stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 11, 2020 9:49:27 GMT
They could not; the entire reason Cash and Carry was replaced IOTL was because of the British inability to continue. So without Lend Lease, the British would likely have signed a separate peace treaty with Germany. Churchill would probably resign and Lord Halifax and Mosley take over. I wonder what will become of the British Royals?
Britain would be forced to make peace, although the degree to which this would be clear to the Germans is uncertain. However without the costs of fighting through every shipment to Britain, of fighting on mutual front and preparing for a possible invasion at very short notice a lot of pressure is taken off. Trade with the US will be limited although not greatly once the fighting is over and Britain without the pressure on shipping is going to be able to conduct more trade with other partners. British resources in the US have been asset stripped but it still has capacity around the rest of the world.
Probably Churchill is forced to resign but not sure that Halifax or even more so Mosley would be prominent. Halifax had shown no interest in power in 1940 and was by now IIRC ambassador in the US. Mosley was imprisoned and even if the government was forced to release him there would be substantial public opinion against him playing any role in government.
Mind you remember here we're talking about a POD in 1933 so going to be a hell of a lot of butterflies by 1939 let alone 1941.
The other option I considered was a peace agreement in late 40 after the defeat of the Luftwaffe. This gives both sides more time to prepare for future action and Britain is in a better economic position as it still has assets in the US not sold at bargain basement prices.
Britain in the 41 option is weakened but definitely not utterly defenceless as being suggested against either Japan or Germany, especially since any conflict with them is likely to be sequential here. Its a difficult position but the horrendous suggestion of the OP with probably several hundred million deaths and the collapse of democracy around the world is unlikely. [Going to be a lot worse than OTL if Japan has longer in China and the Nazis control most of the western SU as well as having longer in the rest of Europe.]
I can't see the US attacking Britain and seizing its possessions unless what happens is not a peace agreement but an unconditional surrender. Which is a possibility but unlikely I suspect.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 11, 2020 9:56:06 GMT
So without Lend Lease, the British would likely have signed a separate peace treaty with Germany. Churchill would probably resign and Lord Halifax and Mosley take over. I wonder what will become of the British Royals?
Britain would be forced to make peace, although the degree to which this would be clear to the Germans is uncertain. However without the costs of fighting through every shipment to Britain, of fighting on mutual front and preparing for a possible invasion at very short notice a lot of pressure is taken off. Trade with the US will be limited although not greatly once the fighting is over and Britain without the pressure on shipping is going to be able to conduct more trade with other partners. British resources in the US have been asset stripped but it still has capacity around the rest of the world.
Probably Churchill is forced to resign but not sure that Halifax or even more so Mosley would be prominent. Halifax had shown no interest in power in 1940 and was by now IIRC ambassador in the US. Mosley was imprisoned and even if the government was forced to release him there would be substantial public opinion against him playing any role in government.
Mind you remember here we're talking about a POD in 1933 so going to be a hell of a lot of butterflies by 1939 let alone 1941.
The other option I considered was a peace agreement in late 40 after the defeat of the Luftwaffe. This gives both sides more time to prepare for future action and Britain is in a better economic position as it still has assets in the US not sold at bargain basement prices.
Britain in the 41 option is weakened but definitely not utterly defenceless as being suggested against either Japan or Germany, especially since any conflict with them is likely to be sequential here. Its a difficult position but the horrendous suggestion of the OP with probably several hundred million deaths and the collapse of democracy around the world is unlikely. [Going to be a lot worse than OTL if Japan has longer in China and the Nazis control most of the western SU as well as having longer in the rest of Europe.]
I can't see the US attacking Britain and seizing its possessions unless what happens is not a peace agreement but an unconditional surrender. Which is a possibility but unlikely I suspect.
How so, with the bolded? |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 11, 2020 12:10:26 GMT
stevep , Hope you won't mind, given the size of your post, if I split it up into portions? Yes, as argued by David Glantz, the premier Western historian on the Red Army in World War II. IOTL, Stalin ordered a partial mobilization in April of 1941 and by June of the 99 Divisions forward deployed, all of them were still rated by STAVKA as combat ineffective due to material shortages already cited and the lack of supporting logistics. The Soviet war planning at the time was DP-41, which called for aggressive offensive ripostes to any German attack as a means of "Active Defense". I ask you, if the Soviets could not support 99 divisions on the defense, then how do they do so for 174? All the additional divisions in the world matter not if the troops not have ammunition, fuel, or even small arms, as the research shows. As for defensive positions, Stalin actually allowed for that; the problem was that they still were not completed. Here, the German operational objective of destroying the Red Army on the first 300-400km of the invasion is complete. The Soviet force regeneration rates just aren't sufficient from therein to stop the German advance; in effect, Berlin really will have destroyed the Red Army in the first six weeks. You have misunderstood the citation in question. It is not that the Luftwaffe gets 3x bigger overall via more production in the limited timeframe, it's that the lack of the Commonwealth in the War frees up substantial resources that are tied down elsewhere. Take, for example, the numerous Fliegerkorps on duty in the Mediterranean fighting the British in 1941. Now, in the ATL, they are free for duty in the East. Once the European USSR falls, further resistance is pointless but also impossible; there simply is no industry or manpower from which to mount a continued resistance if the Germans occupy the A-A Line, nevermind the Ural Line. 90% of the USSR's coal and oil is West of the Ural line, meaning it is impossible to continue to production and the manpower base isn't there either. See The State of the Soviet Economy and Red Army in June of 1942
:Because of the massive casualties the Germans inflicted during Barbarossa (by February 1942, the Red Army had lost over 3 million men captured by the Germans, and another 2,663,000 killed in action) and the huge population centers lost to the Germans the Soviet industrial labor force fell from 8.3 million people in 1940 to 5.5 million people in 1942. This also impacted the Red Army. September 1942 estimates done by E.A. Shchadenko (the man responsible for creating new Red Army units) found that more than five and a half million military age men had been lost from Red Army usage due to the German occupation of Soviet western territories. This meant that list strength of rifle divisions fell from a pre-war total of 14,483 men to 11,626 men in December of 1941. Though many point to the Soviet Union's huge size as the major impediment to any chance of German success in the war this misses a number of crucial points. Not least of which is that the Red Army's major source of reliable manpower was in the Western Soviet Union, and much of that was under German occupation in 1942.
This is not to say that the Red Army did not try to make use of the manpower that could be found in the Caucuses and Central Asia - it just didn't work out. Language barriers represented a formidable obstacle to integrating non-Russian speaking populations into the Red Army. The Red Army raised twenty-six rifle or mountain divisions from the Caucuses, Central Asia, and Baltic states, but almost none of these were deployable against the Germans. Though four Armenian rifle divisions saw combat, as well as the majority of Georgian units, those cases proved the exception rather than the rule. For instance, only three of fifteen Uzbek units saw combat and the Chechen-Ingush cavalry divison never came close to a battlefield. The loss of population in Western Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine therefore had an outsized impact on Soviet military potential as a whole.
Moreover, there is a strong argument that that had the Germans, even in failing to meet the goals of their 1941-1942 campaigns, merely been able to hold onto the Soviet population centers captured in 1941-1942 that the Red Army may have been in deep trouble. That's because as early as January of 1943 a key component in the Red Army's ability to rejuvenate its strength would be its ability to move west and recapture land and population lost to the Germans. For evidence as to that we need look no further than the Voronezh Front's experiences early in 1943 as it pursued German forces withdrawing from Southern Russia as the German pocket at Stalingrad was slowly being reduced. From January 13th to March 3rd 1943 the Voronezh Front's pursuit operations further beat up the Axis armies in Southern Russia but at a cost of 100,00 casualties (this included 33,331 irrecoverable losses) from the front's total initial strength of 350,000 men. To help ameliorate these losses the front received nearly 50,000 replacements during January and February. However, less than 10,000 of these replacements represented trained manpower released from the Stavka reserves. The largest single category of replacements comprised 20,902 men press-ganged into service from recaptured territory as the front moved west. The remainder consisted of front reserve units, previously sick or wounded men released from hospitals, liberated prisoners of war, penal troops (men released from the gulag and prisons) and the like. This meant that forty percent of the Voronezh Front's replacement manpower only came about because the front was able to move west. Nor was this situation unique. At this point in the war the Red Army was running short in the trained reserves needed to replenish the massive losses still being incurred while it also built up a strategic reserve and created new units. Germany gains massively, as she is now able to translate her hold over continental Europe into the global trading sphere; she can import goods again. As for the British, if there is no Lend Lease, then they definitely cannot insist on any demands vis-a-vis the Italians and, probably, will even have to make concessions. If they don't, the Germans continue the war and the UK collapses in 1941. The Dutch Government escaped IOTL, so there is no reason the NEI would fall under a collaborationist regime. As for France, why should the Germans stop that? Vichy France is in no place to make demands and the UK has made peace; Berlin can do as it pleases. Specifically as it pertains to FIC, the Japanese had already occupied the Northern half in 1940, so nothing really changes here since you've suggested an early 1941 peace. I don't see any reason why Japan will be any less successful; even if not directly at war with Italy, Britain will be forced to keep considerable forces in the Mediterranean and in the UK itself in order to protect against a sudden Axis backstop. Indeed, if what was IOTL the 8th Army is busy in Burma, that gives the Italian Army the ability to waltz all the way to the Suez. If the RAF has been considerably diluted in the UK proper for Australia, that means the Luftwaffe establishes air superiority and promptly the German Army is in London. In short, London can't take any real risks here and, as you outlined, the Japanese still have every reason to rampage; why pay for oil when they simply steal it? Also, how, exactly, is the UK supposed to fight the Japanese without Lend Lease? Their economy was already on the verge of collapse in early 1941. By 1943, the Soviets are dead and Caucasus oil is allowing the Germans to simply outproduce the UK decisively. Even IOTL, mind you, the Germans were outproducing them in munitions and matching them in both airplanes and tanks anyway; here, the German superiority in aircraft is closer to 2:1, giving them a decisive advantage over the UK. They don't need a Navy in this case, they need only establish air superiority over the Channel and they may then invade. The Royal Navy means nothing, after all, if it's sunk by Ju-87s. As for elsewhere, the British cannot both be strong in the UK, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. They either can be decent-not even strong-in the former or they can be in the latter, but not both. One need only look at their production statistics to see this. In which case, the Italians and Germans attack in early 1943 and then with the UK itself occupied, their forces in the Pacific quickly break due to lack of reinforcements and supplies. As for the Japanese, while a popular meme, the Banzai attack was only used rarely and actually did not consist of the sole means of Japanese operations. Case in point, are you aware of Operation Ichi-Go the IJA conducted in 1944, which was a full combined arms offensive? The Japanese were not the "savages" of popular media, but rather well trained, professional, and effective soldiers. Removing the last possible threat to the Reich in Afro-Eurasia, giving Berlin immense reach and access to resources to then, at some point, finally attack the United States? I'm not really sure where the idea the Germans are bad at amphibious operations comes from; see Norway, the Channel Islands, and the multiple operations in the Aegean and such. By 1943, they had plenty of experience and, unlike IOTL, now have a trump card in the form of overwhelming production capacity against the UK. The British themselves turned Tube Alloys to the U.S. because their own analysis said it would take them a decade or more to produce an effective weapon; I see no reason this changes, particularly given that by early 1941 Britain is completely broke. Whether or not the 8th Army is fighting in North Africa or not is irrelevant to the lack of British money and resources to the same. By the late 1940s, however, the UK is firmly under the Germans, who will seize the Tube Alloys for themselves and by the late 1940s will have their own bomb, and will be able to thank the British for their role in that. The Army programme finished, and the Luftwaffe program began but was dependent on conquering oil for the USSR. This is of no concern here.
