WI: Neutral U.S. in World War I (No USW in 1917)

[EwellHolmes]

Something of a follow on to my No Lend Lease in World War II thread, but this time looking at World War I.

The German decision to commit to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in 1917 was almost solely at the discretion of the new junta of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who did so with the support of the Navy but at virtually the disagreement of all civilian authorities and, indeed, many of the Army itself; in this regard, it's safe to say it was not an inevitable decision. Let us thus say that Ludendorff dies in 1914 in Belgium, as nearly happened, and as a result we get either Hindenburg with a different fellow traveller, an entirely different duo, or, perhaps, Falkenhayn manages to stubbornly cling onto power and thus keep his rule. As a result there is no USW and thus no extension of further credit to the Entente in 1917 by the Americans. This results in the Entente collapsing by June of 1917 at the latest, as they are unable to continue the war without American credit and, thus, supplies.

Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality
 by Patrick Devlin reveals, on Page 576, that the German peace plan notes in late 1916 were favorable in Wilson's mind and he hoped the Entente would agree to them. They called for the restoration of the German border in the West but with the annexation of Luxembourg and undefined border adjustments with France (Presumably Briey-Longwy and the Vosges brought under German control), "guarantees" from Belgium, annexations in the Baltics and the creation of the Kingdom of Poland under a Habsburg. Reparations from France were discussed but undefined in context and clearly were meant as a simple starting position to be hammered out in an actual peace conference.

[stevep]

Sept 7, 2020 2:09:21 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Something of a follow on to my No Lend Lease in World War II thread, but this time looking at World War I.

The German decision to commit to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in 1917 was almost solely at the discretion of the new junta of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who did so with the support of the Navy but at virtually the disagreement of all civilian authorities and, indeed, many of the Army itself; in this regard, it's safe to say it was not an inevitable decision. Let us thus say that Ludendorff dies in 1914 in Belgium, as nearly happened, and as a result we get either Hindenburg with a different fellow traveller, an entirely different duo, or, perhaps, Falkenhayn manages to stubbornly cling onto power and thus keep his rule. As a result there is no USW and thus no extension of further credit to the Entente in 1917 by the Americans. This results in the Entente collapsing by June of 1917 at the latest, as they are unable to continue the war without American credit and, thus, supplies.

Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality
 by Patrick Devlin reveals, on Page 576, that the German peace plan notes in late 1916 were favorable in Wilson's mind and he hoped the Entente would agree to them. They called for the restoration of the German border in the West but with the annexation of Luxembourg and undefined border adjustments with France (Presumably Briey-Longwy and the Vosges brought under German control), "guarantees" from Belgium, annexations in the Baltics and the creation of the Kingdom of Poland under a Habsburg. Reparations from France were discussed but undefined in context and clearly were meant as a simple starting position to be hammered out in an actual peace conference.

  That assumes that nothing else changes.  Without Ludendorff, who was very much the brains of the team, is there the same attacks on Russia in 1915 that did so much damage?  If not and the Germans are throwing forces at the more powerful western defences both sides would lose more forces but its going to be a real mincer for the Germans.  Giving Russia the time to rebuild after its early losses and keep up the pressure on a staggering Austria.  If that pressure is continuing while Italy joins the war and Serbia is still fighting then things are going to get worse for Austria and you could see it, especially after Franz Joseph dies either collapse or make a separate peace, or at the very least require substantial German support.

  If Falkenhayn isn't distracted by Ludendorff's pressure in the east and fights a Verdun type battle in 1915 in the west he will lose position as OTL so there will be a different head of the Germany General Staff.  Don't know who it would be or what policies he will have but we will be facing a different war.

  There is a factual error in your argument.  This was the 3rd time Germany went for USW and it was strongly backed by much of the navy so wasn't solely a decision by Ludendorff.  He and the growing extreme feeling in Germany made them decide to stick to the policy this time and hence was a factor in the US dow.  This might or might not have happened in an alternative TL but again if Germany doesn't go for it a lot of pressure is off the allies.

  Wilson has never impressed me much with his judgement but if he actually thought that the allies would accept such an unbalanced treaty he was delusional. 

[EwellHolmes]

Sept 7, 2020 15:28:53 GMT stevep said:

Sept 7, 2020 2:09:21 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Something of a follow on to my No Lend Lease in World War II thread, but this time looking at World War I.

The German decision to commit to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in 1917 was almost solely at the discretion of the new junta of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who did so with the support of the Navy but at virtually the disagreement of all civilian authorities and, indeed, many of the Army itself; in this regard, it's safe to say it was not an inevitable decision. Let us thus say that Ludendorff dies in 1914 in Belgium, as nearly happened, and as a result we get either Hindenburg with a different fellow traveller, an entirely different duo, or, perhaps, Falkenhayn manages to stubbornly cling onto power and thus keep his rule. As a result there is no USW and thus no extension of further credit to the Entente in 1917 by the Americans. This results in the Entente collapsing by June of 1917 at the latest, as they are unable to continue the war without American credit and, thus, supplies.

Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality
 by Patrick Devlin reveals, on Page 576, that the German peace plan notes in late 1916 were favorable in Wilson's mind and he hoped the Entente would agree to them. They called for the restoration of the German border in the West but with the annexation of Luxembourg and undefined border adjustments with France (Presumably Briey-Longwy and the Vosges brought under German control), "guarantees" from Belgium, annexations in the Baltics and the creation of the Kingdom of Poland under a Habsburg. Reparations from France were discussed but undefined in context and clearly were meant as a simple starting position to be hammered out in an actual peace conference.

  That assumes that nothing else changes.  Without Ludendorff, who was very much the brains of the team, is there the same attacks on Russia in 1915 that did so much damage?  If not and the Germans are throwing forces at the more powerful western defences both sides would lose more forces but its going to be a real mincer for the Germans.  Giving Russia the time to rebuild after its early losses and keep up the pressure on a staggering Austria.  If that pressure is continuing while Italy joins the war and Serbia is still fighting then things are going to get worse for Austria and you could see it, especially after Franz Joseph dies either collapse or make a separate peace, or at the very least require substantial German support.

  If Falkenhayn isn't distracted by Ludendorff's pressure in the east and fights a Verdun type battle in 1915 in the west he will lose position as OTL so there will be a different head of the Germany General Staff.  Don't know who it would be or what policies he will have but we will be facing a different war.

  There is a factual error in your argument.  This was the 3rd time Germany went for USW and it was strongly backed by much of the navy so wasn't solely a decision by Ludendorff.  He and the growing extreme feeling in Germany made them decide to stick to the policy this time and hence was a factor in the US dow.  This might or might not have happened in an alternative TL but again if Germany doesn't go for it a lot of pressure is off the allies.

  Wilson has never impressed me much with his judgement but if he actually thought that the allies would accept such an unbalanced treaty he was delusional. 

Nothing would change, as Max Hoffman had already laid the success of the German offensives in 1914 and would likely be Hidenberg's CoS. 1915 was driven by the events in the East, with Falkenhayn personally coming East to handle the operations, given the extreme threat of a Russian breakthrough into the Carpathians. In short, the war would proceed with minimal differences. With regards to what I said, you left out the rest of that sentence:

"The German decision to commit to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in 1917 was almost solely at the discretion of the new junta of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who did so with the support of the Navy but at virtually the disagreement of all civilian authorities and, indeed, many of the Army itself; in this regard, it's safe to say it was not an inevitable decision."

With regards to Wilson, he knew the Entente would either be forced to accept it or they would collapse and the Germans could then enforce whatever they desired upon them and there would be nothing they could do to stop it.

