WI: No Lend Lease in WWII

[EwellHolmes]

PoD: Zangara successfully kills FDR in 1933, resulting in a Garner Presidency until 1940 followed by Huey Long in that year. With Gardener a lame duck and Long having no interest in the European war, no Lend Lease comes to pass and the U.S. maintains a strict Cash and Carry policy. My take? The UK is either forced to make terms in early 1941 or collapses at some point later that year, potentially allowing for the Germans to move in and occupy them. As for the Soviets, they too most likely collapse in 1941 or 1942 at the latest. 

[EwellHolmes]

I'd imagine the U.S. would go Fortress America and seek to aggressively keep the Axis out of the Americas, while Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan gradually spend the next generation or so digesting their conquests. If the U.S. is able to build up a sufficient nuclear deterrent, they'll get left alone and the Axis will be focused on eating up the remainder of Afro-Eurasia before, probably, falling out with each other; you then get a three way cold war. If there is not a sufficient nuclear deterrent, they probably invade the U.S. in the late 1950s or 1960s, thereafter dividing up the Americas between us. You then get the German-Japanese split and a two way Cold War. Germany has the technology and industry, while Japan has pure numbers in my estimation. Basically see IOTL Cold War for the end result of that.

[stevep]

   Basically a more logical way of getting a Man in the High Castle type world. It does assume that democracy survives in the US if Roosevelt is killed as I think Garner was a basically traditional/classical economist in outlook so no New Deal and the depression probably continues to worsen.  You could get a hell of a lot of chaos there.

  Hopefully if the US was that short-sighted Britain would make peace and build up its economy and military as much as practical.  Getting nukes 1st could be vital here, otherwise probably a case of hanging on grimly until the Nazi empire implodes.  Which would leave continental Europe in a horrendous state.   There is the chance that Nazi German after Hitler's death evolves into simply a brutal totalitarian dictatorship rather than a racially insane one but unless there are say 100-200M deaths minimum its going to be very unstable.

  One other possible butterfly.  If Britain makes peace in 1940/41 because of a more unfriendly US what happens with Japan.  Germany without Britain at war could win a long war with the Soviets, albeit that their less likely to be taken by surprise.  However this presumably also assumes no economic embargo on Japan.  As such does it strike into Siberia when Barbarossa occurs or south later on?  If the latter can it win such a war.  That would require it ignoring the Philippines and other US possessions and also defeating a Britain not waging war in Europe and the N Atlantic, quite possibly with Vichy France and whatever Dutch government emerging being British allies.  Hitler is very unlikely to be happy with Japan if they disrupt his peace with Britain and doubly so if they don't fight the Soviets.

  If Japan does go north its going to be distracted and see fairly heavy losses for a year or more at least before it can consider turning south.  Which would give Britain even more time to defend its interests in the east.  If it attacks the US then we get a very bloody war in the Far East/Pacific and a defacto if possibly limited Anglo-American alliance.  If it bypasses the US then there's going to be a more limited [force wise] war in the Far East which is likely to end up with a British limited victory.  Unless Germany, having secured European Russia by say 43/44 then decides to turn on Britain in which case your worst case scenario could come into play.

[EwellHolmes]

Garner actually wouldn't be that bad of a President; he was generally in favor of most New Deal programs, but differed on others from FDR that economists are divided upon like the National Recovery Act. Overall, I'd imagine the U.S. comes out of the Great Depression slightly earlier, but without FDR to mobilize public opinion combined with Long's stances, they just won't do anything beyond Cash and Carry which results in Great Britain out by early 1941 at the latest and in terms of total collapse. Nuclear weapons for the UK will not be a reality for a decade, probably more, and Britain will need to focus its resources upon conventional weapons and in any case.

As for everything else, it's likely Japan still goes wild in Southeast Asia in the face of European weakness. Even with no war in Europe, the UK can't draw down its forces lest it invite Hitler and Mussolini to strike, the Dutch are of no consequence as OTL showed and the Vichy French will readily align with Japan. Once the USSR begins to collapse in 1942/1943, the Kwantung Army can then move in at it's leisure as their own war planning shows that was their intention i.e. in the event of Soviet weakness.

[stevep]

Aug 6, 2020 2:14:15 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Garner actually wouldn't be that bad of a President; he was generally in favor of most New Deal programs, but differed on others from FDR that economists are divided upon like the National Recovery Act. Overall, I'd imagine the U.S. comes out of the Great Depression slightly earlier, but without FDR to mobilize public opinion combined with Long's stances, they just won't do anything beyond Cash and Carry which results in Great Britain out by early 1941 at the latest and in terms of total collapse. Nuclear weapons for the UK will not be a reality for a decade, probably more, and Britain will need to focus its resources upon conventional weapons and in any case.

As for everything else, it's likely Japan still goes wild in Southeast Asia in the face of European weakness. Even with no war in Europe, the UK can't draw down its forces lest it invite Hitler and Mussolini to strike, the Dutch are of no consequence as OTL showed and the Vichy French will readily align with Japan. Once the USSR begins to collapse in 1942/1943, the Kwantung Army can then move in at it's leisure as their own war planning shows that was their intention i.e. in the event of Soviet weakness.

  The US might come partially out of recession a little slower without Roosevelt if Garner was to support such measures and do so as fast as Roosevelt did.  Although an increasingly isolated US is unlikely to have the same level of recovery as OTL, especially since purchases from the western democracies are probably smaller.

  If other butterflies are largely avoided Britain could decide to make peace any time from ~Oct 40 to spring 41 with pluses and negatives at all stages.  The lack of a shooting war with the Axis releases huge resources and avoids the continued battle and attrition losses of OTL.  As such even with a steadily strengthening defence of Britain and its naval and supply position Britain can easily support restoring the garrison of its interests in SEA and increasing especially air and ground forces if it looks like Japan is heading that way.  Not to mention that with no British/Commonwealth conflict in Europe and the Med a lot more India forces will be available for the region and where do you think the ANZAc forces will be.

  Doubly so with Germany and its allies deeply tied up with the Soviets for several years.  As stated if Japan doesn't fairly immediately support the attack on the Soviets, which its almost certain not to do so then Hitler will be less favourable to them and won't want them disrupting his peace with Britain and supplies from the region.  Dutch oil here could also be important to him once Soviet supplies are no longer available.  The Dutch will of course be stronger as their homeland isn't occupied and similar a Vichy France, which is likely to control virtually all of France and its empire will be in a markedly stronger position to resist Japanese pressure and will have clear political reasons for doing so.

  Assuming the Axis come out on top in say 43-44, which is probably likely but not certain its going to be too late by then for Japan if its struck south in ~Dec 41.  The failure to gain most of their OTL gains and steady defeats and bleeding of their forces and resources coupled with British material aid probably means their struggling to hold onto parts of their occupation in China.  In that case a serious attempt at eastern Siberia is going to be costly.

  When Britain gets a nuclear device would be difficult to say.  On the down side it won't have access to the US programme as OTL.  On the plus side its not engaged in fighting for its life for 5 years with a huge amount of resources consumed by the war not happening here.  [No Atlantic or other merchantile loses once the war with Germany ends, the vast bulk of the resources sunk into the strategic bomber campaign will be available and there will be no prolonged fighting in N Africa, Italy etc].  If the war is ended in late 40 then Britain hasn't been totally stripped of assets in the US, sold at bargain basement rate as well.  It will have access to a lot of scientific expertise, probably more than  OTL as some scientists who OTL aided the US project are more likely to end up in a British/Commonwealth one.  Since there will be continued worry about the Nazis and especially when they look like their winning against the Soviets something like a nuclear weapon is going to be very attractive as a force equaliser.  A war with Japan will tie up more forces than OTL as Britain would be the leading anti-Japanese power, but the empire will have a lot more resources available to hold the vital positions and bled the Japanese white.  As such I would suggest that a British nuclear device is most likely to be reached in the late 40's.

  A lot depends on how long the war against Japan goes, if the Nazis win in Russia and if so what do they do next?  Especially since such a victory is likely to be followed in a year or two by Hitler's own death so probably going to be a succession crisis.  If there is a new war with the Nazis from say late 44 -/45/46 then a lot would depend on the situation in both states.  How bloodied is Germany, how well or badly are both sides led, how much continued resistance is there in Russia west of the Urals and what is the state of any war with Japan.

[lordroel]

Aug 2, 2020 11:28:39 GMT EwellHolmes said:

PoD: Zangara successfully kills FDR in 1933, resulting in a Garner Presidency until 1940 followed by Huey Long in that year. With Gardener a lame duck and Long having no interest in the European war, no Lend Lease comes to pass and the U.S. maintains a strict Cash and Carry policy. My take? The UK is either forced to make terms in early 1941 or collapses at some point later that year, potentially allowing for the Germans to move in and occupy them. As for the Soviets, they too most likely collapse in 1941 or 1942 at the latest. 

