A Coup In The Night: Hirohito Deposed In 1945

[EwellHolmes]

Oct 1, 2020 10:46:13 GMT stevep said:

Oct 1, 2020 1:20:40 GMT EwellHolmes said:

One third of the defending force was slated for immediate defense on the beaches, with the remainder slated for interior defensive lines stretching across Kyushu. The Japanese by August of 1945 had already stockpiled six months worth of food, ammunition and chemical warfare supplies sufficient to fight the decisive battle in the region and were continuing apace in this regard, so they at the time and Post-War analysis by the American occupational authority rated them as sufficient for at least the six months timeframe logistically speaking.

As for the Kamikazes, we don't have to speculate they would be better than previous kamikazes because we know for an indisputable fact they were. IGHQ, as already stated, was throwing in their last reserves that they had withheld for this exact purpose. The IJAAF having 2,000 pilots with at least 70 hours of flying time while the IJN had 4,200 on hand who were considered sufficiently trained for night or low light missions; given the type of challenges those conditions presented, that means they were well trained. I think it should be also a basic matter of math here, even if they were of the same training as the previous cohorts. Let's do the math, shall we?

At Okinawa, the Japanese achieved a 6:1 ratio of expenditure in aircraft in terms of achieving a successful hit. For Kyushu defense, the Japanese formulated KETSU-GO with the plan calling for 9,000 aircraft to be brought to bare against the invasion fleet, with 6,255 to be used as Kamikazes. Let's round this down to 6,000 for ease.

6,000/6 = 1,000 successful hits.

Just to put that into perspective, there was 1,000 transports in total within the invasion fleet. Take in note, this is also assuming the Japanese only achieve the rate they did at Okinawa despite several new advantages. 

Finally, with regards to starvation, 10 million in the abstract is a lot and a humanitarian disaster, sure. It's also about the same thing the USSR and China endured during the war, so I have no doubt Japan can survive it. 

  EwellHolmes ,

  So its actually ~300,000 troops defending near the beaches with the rest probably being fed in as the battle continues and suffering heavily from US/allied firepower as they do so.  [Yes the Japanese formal plan may be for them to defend deeper in but given the lack of discipline repeatedly shown by the Japanese army during the conflict I suspect a lot of commanders will decide their 'honour' requires them to throw their forces into an immediate attack to throw back the invaders.  [Iwo Jima was so tough for the US because the Japanese commander managed to enforce discipline and keep his forces fighting from deep defensive positions.  Then after he died the vast majority reverted to extremely costly banzai attacks which made the conquest much easier.]

  Your saying that the Japanese, during battles they considered vital in the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa decided to only send 3rd class pilots into the battle and retained their only real trained pilots hundreds of miles from the actual fighting?  I suspect a fair chunk of this force was probably no better trained than them but the Japanese decided they were adequately trained because that's all they had.  Its the standard approach with autocratic systems facing collapse and clutching at straws.

  Also you haven't answered my question about are they trying to organise one massive attack with the kamikazis all on one go, which would be hugely difficult or throwing them in over several days probably/

  Actually flying at night or in low light is bloody difficult, even with more reliable a/c and highly trained air-crew.  The earlier attacks often had one or two experience pilots leading the others, who could just about fly in a straight line, so they could find the enemy.  Distance will be less of a problem in landings on Japan itself but trying to fly at night makes the above impossible and a hell of a lot of those a/c are likely to be unable to find their target at all and probably run out of fuel at sea, or simply crash into the mountains in the darkness.

  Your also assuming that all those hits are both fatal and on different ships.  Losses are likely to be heavy for the US but not the virtual total wipe-out your assuming.  Especially since are the kamikazes go for the transports or the warships?

  The USSR and China suffered heavier losses in WWII but that was from all losses and with larger [in China's case markedly larger populations]  Plus they didn't have much choice as surrender would be very bad for them.  10 million from starvation alone in this period, coupled with losses from other causes and the fact that so much suffering has already been inflicted is likely to make many start thinking surrender won't result in the annihilation that the authorities were threatening for Japan.  Plus if 10M die of starvation then tens of millions of others will be malnourished and hence unable to do any real work.  Who's going to maintain the basic services that the military needs to enable it to function?  If people are seeing their families dying are they going to be reporting for work or desperately seeking any foodstuff they can get for them. 

  As I say its possible that the US initial invasion will be defeated but its far from as certain as your assuming and its going to cost the Japanese far far more.  Not to mention the US just keeps up the pressure and prepares more forces.  Sooner or later enough of the Japanese population and/or military are going to decide enough is enough and turn on the fanatics.  You could actually see a freed Hirohito coming out as some sort of 'hero' when he then announces the Japanese surrender.

  Steve

No, they were in prepared defensive positions extending in continuous lines of defense extending back from the beach. I have no idea how you got that idea about the Japanese defenses of Okinawa and Iwo Jima behaving like that, as they didn't at all and the results were reflected in the heavy casualties sustained by the U.S. at those two battles. I'm a big fan of statistics and math, so let's do a little math, shall we?

Okinawa: 1:1 casualty ratio
Iwo Jima: 2:1 casualty ratio

So the U.S. is invading with 700,000 troops and the Japanese have 900,000 in place to be reinforced by another 90,000 after the start of the invasion. Even at the 1:1 ratio of Okinawa, what's 700,000 divided by 990,000? Take in note, this is just using the Iwo Jima and Okinawa casualties as a baseline, despite the fact there would be notable advantages to the Japanese defense; this would be the first battle of the war that U.S. naval gunfire could not reach Japanese rear areas due to the size of Kyushu. This means they could reorganize if pushed out of defensive lines, deploy reinforcements to lines and even organize counter-attacks in peace. Tell me, why do you think NGF would be more effective in Kyushu than it was on Iwo Jima, where it categorically failed to damage the Japanese garrison? There is a reason, after all, we have the following casualty projections from the contemporary sources:

• In a letter to General Curtis LeMay when LeMay assumed command of the B-29 force on Guam, General Lauris Norstad told LeMay that if an invasion took place, it would cost the US "half a million" dead.
• In July MacArthur's Intelligence Chief, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, warned of between 210,000 and 280,000 battle casualties in the push to the "stop line" one-third of the way up Kyushu. Even when rounded down to a conservative 200,000, this figure implied a total of nearly 500,000 all-causes losses, of whom perhaps 50,000 might return to duty after light to moderate care.
• n the spring of 1945, the Army Service Forces under Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell was working under a figure of "approximately" 720,000 for the projected replacements needed for "dead and evacuated wounded" through December 31, 1946, which was for the whole invasion including Honshu. These figures are for Army and Army Air Force personnel only, and do not include replacements needed for the Navy and Marine Corps.
• A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William Shockley estimated that invading Japan would cost 1.7–4 million American casualties, including 400,000–800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.
• The US Sixth Army, the formation tasked with carrying out the major land fighting on Kyushu, estimated a figure of 394,859 casualties serious enough to be permanently removed from unit roll calls during the first 120 days on Kyushu, barely enough to avoid outstripping the planned replacement stream.

 With regards to the Japanese airpower, this was precisely the case; the Japanese had even ceased contesting the American bombing campaign over Japan itself to conserve their remaining pilot cadre for the expected decisive battle when the American landings took place. This is because of the Japanese doctrine emphasizing Decisive Battle, and their desire to mount an effective defense of their Home Islands. For one example of the output of this thinking, several thousand pilots who were the Japanese air training cadre, were released for combat duty; in other words, the Japanese were putting everything into the coming battle in a final roll of the dice; that's why these last several thousand pilots were so well trained. I've already linked to a Gianreco article on the matter and I think I need to quote from it directly:

---

After Okinawa, however, the Japanese high command had more pressing concerns than aircraft design – the imminence of a U.S. invasion of Japan’s home islands. In expectation of a fall 1945 invasion, the Japanese devised a simple method for the immediate organization of fully equipped and completely staffed“Special Attack”(kamikaze) formations – they assigned existing training units to the suicide mission. This mid-July mass conversion of training units into combat units not only added thousands of experienced flight instructors, but also 5,400 largely wood and fabric trainer planes plus other outmoded aircraft types containing varying amounts of wooden construction. U.S. intelligence analysts speculated on what the Japanese were up to; but perhaps because they perceived Japan’s interest in wood as related to its perpetual aluminum shortage, the Americans made no connection to the fact that the sputtering antiques were nearly impervious to some of America’s most state-of-the-art technologies – early warning radar and the VT (variable time or “proximity”) anti-aircraft artillery projectile fuze, which used radio waves reflected off a target to detonate the projectile at the optimum distance to achieve maximum explosive impact.