[stevep]

Sept 7, 2020 22:28:28 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Sept 7, 2020 15:28:53 GMT stevep said:

  That assumes that nothing else changes.  Without Ludendorff, who was very much the brains of the team, is there the same attacks on Russia in 1915 that did so much damage?  If not and the Germans are throwing forces at the more powerful western defences both sides would lose more forces but its going to be a real mincer for the Germans.  Giving Russia the time to rebuild after its early losses and keep up the pressure on a staggering Austria.  If that pressure is continuing while Italy joins the war and Serbia is still fighting then things are going to get worse for Austria and you could see it, especially after Franz Joseph dies either collapse or make a separate peace, or at the very least require substantial German support.

  If Falkenhayn isn't distracted by Ludendorff's pressure in the east and fights a Verdun type battle in 1915 in the west he will lose position as OTL so there will be a different head of the Germany General Staff.  Don't know who it would be or what policies he will have but we will be facing a different war.

  There is a factual error in your argument.  This was the 3rd time Germany went for USW and it was strongly backed by much of the navy so wasn't solely a decision by Ludendorff.  He and the growing extreme feeling in Germany made them decide to stick to the policy this time and hence was a factor in the US dow.  This might or might not have happened in an alternative TL but again if Germany doesn't go for it a lot of pressure is off the allies.

  Wilson has never impressed me much with his judgement but if he actually thought that the allies would accept such an unbalanced treaty he was delusional. 

Nothing would change, as Max Hoffman had already laid the success of the German offensives in 1914 and would likely be Hidenberg's CoS. 1915 was driven by the events in the East, with Falkenhayn personally coming East to handle the operations, given the extreme threat of a Russian breakthrough into the Carpathians. In short, the war would proceed with minimal differences. With regards to what I said, you left out the rest of that sentence:

"The German decision to commit to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in 1917 was almost solely at the discretion of the new junta of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who did so with the support of the Navy but at virtually the disagreement of all civilian authorities and, indeed, many of the Army itself; in this regard, it's safe to say it was not an inevitable decision."

With regards to Wilson, he knew the Entente would either be forced to accept it or they would collapse and the Germans could then enforce whatever they desired upon them and there would be nothing they could do to stop it.

  So your saying Ludendorff is vital when you want him to be and utterly irrelevant when you want him to be.  My comments stand.  The Germans had tried USW twice before and after the check at Jutland and with no signs of success in either east or west their likely to go for the policy again at some point.

  Furthermore your again working under the belief that the option of importing so much from the US is a necessity.  By this time Britain and France had both ramped up their own production of war materials substantially, which was why they were able to equip so much of the US forces OTL.  Food and oil are issues but can be imported from other areas, especially without the OTL slaughter of MS.  It will cause problems but isn't going to cause an allied collapse.  [At least not in the west, the problems in the east are still likely to occur although even here the Bolshevik coup might well be avoided.]  Ludendorff's stupidity worsened the social crisis inside Germany by totally ignoring the needs of people at home but it was still dire even before he gained power.

[EwellHolmes]

Sept 8, 2020 11:43:02 GMT stevep said:

Sept 7, 2020 22:28:28 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Nothing would change, as Max Hoffman had already laid the success of the German offensives in 1914 and would likely be Hidenberg's CoS. 1915 was driven by the events in the East, with Falkenhayn personally coming East to handle the operations, given the extreme threat of a Russian breakthrough into the Carpathians. In short, the war would proceed with minimal differences. With regards to what I said, you left out the rest of that sentence:

"The German decision to commit to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in 1917 was almost solely at the discretion of the new junta of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who did so with the support of the Navy but at virtually the disagreement of all civilian authorities and, indeed, many of the Army itself; in this regard, it's safe to say it was not an inevitable decision."

With regards to Wilson, he knew the Entente would either be forced to accept it or they would collapse and the Germans could then enforce whatever they desired upon them and there would be nothing they could do to stop it.

  So your saying Ludendorff is vital when you want him to be and utterly irrelevant when you want him to be.  My comments stand.  The Germans had tried USW twice before and after the check at Jutland and with no signs of success in either east or west their likely to go for the policy again at some point.

  Furthermore your again working under the belief that the option of importing so much from the US is a necessity.  By this time Britain and France had both ramped up their own production of war materials substantially, which was why they were able to equip so much of the US forces OTL.  Food and oil are issues but can be imported from other areas, especially without the OTL slaughter of MS.  It will cause problems but isn't going to cause an allied collapse.  [At least not in the west, the problems in the east are still likely to occur although even here the Bolshevik coup might well be avoided.]  Ludendorff's stupidity worsened the social crisis inside Germany by totally ignoring the needs of people at home but it was still dire even before he gained power.

I did not make such a claim; I said Ludendorff was not the decisive factor in German success in 1914-a sentiment backed by historians-but he (and Hindenburg) were the decisive factor in bringing about USW in 1917 given they were appointed as the heads of the German military at that time. If you disagree with this, the onerous is on you to prove it, but I've already provided citations that showed that most outside of the Navy were opposed to such a policy. I therefore do not see it as inevitable and I do not see any compelling evidence to suggest this would not be the case.

The idea that the Entente would collapse is not the result of personal speculation but born of citing the internal documents of the Allies themselves. In particular, my assertions are directly drawn from the internal memorandum created by an interdepartmental committee of the Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade, Admiralty, Board of Agriculture, Ministry of Munitions, War Office, and Colonial Office in late 1916 that stressed the U.S. was critical and could end the war imminently. This is not me saying such, this is me literally quoting the British verbatim on this subject. The Command of Gold Reversed: American Loans to Britain, 1915-1917 by John Milton Cooper, Jr., Pacific Historical Review , May, 1976, Vol. 45, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 209-230:

The interdepartmental committee made a shocking discovery. The chairman, Lord Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office, reported, ". .. it developed at once at the conference that there was really nothing to deliberate about because our dependence was so vital and complete in every respect that it was folly even to consider reprisals." The committee had found that in food, raw materials, and particularly steel, "American supplies are so necessary to us that reprisals, while they would produce tremendous distress in America, would also practically stop the war." Even worse, in order to finance the war orders, the Treasury had to "find something over ?2,000,000 sterling a day in New York." By March 1917, British reserves of gold and securities would be gone. "Now, in these circumstances," wrote Percy, "our job is not merely to maintain decently friendly relations with the United States, but to keep sentiment in America so sweet that it will lend us practically unlimited money." No record was kept of the discussion that produced those conclusions, but it is not hard to guess what happened at the meeting. The Treasury representative to the committee was Keynes, and Percy's comments on finance recapitulated views that Keynes had often expressed. Not only was Keynes the best in-formed person about the American situation on the committee, but throughout his adult life the economist's quick mind and ready turn of phrase made him excel in swaying small groups of experts. The interdepartmental committee, it would seem, furnished an ideal forum for the Treasury's brilliant Cassandra.'4​

​

At the end of October 1916, the Foreign Office circulated three sets of documents from the committee to the Cabinet. These included a resolution against reprisals, a memorandum by Percy urging conciliation toward the United States, and papers on British dependence by different departments. The most incisive arguments came in the Treasury paper prepared by Keynes. Dwindling stocks of gold and securities could meet less and less of the financial requirements, he noted. More and more money would therefore have to come from loans. But loans carried great dangers. "A statement," Keynes warned, "from the United States executive deprecating or disapproving of such loans would render their flotation in sufficient volume a practical impossibility." Even official approval, he further warned, might not be enough. "The sums which this country will require to borrow in the United States of America in the next six to nine months are so enormous, amounting to several times the national debt of that country, that it will be necessary to appeal to every class and section of the investing public." Keynes's conclusion was chilling: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that In a few months time the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more dearly than them.""5​

​

Lord Percy himself said it would end the war and Keynes put a timeframe of that as a few months; this meshes perfectly with Tooze and others noting the UK was going to run out of collateral sometime in April of 1917. I fail to see how an Entente collapse would not follow the cessation of such critical supplies as food, oil and shells reaching not only the front lines, but the home front too. Speaking of Tooze, to quote from The Deluge by Adam Tooze, Pages 51-55:

Throughout October 1916 the banking house J. P. Morgan was in urgent discussions with the British and the French over the future of Allied finance. For their next season of campaigning, the Entente proposed to raise at least 1.5 billion dollars. Realizing the enormity of these sums, J. P. Morgan sought reassurance both from the Federal Reserve Board and from Wilson himself. None was forthcoming.3 As Election Day on 7 November approached, Wilson began drafting a public statement to be delivered by the governor of the Federal Reserve Board warning the American public against committing any more of their savings to Entente loans.4 On 27 November 1916, four days before J. P. Morgan planned to launch the Anglo-French bond issue, the Federal Reserve Board issued instructions to all member banks. In the interest of the stability of the American financial system, the Fed announced that it no longer considered it desirable for American investors to increase their holdings of British and French securities.​

​

As Wall Street plunged and sterling was offloaded by speculators, J. P. Morgan and the UK Treasury were forced into emergency purchasing of sterling to prop up the British currency. 5 At the same time the British government was forced to suspend support of French purchasing.6 The Entente’s entire financing effort was in jeopardy. In Russia in the autumn of 1916 there was mounting resentment at the demand by Britain and France that it should ship its gold reserves to London to secure Allied borrowing. Without American assistance it was not just the patience of the financial markets but the Entente itself that would be put at risk.7 As the year ended, the war committee of the British cabinet concluded grimly that the only possible interpretation was that Wilson meant to force their hand and put an end to the war in a matter of weeks. And this ominous interpretation was reinforced when London received confirmation from its ambassador in Washington that it was indeed the President himself who had insisted on the strong wording of the Fed’s note. ​

Why is this decisive?

Given the huge demands made by the Entente on Wall Street in 1916, it is clear that opinion was already shifting against further massive loans to London and Paris ahead of the Fed’s announcement.8 But what the cabinet could not ignore was the open hostility of the American President. And Wilson was determined to raise the stakes. On 12 December the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, without stating Germany’s own aims, issued a pre-emptive demand for peace negotiations. Undaunted, on 18 December Wilson followed this with a ‘Peace Note’, calling on both sides to state what war aims could justify the continuation of the terrible slaughter. It was an open bid to delegitimize the war, all the more alarming for its coincidence with the initiative from Berlin.​

​

Wilson’s intervention was deeply embarrassing, but to the Entente’s relief the Central Powers took the initiative in rejecting the President’s offer of mediation. This freed the Entente to issue their own, carefully worded statement of war aims on 10 January. These demanded the evacuation of Belgium and Serbia, and the return of Alsace Lorraine, but more ambitiously they insisted on self-determination for the oppressed peoples of both the Ottoman and Habsburg empires.14 It was a manifesto for continued war, not immediate negotiation, and it thus raised the inescapable question: how were these campaigns to be paid for? To cover purchases in the US running at $75 million per week, in January 1917 Britain could muster no more than $215 million in assets in New York. Beyond that, it would be forced to draw down on the Bank of England’s last remaining gold reserves, which would cover no more than six weeks of procurement.​

So we have, with no exaggeration, every single British department unanimously saying the lack of American supplies would end the war in, at most, June of 1917. Why would the British lie to themselves? Beyond that, we have every single historical book I can find that assessed American involvement in this aspect as saying it was decisive; I could only find one that would even suggest a stalemate-not even Entente victory-was possible, the rest saying the continuation of the war would've been impossible. So why, exactly, is the British Government of the time wrong and every Historian since then likewise too? Let's look at oil for example:




Remove the U.S. and there isn't even enough oil out there to sustain the UK, nevermind the French and Italians too. How exactly is the UK going to defeat the Germans with every one Entente power of note removed from the board? This is ignoring too the fact the Royal Navy is immobilized, the British isles are starving and they are too broke to buy essential war supplies.

[stevep]

   EwellHolmes ,

  As you say food and oil are the big issues and if Wilson was as intent on a German victory as you suggest it would have caused serious problems.  Presuming that such an unwise policy could get past Congress.  However this is the sort of reason why the allies would have to fight on.  German demands were so extreme that surrender was not a practical option.  Its possible that forced back only on their own resources the allies might have been defeated but its no where near as simplistic as your suggesting.  Britain and France were in a much better position in terms of their own production than Britain was in 1940.

  I'm dubious about the idea it was only Ludendorff and the navy that argued for the 3rd USW decision because of the sheer bitterness of the war at that time and the fact it seems to be the only way that Germany could hope to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.  Russia was still looking very strong and Britain was producing and training a mass army and Austria was increasingly crippled while Germany was facing exhaustion.

  Also your the one after all who posted in another thread that a German success in overrunning the French eastern Channel coast would have forced mass starvation in Britain on its own.  Should have thought of this earlier but there was an obvious flaw to that argument in that nothing like that happened in 1940 despite Germany overrunning all of France and being able with the development of air power to inflict heavy bombing attacks on Britain.

  Plus your ignoring butterflies:

a)  As I mentioned before no 3rd USW means a lot of allied shipping and materials aren't lost.

b)  You may have misunderstood what I said about Ludendorff in the east.  He wasn't the one who planned the counter attack at Tannenberg although he took credit for it.  However he was the driver for the 1915 offensives against Russia when Falkenhayn wanted more attacks in the west.  That would be a recipe for disaster with heavy losses in the west on both sides but with the allies having the advantage of defensive positions while Russia would be able to maintain pressure on Austria Hungary, probably forcing the latter's collapse.  At most some forces would be directed to keep Vienna in the war but your very unlikely to see the major attacks from Gorlice–Tarnów onward which did so much damage to the Russian army.

[EwellHolmes]

Sept 17, 2020 9:52:42 GMT stevep said:

   EwellHolmes ,

  As you say food and oil are the big issues and if Wilson was as intent on a German victory as you suggest it would have caused serious problems.  Presuming that such an unwise policy could get past Congress.  However this is the sort of reason why the allies would have to fight on.  German demands were so extreme that surrender was not a practical option.  Its possible that forced back only on their own resources the allies might have been defeated but its no where near as simplistic as your suggesting.  Britain and France were in a much better position in terms of their own production than Britain was in 1940.

  I'm dubious about the idea it was only Ludendorff and the navy that argued for the 3rd USW decision because of the sheer bitterness of the war at that time and the fact it seems to be the only way that Germany could hope to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.  Russia was still looking very strong and Britain was producing and training a mass army and Austria was increasingly crippled while Germany was facing exhaustion.

  Also your the one after all who posted in another thread that a German success in overrunning the French eastern Channel coast would have forced mass starvation in Britain on its own.  Should have thought of this earlier but there was an obvious flaw to that argument in that nothing like that happened in 1940 despite Germany overrunning all of France and being able with the development of air power to inflict heavy bombing attacks on Britain.

  Plus your ignoring butterflies:

a)  As I mentioned before no 3rd USW means a lot of allied shipping and materials aren't lost.

b)  You may have misunderstood what I said about Ludendorff in the east.  He wasn't the one who planned the counter attack at Tannenberg although he took credit for it.  However he was the driver for the 1915 offensives against Russia when Falkenhayn wanted more attacks in the west.  That would be a recipe for disaster with heavy losses in the west on both sides but with the allies having the advantage of defensive positions while Russia would be able to maintain pressure on Austria Hungary, probably forcing the latter's collapse.  At most some forces would be directed to keep Vienna in the war but your very unlikely to see the major attacks from Gorlice–Tarnów onward which did so much damage to the Russian army.