That also depends if the US goes the oil embargo route against Japan, if not, Japan will fight and bleed in China while the rest of Asia will be free.

No war in Asia means the United Kingdom can focus more on the war in Europe.

[stevep]

Aug 6, 2020 16:16:55 GMT lordroel said:

Aug 2, 2020 11:28:39 GMT EwellHolmes said:

PoD: Zangara successfully kills FDR in 1933, resulting in a Garner Presidency until 1940 followed by Huey Long in that year. With Gardener a lame duck and Long having no interest in the European war, no Lend Lease comes to pass and the U.S. maintains a strict Cash and Carry policy. My take? The UK is either forced to make terms in early 1941 or collapses at some point later that year, potentially allowing for the Germans to move in and occupy them. As for the Soviets, they too most likely collapse in 1941 or 1942 at the latest. 

That also depends if the US goes the oil embargo route against Japan, if not, Japan will fight and bleed in China while the rest of Asia will be free.

No war in Asia means the United Kingdom can focus more on the war in Europe.

  On the 1st point I may have mentioned that already as if the US is that isolationist then Japan has little reason for a drive south given the costs.  Especially if the DEI are under a Dutch government which is dominated by Germany after a peace in Europe.  If the US is still opposing Japanese operations in China then a boycott and a Japanese move to secure possessions in SE Asia is more likely but their also going to attack the US to get rid of the Philippines.

  I think the key thing is that before there's a war in the Pacific, which I suspect is still likely there will be peace in Europe.  Which means that Britain isn't fighting on mutual fronts at the same time.  The big issue is would be war against Japan be completed - not necessarily in a total Japanese defeat - before the Germans defeat the Soviets and then possibly turn on Britain or before Britain gets the bomb.

  Steve

[EwellHolmes]

Aug 6, 2020 15:47:51 GMT stevep said:

Aug 6, 2020 2:14:15 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Garner actually wouldn't be that bad of a President; he was generally in favor of most New Deal programs, but differed on others from FDR that economists are divided upon like the National Recovery Act. Overall, I'd imagine the U.S. comes out of the Great Depression slightly earlier, but without FDR to mobilize public opinion combined with Long's stances, they just won't do anything beyond Cash and Carry which results in Great Britain out by early 1941 at the latest and in terms of total collapse. Nuclear weapons for the UK will not be a reality for a decade, probably more, and Britain will need to focus its resources upon conventional weapons and in any case.

As for everything else, it's likely Japan still goes wild in Southeast Asia in the face of European weakness. Even with no war in Europe, the UK can't draw down its forces lest it invite Hitler and Mussolini to strike, the Dutch are of no consequence as OTL showed and the Vichy French will readily align with Japan. Once the USSR begins to collapse in 1942/1943, the Kwantung Army can then move in at it's leisure as their own war planning shows that was their intention i.e. in the event of Soviet weakness.

  The US might come partially out of recession a little slower without Roosevelt if Garner was to support such measures and do so as fast as Roosevelt did.  Although an increasingly isolated US is unlikely to have the same level of recovery as OTL, especially since purchases from the western democracies are probably smaller.

  If other butterflies are largely avoided Britain could decide to make peace any time from ~Oct 40 to spring 41 with pluses and negatives at all stages.  The lack of a shooting war with the Axis releases huge resources and avoids the continued battle and attrition losses of OTL.  As such even with a steadily strengthening defence of Britain and its naval and supply position Britain can easily support restoring the garrison of its interests in SEA and increasing especially air and ground forces if it looks like Japan is heading that way.  Not to mention that with no British/Commonwealth conflict in Europe and the Med a lot more India forces will be available for the region and where do you think the ANZAc forces will be.

  Doubly so with Germany and its allies deeply tied up with the Soviets for several years.  As stated if Japan doesn't fairly immediately support the attack on the Soviets, which its almost certain not to do so then Hitler will be less favourable to them and won't want them disrupting his peace with Britain and supplies from the region.  Dutch oil here could also be important to him once Soviet supplies are no longer available.  The Dutch will of course be stronger as their homeland isn't occupied and similar a Vichy France, which is likely to control virtually all of France and its empire will be in a markedly stronger position to resist Japanese pressure and will have clear political reasons for doing so.

  Assuming the Axis come out on top in say 43-44, which is probably likely but not certain its going to be too late by then for Japan if its struck south in ~Dec 41.  The failure to gain most of their OTL gains and steady defeats and bleeding of their forces and resources coupled with British material aid probably means their struggling to hold onto parts of their occupation in China.  In that case a serious attempt at eastern Siberia is going to be costly.

  When Britain gets a nuclear device would be difficult to say.  On the down side it won't have access to the US programme as OTL.  On the plus side its not engaged in fighting for its life for 5 years with a huge amount of resources consumed by the war not happening here.  [No Atlantic or other merchantile loses once the war with Germany ends, the vast bulk of the resources sunk into the strategic bomber campaign will be available and there will be no prolonged fighting in N Africa, Italy etc].  If the war is ended in late 40 then Britain hasn't been totally stripped of assets in the US, sold at bargain basement rate as well.  It will have access to a lot of scientific expertise, probably more than  OTL as some scientists who OTL aided the US project are more likely to end up in a British/Commonwealth one.  Since there will be continued worry about the Nazis and especially when they look like their winning against the Soviets something like a nuclear weapon is going to be very attractive as a force equaliser.  A war with Japan will tie up more forces than OTL as Britain would be the leading anti-Japanese power, but the empire will have a lot more resources available to hold the vital positions and bled the Japanese white.  As such I would suggest that a British nuclear device is most likely to be reached in the late 40's.

  A lot depends on how long the war against Japan goes, if the Nazis win in Russia and if so what do they do next?  Especially since such a victory is likely to be followed in a year or two by Hitler's own death so probably going to be a succession crisis.  If there is a new war with the Nazis from say late 44 -/45/46 then a lot would depend on the situation in both states.  How bloodied is Germany, how well or badly are both sides led, how much continued resistance is there in Russia west of the Urals and what is the state of any war with Japan.

To quote from The Wages of Destruction, by Adam Tooze:

In fact, even before the unsuccessful outcome of the Battle of Britain, Hitler appears to have convinced himself that the military conquest of the Soviet Union in 1941 was the key to ultimate victory in the war as a whole. At the Berghof on 31 July 1940, in conference with the military leadership, Hitler emphasized that the Soviet Union would have to be knocked out of the war, if Britain was to be brought to heel and America's support neutralized.116 'Britain's hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture, America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the Far East.' Russia, according to Hitler, was the 'Far Eastern sword of Britain and the United States', a spearhead pointed at Japan.117​

Attacking and decisively defeating the Soviet Union in 1941 would rob Britain of its 'dagger on the mainland' and unleash Japan. If Britain did choose to continue the war and if Japanese aggression provoked American entry, complete control of the Eurasian landmass would at least secure for Germany the resources it needed for a true trans Atlantic confrontation. As Hitler put in on 9 January 1941, after the conquest of Lebensraum in the East, Germany would be ready for a 'war against continents'.118 Indeed, he seems to have rated the economic potential of such an empire greater than that of Britain and America combined. And it was this vision of a combined Japanese-German war on Britain and America to which he returned six months later, during the euphoric early weeks of July 1941, when he proposed to the Japanese ambassador an offensive alliance against the United States.119​

With the USSR defeated in 1941/1942 and Japan indeed unleashed, if the UK does devote resources to the Far East that leaves the Mediterranean and the UK herself exposed to attack, even invasion. Even with the war in the West over by, say, early 1941, by then Japan is already in French Indochina deeply and the NEI is operating on its own; with the recent defeat of British arms making them look weak, there is all the more reason for Japan to jump in.

As for the nuclear question, Britain had unfettered access in the Atlantic from 1945 to 1952 as well as access to the American program. Simply put, I can see no possible means by which the UK acquires a nuclear weapon until 1950 at the absolute earliest, and even then it would require de-camping the programme to Canada, given the likely Nazi bomber offensive.

[stevep]

Aug 8, 2020 22:28:18 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Aug 6, 2020 15:47:51 GMT stevep said:

  The US might come partially out of recession a little slower without Roosevelt if Garner was to support such measures and do so as fast as Roosevelt did.  Although an increasingly isolated US is unlikely to have the same level of recovery as OTL, especially since purchases from the western democracies are probably smaller.

  If other butterflies are largely avoided Britain could decide to make peace any time from ~Oct 40 to spring 41 with pluses and negatives at all stages.  The lack of a shooting war with the Axis releases huge resources and avoids the continued battle and attrition losses of OTL.  As such even with a steadily strengthening defence of Britain and its naval and supply position Britain can easily support restoring the garrison of its interests in SEA and increasing especially air and ground forces if it looks like Japan is heading that way.  Not to mention that with no British/Commonwealth conflict in Europe and the Med a lot more India forces will be available for the region and where do you think the ANZAc forces will be.

