Operation Trikora WI

[La Rouge Beret]

In 1966 Indonesia launched Operation Trikora which were a series of military actions intended to seize control of Netherlands New Guinea, while after the Battle of the Arafura Sea and several land skirmishes the two parties reached a diplomatic solution in 1962. However, as part of Operation Trikora the Indonesians had planned an attack against the Dutch aircraft carrier HNLMS Karel Doorman using Tu 16s equipped with KS - 1 Komet anti ship missiles. There were also Soviet crewed 'Indonesian' submarines in the area too, so this has the potential to become far larger very quickly. 


My question is what happens if HMAS Melbourne is transiting south of the area, but due to problems with targeting the intended strike against Karel Doorman is launched against Melbourne either damaging her and or sinking a consort? How does Australia respond and, could ANZUS be invoked? Do the Soviets continue supporting the Indonesians?

Does a surviving Australian task force and the Dutch Task Force join up creating a middle power multiple deck task force?

See a map below of the Dutch territory of New Guinea.

[stevep]

  La Rouge Beret ,

  I don't know enough to say in detail but it would definitely heat thing up.  Its an act of open warfare and even if Indonesia apologies to Australia its going to cause a lot of anger. 

  Reading up on the operation, which was planned for 1062, I think you have a typo in your 1st line and see Operation_Trikora for more details.  The operation didn't occur because the US pressurised the Dutch to accept the annexation, albeit with a fig leaf of a brief UN mandate over the territory before it was handed over to Indonesia.  As such what changes to mean the operation goes ahead?

a) If its that the Dutch decide to fight despite US pressure then Washington would probably blame them and refuse support.  In this case I suspect Australia won't fight on its own and the region is taken by force. Britain still has a presence in the region and is facing its own problems in terms of Indonesian threats to Malaysia but may either come under US pressure itself or decide to try and appease Indonesia as well.  As such probably no significant change although it could mean lasting hostility from Australia to Indonesia.

b) If instead the US doesn't apply pressure and possibly even deciding that Indonesia is lost given its links with the Soviets gives some indication it would support the Dutch in pushing for NG's independence then an Indonesian attack that also hits passing Australian military forces its likely that Australia, Britain and the US will react a lot more strongly.  I know Britain still had forces in the region but not sure how much and still has a Tory government and if Kennedy has decided to stand firm then your likely to see Indonesian forces badly knocked about.  On the down side, unless Sukarno is still overthrown in a coup Indonesia is likely to stay in the Soviet camp and possibly even more so.  This is likely to make the region and especially disputed border areas and the important straits a key region of tension.  On the plus side it would highlight the willingness of the west to stand firm and allow NG to become an independent state.  Although might it push Khrushchev into an harder line over Cuba so we could end up with a nuclear exchange!  However avoiding that and at least some of the region will escape rule by Java which whether it ends up in the eastern or western camp is likely to be a military dictatorship as OTL.

  Interesting idea and plenty of butterflies.  If we go with path B and avoid a later nuclear exchange then it could strengthen western commitment to the region and especially Anglo-Australian relations which could have results later on.  Suspect it won't prevent Labour winning the next election after 12+ years of Tory rule but they could find it harder to withdraw from 'east of Suez' and cut the military as much as OTL.

  Steve

[La Rouge Beret]

Hmmm so we need to somehow avoid American pressure on the Dutch, possibly due to a domestic issue that takes the focus of the Kennedy administration combined with some sabre rattling in Berlin for instance. In which case with the Australian - Dutch Naval forces weakened, the Indonesians launch Operation Jayawijaya and we end up with multiple naval skirmishes prior to the landing. The arrival of a British and or American big deck carrier group would probably put paid to any further hostility along with a UN ceasefire resolution. Independence is eventually granted, whether that leads to unification with PNG is another question. But I think Australia would push for a continued Dutch presence in the former Netherlands New Guinea.

As you suggested the big change is that it's very hard to withdraw 'east of Suez' in this scenario and the implications for the Cuban missile crisis are stark. Although if Kennedy takes a harder line here, it might dissuade Khruschev from authorising the missiles being installed in the first place.

[gillan1220]

U.S. forces in the Philippines would be monitoring the situation.