Okay, first, Wilson actually had the support of Congress and the Public in this, so that's not a concern. To quote from The Deluge by Adam Tooze, Pages 51-55:

Given the huge demands made by the Entente on Wall Street in 1916, it is clear that opinion was already shifting against further massive loans to London and Paris ahead of the Fed’s announcement.8 But what the cabinet could not ignore was the open hostility of the American President. And Wilson was determined to raise the stakes. On 12 December the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, without stating Germany’s own aims, issued a pre-emptive demand for peace negotiations. Undaunted, on 18 December Wilson followed this with a ‘Peace Note’, calling on both sides to state what war aims could justify the continuation of the terrible slaughter. It was an open bid to delegitimize the war, all the more alarming for its coincidence with the initiative from Berlin.​

As noted, Wilson thought the terms were light and the Entente could not, as a result, move to reject them out of hand until the Germans gave them an opening. If they attempt to fight on, they will lose and the Germans can then happily place upon them any terms they so desire. As Lord Percy and Keynes noted, if they attempt to fallback upon their own resources, then the war ends in July of 1917 as their own reports stated. Again, I cannot emphasis enough that there are no resources to fallback upon and this conclusion comes from every single department of the British government itself. It is also backed by every single historian I could find on the matter, so I ask again: why are they wrong? 

If you feel I am wrong about USW, the onerous is on you to prove otherwise as I've made my citation in this regard to show it was just Ludendorff and the Navy. Likewise, the suggestion that the Entente had the upperhand in early 1917 is unsupported by the previous citations in of themselves but, further, by a casual review of the situation that Spring. The French Army fails in the Neville Offensive and then has mass mutinies. The British have suffered the Somme just a few months ago, having gutted their Army. Russia, meanwhile, has collapsed into Revolution. This is not the picture of strength but here again, we need only look at the basic math. The British themselves said they could only last, at maximum, until July of 1917. We know Germany lasted until November of 1918. Basic math dictates who wins the war here and it isn't the Entente.

With regards to the matter of the Channel Ports, the answer is easy: experience and 20 years of adjustments. As a result of their World War I experiences, the British spent the interwar era doing capacity upgrades on their railway network that enabled it in WWII to handle the stress. This was non-existent, however, during World War I and thus the reasoning for what I said and quoted from historians. Again, if you feel otherwise, I welcome counter-citations.

Finally, let's address each point:

1) Ludendorff was not in a position of power or influence to make such a grand decision. Falkenhayn was the Supreme Commander and his decision to shift forces was based on the near Russian breakthrough into the Hungarian Plains the previous fall into that spring:

In fierce winter fighting General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the chief of staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army, attacked the Russians who had forced their way into the Carpathian passes in the south of Galicia. Both sides suffered appallingly, but the Russians held their line.[9] By this time half of the Austro-Hungarian Army that had entered the war were casualties. Conrad pleaded for additional German reinforcements to hold the passes. German Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn refused, but in April 1915 Conrad threatened a separate peace if the Germans would not help.[10] Conrad and Falkenhayn met and planned a joint strike on the Russian left flank at the far southern end of the Eastern Front, in the Gorlice-Tarnów front,130 km (81 mi) southeast of Kraków. A successful advance from there would force the Russians to retreat from the passes to save themselves from being cut off.

2) As for whether or not the British could survive non-USW, British shipbuilding in 1917 consisted of 1.16 million tons and in 1918 it was 1.35 million tons. Under Prize Rules, the U-Boats were able to sink 1,298,000 tons from October of 1916 to January of 1917. Averaged out, that comes to ~325,000 tons a month. From January of 1917 to January of 1918, this would've resulted in 3,894,000 tons lost to U-Boat action. In other words, From October of 1916 to January of 1918 in this ATL, total tonnage lost would've been 5,192,000!
In short, there was nothing the Entente could do to prevent being starved out without American entry, USW was irrelevant. 

[stevep]

EwellHolmes ,

   Lets see:-

a)  You say the problem was the growing hostility of the broader US political spectrum and then qoute Tooze who says "But what the cabinet could not ignore was the open hostility of the American President."  You also said that Wilson thought the terms were light but are now saying that the Germans didn't give any terms as opposed to the extreme demands you quoted earlier.

b)  You said "The French Army fails in the Neville Offensive and then has mass mutinies. The British have suffered the Somme just a few months ago, having gutted their Army."  The former is partially correct in that the French army saw turmoil about suicidal offensives and also the dire treatment of the troops with many not even had leave for years.  However they were still willing to fight against German attacks and Petain lead steps that answered many of their other issues.  The Somme was bloody for Britain but didn't gut the army.  There were a lot of mistakes as with every army but it was still growing stronger in terms of numbers and equipment.  There is an argument that Haig's stupidity at Passchendaele caused a lot of harm to the army but it still went on fighting, despite heavy losses then and in the early part on the 1918 campaign.  Its also frequently noted that the Somme also had a definite impact on the German army in terms of its confidence in its own superiority.

c)  Its been repeated noted, including in Lordroel's day by day thread how much Falkenhayn opposed the continued offensives in the east and was repeatedly overruled by the Kaiser.

d)  You said "Likewise, the suggestion that the Entente had the upperhand in early 1917".  As far as I'm aware I haven't made that suggestion, although it was unclear to most until the spring revolution occurred that Russia had potential weaknesses there.  Without Ludendorff's repeated offensive in the east in 1915 that could have changed things considerably in the allies favour.

e)  As far as I'm aware the railway network declined in size during the period of the early part of the 20thC and the government post-war didn't go in much if at all for any planning so the suggestion that it started a massive programme for such upgrades when Germany was looking no threat at all and the entire emphasis was on reducing government spending sounds very odd to me.  That the British economy could function successfully under far worse conditions in 1940 than your saying it would collapse in 1917 defies logic.

f)  Are you now saying that the 3rd USW session didn't increase allied losses at all?  Or not by any great degree?  Because that contradicts all the evidence I've seen.  Losses will still be heavy without it but markedly lower and sooner or later the allies will expand the use of convoying which will greatly improve matters.

  There were a lot of statements throughout this period that x,y,z was impossible.  Many had argued that if a major war broke out that it would end quickly because the economic and fiscal disruption resulting would force either peace or a collapse into chaos.  As such I can see a lot of people saying that such and such an event would cause disaster but that doesn't mean they are right, regardless of how knowledgeable they are in related areas.  By 1917 the western powers had a considerable economic and military infrastructure and faced with either utter defeat and domination by Germany or finding ways to fight on I see no reason why they couldn't do the latter.  It would mean problems and social changes but even if forced to fall back solely on their own economic base they can maintain powerful armies that the Germans can not defeat easily at all.  Especially if say a termination of the US trade in early 1917 prompts retrenchment in their actions and possibly Germany launching its own western offensives in 1917, which are likely to get mauled very badly.

  I'm not saying that in the scenario you propose, with the US deciding to terminate trade with the EPs they will still win.  Just that its not the walk over for the CPs that you propose.