  Doubly so with Germany and its allies deeply tied up with the Soviets for several years.  As stated if Japan doesn't fairly immediately support the attack on the Soviets, which its almost certain not to do so then Hitler will be less favourable to them and won't want them disrupting his peace with Britain and supplies from the region.  Dutch oil here could also be important to him once Soviet supplies are no longer available.  The Dutch will of course be stronger as their homeland isn't occupied and similar a Vichy France, which is likely to control virtually all of France and its empire will be in a markedly stronger position to resist Japanese pressure and will have clear political reasons for doing so.

  Assuming the Axis come out on top in say 43-44, which is probably likely but not certain its going to be too late by then for Japan if its struck south in ~Dec 41.  The failure to gain most of their OTL gains and steady defeats and bleeding of their forces and resources coupled with British material aid probably means their struggling to hold onto parts of their occupation in China.  In that case a serious attempt at eastern Siberia is going to be costly.

  When Britain gets a nuclear device would be difficult to say.  On the down side it won't have access to the US programme as OTL.  On the plus side its not engaged in fighting for its life for 5 years with a huge amount of resources consumed by the war not happening here.  [No Atlantic or other merchantile loses once the war with Germany ends, the vast bulk of the resources sunk into the strategic bomber campaign will be available and there will be no prolonged fighting in N Africa, Italy etc].  If the war is ended in late 40 then Britain hasn't been totally stripped of assets in the US, sold at bargain basement rate as well.  It will have access to a lot of scientific expertise, probably more than  OTL as some scientists who OTL aided the US project are more likely to end up in a British/Commonwealth one.  Since there will be continued worry about the Nazis and especially when they look like their winning against the Soviets something like a nuclear weapon is going to be very attractive as a force equaliser.  A war with Japan will tie up more forces than OTL as Britain would be the leading anti-Japanese power, but the empire will have a lot more resources available to hold the vital positions and bled the Japanese white.  As such I would suggest that a British nuclear device is most likely to be reached in the late 40's.

  A lot depends on how long the war against Japan goes, if the Nazis win in Russia and if so what do they do next?  Especially since such a victory is likely to be followed in a year or two by Hitler's own death so probably going to be a succession crisis.  If there is a new war with the Nazis from say late 44 -/45/46 then a lot would depend on the situation in both states.  How bloodied is Germany, how well or badly are both sides led, how much continued resistance is there in Russia west of the Urals and what is the state of any war with Japan.

To quote from The Wages of Destruction, by Adam Tooze:

In fact, even before the unsuccessful outcome of the Battle of Britain, Hitler appears to have convinced himself that the military conquest of the Soviet Union in 1941 was the key to ultimate victory in the war as a whole. At the Berghof on 31 July 1940, in conference with the military leadership, Hitler emphasized that the Soviet Union would have to be knocked out of the war, if Britain was to be brought to heel and America's support neutralized.116 'Britain's hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture, America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the Far East.' Russia, according to Hitler, was the 'Far Eastern sword of Britain and the United States', a spearhead pointed at Japan.117​

Attacking and decisively defeating the Soviet Union in 1941 would rob Britain of its 'dagger on the mainland' and unleash Japan. If Britain did choose to continue the war and if Japanese aggression provoked American entry, complete control of the Eurasian landmass would at least secure for Germany the resources it needed for a true trans Atlantic confrontation. As Hitler put in on 9 January 1941, after the conquest of Lebensraum in the East, Germany would be ready for a 'war against continents'.118 Indeed, he seems to have rated the economic potential of such an empire greater than that of Britain and America combined. And it was this vision of a combined Japanese-German war on Britain and America to which he returned six months later, during the euphoric early weeks of July 1941, when he proposed to the Japanese ambassador an offensive alliance against the United States.119​

With the USSR defeated in 1941/1942 and Japan indeed unleashed, if the UK does devote resources to the Far East that leaves the Mediterranean and the UK herself exposed to attack, even invasion. Even with the war in the West over by, say, early 1941, by then Japan is already in French Indochina deeply and the NEI is operating on its own; with the recent defeat of British arms making them look weak, there is all the more reason for Japan to jump in.

As for the nuclear question, Britain had unfettered access in the Atlantic from 1945 to 1952 as well as access to the American program. Simply put, I can see no possible means by which the UK acquires a nuclear weapon until 1950 at the absolute earliest, and even then it would require de-camping the programme to Canada, given the likely Nazi bomber offensive.

  Your talking about totally different things.  Yes Hitler did argue for defeating Russia to 'force' Britain to make peace but:

a)  That was in a situation where Britain was still at war and we're talking about here Britain having made peace.

b)  That was almost certainly self-justification on Hitler's part for his obsessive desire to attack Russia.  Actually the external power that Churchill was putting his trust in was Washington not Moscow.

  Your also assuming that Germany can defeat the Soviets very quickly and then have the will and resources to turn and attack Britain.  [The die hard Nazis will have the will but with the task of occupying large parts of the SU and clashing with the west there could be a lot of doubt in the military and population as a whole].  Plus unless its totally collapsed into chaos or some sort of extreme state sooner or later the US will start focusing beyond its immediate borders.  OTL the fall of France was a huge shock and wake up call to the US.  Here France fell, Britain has made peace and now the Nazis have overrun most of the SU so its that wake up call on steroids.  Most likely its going to take to 43/44 at the least, especially since Stalin will be expecting an attack and the Germans will still face the problems of huge Soviet resistance and logistical shortcomings.

  Your also assuming that Japan is going to attack south if no US involvement, which means no US embargo and probably the Dutch regime continuing to provide oil to them.  That again this doesn't bring the US out of isolationism and that the Japanese attack isn't quickly defeated.  If there is a long war in the east then it could be argued that the Germans best approach is to sell to both sides and secure their position in a still turbulent western Russia and other lands.  It would be virtually impossible for Japan to win against a prepared and uncommitted British empire, albeit they can probably provide some nasty shocks.

  Also if Japan refuses to help Germany against the Soviets and attacks two Germany allies [Vichy France and a collaborationist regime in DEI] as well as a Britain that Hitler wants peace with while his fighting the Soviet he's likely to be less than happy with Tokyo. 

  In terms of nuclear weapons yes Britain OTL had unfettered access to world trade from 1945 and access to the US project from 43 to 46.  However it was extremely exhausted by 6+ years of bitter warfare, still had to deal with the widespread disorders resulting from the war, manage the withdrawal from empire and seek to rebuild the country after much devastation.  Even so it managed to build its own nuclear weapons with a 1st test by 52.

  Here Britain has seen about 12-18 months of war ending in what is seen as an humiliating defeat and massive loss of prestige as well as having a clear and continued threat to its liberty.  There is much less material destruction, huge resources haven't been lost in the strategic bombing campaign, the bitter Atlantic battle, the fighting in N Africa, Europe and the Far East.    The humiliation of the defeat is going to give incentives for radical action and new ideas.  Plus with France gone as a balancing factor and the Germans making large successes in Russia there is going to be a massive incentive in finding new ways to counter German dominance in Europe.  The prospect of nuclear weapons is going to be an obvious force multiplier, as will be ideas such as jet a/c and probably a fair number of others. 

  With peace from 40/41 and most of the MS fleet preserved Britain can safely trade with the world and strengthen its economy, especially with most of the rest of the developed world busy with major conflict or under German domination.  Without active fighting there isn't a continued drain on resources and destruction.  Also not the need for panic buying from the US of military equipment.  An home army can be rebuilt and reequipped incorporating lessons from the defeat in France and what they can see from elsewhere.  Forces similarly maintained in the ME against future Italian adventures and SEA against Japan.  The RAF can be built up into a force to safeguard Britain against a new German attack and also for local forces in other areas, which will be a lot simpler without a fighting war and being able to use the Med freely.  Lessons learnt from the early war at sea are going to be incorporated in the RN as well so expect better ASW forces while Germany is concentrating on its army and tactical air for its long slog through Russia.

  Similarly Britain, especially since its not under immediate attack will be the best option for refugees fleeing the Nazis and if its government has any sense will be seeking to lure in as many as possible.  This could include a lot of the scientists who helped trigger the early nuclear research OTL.

  Its extremely unlikely a British bomb project would need to be relocated to Canada as its almost certain once it moves from theory to actual development it will be based in Canada from the start.  The latter as well as offering security against attack in the event of war with the Nazis resuming has space to provide more security and access to a lot more resources in terms of raw materials and power, both of which are important for such a huge operation.