---

Even if you believe-despite the evidence to the contrary-that these pilots were poorly trained despite having years of experience training Japan's preceding airpower-then using the Okinawa ratio(s) still forces us to come to the conclusion they would utterly decimate the American invasion fleet. Let's use those 5,400 wooden planes for example, and ignore the remaining thousand. Let's also be really generous and assume they only achieve the 6:1 Okinawa ratio (In reality, at Okinawa, the combat testing showed a 100% success rate in strikes) by metal planes.

5,400/6 = 900 successful strikes

Just as a reminder, there was only 1,000 APDs (Transports) and we still have 800 Kamikazes left for airstrikes.

900/3 = 300 successful sinkings, 30% of the invasion fleet
900/3 = 300 ships damaged/crippled, requiring removal from the battle area

Combined total: 60% of the Invasion fleet sunk or crippled

Even using the results from Okinawa, almost two thirds of the American invasion fleet is sunk or crippled. As for the Japanese plan on such, I've already stated that repeatedly:

That last bit is perhaps the most important, as experience at Okinawa had shown that a 6:1 ratio existed in the expenditure of kamikazes to achieve a successful ship sinking. Japanese planning held, and U.S. estimates agree with them, that they believed in the initial 10 days of the invasion they could sink at least 500 transports out of the expected 1,000 the U.S. was bringing for the attack. This would've amount to the loss of about five divisions and much of the logistical network, crippling the invasion before it even stormed the beaches. 

The Japanese planning called for a maximum sustained effort in the first 10 days, with the goal of sinking or damaging as much of the invasion fleet as possible before they could finish unloading their men and supplies. To this end, the Japanese had already constructed 60 airfields on Kyushu by August and expected another 15 completed by October, although some of the Kamikazes were to be based on Honshu as well. This meant they had the capacity, the pilots, the fuel and the intelligence-all the crucial measures of success-to conduct this operation; again, the Japanese knew the exact beaches the U.S. was going to be invading which meant the loaded transports would be just a handful of miles off the coast by necessity, thus making them easy prey for the Japanese. 

As for the starvation issue, please re-read what was posted; according to both the U.S. and Japanese authorities, the remaining population would be at subsistence level and thus not malnourished, with 50% of the population already living on farms anyway. The size of the Chinese population or Soviet population are irrelevant, as we're talking about by proportions; i.e. account for the difference in population sizes. Japanese would lose-at a maximum-about the same proportion of its population to starvation that the Soviets lost. As the mass suicides on Okinawa showed, the Japanese civilian population considered American victory just as terrifying as the Soviets considered German victory, so please explain to me why the Soviets could carry that and the Japanese couldn't? It's a logical fallacy to claim otherwise.

Finally, absolutely no reason to assume such; they would have defeated the American landings and the food situation would stabilize by early 1947 if the war even continues on that long. It would take the U.S. until about 1948 to be able to attempt another invasion, which means it's far more likely they'll seek a peace between October of 1945 and January of 1948 than the other way around. As I said in my earlier posts, the U.S. was incredibly lucky Japanese leaders elected to surrender instead of fighting on.

[EwellHolmes]

With regards to the situation vis-a-vis the Soviets, it's important to remember the Japanese had already caused the operational collapse of the Soviet offensive. 

At the time of the surrender, the Kwantung Army was intact and retreating in good order. Outside of the First Area Army, its constituent elements had seen little, if any, heavy combat. Even for the aforementioned First Area Army, despite having taken a beating, it remained combat effective. According the Japanese records, the First Area Army's 3rd Army retained two thirds of its original effectiveness, the 5th Army (The force at Mutanchiang) was one half, the 128th Division (detached from 3rd Army) was also at one half and, finally, the 134th Division (under First Area Army HQ) was at two thirds effectiveness. The 122nd and 139th Divisions, meanwhile, had not been affected by the Soviet offensive to any real meaningful extent. To quote from the U.S. Army's JM-155 monograph, based on Post-War analysis of Japanese records:

"The loss of effectiveness had not been accompanied, however, by an equal loss of morale, for although the Soviet Army accomplished its objective of defeating the Kwantung Army it did not do so in a true military sense, since the Kwantung Army--much of it still intact--did not surrender because of military necessity but at the command of the Japanese emperor."

The Soviets likewise concurred, as S.M. Shtemenko's "The Soviet General Staff at War" states, on page 354:

---

"To precipitate a real surrender and prevent unnecessary bloodshed, it was decided to land airborne forces at key points in the enemy's lines - Harbin, Kirin, Mukden, Changchun, and some other cities of Manchuria and Korea. After 17:00 hours on August 18th aircraft carrying the first group of 120 airborne troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Zabelin took off from Horol and set course for Harbin. This force had the task of seizing the aerodrome and other important military installations, protecting the bridges on the Sungari and holding them until the main forces of the First Far Eastern Front arrived. With the first echelon of the airborne force was Major-General G.A. Shelakhov, the Front's deputy chief of staff, who had been appointed special representative of the Military Council. His duties were to present a surrender ultimatum to the command of the Japanese forces in Harbin and dictate its terms to them. We had no precise information about the situation of the city and the Soviet Consulate there. All we knew was that the main forces of the First Front of the Kwantung Army were falling back on Harbin after their defeat at Mutanchiang. They formed a very considerable force."

---

I should note this particular passage is about the First Area Army in particular, so even in the Soviet's judgement the forces they had engaged heavily were still a potent enemy.

According to Shtemenko, at the onset of operations STAVKA directed that the Kwantung Army be destroyed within 8 weeks or else the logistical situation would become "perilous". It's easy to see why they stated this, because the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway was limited to 13 million tons yearly in 1945 and of this only 9.3 million tons could be used for military needs; this is exactly why the Soviets requested MILEPOST deliveries from the United States. According to John R. Deane's "The Strange Alliance", on pages 263-264, the statistics provided by the Red Army to the United States as part of MILEPOST showed that they would be at a monthly deficit of 200,000 tons. Thus, the 1.25 million tons the U.S. provided in the three months between V-E Day and the Soviet invasion in August gave the Soviets a very limited window to achieve decisive results because after that it would become impossible. With official Soviet belligerency eliminating the ability of further MILEPOST shipments (The Japanese only allowed Soviet shipping through their waters while they were neutral) and the inability to expand rail capacity in the Far East (The Soviets started a project to do so Pre-War...and it took until 1984 to complete IOTL), we know the eight weeks limit is firm.

I should also add that eight weeks might also be way too generous. Their exploitation force was bingo on fuel and thus immobile by day three of combat operations:

---

"Soviet sources do recognize severe short comings in their own logistical planning. The available supply transports were too few to cope with the demand. The road conditions were poor and, together with the rainy weather, caused severe delays in resupply operations. Estimates of fuel requirements were proved to be totally wrong. This severely affected the 6th Guards Tank Army in western Manchuria. This mobile army which was to operate deep behind enemy lines as an operational manoeuvre group (oMG) was in fact out of fuel already on the third day of the operation. It had to be resupplied with emergency air transportation of fuel. one peculiar fact is that the Soviet logistical planning relied heavily on the unrealistic assumption of using enemy railroads for troop and sup ply transports in Manchuria. This raises serious questions of the quality of the Soviet logistical planning. Another explanation is that the Soviet attack actually began before all necessary logistical preparations were in place. However, by launching an attack at an early stage it probably contributed to the creation of surprise."

---

They ended up not even reaching the outskirts of Mukden with just forward recon units until over a week after the Japanese surrender, and ended up having to use surrendered Japanese trains to occupy strategic areas like Port Arthur. Obviously this wouldn't have been possible with continued Japanese resistance.

[gillan1220]

Oct 1, 2020 17:11:51 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Finally, absolutely no reason to assume such; they would have defeated the American landings and the food situation would stabilize by early 1947 if the war even continues on that long. It would take the U.S. until about 1948 to be able to attempt another invasion, which means it's far more likely they'll seek a peace between October of 1945 and January of 1948 than the other way around. As I said in my earlier posts, the U.S. was incredibly lucky Japanese leaders elected to surrender instead of fighting on.

So WWII would end by the 1950s? That's a lot of butterflies.