  Steve

[EwellHolmes]

Sept 28, 2020 15:28:22 GMT stevep said:

EwellHolmes ,

   Lets see:-

a)  You say the problem was the growing hostility of the broader US political spectrum and then qoute Tooze who says "But what the cabinet could not ignore was the open hostility of the American President."  You also said that Wilson thought the terms were light but are now saying that the Germans didn't give any terms as opposed to the extreme demands you quoted earlier.

b)  You said "The French Army fails in the Neville Offensive and then has mass mutinies. The British have suffered the Somme just a few months ago, having gutted their Army."  The former is partially correct in that the French army saw turmoil about suicidal offensives and also the dire treatment of the troops with many not even had leave for years.  However they were still willing to fight against German attacks and Petain lead steps that answered many of their other issues.  The Somme was bloody for Britain but didn't gut the army.  There were a lot of mistakes as with every army but it was still growing stronger in terms of numbers and equipment.  There is an argument that Haig's stupidity at Passchendaele caused a lot of harm to the army but it still went on fighting, despite heavy losses then and in the early part on the 1918 campaign.  Its also frequently noted that the Somme also had a definite impact on the German army in terms of its confidence in its own superiority.

c)  Its been repeated noted, including in Lordroel's day by day thread how much Falkenhayn opposed the continued offensives in the east and was repeatedly overruled by the Kaiser.

d)  You said "Likewise, the suggestion that the Entente had the upperhand in early 1917".  As far as I'm aware I haven't made that suggestion, although it was unclear to most until the spring revolution occurred that Russia had potential weaknesses there.  Without Ludendorff's repeated offensive in the east in 1915 that could have changed things considerably in the allies favour.

e)  As far as I'm aware the railway network declined in size during the period of the early part of the 20thC and the government post-war didn't go in much if at all for any planning so the suggestion that it started a massive programme for such upgrades when Germany was looking no threat at all and the entire emphasis was on reducing government spending sounds very odd to me.  That the British economy could function successfully under far worse conditions in 1940 than your saying it would collapse in 1917 defies logic.

f)  Are you now saying that the 3rd USW session didn't increase allied losses at all?  Or not by any great degree?  Because that contradicts all the evidence I've seen.  Losses will still be heavy without it but markedly lower and sooner or later the allies will expand the use of convoying which will greatly improve matters.

  There were a lot of statements throughout this period that x,y,z was impossible.  Many had argued that if a major war broke out that it would end quickly because the economic and fiscal disruption resulting would force either peace or a collapse into chaos.  As such I can see a lot of people saying that such and such an event would cause disaster but that doesn't mean they are right, regardless of how knowledgeable they are in related areas.  By 1917 the western powers had a considerable economic and military infrastructure and faced with either utter defeat and domination by Germany or finding ways to fight on I see no reason why they couldn't do the latter.  It would mean problems and social changes but even if forced to fall back solely on their own economic base they can maintain powerful armies that the Germans can not defeat easily at all.  Especially if say a termination of the US trade in early 1917 prompts retrenchment in their actions and possibly Germany launching its own western offensives in 1917, which are likely to get mauled very badly.

  I'm not saying that in the scenario you propose, with the US deciding to terminate trade with the EPs they will still win.  Just that its not the walk over for the CPs that you propose.

  Steve

A) I'm not sure what you're attempting to argue there, as that exact quotation is about the British response to Wilson's movement against them, not the American cabinet's reaction? Likewise, the German terms weren't extreme; Wilson was an objective outside and thought them quite fair, as did the Entente, which is why, as Tooze notes, they couldn't reject them out of hand. You personally may think so, but the players at the time certainly didn't. I'm also not sure where you're getting the idea I've changed on anything because I haven't.

B) The French Army was incapable of offensive, the Russians were collapsing slowly and the British were gutted. The Germans had rebuffed all offensives and still held most of their gains, so that the Entente would gain no leverage from any of this in any negotiations. This also, again, doesn't change the basic strategic calculus of the Entente powers as previously cited: They can't fight on past July of 1917. 

C) Taking that at face value, then your point about the lack of Ludendorff is meaningless; the Kaiser will still force Falkenhayn to respond in the East with or without him (Ludendorff).

D) The above point you made shows nothing changes in this regard and it was clear the Russians were starting to fall apart; the Great Retreat had been in 1915 and by late 1916 unrest was starting to occur that outside observers were noting. The French Ambassador, in his diaries, notes of such by then.

E) They survived because they conducted capacity upgrades that allowed such. 

F)Between November of 1916 and January of 1917, the Germans sank more tonnage than the British would build in either 1917 or 1918. This prompted Admiral Beatty to remark on January 27th-four days before the start of USW-that the question of the war was now whether the Germans would blockade the British to peace before the Royal Navy could do the same to the Germans. Even without USW, the British themselves noted the Germans were winning and here they won't have American oil for their destroyers, American destroyers or American shipping output to make up for it. In short, if nothing else, this alone dooms the Entente war effort.

[stevep]

Sept 29, 2020 1:58:58 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Sept 28, 2020 15:28:22 GMT stevep said:

EwellHolmes ,

   Lets see:-

a)  You say the problem was the growing hostility of the broader US political spectrum and then qoute Tooze who says "But what the cabinet could not ignore was the open hostility of the American President."  You also said that Wilson thought the terms were light but are now saying that the Germans didn't give any terms as opposed to the extreme demands you quoted earlier.

b)  You said "The French Army fails in the Neville Offensive and then has mass mutinies. The British have suffered the Somme just a few months ago, having gutted their Army."  The former is partially correct in that the French army saw turmoil about suicidal offensives and also the dire treatment of the troops with many not even had leave for years.  However they were still willing to fight against German attacks and Petain lead steps that answered many of their other issues.  The Somme was bloody for Britain but didn't gut the army.  There were a lot of mistakes as with every army but it was still growing stronger in terms of numbers and equipment.  There is an argument that Haig's stupidity at Passchendaele caused a lot of harm to the army but it still went on fighting, despite heavy losses then and in the early part on the 1918 campaign.  Its also frequently noted that the Somme also had a definite impact on the German army in terms of its confidence in its own superiority.

c)  Its been repeated noted, including in Lordroel's day by day thread how much Falkenhayn opposed the continued offensives in the east and was repeatedly overruled by the Kaiser.

d)  You said "Likewise, the suggestion that the Entente had the upperhand in early 1917".  As far as I'm aware I haven't made that suggestion, although it was unclear to most until the spring revolution occurred that Russia had potential weaknesses there.  Without Ludendorff's repeated offensive in the east in 1915 that could have changed things considerably in the allies favour.

e)  As far as I'm aware the railway network declined in size during the period of the early part of the 20thC and the government post-war didn't go in much if at all for any planning so the suggestion that it started a massive programme for such upgrades when Germany was looking no threat at all and the entire emphasis was on reducing government spending sounds very odd to me.  That the British economy could function successfully under far worse conditions in 1940 than your saying it would collapse in 1917 defies logic.

f)  Are you now saying that the 3rd USW session didn't increase allied losses at all?  Or not by any great degree?  Because that contradicts all the evidence I've seen.  Losses will still be heavy without it but markedly lower and sooner or later the allies will expand the use of convoying which will greatly improve matters.

  There were a lot of statements throughout this period that x,y,z was impossible.  Many had argued that if a major war broke out that it would end quickly because the economic and fiscal disruption resulting would force either peace or a collapse into chaos.  As such I can see a lot of people saying that such and such an event would cause disaster but that doesn't mean they are right, regardless of how knowledgeable they are in related areas.  By 1917 the western powers had a considerable economic and military infrastructure and faced with either utter defeat and domination by Germany or finding ways to fight on I see no reason why they couldn't do the latter.  It would mean problems and social changes but even if forced to fall back solely on their own economic base they can maintain powerful armies that the Germans can not defeat easily at all.  Especially if say a termination of the US trade in early 1917 prompts retrenchment in their actions and possibly Germany launching its own western offensives in 1917, which are likely to get mauled very badly.

  I'm not saying that in the scenario you propose, with the US deciding to terminate trade with the EPs they will still win.  Just that its not the walk over for the CPs that you propose.

  Steve

A) I'm not sure what you're attempting to argue there, as that exact quotation is about the British response to Wilson's movement against them, not the American cabinet's reaction? Likewise, the German terms weren't extreme; Wilson was an objective outside and thought them quite fair, as did the Entente, which is why, as Tooze notes, they couldn't reject them out of hand. You personally may think so, but the players at the time certainly didn't. I'm also not sure where you're getting the idea I've changed on anything because I haven't.

B) The French Army was incapable of offensive, the Russians were collapsing slowly and the British were gutted. The Germans had rebuffed all offensives and still held most of their gains, so that the Entente would gain no leverage from any of this in any negotiations. This also, again, doesn't change the basic strategic calculus of the Entente powers as previously cited: They can't fight on past July of 1917. 

