mspence
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Post by mspence on Aug 27, 2020 6:58:38 GMT
At the end of the war with Japan there was a very real danger of Hirohito being deposed in a military coup; WI it had happened?
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 27, 2020 12:24:45 GMT
At the end of the war with Japan there was a very real danger of Hirohito being deposed in a military coup; WI it had happened?
Assuming their able to keep enough of the military and other leading figures with then it gets even nastier for Japan. Further time for the cutting of shipping links and destruction of railways to cause further social and economic collapse and suffering as well as probably further nuclear attacks, plus likely at least Operation Olympic in Nov 45 with the invasion of Kyūshū, probably heavy US losses and almost certainly very, very heavy Japanese losses both military and civilian. Also there will be further operations elsewhere such as the British liberation of Malaya/Singapore and Soviet operations in Korea and N China.
How long the fanatics continue to fight before enough people turn against them I don't know. If Hirohito managed to survive all this then he might end up with a better position post-war as he was trying to make peace. If he dies then whoever is his successor could get some reflected glory so to speak. However Japan is going to be in an even worse mess than OTL, with a lot more deaths and destruction in the prolonged conflict and the invasion. It could also increase bitterness between the two nations. Coupled with Korea probably being united under communist rule so no Korean war then unless there is a similar conflict in the region Japan doesn't get the economic/industrial boost of OTL as a local supply centre for UN forces in such a conflict.
You might also see a stronger communist movement in Japan with a longer and more destructive final stages to the conflict. Which is likely to be suppressed by the US assuming the cold war still occurs - which seems pretty likely - but again that could give it more prestige with any groups opposing the occupation, especially if as a result the Us links up more with the old ruling elite. So as well as slower economic recover it could be more unstable politically. Possibly more like France or worse still Italy in the 50's and 60's at least.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 27, 2020 14:50:32 GMT
At the end of the war with Japan there was a very real danger of Hirohito being deposed in a military coup; WI it had happened? More nukes and a heck lot of American deaths rivaling no other US landing during the war.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 27, 2020 15:53:06 GMT
At the end of the war with Japan there was a very real danger of Hirohito being deposed in a military coup; WI it had happened? More nukes and a heck lot of American deaths rivaling no other US landing during the war.
Very probable. US fatalities for the war as a whole, while nowhere near the levels of the other big players are likely to increase a lot. Japanese deaths will be far, far higher. Which coupled with the probably lack of an Korean war promoted recovery could mean a lot less friendly relations between the two nations in the following decades.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 27, 2020 15:55:10 GMT
More nukes and a heck lot of American deaths rivaling no other US landing during the war. Very probable. US fatalities for the war as a whole, while nowhere near the levels of the other big players are likely to increase a lot. Japanese deaths will be far, far higher. Which coupled with the probably lack of an Korean war promoted recovery could mean a lot less friendly relations between the two nations in the following decades.
Well if the US Military made over 1.5 million Purple Heart medals in anticipation of a colossal casualty rate from the planned invasion of Japan during Operation Downfall, you can be sure the death toll on the allied side will be gigantic.
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ssgtc
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Post by ssgtc on Aug 28, 2020 0:58:18 GMT
Honestly, it could go one of several ways. Downfall went through multiple iterations. Including one that called for the use of multiple atomic weapons to blast holes open on the beach. Had that particularly lovely option been used we would have A LOT of long term US casualties in the form of lukemia and other cancers.
But, and this is strictly my opinion, I'm not sure if the US would actually invade. I think they may just continue to nuke and firebomb cities while straffing anything bigger than an oxcart. While the Navy blockades and mines every port and sinks anything bigger than a rowboat. (And then they'd start to sink the rowboats too).
In short, I think the US goes for a blockade and bomb strategy until Japan is reduced to a medieval country and they surrender without having to land their own soldiers.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 28, 2020 9:50:25 GMT
Honestly, it could go one of several ways. Downfall went through multiple iterations. Including one that called for the use of multiple atomic weapons to blast holes open on the beach. Had that particularly lovely option been used we would have A LOT of long term US casualties in the form of lukemia and other cancers. But, and this is strictly my opinion, I'm not sure if the US would actually invade. I think they may just continue to nuke and firebomb cities while straffing anything bigger than an oxcart. While the Navy blockades and mines every port and sinks anything bigger than a rowboat. (And then they'd start to sink the rowboats too). In short, I think the US goes for a blockade and bomb strategy until Japan is reduced to a medieval country and they surrender without having to land their own soldiers.