[EwellHolmes]

Aug 9, 2020 10:29:26 GMT stevep said:

Aug 8, 2020 22:28:18 GMT EwellHolmes said:

To quote from The Wages of Destruction, by Adam Tooze:
With the USSR defeated in 1941/1942 and Japan indeed unleashed, if the UK does devote resources to the Far East that leaves the Mediterranean and the UK herself exposed to attack, even invasion. Even with the war in the West over by, say, early 1941, by then Japan is already in French Indochina deeply and the NEI is operating on its own; with the recent defeat of British arms making them look weak, there is all the more reason for Japan to jump in.

As for the nuclear question, Britain had unfettered access in the Atlantic from 1945 to 1952 as well as access to the American program. Simply put, I can see no possible means by which the UK acquires a nuclear weapon until 1950 at the absolute earliest, and even then it would require de-camping the programme to Canada, given the likely Nazi bomber offensive.

  Your talking about totally different things.  Yes Hitler did argue for defeating Russia to 'force' Britain to make peace but:

a)  That was in a situation where Britain was still at war and we're talking about here Britain having made peace.

b)  That was almost certainly self-justification on Hitler's part for his obsessive desire to attack Russia.  Actually the external power that Churchill was putting his trust in was Washington not Moscow.

  Your also assuming that Germany can defeat the Soviets very quickly and then have the will and resources to turn and attack Britain.  [The die hard Nazis will have the will but with the task of occupying large parts of the SU and clashing with the west there could be a lot of doubt in the military and population as a whole].  Plus unless its totally collapsed into chaos or some sort of extreme state sooner or later the US will start focusing beyond its immediate borders.  OTL the fall of France was a huge shock and wake up call to the US.  Here France fell, Britain has made peace and now the Nazis have overrun most of the SU so its that wake up call on steroids.  Most likely its going to take to 43/44 at the least, especially since Stalin will be expecting an attack and the Germans will still face the problems of huge Soviet resistance and logistical shortcomings.

  Your also assuming that Japan is going to attack south if no US involvement, which means no US embargo and probably the Dutch regime continuing to provide oil to them.  That again this doesn't bring the US out of isolationism and that the Japanese attack isn't quickly defeated.  If there is a long war in the east then it could be argued that the Germans best approach is to sell to both sides and secure their position in a still turbulent western Russia and other lands.  It would be virtually impossible for Japan to win against a prepared and uncommitted British empire, albeit they can probably provide some nasty shocks.

  Also if Japan refuses to help Germany against the Soviets and attacks two Germany allies [Vichy France and a collaborationist regime in DEI] as well as a Britain that Hitler wants peace with while his fighting the Soviet he's likely to be less than happy with Tokyo. 

  In terms of nuclear weapons yes Britain OTL had unfettered access to world trade from 1945 and access to the US project from 43 to 46.  However it was extremely exhausted by 6+ years of bitter warfare, still had to deal with the widespread disorders resulting from the war, manage the withdrawal from empire and seek to rebuild the country after much devastation.  Even so it managed to build its own nuclear weapons with a 1st test by 52.

  Here Britain has seen about 12-18 months of war ending in what is seen as an humiliating defeat and massive loss of prestige as well as having a clear and continued threat to its liberty.  There is much less material destruction, huge resources haven't been lost in the strategic bombing campaign, the bitter Atlantic battle, the fighting in N Africa, Europe and the Far East.    The humiliation of the defeat is going to give incentives for radical action and new ideas.  Plus with France gone as a balancing factor and the Germans making large successes in Russia there is going to be a massive incentive in finding new ways to counter German dominance in Europe.  The prospect of nuclear weapons is going to be an obvious force multiplier, as will be ideas such as jet a/c and probably a fair number of others. 

  With peace from 40/41 and most of the MS fleet preserved Britain can safely trade with the world and strengthen its economy, especially with most of the rest of the developed world busy with major conflict or under German domination.  Without active fighting there isn't a continued drain on resources and destruction.  Also not the need for panic buying from the US of military equipment.  An home army can be rebuilt and reequipped incorporating lessons from the defeat in France and what they can see from elsewhere.  Forces similarly maintained in the ME against future Italian adventures and SEA against Japan.  The RAF can be built up into a force to safeguard Britain against a new German attack and also for local forces in other areas, which will be a lot simpler without a fighting war and being able to use the Med freely.  Lessons learnt from the early war at sea are going to be incorporated in the RN as well so expect better ASW forces while Germany is concentrating on its army and tactical air for its long slog through Russia.

  Similarly Britain, especially since its not under immediate attack will be the best option for refugees fleeing the Nazis and if its government has any sense will be seeking to lure in as many as possible.  This could include a lot of the scientists who helped trigger the early nuclear research OTL.

  Its extremely unlikely a British bomb project would need to be relocated to Canada as its almost certain once it moves from theory to actual development it will be based in Canada from the start.  The latter as well as offering security against attack in the event of war with the Nazis resuming has space to provide more security and access to a lot more resources in terms of raw materials and power, both of which are important for such a huge operation.

Where to begin? I guess let's start with the USSR.

Stalin knowing Hitler is coming for him does absolutely nothing to help him and in all actuality probably harms the Soviets more than OTL. I'd really commend the Stumbling Colossus series by David Glantz in this regard, although for brevity's sake here I will cite from When Titans Clashed, also by David Glantz:

The January 1941 Moscow war game was intended to validate the October plan. To Stalin’s
consternation, however, both the defensive and the counteroffensive scenarios indicated that the
General Staff had overestimated Soviet defensive capabilities and underestimated German
offensive potential.
36 In the months after the war game, the General Staff again revised its
mobilization plans and probably held new war games to develop a more effective defense against
the ever-increasing threat of German attack. Fragmentary evidence exists that this frenetic
planning focused on hitherto neglected defensive themes, but little of this seems to have been
implemented in the field forces, which remained oriented on a vigorous counteroffensive.
Stalin and Soviet diplomats continued to act as if peace reigned supreme and all was well with
the German-Soviet partnership. Still, by April 1941 Soviet intelligence had detected German
offensive preparations, including the infiltration of sabotage agents into the newly acquired
territories.
37

As a precaution, literally hedging his bets on future peace, in April Stalin directed
implementation of a “special threatening period of war” (osoboe ugrozhaemyi voennyi period),
which featured special readiness procedures to be carried out only when war was imminent. This
meant that partial mobilization would be expanded even as diplomats continued to seek the
maintenance of peace. This dichotomy between Stalin’s frantic desire for peace (at least in the
short run) and his desire to implement prudent defensive measures created confusion and paved
the way for the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army. Thus, the Soviets partially mobilized while
prohibiting their most ready forces in the border areas from undertaking measures vital for their
survival.


In the last three months of peace, the Soviets accelerated the process of “creeping up to war,”
a process that had been continuous since 1937. Between 26 April and 10 May, the Trans-Baikal,
Ural, and Siberian Military Districts and the Far Eastern Front all dispatched forces to the
border military districts in the West, replacing those units with newly generated local divisions.
On 13 May, the General Staff ordered twenty-eight rifle divisions and the headquarters of four
field armies (the 16th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd) to move from the interior to border districts, and
three more armies (the 20th, 24th, and 28th) to begin assembling in several regions, with all
movement to be completed by 10 July.
38 But when the German invasion began on 22 June, only
20th Army had assembled west of Moscow, and the 24th and 28th Armies had yet to move.
Finally, during late May and early June the General Staff called up a further 800,000 reservists to
fill out a hundred cadre divisions and numerous fortified regions, although many of these
individuals were still en route when the Germans attacked.
39


Despite these precautions, the Soviet Union was not ready for war in June 1941, nor did it
intend to launch a preventive war (see chapter 3). Although the General Staff had expended
more than three years in developing defensive plans while intelligence agencies collected
sufficient information to give clear warning, Soviet forces were poorly arrayed, trained, and
equipped, and the Soviet political leadership was paralyzed by its fixation on maintaining peace,
at least until 1942. Hope clouded reality, and both the Red Army and the Soviet peoples would
pay the price.