C) Taking that at face value, then your point about the lack of Ludendorff is meaningless; the Kaiser will still force Falkenhayn to respond in the East with or without him (Ludendorff).

D) The above point you made shows nothing changes in this regard and it was clear the Russians were starting to fall apart; the Great Retreat had been in 1915 and by late 1916 unrest was starting to occur that outside observers were noting. The French Ambassador, in his diaries, notes of such by then.

E) They survived because they conducted capacity upgrades that allowed such. 

F)Between November of 1916 and January of 1917, the Germans sank more tonnage than the British would build in either 1917 or 1918. This prompted Admiral Beatty to remark on January 27th-four days before the start of USW-that the question of the war was now whether the Germans would blockade the British to peace before the Royal Navy could do the same to the Germans. Even without USW, the British themselves noted the Germans were winning and here they won't have American oil for their destroyers, American destroyers or American shipping output to make up for it. In short, if nothing else, this alone dooms the Entente war effort.

 a)  That's exactly what I'm arguing.  You said there was great hostility towards the allies throughout the US government but give as evidence Wilson's personal hostility. 

  Let me see the Germany terms you quoted at one stage - although elsewhere you say they gave no details - involve considerable annexations of territory in both east and west.  Probably also the annexation or at least continued occupation of Belgium and given what German figures were arguing for as early as Sept 1914, probably a lot more.  It would leave France continually under threat from new aggression and was totally unacceptable to British and French leaders at the time.

b)  So a gutted army carried out a major offensive against the German army from 31-7-17 to 10-11-17 as well as fighting on a number of other fronts!  Get real.  The French army was unable for morale reasons to wage offensives for a while but still very capable of waging defensive war.  It should be noted that in 1918 while the Germans have some early successes it was the French as much as the British that defeated the German last gasp offensive in 1918.  They don't need to attack in 1917, they just need to hold on which they clearly can.  This also assumes that with a butterfly in 1914 you get the same operational sequence as OTL - see point c).  Plus your ignoring that the allies don't have to win quickly.  They just have to keep fighting and since they have the men and munitions for this that is a clear possibility.

c)  Wrong.  The Kaiser listened to Ludendorff and overruled Falkenhayn.  Without Ludendorff someone else might have pushed for major diversions of forces for offensive operations in the east and might have been listened to but either of those similarly might not have happened.  Ludendorff gained a lot of prestige for his 'success' in 1914 despite the ground work being laid by others and was more outspoken than most generals and hence willing to challenge his superior/  Its likely that without him Falkenhayn would have reluctantly sent some forces east to prop up the Austrians, who were seriously struggling but kept more forces in the west and you would probably have seen an earlier and smaller Verdun type campaign as he fails to break the allies in the west.  This would give the Russians time to absorb their 1914 casualties and while their likely to suffer a fair number fighting the Austro-German forces its not going to be as high as OTL and their not going to suffer the massive territorial losses with effects on morale, economy and problems of masses of refugees.

d)  The point is that you made an inaccurate statement.

e)  That is a link about what was done OTL in 1923-39 after

In the 16 years before the outbreak of World War II, the new companies set about the tremendous task of rebuilding railways which had had little or no work done since the end of World War I hostilities in 1918. Priority was new rolling stock: locomotives, coaches and wagons. As an example of the need for rationalisation, the LMSR took over 10,316 steam locomotives at the grouping: these comprised no fewer than 393 different classes. 

  It mentions further down that the companies struggled in part because of the continuation of the common carrier requirement that handicapped them in comparison to the increasing number of road haulage companies and hence that none of them made profits during this period.  It also says that

Total length of the British railways at 1 January 1923 was 19,585 route miles (31,336 km). From the end of the 1920s, when it was obvious that the motor vehicle was in the ascendancy, dozens of little-used branch lines began to close: some to passenger traffic, many completely. 

  I.e. the capacity of the rail network declined between the wars.  True the road capacity expanded but that was less easy to organise in a war crisis and you were arguing that it was a better rail network that was the difference between the success in far more circumstances in ~1940 and the assumed massive collapse in WWI if the Germans made rather unlikely gains.

 

f)  Beatty, who was something of a political character questioned which blockade would win 1st.  OTL despite much worst losses the allies won in large part because of changes in tactic, specifically the introduction of convoys.  Which was already starting to happen.  It would have been a lot closer without US resources but still far from certain to assume a German victory given the status of the German economy and society by this time.

[EwellHolmes]

Sept 29, 2020 11:30:47 GMT stevep said:

Sept 29, 2020 1:58:58 GMT EwellHolmes said:

A) I'm not sure what you're attempting to argue there, as that exact quotation is about the British response to Wilson's movement against them, not the American cabinet's reaction? Likewise, the German terms weren't extreme; Wilson was an objective outside and thought them quite fair, as did the Entente, which is why, as Tooze notes, they couldn't reject them out of hand. You personally may think so, but the players at the time certainly didn't. I'm also not sure where you're getting the idea I've changed on anything because I haven't.

B) The French Army was incapable of offensive, the Russians were collapsing slowly and the British were gutted. The Germans had rebuffed all offensives and still held most of their gains, so that the Entente would gain no leverage from any of this in any negotiations. This also, again, doesn't change the basic strategic calculus of the Entente powers as previously cited: They can't fight on past July of 1917. 

C) Taking that at face value, then your point about the lack of Ludendorff is meaningless; the Kaiser will still force Falkenhayn to respond in the East with or without him (Ludendorff).

D) The above point you made shows nothing changes in this regard and it was clear the Russians were starting to fall apart; the Great Retreat had been in 1915 and by late 1916 unrest was starting to occur that outside observers were noting. The French Ambassador, in his diaries, notes of such by then.

E) They survived because they conducted capacity upgrades that allowed such. 

F)Between November of 1916 and January of 1917, the Germans sank more tonnage than the British would build in either 1917 or 1918. This prompted Admiral Beatty to remark on January 27th-four days before the start of USW-that the question of the war was now whether the Germans would blockade the British to peace before the Royal Navy could do the same to the Germans. Even without USW, the British themselves noted the Germans were winning and here they won't have American oil for their destroyers, American destroyers or American shipping output to make up for it. In short, if nothing else, this alone dooms the Entente war effort.

 a)  That's exactly what I'm arguing.  You said there was great hostility towards the allies throughout the US government but give as evidence Wilson's personal hostility. 

  Let me see the Germany terms you quoted at one stage - although elsewhere you say they gave no details - involve considerable annexations of territory in both east and west.  Probably also the annexation or at least continued occupation of Belgium and given what German figures were arguing for as early as Sept 1914, probably a lot more.  It would leave France continually under threat from new aggression and was totally unacceptable to British and French leaders at the time.

b)  So a gutted army carried out a major offensive against the German army from 31-7-17 to 10-11-17 as well as fighting on a number of other fronts!  Get real.  The French army was unable for morale reasons to wage offensives for a while but still very capable of waging defensive war.  It should be noted that in 1918 while the Germans have some early successes it was the French as much as the British that defeated the German last gasp offensive in 1918.  They don't need to attack in 1917, they just need to hold on which they clearly can.  This also assumes that with a butterfly in 1914 you get the same operational sequence as OTL - see point c).  Plus your ignoring that the allies don't have to win quickly.  They just have to keep fighting and since they have the men and munitions for this that is a clear possibility.

c)  Wrong.  The Kaiser listened to Ludendorff and overruled Falkenhayn.  Without Ludendorff someone else might have pushed for major diversions of forces for offensive operations in the east and might have been listened to but either of those similarly might not have happened.  Ludendorff gained a lot of prestige for his 'success' in 1914 despite the ground work being laid by others and was more outspoken than most generals and hence willing to challenge his superior/  Its likely that without him Falkenhayn would have reluctantly sent some forces east to prop up the Austrians, who were seriously struggling but kept more forces in the west and you would probably have seen an earlier and smaller Verdun type campaign as he fails to break the allies in the west.  This would give the Russians time to absorb their 1914 casualties and while their likely to suffer a fair number fighting the Austro-German forces its not going to be as high as OTL and their not going to suffer the massive territorial losses with effects on morale, economy and problems of masses of refugees.

d)  The point is that you made an inaccurate statement.

e)  That is a link about what was done OTL in 1923-39 after

In the 16 years before the outbreak of World War II, the new companies set about the tremendous task of rebuilding railways which had had little or no work done since the end of World War I hostilities in 1918. Priority was new rolling stock: locomotives, coaches and wagons. As an example of the need for rationalisation, the LMSR took over 10,316 steam locomotives at the grouping: these comprised no fewer than 393 different classes. 

