was already on station with two boats. By that time, the counterattack in the Sinai had failed and the Egyptian boats did not leave the port.

Barkai and Admiral Binyamin Telem decided to lure the Egyptians out by shelling coastal targets along the Nile delta. At 21:00, just as they began shelling, they detected targets to the west. The Israeli boats charged at forty knots, but after about thirty minutes it turned out that they had been chasing electronic shadows. Halting to regroup, Barkai asked his ships to report the state of their fuel and munitions supply. The boat he was on, INS Miznak, and three others, were very low on fuel. He contemplated a return to Haifa, but eventually decided to send back the boats that were low on fuel and remain on site with the remaining six. As he was moving from the Miznak to INS Herev, four Osa class missile boats were detected coming out of Alexandria, heading east. When Barkai climbed aboard the Herev, he ordered his force to move toward Alexandria.

Prelude to the Battle of Baltim

Barkai had two Sa'ar 4-class missile boats, INS Reshef and INS Keshet; two Sa'ar 3-class missile boats, INS Soufa and INS Herev; one Sa'ar 2-class missile boats, INS Eilat (named after the INS Eilat sunk six years earlier); and one missileless Sa'ar 1-class patrol boat, INS Misgav. At 23:00, Barkai formed his boats into three pairs, moving in parallel lines across a broad front. The northern pair included the Reshef and the Keshet, the central pair the Eilat and the Misgav, and the southern pair the Herev and the Soufa. At this point, the Osas did not appear on the radar or the long-range electronic sensors, and it was not clear if they were moving toward the Israeli force.

Close to midnight, Barkai took the southern pair to shell targets at Damietta on the delta. As they prepared to fire, their ESM detected something off Baltim, to the west. Barkai ordered the northern pair to disperse long-distance chaff to his north, to see if that would draw fire. After a few moments, the chaff cloud was targeted by missiles from the west. The Sa'ar boats switched on their electronic defenses and opened full throttle, while Barkai decided not to call for help from the Israeli Air Force.

Photo: Sa'ar 4-class missile boat INS Reshef before the outbreak of hostilities

[lordroel]

Day 4 of Yom Kippur War, October 9th 1973

Israeli commandos belonging to Shayetet 13, the Israeli Navy's elite special unit, infiltrate the Egyptian port of Hurghada and sink a Komar-class missile boat after four previous attempts had failed.

Israel: start of Operation Nickel Grass

United States Secretary of State Kissinger learns of the Israel readying nuclear missiles and bombs, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir issue a personal appeal for military assistance, which European nations decline. President Richard Nixon, however, orders the commencement of Operation Nickel Grass, to replace all of Israel's materiel losses.

Golan Heights Front: Day 4 of the Tears Battle

The Northern Command was trying to put together a command reserve, but could only assemble the survivors of the 53rd Battalion. The Barak Brigade had almost ceased to exist: Its commander and key staff officers were dead, and almost all of its troops and equipment were absorbed into other brigades. Lieutenant-Colonel Yossi Ben Hanan arrived the night before to take command of what was left of it. He had been the commander of the 53rd Battalion until two weeks earlier, and was on his honeymoon when the war started. He was sent to reorganize the brigade. He teamed with Erez, who had escaped from Tel Faris on Monday morning, and Shmuel Askarov, the 53rd Battalion's deputy commander, to start repairing tanks. At 1800, he reported to his division commander, General Rafael Eitan that he was ready to bring forward the thirteen Centurions he had repaired thus far, and was ordered to head for Nafakh. He was on his way when the IAF confirmed that about 100 Syrian tanks were headed toward the 7th Brigade's sector. One air photo depicted a complete Syrian battalion of thirty-eight T-62s and four BMPs.

At dawn, the Syrians launched the heaviest artillery barrage thus far, using Katyusha rockets and MiG-17s. Seven Syrian helicopters flew over the Israeli positions to Buq'ata, where four of them discharged commando forces. At 08:00, a Syrian force of 100 tanks and a large number of APCs began to advance. The Israelis opened fire at maximum range but the Syrian advance continued. The Israeli commanders were exposed in their turrets and the artillery caused the number of casualties among them to grow significantly. Ben-Gal ordered his force to leave the high ramps and withdraw some 360 m to escape the artillery concentrations.

Nafshi was ordered to join the 7th Brigade's area. He entered the battle with six tanks and was hit. He joined another tank and left A3. He ordered all the men under cover and requested Israeli artillery shelling of the position for protection. Later that day, he organized a supply convoy to A3. His tank was hit by a Syrian bazooka near Kuneitra and the tank behind him reported him dead. Nafshi continued with three APCs past Booster and entered A3 with the supplies.

When the 7th Brigade withdrew from the hill, the artillery stopped and Syrian tanks mounted the hill to fire at them. Ben-Gal's 7th Battalion had only six tanks and was acting as a brigade reserve, Nafshi had six tanks, and the operations officer was patrolling Buq'ata for the commandos. Zamir was fighting on Tel Git and was running out of ammunition, so he asked for permission to withdraw and reload. Ben-Gal refused at first, but relented when he was told there was only one shell per tank. Ben-Gal consulted Eitan and decided to counterattack. The 7th Battalion began to move up the hill and saw the Syrian tanks. Kahalani called the other Israeli tanks behind the ramp and got little response, since they were from different units and were operating on different frequencies. The brigade communications officer cut into every company's net, but they still did not respond to Kahalani. Kahalani's gunner knocked out the Syrian tank at the top of the hill, and another one was hit by an Israeli tank from the rear of the ramp.