No problem in splitting large posts. I would have done so here in reply but once we start getting multiple nested layers it gets bloody difficult to follow. Just providing a quick reply to your point on the fighting in Russia then more detailed responses to the otheres
In terms of Soviet losses yes they were huge and will likely be even larger than OTL here but so will be German losses and they were running on fumes very quickly OTL. A lot of those extra troops may escape from attempted encirclement's as they did OTL and will the remains of the German forces be able to push as fast as OTL even against weaker losses without being fatally exposed. It is to be noted that in both 41 and 42 the Germans were unable to hold onto their gains after their offensives.
I don't have the same access to sources as you do but with the decline of library services nor I admit the willpower. How I do note that the Youtube source I have mentioned before often quotes Glantz, Tooze and others and comes to the opposite conclusion as you as, do many other sources. As Lordroel's own day by day shows the Germans were in great difficulties from early in the campaign supplying and supporting those exposed spearhead forces and if they take significantly higher losses in the early weeks of the conflict while that will mean less forces to be supplied their even more exposed and its noticeably that throughout the campaign the USSR was producing not just new infantry units but a lot equipment as well. As I said, especially in this position I can see the Soviets losing but I don't agree it will be as quick and cheap for Germany as you think and holding such an huge area is going to tied down a lot of both men and resources. At the earliest I can't see Germany pulling any significant forces back from the region prior to early 43.
Yes I misunderstood that part but the rest of my reply is relevant. The Luftwaffe wouldn't be greatly larger because substantial forces were not left in the west, nor in action in Germany at this point for defence against BC attacks. Similarly involvement in the Med was episodically until after Torch with forces switching south before Barbarossa and then during the winter seasons when it couldn't operate effectively in the east. As I said having more forces in the east will require supporting them, which will be more difficult as the front goes eastwards. The Luftwaffe position will be stronger but not greatly so.
As I said Germany can import goods if she can pay for them. The economy of the German zone of control was in a mess due to chaotic nature of the Nazi regime with chronic infighting corruption and short term looking. Also a general unwillingness to plan for the future - Hitler's grandeur architectural plans apart. Germany had relied heavily on barter agreements in its pre-war trade deals in part because the economy is in such a mess. This won't stop imports but will pose some restrictions. Similarly a new German attack on Britain will mean the rapid cutting of those trade operations.
Is Hitler, who is unlikely to know in detail about the details of British finances going to be willing to insist continuing the war with Britain when he wants his 'crusade' against the eastern Slavs so desperately and Italy has only been a burden for him? Mussolini is going to get lost land returned and may get a token such as Malta but is unlikely to be able to prevent a peace agreement by insisting on massive gains when Italian actions have only resulted in failure and humiliation.
Because a peace with Britain its empire and the dominions will mean a general peace. London will do what it can for its allies but their going to be forced to make peace as well. A lot of people are understandably going to decide not to 'return' to a fascist dominated homeland but there will be a peace. As such while its possible that the Dutch government in exile may continue and maintain control in the DEI its more likely that it will fall under the control of a collaborationist regime. In which case it will be a German ally and also probably an important supplier of oil so Germany is unlikely to want Japan attacking and occupying it. Especially if Japan has refused to take part in the attack on the Soviets.
With France an armistice was signed until a general peace was achieved. This has now occurred. Technically Germany can say its made peace with Britain but refusing to do so with France but it will display the nature of Hitler's regime and also make for a lot of resentment in France as Hitler has betrayed them. More likely while Germany will maintain some military bases under some treaty terms its likely to
want to withdraw the bulk of its forces as they will be wanted in the eastern empire or simply in industry and other activities. There is no basis then for a continued extraction of loot under the basis of occupation costs or holding millions of French POWs.
With Japan it occupied the northern half of FIC in 1940. However I mentioned two options, either ~Oct 40 or spring 41. In the latter you are more likely to see an occupation of the southern part roughly as OTL but with a formally independent Vichy France that again is likely to cause tension. If peace comes in late 40 then this could be more difficult for them. I'm willing to accept that Japan is likely to occupy the entire colony but its going to come at political costs and give a clear warning that an attack south is planned.
Britain will need to keep a strong garrison in Britain and a decent one in the ME but they won't be constantly at war and enduring losses. There wouldn't be continued losses in the Atlantic either and its a lot easier sending forces and supplies to Egypt via a peaceful Med rather than having to fight shipping all the way around Africa. Even more so with getting the formally agreed garrison for Malaya. [OTL the main defence was supposed to be ~650 modern a/c which due to the war was cut to 336 IIRC. When Japan attacked there were ~180 obsolete a/c.] Given Britain's production of a/c that's at most a month or two of production. Similarly the ground garrison is almost certain to be larger and will be better equipped as well as likely to include troops with some combat experience. Japan can't send much more forces than it attacked with OTL, other than naval if not attacking the US because its limitations are logistical. It depends on foreign MS for a lot of its imports and once it goes to war its going to lose that as well as a fair bit of its own in battle losses. For instance with Japan obviously building up for a strike south and no immediate threat in Europe - as the Germans are fighting bitterly deep in Russia and the Italians have shown themselves as inept - the RN sub force will be largely back in the Far East for the role it was constructed for, attacking Japanese shipping.
Similarly as I said before one huge saving with be a drastically lower spending on the strategic bomber force. Both in terms of the ruinous losses it was already suffering and that there won't be the massive construction of OTL. That would free up huge resources in terms of manpower, material and money.
Britain was nearly bankrupt because it was fighting a war under dire pressure and being forced to rely on many imports from a US that was intent on stripping the counties reserves bare. This is no longer the case and Britain can get everything it needs from other trade partners. Money will be a problem but not the fatal issue it was OTL. This is especially so if the peace agreement was say in Oct 40 rather than spring 41.
By 43 yes Germany was ramping up production and had overtaken the prior British lead. It doesn't mean that successfully invading the UK is going to be easy. Normandy saw very heavy fighting despite a huge allied superiority in land, sea and air forces. Attacking a UK which has had 3 years to construct defences, building on what was already in place in late 40 isn't going to be easy. Similarly the Luftwaffe had a greater than 2-1 advantage in 40 and still failed. Stuka's were nonviable in 40 so their unlikely to be successful in 43 as the Germans won't be certain of air superiority. In terms of the air battle the Germans will have many veterans but given their been fighting hard in the east would their a/c have been updated much? By this time Britain will have had the time in peace to develop its own a/c and might even have early jets in service. Also if their got a decent amount of AA guns with proxy fuses the Luftwaffe is going to be in for a nasty shock. Plus of course fighting over Britain has the huge advantage that many of their downed pilots can quickly return to service. Not so for the Luftwaffe losses.
Even winning air superiority isn't going to help much in supporting an invasion. That will need a lot of amphibious facilities the Germans don't have going up against built up coastal defences. Plus once an invasion starts the task for the Luftwaffe is much, much harder. Instead of having to escort bombers on missions planned in advance their going to have multiple tasks. There will still be planned bomber attacks but they will also need to send in attacks at short notice, and to try and provide air support to ground forces on any beachheads established and on cross channel supply routes under attack from British a/c so the demand for Luftwaffe fighters expands greatly.
This assumes that the RN does nothing which is unlikely. Stuka's aren't going to be effective unless their sure of air superiority as otherwise their dead meat. The Luftwaffe has some units which have been specialised in attacking naval shipping but after the 1st year or so of the war in Russia their not going to be doing much of that and will be out of practice. Also dive bombers especially aren't very good at night. A few destroyer sweeps, and by 43 Britain will have a lot more such vessels, could cost the Germans a lot of their shipping and reinforcements/supplies. Plus minefields and possibly subs, along with coastal or railway guns hammering landing areas.
Don't forget also that Britain will have a good bit of warning. To launch any serious invasion Germany is going to have to start building up some amphibious ability and related capacities some time before the attempt, probably while heavy fighting is still going on say in the Urals. Then there will be a substantial build up in France and the Low Countries, in the former case almost certainly breaching any agreements signed with Vichy at the peace settlement in 40/41.
Also by this time the threat from Japan is greatly reduced. Even if they have most of their fleet still they will lack the oil to operate it and similarly their a/c. As such substantial resources can be pulled back from the Far East and new production will no longer have that as a priority. You might even get some sort of peace agreement where Britain say concedes Honk Kong, a free hand in China and say some agreement in oil supplies in return for the withdrawal of Japanese forces from occupied areas.
In the ME the Italians will be no great threat, nor will Germany via Libya as logistics prevent a massive offensive and the El Alamein position gives a virtually unbreakable defensive position. Britain could be better off if it lost Malta in the peace as it no longer has the heavy price of supplying it. There would be a potential threat via the Caucasus but the German supply lines are very, very long and the terrain not favourable to an attacker. Also while the Germans may gain Baku in 43 or even sometime in 42 don't expect to get anything out of it for quite a while. The Soviets will have razed the place to the ground so everything will need to be rebuilt, which puts a further strain on logistics and then they have to ship the oil back to Germany - or for local use rebuild refineries there. Plus once they go to war with Britain again its likely to be a major target for British bombers.
As I said earlier the primary threat might be if Turkey is occupied or forced into the Axis camp but even then there is a lot of rugged terrain before you reach Syria and likly to be a lot of Turkish guerilla opposition which Britain will seek to support. Its possible that after a fair amount of fighting Britain loses the ME. However its going to take time and a lot of effort plus once war resumes Britain has to reinforce via Africa anyway. Plus by holding southern Arabia [Yemen and Oman] and East Africa - expect that to fall into British hands as a priority its going to be difficult for the Axis to get anything but subs possibly through a reopened Suez Canal.
The Japanese repeated make frontal assaults even when they were formally defending. This made the task of the US advancing across the Pacific markedly easier than it would otherwise have been. With a stronger defence holding in northern Malaya and British forces moving into Sumatra and Java to support the Dutch the desperate need to get the southern supplies before their logistics are exhausted is almost certain to result in frontal infantry attacks. The British are superior in armour and artillery and the Japanese casualties are going to be horrendous, very probably for little or no gain. The problem was not the often brutal training of the ordinary Japanese soldier, with the basis on unthinking obedience, but the twisted view of honour in much of the middle and higher ranks. With their lack of heavy equipment and very restricted front lines frontal attacks will be the only real option once a defensive position is established. They can try infiltrating but against a stronger defence with the ability to counter-attack its almost certainly to be a lot less effective.
At huge costs to them, if they can achieve it. Huge production superiority only applies if you can use it. Germany can't apply many men against the UK, even without the losses and continued occupation burden in the east, and are likely to fail repeatedly if they try. Its possible they can wear Britain down but its likely to take repeated attempts over years. More likely to be successful with a new blockade except they probably haven't built many subs while Britain will have boosted its escort units in numbers, experience and technology so its going to take a long time.
The US had the advantage that a they could use their huge production, as well as that of allies, to arm those allies who did the majority of the fighting. They only really got into a meat-grinder in Europe after D day against largely outclassed [in numbers and equipment terms] and it still costs them heavily. The Germans face a worse task here as their not going to have anything like the same numerical superiority because they can't get tens of divisions across the channel. Not until Britain is defeated anyway by which point any such effort is wasted. Plus their already been through a meat grinder in the east which will still be ongoing to some degree. You can moblise children and old men to defend the Reich against invaders but not really to take part in amphibious assaults against prepared defences so how much manpower can Germany throw away?
In terms of German amphibious assaults Norway was a desperate gamble that without a lot of luck could have failed badly, or at least been a lot more expensive than it was. That was against a minor power with minimal forces at peace. Plus they were quickly able to secure overwhelming air superiority. Even so they lost a sizeable chunk of their navy. Going up against a forewarned and heavily defended Britain is a far far more difficult task as I mentioned above.
