Save Singapore from falling in 1942?

[James G]

How can Singapore be saved from falling to the Japanese in 1942?
What kind of POD is needed to make this happen?
My initial thoughts would be a far shorter Western Desert Campaign in North Africa leading to no troop diversions of ANZAC forces. Or, maybe, guns on the island and other defences too facing inland... but that might be a bit simplistic.

[lordroel]

Apr 27, 2020 19:07:52 GMT James G said:

How can Singapore be saved from falling to the Japanese in 1942?
What kind of POD is needed to make this happen?
My initial thoughts would be a far shorter Western Desert Campaign in North Africa leading to no troop diversions of ANZAC forces. Or, maybe, guns on the island and other defences too facing inland... but that might be a bit simplistic.

Like this: What If: Singapore Had Not Fallen

[stevep]

Apr 27, 2020 19:19:29 GMT lordroel said:

Apr 27, 2020 19:07:52 GMT James G said:

How can Singapore be saved from falling to the Japanese in 1942?
What kind of POD is needed to make this happen?
My initial thoughts would be a far shorter Western Desert Campaign in North Africa leading to no troop diversions of ANZAC forces. Or, maybe, guns on the island and other defences too facing inland... but that might be a bit simplistic.

Like this: What If: Singapore Had Not Fallen

  James G,lordroel,

  I largely stand by my comments in the link.  Not sure that Libya could have been cleared but a couple of opportunities were lost, both by pausing Compass to send the 4th Indian Division to E Africa and then the intervention in Greece.  Also there were other wastes of resources.  Even if Tripoli couldn't have been reached by say summer 41 possibly a strategic decision, as the threat in the east grew and knowing how over-committed the RN was to start organisaing a ground forces and land based air defence for Malaya and recognising adjacent areas would also need to be supported.

  I think ANZAC forces would still have been drawn into the Med in late 40 - early 41 but it should be possible to start sending some of them back, along with some British and Indian units, especially once E Africa and the ME region were largely secured.  It didn't need massively more land forces for Malaya but they needed to be suitable trained and equipped.  You would need a lot more air, especially since the abilities of the Japanese air forces [army and navy] would come as a nasty shock but given Britain's production by this time its possible and if Libya was successfully cleared definitely so.  Then with other forces brought in to secure Malaya and help defend Sumatra and Java once war started.

  One advantage if Libya was cleared was that naval units designed and initially trained to fight against Japan would have been available.  I'm referring to a lot of the RN's subs.  Unfortunately with the threat of invasion many were drawn into the N Sea in 1940 and then the Med in 41, areas they were unsuitable for.  Get them back into the Far East in time and given they have effective torpedoes and would have combat experience they could be very useful against Japanese warships and probably more importantly their supply lines and logistical shortfalls.

  I can't see any practical way, once France had fallen, of defending Borneo or other islands of the archipelago east of Java until probably the historical defence of New Guinea, or at least the area around Port Moresby.  However holding the areas mentioned above would greatly restrict Japanese access to the Indian Ocean, helping both there and links between Britain, India and Australia.  Also it could well save Burma and draw Japan into a [for them] costly attrition conflict they can't afford.  Coupled with destruction of oil centres in Borneo before their capture and attacks on supply links once their repaired to limit what the Japanese can get out of there.  This would greatly speed the collapse of the Japanese war machine.

  Going to see more Britain/dominion/empire casualties in the 1st year or so of the war - although likely to be some way below the total casualties without the mass surrenders - but after say mid-late 42 things could quieten down somewhat as defensive lines are strengthened and Japanese resources are drained - or at least those they could logistically support in the area.  Plus with the USN getting into the attack in the Pacific and adjacent areas.  One single Midway type victory for them would greatly ease the pressure.  Then concentration on the more vital European theatre until possibly moves against Borneo in 44/45, both to liberate the colonies there and to ensure no further oil supplies going from the island to Japan's war economy. 

  As I said in the previous post this might actually increase total Japanese and American casualties however as with Japan weakened earlier the US might well advance faster and end up invading Japan in late 44 say, which is likely to be very, very bloody.