In the north, the 74th Battalion was fighting with less than half its tanks. Ben-Gal feared that it might not be able to hold out, and ordered it to leave three tanks in the sector and move to the northern flank of the battle to face the Assad Republican Guard, which was trying to use the dead ground to move towards El Rom. The battalion commander was killed in this battle. Ben-Gal ordered the 77th Battalion to take command of the 74th Battalion. The 77th Battalion then fought two battalions of T62 tanks that got by the 7th Brigade and were about 460 m behind it. The 77th Battalion moved to the high ground around the valley and destroyed the Assad Republican Guard force. All the forces in the central sector, about fifteen tanks, were at this point under Kahalani's command, fighting at ranges of 230–460 m from their original positions on the ramps. The Syrians passed them and fired on them from behind. The 7th Brigade was fighting in all directions. Tanks from both sides got mixed up with the other side and struck by friendly artillery fire. Several Syrian Mi-8 helicopters flew over the valley toward El Rom. At this point, Eitan heard that Syrian infantry was approaching Buq'ata, north of El Rom. If the 7th Division were to break through, it could join the infantry force and proceed to Dan and Kiryat Shmona.

Ben-Gal described the battle to Eitan and told him he was not sure he could hold on. Eitan asked him to hold on for another half-hour. At this point, the remaining eleven tanks of the Barak Brigade arrived, and Eitan directed them to Ben-Gal. Eitan told Ben-Gal of Ben-Hanan's force. Kahalani called Captain Emi Palant, the senior officer behind the ramps, to use a signal flag to get the tank commanders' attention and direct them to the ramp, but waving the flag got no response. Palant fired his machine gun at the side of the nearest tank to get the commander to look out, and the message was passed. He ran from tank to tank and rapped on their turrets to get their attention before returning to his own tank and starting to move forward. No tank followed. Kahalani heard a sergeant from the 74th Battalion and ordered him to take his position and guard the wadi. The sergeant replied he did not have any shells left. Zamir, who was flanking his position to the south, reported a massive Syrian attack and asked for permission to move the remaining tanks to Zamir's company to a better position slightly to the south. Ben-Gal refused. Kahalani reported that he was unable to control the tanks, which kept drifting to the rear. Ben-Gal said he would try to get him more tanks. Kahalani ordered the sergeant to take his place, saying the Syrians would not try to attack if they saw his tank.

Kahalani moved towards the tanks behind the rampart and told their commanders to raise their flags if they heard him. He saw ten tanks, and most raised their flags. Two Israeli planes accidentally bombed them, but none of the tanks were hit. On the southern sector, Zamir reported that he was out of ammunition and could no longer hold out on Booster. His force was left with two shells per tank. He radioed Ben-Gal that he could no longer hold on. Ben-Gal asked him for ten more minutes. Zamir's tank ran out of shells, and he began to fill his pockets with grenades and withdraw. Kahalani reached the tanks behind the ramps and told them they were going to retake the ramp. He started moving and a few other tanks slowly followed. Two Syrian tanks were knocked out, but the tanks behind him began to pull back. Ben-Gal informed him on the radio that several tanks, under the command of Eli Geva, were on their way.

Kahalani managed to convince the other tanks to follow him. The tank next to him hit a Syrian tank that came over the ramp. The tanks' hatches were open, and eventually they could see the valley. Syrian tanks were moving forward, fifty to 910 m away. The Israeli tanks opened fire. Kahalani ordered them to shoot only at moving tanks. Geva's force reached the ramp and joined the battle. The Syrians fired a heavy artillery barrage. When it subsided, Kahalani could see no Syrian tanks moving ahead. Zamir had two tanks left and requested permission to withdraw, but Ben-Gal turned him down. He began to withdraw just as a force from the south, under the command of Ben Hanan, was arriving. Askarov took a position near Ben Hanan and the rest of the unit formed a battle line. Ben Hanan's face was wounded and he passed command to Askarov to get treatment. The force destroyed about thirty Syrian tanks.

The 7th Brigade was left with seven tanks, and Ben-Gal told Eitan he could no longer hold on. Then A3, surrounded by Syrian forces, reported that the Syrian supply trains were turning around and withdrawing. Dennie Agmon, Eitan's intelligence officer, told him that the Syrian General Staff had decided to retreat. The Syrian forces began to withdraw.

Drawing: Israelis under attack



Suez Canal/Sinai Front

The front lines have stabilized. The Egyptians are unable to advance further and Egyptian armored attacks are repulsed with heavy losses. 

The Egyptian 1st Mechanized Brigade launches a failed attack southward along the Gulf of Suez in the direction of Ras Sudar. Leaving the safety of the SAM umbrella, the brigade is attacked by Israeli aircraft and suffered heavy losses.

General Sharon advocates an immediate crossing at Deversoir at the northern edge of Great Bitter Lake. A reconnaissance force attached to Colonel Amnon Reshef's Brigade has detected a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third armies in this sector. Chief of Staff Elazar and General Chaim Bar-Lev, who has by now replaced Gonen as Chief of Southern Command agrees that this will be the ideal spot for a crossing. However, given the size of the Egyptian armored reserves, the Israelis chose to wait for an opportunity that will allow them to reduce Egyptian armored strength before initiating any crossing.

Naval battles of the Yom Kippur War: Part 2 of the Battle of Baltim (Israel and Egypt)

The Battle of Baltim

The Israeli battle line was crescent-shaped, with the northern pair positioned further forward from the rest. Two pairs of Osas were moving towards the Israeli force but were still outside the forty-five kilometer range of their Styx missiles. The range of the Israelis' Gabriel missiles was twenty-five kilometers, forming a 20 kilometres gap the Israelis hoped to bridge unharmed using their Electronic Warfare equipment which offered the Styx missiles more targets than were available. At 00:15, Israeli sensors detected an Egyptian missile launch at a range of 48 kilometres. After two minutes, these missiles exploded harmlessly in the sea. The Egyptians continued their advance and fired three more salvos in the following ten minutes, their fire aimed mostly at the chaff clouds dispersed by the northern Israeli pair. After firing their last barrage at a range of thirty kilometers, the Osas made a figure-eight maneuver and began speeding back to Alexandria, with the Sa'ars giving chase. Barkai warned his commanders not to fire at any range longer than 17 kilometres. His calculations suggested that they could catch the slower Osas before they could reach the port.