What opposition on the Channel Isles? Pretty certain they were unopposed - quick check on wiki says
Not exactly a spectacular amphibious achievement. I suspect they would take them again in a 43 attack for the same reason.
Similarly with the Aegean was there that much in the way of opposition? Again the Luftwaffe had unquestioned air superiority and what defenders there were were in small numbers and ill-equipped. Crete was famously taken with paras/air landing units with the attempted landings by boats failing miserably. Even then the invading forces and their transport a/c paid a butcher's bill against a weak and very poorly lead defensive force. Trying that against a well defended UK and its not going to go well especially since if Crete has still occurred here their pretty much abandon using air drops.
Britain combined with the US project in 43 IIRC but that was under markedly worse conditions. Two further years of heavy war on many fronts and with many losses. Which also meant that it couldn't put a massive amount of effort into the work.
If Germany is as successful as you assume and attacks Britain again in 43 then some of those problems will recur. However Britain will have had a couple of years to get a lot further along and it will be seen as pretty much the only realistic hope for a lasting victory from 43 onward so will achieve a high priority. Especially since a lot of resources won't have been lost elsewhere. It might not come in time if the Germans are willing to tear themselves apart with repeated attacks on Britain but its far from certain that will happen. I would fear another blockade but that also would take a long time.
Germany won't get much if any info from Britain if it does manage to conquer the home islands because the project won't be based there. Its almost certain to be in Canada as OTL and with some of the Canadian resources that OTL the US was able to monopolise. There will be some records in Britain but their likely to be burnt as a top priority and any related technical people evacuated as soon as it looks like Britain will fall.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 11, 2020 12:12:17 GMT
Britain would be forced to make peace, although the degree to which this would be clear to the Germans is uncertain. However without the costs of fighting through every shipment to Britain, of fighting on mutual front and preparing for a possible invasion at very short notice a lot of pressure is taken off. Trade with the US will be limited although not greatly once the fighting is over and Britain without the pressure on shipping is going to be able to conduct more trade with other partners. British resources in the US have been asset stripped but it still has capacity around the rest of the world.
Probably Churchill is forced to resign but not sure that Halifax or even more so Mosley would be prominent. Halifax had shown no interest in power in 1940 and was by now IIRC ambassador in the US. Mosley was imprisoned and even if the government was forced to release him there would be substantial public opinion against him playing any role in government.
Mind you remember here we're talking about a POD in 1933 so going to be a hell of a lot of butterflies by 1939 let alone 1941.
The other option I considered was a peace agreement in late 40 after the defeat of the Luftwaffe. This gives both sides more time to prepare for future action and Britain is in a better economic position as it still has assets in the US not sold at bargain basement prices.
Britain in the 41 option is weakened but definitely not utterly defenceless as being suggested against either Japan or Germany, especially since any conflict with them is likely to be sequential here. Its a difficult position but the horrendous suggestion of the OP with probably several hundred million deaths and the collapse of democracy around the world is unlikely. [Going to be a lot worse than OTL if Japan has longer in China and the Nazis control most of the western SU as well as having longer in the rest of Europe.]
I can't see the US attacking Britain and seizing its possessions unless what happens is not a peace agreement but an unconditional surrender. Which is a possibility but unlikely I suspect.
How so, with the bolded?
To highlight that I mentioned two options for when peace occurs but you only replied to one. For the 2nd bit see the post I've just completed.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 16, 2020 0:39:31 GMT
To highlight that I mentioned two options for when peace occurs but you only replied to one. For the 2nd bit see the post I've just completed.
Before we continue, I'm going to post further sources for everyone to read so we have a baseline. Denis Havlat (2017) Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies:
Between January 1939 and June 1940, the combined French and British orders of military planes had amounted to 10,800 machines; yet from January to May 1940 Britain had received only 104 and France 557 aircraft.19 While these deliveries were certainly helpful for the Allies, they were not enough to stem the advance of the Germans into Western Europe. In fact, after the disaster at Dunkirk, where the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) narrowly escaped capture by the German army, the demand for American deliveries increased significantly. The soldiers evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk had left behind vast amounts of materiel and equipment, which was impossible to quickly replace. BEF equipment abandoned in France included 120,000 vehicles, 600 tanks, 1,000 field guns, 500 anti-aircraft guns, 850 antitank guns, 8,000 Bren machine guns, 90,000 rifles, and half a million tons of stores and ammunition.20 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill sent a desperate message to Roosevelt asking for more deliveries, a request Roosevelt made possible by exporting ‘outdated’ weapons from US Army stocks.21 A dozen ships fully loaded with weapons and supplies sailed for Britain in June and a further 15 from July to early August.22 I n total, Britain received 500,000 rifles, 85,000 machine guns, nine hundred 75 mm field guns, 25,000 automatic rifles, and 21,000 revolvers, including substantial amounts of ammunition.23 In order to comprehend the value of these deliveries, one has to compare them to British production of these items, which amounted to 193,712 rifles and 85,924 machine guns in the years 1939–1941.24 Within eight weeks, the United States had delivered two and a half times as many rifles and the same amount of machine guns as British industry had managed to produce in three years. But infantry weapons and guns were not the only items that Britain needed in order to survive. The nation needed aircraft to defend itself from the bombing raids conducted by the Luftwaffe and warships for the escort of merchant vessel convoys. Both of these items were readily supplied by the Americans. Through the so-called Destroyers for Bases agreement, Britain received 50 renewed World War I destroyers from American stocks. Of these, nine were in service by the end of 1940 and a further 20 by May 1941.25 These ships were of immense value, in view of the fact that by the end of 1940 fully 70 percent of the British destroyer fleet was laid up for repairs and that domestic production had turned out just 88 of these vessels from 1939 to 1941.26 By the summer of 1943, only five of these destroyers had been sunk, while the other 45 were still providing escort duty.27With the Battle of Britain raging in the summer and autumn of 1940, British demand for aircraft reached new heights as well. By 1 December 1940, Britain had ordered a staggering 23,000 aircraft from the American industry, of which only 2,100 had been delivered to the beleaguered island.28 Domestic production of aircraft for that year had been 15,049 aircraft.29 While these shipments were invaluable for Britain’s survival, they came at great financial cost. In order to purchase the 50 destroyers offered by the United States, the British had to sell their possessions in the West Indies and Newfoundland, leasing them to the Americans for 99 years.30 Even then, the strains of war were too great a burden for the British economy: By September 1940, British orders in the United States amounted to 10 billion dollars, of which only a fraction could be paid for.32 The country was nearing financial collapse: ‘ … by the beginning of 1941 it had less than £3 million left in its gold and dollar reserves. This was as near to bankruptcy as it was possible to go without actual default’. 33 Realizing that without American aid Britain would have to surrender or negotiate with Germany, Roosevelt devised the so-called Lend-Lease law, which took effect on 11 March 1941. This law gave the President the authority to supply any country that was considered vital for the defense of the United States.34 For the duration of the war, Britain would receive supplies free of charge, which would be handed back or repaid once the war had ended. |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 16, 2020 0:40:54 GMT
Same source:
Even with the deliveries received from the United States, Britain’s military position in 1941 was close to hopeless. During the first half of this year the Luftwaffe continued its bombing raids against the island, Rommel’s forces were steadily advancing in North Africa, British forces sustained yet again humiliating defeats in Greece and Crete, and the German U-boats were sinking ever more British ships. Luckily, the Americans were now supplying Britain for free. In 1941 the United States delivered 4,473 aircraft either directly to Britain, to British overseas commands, or to British colonies and dominions.35 British production of aircraft in 1941 had been 20,094 units; whereas the colonies and dominions produced around 15 percent of this number.36 Other substantial military deliveries were tanks and trucks. Around 13,000 trucks and 1,390 tanks were shipped to Britain and its overseas forces before the end of 1941.37 Domestic production in 1941 had manufactured 4,841 tanks and 88,161 military trucks.38 Food represented the most crucial non-military supply. Before the war Britain had to import twice as many tons of food from overseas sources as raised on her own land.39 However, by the summer of 1940 Britain could no longer import food from continental Europe and had to cut down its food imports from other parts of the world in order to free shipping capacity for military supplies and resources. In combination with the many shiploads of food lost to the German U-boats, this created a situation where the British nation was close to starvation. Between the fall of France and the passing of the Lend-Lease act, the average British adult lost around 4.5 kilogram of weight due to the rapidly shrinking diet.40 Between 16 April and 25 December 1941, the Americans supplied Britain with over one million tons of food, including millions of concentrated vitamin tablets to counter a vitamin shortage caused by strict rationing.41 Shipments continued to increase, delivering 1.427 million tons in 1942, 1.705 million tons in 1943, 1.28 million in 1944, and 709,000 tons in 1945.42 On average, this amount of food was sufficient to feed over 4 million people during the years 1941–1945, around 10 percent of the British population.43
Besides the deliveries sustaining the British population and industry, American aid contributed decisively in stopping Rommel’s advance in North Africa. By 24 October 1942, American deliveries to North Africa and the Middle East amounted to 900 medium tanks, including 300 Sherman tanks that were of better quality than anything the British had before, as well as ninety 105 mm self-propelled anti-tank guns, 800 light tanks, 25,000 trucks and jeeps, over 700 twin-engine medium bombers, and nearly 1,100 fighters.44 The percentage of military equipment supplied to the British armed forces from American sources was 11.5 percent in 1941, 16.9 percent in 1942, 26.9 percent in 1943, and 28.7 percent in 1944.45 Even these figures understate the full magnitude of American aid to the British Empire. In 1942 the United States supplied 9,253 tanks and 5,898 aircraft, while British industry had turned out just 8,611 tanks and 23,672 aircraft.46 In 1943 American supplies had increased to 15,933 tanks and 6,710 aircraft, while British manufacture of tanks had decreased to 7,476 and aircraft production increased only modestly to 26,263 machines.47 In 1944, at the height of these deliveries, the United States supplied the British Empire with a staggering 11,414 aircraft, while the British produced 26,461 during that year.48 Total US deliveries of aircraft to the British Commonwealth amounted to nearly 34,000 units.49 Throughout the years 1941–1944 the United States delivered between one-fifth and one-third of total British Empire aircraft production. The share of American tanks was even greater; it increased from approximately 20 percent in 1941, to 100 percent in 1942, and to 200 percent of the total British Empire production in 1943. During the last two years of the war, Britain alone received, among other things, 76,737 Jeeps, 98,207 trucks, 12,431 tanks, and 6,715 000 tons of steel and iron.50 By 1944 around two-thirds of the tanks and trucks in the British army came from the United States.51 The total value of the aid delivered to the British Empire amounted to slightly more than 30 billion dollars.52
By the summer of 1941, the island nation was fully dependent on American deliveries, having been transformed into a giant unsinkable aircraft carrier similar to the ‘Airstrip One’ described in George Orwell’s novel 1984. Without American deliveries, Britain would either have been starved into submission or collapsed financially. Even if these two scenarios could somehow have been avoided, British industry would have produced fewer weapons than historically, since it was dependent on overseas deliveries of resources from the United States. The absence of these resources, combined with the lack of Lend-Lease tanks, aircraft, motor vehicles, small arms, and artillery, would have meant a far weaker and far worse-equipped British army, navy, and air force.