Further:

To achieve this quick victory, the Germans planned to destroy the bulk of Soviet forces in a series
of encirclements near the new Soviet-Polish frontier, denying the Red Army any opportunity to
retreat and reorganize. In light of later recriminations concerning the objectives of the campaign,
it is worth reviewing the original plan drafted by the German Army High Command
(Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH [also known as the Army General Staff], as opposed to the
joint forces staff, or OKW) and modified by Hitler.
18 Although contingency planning began in
the summer of 1940, Directive No. 21, “Fall [Case or Operation] Barbarossa,” was not issued
until 18 December. The focus of this directive was clearly to destroy the Red Army rather than to
seize any specific terrain or achieve a particular political objective:


The mass of the [Red] army stationed in Western Russia [meaning west of the Western Dvina
and Dnepr Rivers] is to be destroyed in bold operations involving deep penetrations by
armored spearheads, and the withdrawal of elements capable of combat into the extensive
Russian land spaces is to be prevented.
By means of rapid pursuit a line is then to be reached from beyond which the Russian [sic]
air force will no longer be capable of attacking the German home territories.
19

Further:

The Red Army was in serious disarray. Although its strategy was now defensive, its doctrinal
concepts and force deployments continued to reflect the offensive, deep operational theory of
M. N. Tukhachevsky and V. K. Triandafillov. Unlike the Germans, the Soviets, while
emphasizing the importance of the counteroffensive or counterblow (kontrudar), had included
development of at least rudimentary defensive concepts and procedures. Their basic concept was
that fortified frontier regions would delay the attacker and force him to deploy, allowing the main
army to counterattack. Unfortunately, the Soviets had stripped the prewar defenses of the old
Polish-Soviet frontier of land mines, barbed wire, and guns in order to build twenty new fortified
regions in the territories occupied in 1939, the so-called special military districts. These new
regions were far from complete in 1941.
30


Many of the same logistical problems that plagued German planners also limited the Soviet
defenders. Despite consistent efforts throughout the interwar period, the railway network in the
western USSR, like its 1914 predecessor in Imperial Russia, was inadequate for a rapid
mobilization and projection of forces from the interior to the border. The only solution that
Soviet staff officers could develop was to concentrate forces and supplies near the border prior to
hostilities, a process that was still ongoing when the war began. This railroad restriction goes far
to explain the apparently aggressive and even foolhardy forward deployment of Red Army and
Air Force elements in 1941.

Finally:

Soviet infantry organization was superficially similar to that of the Germans. Each rifle division
was authorized 14,483 men organized into three rifle regiments of three battalions each, plus two
artillery regiments and supporting services. Three rifle divisions formed a rifle corps, with two or
three rifle corps and one mechanized corps generally composing a field army. In practice,
however, the Red Army was woefully understrength, with most divisions numbering 8,000 or less
even before the German attack; such divisions had significant shortages in machine guns, 120mm
mortars, and antiaircraft guns, not to mention ammunition.
42 In late May 1941, the Soviet
government attempted to remedy the personnel shortage by calling up 800,000 additional
reservists and accelerating the graduation of various military schools. These additional personnel
were just joining their units when the attack came.


On paper, a 1941 field army was supposed to have three rifle corps, each with five divisions,
plus a mechanized corps and several separate artillery and engineer regiments. In practice, many
of these armies had only six to ten divisions in two rifle corps with an incomplete mechanized
corps and little maintenance or fire support.
The logistical support base for these field armies was even weaker.
43 The General Staff was
responsible for “rear services” of this type, but it failed to establish an effective organization in
the newly acquired regions. This meant not only that the forward units received poor support but
also that there was no mechanism to evacuate the existing supplies before the Germans overran
the area.

In essence, IOTL was the best possible result for the Soviets. The alternative to what occurred is to initiate DP-41, which called for aggressive counter-offensives and for the overwhelming majority of the Red Army to be focused in forward defense:

DP-41 called for 171 divisions to be arrayed in three successive belts or operational echelons
along the new frontier.
51 The first echelon was intended as a covering force, and each of its 57
rifle divisions had up to 70 kilometers (44 miles) of frontier to defend. The next two echelons
contained much greater concentrations of troops, with 52 and 62 rifle divisions, respectively, and
most of the 20 mechanized corps in European Russia. These formations belonged in peacetime
to the various military districts of the western Soviet Union; in the event of war, these districts
would transform into five army group, or front, headquarters. Because the fronts were based on
peacetime administrative borders, they did not correspond directly to the three German army
groups. Thus, for example, the Leningrad Military District became the Northern Front, with
defense responsibilities both northward toward Finland and (unexpectedly) westward toward
German Army Group North.


Behind the five forward fronts with their three defensive belts, a separate group of five field
armies was in the process of forming a second strategic echelon (see the discussion that follows
on the covert mobilization Stalin began in April 1941). This future reserve front began
concentrating along the line of the Dnepr and Western Dvina Rivers in June 1941 but was
woefully incomplete when the war began. As a practical matter, the scarcity of rails and roads
meant that these armies could not easily support the forward fronts. This structure was typical of
the Soviet principle of echeloning forces in great depths; it was virtually invisible to German
intelligence prior to the start of hostilities. These reserve armies, as well as significant elements of
forward units, had only begun to deploy in late April. Thus, just as the German attack caught the
Soviets in transition to new organizations, leaders, equipment, and doctrine, it also found them
shifting troop concentrations.

Basically, in such a scenario, the RKKA commits suicide by launching attacks it cannot logistically support via under-trained, under-equipped troops that are poorly led. You basically grant the OKH's goal of destroying the Red Army as an entity in the first 300-400 kilometers as their planning called for. Any concern over German logistics melts away, as they simply overrun the USSR before the Soviet force regeneration can make up for this disaster. That on it's own is decisive, but for the sake of the argument, we'll keep rolling with it. 

To this end, I now turn to Denis Havlat's article on Lend Lease for the Journal of Slavic Military Studies:

Continued British resistance after the summer of 1940 denied the
Germans the ability to reorganize and replenish their air forces; instead it forced them into a costly campaign that greatly decimated the Luftwaffe.
Without British resistance in the year leading up to Barbarossa and the
necessity to keep substantial amounts of aircraft in Western Europe and
the Mediterranean, the Luftwaffe could have attacked the USSR with a force
up to three times as strong as it actually did. On top of that, German stocks
of aviation fuel would have been substantially higher because in case of a
British withdrawal or surrender, fuel consumption would have stood at a
fraction of the historical level. Even in the second half of 1941, at a time when
the majority of the Luftwaffe fought in the East, Britain contributed greatly to
Soviet survival by engaging and destroying hundreds of German aircraft, thus
preventing the Luftwaffe from creating reserves that could have been used to
keep up the strength of German air forces in the East.

Thus, it is extremely likely the USSR will collapse in 1941 with 1942 being mop up. Why is this important? Again, we turn back to Tooze and The Wages of Destruction:

The floodgates in Luftwaffe planning finally opened in the summer of 1941 with the completion of the army's Barbarossa programme and the long-awaited decision to shift priority to the air war. In June 1941 the Air Ministry proposed a doubling of output to 20,000 aircraft per year over the following three years.72 To implement this expansion, Goering's staff came to an agreement with Fritz Todt to carry out the reallocation of resources from the army to the Luftwaffe in a 'consensual fashion'. Todt himself was to oversee the identification of spare capacity and to ensure continuity of employment for army contractors.73 Days after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe revealed the full urgency and ambition of its new plans. At a meeting with representatives of the OKW, State Secretary Milch announced that, as of 1 May 1941, German intelligence believed that combined British and American output had exceeded that of Germany and Italy. The United States alone was turning out 2,800 high-performance aero-engines per month. On current trends, Anglo-American output would be twice that of the Axis by the end of 1942. 'There is not a minute to lose...', Milch declared.​

​

By the summer of 1942 Germany needed to increase its production of aircraft by 150 percent, to roughly 3,000 planes per month.74 The precise target set by Milch was new, but not the basic thrust of his comments. As we have seen, the expansion in productive capacity had already begun in the autumn of 1940. Milch's new target of 3,000 aircraft per month, however, required a further scaling up. Since earlier in the year Krauch had been envisioning a medium-term increase in the production of air fuel from 1 to 1.5 million tons. Now he raised his target to no less than 3 million tons. Given the cost of the hydrogenation process, it was unrealistic to assume that this could be produced from German coal. Hydrogenation was simply too expensive. Krauch's promise therefore hinged on the assumption that the Wehrmacht would conquer the Caucasus in the next few months and that Germany by 1942 would be importing Russian oil at the rate of at least one million tons per annum.75​

I still fully expect Japan to attack South, of course, as European weakness here is too much to ignore. Given Japan occupied French Indochina-then under Vichy control-without damaging their relations with Germany and the NEI was under the rule of the Dutch government in exile, I don't foresee how this could effect relations with Germany or impair Japanese planning at all, given it failed to do so IOTL. Britain could, in theory, transfer forces to the Pacific to face the IJN and IJA, but that leaves them open to a now undivided in attention European Axis. Italy in particularly has had longer to prepare here, and Germany now has the basis for definitively winning a Second Battle of Britain via superior air production. More than likely, we get a successful invasion of the UK sometime in 1944 or 1945.

As for the nuclear question, the UK spun off Tube Alloys in 1941 to the Americans because their own projections showed a time-frame of acquisition of about 10 years; no amount of a shortened war is going to change that and by 1941 they'd only been at war for two years. The sheer scale of resources needed always meant a British project would take a long time.