  Steve

[EwellHolmes]

Somehow keep Italy neutral, avoiding the Desert War and thus freeing the forces available for Operation Matador to be done.

[stevep]

Apr 29, 2020 4:02:40 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Somehow keep Italy neutral, avoiding the Desert War and thus freeing the forces available for Operation Matador to be done.

  That would definitely help but its really outside Britain's hands, unless you have some very unlikely and successful plot to remove Mussolini and replace him with a more capable and/or cautious leaders. 

  Mind you if your going back that far the western powers standing up to fascism a couple of years earlier would help immensely.  Taking out Hitler before he got too powerful would really screw over Japanese attempts against SE Asia, even if the gambled, possibly successfully in those circumstances, to avoid clashing with the US.

  In terms of after the fall of France its possible but it needs either a good amount of luck and/or better deployment of British and allied resources.

  Of course while a successful Operation Matador would have helped in safeguarding Malaya against direct attack, albeit it might have been attempted OTL, it wouldn't have prevented the threat of the Japanese working through the DEI.  If Sumatra falls then Malaya is pretty much indefensible and its a lot more difficult if they get all of Java as well.  To hold the region secure you need at least western Java.

  Steve

[lordroel]

The British could have outlasted the Japanese & not surrender on Feb. 15, 1942

[stevep]

Apr 29, 2020 12:29:39 GMT lordroel said:

The British could have outlasted the Japanese & not surrender on Feb. 15, 1942

  I've heard this mentioned before and even that when Percival  approached the Japanese to discuss surrender they were initially thinking he was asking for their surrender.

  I don't think it would have avoided the fall of Singapore.  Even if a more determined defence had forced the Japanese to withdraw some way up the Malayan peninsula and the British didn't really have the supplies and mobile forces for that the Japanese had already invaded Sumatra and were closing in on Java so Singapore and southern Malaya would have been too isolated and fallen in a realtively short period.  Britain if Churchill was reckless could have lost substantial naval forces trying to resupply it at a stage when the RN was already grossly overstretched.  There is the danger he might think it could be another Trobuk.

  However a successful brief defence which sees the Japanese thrown back a little and gave the defenders a moral boost could have delayed the fall a bit and also reduced somewhat the loss of morale and prestige for Britain in the region.  Not greatly so but it would have probably been seen more like the American action at Bataan, gallant but ultimately fruitless. It was too late by that stage to successfully defend Malaya and without that and Sumatra at least Singapore can't sustain a long siege.  Its too isolated and closely surrounded by enemy held forces.

[lordroel]

Apr 29, 2020 12:53:56 GMT stevep said:

Apr 29, 2020 12:29:39 GMT lordroel said:

The British could have outlasted the Japanese & not surrender on Feb. 15, 1942

  I've heard this mentioned before and even that when Percival  approached the Japanese to discuss surrender they were initially thinking he was asking for their surrender.

  I don't think it would have avoided the fall of Singapore.  Even if a more determined defence had forced the Japanese to withdraw some way up the Malayan peninsula and the British didn't really have the supplies and mobile forces for that the Japanese had already invaded Sumatra and were closing in on Java so Singapore and southern Malaya would have been too isolated and fallen in a realtively short period.  Britain if Churchill was reckless could have lost substantial naval forces trying to resupply it at a stage when the RN was already grossly overstretched.  There is the danger he might think it could be another Trobuk.

  However a successful brief defence which sees the Japanese thrown back a little and gave the defenders a moral boost could have delayed the fall a bit and also reduced somewhat the loss of morale and prestige for Britain in the region.  Not greatly so but it would have probably been seen more like the American action at Bataan, gallant but ultimately fruitless. It was too late by that stage to successfully defend Malaya and without that and Sumatra at least Singapore can't sustain a long siege.  Its too isolated and closely surrounded by enemy held forces.

Found this: Did Singapore Have to Fall?

1. Singapore was not and could not be an “impregnable fortress” by any definition. This wasn’t the 1800s and this wasn’t Khartoum.