British victory in North Africa would have thus become unlikely, a successful Bomber Offensive improbable, and an invasion of continental Europe impossible.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 16, 2020 0:48:08 GMT
Soviet agriculture was to the absolute breaking point IOTL, with starvation breaking out in 1943-1944 among the industrial workers in the Urals and ultimately bleeding into the Famine of 1946-1947. The situation is described thusly: The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff - "The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943." The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn - "By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals." To quote from Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union During World War II -   The loss of the Ukraine and other occupied areas had already engendered shortages of coal (The Donbass was home to roughly 60% of Soviet output by itself), aluminum (Main Soviet facility was along the Dnieper, about 60-80% of production), iron ore (60% of production), steel (50% of production), electric power (30% of output), manganese ore (30% of production), and nickel (30% of production). Overall output of the machinery and metal goods sector had fallen by 40%. In addition, the USSR was also unable to meet the demand for copper, tin, zinc, lead, aluminum, and nickel with remaining sources; Lend Lease was sufficient to meet all of these demands except for aluminum and nickel. Antimony, tungsten, cobalt, vanadium, molybdenum, tin, and magnesium were also almost entirely lacking. Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat: During World War II the Soviet Union received large amounts of aid from the Western world in the form of supplies and military intervention, both of which were declared to have been irrelevant for the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany by Soviet historians. This article examines the claim made by Soviet historiography, and it comes to the conclusion that both Western supplies and military intervention were far more helpful than claimed by the Soviets. Without this aid the Red Army would not have been able to perform as well as it did historically, tilting the balance in Germany’s favor. Soviet claims about the irrelevance of Western aid can thus be dismissed as propaganda and inaccurate. The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison: Roosevelt also contributed to Soviet stabilization. The first installment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942, although small by later standards, amounted to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year. Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus increase in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend-Lease was stabilizing. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it seems beyond doubt that collapse was near. Without Lend-Lease it would have been nearer. Stalin himself recognized this, although he expressed himself more directly. He told Khrushchev several times that the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses that without Allied aid it would have lost the war.19 Havlat also goes further, noting how the lack of the U.S. would have further effects: Overall, the Western Allies were responsible only for a small fraction of the losses sustained by German infantry and armor between 1941 and 1943 (around 10 percent); however, their contribution in the destruction and occupation of the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. The same applies to their contribution in forcing the Germans to leave most heavy artillery in the Reich as anti-aircraft weapons, preventing them from being used as anti-tank weapons in the East. Without Allied military intervention, the Germans could have sent at least 2,000 additional tanks, some 5,000 additional 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, around 15,000 additional aircraft, tens of thousands of additional motor vehicles, and up to half a million additional soldiers to the Eastern Front in the years 1941–1943, which would have shifted the balance in their favor.Further on: Without the need to fight in the Atlantic; to transport large amounts of troops, equipment, and supplies across the entire continent; and the necessity to defend against Allied bombing, Germany could have massively reduced its U-boat, locomotive, and anti-aircraft gun and ammunition production and converted at least part of these capacities into the production of more aircraft and equipment for land warfare. Additionally, without bombing, and the need to maintain a large enough army to fight on several fronts, there would have been less need to use forced labor in the factories, thus boosting production. Historically, Germany already outproduced the USSR in certain areas like locomotives, trucks, and even bombers, with 12,664 produced by Germany in the years 1941–1943 as compared to 11,359 built by the USSR.170 Without Allied intervention and Lend-Lease, Soviet margins in these areas would most likely have widened, while margins in areas such as tanks would have shrunk significantly. If Germany and its industry could have concentrated on one single front from 1941 onwards, it most likely would have vastly changed the outcome of the war in the East.
It's important to note Adam Tooze in Wages of Destruction essentially agrees with this assessment, at least in spirit: With farm labour cut to the bone, to permit the maximum concentration of manpower on the Red Army and on armaments production, only those who worked received adequate rations. By the same token, the extraordinary pitch of mobilization achieved by the Soviet Union in 1942 and early 1943 was not sustainable. By 1944 Germany had clawed back the Soviet advantage in every category. |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 16, 2020 0:50:27 GMT
Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586.
One of the bottlenecks of the Soviet economy before the war was the production of aviation and, to a lesser extent, automobile gasoline. High-octane benzoins were especially lacking. So, in 1941, on the eve of the war, the need for aviation gasoline B-78 was satisfied by only 4%. {7} In 1940, the USSR produced 889 thousand tons of aviation gasoline, in 1941 - 1269 thousand tons, in 1942 - 912, in 1943 - 1007, in 1944 - 1334 and in 194 5. - 1017 thousand tons. {8} In total, during the war years in the United States under Lend-Lease and within the framework of Soviet orders, 666 thousand tons of aviation gasoline were delivered, of which, after shipment, 37.65 thousand tons were redirected to other places, so that the net delivery was 628.4 thousand tons. {9}In addition, the net supply of light gasoline fractions from the USA to the USSR reached 732.3 thousand tons.In addition, Great Britain supplied 14.7 thousand tons of aviation gasoline and 902.1 thousand tons of light gasoline fractions to the USSR from the Abadan oil refinery ( these supplies were reimbursed by the United Kingdom (USA). To this must also be added 573 thousand tons of aviation gasoline supplied to the USSR from oil refineries in Great Britain and Canada. {ten}In total, all this gives 2850.5 thousand short tons of aviation gasoline and light gasoline fractions received by the USSR from the USA, Great Britain and Canada, which is equal to 2586 thousand metric tons. In the Soviet Union, imported aviation gasoline and light gasoline fractions were used almost exclusively for mixing with Soviet aviation gasoline in order to increase their octane number, since Soviet aircraft were adapted to use gasolines with a much lower octane number than in the West. Suffice it to say that more than 97% of imported gasoline had an octane rating of 99 and higher, while in the USSR, as we have already seen, there was even B-78 gasoline in a huge deficit. Therefore, in fact, the aviation gasoline supplied under the Lend-Lease was included in the Soviet production of aviation gasoline and amounted, therefore (together with light gasoline fractions), 51, 5% of Soviet production 1941-1945 If we subtract from the total Soviet aviation gasoline production for the first half of 1941, estimating it at about half of the annual production, then the share of supplies under Lend-Lease will rise to 57.8%. It turns out that the deliveries under Lend-Lease of aviation gasoline, which took place from August 1941 to September 1945, were 1.4 times higher than the actual Soviet production. From other sources of aviation gasoline supply, the USSR was able to capture in 1944-1945. 82.8 thousand tons of trophy gasoline in Romania, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to September 1945, which was a drop in the ocean. It is obvious that without Western supplies of fuel, Soviet aviation simply would not have been able to support its troops in the required volume. It should also be taken into account that due to the much higher octane numbers of western aviation gasoline, its role in providing Soviet aviation was actually even more significant than could be concluded from weight alone.
The Red Army's vehicle fleet was also largely secured by Western supplies. The production of cars in the USSR in 1940 amounted to 145 390, in 1941 - 124 476, in 1942 - 34 976, in 1943 - 49 266, in 1944 - 60 549, in 1945 - 74 757. {15} At the same time, in the first half of the year 1941 was produced 73.2 thousand cars, and in the second - only 46.1 thousand {16} , so that from the beginning of the war until the end of 1945, the total production of cars can be determined at 265.6 thousand units. During the war years, 409.5 thousand cars were delivered from the USA to the USSR, which is 1.5 times higher than Soviet production during the war years. By the end of the war (as of May 1, 1945), cars delivered under Lend-Lease accounted for 32.8% in the Red Army's car park (58.1% were domestically produced cars and 9.1% were captured cars).{17}Taking into account the greater carrying capacity and better quality, the role of American vehicles was even higher ("Studebakers", in particular, were used as artillery tractors). The pre-war fleet of Soviet cars (both in the Red Army and withdrawn from the national economy at the beginning of the war) was badly worn out. Before the war, the needs of the Red Army in motor transport were determined at 744 thousand cars and 92 thousand tractors, while there were 272.6 thousand cars and 42 thousand tractors in stock. It was planned to withdraw 240 thousand cars from the national economy, including 210 thousand trucks (GAZ-AA and ZIS-5), however, due to the severe wear of the vehicle fleet (for passenger cars, cars belonging to the 1st and 2nd categories , i.e., not requiring immediate repair, was 45%,{18} Obviously, without Western supplies, the Red Army would not have acquired the degree of mobility that it possessed at least from the middle of 1943, although until the end of the war, the use of motor vehicles was constrained by a lack of gasoline.
Also, the functioning of Soviet railroad transport would have been impossible without Lend-Lease. Production of railway rails (including the narrow gauge rail) in the USSR varied as follows (in kt.) 1940 - 1360 1941 - 874 1942 - 112 1943 - 115 1944 - 129 1945 - 308 {19} According Lend Liza was delivered to the USSR 685.7 thousand short tons of railway rails, {20}which is equal to 622.1 thousand metric tons. This is about 56.5% of the total production of railroad rails in the USSR from mid-1941 to the end of 1945. If we exclude from the calculation narrow-gauge rails that were not supplied under Lend-Lease, then American deliveries will amount to 83.3% the total volume of Soviet production. If we exclude from the calculations of production for the second half of 1945, taking it to be equal to at least half of the annual production (in fact, in the second half of 1945, significantly more than half of the annual production of rails was produced due to a reduction in the actual war production), then the Lend Lease on rails will make up 92.7% of the total volume of Soviet rail production. Thus, almost half of the railroad rails used on Soviet railways during the war received from the USA. The sharp reduction in the production of rails by the Soviet industry made it possible to direct additional capacities and resources of steel for the production of weapons (in 1945, the production of rails was 13% of the 1940 level, and in 1944 - only 5.4%).
According to our estimates, based on a decrease in labor costs per unit of various types of weapons and equipment in 1941-1943, the production of tanks and combat aircraft during the war years was at least doubled. Taking this into account, the share of Western supplies of weapons and military equipment turns out to be approximately twice as high as is commonly believed. {56} 7,057 tanks and self-propelled guns were delivered from the USA, 5,480 from England and Canada. 15,481 American aircraft, 3,384 British ones. Of the total of 18,865 vehicles, about 17,000 combat vehicles were received {57}Taking into account the overestimation of data on Soviet production, the share of Western deliveries for combat aircraft will not be 15%, as was traditionally believed, but about 30%, for tanks and self-propelled guns, the share will increase from the traditional 12% to 24% of the total production level in the USSR in the military years. As for the artillery, only anti-aircraft artillery was supplied from the United States - 7944 guns. {58}Soviet historians usually correlate this number with the total production of guns and mortars in the USSR - 482.2 thousand guns and 351.8 thousand mortars, which makes the share of American deliveries less than 2% of the total volume of Soviet gun production, and less than 1% - from the total production of guns and mortars. Meanwhile, it is only necessary to compare here with the Soviet production of anti-aircraft guns - the most scarce type of artillery for the Red Army, and here the share of American supplies turns out to be much higher (unfortunately, an accurate calculation is still impossible due to the lack of data on the production of anti-aircraft guns in the USSR).
In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F.D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin believed it was impossible without American assistance from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe. {70}Roosevelt, back in October 1940, announcing his decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are surplus for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that could protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of these countries and Russia. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 16, 2020 0:56:09 GMT
In short, Britain either makes peace in late 1940 and then around 1943 has the Axis fall upon it with devastating results or they utterly collapse in early 1941. The Soviets most likely collapse in 1941 or, at the latest, 1942, enabling the aforementioned turn of the European Axis to the UK once again which here is, at best, operating with a military one third the size of that it enjoyed historically.
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Aug 16, 2020 14:26:27 GMT
I would agree that Britain is best off making peace in late 40. Given the failure of the Battle of Britain, or at least the day raids by that time there is a decent chance of this happening. In that case and with some logical leadership, which I suspect probably means someone other than Churchill, who would probably have to go to get peace, it has about a year to regroup before a possible Japanese attack in the east and about 18 months minimum to effectively defeat that before a possible renewed German attack. In those 18 months it basically needs to cripple the Japanese war economy which can be done by holding Malaya-Sumatra-Java, which should be quite possible with the forces that would be available and greatly restricting Japanese importation of oil from repaired facilities in Borneo. Given the limitations of the Japanese merchant fleet and of their escort capacity this latter should also be practical. - Assuming here that the US is still imposing serious restrictions on Japan and the Dutch government which will be almost certainly under German domination goes along with them and that Germany doesn't oppose a Japanese attack on one [or two if including Vichy France] of its allies and one its probably looking to import oil from itself. As a result by this time, unless it can get oil and other essential materials from other areas the Japanese war machine is running on empty and its probably struggling to hold ground in China.