After a twenty-five-minute chase, INS Keshet entered the seventeen kilometer range and fired a missile which hit an Osa. At this point, Keshet's engine room began taking water from a burst pipe. Firing off another missile, Keshet stopped two kilometers from the damaged Osa while INS Misgav closed in and hit it with gunfire. Meanwhile, INS Reshef fired and hit the second Osa, while INS Eilat also fired one missile. The Reshef charged at the damaged Osa and sank it with gunfire. The southern pair of Osas split, one of which was then hit and came to a standstill, although it did not sink. The Herev and the Soufa fired dozens of shells into the Osa before discovering that it had in fact run aground. The other Osa headed west toward Alexandria, and got out of range. The Reshef was closest to it and began chasing the Osa, but the weapons officer reported an electrical malfunction preventing a missile launch. INS Reshef kept pursuing, hoping to reach gun range, but Barkai noticed that it was breaking away from the rest of the force and was getting dangerously close to the coast. Fearing it would be vulnerable to air attacks, he ordered it to withdraw. The commander of the Reshef asked for a few more minutes, but eventually rejoined the force.

Map of the battle of baltim



Golan Heights Front: Syrian General Staff Headquarters raid

Background to the Syrian General Staff Headquarters raid

At 03:35, Syrian FROG-7 Surface-to-surface missiles struck Israel's northern air base at Ramat David, killing one pilot and injuring several soldiers. Additional missiles struck civilian settlements nearby, including Migdal HaEmek and Kibbutz Gvat. The Israeli government decided to retaliate fiercely for the Syrian FROG attack, both to deter future strikes and to disrupt Syrian war efforts. The IAF was to destroy the infrastructure on which Syria's war-making capacity depended, targeting strategic targets in Syria such as its oil industry and electricity generating system. The first target was to be the Syrian General Staff Headquarters in the prosperous Abu Rummaneh district of Damascus The raid was to disrupt Syrian command and control, but would also serve to deter Jordan from joining the war and would prove that despite the blows the IAF had suffered, it would not be deterred from taking the war to Syria.

Strike against the Syrian General Staff Headquarters

In order to allow IAF aircraft to strike targets inside Syria without overflying the heavily defended regions around the Golan Heights, new attack routes through Lebanon had to be opened. The IAF therefore first attacked the Lebanese radar station at Barouk, which had been linked to the Syrian air defence network and was capable of supplying Syrian defenders with advance warning of Israeli strikes.

Three IAF squadrons were assigned the task of attacking the Syrian GHQ in Damascus and each was to contribute 8 F-4E Phantom IIs. Leading the strike would be a formation from 119 "Bat" Squadron, led by squadron deputy CO Arnon Lavoshin (Lapidot). These were to be followed by 107 Squadron Phantoms led by squadron leader Iftach Spector, with a 69 Squadron 8-ship formation coming in last.

Having taken off from their bases in Israel, the three Israeli formations first headed out over the Mediterranean, before turning north towards Lebanon and then east towards Damascus. Shortly after take-off from Tel-Nof, one of the 119 Squadron Phantoms suffered a mechanical fault, forcing it to abort and leaving seven to carry on. Approaching their target, the Phantom formations encountered heavy cloud cover, obscuring their target and making low-altitude approach, essential for the surprise attack, difficult. Commanding the leading formation, Arnon Lavoshin was contemplating calling off the strike, but broke radio silence to inform his formation that they would nevertheless continue. Eventually a break in the clouds over Damascus allowed the Phantoms to see the ground, re-orient themselves and head for their target, catching Syrian air defences off their guard. Only after the first bombs had already struck their targets did the air-raid sirens sound.

One after the other, the seven 119 Phantoms released their bombloads. The top floors of the Syrian GHQ were hit, as were the adjacent Syrian Air Force headquarters, a nearby TV station, a Soviet cultural center and several other structures in the city's diplomatic quarter. Having arrived unchallenged, the Israeli aircraft extricating themselves were now engaged by the dense air defence array guarding Damascus. Two aircraft were hit. One Phantom was downed outright, killing pilot Captain Dov Shafir. His navigator, Lieutenant Yaakov Yaakobi, fell into Syrian captivity where he was beaten and tortured. Another aircraft was heavily damaged and suffered an engine fire, yet its pilot, Major Omri Afek, managed to bring it to a safe landing in Ramat David.

Unlike Lavoshin's formation, the eight 107 Squadron Phantoms from Hatzerim were flying a slightly different route to the target. These failed to spot any opening in the cloud cover over the target and therefore requested an alternate target. The Phantoms were diverted to bomb Syrian armor near Hushniyah, on the Golan Heights. Their strike decimated a tank column and allowed Israeli forces to push Syrian forces back over the pre-war ceasefire lines. The trailing 69 Squadron aircraft, having heard the 107 strike called off, returned to base after dumping their bombs and excess fuel in the Mediterranean.

Photo: Syrian soldiers stand guard in the aftermath of the strike

[stevep]

Gods that fighting on the Golan heights was very tight. Sounds like if the Syrians had pushed on a bit longer the Israelis would have had to withdraw or be destroyed.

[lordroel]

Oct 9, 2019 15:51:30 GMT stevep said:

Gods that fighting on the Golan heights was very tight. Sounds like if the Syrians had pushed on a bit longer the Israelis would have had to withdraw or be destroyed.

If you read this article, in some sectors those Israeli front line units who had been hammerd by Syrian forces where pulling back, only the arrival of fresh reserve units prevented a total collapse of the front.