[simon darkshade]

In @, the Americans were extremely keen to sell the Dutch down the street in order to work on the Indonesians and bring them onside. Here, there is a complete change of circumstance, but there would still be a tendency for some within the Kennedy administration to see things as they want them, not as they are. That will work against any wholehearted shift of policy. Would it toughen up Kennedy? This was the time when McNamara et al tried to engineer the Skybolt situation, so it is unlikely that they’d have a Damascus Road conversion.

Given that US forces in the Philippines amounted to an F-100 squadron and an F-86D squadron, it does not matter what they do or monitor. The real factor is the Midway and Ranger CVBGs then operating in the WestPac.

As of mid 1962, of the other USN carriers, Enterprise was in the Atlantic, Kitty Hawk was undergoing work at San Francisco, Constellation was going around South America to join Seventh Fleet, Independence and Forrestal were working up for the Med, Saratoga was under repair, FDR and Shangri-La were in the Med, Ticonderoga and Coral Sea were somewhere on the West Coast, Antietam was the training carrier in the Gulf of Mexico, Lexington was preparing to relieve Antietam, Hancock was off Taiwan and Oriskany and Bonhomme Richard were en route to the West Pacific.

CVS: Essex was in drydock at Brooklyn, Bennington, Hornet and Yorktown were on the West Coast, Intrepid was supporting Mercury flights in the Atlantic, Randolph in the Med, Wasp was in Western Europe, Lake Champlain was on a training cruise in the Caribbean and Kearsarge was under repair in Puget Sound.

If an Australian ship is hit, there will be a hell of a fuss and we would definitely invoke ANZUS and try and haul in SEATO. There would be a significant reaction and armament as a minimum result; this was the era when we expected to go nuclear and did expect to get several dozen Red Beards from Britain.

However, we wouldn’t put a carrier up in the Arafura Sea in the first place. It isn’t on the way to anywhere nor is it an area where anyone would operate a low air defence carrier. There are no docks to take her at Darwin and the fleet operated out of Sydney.

The British at this point had a sizeable presence in the area with a Gurkha division in Malaya, V-Bombers at Singapore and a carrier group built around Victorious; Albion and Centaur were also EoS at this point. The flow-on effects on British policy could be significant.

[stevep]

   Could the necessary change in Kennedy's response, i.e. to support rather than ditch the Dutch possibly come from some intel as to how closely Sukarno is working with the Soviets.  This might lead to them seeing him and Indonesia as a lost cause - at least under the current regime. That Sukarno can't be won over and needs to be opposed.  Hence a need to stand up to Soviet influence in the region which could include supporting the Dutch bid for the region to become an independent state?

  Simon's point about it being unlikely that a HMAS CV would be transiting those waters is more of an issue.  Could it be that something is set up for it to meet up with UK and/or US ships for a joint exercise.  Possibly given the trigger above to seek to deter Sukarno's adventurism?  Although in such a case its passage is likely to be well advertised so it would be difficult for the Indonesians not to know there's an Aussie CV in the region and either wait until its sailed through or simply make sure that they avoid it.  Mind you there is always the opportunity for someone doing something stupid as is the fact that if the Melbourne and its supporting ships suddenly find themselves in the middle of a war zone I can't see them not going on high alert and possibly some Indonesian/Soviet idiot decides that makes them a threat.

  If there's a clash which sees the Indonesian forces knocked about a good bit and the region come under some sort of UN control in line for full independence, without an Indonesian occupation then the question is what are the knock on effects?  Does Sukarno backed down, double up with possibly larger attacks against Malaysian Borneo or possibly get replaced by another military figure who could be even more hostile to the west, due to the perceived humiliation or more friendly because their found Soviet support inadequate?  All I think are possible.  Also does a defeat here mean Khrushchev feels he has to take a harder line somewhere else, such as Cuba, Vietnam and/or somewhere else.

  I think if there's a shooting war its likely to strengthen Australian-British links especially even if the latter are still secondary to US military aid to Australia and the Netherlands.  How long this would last and what impact it would have on other issues I don't know.  Could Britain end up sending some forces to Vietnam?  Its likely to stay a factor in the Indian Ocean for a while longer, which could mean longer tension in Aden for instance and possibly other areas.  [Of course one longer lasting impact I would like to see is that Britain - hence probably Ireland and possibly also Denmark - doesn't join the EEC in the early 70's because of the greater links with the ANZ region.]