That is definitely a possibility and its the one that would minimise US/allied losses. Although presumably there would still be fighting elsewhere, Malaya, China, other occupied positions etc. However it does mean prolonging the war, for how long would be unclear. Then either your got millions of men and a hell of a lot of equipment sitting around waiting or a massive demoblisation which could encourage further resistance from the fanatics and if you did need the forces you would need to recruit a lot of forces again. I have read that a lot of the US troops who had fought in Europe were bitterly opposed to being sent to the Far East, to the degree that Washington started disbanding units and returning them to civilian life.
Also there are probably sectional interests in the US military who would push for an invasion both to get it over with or to demonstrate the power of their particular branches of the forces.
I've heard of the idea of 'supporting' the invasion by 'tactical' use of nukes to clear defences and as you say that would be very bad for everybody involved. Which could be especially bad given those would probably be ground bursts which would cause a lot more radiation.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 28, 2020 9:57:13 GMT
Honestly, it could go one of several ways. Downfall went through multiple iterations. Including one that called for the use of multiple atomic weapons to blast holes open on the beach. Had that particularly lovely option been used we would have A LOT of long term US casualties in the form of lukemia and other cancers. But, and this is strictly my opinion, I'm not sure if the US would actually invade. I think they may just continue to nuke and firebomb cities while straffing anything bigger than an oxcart. While the Navy blockades and mines every port and sinks anything bigger than a rowboat. (And then they'd start to sink the rowboats too). In short, I think the US goes for a blockade and bomb strategy until Japan is reduced to a medieval country and they surrender without having to land their own soldiers. That is definitely a possibility and its the one that would minimise US/allied losses. Although presumably there would still be fighting elsewhere, Malaya, China, other occupied positions etc. However it does mean prolonging the war, for how long would be unclear. Then either your got millions of men and a hell of a lot of equipment sitting around waiting or a massive demoblisation which could encourage further resistance from the fanatics and if you did need the forces you would need to recruit a lot of forces again. I have read that a lot of the US troops who had fought in Europe were bitterly opposed to being sent to the Far East, to the degree that Washington started disbanding units and returning them to civilian life.
Also there are probably sectional interests in the US military who would push for an invasion both to get it over with or to demonstrate the power of their particular branches of the forces. I've heard of the idea of 'supporting' the invasion by 'tactical' use of nukes to clear defences and as you say that would be very bad for everybody involved. Which could be especially bad given those would probably be ground bursts which would cause a lot more radiation. The Us did test after the war with dropping a nuke and then have troops move.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 28, 2020 10:26:26 GMT
That is definitely a possibility and its the one that would minimise US/allied losses. Although presumably there would still be fighting elsewhere, Malaya, China, other occupied positions etc. However it does mean prolonging the war, for how long would be unclear. Then either your got millions of men and a hell of a lot of equipment sitting around waiting or a massive demoblisation which could encourage further resistance from the fanatics and if you did need the forces you would need to recruit a lot of forces again. I have read that a lot of the US troops who had fought in Europe were bitterly opposed to being sent to the Far East, to the degree that Washington started disbanding units and returning them to civilian life.
Also there are probably sectional interests in the US military who would push for an invasion both to get it over with or to demonstrate the power of their particular branches of the forces. I've heard of the idea of 'supporting' the invasion by 'tactical' use of nukes to clear defences and as you say that would be very bad for everybody involved. Which could be especially bad given those would probably be ground bursts which would cause a lot more radiation. The Us did test after the war with dropping a nuke and then have troops move.
Which they really shouldn't have done as there was at least some knowledge of the problems of fall-out by then. Britain made a similar mistake. There was an expectation that nuclear weapons would be deployed in a future major war and that they would need to see how military forces could operate in such circumstances.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 28, 2020 10:44:48 GMT
The Us did test after the war with dropping a nuke and then have troops move. Which they really shouldn't have done as there was at least some knowledge of the problems of fall-out by then. Britain made a similar mistake. There was an expectation that nuclear weapons would be deployed in a future major war and that they would need to see how military forces could operate in such circumstances.