YOM KIPPUR WAR: SACRIFICIAL STAND IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

[stevep]

Oct 9, 2019 16:01:40 GMT lordroel said:

Oct 9, 2019 15:51:30 GMT stevep said:

Gods that fighting on the Golan heights was very tight. Sounds like if the Syrians had pushed on a bit longer the Israelis would have had to withdraw or be destroyed.

If you read this article, in some sectors those Israeli front line units who had been hammerd by Syrian forces where pulling back, only the arrival of fresh reserve units prevented a total collapse of the front.

YOM KIPPUR WAR: SACRIFICIAL STAND IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

  Very interesting.  Many thanks.

[lordroel]

Oct 9, 2019 17:41:09 GMT stevep said:

Oct 9, 2019 16:01:40 GMT lordroel said:

If you read this article, in some sectors those Israeli front line units who had been hammerd by Syrian forces where pulling back, only the arrival of fresh reserve units prevented a total collapse of the front.

YOM KIPPUR WAR: SACRIFICIAL STAND IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

  Very interesting.  Many thanks.

No problem, I hoop it helps with some questions about the Battle of the Golan Heights.

[lordroel]

Day 5 of Yom Kippur War, October 10th 1973

The Soviet Union which has encouraged other Arab states to come to Egypt's and Syria's assistance, begins a gigantic airlift of heavy weapons to them.

Washington counters by authorizes an airlift of military supplies to Israel.

The last Syrian unit in the Golan Heights central sector are pushed back across the Purple Line, the pre-war ceasefire line. After 4 days of intense and incessant combat, the Israelis have succeeded in ejecting the Syrians from the entire Golan.

Photo: Syrian soldiers raise their hands in surrender on the Golan Heights

[lordroel]

Day 6 of Yom Kippur War, October 11th 1973

Israel attacks Syria from its positions on the Golan Heights. The Soviet Union's ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, tells Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that Soviet airborne forces are on the alert to defend Damascus. Kissinger warns Dobrynin that if the Soviet forces sent troops to the Middle East, the United States would as well.

Jordan sends an expeditionary force into Syria. King Hussein who has come under intense pressure to enter the war, informs Israel of his intentions through United States intermediaries, in the hope that Israel will accept that this is not a casus belli justifying an attack on Jordan. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declines to offer any such assurance, but says that Israel has no intention of opening another front.

Iraq sends an expeditionary force to Syria, consisting of the 3rd and 6th Armoured Divisions, some 30,000 men, 250–500 tanks, and 700 APCs. Israeli jets attack Iraqi forces as they arrived in Syria.

The Egyptian 103rd Sa'iqa battalion of the 139th Sa'iqa Group battalion is sent from Cairo to reinforce the Port Said Sector for a planned second attack at the Israeli held Fort Budapest.

Golan Heights Front: advance to Damascus

Israeli forces push into Syria and advanced towards Damascus along the Quneitra-Damascus road until October 14th, encountering stiff resistance by Syrian reservists in prepared defenses. Three Israeli divisions break the first and second defensive lines near Sasa, and conquered a further 50 square kilometres of territory in the Bashan salient. From there, they are able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40 km away, using M107 heavy artillery.

Photo: an Israeli tank patrols a stretch of the northern border on the Golan Heights



Naval battles of the Yom Kippur War: Second Battle of Latakia  (Israel and Syria)

Prelude to the Second Battle of Latakia

After losing three missile boats during the first Battle of Latakia four days earlier on the 7th, the Syrian Navy refused to engage the Israeli Navy in open battle at sea. Instead, it used its missile boats on short forays from harbor mouths to launch missiles, relying on coastal artillery batteries for defense. To provoke the Syrian missile boats into open combat, the commander of the Israeli Navy missile-boat flotilla, Michael Barkai, was dispatched with seven missile boats to launch a night attack on Syrian ports. Oil tanks at the ports were marked as secondary targets.

Barkai split his force, assigning two Sa'ar 4-class missile boats to attack the Port of Banias and another two boats to attack the Syrian naval base at Mina Al-Baida. He assigned the other three missile boats, the Sa'ar 3-class boats INS Hetz and INS Herev and the Sa'ar 2-class boat INS Haifa, to attack Latakia again.

Second Battle of Latakia

As the boats began their attack, Barkai ordered them to turn their electronic countermeasures (ECM) on and at the same time proceed to their targets at 40 knots. As they had been during the earlier battle, Syrian radar operators were confused, believing they were tracking five groups of targets with a combined 17 ships between 12 and 15 nautical miles off the coast. The Syrian Navy dispatched two missile boats from Banias and two from Latakia to fire their missiles at the targets.

Upon reaching Latakia, the Israelis found that the Syrian missile boats were using foreign merchant ships anchored off the harbor for protection, darting in and out from among the ships to fire their missiles. The Israeli boats were ordered to fire on the Syrian boats despite the risk of hitting the unarmed merchant ship. As a result, Israeli Gabriel missiles sank two of the merchant ships, one Japanese and one Greek.

INS Hetz sighted one Styx missile missing her overhead, and a gunner on Hetz shot down another Styx. The battle lasted for almost two hours, with the Israeli boats zigzagging around the port trying to evade fire from the Syrian missile boats and coastal artillery, while at the same time alternately shooting at either the Syrian missile boats or at the oil tanks on shore.

The Israelis ultimately failed to ignite any of the oil tanks and could only account for probable hits on one Osa-class and one Komar-class boat. Only the attack on the Port of Banias was successful in igniting the oil tanks on shore.