[stevep]

   EwellHolmes ,

  To summarise your saying for the Soviets that being better prepared will be worse for them because either they will launch a pre-emptive attack that will fail or that even if their moblised and deployed several hundred new divisions to the frontier/Dnieper region the German attack will still overwhelm several times the number of forces they faced OTL.  Plus that despite all those additional preparations and the realisation that an attack is coming Stalin, if not ordering a pre-emptive strike will still insist his forces take no precautions against a German attack.  Some of that may be accurate, especially if Stalin tries a pre-emptive strike, given the mess the Red Army is in at the time but not sure that the Germans could have as much success against somewhere between 2-4 times as many enemy units as OTL.  Even if commanders were still forbidden permission to construct defences.

  In terms of the effects on the Luftwaffe I think a lot depends on when Britain makes peace.  I'm assuming somewhere between say Oct 40 and spring 41 - i.e. just after a victory in the Battle of Britain to when the funds available for imports from the US runs out.  There is an advantage in this for the Germans as the failure of the Luftwaffe gives them a wake up call while an October settlement gives them time to recover and avoids later wear and tear.  This could be used for increasing the Luftwaffe substantially but then OTL the Germans didn't do that.  After the fall of France and with the war with Britain ongoing and plans already being made for at attack on Russia Hitler demoblised several hundred thousand men from the army and didn't greatly increase resources for the Luftwaffe.  If Britain has made peace then German does have the capacity to increase its air strength but would it have the desire?  With no war in the Med or west do they increase military strength or get more complacent?  As such I can't see the Luftwaffe being 3 times as large as you suggest, especially with problems of restricted resources for training pilots, shortages of oil supplies etc.  [Yes once Britain makes peace Germany can have access to the rest of the world, although they have already lost a lot of shipping, but can they pay for it?]  Plus any increase also needs an increase in supporting infrastructure for that extra force to be effectively, something that the Germans were poor at and once they start advancing into Russia the logistical problems will be even worse.

  Also in the wider term the nature of Nazi aims will prevent a short war in the east.  Their occupation policies as well as the appalling inefficiencies of their system will mean that areas they occupy are likely to be of limited merit once the costs of maintaining them are taken into account and there will still be large masses of the SU beyond their control with substantial resources.  Unless and until Germany has secure occupation of western Siberia and possibly have puppetised the Central Asian republics there is the basis for a substantial organised opposition as well as massed unrest in the vast occupied areas.

  If Britain makes peace in early 41 its following economic position is worse but Germany gains little materially from the peace prior to the attack on the Soviets.  Also prior to Rommels' unauthorised attack in the western desert, [which for a variety of reasons might not occur here] its geographical position is better as its got a good chunk of Italian Libya and is already advancing into Italian E Africa.  Plus does Italy still attack Greece in which case Germany will still need to help Mussolini out there and that is likely to mean Hitler is less likely to listen to demands for substantial territorial conquests if it threatens peace with Britain.

  In terms of a Japanese attack south I agree that is likely at some point.  However a peace with Britain is almost certainly going to mean a general peace in western Europe.  This is likely to mean that the DEI will be formally under the control of a collaborationist regime in the Netherlands and Germany could even be seeking to get oil from the region itself so such a Japanese move is likely to be less than welcome in Berlin.  The occupation of FIC OTL was a different matter because there was still a war going on in Europe and hence distractions for a belligerent Britain were useful for Hitler.  It also means that Germany returns to France most of the OTL occupied areas and frees the POWs it was still holding.  The massed looting will have to end as well as the huge occupation payments France was making to Germany.  Berlin will still have a lot of control over Vichy France but nowhere near as much as OTL and to an admittedly markely lower degree with a number of other occupied states in western Europe.

  Even if as OTL you have an already fully occupied FIC and a DEI controlled by a separate regime from whatever is in charge in the homeland things are a lot more difficult for the Japanese as Britain will be able to send far more forces eastwards with no immediate threat to Britain.  Yes if Japan doesn't attack the US it will have more forces to commit to the war against the western allies but its still seriously limited by logistics.  Japan has potentially millions of men it could in theory commit to such an operation but it lacks the shipping capacity to move more than a relatively small proportion of them for such a distance.  Also it has markedly less industrial capacity that Britain, while once war starts oil supplies stop, at least from SE Asia.  In theory they might be able to purchase oil and other materials from an isolationist US but that assumes that they can pay for that and then ship it across the Pacific to Japan.  Which means a lot more shipping than they have already as such a US is going to flatly refuse to ship such items itself and Britain has a substantial sub force with torpedoes that work and experience gained from the war in Europe while the Japanese were notorious for their neglect of trade protection.

  You grossly over-estimate the threat to Britain from a Germany heavily committed to fighting in the SU.  Even if by early 43 say the fighting there is dying down what can Germany do if it decides to attack Britain again?  Its likely that the navy will have been neglected, probably especially the U boats as the capital ships will have more prestige.  A direct attack against a well protected British Isles is very unlikely to success given the heavy continued costs of occupying vast areas of the SU and the limited German abilities to project strategic power.  Attacking the British positions in the ME is going to face serious logistical issues even without Britain having a couple of years to prepare defensive positions.  El Alamein for instance makes a virtually unbreakable block on any advance into Egypt, especially with some prepared defences and a railway from Alexandria to aid flow of forces and supplies.  Going through the Caucasus would have huge logistical problems with long distances through very difficult terrain.  Possibly Turkey could be strong armed into submission but again the terrain is very bad over much of the distance.

  Also unless Germany is going to attack before its really secured the east this isn't going to happen until 43 at the earliest.  By that time if Britain and its allies can hold Malaya,Sumatra and most/all of Java then Japan is likely to be largely nullified.  It might have gained Borneo but even once facilities there are repaired they can be bombed and shipping from them attacked.  Japan has some very elite forces - again assuming that things go pretty much as OTL.  However instead of facing the limited and poorly equipped forces that were all Britain could spare OTL their likely to face much stronger forces, in terms of numbers, equipment levels and also experience.  Given the nature of the Japanese military initial failures are likely to be followed by increasingly frenzied frontal assaults.  The Banzai attacks gained a reputation for their dramatic nature but against prepared troops with decent levels of firepower they were very effective at bleeding Japanese forces white. Similarly even if they haven't lost a lot of their big naval units those will be increasingly crippled by the lack of oil. 

  Plus what would Germany gain from such an attack?  Given its limited navy compared to what the RN will be by that time and lack of experience of amphibious assault do you think they can successfully invade a fully prepared UK?  It would be hugely costly for them and the 1st few attempts are likely to fail.  Attempted bombardment might work but again the RAF proved a formidable opponent in 1940 and are likely to be even more so later on.  Trying to starve Britain out by blockade is possible but going to be a long term operation, which isn't something the Nazis are good at and Britain is going to be putting a lot more effort into ASW and protecting its trade lines than Germany is going to be doing in attacking them.

  In terms of  nuclear weapons development Britain's position is far, far superior here.  There's no blockade, bombing of cities, waging war on several fronts with all the problems that poses.  If/when Japan attacks there will be a level of war but that will be limited to one theatre which is some distance from Britain so no threat to the main resource base and Britain has substantial bases and allies nearby which can support operations in such an area.  Britain isn't continually fighting for its own survival and also trying to maintain positions around the world.  This may change if Germany was to both decisively defeat the SU and then decide to attack Britain again but that's far from certain.

  As such there is definitely a resource base for Britain to develop its own nuclear weapons, as it did in a much inferior position OTL.  It won't be by 1945 unless we get very lucky but it should be possible by the late 40's.  Especially since Britain isn't likely to do the broad approach of the US, working on both Plutonium bombs and three different ways of enriching Uranium.  A lot of resources is also likely to be saved by avoiding the massive bomber offensive of OTL.  Both in terms of the men killed and equipment destroyed but also simply because there's no real argument for a massed heavy bomber force.  Britain can't really afford it with so many other things going on and because it would only be useful for a prolonged air offensive against Germany which is a political message that London won't want to send.  There will be development of better bombers but not in great numbers.  Once Britain gets near a nuclear warhead then there will be interest in developing a suitable aircraft to carry it but then Britain had the basis of this OTL with the Lancaster which entered service in 42 OTL.  However by say 47 you could even start seeing development of a substantial jet powered strategic bomber.  OTL The English Electric Canberra gad its 1st test flight in 1949 and entered service in 1951 and its development was delayed by the post war defence cuts and the desperate need for social spending which will be markedly less TTL.

  As such I can quite easily see an 'imperial' bomb by say 49 and quite possibly a year or two before it. 

  Steve

PS  Before I forget again.  You mentioned the increased priority given the Luftwaffe in mid-41 and admit that came at the expense of the army.  Given the that "Barbarossa Programme" proved totally insufficient for the armies need in Russia how much of the Luftwaffe expansion was actually achieved before the desperate needs of the army caused a return of resources to them?

[EwellHolmes]

stevep, Hope you won't mind, given the size of your post, if I split it up into portions?