2. If Singapore were so critical to the British Empire, then having the “B” Team of Commander-in-Chief Far East Robert Brooke-Popham (relieved during the Battle for Malaya) and General Arthur E. Percival (British commander at Singapore) in charge was incomprehensible. Neither was Chinese Gordon and both were completely overmatched by Japan’s General Yamashita.

3. For a litany of reasons, many economic, the defenders were ill-equipped. Even the air defense strategy, which succeeded the naval defense, was starved and never approached the presumed requirement of 336 modern aircraft (there being on hand but 180 obsolete Buffalos and Wildebeests).

Never underestimate an opponent, for they will most certainly not do what you expect.

4. Once and for all, the 15-inch guns were not pointing the wrong way. Four of the five had Mark II naval turret mountings and 360-degree traverse if the obstructing cables and gun-stops were removed, as they were. Two of the five 15-inch rifles (two others obstructed by hills), along with all six of the 9.2-inch guns, fired north during the battle. All the 6-inch guns on Tekong Island also fired into Johore. The greater limitation was the lack of high explosive, anti-personnel ammunition, most being armor piercing for ship assault. The latter was ineffective against massed formations, intended for the Japanese fleet that never came. There’s that problem again: “the enemy does what it can, not what you expect it to do.”

5. If you want to lead a coalition, it’s a good thing to have conformity of strategic goals. In the months and weeks prior to the attack on 8 December 1941, there were draining disputes with Australia, in particular, over the Far East/Near North dichotomy.

6. John Curtin, the pacifist of the Thirties who succeeded Robert Menzies as Australian Prime Minister, became the appeaser of 1940, attempting to negotiate with his friend, Ambassador Tatsuo Kawai, for a separate peace with Japan. The prize was the iron ore deposits in Yampi Sound. As these discussions began to fail, Kawai told Curtin straight out on 29 November 1941—ten days prior to the attack—that matters had “gone too far.”

Curtin had become increasingly hawkish from mid-1941. Equipped with this additional knowledge, he became embarrassingly more vocal with his criticisms of London’s policies, demanding that they immediately assume the defensive positions in Southern Thailand known as the Matador Plan. He was unsuccessful, as was Percival, whose dithering scuttled this opportunity;

7. Lest one think Curtin a traitor, one must put his actions within the context of the time. Britain’s Far East policy from 1939 was one of appeasement, a play for time. An odious example was Britain’s being quite willing to starve the Chinese following Japan’s demand to close the Burma Road, reopening it under U.S. pressure in late 1941.


8. Though one prominent turncoat, Capt. Heenan, was executed, Singapore’s failures were not the result of fifth column activity. There was significant Japanese spy infiltration into Thailand and Malaya from 1937. These spies were fully versed on the woeful state of British preparedness.

9. The sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales was a psychological blow. But these assets were never deployed in any serious military context and had zero effect upon the tactical outcome

10. The three national forces, the British, Australians and Indians, especially the Indians and the Australian replacements, were conspicuously untrained. The last reinforcements, in January 1942, virtually marched off their transports and into captivity at Changi.

11. The civilian administration under Shelton Thomas was obstructionist and actually forbade military preparations on the basis of not wishing to alarm the population.

12. There are well-substantiated allegations that some of the Indian troops ran under fire, and that others joined the Japanese Army. Lest this suggest some character or racial defect, let the record show that as they jumped into the waters of Keppel Harbour, they landed atop the Aussies who beat them to the docks. And why not? Aussie Gen. Gordon Bennett fled Singapore without permission. Poor leadership in the field is a virus that will sap the will of any army to fight.

[stevep]

Apr 29, 2020 13:04:01 GMT lordroel said:

Apr 29, 2020 12:53:56 GMT stevep said:

  I've heard this mentioned before and even that when Percival  approached the Japanese to discuss surrender they were initially thinking he was asking for their surrender.