Photo: The Banyas oil terminal in Syria after being ignited with 76 mm shells from Israeli missile boats

[lordroel]

Day 7 of Yom Kippur War, October 12th 1973

Golan Heights Front: disrupting the transfer of weapons and military forces between Syria and its allies

Israeli paratroopers from the elite Sayeret Tzanhanim reconnaissance unit launch Operation Gown, infiltrating deep into Syria and destroying a bridge in the tri-border area of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. The operation disrupts the flow of weapons and troops to Syria. During the operation, the paratroopers destroy a number of tank transports and kill several Syrian soldiers. There are no Israeli casualties

Photo: Israeli artillery fires on Syrian positions



Suez Canal/Sinai Front

Israeli intelligence detects signs that the Egyptians are gearing up for a major armored thrust. This is precisely the moment the Israelis are waiting for. They can finally utilize their advantages in speed, maneuver and tank gunnery, areas in which they excelled. Once Egyptian armored strength is sufficiently degraded, the Israelis will commence their own canal crossing.

[lordroel]

Day 8 of Yom Kippur War, October 13th 1973

Golan Heights Front: raid on al-Mazzah Airport

Israeli F-4s and Mirage IIICs approached Al-Mazzah airport to conduct a series of raids to neutralize the bases capable of launching attacks over Israeli airspace. Shortly after crossing into Syrian airspace, the Israeli formations came under heavy fire by Soviet-made Syrian Air Force MiG-21s. The Israeli pilots managed to shoot down two of the MiG-21s and then concentrated their attack on the airbase itself. Using the Mirage IIIC's bombing capabilities, they were able to crater the runways and inflict light ground losses. During the raid a MiG-21 shot down an F-4 Phantom; both the pilot and the navigator survived, but they crashed on hostile ground near the airbase, and shortly after that were rescued by IDF forces. Another F-4 Phantom was severely damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the airbase; the plane was escorted back to Israeli airspace, and safely returned home.

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: planning the Second Battle of Fort Budapest

The Port Said Sector receive 10 fiberglass boats from Alexandria. The boats however have been sent without necessary maintenance of the boats themselves or their engines. With the arrival of these reinforcements and equipment Brigadier General Salah 'Abd el-Halim began to lay a plan of attack.

As in the first attempt, a Sa'iqa company from the 103rd Battalion would occupy positions four kilometers east of Budapest to isolate the fort. It would be supported by an AT-3 Sagger ATGM platoon. The main attack would be launched from the east by a Sa'iqa company and a company from al-Mezahi's battalion as the first echelon. Other units of al-Mezahi's battalion would conduct a secondary attack from the west, while one company remained in reserve near Port Fouad along with a Sa'iqa company. A reinforced company (less one platoon) of al-Mezahi's battalion would land by sea directly upon the Israeli fort. The attack would be preceded by a 30-minute-long fire preparation.

[lordroel]

Day 9 of Yom Kippur War, October 14th 1973

Operation Nickel Grass: tanks, plans and ammunition land in Israel

The United States Air Force begins Operation Nickel Grass, a major airlift to Israel when the first C-5A Galaxy transport airplane lands at Lod airport.

YouTube (Israeli soldiers find headquarters of Soviet advisers in Syria)



Naval battles of the Yom Kippur War: Israeli attack on Ras Ghareb (Israel and Egypt)

5 nights have passed sins the Battle of Baltim where Israeli missile boats sank 3 Egyptian missile boats. Now 5 Israeli patrol boats enter the Egyptian anchorage at Ras Ghareb, where over 50 Egyptian small patrol craft (including armed fishing boats mobilized for the war effort and loaded with troops, ammunition, and supplies bound for the Israeli side of the Gulf) are based. In the battle that follows, 19 Egyptian boats are sunk, while others remained bottled up in port.

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Egypt launches a failed attack in the Sinai

After Egyptian infantry successfully crossed the canal and captured the Bar-Lev Line on October 6th, Israeli forces made several counterattacks in attempts to push the Egyptians back across the Suez Canal. The Israelis suffered heavy losses in these attacks, and by this day Egyptian forces in the Sinai had managed to destroy 500 Israeli tanks. Following this both sides dug in. The Egyptians would not attack for fear of extending their forces beyond the cover of their SAM defences.

In the Golan Heights, Israel had repelled Syrian forces and pushed into Syria itself. By the time the Syrians, now aided by Iraqi and Jordanian expeditionary forces managed to put a halt to the Israeli advance, Israeli forces were 40 km from Damascus. Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad requested his Egyptian ally, Anwar El-Sadat, order an attack in the Sinai, which would draw Israeli attention away from the Syrian front. Sadat consented and ordered the attack. His War Minister, Ahmed Ismail, and his Chief of Staff, Saad El Shazly, opposed the idea; Shazli in particular stated that for Egyptian forces to advance outside their SAM defences would mean their exposure to the Israeli Air Force, which the Egyptian Air Force was too weak to challenge. Sadat insisted that the attack proceed, however, and both Ahmed Ismail and Shazli had no choice but to acknowledge the order.

The attack was to proceed on October 13th, but was postponed to October 14th. Four armored brigades and one mechanized infantry brigade under the command of the Second and Third Armies were to make four independent thrusts. Awaiting for them was a dug-in force of 800 Israeli tanks supported by infantry equipped with SS.11 missiles, as well as American-made LAW and TOW anti-tank missiles. Israel had in the Sinai by October 14th around fifteen brigades totaling nearly 60,000 infantry. The Israeli air force provided intense air cover during the battle.

The Egyptians launched their offensive in the early morning of October 14th, at 6:30. The mechanized infantry brigade was to attack in the direction of the Gidi Pass, one armored brigade was to attack in the direction of the Mitla Pass, one brigade was to attack towards Baluza, and two brigades were to attack in the direction of Tasa. As anticipated by many Egyptian officers, the attack was a failure. Encountering stiff Israeli resistance, the Egyptian assault came to a halt after suffering heavy losses, and Egyptian troops retreated back to their lines on the Suez Canal.