This makes several additional assumptions: a) That Germany boost production as much as it did OTL. It was only really after the early failure in Russia and the growing size of western production and pressure that it really sought to ramp up production, including in the massive increase in slave labour. This may not occur this time, at least until it realises how tough a nut 1943 Britain is. b) That the Germans get lucky in Russia where even OTL their logistics especially were strained to the limit and having extra forces to support will not greatly help that. They could get very unlucky, reaching Moscow in 41, making a fight for it and losing heavily, which would cause them far more serious manpower and material losses than OTL. That wouldn't prevent a final 'victory' over the Soviets but would make it even more draining and questionable. c) That by say spring 43 the Germans have occupied up to say the Urals inclusive and are reasonably certain they needed press further east. They were talking about a garrison of ~40 divs OTL so for such an increased areas that probably going to need at least 80 divs and supporting forces to hold against the continued resistance - which will occur simply because the Nazis give the population no choice. d) That the Germans, which presumably are still lead by Hitler, albeit ailing by this time, then decides to go to war with the UK and its empire again.
If all of those happen its going to be bad for Britain but also very costly for Germany, especially if they decide to try for an invasion. That's extremely unlikely to succeed simply because the Germans lack the amphibious equipment and experience and their unlikely to develop it while waging a massive war deep in Russia. Similarly they may have continued building up their navy but is this likely to be subs or more prestige projects like large capital ships? They would have a decent sized fleet, including the twins, Bismarck and Tirpitz and possibly a couple of a later and larger design plus possibly a couple of early CVs, although with no experience of operating the latter in sea battles. Britain in comparison is likely to have at a minimum all 5KGV, along with older ships not lost due to the peace treaty and possibly a couple of Lions, along with a sizeable fleet of CVs with operating experience and more modern a/c by this time.
Germany has a number of options: a) One or more attempts at an invasion of the UK. Virtually impossible to succeed.
b) Attempting to bombard Britain into surrender. This is unlikely to succeed in day time raids as Britain will have a fairly substantial edge in terms of higher quality oil, more modern a/c entering service, quite possible including some early jets if their pushed and by this time proxy fuses which will make AA fire a lot more effective. With a period of peace in Europe and time for the Imperial Training system to develop, plus far less resources wasted on the bomber offensive that's going to be a lot of resources. Plus of course home advantage which means downed allied pilots unless wounded can reenter action fairly quickly whereas Luiftwaffe ones are almost certainly lost for good.
They can try night raids and OTL the terror attacks of the Blitz were very damaging. However Britain will in this scenario have seen the early stages of that then been given 2+ years to look at developing defences against the tactics. Another option is the V weapons. However given they were V for vengeance in response to the British bombing campaign which largely didn't occur here how likely are they to be developed with any speed. Their likely to be some way behind OTL, at least until its realised their needed at which stage they might get greater development.
c) They can seek to starve Britain out by a renewed U boat campaign. It would be largely U boats as surface ships are likely to play a minimal role given the British superiority in surface ships, in radar and in air power. Similarly with longer ranged units such as the FW Condors are likely to be more exposed OTL. Britain has had over 2 years to build up the ships, equipment and doctrine to make a far more capable defence of its supply lines. The Germans can probably win in a long war if they have the steaminess but it won't be easy as its unlikely the KM will have anything like the same level of development as Britain because they don't have the same incentive and the focus is on the land war with Russia. The big problem here would be that a renewed conflict in the Atlantic would also renew the preference for trade with N America to reduce the demand on shipping. Which reduces Britain's independence from the US even with getting much more from Canada hopefully. [One other question here is what is the US view of U Boats operating in their coastal waters and locations like the Caribbean? Since a lot of US MS is likely to be caught up in the crossfire. Are they willing to tolerate that or would there be a Neutrality Zone like OTL?] Also a key question would be the status of Iceland which is likely to be a target for both sides at the start of any conflict.
d) They can seek to impose pressure elsewhere. This is likely to be the most successful route. Pressure on either Spain or Vichy France could enable the closing of the western Med and ability to deploy U boats to Morocco and/or Spain. Plus if Germany prepares will they might be able to hold locations such as the Canary's which would tighten the pressure, especially on trade via Africa or S America. Also while El Alamein is likely to be impassable and the Caucasus route would be extremely difficult for Germany to make any progress there would be the danger of Turkey being persuaded to allow passage of Axis forces. As such a campaign here could see German success and the occupation of the bulk of the ME including Egypt and Iraq. This in theory opens up an overland route to India but the terrain and distance would make that very, very difficult. [Not sure what the status of India will be by this time but a few nutters aside there won't be any welcoming either Japanese [which would be a forlorn hope by this stage] or German occupation.]
The collapse of the allied position in the ME would put heavy pressure on Britain but one thing to remember here is that we're talking about a war of conquest here. Britain has two alternatives, surrender to a military occupation by an extremely brutal not to say murderous regime that won't tolerate any freedom or fight on so its going to take a hell of a lot to force a surrender of the UK.
Also while such a dominant Germany has a numerical edge can it endure long enough to win victory, especially with the continued occupation coasts around the steadily increasing Nazi empire? Or that the US doesn't finally wake up to the idea its best to fight Germany this side of the Atlantic rather than their own? Or as I say that under the extreme pressure Britain can get a nuclear programme and delivery system in time?
I will agree that if all the things your relying on happen things are very bad for Britain, as well as just about everybody outside N America. However you are assuming a lot of things go right for the Nazis and while many of them are quite likely even a string of 90% probability events quickly become a low probability overall.
You are right that British production is going to be significantly lower than OTL without L-L. However it doesn't need to be massive without the strain of continued war losses of OTL to rebuild the British military considerably. Nearly 3 years of peace also gives the chance of actually planning and developing new equipment and doctrine without continually dashing from crisis to crisis. There will still be - by your assumption - a war with Japan but its going to be a lot easier to hold them at the Malaya Barrier given their logistical problems and a/c aside it shouldn't see massive British/allied losses. Also that prolonged peace for Britain means no blockade, no blackout, no struggle to maintain facilities under air attack. Plus with an Oct 40 peace Britain is going to avoid not just material but also manpower losses. As such the imperial armies are probably going to be of similar size and generally better equipment levels than OTL albeit with less fighting experience other than in SEA until war resumes in Europe.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 17, 2020 6:20:58 GMT
I would agree that Britain is best off making peace in late 40. Given the failure of the Battle of Britain, or at least the day raids by that time there is a decent chance of this happening. In that case and with some logical leadership, which I suspect probably means someone other than Churchill, who would probably have to go to get peace, it has about a year to regroup before a possible Japanese attack in the east and about 18 months minimum to effectively defeat that before a possible renewed German attack. In those 18 months it basically needs to cripple the Japanese war economy which can be done by holding Malaya-Sumatra-Java, which should be quite possible with the forces that would be available and greatly restricting Japanese importation of oil from repaired facilities in Borneo. Given the limitations of the Japanese merchant fleet and of their escort capacity this latter should also be practical. - Assuming here that the US is still imposing serious restrictions on Japan and the Dutch government which will be almost certainly under German domination goes along with them and that Germany doesn't oppose a Japanese attack on one [or two if including Vichy France] of its allies and one its probably looking to import oil from itself. As a result by this time, unless it can get oil and other essential materials from other areas the Japanese war machine is running on empty and its probably struggling to hold ground in China.
This makes several additional assumptions: a) That Germany boost production as much as it did OTL. It was only really after the early failure in Russia and the growing size of western production and pressure that it really sought to ramp up production, including in the massive increase in slave labour. This may not occur this time, at least until it realises how tough a nut 1943 Britain is. b) That the Germans get lucky in Russia where even OTL their logistics especially were strained to the limit and having extra forces to support will not greatly help that. They could get very unlucky, reaching Moscow in 41, making a fight for it and losing heavily, which would cause them far more serious manpower and material losses than OTL. That wouldn't prevent a final 'victory' over the Soviets but would make it even more draining and questionable. c) That by say spring 43 the Germans have occupied up to say the Urals inclusive and are reasonably certain they needed press further east. They were talking about a garrison of ~40 divs OTL so for such an increased areas that probably going to need at least 80 divs and supporting forces to hold against the continued resistance - which will occur simply because the Nazis give the population no choice. d) That the Germans, which presumably are still lead by Hitler, albeit ailing by this time, then decides to go to war with the UK and its empire again.
If all of those happen its going to be bad for Britain but also very costly for Germany, especially if they decide to try for an invasion. That's extremely unlikely to succeed simply because the Germans lack the amphibious equipment and experience and their unlikely to develop it while waging a massive war deep in Russia. Similarly they may have continued building up their navy but is this likely to be subs or more prestige projects like large capital ships? They would have a decent sized fleet, including the twins, Bismarck and Tirpitz and possibly a couple of a later and larger design plus possibly a couple of early CVs, although with no experience of operating the latter in sea battles. Britain in comparison is likely to have at a minimum all 5KGV, along with older ships not lost due to the peace treaty and possibly a couple of Lions, along with a sizeable fleet of CVs with operating experience and more modern a/c by this time.
Germany has a number of options: a) One or more attempts at an invasion of the UK. Virtually impossible to succeed.
b) Attempting to bombard Britain into surrender. This is unlikely to succeed in day time raids as Britain will have a fairly substantial edge in terms of higher quality oil, more modern a/c entering service, quite possible including some early jets if their pushed and by this time proxy fuses which will make AA fire a lot more effective. With a period of peace in Europe and time for the Imperial Training system to develop, plus far less resources wasted on the bomber offensive that's going to be a lot of resources. Plus of course home advantage which means downed allied pilots unless wounded can reenter action fairly quickly whereas Luiftwaffe ones are almost certainly lost for good.
They can try night raids and OTL the terror attacks of the Blitz were very damaging. However Britain will in this scenario have seen the early stages of that then been given 2+ years to look at developing defences against the tactics. Another option is the V weapons. However given they were V for vengeance in response to the British bombing campaign which largely didn't occur here how likely are they to be developed with any speed. Their likely to be some way behind OTL, at least until its realised their needed at which stage they might get greater development.
c) They can seek to starve Britain out by a renewed U boat campaign. It would be largely U boats as surface ships are likely to play a minimal role given the British superiority in surface ships, in radar and in air power. Similarly with longer ranged units such as the FW Condors are likely to be more exposed OTL. Britain has had over 2 years to build up the ships, equipment and doctrine to make a far more capable defence of its supply lines. The Germans can probably win in a long war if they have the steaminess but it won't be easy as its unlikely the KM will have anything like the same level of development as Britain because they don't have the same incentive and the focus is on the land war with Russia. The big problem here would be that a renewed conflict in the Atlantic would also renew the preference for trade with N America to reduce the demand on shipping. Which reduces Britain's independence from the US even with getting much more from Canada hopefully. [One other question here is what is the US view of U Boats operating in their coastal waters and locations like the Caribbean? Since a lot of US MS is likely to be caught up in the crossfire. Are they willing to tolerate that or would there be a Neutrality Zone like OTL?] Also a key question would be the status of Iceland which is likely to be a target for both sides at the start of any conflict.
d) They can seek to impose pressure elsewhere. This is likely to be the most successful route. Pressure on either Spain or Vichy France could enable the closing of the western Med and ability to deploy U boats to Morocco and/or Spain. Plus if Germany prepares will they might be able to hold locations such as the Canary's which would tighten the pressure, especially on trade via Africa or S America. Also while El Alamein is likely to be impassable and the Caucasus route would be extremely difficult for Germany to make any progress there would be the danger of Turkey being persuaded to allow passage of Axis forces. As such a campaign here could see German success and the occupation of the bulk of the ME including Egypt and Iraq. This in theory opens up an overland route to India but the terrain and distance would make that very, very difficult. [Not sure what the status of India will be by this time but a few nutters aside there won't be any welcoming either Japanese [which would be a forlorn hope by this stage] or German occupation.]