[oscssw]

This begs a few questions, at least in my mind.
1. Steve have you factored in the war weariness of the Allies? In that context, I think Olympic would go but if it was a real blood bath AND it was defeated I would think the US and most certainly the Brits population would be pressing not to try it again. Whether this would lead to the continued bombing starvation strategy, a negotiated settlement, chemical warfare or a switch to the destruction of Japanese agriculture (if possible) I don't know.

2. Ewell have you considered the effects on the Kamikazes of Aerial AEW, all weather fighters and introduction of jet fighters. All of which have already been developed and whose production was ramping up toward the end of the Okinawa campaign?


TBM-3W Cadillac I

The U.S. Navy, in 1944, under the threat of Kamikaze attack, ordered the development of a radar system that could be carried aloft in an aircraft. Which would expand the radar horizon under which the Fleet was to operate during a series of campaigns through the Philippines and northwards to Japan. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was tasked with developing a workable system in February 1944 under Project Cadillac (a reference to a mountain in the state of Maine, where some of the equipment testing had taken place) and a prototype system was built and flown in August on a modified TBM Avenger torpedo bomber. With tests proving successful, the system being able to detect low flying formations at a range in excess of 100 miles, the US Navy ordered production of the TBM-3W, the first AEW aircraft to enter service. TBM-3Ws fitted with the AN/APS-20 radar entered service in March 1945, with some 36-40 eventually being constructed.

A fiberglass radome containing the AN/APS-20 radar was installed at the front of the Bombay and in between the main wheels; it had a modified cockpit, housing only the pilot. A couple of radar specialists were ensconced in a turtle backed compartment in the rear fuselage. It had nine external antennas and in order to maintain the required aerodynamic yaw control, which had been affected by the large belly radome, a pair of finlets was added above and below the horizontal stabilizers. The AN/APS-20 radar was just a part of a new package of mission avionics installed aboard the TBM-3W. It was complemented by the AN/APX-13 Identification Friend of Foe (IFF) system. The IFF used the United States Navy �A� and �G� frequency bands to distinguish whether a contact was a friendly or enemy aircraft.

The Avenger was purely an AEW radar aircraft, as the aircraft had a crew of only a single pilot and one radar operator. All control functions were conducted on surface ships, with radar data transmitted via a data link which gave the video image and radar antenna angle to enable a tactical picture to be developed in the Combat Information Center (CIC).

Tests were conducted aboard the USS Ranger between January and April, 1945, they revealed that a single aerial target could be detected at twice the range of a radar picket ships radar range whilst an enemy formation could be located from two to four times farther out still. Also an enemy surface vessel could be picked up six times further away that was possible before with surface radars. The second world war was to end before the Cadillac 1 aircraft could be used against the Japanese.

Following the success of Project Cadillac, Project Cadillac II was commenced in 1944, with the aim of producing a flying command center. This lead to the development of the PB-1W, a modified B-17, using the same AN/APS-20 radar as the TBM-3W, but with several operators on board who could steer defending fighters towards targets via radio. The PB-1W was specifically designed to counter the Kamikaze threat, operating from land bases in support of the Fleet at sea.

P-80 Shooting Star
The Shooting Star began to enter service in late 1944 with 12 pre-production YP-80As, one of which was destroyed in the accident in which Burcham was killed. Four were sent to Europe for operational testing (demonstration, familiarization, and possible interception roles), two to England and two to the 1st Fighter Group at Lesina Airfield, Ital.

Before World War II ended, however, two American pre-production Lockheed YP-80A Shooting Star fighter jets did see limited service in Italy with the USAAF on reconnaissance, in February and March 1945.

The initial production order was for 344 P-80As after USAAF acceptance in February 1945. A total of 83 P-80s had been delivered by the end of July 1945 and 45 assigned to the 412th Fighter Group (later redesignated the 1st Fighter Group) at Muroc Army Air Field.

To say nothing of the combat proven Gloucester Meteor. Those early jets flying from Okinawa and later from Kyushu coupled with the AEW would pose a considerable attrition on the Kamikazes, IMO.

Your thoughts?

[stevep]

Oct 1, 2020 18:45:51 GMT oscssw said:

This begs a few questions, at least in my mind.
1. Steve have you factored in the war weariness of the Allies? In that context, I think Olympic would go but if it was a real blood bath AND it was defeated I would think the US and most certainly the Brits population would be pressing not to try it again. Whether this would lead to the continued bombing starvation strategy, a negotiated settlement, chemical warfare or a switch to the destruction of Japanese agriculture (if possible) I don't know.

2. Ewell have you considered the effects on the Kamikazes of Aerial AEW, all weather fighters and introduction of jet fighters. All of which have already been developed and whose production was ramping up toward the end of the Okinawa campaign?


TBM-3W Cadillac I

The U.S. Navy, in 1944, under the threat of Kamikaze attack, ordered the development of a radar system that could be carried aloft in an aircraft. Which would expand the radar horizon under which the Fleet was to operate during a series of campaigns through the Philippines and northwards to Japan. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was tasked with developing a workable system in February 1944 under Project Cadillac (a reference to a mountain in the state of Maine, where some of the equipment testing had taken place) and a prototype system was built and flown in August on a modified TBM Avenger torpedo bomber. With tests proving successful, the system being able to detect low flying formations at a range in excess of 100 miles, the US Navy ordered production of the TBM-3W, the first AEW aircraft to enter service. TBM-3Ws fitted with the AN/APS-20 radar entered service in March 1945, with some 36-40 eventually being constructed.

A fiberglass radome containing the AN/APS-20 radar was installed at the front of the Bombay and in between the main wheels; it had a modified cockpit, housing only the pilot. A couple of radar specialists were ensconced in a turtle backed compartment in the rear fuselage. It had nine external antennas and in order to maintain the required aerodynamic yaw control, which had been affected by the large belly radome, a pair of finlets was added above and below the horizontal stabilizers. The AN/APS-20 radar was just a part of a new package of mission avionics installed aboard the TBM-3W. It was complemented by the AN/APX-13 Identification Friend of Foe (IFF) system. The IFF used the United States Navy �A� and �G� frequency bands to distinguish whether a contact was a friendly or enemy aircraft.

The Avenger was purely an AEW radar aircraft, as the aircraft had a crew of only a single pilot and one radar operator. All control functions were conducted on surface ships, with radar data transmitted via a data link which gave the video image and radar antenna angle to enable a tactical picture to be developed in the Combat Information Center (CIC).

Tests were conducted aboard the USS Ranger between January and April, 1945, they revealed that a single aerial target could be detected at twice the range of a radar picket ships radar range whilst an enemy formation could be located from two to four times farther out still. Also an enemy surface vessel could be picked up six times further away that was possible before with surface radars. The second world war was to end before the Cadillac 1 aircraft could be used against the Japanese.

Following the success of Project Cadillac, Project Cadillac II was commenced in 1944, with the aim of producing a flying command center. This lead to the development of the PB-1W, a modified B-17, using the same AN/APS-20 radar as the TBM-3W, but with several operators on board who could steer defending fighters towards targets via radio. The PB-1W was specifically designed to counter the Kamikaze threat, operating from land bases in support of the Fleet at sea.

P-80 Shooting Star
The Shooting Star began to enter service in late 1944 with 12 pre-production YP-80As, one of which was destroyed in the accident in which Burcham was killed. Four were sent to Europe for operational testing (demonstration, familiarization, and possible interception roles), two to England and two to the 1st Fighter Group at Lesina Airfield, Ital.

Before World War II ended, however, two American pre-production Lockheed YP-80A Shooting Star fighter jets did see limited service in Italy with the USAAF on reconnaissance, in February and March 1945.

The initial production order was for 344 P-80As after USAAF acceptance in February 1945. A total of 83 P-80s had been delivered by the end of July 1945 and 45 assigned to the 412th Fighter Group (later redesignated the 1st Fighter Group) at Muroc Army Air Field.

To say nothing of the combat proven Gloucester Meteor. Those early jets flying from Okinawa and later from Kyushu coupled with the AEW would pose a considerable attrition on the Kamikazes, IMO.