Photo: Israeli soldiers take cover in their foxholes during fighting in the Sinai Desert



Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Part 1, Israeli breakthrough – Crossing the canal

The Israelis immediately follow the Egyptian failed attack with a multidivisional counterattack through the gap between the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies. Sharon's 143rd Division, now reinforced with a paratroop brigade commanded by Colonel Danny Matt, is tasked with establishing bridgeheads on the east and west banks of the canal. The 162nd and 252nd Armored Divisions, commanded by Generals Avraham Adan and Kalman Magen respectively, will then cross through the breach to the west bank of the canal and swing southward, encircling the 3rd Army. The offensive was code-named Operation Abirey-Halev.

Air battle of the Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Mansoura

Background to The Battle of Mansoura

The Egyptian Air Force 104th Air Wing had three squadrons equipped with MiG-21MF fighters; two squadrons were stationed at Mansoura, tasked with interception and air defense, and the third was stationed at the Tanta air base to defend both air bases. The IAF had made several attacks on the Mansoura air base from October 6 onwards, but failed due to dense Egyptian SAM defenses.

At dawn when Egyptian forces made their advance towards the Sinai Mitla and Gedy Passes, the ground forces were given ground support by MiG-17s, Su-7s, Su-20s and Mirage III fighter bombers. These in turn were given fighter cover by the 104th's MiG-21s. Although the Egyptian offensive was a failure and culminated in heavy losses, the IAF was determined to destroy the 104th Air Wing's capabilities. A massive air strike would be launched against air bases in Salihiya, Mansoura and Tanta.

Initial contact

When the Egyptians advanced from their bridgeheads along the Suez Canal, an Israeli air strike was expected to come against the Mansoura air base sooner or later, and consequently a number of MiG-21s were kept at full alert at the end of the runway with their pilots, ready for immediate take-off. As of 15:00, there was still no indication of an impending enemy attack.

At 15:15, air observation posts on the Mediterranean Sea notified EAF command that 20 Phantoms were approaching in south-west direction towards the Delta, flying over Port Said. The commander of the EAF, Air Marshal Hosni Mubarak ordered General Naser to scramble 16 MiG-21s. The EAF command believed the enemy aircraft were only a decoy meant to lure the MiG-21s away from the airbase, so that further waves of aircraft could attack the air base uninterrupted. Hence the fighter pilots were ordered to create a protective umbrella over the air base. Most importantly, they were instructed not to pursue and engage enemy aircraft before they had reached their target.

The pilots were puzzled by the order, not knowing the reason behind it, as they expected to immediately engage the enemy after scrambling. In the event, the Israeli fighters continued to fly in broad circles for some time until, when it became clear the Egyptians would not leave the vicinity of the Mansoura air base, the Phantoms withdrew back to the sea.

The Battle 

Sometime around 15:30, the Egyptian Air Defense Command issued a warning that around sixty enemy aircraft were approaching from the Mediterranean Sea in three directions; one from Port Said, another from Damietta, and the third from Baltim, to the west of Damietta. Mubarak ordered his pilots in the air to intercept them. The 16 MiG-21s forming the air umbrella over Mansoura moved against the Israeli aircraft with the objective of breaking the enemy formations and forcing them to disperse. 16 MiG-21s took off from Mansoura air base to support those in the air, along with eight fighters from Tanta air base, located west of Mansoura. The MiG-21s intercepted the Israeli formation a few dozen kilometers north of Mansoura.

At 15:38, Egyptian radar installations informed the EAF command that a second wave of around 16 Israeli aircraft was coming from over the Mediterranean at very low altitude.[citation needed] The Egyptians scrambled a final eight MiG-21s at Mansoura, while eight MiG-21s from the Abu Hamad air base were called upon to assist. The ensuing air battle was intense, involving large numbers of aircraft; at one point, the battle involved 62 MiG-21s and some 120 Phantoms and A-4 Skyhawks. A few Israeli fighter-bombers reached their target and bombed the runway and the air defenses around the air base. While the final eight aircraft from Mansoura took off, Israeli aircraft were approaching to make their bombing run. Nasr Mousa, piloting one of the eight MiG-21s, spotted an Israeli Phantom lining up against him. Mousa made a sudden, hard right-hand turn that put him on the Phantom's tail. He shot down the Phantom with cannon fire, and no parachutes emerged. Medhat 'Arafa, an Egyptian pilot, recalls "the battle was a frightening sight because I had never seen so many aeroplanes in one area. We were not only dogfighting, but also warning other pilots that they had an enemy on their tail..." The Israeli Phantoms had to abandon their bomb-loads in order to dogfight with the more maneuverable MiG aircraft. Egyptian pilots had to land their aircraft, re-arm, refuel and take-off again within a period of seven minutes. Take-off usually took three minutes, but according to Naser, the pilots were able to accomplish it in one-and-a-half minutes during the air battle.

At 15:52, radars detected another wave of enemy aircraft, estimated to incorporate up to 60 Phantoms and Skyhawks. Eight MiG-21s from 102nd Air Wing were scrambled from Inshas air base, near Cairo. Around 20 MiG-21s that had landed, refueled and re-armed at Mansoura air base were also en route to intercept the Israeli aircraft. An air battle was raging over the Nile Delta village of Dekernis, where Israeli aircraft retreating eastward were being pursued by Egyptian aircraft. A dogfight ensued over this village between the latest Israeli wave and intercepting Egyptian MiG-21s. The commander of this final wave of Israeli aircraft, realizing that the previous waves had failed in their objectives and there were more Egyptian aircraft in the air than expected, decided to withdraw. The last Israeli aircraft left Egyptian airspace at 16:08, and the air battle of  Mansoura was over.

[lordroel]

Day 10 of Yom Kippur War, October 15th 1973

Algeria, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Saudi Arabia announce they will send contingents to fight.

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: Part 2, Israeli breakthrough – Crossing the canal

Map: Operation Gazelle (also known as Operation Abiray-Lev or Operation Stouthearted Men). Modified to show only the Israeli plan for the operation.