The collapse of the allied position in the ME would put heavy pressure on Britain but one thing to remember here is that we're talking about a war of conquest here. Britain has two alternatives, surrender to a military occupation by an extremely brutal not to say murderous regime that won't tolerate any freedom or fight on so its going to take a hell of a lot to force a surrender of the UK.
Also while such a dominant Germany has a numerical edge can it endure long enough to win victory, especially with the continued occupation coasts around the steadily increasing Nazi empire? Or that the US doesn't finally wake up to the idea its best to fight Germany this side of the Atlantic rather than their own? Or as I say that under the extreme pressure Britain can get a nuclear programme and delivery system in time?
I will agree that if all the things your relying on happen things are very bad for Britain, as well as just about everybody outside N America. However you are assuming a lot of things go right for the Nazis and while many of them are quite likely even a string of 90% probability events quickly become a low probability overall.
You are right that British production is going to be significantly lower than OTL without L-L. However it doesn't need to be massive without the strain of continued war losses of OTL to rebuild the British military considerably. Nearly 3 years of peace also gives the chance of actually planning and developing new equipment and doctrine without continually dashing from crisis to crisis. There will still be - by your assumption - a war with Japan but its going to be a lot easier to hold them at the Malaya Barrier given their logistical problems and a/c aside it shouldn't see massive British/allied losses. Also that prolonged peace for Britain means no blockade, no blackout, no struggle to maintain facilities under air attack. Plus with an Oct 40 peace Britain is going to avoid not just material but also manpower losses. As such the imperial armies are probably going to be of similar size and generally better equipment levels than OTL albeit with less fighting experience other than in SEA until war resumes in Europe.
Okay, first, there would be no "attack" on Vichy Indochina; there wasn't one IOTL either. The Japanese occupied the colony while leaving the French formally in charge, a polite fiction that I see no reason wouldn't be repeated here. If we are assuming the NEI is under a German collaborationist regime-and I see no reason to assume such-then they can perform the same here and therefore Japan is in no danger of running out of oil. If it isn't, then Japan needs to attack it and take it; Hitler will not care given the NEI is under the Dutch government in exile and, as I cited via Tooze, he was obsessed with bringing Japan into the war and had been proposing an Anti-British Pact for awhile. With that out of the way, how exactly is Britain supposed to hold any sort of barrier with far smaller sources? To be honest, you're very much handwaving this under the assumption Britain can somehow make do when it's already been shown they can't. To recap: Even with 18 months of peace-time, the UK still has a force that is almost two thirds weaker than what it had historically and this is assuming they prioritize the Far East over North Africa and the home defense. If they empty out those areas, the Germans and Italians will be able to quite literally walk in. Now then, as to the assumptions: A) There is no reason this wouldn't happen, as it was the German intention pre-dating Barbarossa as I've already cited via Tooze. The doubling of production was enabled via the acquisition of territories in 1941-in particular Ukraine. If you don't have a copy of Tooze I can furnish it for you or can post relevant citations? In particular, the ores of Nikopol were invaluable to the Reich. B) The logistics will be the same or, most likely, better here. Case in point is that without the Afrika Corps, you've just freed up an additional 20-40,000 trucks and a fair amount of rail capacity that had to go through France and Italy to reach Libya. As Havlat specifically notes: The 15,000 aircraft bit is also important, and explains why Havlat, as earlier cited, believes they could seal the deal in 1941. Boris V. Sokolov agrees: In case you're curious, Sokolov is one of the premier Russian historians on the Eastern Front of World War II. With both of these sources coming to the conclusion the Soviets will collapse in 1941, I'm in agreement. If you wish to say they can't, I don't agree based on the available evidence, but I'm content to role with that because we know for as certain as one can be with a What If that they will in 1942. As Mark Harrison notes: Stalin himself, in private, conceded that Lend Lease Aid in 1942 was the only thing that kept the Soviets from collapsing. At this point, the evidence is overwhelming the USSR will collapse either in 1941 or 1942, and by 1943 the German Army will be at its stop line of the Urals. Hitler had no intention of going further and its easy to see why; it's easily defended given the Ural Mountains and there's nothing of value past them. The Soviet remnant will not have the manpower or resources to offer a plausible challenge from this position either. C) If you wish to assume an 80 Division occupying force, I'm content to do so although I'm doubtful of it. This still frees up 70 Divisions compared to OTL. To put that in perspective, the UK raised just 43 Divisions during World War II. D) Why would they not? As you noted, the Nazi Hardliners would have reason to do so, particularly if the UK didn't concede anything in 1940 of note. The Germans wanted their colonies back in Africa, Madagascar for obvious reasons (i.e. the Jews) and Italy wanted gains that they would obviously not achieve in Eastern Europe given the overriding German interests there. As noted by Tooze, Hitler always conceived of a final showdown with the Anglo-Americans anyway... Now then, let us address the German options. A) A German invasion of the UK in, say, 1945 or 1946 will definitely succeed. Why? The German advantage in air production is so vast as to give the Luftwaffe at least a 2-1 advantage in the air based solely on relevant production. Indeed, the likely result is even better for the Germans, as Havlat notes: Recall also that British production will be lower without American deliveries. In short, if the Royal Navy comes out to play, the Germans send it to the bottom of the ocean by weight of overwhelming aerial superiority to offset their surface fleet lackings. Ask the Imperial Japanese Navy circa 1945 who wins when you send Battleships against an opponent with air supremacy. B) See above with regards to the air superiority of the Luftwaffe vis-a-vis the Royal Air Force. Unlike the USAAF in 1943, the BF-109G via air bases in France is more than capable of escorting bombing raids. Basically, you've switched the roll of the Germans here. By 1944/1945, the Ta-152 with it's 1,200 mile range (every bit the German P-51) is also available. C) Very nearly worked IOTL and I see no reason it wouldn't here:
D) Will definitely happen in conjunction with what was outlined above. As for everything else, what the British may "Want" will ultimately come up against the hard barrier of what they "Can" actually do. As you've noted before with regards the IJA, they regularly fought to complete annihilation during the Pacific War; they still lost in the face of overwhelming force. British will not survive as long as the Axis maintain their desire to attack, the same way IOTL the Axis lost in the face of American production. Given the Nazis fought until literally overwhelmed and the Japanese did likewise until quite literally nuked-and even then the War Council deadlocked on seeking peace-I do not foresee this happening. I will close out with re-quoting a bit of Havlat: Even if Britain did avoid a Japanese attack in 1941 or, as you propose, somehow stop it on a better defensive barrier, the British Army is still two thirds smaller/less mechanized and the RAF is 20-30% smaller. It is facing a much, much stronger German than OTL as well. In short, defeat is inevitable and cannot be plausible prevented unless the U.S. suddenly enters the war. Don't be sure on that, however: NOVEMBER 22 EUROPEAN WAR Interviewing Date 11/7-12/41 Survey #252-K Question #11 It has been suggested that Congress pass a resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and Germany. Would you favor or oppose such a resolution at this time? Favor.............................. 26% Oppose.............................63No opinion......................... 11 Yes, less than a month from Pearl Harbor as the Germans advanced on Moscow nearly two thirds of Americans were still opposed to entry into the conflict; this despite the Reuben James and other events. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 17, 2020 8:34:26 GMT
EwellHolmes , Don't have much time as going to work soon so summarising quickly. Basically your assuming that things that happened OTL will still happen despite the differences when they help your desires but not when they don't.
Key points: a) Britain doesn't need to produce as much military stuff as OTL because a massive amount of material isn't being consumed by continued heavy fighting. Also with a technical peace its unlikely that anything like the OTL BC force will be built up.
b) If Britain makes peace why is Germany refusing to make peace with already occupied countries like France and the Netherlands, especially since the latter would give him access to a controlled oil supply. c) FIC was occupied in stages and if peace is made in ~Oct 40 then Vichy is in a position to strengthen its garrison in the southern region. They after all won a war against Thailand in 41 OTL until Japan stepped in and forced them to make concessions. This may not be the case TTL and if Vichy was to strengthen its position in the south then Japans entire plan comes unhinged. I'm not relying on that at all but its a definite possibility. d) Hitler wanted an alliance with Japan against the Soviets and was angry when they refused. He joined the war against the US in Dec 41 because he totally misjudged the situation. Here Japan has again rejected joining the war against Stalin and is now attacking the colony of an ally [the Netherlands] from which he is gaining considerable resources. Germany and Britain are at peace and while he might plan a later war he's still deep in conflict with the Soviets. Therefore the idea he will be egging the Japanese on to such an operation seems very strange. e) The Japanese success in Malaya and DEI was in part due to some appalling mis-leadership on the allied side but also to the fact that the war in Europe had pulled so many allied resources west. Here with clear war clouds gathering, especially if they still occupy southern FIC there is time and resources to spare to get both more and definitely better equipped forces there, land and air especially but also by sea. Simply if the subs planned for the region were in place and given free rein to open fire at landing forces things could quickly come apart for Japan. f) You seem to be assuming that the only thing stopping a successful German invasion of Britain is the RN heavy ships. There are plenty of others, as well as those same ships operating at night! Like fixed defences including heavy guns, minefields [both land and sea], air power and most of all the inadequate German resources for such an invasion.
I'm out of time so will reference the other issues later.
Steve
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Post by EwellHolmes on Aug 17, 2020 12:37:52 GMT
EwellHolmes , Don't have much time as going to work soon so summarising quickly. Basically your assuming that things that happened OTL will still happen despite the differences when they help your desires but not when they don't.
Key points: a) Britain doesn't need to produce as much military stuff as OTL because a massive amount of material isn't being consumed by continued heavy fighting. Also with a technical peace its unlikely that anything like the OTL BC force will be built up.
b) If Britain makes peace why is Germany refusing to make peace with already occupied countries like France and the Netherlands, especially since the latter would give him access to a controlled oil supply. c) FIC was occupied in stages and if peace is made in ~Oct 40 then Vichy is in a position to strengthen its garrison in the southern region. They after all won a war against Thailand in 41 OTL until Japan stepped in and forced them to make concessions. This may not be the case TTL and if Vichy was to strengthen its position in the south then Japans entire plan comes unhinged. I'm not relying on that at all but its a definite possibility. d) Hitler wanted an alliance with Japan against the Soviets and was angry when they refused. He joined the war against the US in Dec 41 because he totally misjudged the situation. Here Japan has again rejected joining the war against Stalin and is now attacking the colony of an ally [the Netherlands] from which he is gaining considerable resources. Germany and Britain are at peace and while he might plan a later war he's still deep in conflict with the Soviets. Therefore the idea he will be egging the Japanese on to such an operation seems very strange. e) The Japanese success in Malaya and DEI was in part due to some appalling mis-leadership on the allied side but also to the fact that the war in Europe had pulled so many allied resources west. Here with clear war clouds gathering, especially if they still occupy southern FIC there is time and resources to spare to get both more and definitely better equipped forces there, land and air especially but also by sea. Simply if the subs planned for the region were in place and given free rein to open fire at landing forces things could quickly come apart for Japan. f) You seem to be assuming that the only thing stopping a successful German invasion of Britain is the RN heavy ships. There are plenty of others, as well as those same ships operating at night! Like fixed defences including heavy guns, minefields [both land and sea], air power and most of all the inadequate German resources for such an invasion.