Your thoughts?

  oscssw,

 War weariness is a factor and I have read that US troops who had fought in Europe - many of which would have seen a year's service at most - were reluctant to outright mutinous according to some reports at the ideal of being sent to the Far East.  However it would depend on how the landings actually went.  Plus given the continued resistance - if an invasion was defeated - is going to be unacceptable to the allies.  This would mean both continued pressure from the US by air and sea and almost certainly later invasions.  If nothing else the US would want to avoid Japan falling under Soviet control and regardless of Soviet weaknesses at the moment in amphibious abilities that can change over time while also they traditionally have very large parachute forces.  Even if the US is willing to come to terms can you see the fanatics in charge accepting anything that restricts their control of Japan, or even the loss of their empire? 

  Interesting about the Cadillac as I hadn't heard of that before.  If deployed in time, which if its anything like ready it would very probably be a high priority, it could be very useful.  Not sure with the Meteor whether it has the range to operate frequently over Kyushu or numbers would be available but the US has a lot of powerful prop a/c that could provide some air cover from Okinawa.  Also the US had developed a number of tactics to counter kamikazes.  Including for instance bombing Japanese airfields with mines to hinder their use which is likely to happen prior to the invasion.

  I think the basic problem is that Ewell is unwilling to accept that in warfare friction exists.  He's assuming that all the Japanese plans will work as they hope and that the US and allies will do nothing really to change their tactics for circumstances.  The US were worried about the resistance they would get and as with most democracies were cautious and pessimistic about potential losses.  [Think of Eisenhower's pre-written letter accepting responsibility for the 'failure' of the D Day landings in case they went seriously wrong.

  Steve

[stevep]

Oct 1, 2020 17:11:51 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Oct 1, 2020 10:46:13 GMT stevep said:

  EwellHolmes ,

  So its actually ~300,000 troops defending near the beaches with the rest probably being fed in as the battle continues and suffering heavily from US/allied firepower as they do so.  [Yes the Japanese formal plan may be for them to defend deeper in but given the lack of discipline repeatedly shown by the Japanese army during the conflict I suspect a lot of commanders will decide their 'honour' requires them to throw their forces into an immediate attack to throw back the invaders.  [Iwo Jima was so tough for the US because the Japanese commander managed to enforce discipline and keep his forces fighting from deep defensive positions.  Then after he died the vast majority reverted to extremely costly banzai attacks which made the conquest much easier.]

  Your saying that the Japanese, during battles they considered vital in the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa decided to only send 3rd class pilots into the battle and retained their only real trained pilots hundreds of miles from the actual fighting?  I suspect a fair chunk of this force was probably no better trained than them but the Japanese decided they were adequately trained because that's all they had.  Its the standard approach with autocratic systems facing collapse and clutching at straws.

  Also you haven't answered my question about are they trying to organise one massive attack with the kamikazis all on one go, which would be hugely difficult or throwing them in over several days probably/

  Actually flying at night or in low light is bloody difficult, even with more reliable a/c and highly trained air-crew.  The earlier attacks often had one or two experience pilots leading the others, who could just about fly in a straight line, so they could find the enemy.  Distance will be less of a problem in landings on Japan itself but trying to fly at night makes the above impossible and a hell of a lot of those a/c are likely to be unable to find their target at all and probably run out of fuel at sea, or simply crash into the mountains in the darkness.

  Your also assuming that all those hits are both fatal and on different ships.  Losses are likely to be heavy for the US but not the virtual total wipe-out your assuming.  Especially since are the kamikazes go for the transports or the warships?

  The USSR and China suffered heavier losses in WWII but that was from all losses and with larger [in China's case markedly larger populations]  Plus they didn't have much choice as surrender would be very bad for them.  10 million from starvation alone in this period, coupled with losses from other causes and the fact that so much suffering has already been inflicted is likely to make many start thinking surrender won't result in the annihilation that the authorities were threatening for Japan.  Plus if 10M die of starvation then tens of millions of others will be malnourished and hence unable to do any real work.  Who's going to maintain the basic services that the military needs to enable it to function?  If people are seeing their families dying are they going to be reporting for work or desperately seeking any foodstuff they can get for them. 

  As I say its possible that the US initial invasion will be defeated but its far from as certain as your assuming and its going to cost the Japanese far far more.  Not to mention the US just keeps up the pressure and prepares more forces.  Sooner or later enough of the Japanese population and/or military are going to decide enough is enough and turn on the fanatics.  You could actually see a freed Hirohito coming out as some sort of 'hero' when he then announces the Japanese surrender.

  Steve

No, they were in prepared defensive positions extending in continuous lines of defense extending back from the beach. I have no idea how you got that idea about the Japanese defenses of Okinawa and Iwo Jima behaving like that, as they didn't at all and the results were reflected in the heavy casualties sustained by the U.S. at those two battles. I'm a big fan of statistics and math, so let's do a little math, shall we?

Okinawa: 1:1 casualty ratio
Iwo Jima: 2:1 casualty ratio

So the U.S. is invading with 700,000 troops and the Japanese have 900,000 in place to be reinforced by another 90,000 after the start of the invasion. Even at the 1:1 ratio of Okinawa, what's 700,000 divided by 990,000? Take in note, this is just using the Iwo Jima and Okinawa casualties as a baseline, despite the fact there would be notable advantages to the Japanese defense; this would be the first battle of the war that U.S. naval gunfire could not reach Japanese rear areas due to the size of Kyushu. This means they could reorganize if pushed out of defensive lines, deploy reinforcements to lines and even organize counter-attacks in peace. Tell me, why do you think NGF would be more effective in Kyushu than it was on Iwo Jima, where it categorically failed to damage the Japanese garrison? There is a reason, after all, we have the following casualty projections from the contemporary sources:

• In a letter to General Curtis LeMay when LeMay assumed command of the B-29 force on Guam, General Lauris Norstad told LeMay that if an invasion took place, it would cost the US "half a million" dead.
• In July MacArthur's Intelligence Chief, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, warned of between 210,000 and 280,000 battle casualties in the push to the "stop line" one-third of the way up Kyushu. Even when rounded down to a conservative 200,000, this figure implied a total of nearly 500,000 all-causes losses, of whom perhaps 50,000 might return to duty after light to moderate care.
• n the spring of 1945, the Army Service Forces under Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell was working under a figure of "approximately" 720,000 for the projected replacements needed for "dead and evacuated wounded" through December 31, 1946, which was for the whole invasion including Honshu. These figures are for Army and Army Air Force personnel only, and do not include replacements needed for the Navy and Marine Corps.
• A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William Shockley estimated that invading Japan would cost 1.7–4 million American casualties, including 400,000–800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.
• The US Sixth Army, the formation tasked with carrying out the major land fighting on Kyushu, estimated a figure of 394,859 casualties serious enough to be permanently removed from unit roll calls during the first 120 days on Kyushu, barely enough to avoid outstripping the planned replacement stream.

 With regards to the Japanese airpower, this was precisely the case; the Japanese had even ceased contesting the American bombing campaign over Japan itself to conserve their remaining pilot cadre for the expected decisive battle when the American landings took place. This is because of the Japanese doctrine emphasizing Decisive Battle, and their desire to mount an effective defense of their Home Islands. For one example of the output of this thinking, several thousand pilots who were the Japanese air training cadre, were released for combat duty; in other words, the Japanese were putting everything into the coming battle in a final roll of the dice; that's why these last several thousand pilots were so well trained. I've already linked to a Gianreco article on the matter and I think I need to quote from it directly:

---

After Okinawa, however, the Japanese high command had more pressing concerns than aircraft design – the imminence of a U.S. invasion of Japan’s home islands. In expectation of a fall 1945 invasion, the Japanese devised a simple method for the immediate organization of fully equipped and completely staffed“Special Attack”(kamikaze) formations – they assigned existing training units to the suicide mission. This mid-July mass conversion of training units into combat units not only added thousands of experienced flight instructors, but also 5,400 largely wood and fabric trainer planes plus other outmoded aircraft types containing varying amounts of wooden construction. U.S. intelligence analysts speculated on what the Japanese were up to; but perhaps because they perceived Japan’s interest in wood as related to its perpetual aluminum shortage, the Americans made no connection to the fact that the sputtering antiques were nearly impervious to some of America’s most state-of-the-art technologies – early warning radar and the VT (variable time or “proximity”) anti-aircraft artillery projectile fuze, which used radio waves reflected off a target to detonate the projectile at the optimum distance to achieve maximum explosive impact.