To summarise your saying for the Soviets that being better prepared will be worse for them because either they will launch a pre-emptive attack that will fail or that even if their moblised and deployed several hundred new divisions to the frontier/Dnieper region the German attack will still overwhelm several times the number of forces they faced OTL. Plus that despite all those additional preparations and the realisation that an attack is coming Stalin, if not ordering a pre-emptive strike will still insist his forces take no precautions against a German attack. Some of that may be accurate, especially if Stalin tries a pre-emptive strike, given the mess the Red Army is in at the time but not sure that the Germans could have as much success against somewhere between 2-4 times as many enemy units as OTL. Even if commanders were still forbidden permission to construct defences.

Yes, as argued by David Glantz, the premier Western historian on the Red Army in World War II. IOTL, Stalin ordered a partial mobilization in April of 1941 and by June of the 99 Divisions forward deployed, all of them were still rated by STAVKA as combat ineffective due to material shortages already cited and the lack of supporting logistics. The Soviet war planning at the time was DP-41, which called for aggressive offensive ripostes to any German attack as a means of "Active Defense". I ask you, if the Soviets could not support 99 divisions on the defense, then how do they do so for 174? All the additional divisions in the world matter not if the troops not have ammunition, fuel, or even small arms, as the research shows. As for defensive positions, Stalin actually allowed for that; the problem was that they still were not completed. 

Here, the German operational objective of destroying the Red Army on the first 300-400km of the invasion is complete. The Soviet force regeneration rates just aren't sufficient from therein to stop the German advance; in effect, Berlin really will have destroyed the Red Army in the first six weeks.

In terms of the effects on the Luftwaffe I think a lot depends on when Britain makes peace. I'm assuming somewhere between say Oct 40 and spring 41 - i.e. just after a victory in the Battle of Britain to when the funds available for imports from the US runs out. There is an advantage in this for the Germans as the failure of the Luftwaffe gives them a wake up call while an October settlement gives them time to recover and avoids later wear and tear. This could be used for increasing the Luftwaffe substantially but then OTL the Germans didn't do that. After the fall of France and with the war with Britain ongoing and plans already being made for at attack on Russia Hitler demoblised several hundred thousand men from the army and didn't greatly increase resources for the Luftwaffe. If Britain has made peace then German does have the capacity to increase its air strength but would it have the desire? With no war in the Med or west do they increase military strength or get more complacent? As such I can't see the Luftwaffe being 3 times as large as you suggest, especially with problems of restricted resources for training pilots, shortages of oil supplies etc. [Yes once Britain makes peace Germany can have access to the rest of the world, although they have already lost a lot of shipping, but can they pay for it?] Plus any increase also needs an increase in supporting infrastructure for that extra force to be effectively, something that the Germans were poor at and once they start advancing into Russia the logistical problems will be even worse.

You have misunderstood the citation in question. It is not that the Luftwaffe gets 3x bigger overall via more production in the limited timeframe, it's that the lack of the Commonwealth in the War frees up substantial resources that are tied down elsewhere. Take, for example, the numerous Fliegerkorps on duty in the Mediterranean fighting the British in 1941. Now, in the ATL, they are free for duty in the East.

Also in the wider term the nature of Nazi aims will prevent a short war in the east. Their occupation policies as well as the appalling inefficiencies of their system will mean that areas they occupy are likely to be of limited merit once the costs of maintaining them are taken into account and there will still be large masses of the SU beyond their control with substantial resources. Unless and until Germany has secure occupation of western Siberia and possibly have puppetised the Central Asian republics there is the basis for a substantial organised opposition as well as massed unrest in the vast occupied areas.

Once the European USSR falls, further resistance is pointless but also impossible; there simply is no industry or manpower from which to mount a continued resistance if the Germans occupy the A-A Line, nevermind the Ural Line. 90% of the USSR's coal and oil is West of the Ural line, meaning it is impossible to continue to production and the manpower base isn't there either. See The State of the Soviet Economy and Red Army in June of 1942
:


Because of the massive casualties the Germans inflicted during Barbarossa (by February 1942, the Red Army had lost over 3 million men captured by the Germans, and another 2,663,000 killed in action) and the huge population centers lost to the Germans the Soviet industrial labor force fell from 8.3 million people in 1940 to 5.5 million people in 1942. This also impacted the Red Army. September 1942 estimates done by E.A. Shchadenko (the man responsible for creating new Red Army units) found that more than five and a half million military age men had been lost from Red Army usage due to the German occupation of Soviet western territories. This meant that list strength of rifle divisions fell from a pre-war total of 14,483 men to 11,626 men in December of 1941. Though many point to the Soviet Union's huge size as the major impediment to any chance of German success in the war this misses a number of crucial points. Not least of which is that the Red Army's major source of reliable manpower was in the Western Soviet Union, and much of that was under German occupation in 1942.



This is not to say that the Red Army did not try to make use of the manpower that could be found in the Caucuses and Central Asia - it just didn't work out. Language barriers represented a formidable obstacle to integrating non-Russian speaking populations into the Red Army. The Red Army raised twenty-six rifle or mountain divisions from the Caucuses, Central Asia, and Baltic states, but almost none of these were deployable against the Germans. Though four Armenian rifle divisions saw combat, as well as the majority of Georgian units, those cases proved the exception rather than the rule. For instance, only three of fifteen Uzbek units saw combat and the Chechen-Ingush cavalry divison never came close to a battlefield. The loss of population in Western Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine therefore had an outsized impact on Soviet military potential as a whole.



Moreover, there is a strong argument that that had the Germans, even in failing to meet the goals of their 1941-1942 campaigns, merely been able to hold onto the Soviet population centers captured in 1941-1942 that the Red Army may have been in deep trouble. That's because as early as January of 1943 a key component in the Red Army's ability to rejuvenate its strength would be its ability to move west and recapture land and population lost to the Germans. For evidence as to that we need look no further than the Voronezh Front's experiences early in 1943 as it pursued German forces withdrawing from Southern Russia as the German pocket at Stalingrad was slowly being reduced.



From January 13th to March 3rd 1943 the Voronezh Front's pursuit operations further beat up the Axis armies in Southern Russia but at a cost of 100,00 casualties (this included 33,331 irrecoverable losses) from the front's total initial strength of 350,000 men. To help ameliorate these losses the front received nearly 50,000 replacements during January and February. However, less than 10,000 of these replacements represented trained manpower released from the Stavka reserves. The largest single category of replacements comprised 20,902 men press-ganged into service from recaptured territory as the front moved west. The remainder consisted of front reserve units, previously sick or wounded men released from hospitals, liberated prisoners of war, penal troops (men released from the gulag and prisons) and the like. This meant that forty percent of the Voronezh Front's replacement manpower only came about because the front was able to move west. Nor was this situation unique. At this point in the war the Red Army was running short in the trained reserves needed to replenish the massive losses still being incurred while it also built up a strategic reserve and created new units.

If Britain makes peace in early 41 its following economic position is worse but Germany gains little materially from the peace prior to the attack on the Soviets. Also prior to Rommels' unauthorised attack in the western desert, [which for a variety of reasons might not occur here] its geographical position is better as its got a good chunk of Italian Libya and is already advancing into Italian E Africa. Plus does Italy still attack Greece in which case Germany will still need to help Mussolini out there and that is likely to mean Hitler is less likely to listen to demands for substantial territorial conquests if it threatens peace with Britain.

Germany gains massively, as she is now able to translate her hold over continental Europe into the global trading sphere; she can import goods again. As for the British, if there is no Lend Lease, then they definitely cannot insist on any demands vis-a-vis the Italians and, probably, will even have to make concessions. If they don't, the Germans continue the war and the UK collapses in 1941. 

In terms of a Japanese attack south I agree that is likely at some point. However a peace with Britain is almost certainly going to mean a general peace in western Europe. This is likely to mean that the DEI will be formally under the control of a collaborationist regime in the Netherlands and Germany could even be seeking to get oil from the region itself so such a Japanese move is likely to be less than welcome in Berlin. The occupation of FIC OTL was a different matter because there was still a war going on in Europe and hence distractions for a belligerent Britain were useful for Hitler. It also means that Germany returns to France most of the OTL occupied areas and frees the POWs it was still holding. The massed looting will have to end as well as the huge occupation payments France was making to Germany. Berlin will still have a lot of control over Vichy France but nowhere near as much as OTL and to an admittedly markely lower degree with a number of other occupied states in western Europe.

The Dutch Government escaped IOTL, so there is no reason the NEI would fall under a collaborationist regime. As for France, why should the Germans stop that? Vichy France is in no place to make demands and the UK has made peace; Berlin can do as it pleases. Specifically as it pertains to FIC, the Japanese had already occupied the Northern half in 1940, so nothing really changes here since you've suggested an early 1941 peace.