I'm out of time so will reference the other issues later.
Steve
I eagerly await your further response but I'll go ahead and answer what you've already provided. A) During the entire course of the war, the UK lose 15,844 tanks and 42,020 aircraft. To put that into perspective: Want to look at small arms? It'll take until 1943 to make up for what the U.S. sent them in just eight weeks in 1940. B) Same reason he didn't make a formal peace with France in 1940-1941; he needed to loot the French economy to ready up for Barbarossa. As for the Dutch, how, exactly could he do that when the Dutch government evacuated to London and refused to surrender? NEI was respecting their authority. C) Vichy had a limited Army, so no reinforcements are available; why would they resist, either? Particularly with German pressure and the Japanese formally leaving them in charge. D) Again, this isn't the case as I've already cited Tooze to show. To requote from The Wages of Destruction: The entire reason Hitler attacked the USSR was to free up Japan to attack Britain. You might argue that he has no reason to do so if Britain has made peace but the second half of the quote answers that; Hitler wanted an alliance with Japan as a means of fighting the endgame against the Anglo-American bloc. This doesn't change whether Britain makes peace or not. E) Where, exactly, are these better equipped forces to be had and where does that leave the British weak? Again, they're not going to make good their 1940 losses until 1943, they will be short two thirds of their tanks and trucks, and one fifth to one third of the RAF? If they've heavily reinforced the Far East, then Italy and Spain say thank you before overrunning Egypt, Malta, Gibraltar, etc. The UK IOTL only raised 43 Infantry Divisions during the entire war, and here their equipment situation is much worse. F) Air power which the Germans will be able to decisively destroy via their superior production? Coastal artillery they can suppress with said air power? Ships operating at night? See German aircraft operating at night, in particular their operations against the Allies in the North Sea. See Norway where the Germans defeated heavy coastal defenses, their own operations in the Baltics in 1941, Crete and the Aegean also in 1941, etc. The Germans have the skills and here will have the resources. Even better, their opponent is much, much weaker as described above and has obliged them by concentrating their resources in the Far East. If the British pull those resources out of the Far East or never send them in the first place, Japan says thank you and overruns them in the Pacific. Case in point, by 1943 the Caucasus oil is well in German hands and producing enough tonnage to allow Germany to achieve its goal of 3,000 planes per month for 36,000 per year. 1943, 1944, and 1945 production allows for 108,000 aircraft; Britain during this same time span only produced 64,000. Take in note, this is also assuming the UK can maintain the high level of production seen in 1943-1944 despite the lack of imports of American steel and aluminum. Ah, but you might argue home field advantage, no? Battle of Britain ratio: 1.13 German aircraft lost to every British ATL production ratio: 1.7 German aircraft to every British The British could do exactly as good as they did during the BoB and they still lose. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 18, 2020 15:24:50 GMT
EwellHolmes , Don't have much time as going to work soon so summarising quickly. Basically your assuming that things that happened OTL will still happen despite the differences when they help your desires but not when they don't.
Key points: a) Britain doesn't need to produce as much military stuff as OTL because a massive amount of material isn't being consumed by continued heavy fighting. Also with a technical peace its unlikely that anything like the OTL BC force will be built up.
b) If Britain makes peace why is Germany refusing to make peace with already occupied countries like France and the Netherlands, especially since the latter would give him access to a controlled oil supply. c) FIC was occupied in stages and if peace is made in ~Oct 40 then Vichy is in a position to strengthen its garrison in the southern region. They after all won a war against Thailand in 41 OTL until Japan stepped in and forced them to make concessions. This may not be the case TTL and if Vichy was to strengthen its position in the south then Japans entire plan comes unhinged. I'm not relying on that at all but its a definite possibility. d) Hitler wanted an alliance with Japan against the Soviets and was angry when they refused. He joined the war against the US in Dec 41 because he totally misjudged the situation. Here Japan has again rejected joining the war against Stalin and is now attacking the colony of an ally [the Netherlands] from which he is gaining considerable resources. Germany and Britain are at peace and while he might plan a later war he's still deep in conflict with the Soviets. Therefore the idea he will be egging the Japanese on to such an operation seems very strange. e) The Japanese success in Malaya and DEI was in part due to some appalling mis-leadership on the allied side but also to the fact that the war in Europe had pulled so many allied resources west. Here with clear war clouds gathering, especially if they still occupy southern FIC there is time and resources to spare to get both more and definitely better equipped forces there, land and air especially but also by sea. Simply if the subs planned for the region were in place and given free rein to open fire at landing forces things could quickly come apart for Japan. f) You seem to be assuming that the only thing stopping a successful German invasion of Britain is the RN heavy ships. There are plenty of others, as well as those same ships operating at night! Like fixed defences including heavy guns, minefields [both land and sea], air power and most of all the inadequate German resources for such an invasion.
I'm out of time so will reference the other issues later.
Steve
I eagerly await your further response but I'll go ahead and answer what you've already provided. A) During the entire course of the war, the UK lose 15,844 tanks and 42,020 aircraft. To put that into perspective: Want to look at small arms? It'll take until 1943 to make up for what the U.S. sent them in just eight weeks in 1940. B) Same reason he didn't make a formal peace with France in 1940-1941; he needed to loot the French economy to ready up for Barbarossa. As for the Dutch, how, exactly could he do that when the Dutch government evacuated to London and refused to surrender? NEI was respecting their authority. C) Vichy had a limited Army, so no reinforcements are available; why would they resist, either? Particularly with German pressure and the Japanese formally leaving them in charge. D) Again, this isn't the case as I've already cited Tooze to show. To requote from The Wages of Destruction: The entire reason Hitler attacked the USSR was to free up Japan to attack Britain. You might argue that he has no reason to do so if Britain has made peace but the second half of the quote answers that; Hitler wanted an alliance with Japan as a means of fighting the endgame against the Anglo-American bloc. This doesn't change whether Britain makes peace or not. E) Where, exactly, are these better equipped forces to be had and where does that leave the British weak? Again, they're not going to make good their 1940 losses until 1943, they will be short two thirds of their tanks and trucks, and one fifth to one third of the RAF? If they've heavily reinforced the Far East, then Italy and Spain say thank you before overrunning Egypt, Malta, Gibraltar, etc. The UK IOTL only raised 43 Infantry Divisions during the entire war, and here their equipment situation is much worse. F) Air power which the Germans will be able to decisively destroy via their superior production? Coastal artillery they can suppress with said air power? Ships operating at night? See German aircraft operating at night, in particular their operations against the Allies in the North Sea. See Norway where the Germans defeated heavy coastal defenses, their own operations in the Baltics in 1941, Crete and the Aegean also in 1941, etc. The Germans have the skills and here will have the resources. Even better, their opponent is much, much weaker as described above and has obliged them by concentrating their resources in the Far East. If the British pull those resources out of the Far East or never send them in the first place, Japan says thank you and overruns them in the Pacific. Case in point, by 1943 the Caucasus oil is well in German hands and producing enough tonnage to allow Germany to achieve its goal of 3,000 planes per month for 36,000 per year. 1943, 1944, and 1945 production allows for 108,000 aircraft; Britain during this same time span only produced 64,000. Take in note, this is also assuming the UK can maintain the high level of production seen in 1943-1944 despite the lack of imports of American steel and aluminum. Ah, but you might argue home field advantage, no? Battle of Britain ratio: 1.13 German aircraft lost to every British ATL production ratio: 1.7 German aircraft to every British The British could do exactly as good as they did during the BoB and they still lose.
Dug up one of my own reference books and sorted through some of the data there. Will try and put it into some tables and post although probably not for a while as I want to take a break and have other things to do. Hopefully sometime this evening. In response to the items above. A) To put that into prospective the US nearly covered British war losses in some areas. In others it was less important while in some its impact was magnified by the fact that with L-L in place Britain took items from the US that otherwise it could have produced itself. For instance in some areas British production of items peaked in 43 which I suspect is largely because it was cheaper and more practical to standardise on US produced equipment. Ignoring that British production was massive and in many areas exceeded that of Germany for much of the war.
TTL that L-L isn't available so Britain and its allies will have to produce their own stuff. At the same time with peace a lot of losses will be avoided and it will be easier for Britain to manufacture more, without the impacts of bombing, blackout, import restrictions etc. Also with no war in the Med it can be used for shipping both imports and military equipment far more efficiently. Plus assuming Japan attacks on ~Dec 41 and Germany in spring 43 that gives the option of crippling one opponent before the other is a serious threat again.
B) Wrong. Germany and France signed an armistice because a peace agreement wasn't possible while Britain was still fighting. If Britain makes peace, which also pretty much forces all the governments in exile to come to terms as well. Hitler can decide to refuse to sign a peace agreement with France to continue looting it but that not only makes clear the nature of his regime and could end up, since Britain is still able to continue on for some time at least, with a French revolt and the break away of much of the empire to resume the conflict. Vichy would be occupied fairly quickly but Libya would be exposed if the French fleet moved to FNA and the latter also provided a basis for British forces which could reach there markedly easier than to Egypt. More likely to get the peace he desires Hitler is going to sign a formal peace with France. There will still be serious restrictions on the latter and some basing of German forces in N France as well as continued tribune but there will almost certainly be a peace agreement. After all he's expecting Russia to be defeated within a few months so he can always backstab France again later if he wishes.
This gives France the opportunity to send reinforcements to FIC to protect against encroachments from either Thailand or Japan. They might not do enough in time but they might.
Similarly without Britain the exile governments can't survive and Hitler will want to have his puppets in control of the home countries and where possible formal control of colonial resources. This would be especially important with the DEI as it can supply oil, rubber and other such resources that will be lost once he strikes east. Also without British support DEI is also vulnerable to Japanese pressure so its in the interests of the colonial authorities to make some agreement with Berlin. Both they and London will want to restrict German control on this and other colonies and given its distance from Europe while the oil is being supplied that shouldn't be too difficult. As such, especially once Japan refuses to join the attack on the Soviets Hitler has no reason to support Japanese seizure of oil supplies and other resources he wants for Germany.
C) As I mentioned above the situation is different enough here that while Japan may still gain control of all FIC its far from certain. If it doesn't have the southern part of it then an attack on Malaya and the DEI is markedly more difficult.
D) Wrong again. Hitler wanted to attack and destroy the Soviet Union period. He may have actually believed that Britain was relying on the Soviets to fight Germany at some point - which we know was wrong as Churchill was looking to Washington. However he wanted to destroy the SU because of his desire to establish that continental empire and because of his distinctly deranged hatred of Slavs, of communism and of Jews. He may well have planned future wars against Britain and the US but he often made deals with countries he intended to attack later, Poland and the SU being obvious examples. Your quote showed that he underestimated the US but also assumes that other things are as OTL. If Germany is getting oil from the Dutch then he has no interest in allowing Japan any influence there.
E) What part of no combat losses do you fail to understand? Britain is taking no combat losses for a year and then fairly minimal ones for another 18 months and during that time is able to be more productive at home and to trade fairly freely across most of the world. There's no problem with getting modern a/c and more ground forces to Malaya and with enough reserves to also support much of the DEI against Japan. Britain and its allies only need to hold that line until Japan is out of oil even if they never sink a single IJN warship. Japan is fighting on a shoestring because of its limited industrial capacity, its critical dependence on foreign imports and the quagmire of its invasion of China. OTL Britain was as well because it was fighting against three opponents and staggering from crisis to crisis.