Looking at this image you can picture US marines in their landing craft heading towards a Japanese beach that just got nuked.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Sept 7, 2020 1:16:40 GMT
Honestly, it could go one of several ways. Downfall went through multiple iterations. Including one that called for the use of multiple atomic weapons to blast holes open on the beach. Had that particularly lovely option been used we would have A LOT of long term US casualties in the form of lukemia and other cancers. But, and this is strictly my opinion, I'm not sure if the US would actually invade. I think they may just continue to nuke and firebomb cities while straffing anything bigger than an oxcart. While the Navy blockades and mines every port and sinks anything bigger than a rowboat. (And then they'd start to sink the rowboats too). In short, I think the US goes for a blockade and bomb strategy until Japan is reduced to a medieval country and they surrender without having to land their own soldiers. Blockade and Bomb had already been dismissed as the Joint Chiefs realized they were never win via that strategy; the landings had been agreed upon and were going ahead as the only viable means to defeat Imperial Japan. Unfortunately for the U.S. those landings were to be decisively defeated by the Japanese and the likely result was a stalemate peace. The Americans really, really lucked out with the Japanese surrendering at this juncture as there was no real reason for them to. Chapter 16: Half a Million Purple Hearts, from D.M. Gianreco's Hell To Pay: "To King, Leahy, and naval officers in general, it had always seemed that the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone, without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese Home Islands by ground troops. In 1942, 1943, and 1944, while the attention of most of the Allied political and military leaders was concentrated on Europe, and while the war against Japan was left largely to King to manage with what forces he could muster, the Pacific war had proceeded upon this assumption." -King and Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King The US Navy found itself in quite a bind by early 1945, and the myopia displayed in the preceding quote, that the war in the Pacific "was left largely to [me] to manage," is at least part of the reason why. Putting aside for the moment the not insubstantial role of Gen. Douglas MacArthur on the course of events, the need for a swift victory against Japan after the defeat of Germany had been expressed as early as the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, codified at the Quebec Conference later that year in August, and reaffirmed at the end of 1943 during the Cairo Conference. As time moved along and planning progressed, the war leaders and senior staffs of Great Britain and the United States moved away from the conviction that an invasion of the Home Islands "may well not be found necessary" if "blockade and bombardment" proved to be war winners. They still believed such measures to be "inherent in all offensive operations" but that the agreed objective of forcing Japan's capitulation within as little as twelve months after victory in Europe had pushed a third facet of war termination, destruction of Japan's army, to the forefront. Strenuous objections to this by some members of the Army Air Force staff were trumped by the basic fact that there was no way they could guarantee success within the parameters of the "twelve month victory assumption." The JCS, King included, proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that "operations against Japan following [an invasion of Formosa] should envisage in invasion into the industrial heart of Japan. While it may be possible to defeat Japan by sustained aerial bombardment and the destruction of her sea and air forces, this would probably involve an unacceptable delay." Upon the acceptance of the American view by the British chiefs in July 1944, Army logistic and manpower staffs were now able to plan accordingly for the Army ground and air forces' complex redeployment from Europe and the mammoth series of campaigns that would be unleashed under the codename 'Downfall.' Meanwhile the Joint Planning Staff finalized a blueprint for the invasion, which was adopted by the JCS at the end of June known as JCS 924, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," a document that "articulated the JCS consensus on an invasion of Kyushu" and warned that taking the Home Islands "might cost us half a million American lives and many times that number wounded." Subsequently the September 1944 conference at Quebec involved a considerable amount of planning for the end game, and at Yalta, Marshall and King reported that the US military was ready to proceed with the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu, the dates dependent on the close of hostilities in Europe. Admiral King had attended each of these international conferences and had been intimately involved in the US planning process as the agreed-upon invasion and redeployment timetables were fleshed out. Although he pressed the other American chiefs, both directly and indirectly, for a scheme of operations that would have ultimately promoted "blockade and bombardment" over a direct invasion, he was continually frustrated by the indefinite nature of such a policy in much the same way as its advocates within the air staff. This was only reinforced by the lack of Japanese response to the terrible carnage of the March 9-10 Tokyo firebomb raid, which, said Marshall, "seemingly had no effect whatsoever." The Joint Intelligence Committee summed up the prevailing view when it noted that "under the full impact of air-sea blockade combined with strategic bombing, Japan's will to continue the war can be broken." However, "It does not follow that such air-sea blockades and air attacks upon Japan Proper, without actual invasion of the Home Islands, will force unconditional surrender within a reasonable length of time. On this point there is a wide divergence of informed opinion... Estimates with regard to the time element vary from a few months to a great many years." But while the Navy personnel on the myriad of joint staffs, including King himself, were party to the long-standing strategic objective of not risking that the war drag on for an indefinite period of time (and were deeply involved in working toward that objective), there always lurked the underlying assumption that the Allies would ultimately turn to blockade and bombardment because of the sheer costs of redeployment and invasion. Remarkably this belief persisted well after the Yalta Conference in early February 1945. It was not until mid-March, when the Army was visibly going full bore to reorganize its forces world wide for Downfall and the Japanese had brushed off the Tokyo firebombing, that the ranking soldier of the JWPC, Brigadier General Bessell, could write, "It seems at last to be acknowledged that the ultimate defeat of Japan will require the invasion of Japan proper and the defeat of her ground forces there."