  It mentions further down that the companies struggled in part because of the continuation of the common carrier requirement that handicapped them in comparison to the increasing number of road haulage companies and hence that none of them made profits during this period.  It also says that

Total length of the British railways at 1 January 1923 was 19,585 route miles (31,336 km). From the end of the 1920s, when it was obvious that the motor vehicle was in the ascendancy, dozens of little-used branch lines began to close: some to passenger traffic, many completely. 

  I.e. the capacity of the rail network declined between the wars.  True the road capacity expanded but that was less easy to organise in a war crisis and you were arguing that it was a better rail network that was the difference between the success in far more circumstances in ~1940 and the assumed massive collapse in WWI if the Germans made rather unlikely gains.

 

f)  Beatty, who was something of a political character questioned which blockade would win 1st.  OTL despite much worst losses the allies won in large part because of changes in tactic, specifically the introduction of convoys.  Which was already starting to happen.  It would have been a lot closer without US resources but still far from certain to assume a German victory given the status of the German economy and society by this time.

A) I've already provided the evidence of growing public hostility to the Entente, you've seized upon a single sentence that is about the Entente reaction specifically to Wilson; I'm therefore unsure what you're attempting to argue, as this conjecture is a goalpost shift in of itself but also doesn't make much sense at all in the given context of what you're asserting. Would you please clarify?

B) No offensive occurred within that entire timeframe. There was the Battle of Arras but that lasted for about a month, Passchendaele which started in July and lasted until November (Three months) and Cambrai in November that lasted about a month. It's notable that none of these achieved a decisive breakthrough nor resembled the months long slog the BEF had achieved in 1916 with the Somme; that capability only returned in 1918. As Lloyd George himself later stated:

"Passchendaele was indeed one of the greatest disasters of the war." - Memoirs, 1938

C) It is not, I've already provided evidence this was not the case. See German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, which shows Moltke was writing to both Bethmann and the Kaiser on the matter, and even suggested someone else over Ludendorff, given the latter was a junior officer. Further, Falkenhayn was motivated by this criticism and the demands of the Austro-Hungarians. Read further and you'll see the Kaiser wanted to court martial Hindenburg at the time over his letters, even. Please provide counter-evidence, because just saying I am when I've already provided evidence for my position twice now is meaningless.

D) Please provide evidence I did.

E) So, in other words, exactly as I said; 16 years before 1939 is from 1923 on, which is the Inter-War era. Further, you've focused in on line length while ignoring capacity isn't solely decided by railway length. For example:

Priority was new rolling stock: locomotives, coaches and wagons. As an example of the need for rationalisation, the LMSR took over 10,316 steam locomotives at the grouping: these comprised no fewer than 393 different classes.

Yes, the total railway length decreased but this was more than made up through the implementation of new technologies and advances, such as adding newer locomotives that could carry more cargo and the new coaches and wagons which too held a higher capacity. If the trains go from carrying, say, 400 tons of cargo to 800 tons of cargo, that's a doubling of capacity. New signalling equipment was another invention, as it allowed faster and repeat use of the railways by the new capacity trains; if you've got three 800 ton cargo trains going over the same track in one day versus two 400 ton cargo trains before, you've tripled the capacity for the same amount-or even less-trackage as before.

F) Beatty was in charge of the Royal Navy so to just blithely dismiss his point based on "politics" is meaningless. You also did not address my point at all with regards to the actual tonnage being sunk/produced.

British shipbuilding in 1917 consisted of 1.16 million tons.

Under Prize Rules (i.e. Non-USW), the U-Boats were able to sink 1,298,000 tons from October of 1916 to January of 1917.

In four months, without USW, the Germans sank more tonnage the British produced in all of 1917. If this rate of tonnage loss continued-i.e. Non-USW rates-from January of 1917 to January of 1918, this would've resulted in 3,894,000 tons lost to U-Boat action. To further put that into perspective, British shipbuilding in 1918 was 1.35 million tons, meaning that Germany without USW was sinking vastly more shipping than Britain could produce on her own.

You've brought up Convoying, but that runs into the unfortunate issue of oil; how exactly is the Royal Navy supposed to function without oil? To put this into perspective:

Acorn-class: 20

Acheron-class: 23

Acasta-class: 20

Laforey-class: 22

Admiralty M-class: 85

R-class: 62

Total: 232 Destroyers

I stopped here, so as not to include the 1918 onward builds. There had not been a coal fired Destroyer class built since the Beagle-class of the 1908–1909 shipbuilding program. In short, without America, there was simply no hope for the Entente past the coming Summer; they lacked the shipbuilding capacity and oil alone in this regard.

[stevep]

Oct 4, 2020 22:48:32 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Sept 29, 2020 11:30:47 GMT stevep said:

 a)  That's exactly what I'm arguing.  You said there was great hostility towards the allies throughout the US government but give as evidence Wilson's personal hostility. 

  Let me see the Germany terms you quoted at one stage - although elsewhere you say they gave no details - involve considerable annexations of territory in both east and west.  Probably also the annexation or at least continued occupation of Belgium and given what German figures were arguing for as early as Sept 1914, probably a lot more.  It would leave France continually under threat from new aggression and was totally unacceptable to British and French leaders at the time.

b)  So a gutted army carried out a major offensive against the German army from 31-7-17 to 10-11-17 as well as fighting on a number of other fronts!  Get real.  The French army was unable for morale reasons to wage offensives for a while but still very capable of waging defensive war.  It should be noted that in 1918 while the Germans have some early successes it was the French as much as the British that defeated the German last gasp offensive in 1918.  They don't need to attack in 1917, they just need to hold on which they clearly can.  This also assumes that with a butterfly in 1914 you get the same operational sequence as OTL - see point c).  Plus your ignoring that the allies don't have to win quickly.  They just have to keep fighting and since they have the men and munitions for this that is a clear possibility.

c)  Wrong.  The Kaiser listened to Ludendorff and overruled Falkenhayn.  Without Ludendorff someone else might have pushed for major diversions of forces for offensive operations in the east and might have been listened to but either of those similarly might not have happened.  Ludendorff gained a lot of prestige for his 'success' in 1914 despite the ground work being laid by others and was more outspoken than most generals and hence willing to challenge his superior/  Its likely that without him Falkenhayn would have reluctantly sent some forces east to prop up the Austrians, who were seriously struggling but kept more forces in the west and you would probably have seen an earlier and smaller Verdun type campaign as he fails to break the allies in the west.  This would give the Russians time to absorb their 1914 casualties and while their likely to suffer a fair number fighting the Austro-German forces its not going to be as high as OTL and their not going to suffer the massive territorial losses with effects on morale, economy and problems of masses of refugees.

d)  The point is that you made an inaccurate statement.

e)  That is a link about what was done OTL in 1923-39 after

  It mentions further down that the companies struggled in part because of the continuation of the common carrier requirement that handicapped them in comparison to the increasing number of road haulage companies and hence that none of them made profits during this period.  It also says that

  I.e. the capacity of the rail network declined between the wars.  True the road capacity expanded but that was less easy to organise in a war crisis and you were arguing that it was a better rail network that was the difference between the success in far more circumstances in ~1940 and the assumed massive collapse in WWI if the Germans made rather unlikely gains.