---

Even if you believe-despite the evidence to the contrary-that these pilots were poorly trained despite having years of experience training Japan's preceding airpower-then using the Okinawa ratio(s) still forces us to come to the conclusion they would utterly decimate the American invasion fleet. Let's use those 5,400 wooden planes for example, and ignore the remaining thousand. Let's also be really generous and assume they only achieve the 6:1 Okinawa ratio (In reality, at Okinawa, the combat testing showed a 100% success rate in strikes) by metal planes.

5,400/6 = 900 successful strikes

Just as a reminder, there was only 1,000 APDs (Transports) and we still have 800 Kamikazes left for airstrikes.

900/3 = 300 successful sinkings, 30% of the invasion fleet
900/3 = 300 ships damaged/crippled, requiring removal from the battle area

Combined total: 60% of the Invasion fleet sunk or crippled

Even using the results from Okinawa, almost two thirds of the American invasion fleet is sunk or crippled. As for the Japanese plan on such, I've already stated that repeatedly:

That last bit is perhaps the most important, as experience at Okinawa had shown that a 6:1 ratio existed in the expenditure of kamikazes to achieve a successful ship sinking. Japanese planning held, and U.S. estimates agree with them, that they believed in the initial 10 days of the invasion they could sink at least 500 transports out of the expected 1,000 the U.S. was bringing for the attack. This would've amount to the loss of about five divisions and much of the logistical network, crippling the invasion before it even stormed the beaches. 

The Japanese planning called for a maximum sustained effort in the first 10 days, with the goal of sinking or damaging as much of the invasion fleet as possible before they could finish unloading their men and supplies. To this end, the Japanese had already constructed 60 airfields on Kyushu by August and expected another 15 completed by October, although some of the Kamikazes were to be based on Honshu as well. This meant they had the capacity, the pilots, the fuel and the intelligence-all the crucial measures of success-to conduct this operation; again, the Japanese knew the exact beaches the U.S. was going to be invading which meant the loaded transports would be just a handful of miles off the coast by necessity, thus making them easy prey for the Japanese. 

As for the starvation issue, please re-read what was posted; according to both the U.S. and Japanese authorities, the remaining population would be at subsistence level and thus not malnourished, with 50% of the population already living on farms anyway. The size of the Chinese population or Soviet population are irrelevant, as we're talking about by proportions; i.e. account for the difference in population sizes. Japanese would lose-at a maximum-about the same proportion of its population to starvation that the Soviets lost. As the mass suicides on Okinawa showed, the Japanese civilian population considered American victory just as terrifying as the Soviets considered German victory, so please explain to me why the Soviets could carry that and the Japanese couldn't? It's a logical fallacy to claim otherwise.

Finally, absolutely no reason to assume such; they would have defeated the American landings and the food situation would stabilize by early 1947 if the war even continues on that long. It would take the U.S. until about 1948 to be able to attempt another invasion, which means it's far more likely they'll seek a peace between October of 1945 and January of 1948 than the other way around. As I said in my earlier posts, the U.S. was incredibly lucky Japanese leaders elected to surrender instead of fighting on.

  EwellHolmes,

  I got the idea on how the battles went from numerous history books I have read over the years.  Note that if your right and like on Iwo Jima they do stay in defensive positions then there aren't going to be 900,000 Japanese troops fighting the landings but only about a third of that number.  The others would only come into play if the US gets beyond the beaches - which your saying won't happen - and if they do then they have land bases from which to add ground based artillery and local air support in pounding such positions.  Still going to be very costly for the US but they have gained a lot of experience of such fighting.  If they [or probably more accurately local commanders] do lose discipline then they can play a part but attacking on fairly open ground they will suffer very heavy losses trying to do so.

  Lets look at your figures.  Just using Wiki for a quick rough figure. For Okinawa US losses are between 14 and 20k dead and 38-55k wounded.  The Japan had 77-110k dead and 'more than' 7k-15 captured.  As such maximum US casualties would be 75k and minimum 52k while Japanese losses were between 84-125k dead.  Even taking the very worst comparison and ignoring that many of those wounds would be relatively minor that is between ~ 1.2 Japanese for every American and could be 2:1 or more. 

  Similarly with the battle at sea.  The US lost 36 ships [12 DD, 15 amphibious ships and 9 others].  Without looking into details I would suspect that at least some of those were probably damaged by mines and shore defences rather than kamikazes.  Another 386 ships were damaged - although it doesn't give a breakdown on how badly as I know some were write offs while others probably only suffered some strafing or shrapnel damage.  About 1450 kamikazes were destroyed by the defenders.  That means, assuming simple scaling, albeit there are factors that could change this either way, ~6 times as many, i.e. just under 9,000 would sink ~110 ships.  You do mention factors that might increase this, that the a/c are mainly attacking at night and are less easy to pick up on radar plus the fleet will be operating nearer the launch point of many of those a/c.  I've in turn pointed out others such as the effects of softening up attacks beforehand and the difficulty for even experienced pilots to accurately navigate at night, let alone many inexperienced ones in unfamiliar a/c.  Plus those wooden a/c are going to be very vulnerable when attacked and a lot lower in performance.

  As you may have gathered I'm doubtful that the Japanese, who suffered from shortages of experienced pilots due in part to their long training programmes pre-war and shortages during it have ~9,000 experienced trainers.  I note that furthermore the author mentions that the USN was already aware of the problem and working on counter-measures while the Japanese don't seem to have fully realised the potential for such attacks.  They were striking at night simply because so many of those old a/c were so vulnerable during the day.  It mentions two DDs being such in such attacks and another damaged but doesn't say how many a/c flew on those missions to make those attacks. 

  As you say about 50% of the Japanese population lived on farms.  This doesn't mean their OK as they would be suffering from the general disruption including loss of supplies and equipment from the attacks on Japanese infrastructure and probably also looting by both the military and desperate refugees from the cities looking for food.  Those latter, about another 45 million people still need food and for that food to reach them which isn't going to be easy with everything else going on.

  No 10 million killed by starvation doesn't mean the rest of the population are on subsistence level and hence OK.  That will mean their getting the bare minimum, even if its distributed evenly, which is unlikely, probably just to survive, let alone do heavy labour.  [Your now made clear that your talking about proportional losses, which you hadn't said before hence the confusion].  The comparison with the Soviets and Chinese is therefore false because they would have lost similar proportion from all losses over several years - nearly a decade in the Chinese case.  Losing so much from a single source in a few months is a totally different matter.  When added onto this the other costs of the war and the collapse of the Japanese economy the population is already under much more stress than in those cases.

  The fact that the civilian population on Okinawa were in most cases pressurised into committing suicide or directly killed by Japanese troops is a different matter.  I don't think the Japanese army is going to be in such a position in Japan itself.

[oscssw]

Oct 2, 2020 10:36:25 GMT stevep said:

 oscssw ,

 War weariness is a factor and I have read that US troops who had fought in Europe - many of which would have seen a year's service at most - were reluctant to outright mutinous according to some reports at the ideal of being sent to the Far East. 

Steve

I knew some US troops were griping about being sent to the Pacific but I have never seen an account of anything that meets the criteria of Mutiny or even sedition.  Steve, if you have a reference I'd like to read it.  You see mutinies fascinate me.

This is no Sh!t.

When I was an RD2 I was sitting on the mess decks with a QM2 friend of mine.  At a nearby table were a bunch of non-rated deck apes who were very, very angry at a certain BM-1.  They were talking very loudly about ALL OF THEM refusing to do any more Sh!t work for him.

My quartermaster shipmate told them knock it off before some "Lifer" wrote them up for mutiny.  One of the Deck Apes

told him to mind his own F-N business because he didn't know "nothin" about mutiny.  My buddy said to him

"Well I know one thing about mutinies and that is you don't plan them at the top of your lungs!"

Article 94 UCMJ: Mutiny and Sedition

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who—
(1) with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny;

(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against that authority is guilty of sedition;

(3) fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress a mutiny or sedition being committed in his presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior commissioned officer or commanding officer of a mutiny or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition.

(b) A person who is found guilty of attempted mutiny, mutiny, sedition, or failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

[EwellHolmes]

Oct 2, 2020 11:21:49 GMT stevep said:

  EwellHolmes ,

  I got the idea on how the battles went from numerous history books I have read over the years.  Note that if your right and like on Iwo Jima they do stay in defensive positions then there aren't going to be 900,000 Japanese troops fighting the landings but only about a third of that number.  The others would only come into play if the US gets beyond the beaches - which your saying won't happen - and if they do then they have land bases from which to add ground based artillery and local air support in pounding such positions.  Still going to be very costly for the US but they have gained a lot of experience of such fighting.  If they [or probably more accurately local commanders] do lose discipline then they can play a part but attacking on fairly open ground they will suffer very heavy losses trying to do so.