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gillan1220
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Post by gillan1220 on Sept 8, 2020 12:21:12 GMT
I read from multiple comments from Facebook there are two options here:
1) Impose a naval blockade and air campaign utilizing firebombs dropped from B-29s while dropping a blight that would have killed Japan's rice production, thus starving the population. This occurs while the U.S. waits for the third atomic bomb to be completed which was scheduled to be ready around November 1945. 2) Go ahead with Operation Downfall and Operation Olympic.
Option 1 would have decreased Allied casualties and probably kill more Japanese civilians as a result of continuous bombings and starvation. Option 2 would no doubt see millions in terms of casualties from the invader's side. Nonetheless, both options would see a prolonged World War II ending by 1946-47.
From history books, thousands of U.S. troops from Europe were redeployed to the Philippines in preparation for the Invasion of Japan. Thankfully, that never happened.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Sept 8, 2020 12:38:39 GMT
I read from multiple comments from Facebook there are two options here: 1) Impose a naval blockade and air campaign utilizing firebombs dropped from B-29s while dropping a blight that would have killed Japan's rice production, thus starving the population. This occurs while the U.S. waits for the third atomic bomb to be completed which was scheduled to be ready around November 1945. 2) Go ahead with Operation Downfall and Operation Olympic. Option 1 would have decreased Allied casualties and probably kill more Japanese civilians as a result of continuous bombings and starvation. Option 2 would no doubt see millions in terms of casualties from the invader's side. Nonetheless, both options would see a prolonged World War II ending by 1946-47. From history books, thousands of U.S. troops from Europe were redeployed to the Philippines in preparation for the Invasion of Japan. Thankfully, that never happened.
Either way its going to be hugely costly for Japan with millions dead, possibly approaching or exceeding Soviet/Chinese losses. US losses are likely to be huge, compared to their losses in the smaller island campaigns, in the 2nd route. Also you might well see no Korean war as the peninsula is likely to be totally under Soviet control - at least unless there is already an agreement for the partition of the peninsula.
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gillan1220
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Post by gillan1220 on Sept 8, 2020 12:50:38 GMT
I read from multiple comments from Facebook there are two options here: 1) Impose a naval blockade and air campaign utilizing firebombs dropped from B-29s while dropping a blight that would have killed Japan's rice production, thus starving the population. This occurs while the U.S. waits for the third atomic bomb to be completed which was scheduled to be ready around November 1945. 2) Go ahead with Operation Downfall and Operation Olympic. Option 1 would have decreased Allied casualties and probably kill more Japanese civilians as a result of continuous bombings and starvation. Option 2 would no doubt see millions in terms of casualties from the invader's side. Nonetheless, both options would see a prolonged World War II ending by 1946-47. From history books, thousands of U.S. troops from Europe were redeployed to the Philippines in preparation for the Invasion of Japan. Thankfully, that never happened.
Either way its going to be hugely costly for Japan with millions dead, possibly approaching or exceeding Soviet/Chinese losses. US losses are likely to be huge, compared to their losses in the smaller island campaigns, in the 2nd route. Also you might well see no Korean war as the peninsula is likely to be totally under Soviet control - at least unless there is already an agreement for the partition of the peninsula.
Japan would not be like the country we know today. So meaning no anime, no video games, no electronics, and no compact cars. As for Korea, wasn't there a conference before that it would be split at the 38th parallel?
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Sept 8, 2020 15:15:00 GMT
Either way its going to be hugely costly for Japan with millions dead, possibly approaching or exceeding Soviet/Chinese losses. US losses are likely to be huge, compared to their losses in the smaller island campaigns, in the 2nd route. Also you might well see no Korean war as the peninsula is likely to be totally under Soviet control - at least unless there is already an agreement for the partition of the peninsula.
Japan would not be like the country we know today. So meaning no anime, no video games, no electronics, and no compact cars. As for Korea, wasn't there a conference before that it would be split at the 38th parallel?
On Korea possibly, in which case that might well stand but wasn't sure when the partition was agreed.
On Japan yes relations are likely to be far worse between Japanese and Americans after such a bloody conquest, which ever way it occurred but even more so in the event of an invasion. You could see a distinctly more prominent pro-communist element in Japan as the cold war develops.
If there is no Korean war Japan doesn't get the reboot it did then as a source of materials and supplies for the conflict. Still going to be some progress I suspect but probably significantly slower than OTL.
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