 

f)  Beatty, who was something of a political character questioned which blockade would win 1st.  OTL despite much worst losses the allies won in large part because of changes in tactic, specifically the introduction of convoys.  Which was already starting to happen.  It would have been a lot closer without US resources but still far from certain to assume a German victory given the status of the German economy and society by this time.

A) I've already provided the evidence of growing public hostility to the Entente, you've seized upon a single sentence that is about the Entente reaction specifically to Wilson; I'm therefore unsure what you're attempting to argue, as this conjecture is a goalpost shift in of itself but also doesn't make much sense at all in the given context of what you're asserting. Would you please clarify?

B) No offensive occurred within that entire timeframe. There was the Battle of Arras but that lasted for about a month, Passchendaele which started in July and lasted until November (Three months) and Cambrai in November that lasted about a month. It's notable that none of these achieved a decisive breakthrough nor resembled the months long slog the BEF had achieved in 1916 with the Somme; that capability only returned in 1918. As Lloyd George himself later stated:

"Passchendaele was indeed one of the greatest disasters of the war." - Memoirs, 1938

C) It is not, I've already provided evidence this was not the case. See German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, which shows Moltke was writing to both Bethmann and the Kaiser on the matter, and even suggested someone else over Ludendorff, given the latter was a junior officer. Further, Falkenhayn was motivated by this criticism and the demands of the Austro-Hungarians. Read further and you'll see the Kaiser wanted to court martial Hindenburg at the time over his letters, even. Please provide counter-evidence, because just saying I am when I've already provided evidence for my position twice now is meaningless.

D) Please provide evidence I did.

E) So, in other words, exactly as I said; 16 years before 1939 is from 1923 on, which is the Inter-War era. Further, you've focused in on line length while ignoring capacity isn't solely decided by railway length. For example:

Priority was new rolling stock: locomotives, coaches and wagons. As an example of the need for rationalisation, the LMSR took over 10,316 steam locomotives at the grouping: these comprised no fewer than 393 different classes.

Yes, the total railway length decreased but this was more than made up through the implementation of new technologies and advances, such as adding newer locomotives that could carry more cargo and the new coaches and wagons which too held a higher capacity. If the trains go from carrying, say, 400 tons of cargo to 800 tons of cargo, that's a doubling of capacity. New signalling equipment was another invention, as it allowed faster and repeat use of the railways by the new capacity trains; if you've got three 800 ton cargo trains going over the same track in one day versus two 400 ton cargo trains before, you've tripled the capacity for the same amount-or even less-trackage as before.

F) Beatty was in charge of the Royal Navy so to just blithely dismiss his point based on "politics" is meaningless. You also did not address my point at all with regards to the actual tonnage being sunk/produced.

British shipbuilding in 1917 consisted of 1.16 million tons.

Under Prize Rules (i.e. Non-USW), the U-Boats were able to sink 1,298,000 tons from October of 1916 to January of 1917.

In four months, without USW, the Germans sank more tonnage the British produced in all of 1917. If this rate of tonnage loss continued-i.e. Non-USW rates-from January of 1917 to January of 1918, this would've resulted in 3,894,000 tons lost to U-Boat action. To further put that into perspective, British shipbuilding in 1918 was 1.35 million tons, meaning that Germany without USW was sinking vastly more shipping than Britain could produce on her own.

You've brought up Convoying, but that runs into the unfortunate issue of oil; how exactly is the Royal Navy supposed to function without oil? To put this into perspective:

Acorn-class: 20

Acheron-class: 23

Acasta-class: 20

Laforey-class: 22

Admiralty M-class: 85

R-class: 62

Total: 232 Destroyers

I stopped here, so as not to include the 1918 onward builds. There had not been a coal fired Destroyer class built since the Beagle-class of the 1908–1909 shipbuilding program. In short, without America, there was simply no hope for the Entente past the coming Summer; they lacked the shipbuilding capacity and oil alone in this regard.

  EwellHolmes,

a)  I made reference to the quote you made.  There was concern about whether the allies could repair debts but then that could either lead to stopping trade as you suggest, which ensure that they won't repay them or extending loans to maintain the economic activity that the US was benefiting from.  There were small groups that were specifically hostile to the allies, mainly German Americans and the more extreme Fenian groups but there was also a hell of a lot of hostility towards the Germans especially, both on their behaviour in Europe - widespread abuse of civilians, introduction of gas warfare, bombardment of civilian targets, use of USW - which occurred twice earlier in the conflict - and also their actions in the US, with terrorist attacks and most noticeably the Zimmermann Telegram.  As such, even if Germany doesn't launch its OTL 3rd go at USW, which seems unlikely if the only butterfly is Ludendorf not gaining power.

b)  Not sure what your saying in the 1st part as you say no offensive was undertaken in that period then detail what offensives were carried out in the period and before at Ameins.  Also I never said the offensive was a success.  I pointed out your suggestion that the Somme gutted the British army was obviously totally inaccurate.

c)  Seen as much as I can and there was some bitter infighting.  Unfortunately the bulk of the section on the 1915 offensive in the east is missing - with p121-152 not being available.  Falkenhayn was under a lot of pressure from assorted generals, most noticeably the Ludendorff/Hindenburg axis who wanted a massive effort in the east to knock Russia out of the war and Falkenhayn wanted more limited aims.  It does mention he did want to cause enough damage to the Russians to try and get them to make a separate peace but this fell down on the twin barriers of Russian resistance and Berlin's refusal to accept such an idea.  As such it seems like Falkenhayn was more willing to consider major offensives in the east, although he was convinced that the war could only be won in the west and was fearful of trying to advance too far in the east.

d)  I quote what was said before i.e.

If you feel I am wrong about USW, the onerous is on you to prove otherwise as I've made my citation in this regard to show it was just Ludendorff and the Navy. Likewise, the suggestion that the Entente had the upperhand in early 1917 is unsupported by the previous citations in of themselves but, further, by a casual review of the situation that Spring. The French Army fails in the Neville Offensive and then has mass mutinies. The British have suffered the Somme just a few months ago, having gutted their Army. Russia, meanwhile, has collapsed into Revolution. This is not the picture of strength but here again, we need only look at the basic math. The British themselves said they could only last, at maximum, until July of 1917. We know Germany lasted until November of 1918. Basic math dictates who wins the war here and it isn't the Entente.

  As I pointed out I don't think I ever said that so its up to you to identify where you think I did. 

e)  Your mentioning investment in the railway system, which as your quote mentioned was drastically underfunded in the period 1918-23.  How much this increased capacity or simply replaced older stock and capacity is unclear.    Do you have details that the investment caused such a large increase in capacity?

f)  I didn't dismiss what Beatty said, but commented that he was a distinctly 'political' officer who depended a lot on social links and wealth and looked to secure his position.  He's fairly notorious for his attempts to undermine Jellicoe's performance at Jutland to hide his own shortcomings.  Also what he said was that there was a race between the two blockades, not that the German blockade would definitely win 1st which is what you seem to be taking it as.  It might have been accurate in his actual statement or have been related to his views rightly or wrongly on the issue or simply a way to seeking additional resources for the RN.

  In terms of the oil issue you seem to be assuming zero imports which seems highly unlikely.  Yes it will cause a lot of problems if the US decides not to sell more oil to Britain but its not necessarily a war -loser for the navy. 

  Its interesting that you assume that the western allies will collapse in 1917/18 automatically under far, far less pressure and destruction than Japan is suffering in 1945 but where you think it will automatically defeat a far more powerful and better placed opponent than Imperial Germany is for the allies in WWI.

  Steve