After receiving his orders late on October 14th from Bar-Lev, Sharon headed to his headquarters to prepare for the operation. His division incorporated Raviv's Brigade, Colonel Amnon Reshef's 14th Armored Brigade, and the 'Haim' Brigade commanded by Colonel Haim Erez. Attached to his division was the 243rd Paratrooper Brigade commanded by Colonel Dani Matt.

Sharon planned for Raviv's brigade to attack from the east, diverting Egyptian attention away from Deversoir. Erez was tasked with transporting a pre-constructed roller bridge to the crossing area at Deversoir, while one of his tank battalions would be attached to the paratroopers. Colonel Reshef was given the most critical tasks of all. Accordingly, his brigade was heavily reinforced to incorporate four armored and three mechanized infantry battalions, in addition to the division's reconnaissance battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yaov Brom. His brigade would conduct a turning maneuver at 6:00 AM south of Akavish Road, move through the sand dunes to reach Fort Lakekan, before heading north to occupy Fort Matzmed. Reshef's brigade would then split up to clear the Akavish and Titur Roads and seize the Chinese Farm, while occupying the crossing area and awaiting Matt's brigade. Matt's paratrooper brigade, containing an additional tank company and the armored battalion, would move south-west via Akavish to reach Fort Matzmed. From there, it would continue on to the Yard and cross the canal at 11:00 PM, using rubber dinghies and rafts for the tanks.

Matt's brigade began moving to Tasa at 4:30 PM, before turning eastwards on Akavish. Heavy congestion on the roads made the brigade's progress very slow. A little after midnight, the brigade left Akavish and moved westward to the Yard, an area 700 meters long and 150 meters wide surrounded by protective sand walls. The site had been made long before the war.

Reshef maneuvered his brigade as planned, entering into the previously discovered gap without any opposition. Leaving a combined recon and paratrooper force at the canal, he sent his tanks north and west to secure the flank of the projected crossing site and clear the Akavish and Tirtur roads from behind for the follow-on bridging equipment. He seized the Lakekan and Matzmed fortifications without resistance. Reshef informed Sharon that the forts were under control and that Akavish was clear. Sharon in turn informed Southern Command of these successes, sending a wave of jubilation through the Israeli commanders, delighted that the operation had begun so smoothly.

Matt had been informed that the crossing area and its environs were clear of Egyptian forces, but out of caution, ordered his tank company to deploy at the Lexicon-Tirtur junction to confront any Egyptian movements towards the crossing site, just 800 meters south of the crossroads. The entire company was wiped out after it was ambushed by Egyptian infantry of the 16th Brigade. The company commander was killed and most of his men were casualties, unbeknownst to Matt. Meanwhile, Israeli artillery batteries opened fire on the landing site on the west bank, delivering around 70 tons of shells and ordnance. In fact, the opposite bank was completely clear of Egyptian troops. The crossing finally got underway at 1:35 AM, over five hours behind schedule. By 9:00 AM, 2,000 paratroopers had crossed, along with a battalion of thirty tanks. The Israelis sent raiding parties attacking Egyptian SAMs on the west bank, while securing a 4-kilometer-deep bridgehead without facing resistance.

Tuvia Raviv's armored brigade began its diversionary attack against the 16th Division's bridgehead at 5:00 PM, striking at the bridgehead's center from the east, after a fire preparation. It was repulsed by the Egyptians, as had been expected, but succeeded in its purpose. When the 16th Division's southern flank came under increasing Israeli attack, the Egyptians assumed that the Israeli objective was to roll up the Second Army's right flank, not to open a corridor to the west bank for Israeli forces to cross the canal. For the next 24 hours, this remained the general impression among Egyptian commanders, and they reacted accordingly. Had they discovered the Israelis' true intentions earlier, the Egyptians would almost certainly have been able to defeat the Israeli operation, in light of the greater strength of their forces and reserves near the Deversoir area, on the east and west banks of the Suez Canal.

While the paratroopers prepared to cross, Reshef was informed that Akavish had been closed again by Egyptian infantry units soon after his passing. He sent one armored battalion to clear the road and committed his remaining three armored and three mechanized battalions to push northwards and secure Tirtur and the Chinese Farm.

An infantry battalion, forming the right flank of Abd el-Hamid's 16th Brigade, was in position to defend the Lexicon-Tirtur crossroads. Initially, Reshef sent two armored battalions northward on Lexicon. As the Israeli tanks neared the infantry battalion, they were met by heavy fire from anti-tank weapons. They lost 27 tanks during this engagement, although seven Israeli tanks managed to break through the battalion's westernmost position on Lexicon and advance northwards to al-Galaa'. Thereafter, 'Abd el-Hamid ordered tank-hunting squads – groups of ten equipped with RPG-7 rockets and RPG-43 grenades – to deploy around al-Galaa' and destroy those tanks that broke through; he also sent a tank company to reinforce the infantry battalion.

At night, Reshef moved with his remaining forces north along the canal bank. Bypassing the 16th Brigade's positions, the Israelis soon found themselves in the center of a huge administrative area and vehicle park. Reshef's brigade had stumbled into the command and supply bases of the Egyptian 16th and 21st Divisions. The base was located near the canal on the assumption that it was the safest location from Israeli attacks, which was expected to come from the east, where the defenses were the strongest, not from the south, where they were the weakest. Both sides immediately opened fire, inadvertently leading to the destruction of supply trucks and SAM launchers. The Egyptians managed to organize a counterattack by units of the 21st Division; a battalion of the 14th Brigade and a battalion (less one company) of the 18th Brigade. The tanks repelled the Israelis, who sustained significant losses from vastly overwhelming opposing forces.