  I don't think it would have avoided the fall of Singapore.  Even if a more determined defence had forced the Japanese to withdraw some way up the Malayan peninsula and the British didn't really have the supplies and mobile forces for that the Japanese had already invaded Sumatra and were closing in on Java so Singapore and southern Malaya would have been too isolated and fallen in a realtively short period.  Britain if Churchill was reckless could have lost substantial naval forces trying to resupply it at a stage when the RN was already grossly overstretched.  There is the danger he might think it could be another Trobuk.

  However a successful brief defence which sees the Japanese thrown back a little and gave the defenders a moral boost could have delayed the fall a bit and also reduced somewhat the loss of morale and prestige for Britain in the region.  Not greatly so but it would have probably been seen more like the American action at Bataan, gallant but ultimately fruitless. It was too late by that stage to successfully defend Malaya and without that and Sumatra at least Singapore can't sustain a long siege.  Its too isolated and closely surrounded by enemy held forces.

Found this: Did Singapore Have to Fall?

1. Singapore was not and could not be an “impregnable fortress” by any definition. This wasn’t the 1800s and this wasn’t Khartoum.

2. If Singapore were so critical to the British Empire, then having the “B” Team of Commander-in-Chief Far East Robert Brooke-Popham (relieved during the Battle for Malaya) and General Arthur E. Percival (British commander at Singapore) in charge was incomprehensible. Neither was Chinese Gordon and both were completely overmatched by Japan’s General Yamashita.

3. For a litany of reasons, many economic, the defenders were ill-equipped. Even the air defense strategy, which succeeded the naval defense, was starved and never approached the presumed requirement of 336 modern aircraft (there being on hand but 180 obsolete Buffalos and Wildebeests).

Never underestimate an opponent, for they will most certainly not do what you expect.

4. Once and for all, the 15-inch guns were not pointing the wrong way. Four of the five had Mark II naval turret mountings and 360-degree traverse if the obstructing cables and gun-stops were removed, as they were. Two of the five 15-inch rifles (two others obstructed by hills), along with all six of the 9.2-inch guns, fired north during the battle. All the 6-inch guns on Tekong Island also fired into Johore. The greater limitation was the lack of high explosive, anti-personnel ammunition, most being armor piercing for ship assault. The latter was ineffective against massed formations, intended for the Japanese fleet that never came. There’s that problem again: “the enemy does what it can, not what you expect it to do.”

5. If you want to lead a coalition, it’s a good thing to have conformity of strategic goals. In the months and weeks prior to the attack on 8 December 1941, there were draining disputes with Australia, in particular, over the Far East/Near North dichotomy.

6. John Curtin, the pacifist of the Thirties who succeeded Robert Menzies as Australian Prime Minister, became the appeaser of 1940, attempting to negotiate with his friend, Ambassador Tatsuo Kawai, for a separate peace with Japan. The prize was the iron ore deposits in Yampi Sound. As these discussions began to fail, Kawai told Curtin straight out on 29 November 1941—ten days prior to the attack—that matters had “gone too far.”

Curtin had become increasingly hawkish from mid-1941. Equipped with this additional knowledge, he became embarrassingly more vocal with his criticisms of London’s policies, demanding that they immediately assume the defensive positions in Southern Thailand known as the Matador Plan. He was unsuccessful, as was Percival, whose dithering scuttled this opportunity;

7. Lest one think Curtin a traitor, one must put his actions within the context of the time. Britain’s Far East policy from 1939 was one of appeasement, a play for time. An odious example was Britain’s being quite willing to starve the Chinese following Japan’s demand to close the Burma Road, reopening it under U.S. pressure in late 1941.


8. Though one prominent turncoat, Capt. Heenan, was executed, Singapore’s failures were not the result of fifth column activity. There was significant Japanese spy infiltration into Thailand and Malaya from 1937. These spies were fully versed on the woeful state of British preparedness.

9. The sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales was a psychological blow. But these assets were never deployed in any serious military context and had zero effect upon the tactical outcome

10. The three national forces, the British, Australians and Indians, especially the Indians and the Australian replacements, were conspicuously untrained. The last reinforcements, in January 1942, virtually marched off their transports and into captivity at Changi.