Even if as OTL you have an already fully occupied FIC and a DEI controlled by a separate regime from whatever is in charge in the homeland things are a lot more difficult for the Japanese as Britain will be able to send far more forces eastwards with no immediate threat to Britain. Yes if Japan doesn't attack the US it will have more forces to commit to the war against the western allies but its still seriously limited by logistics. Japan has potentially millions of men it could in theory commit to such an operation but it lacks the shipping capacity to move more than a relatively small proportion of them for such a distance. Also it has markedly less industrial capacity that Britain, while once war starts oil supplies stop, at least from SE Asia. In theory they might be able to purchase oil and other materials from an isolationist US but that assumes that they can pay for that and then ship it across the Pacific to Japan. Which means a lot more shipping than they have already as such a US is going to flatly refuse to ship such items itself and Britain has a substantial sub force with torpedoes that work and experience gained from the war in Europe while the Japanese were notorious for their neglect of trade protection.

I don't see any reason why Japan will be any less successful; even if not directly at war with Italy, Britain will be forced to keep considerable forces in the Mediterranean and in the UK itself in order to protect against a sudden Axis backstop. Indeed, if what was IOTL the 8th Army is busy in Burma, that gives the Italian Army the ability to waltz all the way to the Suez. If the RAF has been considerably diluted in the UK proper for Australia, that means the Luftwaffe establishes air superiority and promptly the German Army is in London. In short, London can't take any real risks here and, as you outlined, the Japanese still have every reason to rampage; why pay for oil when they simply steal it?

Also, how, exactly, is the UK supposed to fight the Japanese without Lend Lease? Their economy was already on the verge of collapse in early 1941. 

You grossly over-estimate the threat to Britain from a Germany heavily committed to fighting in the SU. Even if by early 43 say the fighting there is dying down what can Germany do if it decides to attack Britain again? Its likely that the navy will have been neglected, probably especially the U boats as the capital ships will have more prestige. A direct attack against a well protected British Isles is very unlikely to success given the heavy continued costs of occupying vast areas of the SU and the limited German abilities to project strategic power. Attacking the British positions in the ME is going to face serious logistical issues even without Britain having a couple of years to prepare defensive positions. El Alamein for instance makes a virtually unbreakable block on any advance into Egypt, especially with some prepared defences and a railway from Alexandria to aid flow of forces and supplies. Going through the Caucasus would have huge logistical problems with long distances through very difficult terrain. Possibly Turkey could be strong armed into submission but again the terrain is very bad over much of the distance.

By 1943, the Soviets are dead and Caucasus oil is allowing the Germans to simply outproduce the UK decisively. Even IOTL, mind you, the Germans were outproducing them in munitions and matching them in both airplanes and tanks anyway; here, the German superiority in aircraft is closer to 2:1, giving them a decisive advantage over the UK. They don't need a Navy in this case, they need only establish air superiority over the Channel and they may then invade. The Royal Navy means nothing, after all, if it's sunk by Ju-87s. 

As for elsewhere, the British cannot both be strong in the UK, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. They either can be decent-not even strong-in the former or they can be in the latter, but not both. One need only look at their production statistics to see this.

Also unless Germany is going to attack before its really secured the east this isn't going to happen until 43 at the earliest. By that time if Britain and its allies can hold Malaya,Sumatra and most/all of Java then Japan is likely to be largely nullified. It might have gained Borneo but even once facilities there are repaired they can be bombed and shipping from them attacked. Japan has some very elite forces - again assuming that things go pretty much as OTL. However instead of facing the limited and poorly equipped forces that were all Britain could spare OTL their likely to face much stronger forces, in terms of numbers, equipment levels and also experience. Given the nature of the Japanese military initial failures are likely to be followed by increasingly frenzied frontal assaults. The Banzai attacks gained a reputation for their dramatic nature but against prepared troops with decent levels of firepower they were very effective at bleeding Japanese forces white. Similarly even if they haven't lost a lot of their big naval units those will be increasingly crippled by the lack of oil.

In which case, the Italians and Germans attack in early 1943 and then with the UK itself occupied, their forces in the Pacific quickly break due to lack of reinforcements and supplies. As for the Japanese, while a popular meme, the Banzai attack was only used rarely and actually did not consist of the sole means of Japanese operations. Case in point, are you aware of Operation Ichi-Go the IJA conducted in 1944, which was a full combined arms offensive? The Japanese were not the "savages" of popular media, but rather well trained, professional, and effective soldiers. 

Plus what would Germany gain from such an attack? Given its limited navy compared to what the RN will be by that time and lack of experience of amphibious assault do you think they can successfully invade a fully prepared UK? It would be hugely costly for them and the 1st few attempts are likely to fail. Attempted bombardment might work but again the RAF proved a formidable opponent in 1940 and are likely to be even more so later on. Trying to starve Britain out by blockade is possible but going to be a long term operation, which isn't something the Nazis are good at and Britain is going to be putting a lot more effort into ASW and protecting its trade lines than Germany is going to be doing in attacking them.

Removing the last possible threat to the Reich in Afro-Eurasia, giving Berlin immense reach and access to resources to then, at some point, finally attack the United States? I'm not really sure where the idea the Germans are bad at amphibious operations comes from; see Norway, the Channel Islands, and the multiple operations in the Aegean and such. By 1943, they had plenty of experience and, unlike IOTL, now have a trump card in the form of overwhelming production capacity against the UK. 

In terms of nuclear weapons development Britain's position is far, far superior here. There's no blockade, bombing of cities, waging war on several fronts with all the problems that poses. If/when Japan attacks there will be a level of war but that will be limited to one theatre which is some distance from Britain so no threat to the main resource base and Britain has substantial bases and allies nearby which can support operations in such an area. Britain isn't continually fighting for its own survival and also trying to maintain positions around the world. This may change if Germany was to both decisively defeat the SU and then decide to attack Britain again but that's far from certain.



As such there is definitely a resource base for Britain to develop its own nuclear weapons, as it did in a much inferior position OTL. It won't be by 1945 unless we get very lucky but it should be possible by the late 40's. Especially since Britain isn't likely to do the broad approach of the US, working on both Plutonium bombs and three different ways of enriching Uranium. A lot of resources is also likely to be saved by avoiding the massive bomber offensive of OTL. Both in terms of the men killed and equipment destroyed but also simply because there's no real argument for a massed heavy bomber force. Britain can't really afford it with so many other things going on and because it would only be useful for a prolonged air offensive against Germany which is a political message that London won't want to send. There will be development of better bombers but not in great numbers. Once Britain gets near a nuclear warhead then there will be interest in developing a suitable aircraft to carry it but then Britain had the basis of this OTL with the Lancaster which entered service in 42 OTL. However by say 47 you could even start seeing development of a substantial jet powered strategic bomber. OTL The English Electric Canberra gad its 1st test flight in 1949 and entered service in 1951 and its development was delayed by the post war defence cuts and the desperate need for social spending which will be markedly less TTL.

The British themselves turned Tube Alloys to the U.S. because their own analysis said it would take them a decade or more to produce an effective weapon; I see no reason this changes, particularly given that by early 1941 Britain is completely broke. Whether or not the 8th Army is fighting in North Africa or not is irrelevant to the lack of British money and resources to the same. By the late 1940s, however, the UK is firmly under the Germans, who will seize the Tube Alloys for themselves and by the late 1940s will have their own bomb, and will be able to thank the British for their role in that.

PS Before I forget again. You mentioned the increased priority given the Luftwaffe in mid-41 and admit that came at the expense of the army. Given the that "Barbarossa Programme" proved totally insufficient for the armies need in Russia how much of the Luftwaffe expansion was actually achieved before the desperate needs of the army caused a return of resources to them?

The Army programme finished, and the Luftwaffe program began but was dependent on conquering oil for the USSR. This is of no concern here.

[gillan1220]

Could Britain support herself on its own without U.S. supplies? Because if not, the British would sign a peace deal with the Germans. The Americas would probably its own hemisphere with the U.S. seizing British, French, and Danish positions to prevent it from falling to the Germans.

[EwellHolmes]

Aug 11, 2020 5:43:04 GMT gillan1220 said:

Could Britain support herself on its own without U.S. supplies? Because if not, the British would sign a peace deal with the Germans. The Americas would probably its own hemisphere with the U.S. seizing British, French, and Danish positions to prevent it from falling to the Germans.

They could not; the entire reason Cash and Carry was replaced IOTL was because of the British inability to continue.

[gillan1220]

Aug 11, 2020 5:45:41 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Aug 11, 2020 5:43:04 GMT gillan1220 said:

Could Britain support herself on its own without U.S. supplies? Because if not, the British would sign a peace deal with the Germans. The Americas would probably its own hemisphere with the U.S. seizing British, French, and Danish positions to prevent it from falling to the Germans.

They could not; the entire reason Cash and Carry was replaced IOTL was because of the British inability to continue.

So without Lend Lease, the British would likely have signed a separate peace treaty with Germany. Churchill would probably resign and Lord Halifax and Mosley take over. I wonder what will become of the British Royals?