  Lets look at your figures.  Just using Wiki for a quick rough figure. For Okinawa US losses are between 14 and 20k dead and 38-55k wounded.  The Japan had 77-110k dead and 'more than' 7k-15 captured.  As such maximum US casualties would be 75k and minimum 52k while Japanese losses were between 84-125k dead.  Even taking the very worst comparison and ignoring that many of those wounds would be relatively minor that is between ~ 1.2 Japanese for every American and could be 2:1 or more. 

  Similarly with the battle at sea.  The US lost 36 ships [12 DD, 15 amphibious ships and 9 others].  Without looking into details I would suspect that at least some of those were probably damaged by mines and shore defences rather than kamikazes.  Another 386 ships were damaged - although it doesn't give a breakdown on how badly as I know some were write offs while others probably only suffered some strafing or shrapnel damage.  About 1450 kamikazes were destroyed by the defenders.  That means, assuming simple scaling, albeit there are factors that could change this either way, ~6 times as many, i.e. just under 9,000 would sink ~110 ships.  You do mention factors that might increase this, that the a/c are mainly attacking at night and are less easy to pick up on radar plus the fleet will be operating nearer the launch point of many of those a/c.  I've in turn pointed out others such as the effects of softening up attacks beforehand and the difficulty for even experienced pilots to accurately navigate at night, let alone many inexperienced ones in unfamiliar a/c.  Plus those wooden a/c are going to be very vulnerable when attacked and a lot lower in performance.

  As you may have gathered I'm doubtful that the Japanese, who suffered from shortages of experienced pilots due in part to their long training programmes pre-war and shortages during it have ~9,000 experienced trainers.  I note that furthermore the author mentions that the USN was already aware of the problem and working on counter-measures while the Japanese don't seem to have fully realised the potential for such attacks.  They were striking at night simply because so many of those old a/c were so vulnerable during the day.  It mentions two DDs being such in such attacks and another damaged but doesn't say how many a/c flew on those missions to make those attacks. 

  As you say about 50% of the Japanese population lived on farms.  This doesn't mean their OK as they would be suffering from the general disruption including loss of supplies and equipment from the attacks on Japanese infrastructure and probably also looting by both the military and desperate refugees from the cities looking for food.  Those latter, about another 45 million people still need food and for that food to reach them which isn't going to be easy with everything else going on.

  No 10 million killed by starvation doesn't mean the rest of the population are on subsistence level and hence OK.  That will mean their getting the bare minimum, even if its distributed evenly, which is unlikely, probably just to survive, let alone do heavy labour.  [Your now made clear that your talking about proportional losses, which you hadn't said before hence the confusion].  The comparison with the Soviets and Chinese is therefore false because they would have lost similar proportion from all losses over several years - nearly a decade in the Chinese case.  Losing so much from a single source in a few months is a totally different matter.  When added onto this the other costs of the war and the collapse of the Japanese economy the population is already under much more stress than in those cases.

  The fact that the civilian population on Okinawa were in most cases pressurised into committing suicide or directly killed by Japanese troops is a different matter.  I don't think the Japanese army is going to be in such a position in Japan itself.

Steve,

For one, the Japanese defensive strength on Kyushu was 900,000 and scheduled to go up to 990,000. The U.S. landing force was to be 600,000 to go up to 720,000 as the landings progressed. One third of the Japanese strength was scheduled to fight them on the beaches, meaning 300,000 men and applying Iwo Jima level losses to the invading Americans results in the entire landing force becoming a casualty. You can do the math yourself; if every Japanese is casualty is exchanged for 2:1 losses, that whole 600,000 initial landing force is removed from combat. The problem does not stop there, however, as the U.S. just isn't stopping at the beaches because that's insanity, leaving over 600,000 men in front of them while contained themselves to a narrow corridor from a military perspective. Indeed, American planning called for at least 2/3rds of the island captured because they needed it for airfields and logistics bases for Operation CORONET in 1946. If they don't occupy most of the island, the follow up Operation against Tokyo itself becomes impossible. Therefore, they're going to be a slugfest from day one against nearly 1 million entrenched Japanese soldiers. 

Also, you're including conscripted Okinawan civilians in your total for that battle. Actual Japanese military personnel were only 77,000 and thus the American casualties of   75,000 - 82,000 casualties show it was actually a 1:1 exchange rate. Again, please explain how 720,000 men defeat 990,000 at a 1:1 exchange rate? I eagerly await your answer on this.

With regards to the battle at sea, you do need to look at the details and to not do so makes this discussion pointless as it removes any common basis for it. The Japanese had no minelayers and no ability to send them, given the U.S. control of the sea and the Japanese had no mine laying submarines; those sea losses were due to Kamikazes and Kamikazes only. Again, you need to read the Gianreco article as its clear from some of these questions you have not and that's why you're personally incredulous despite everything I'm saying being verifiable in the historical record. For example:

The carnage was frightful. During the prolonged April-June 1945 fighting in the invasion and capture of Okinawa – the largest land-sea-air battle of World War II – 400 U.S. warships and large landing craft were slammed by Japanese kamikaze suicide planes or hit during conventional air bombing attacks. Thirty-two American ships were sunk outright. More than 60 of the vessels struck required extensive repairs, and at least 40 more were so badly damaged they were scrapped. Much worse, 4,907 American Sailors were killed and 4,874 wounded. This was by far the most costly naval campaign in U.S. Navy history.

Whats 400 divided by 1,500? 3.75 aircraft per successful strike; my 6:1 ratio was me trying to eliminate the bombing attacks, so actually I've been undercounting Kamikaze success most likely. As I've said before, do the math and you find your answer here. 6,225 out of the 9,000 aircraft were slated for Kamikaze attacks, now divide that by 6:1 and 3.75:1. Either way you slice, the vast majority of the 1,000 U.S. transports would be struck here anyway you dice it. Now, as shown above, the loss ratio was 100 out of 400 struck, a 25% rate of loss. I've been saying 1:3 for Kyushu for a reason, however:

Just when the U.S. Pacific Fleet was feeling confident it could handle the developing suicide attack threat, the Japanese succeeded in trading a single, antiquated biplane for an American warship – two nights in a row. First, the night of July 28-29, the destroyer USS Callaghan was hit and sunk with the loss of 47 dead and 73 wounded. The following night, the destroyer USS Cassin Young was struck and knocked out of the war with 22 Sailors killed and 45 wounded. With little radar warning and no visual sighting of the attackers until they were practically upon the ships (despite bright moonlight), the slow-moving wood and fabric biplanes – dubbed “sticks-’n’-string kamikazes” – were the functional equivalent of today’s sophisticated stealth aircraft.

Furthermore, a third destroyer, USS Prichett, was similarly struck while assisting Callaghan. Although two of Prichett’s Sailors were killed and the ship suffered extensive damage, it was able to continue performing its radar picket mission duty of providing early warning of approaching Japanese aircraft to the main U.S. fleet assembled many miles to the south.

Out of three aircraft sent, every single one hit their target and two of the three sunk or crippled their target. That's 100% successful strike ratio and 66% kill/cripple ratio within the 100% ratio. Why is this important?

After Okinawa, however, the Japanese high command had more pressing concerns than aircraft design – the imminence of a U.S. invasion of Japan’s home islands. In expectation of a fall 1945 invasion, the Japan ese devised a simple method for the immediate organization of fully equipped and completely staffed“Special Attack”(kamikaze) formations – they assigned existing training units to the suicide mission. This mid-July mass conversion of training units into combat units not only added thousands of experienced flight instructors, but also 5,400 largely wood and fabric trainer planes plus other outmoded aircraft types containing varying amounts of wooden construction. U.S. intelligence analysts speculated on what the Japanese were up to; but perhaps because they perceived Japan’s interest in wood as related to its perpetual aluminum shortage, the Americans made no connection to the fact that the sputtering antiques were nearly impervious to some of America’s most state-of-the-art technologies – early warning radar and the VT (variable time or “proximity”) anti-aircraft artillery projectile fuze, which used radio waves reflected off a target to detonate the projectile at the optimum distance to achieve maximum explosive impact.