11. The civilian administration under Shelton Thomas was obstructionist and actually forbade military preparations on the basis of not wishing to alarm the population.

12. There are well-substantiated allegations that some of the Indian troops ran under fire, and that others joined the Japanese Army. Lest this suggest some character or racial defect, let the record show that as they jumped into the waters of Keppel Harbour, they landed atop the Aussies who beat them to the docks. And why not? Aussie Gen. Gordon Bennett fled Singapore without permission. Poor leadership in the field is a virus that will sap the will of any army to fight.

  lordroel,

  In general agreement although I think point 7 is factually inaccurate.  Britain did close the Burma road at the height of the invasion threat from Germany in autumn 40, although this was of relatively minimal effect as this was also the monsoon season so its carrying capacity was greatly restricted during that period anyway.  As I think your already mentioned in your WWII day by day it was repoened shortly after the situation improved.  See Burma_Road - Wiki for more details as that says it closed for 3 months from July 1940.  That last line of its history entry:

From 1942–1944, 98 percent of all US lend lease to China went directly to US Army units in China, not the Chinese military.[6] 

  is rather surprising if accurate.  A lot of this would have gone to the USAAF which was trying strategic bombing from China as I don't thing there were any significant US land forces there.

  On point 12 a number of the Indian prisoners taken did eventually join the collaborative INA that Japan set up under Boise but I suspect many may have done that simply to escape the brutal treatment under Japanese control.

  Actually, with point 3 a few years before Dec 41 Percival was tasked with estimating the method Japan might use for an invasion of Malaya and very accurately predicted landings in the far north and associated parts of Thailand, with the main push being down the west coast which was far more developed than the east, with road and railways and plantations rather than largely being jungle.  This makes it especially frustrating that his warnings weren't heeded.  Percival may not have been the best man for a leading command role as he seemed to be too indecisive but others above him, both military and political are largely responsible for the shortcomings in the defence.

  Steve

[lordroel]

Apr 29, 2020 14:04:13 GMT stevep said:

is rather surprising if accurate.  A lot of this would have gone to the USAAF which was trying strategic bombing from China as I don't thing there were any significant US land forces there.

Correct, the Fourteenth Air Force
was the one that got most of the supplies.

[EwellHolmes]

Apr 29, 2020 11:41:18 GMT stevep said:

Apr 29, 2020 4:02:40 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Somehow keep Italy neutral, avoiding the Desert War and thus freeing the forces available for Operation Matador to be done.

  That would definitely help but its really outside Britain's hands, unless you have some very unlikely and successful plot to remove Mussolini and replace him with a more capable and/or cautious leaders. 

  Mind you if your going back that far the western powers standing up to fascism a couple of years earlier would help immensely.  Taking out Hitler before he got too powerful would really screw over Japanese attempts against SE Asia, even if the gambled, possibly successfully in those circumstances, to avoid clashing with the US.

  In terms of after the fall of France its possible but it needs either a good amount of luck and/or better deployment of British and allied resources.

  Of course while a successful Operation Matador would have helped in safeguarding Malaya against direct attack, albeit it might have been attempted OTL, it wouldn't have prevented the threat of the Japanese working through the DEI.  If Sumatra falls then Malaya is pretty much indefensible and its a lot more difficult if they get all of Java as well.  To hold the region secure you need at least western Java.

  Steve

Yeah, you'd need a PoD for Italian neutrality. An earlier war isn't within the Anglo-French interest.

[stevep]

Apr 30, 2020 1:08:29 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Apr 29, 2020 11:41:18 GMT stevep said:

  That would definitely help but its really outside Britain's hands, unless you have some very unlikely and successful plot to remove Mussolini and replace him with a more capable and/or cautious leaders. 

  Mind you if your going back that far the western powers standing up to fascism a couple of years earlier would help immensely.  Taking out Hitler before he got too powerful would really screw over Japanese attempts against SE Asia, even if the gambled, possibly successfully in those circumstances, to avoid clashing with the US.