Brigadier General Hafez, commanding the 16th Infantry Division, planned to contain the Israeli attack from the south by having the 18th Mechanized Brigade occupy defenses north of the Chinese Farm, directly behind the 16th Infantry Brigade, but without its organic tank battalion, which was designated as part of the division's reserve. The 1st Armored Brigade moved southward to occupy positions between Lateral Road and the canal on the right flank of the 18th Brigade. Upon the brigade's arrival, it engaged Israeli armor from Reshef's brigade in al-Galaa'; Egyptian armor destroyed around 15 tanks and several half-tracks. At around 1:00 PM, sorties of Egyptian Su-7s destroyed many Israeli tanks in ground-attack missions over al-Galaa' village. The 1st Brigade countered a flanking attempt on its left at 2:00 PM by a tank battalion, thwarting the attack and destroying ten tanks. 

Meanwhile, one of Reshef's mechanized battalions, commanded by Major Nathan Shunari, was reinforced with company-sized remnants of the 40th Tank Battalion, now commanded by Captain Gideon Giladi after the previous battalion commander had been wounded. Shunari was ordered to seize the Lexicon-Tirtur junction. He sent the tank company ahead first, which initially reported no Egyptian units. Shunari dispatched an infantry unit in six half-tracks to the junction. Upon reaching it, they discovered that the tank company had already been destroyed and Giladi killed. Soon the vehicles began came under heavy fire, stopping their advance. The unit commander reported casualties, and Shunari ordered the remainder of his battalion to aid the pinned-down men. Attempts to rescue the infantry failed, and the Egyptian battalion defending the junction directed heavy firepower against the area, aided by the brigade's artillery. The Egyptian defenders had managed to catch the Israelis in a prepared killing zone. Shunari, whose troops lacked cover and were threatened with annihilation, regrouped some of his forces and managed to escape the area in vehicles, but the infantry half-track unit first sent to the crossroads remained pinned down.

Reshef sent another tank company to rescue the infantrymen. The tanks advanced towards the Chinese Farm from the south. As they neared the farm and the village, a downpour of anti-tank and artillery fire forced the company to retreat. Nathan kept pleading with Rehsef to send additional support, unaware he was facing superior Egyptian forces after entering the administrative bases of the Egyptian 16th and 21st Divisions. With no help coming, the unit commander had his men carry the wounded and attempted to leave the battlefield, tasking two sections of heavy machine guns with providing cover to the force. As the Israelis slowly made their way back to their lines, a group of Egyptian tanks intercepted and wiped out the Israeli force.

Despite the debacle, Reshef remained determined to seize the junction, giving the task to the division's reconnaissance battalion attached to his brigade. To achieve surprise, the battalion maneuvered to attack at 3:00 AM from the west, as the Egyptians were preparing for further attacks from the south and east. As the Israelis attacked, Lieutenant Colonel Brom was killed barely thirty meters from Egyptian positions, disrupting his battalion's assault. The Israelis sustained losses, but managed to retreat. 

Suez Canal/Sinai Front: the Second Battle of Fort Budapest

The Second Battle of Fort Budapest begins when a Egyptian reinforced company (less one platoon) moves out of Port Said in preparation for its landing. At 3:30, the fire preparation began against Fort Budapest. being carried out by the 135th Brigade's artillery and an additional artillery battalion. At 4:00, the attack began. The secondary attack force approaching from the west opened fire to draw the garrison's attention. The main force advanced towards the fort, spearheaded by the Sa'iqa company. The Egyptians managed to reach the fort and surprise its garrison. Soon the company was on the verge of entering the fort. The naval force however, due to bad sea conditions (sea state 4) arrived at 4:30, half an hour late, and then was forced to land one kilometer west of the fort. It joined the secondary attack group in its advance against the fortification. The mixed force came under heavy fire, and the battalion commander, Ali al-Mezahi was killed. The Sa'iqa company east of the fort finally succeeded in breaching the fort's defenses under heavy fire; the company commander was hit several times but continued to lead his men. The secondary force also managed to reach the fort's northern sand embankment. The fighting became intense, and the Egyptians picked up a radio signal sent by the garrison commander in which he detailed his men's precarious position and requested immediate assistance, especially air support. Despite the initial success achieved, Salah did not have his reserves on either side of the fort join the attack. With sunrise, Israeli aircraft began attacking Egyptian troops. Two F-4 Phantoms strafed the secondary force and made several bombing runs against it, while helicopters attacked the main force.

The Israelis reinforced the fort with two tank companies. They came up against the Sa'iqa company isolating the fort. In the ensuing firefight, the company leader and every platoon commander were killed as the Egyptians were caught in open ground, bereft of any cover. There were also many casualties, but the Sa'iqa destroyed twenty Israeli tanks and half-tracks during the battle.

The Egyptians, under heavy and effective fire from the Israelis inside the bunkers, ceased entering the fort. The Sa'iqa company to the east, under concentrated Israeli tank fire and aerial bombardment, was finally overwhelmed by the Israeli reinforcements, which proceeded towards the fort, opening fire on the main force. Consequently, all Egyptian forces east of the fort attempted to retreat through the marshes. The Israelis attempted to hamper the retreat by dropping smoke capsules over the area from four A-4 Skyhawks. The lack of visibility caused injuries as men tripped and were trampled during the retreat through the marshes.

The sector's command contacted Saad El Shazly, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, and informed him of the failure of the attack, and requested that paratroopers – who were supposedly promised in support of the attack but never arrived – be sent to protect the retreating forces. Artillery fire was used to provide cover. Khalid instructed Salah to have his forces retreat to their original defensive positions east of Port Fouad to reorganize, and to defend against counterattacks at all costs. Throughout October 15, troops that had retreated through the lake continued to arrive at the defensive positions, where Israeli counterattacks were repulsed with the help of artillery. At 8:00 that morning, two Egyptian Sukhoi Su-7 fighter-bombers flew over the battlefield. On arriving over the fort, one was shot down by ground fire, and the other withdrew.