Of the 6,255 Kamikazes, 5,400 were the same type of wooden aircraft as described above. I've been generous in assuming they would only achieve a 6:1 rate of expenditure-the same as Okinawa overall instead for the specific aircraft types record. If you want to use the actual rate as just shown, that'd be almost 6,000 successful hits with over 4,000 sinkings and cripplings among the ships.....but they only had 1,000 APDs to strike, which really says it all, no?

With regards to the pilots, if you have a source to the contrary, please cite it because the fact of the matter is Japan did have the trained pilots for this as I've already repeatedly said:

The Japanese, who throughout the war were slow to grasp the potentials and weaknesses of radar, did not realize how dynamic the “wooden windfall” they had stumbled upon truly was. In fact, the Japanese air staff ’s decision to launch the biplanes in night attacks (when U.S. radar was the only practical means of detecting approaching aircraft) was based solely on the desire to use darkness to mask the biplanes’ lumbering approach, not on any comprehension of their low radar signature “stealth” advantage. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the brilliant successes scored against Callaghan and Cassin Young, the combination of “stealth” wooden biplanes with 2,450 of the 18,600 remaining Japanese pilots qualified for twilight and night missions was a potentially deadly turn of events for the American Sailors, Marines and Soldiers at sea.

One third of 2,450 is ~820 sinkings, for the record. That would be 80% of the invasion fleet's transports sunk on it's own, not even counting in the other almost 4,000 Kamikazes...

You've spoke of counter-measures, but as Gianreco notes specifically:

However, using the modified fuzes effectively in combat would have been extraordinarily difficult. The complexities that this new threat added to both radar detection and fire control would have been enormous as harried Combat Information Center (CIC) personnel scrambled to make instant life-or-death decisions as to whether or not the approaching aircraft was of wooden construction and then rush to orally transfer this absolutely essential firing information to gunnery officers in the anti-aircraft gun turrets. Although the lumbering biplanes would have stood no chance during daylight, a night “stealth” attack – particularly if launched with a mix of slow-moving wooden biplanes and faster modern metal aircraft to confuse CIC personnel – had already proved deadly to U.S. warships and their crews.

So no, according the author there was no easy fix. How about suppression raids, as you also talked about? Gianreco also answers that too:

Attacks on Japanese air bases by the Pacific Fleet’s Night Air Group 90, flying from USS Enterprise, had proved their worth; but the mass employment of kamikazes and conventional aircraft would have far outstripped the ability of even two such air groups (the maximum number that could be made available for Operation Olympic) to suppress the hordes. Any efforts by U.S. air elements that dampened down, or completely removed, hostile aircraft from the equation would have saved lives, but every American Sailor understood that it eventually would come down to ship against plane and that the odds that he and his buddies would survive to reach “the Golden Gate in ’48” were not looking good.

So again, we see I've been very, very conservative in my estimates. If you want to apply the 6:1 ratio against solely the night pilots, that's still 408 strikes alone, of which 272 result in sinkings or crippled vessels; that's almost 30% of the invasion fleet gone before they even have a chance to unload their supplies and troops. Remember, too, this also leaves almost 4,000 other Kamikazes for strikes too. This is why it's important, as I said earlier, to read the details and not cherry pick on top of that. Math tells the tale here quite well, no?

As for the matter of food, again, you need to read what I posted. To re-quote:

The potential problems relating to keeping the population of occupied Kyushu fed and relatively healthy during an invasion, however, paled in comparison with those faced elsewhere in Japan after the surrender, and began as early as the winter of 1945–46. Agricultural experts within the U.S. Military calculated in 1944 that there would be enough food available to sustain the population on a subsistence level but had correctly foreseen that “the possibility of localized famines beginning within the first few months of 1946 was a very real possibility.” 15 Some factors, such as the willingness, or unwillingness, of Tokyo and the prefectoral governments to feed millions of “excess mouths” not directly contributing to the war effort, could not be known. U.S. military and civilian officials privy to Magic intercepts duly took note, however, that the anguished warnings by the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Sato Naotake—including that if the fall 1945 harvest failed the nation would face “absolute famine”—were disdainfully rejected by his superiors. 16 It was also clear that a disruption of the rail system by U.S. air power plus the growing number of refugees would likely collapse the system and that “we’d eventually have to pick up the pieces.” 17

According to the U.S. military advisers themselves, those in the rural areas and overall the vast majority of the population would be at a subsistence diet; they're fine. How about what the Japanese said?

Obviously some historians enthusiasm for the point they are trying to make has gotten the better of them since the reduced nutritional value of meals is somewhat different than imminent starvation. But the life-and-death question for a family that might well find itself in one of the areas of “localized famine” within as few as six months was how would the militarists in charge of their prefecture or district, who essentially believed that the population was expendable, allot the dwindling food supplies in the midst of an invasion? One indication of what likely would have transpired came from future prime minister Yoshida Shigeru, who before war-surplus food stocks from across the Pacific were rushed to Japan stated in January 1946 that as many as 10 million might die of starvation and malnutrition in “spot famines” that were forecast to begin by the summer of that year.

The Japanese themselves said malnutrition and starvation would be limited in spot famines, same as the U.S. and that the deaths would begin in the Summer of 1946. Just to really drive the point home:

Japan would indeed have become “a nation without cities,” as urban populations suffered grievously under the weight of Allied bombing, but over half the population during the war lived and worked on farms. 20 Back then the system of price supports that has encouraged Japanese farmers today to convert practically every square foot of their land to rice cultivation did not exist. There was more food available in rural areas than is generally understood as wheat was widely grown, and large vegetable gardens were a standard feature of a family’s land. 21 Food reserves existed that were largely unaccounted for immediately after the war because responsibility for the storage and distribution of strategic stocks had been moved from national to principally prefectoral control in April due to the anticipated destruction of the transportation system (see chapter 7), and farmers had begun to hoard their crops in contravention of government directives.

Over half of the nation is farmers and they've already started hoarding their food supplies, with localized control of existing stockpiles already being put into place by IGHQ by April of 1945. In other words, they're fine and they have the stocks already moved so further U.S. bombings won't do anything. 10 million casualties, by the way, spread out from Summer of 1945 to the Summer of 1947 is about a similar level of loss as that experienced by the USSR or China. China didn't starve over the entire course of that entire eight years; as usual, famines come in waves or set timeframes, not consistently. If you compare them on a reasonable objective standard of reference, you see this. By all means, however, cite any sources in contradiction if you so wish.

Finally, the argument wasn't that the Japanese population would be pressured into suicide, but that they would not desire to surrender to the Americans anymore than the Soviets did to the Germans for most of the war because, by their own actions, they viewed the Americans as the same the Soviets did the Germans. Unlike the Soviets, however, Japanese civilian populations showed a fanaticism that the Soviets never did; I know of no mass suicides conducted in the USSR in response to the German invasion. I also don't understand how one can make the claim the Japanese Army could not instill a similar dedication in the Home Islands despite the fact that, as you note, 77,000 IJA soldiers in Okinawa did and given the fact the IJA has 990,000 soldiers on Kyushu by D-Day in October of 1945. In short, the military can and will hold the civilians in line. 

[stevep]

   EwellHolmes ,

  I have read the article you linked.  I'm just pointing out dubious points in your argument.

  Note for your figures you get that 1-1 ratio by excluding local militia and by taking the largest possible figure from the range of estimates so your taking the worst case scenario to fit your assumption.  As such your assumption that it will inevitably be a 1-1 ratio as for Okinawa is on thin ground.  For Iwo Jima because of the initial actions of the Japanese commander the US took more casualties than the Japanese, some 26k compared to ~18k but that's not 2-1 and of course the majority were wounded, a lot of which are likely to be minor injuries.  Furthermore I assume that some of those would be sailors in the ships at sea so your double counting there.  Its possibly that an about 1-1 ratio might be achieved in an invasion of the mainland, provided that the Japanese stay strictly on the defensive although with the much greater force density the allied firepower is likely to be more effective in terms of kills per shell.

  A lot of the civilians killed in Okinawa were by Japanese soldiers or under pressure from them to commit suicide.  Others probably were genuine suicides. 

  I again ask, in those attacks on 3DD how many a/c were actually used?  Its no good saying they were hit by three a/c.  How many others were sent out and failed to find target or crashed due to problems?

  Steve

[EwellHolmes]

Oct 3, 2020 10:57:06 GMT stevep said:

   EwellHolmes ,

  I have read the article you linked.  I'm just pointing out dubious points in your argument.