Britain can now rebuild its regular forces without massive panic and continued heavy losses. It can time upgrades and do some decent level of planning. The BEF can be reequipped more steadily and also the regular forces expanded as they did OTL. Remembering that Britain only applied conscription in early 1939 so a lot of people haven't been mobilised and trained yet. Also with peace in the Med as the military expands British forces will replace the ANZAC forces and at least some of the Indians which can be deployed in SEA as well as some British forces. Its also unlikely that Bomber command will be built up as massively as OTL. Even if it did without the huge losses of OTL that's going to release a lot of resources.
F) Wrong again. British forces by 1943 are almost certain to be larger and better equipped than OTL simply because the UK can produce more and isn't taking continued heavy losses. Also the technical edge was markedly great for the allies than in 1940. Britain is developing both more advanced versions of existing a/c such as the Spitfire but also new fighters such as the Typhoon and Tempest. It will have better radar and much better AA fire with proximity fuses. According to the source I'm using, John Ellis's World War II Databook, Germany did produce more military a/c than Britain in one year and that was 1944. Furthermore this was in a world where it also uses a lot of US a/c which isn't going to be the same option now. Germany in the different circumstances might produce more a/c than OTL and possibly here even more than the UK but that's not certain and probably not by much. Especially since again Britain is likely to be producing far less 4 engined strategic bombers and I doubt you would argue they can produce those more easily than fighters.
Also again your ignoring the lack of German experience of amphibiously attacking defended positions. Norway was still at peace and very lightly armed with many units not able to moblise. Not going to be the case with the UK given its much greater resources, the warning that will be given by a German buildup and via electronic intelligence. Even then they inflicted some significant blows on the attackers. The Germans landed by surprise not having to fight their way across fortified beaches and are likely to get slaughtered if they try that against a 1943 Britain. Even if the Germans can get air superiority, which is far from certain supporting landing forces is going to be very difficult. Germany lacks heavy bombers to really threaten prepared defences while if they try sending their few heavy ships into the Channel, with its narrow waters their going to suffer badly even without have RN ships being involved. As I said in a previous post the Luftwaffe fighters have a far more difficult task to cover all the roles they will have in an invasion rather than supporting a simple bombing campaign.
Skimming back through your post before the last one I'll try and summarise some further points. 1) The Nazis made many plans and often they came to nought because of either the endemic corruption, incompetence and infighting among the Nazi elite. There will be some possibly fairly dramatic increases in German production as OTL but its still going to take a while to overhaul the greater British production, especially if your assuming early attempts at an invasion or a new day-time battle of Britain. [Not sure what the situation would be with a new blitz attempt.] Germany might win in the end but such operations would be very bloody for Germany. For Britain as well but then it knows its got no choice.
2) Logistics will be made a bit easier by the vehicles not involved in N Africa although when and where did the Axis get those 20-40k trucks? Rommel often used captured British vehicles to make up for his shortfall in German supplies and that won't be happening here as the fighting ends before he gets involved. Those railway tracks in France and Italy won't help much in an invasion of Russia.
Also this assumes that there is no real additional military forces being used as otherwise their going to soak up those extra vehicles and the supplies they carry. Furthermore its not simply a case that say increasing the trucks by X% increases the supplies to the front by X%. As well as the long supply lines another big problem was the very poor roads. Adding more vehicles to the logistical operation not only demands more fuel and spares for them but is going to tear up those dirt tracks even more. You could even make it so bad that less gets through but I suspect that in the short term at least you will get some addition to the total supplies reaching the front.
You mention the extra forces you say that Germany could have sent to the eastern front - over a 2 year period - without fighting the western powers. This also assumes I suspect no occupation of France and other locations - which you assume is continuing - and that those additional forces could have been supported there. Furthermore were those AA guns in Germany being operated by regular army units? In the UK most AA guns were being operated by volunteers, reservists or rear echelon forces. It might not be possible to move them from Germany as well as support them on the eastern front, as with those additional tanks and other forces.
15,000 additional a/c is a hell of a lot as that's pretty much the total military production for Germany in 1942. Again it assumes that your leaving both the Reich and occupied areas in western Europe unprotected and that you can supply them on the front. Its a lot easier to feed and house men in your industrial heartland and supply munitions and spares for the equipment than trying to do so several hundred miles to the west over rugged terrain with poor roads.
3) I was working on the assumption that with the greater area to occupy and a lot more resistance than they expected that ~80 divs would be a suitable number for a basic presence over such a vast area. Of course they could still prove inadequate if Soviet resistance plans its moves carefully. Plus Germany still have to occupy other areas such as Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece plus yous plans for France and other countries in western Europe. IIRC they kept 300,000 men in Norway for most of the war as well. Not to mention your leaving all of Siberia and central Asia to any successor state which is a sizeable resource base for continued opposition.
4) By 43 at least some of the German leadership might be wanted to secure their gains rather than risk a new war with a now strongly defended Britain which has had about 30 months to make up shortfalls in its military and develop new weapons and doctrines. They can expect to win but also that it would take a long time and be very bloody.
Also forget Madagascar. If Hitler was willing to let Jews survive, even as brutalised slaves, which I'm uncertain of, he could have had it with a peace deal with France. However I doubt that was ever a significant element in his planning. The fanatics want to conquer everybody and Hitler will definitely want to do so before his declining health catches up with him as he's so convinced he's the only one who can lead Germany to world conquest. However there could be growing reluctance to go for further war among other elements. As a wild car one of those many assassination events could remove Hitler but I'm not assuming this. However you could see something like the OTL 44 coup attempt in this situation.
5) German invasion by say 45/46 stands a chance of succeeding. Depending on how much effort their put into amphibious facilities and what's happened elsewhere. Its still going to be damned bloody for them and if they try in 44/43 its almost certain to be a costly failure.
If any rational leadership in Britain Egypt can be held at El Alamein fairly simply. Axis logistics would be a serious cripplying factor in getting and maintaining substantial forces that far east while Britain would probably as OTL have a railway to the defensive area to greatly ease moving of supplies. Older BBs and supporting elements, especially with the Japanese threat clearly in decline, and land based maritime air would make attempts at an amphibious assault somewhere east of that very difficult.
I notice you say
Those are similar figures for what I've got for OTL British production. It seems odd your saying just when in terms of both tanks [which included SP Guns] and a/c that was more than Germany produced in 1942. Also as I said above how much of British production decline in some categories in the last years was because it decided to standardise on US equipment? Given less strain on the British economy in the period of peace especially it could quite possibly produce more. Especially with priorities being different and less threat elsewhere.
6) - German chances in a new BoB - I have made some mention of this elsewhere. You mention the Ta-152 which OTL entered service in Jan 45 OTL having been prompted by reports of the B-29 and the height it could fly at. Earlier FW190 variants were prompted by problems with USAAF attackers coming in at higher levels and struggled with that. Neither of those are likely to happen TTL so there's no direct incentive for either a/c. Given that Germany is at war with Russia for most of this time and its technology is undemanding in most areas its very likely that the higher authorities will be mainly concerned with building as many as possible of existing designs rather than developing new ones, especially since changing production lines would disrupt production. The earlier FW 190s and the BF-109G may have the range to cover more of Britain than in 1940 but their still going to be restricted somewhat by range and will suffer heavier losses rates simply because an a/c damaged over say Liverpool or Newcastle is less likely to make it home. I would fear more a return of the Blitz as even with improved radar, proxy fuses etc its going to be more difficult to intercept attackers.
7) The U boat threat causes a lot of fears and heavy losses and Britain will have seen a fair amount of losses prior to the peace agreement. They won't have the same level of experience as OTL by 1943 and could make some mistakes in doctrine but their going to be a lot better prepared than they were in 1940/41. A lot of escort vessels will have been constructed including probably a number of CVEs. Also especially if the Bomber Baron's have been reigned in a fair number of VLRPA. Expect items like squid and hedgehog to appear as well as probably the idea of support groups. The U boat force will be larger than in 1941 almost certainly but they are as unlikely to have been given the resources they were OTL in 41-43. Especially if Hitler had annexed Denmark, something he considered, Britain would definitely keep Iceland out of German hands and have bases there. Also Britain has avoided the heavy MS losses of 41-42 and has some additional construction so its fleet is probably larger than at the start of the war. Again there is a threat but its going to take a fair amount of time and effort for it to succeed.
The other factor to consider here is the US. Its unlikely to welcome U boats sinking shipping off its coastline or in the Caribbean so there's likely to be some form of Neutrality Zone, albeit probably starting further west than by OTL 41. Unless Hitler wants to start a war with the US now, which would change a hell of a lot, that's going to avoid the sort of disaster of the 2nd Happy Time. Also with more maritime air and improved radar surface raiders are unlikely to have much scope, at least the formal military ones. Disguised raiders could still be dangerous but something like the Hipper class or one of the Twins will have far less chance and any bigger ships are likely to have even less chance, if Hitler would risk them for commerce raiding.
8) Depends on what you mean will definitely happen by D)? I can see most of the ME falling over time especially if Turkey is forced to allow passage, although again I think your assuming its going to be a lot easier than its likely to be. Possibly Hitler decides to invade Vichy and or Spain although again just because the US is more isolationist doesn't mean it will keep its head up its rear about the rabid dog devouring most of the old war indefinitely.
You miss my point on what Britain wants. Britain wants to stay an independent state. By attacking in 43 the Nazis are formally declaring they won't allow that. As such Britain has no option but to fight to the bitter end. Especially given reports about what's happening in other parts of occupied Europe and the insane action your assuming in terms of Hitler refusing to make peace with France, the Netherlands etc its clear surrender is not an intelligent option while resistance is practical. Even Japan was likely to inflict appalling losses on a US invasion in 45 and I think you once suggested that such an invasion would fail. Britain is in a markedly stronger position in comparison so don't rely on the Germans not running out of people/will before they conquer the UK.
As I've pointed out a Britain not heavily engaged and fighting for its life on multiple fronts easily has sufficient resources to prevent a Japanese conquest of SEA, or at least the bits of it that really matter. Even with the stupidly reduced military your for some reason assuming Britain will have the empire and dominions as a whole can manage that.
Anyway I've spent another 1-2 hours replying to your points so need to get some other things done.
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Aug 18, 2020 17:06:53 GMT
EwellHolmes ,
A few points I forgot to mention.
By the way we really need to decide what the hell's happening with the US in the Pacific. Just because its isolationist in regards to Europe doesn't mean its staying out of things in the Pacific and FE. If it was isolationist there as well and still willing to trade with Japan that means no sanctions and hence probably the war in China gets even bloodier but removes the primary incentive for a Japanese drive south. If they are supporting the KMT against Japan anything like OTL then it would be virtually unthinkable for Japan not to go to war with the US as well. [Which doesn't necessarily means Hitler leaps in as OTL of course]. Or some vague area in the middle.
For the peace in ~Oct 40 I'm assuming something happens to remove Churchill. Possibly a victim of an early blitz attack, an accident while drunk, stroke or some other incident. Chamberlain was already clearly dying by this time. Halifax was not yet sent to Washington but he hadn't been willing to become PM in May so unlikely he would do now, although possibly a figurehead leader? Could be one of the younger Tories such as Eden or Macmillan with a continued coalition with Labour and probably other parties. That might give a technocratic tendency to the leadership in the following difficult years.
In terms of the poll you mentioned I can remember a long discussion, think it was on a naval site a couple of years back about US public opinion in this period. Very much depended on what question was asked as slightly different wording often made a considerable difference to the result. US public opinion would be growing wary of Nazi Germany especially after the fall of both France and much of the SU but their unlikely to go to war unless either Hitler forces them or there's some significant trigger. A major prolonged attack to remove Britain as the primary buffer between the US and Nazi Germany is a potentially very powerful one here, especially since its clearly naked aggression. However I'm willing to assume its possible that the US stays in denial about their best interests.
Steve
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