  In terms of after the fall of France its possible but it needs either a good amount of luck and/or better deployment of British and allied resources.

  Of course while a successful Operation Matador would have helped in safeguarding Malaya against direct attack, albeit it might have been attempted OTL, it wouldn't have prevented the threat of the Japanese working through the DEI.  If Sumatra falls then Malaya is pretty much indefensible and its a lot more difficult if they get all of Java as well.  To hold the region secure you need at least western Java.

  Steve

Yeah, you'd need a PoD for Italian neutrality. An earlier war isn't within the Anglo-French interest.

  EwellHolmes,

  I think we're disagreed on that 2nd point before.

  Steve

[lordroel]

Apr 30, 2020 11:18:09 GMT stevep said:

Apr 30, 2020 1:08:29 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Yeah, you'd need a PoD for Italian neutrality. An earlier war isn't within the Anglo-French interest.

  EwellHolmes,

  I think we're disagreed on that 2nd point before.

  Steve

Would you agree with:

9. The sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales was a psychological blow. But these assets were never deployed in any serious military context and had zero effect upon the tactical outcome

That even if the mange to get to Singapore they will not add to its defends.

[stevep]

Apr 30, 2020 11:21:39 GMT lordroel said:

Apr 30, 2020 11:18:09 GMT stevep said:

  EwellHolmes ,

  I think we're disagreed on that 2nd point before.

  Steve

Would you agree with:

9. The sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales was a psychological blow. But these assets were never deployed in any serious military context and had zero effect upon the tactical outcome

That even if the mange to get to Singapore they will not add to its defends.

  lordroel,

  It was definitely a psychological blow and with the lack of any other powerful naval force in the region it made later Japanese operations a bit easier.  IIRC the navy wanted to send a larger number of older ships, a bit like the later Eastern fleet in 1942 which that far forward would probably have been a bad idea.  However they wouldn't have been available in time, especially given Dec 41 was a very bad time for the already overstretched RN [Barham and Ark Royal sunk and Queen Elizabeth and Valiant crippled in Alexandria harbour by Italian mini subs.] 

  Churchill had the idea that a small but powerful fast force might act as a deterrent, being able to threaten Japanese deployments and if they had been able to hit the transporters before they landed it would have hurt the Japanese a lot but they had a powerful covering naval force and of course overwhelming air power so that was unlikely.  Would have required both an earlier move north and then a clear victory, probably in a night battle over the covering force 1st and given the Japanese torpedoes and that the Japanese were also well trained in night combat that could have been very risky.

  The force very nearly got away.  If Philips hadn't diverted the fleet to investigate a [false] report of a Japanese landing at Kuantan - which he could have checked using an a/c they would probably have escaped on that day.  Or if a torpedo hit on the POW hadn't been drastically worsened by restarting a propeller shaft that did huge damage to the ship at least one might have got away as they were dodging the Japanese attacks fairly successful until the POW became very much a sitting duck.  However unless they had been withdrawn quite a way, which would have been politically difficult given Malaya under attack and if the attack had been avoided the RN would still have been unaware how long ranged a lot of the Japanese a/c were so they could well be caught later.

  Basically it needed substantially better organised and equipped land and land based air forces to defend the peninsula, and definitely more numbers in terms of a/c as well as not being obsolete.  Along with as I say further forces to secure the southern flank by holding parts of the DEI.  There is no way with the condition of the RN at this point and the situation in Europe that it could be the primary defence for the region and that wasn't the plan as it was supposed to the the RAF, with their airbases protected by the army.  However neither service were able/willing to supply the forces necessary for this.

  Steve

[EwellHolmes]

Apr 30, 2020 11:18:09 GMT stevep said:

Apr 30, 2020 1:08:29 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Yeah, you'd need a PoD for Italian neutrality. An earlier war isn't within the Anglo-French interest.

  EwellHolmes ,

  I think we're disagreed on that 2nd point before.

  Steve

Can't remember if we did. I was assuming you were talking about the time of the Munich Affair?