  Note for your figures you get that 1-1 ratio by excluding local militia and by taking the largest possible figure from the range of estimates so your taking the worst case scenario to fit your assumption.  As such your assumption that it will inevitably be a 1-1 ratio as for Okinawa is on thin ground.  For Iwo Jima because of the initial actions of the Japanese commander the US took more casualties than the Japanese, some 26k compared to ~18k but that's not 2-1 and of course the majority were wounded, a lot of which are likely to be minor injuries.  Furthermore I assume that some of those would be sailors in the ships at sea so your double counting there.  Its possibly that an about 1-1 ratio might be achieved in an invasion of the mainland, provided that the Japanese stay strictly on the defensive although with the much greater force density the allied firepower is likely to be more effective in terms of kills per shell.

  A lot of the civilians killed in Okinawa were by Japanese soldiers or under pressure from them to commit suicide.  Others probably were genuine suicides. 

  I again ask, in those attacks on 3DD how many a/c were actually used?  Its no good saying they were hit by three a/c.  How many others were sent out and failed to find target or crashed due to problems?

  Steve

U.S. casualties estimates from Okinawa range from 75,000 to 84,000 while we know for a fact Japanese military personnel were 77,000 so no, I'm not taking the highest number and actually included the full range of casualties when I made the last post. Given that of the range of U.S. casualty estimates, 80% are above the total Japanese force on the island, it's extremely fair to say casualties were 1:1 there. If you wish to include the civilians impressed into service, sure, but that leads to the uncomfortable fact that around one million were expected at Kyushu from the population, meaning you now have 700,000 Americans facing off against almost two million Japanese; that is a no win situation no matter how you dice it based on the Okinawa experience. There is a reason Major Arens, who was involved in the planning of the campaign, later stated that the invasion was doomed to fail when the full scope of Japanese preparations came into general knowledge immediately after the war.

Again, you continuously assert that American firepower would somehow make up for this except we no it didn't at Iwo Jima, at Okinawa, and other various late stages of the war because the Japanese had figured out American tactics and devised their own counters. The popular perception of Japanese soldiers mindless charging into American firepower is a racist notion derived from war time propaganda with no real basis in the lived realities of both sides by 1945. At Okinawa, for example-not just Iwo Jima as you seem to believe-the Japanese fought a layered defense which was how they inflicted such high losses on the Americans. See the The Pinnacle, the Shuri Line, Machinato line and the Kiyan line.

In particular, one should pay special attention to the actions on Kakazu Ridge, such as how the largest bombardment of the Pacific War failed to route the Japanese defenders:

The 27th Infantry Division—which had landed on April 9—took over on the right, along the west coast of Okinawa. General John R. Hodge now had three divisions in the line, with the 96th in the middle, and the 7th to the east, with each division holding a front of only about 1.5 mi (2.4 km). Hodge launched a new offensive of April 19 with a barrage of 324 guns, the largest ever in the Pacific Ocean Theater. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers joined the bombardment, which was followed by 650 Navy and Marine planes attacking the enemy positions with napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine guns. The Japanese defenses were sited on reverse slopes, where the defenders waited out the artillery barrage and aerial attack in relative safety, emerging from the caves to rain mortar rounds and grenades upon the Americans advancing up the forward slope.

Now ask yourself, with this in mind, how exactly U.S. firepower was supposed to beat the Japanese on Kyushu, especially given that the overwhelming majority of the Island was beyond naval gunfire range-the first time this had happened in the Pacific War for the Marines. Further:

A tank assault to achieve breakthrough by outflanking Kakazu Ridge failed to link up with its infantry support attempting to cross the ridge, and therefore failed with the loss of 22 tanks. Although flame tanks cleared many cave defenses, there was no breakthrough, and the XXIV Corps suffered 720 casualties. The losses might have been greater except for the fact that the Japanese had practically all of their infantry reserves tied up farther south, held there by another feint off the Minatoga beaches by the 2nd Marine Division that coincided with the attack.

Notice how Japanese tactics had been refined to the extent they could and did break American armored attacks at a high cost to the latter. Again, there is a reason why the Japanese were inflicting such high casualties and why every single estimate by the War Department and the like were predicting insanely high losses to the Japanese. Would it surprise you to know that, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Japanese were a more effective enemy than the Germans were/had been? Compare the formulas for expected casualties the JCS had come up with before Okinawa:

"Pacific Experience" - 1.95 dead and missing and 7.45 total casualties/1,000 men/day
"European Experience" - 0.42 dead and missing and 2.16 total casualties/1,000 men/day

Clearly, Japanese tactics worked in terms of causing mass losses for the U.S. on the whole of the war. Also of note here is, while you think I'm double counting losses with the estimates, I'm actually not; the JCS ratio does not included personnel losses at sea from Japanese air attacks nor does it include losses to civilian militias. Of note about the terminology here, you brought up wounded but I've been saying casualty the whole time, which is an all encompassing term for killed, missing, captured, wounded, etc. The U.S. was not expecting much return on the wounded:

• In July MacArthur's Intelligence Chief, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, warned of between 210,000 and 280,000 battle casualties in the push to the "stop line" one-third of the way up Kyushu. Even when rounded down to a conservative 200,000, this figure implied a total of nearly 500,000 all-causes losses, of whom perhaps 50,000 might return to duty after light to moderate care.
• The US Sixth Army, the formation tasked with carrying out the major land fighting on Kyushu, estimated a figure of 394,859 casualties serious enough to be permanently removed from unit roll calls during the first 120 days on Kyushu, barely enough to avoid outstripping the planned replacement stream.

Although medicine was advancing, it's important to recall that one third of wounded even as late as WWII tended to die from their wounds, and this is exclusive of those who managed to survive but were too badly wounded to return to frontline duty.

Finally, let's address once again the question of the aircraft on the destroyers:

Just when the U.S. Pacific Fleet was feeling confident it could handle the developing suicide attack threat, the Japanese succeeded in trading a single, antiquated biplane for an American warship – two nights in a row. First, the night of July 28-29, the destroyer USS Callaghan was hit and sunk with the loss of 47 dead and 73 wounded. The following night, the destroyer USS Cassin Young was struck and knocked out of the war with 22 Sailors killed and 45 wounded. With little radar warning and no visual sighting of the attackers until they were practically upon the ships (despite bright moonlight), the slow-moving wood and fabric biplanes – dubbed “sticks-’n’-string kamikazes” – were the functional equivalent of today’s sophisticated stealth aircraft.

One aircraft was used in each attack, with three attacks conducted over the course of three nights and each one successfully hitting its target. U.S.S. Callaghan was sunk and U.S.S. Cassin Young was so crippled, it was required to leave the battlefield for repairs that lasted the rest of the war. Again, the math is telling here given the Japanese had 2,450 night/twilight qualified pilots drawn from experienced training cadres and 5,440 aircraft of the same "Stealth" capability.

[stevep]

   EwellHolmes ,

  US losses at Okinawa may have been between 75,000 to 84,000 in the sources you referred to but as I say there are a lot of differing opinions.  You may have a point in the local militia units but they still had to be counted as armed opponents and obviously killed so they can't be ignored.  The Japanese had a lot of primitively armed civilians in some of their plans for home defence but how effective are they going to be compared to the task of supplying them?  Especially if they basically sit in prepared defences as your proposing.  The US forces can basically screen and ignore them other than in those areas they decide to attack in, where it does sound like things will be very tough for both sides.

  In terms of daily combat losses part of the difference is likely to be that fighting in Europe was often fairly continuous on a broad front while in the Pacific it was often in intense spurts.  Expect daily loss rates to be above those in Europe but they could well be some way less than those previously seen in the Pacific over the extended campaign.

  Thanks for clarifying about the single a/c attacks that they were exactly that, not a number of a/c send out and only some found targets.  That won't be occurring here as the Japanese don't have the time to dribble forces out in large numbers, so there will be more massive attacks, which may well overwhelm the defences in some places but will also make such targeting more difficult as with a large number of Japanese a/c in the air there are going to be accidents and cases where multiple a/c go for the same targets.

  As I say the invasion could well be defeated, but I'm not as complacent as you that its an automatic defeat as that's so rarely the case in something as complex as modern warfare.  Plus its going to be hugely costly for the Japanese as well and going to consume a lot of resources they can't replace so its not something they can repeat against any later invasion.  Even ignoring the other losses and damage that will be inflicted on Japan in the interim.

  Steve