[simon darkshade]

The general US approach in the case of Sukarno was to try and sideline and then remove him in favour of a more pliant Indonesian regime, as happened historically. There was more value in securing that state than could be gained from siding with the Dutch, who were already onside and considered as having no option apart from the USA.

[stevep]

Feb 19, 2021 3:13:44 GMT simon darkshade said:

The general US approach in the case of Sukarno was to try and sideline and then remove him in favour of a more pliant Indonesian regime, as happened historically. There was more value in securing that state than could be gained from siding with the Dutch, who were already onside and considered as having no option apart from the USA.

  That could well be the problem here.  Denmark has no alternative so its interests are expendable as far as Washington is concerned.

[La Rouge Beret]

There has been some great discussion here, which is exactly what I hoped. I am after a situation, where the Indonesians miscalculate and launch a fateful attack on Melbourne.

As others alluded to an exercise just might do the trick, particularly if the Indonesians believe that it is a figleaf for support for the Dutch.

[simon darkshade]

I think that a situation could arise whereby the Indonesians attack an RAN escort, but I don't really think we would stick our carrier up in the Arafura Sea by virtue of basing limitations.

We do have the precedent of the Sunda Strait Crisis for a situation with an RN carriers (Victorious), but that was en route to and from Singers and almost lead to a proper kick-off.

So, if it does happen, somehow, we're looking at Operation Althorpe in response - air strikes to destroy the Indonesian air force by RAF V-Bombers out of Darwin and Singapore. Very hard to stop that escalating into a full blown war, with the accompanying risk of nuclear weapons use.

[La Rouge Beret]

Feb 23, 2021 2:45:00 GMT simon darkshade said:

I think that a situation could arise whereby the Indonesians attack an RAN escort, but I don't really think we would stick our carrier up in the Arafura Sea by virtue of basing limitations.

We do have the precedent of the Sunda Strait Crisis for a situation with an RN carriers (Victorious), but that was en route to and from Singers and almost lead to a proper kick-off.

So, if it does happen, somehow, we're looking at Operation Althorpe in response - air strikes to destroy the Indonesian air force by RAF V-Bombers out of Darwin and Singapore. Very hard to stop that escalating into a full blown war, with the accompanying risk of nuclear weapons use.

I haven't heard about the Sunda Strait Crisis and, I always had a soft spot for Victorious. 

My original plan had a RAN frigate being hit with an anti ship missile and this led to a dramatic escalation between the powers. I wanted to set the scene for an Australian version of the Cuban missile crisis in 1966 / 1967.

[simon darkshade]

If it happens in a situation where Sukarno is still in power, then Konfrontasi is still going. It could well turn into something like a Cuba, but far more likely to go hot. The Soviets don’t have Indonesia’s back in the same manner as Cuba.

This would be seen as the exact concern often cited in the domino theory and would lead to some major, major consequences.

[stevep]

Feb 23, 2021 2:45:00 GMT simon darkshade said:

I think that a situation could arise whereby the Indonesians attack an RAN escort, but I don't really think we would stick our carrier up in the Arafura Sea by virtue of basing limitations.

We do have the precedent of the Sunda Strait Crisis for a situation with an RN carriers (Victorious), but that was en route to and from Singers and almost lead to a proper kick-off.

So, if it does happen, somehow, we're looking at Operation Althorpe in response - air strikes to destroy the Indonesian air force by RAF V-Bombers out of Darwin and Singapore. Very hard to stop that escalating into a full blown war, with the accompanying risk of nuclear weapons use.

  La Rouge Beret, simon darkshade,

    As I understand it the idea wasn't that the CV was operating in that region but in transit to possible Singers and that it was attacked by mistake as the Indonesian attack on the Dutch start.  Possibly on the way there to take part in an exercise with Britain and perhaps US forces in the region.  This could be a way to get the clash that La Rouge Beret, wanted?  Or possibly for some reason it is a British force that's passing through that region on the way to Australia or elsewhere in the east?

  In don't think Australia on its own has the weight to really impact Indonesia much but sounds like Britain, with Australian and Malaysian support could really hurt them, which might mean a defeat in the effort to conquer W New Guinea.  Let alone if the US pitched in as well.