Japan Attacks Russia II

[lordroel]

Apr 4, 2021 17:10:28 GMT gillan1220 said:

Apr 4, 2021 16:55:50 GMT lordroel said:

But except bombarding Vladivostok and using the Special Naval Landing Forces i do not think we will see much action of the Imperial Japanese Navy in this war, it will mostly like China be a Imperial Japanese Army oparation.

The Navy would have already committed to invading the DEI and Malaya at this point.

But fighting the Soviet Union alongside the United States and the rest of the allies would be much more suicidal than OTL.

[gillan1220]

Apr 4, 2021 17:13:00 GMT lordroel said:

Apr 4, 2021 17:10:28 GMT gillan1220 said:

The Navy would have already committed to invading the DEI and Malaya at this point.

But fighting the Soviet Union alongside the United States and the rest of the allies would be much more suicidal than OTL.

It would hasten Japan's defeat even faster.

[stevep]

Apr 4, 2021 17:10:28 GMT gillan1220 said:

Apr 4, 2021 16:55:50 GMT lordroel said:

But except bombarding Vladivostok and using the Special Naval Landing Forces i do not think we will see much action of the Imperial Japanese Navy in this war, it will mostly like China be a Imperial Japanese Army oparation.

The Navy would have already committed to invading the DEI and Malaya at this point.

  That's what the navy wanted to do but I can't see even the Japanese government trying both operations at once.  Plus the navy as well as its ships have a lot of land based aircraft so for coastal regions - and some way inland given their range - they could be effective in the attacks on Russia.  Of course with the small but elite size of the Japanese naval air force any losses, include due to flying accidents on long flights over inland reaches, is going to be a drain.

  I read a brief reference yesterday suggesting that the army was winning the argument for an intervention in Siberia until the US lead boycott of oil and other key exports to Japan in July/August persuaded the leadership they had to go south.  Not sure if this is accurate at all but does give options for an attack in the north say before those restrictions come into place and then Japan is going to be really stretched trying to strike south as well.  Plus the last two CV of their fleet carriers, Shōkaku and Zuikaku weren't commissioned until August and September 41 respectively so they would be weakened even if they could still support a logistically heavy set of operations in the south as well as attacks on Siberia.

[oscssw]

Apr 5, 2021 10:36:59 GMT stevep said:

Apr 4, 2021 17:10:28 GMT gillan1220 said:

The Navy would have already committed to invading the DEI and Malaya at this point.

  That's what the navy wanted to do but I can't see even the Japanese government trying both operations at once.  Plus the navy as well as its ships have a lot of land based aircraft so for coastal regions - and some way inland given their range - they could be effective in the attacks on Russia.  Of course with the small but elite size of the Japanese naval air force any losses, include due to flying accidents on long flights over inland reaches, is going to be a drain.

  I read a brief reference yesterday suggesting that the army was winning the argument for an intervention in Siberia until the US lead boycott of oil and other key exports to Japan in July/August persuaded the leadership they had to go south.  Not sure if this is accurate at all but does give options for an attack in the north say before those restrictions come into place and then Japan is going to be really stretched trying to strike south as well.  Plus the last two CV of their fleet carriers, Shōkaku and Zuikaku weren't commissioned until August and September 41 respectively so they would be weakened even if they could still support a logistically heavy set of operations in the south as well as attacks on Siberia.

All good points but the ones that intrigues me are:

1. US oil boycott established on July 26th, 1941

2. Japanese invasion of Dutch wast Indies and Malaya only.

Barbarossa kicks off on June 22, 1941.  So to make this work Japan has to agree and coordinate plans for simultaneous

invasion of Soviet union.   It means the Japanese forces will be piling on the Soviets at the very outset of the war when the Germans were victorious everywhere and the Red Army was loosing hundreds of thousands of troops and giving ground at an astounding rate.   This was the period Uncle Joe had his Break Down.  I wonder if learning he was being attacked on two fronts would have been enough to permanently push him over the edge?   Without "The Man of Steel" would a total collapse of the soviet government happen?

I'd think Japan's attack on the Soviets would have triggered the same US Oil Boycott at about the same time.  So Japan still needs the oil.  The question is if the Japanese do not attack the US directly and restrict their invasions to The Dutch East Indies (DEI) and the oil regions of Malaya would the US declare war on Japan?   I think not.  US was rabidly non interventionist until stabbed in the back at Pearl harbor.  The Dutch sure are no match for the Imperial Japanese Navy  (IJN ) and I don't see the UK able to do much more. 

If the Japanese did nothing more than holding the soviet Siberian forces in place they would be giving the Germans a huge advantage. Getting Vladivostok, the Northern Resource Zone and the Oil of the DEI and Malaya would seem to meet all their immediate goals.    

[lordroel]

Apr 5, 2021 16:40:00 GMT oscssw said:

Apr 5, 2021 10:36:59 GMT stevep said:

  That's what the navy wanted to do but I can't see even the Japanese government trying both operations at once.  Plus the navy as well as its ships have a lot of land based aircraft so for coastal regions - and some way inland given their range - they could be effective in the attacks on Russia.  Of course with the small but elite size of the Japanese naval air force any losses, include due to flying accidents on long flights over inland reaches, is going to be a drain.

  I read a brief reference yesterday suggesting that the army was winning the argument for an intervention in Siberia until the US lead boycott of oil and other key exports to Japan in July/August persuaded the leadership they had to go south.  Not sure if this is accurate at all but does give options for an attack in the north say before those restrictions come into place and then Japan is going to be really stretched trying to strike south as well.  Plus the last two CV of their fleet carriers, Shōkaku and Zuikaku weren't commissioned until August and September 41 respectively so they would be weakened even if they could still support a logistically heavy set of operations in the south as well as attacks on Siberia.

All good points but the ones that intrigues me are:

1. US oil boycott established on July 26th, 1941

2. Japanese invasion of Dutch wast Indies and Malaya only.

Point 2 i can answer: What if: Japan invades Netherlands East Indies only (no Pearl Harbor)

We know that on December 7th 1941, Japanese bombers launched an attack on Pearl Harbor, officially drawing the United States into World War II. After the attack, American forces battled in the Pacific and European fronts, lending aid to Allied soldiers at Normandy and other notable battles while fending off Japan’s forces on the other side of the globe. It was a difficult fight that resulted in the deaths of over 400,000 American soldiers, including the over 2,400 who perished at Pearl Harbor.

But how would things have been different had the harbor been left alone and Japan never launched its attack and instead focusing on invading the Netherlands East Indies, a scenario that Japan never really consider doing but might have been wise to do so.

So the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies begins on December 15th 1941 when naval and air units of the empire of Japan suddenly and deliberately attack the Royal Netherlands Navy squadron based at Batavia in the Netherlands East Indies (present-day Indonesia). They destroy or damage three cruisers (HNLMS Java, HNLMS De Ruyter, HNLMS Tromp) and eight destroyers belonging to the Admiralen-class, leaving fifty-five-year-old Vice Adm. Conrad Emil Lambert Helfrich with only twenty submarines and numerous but frail torpedo boats with which to retaliate. Shortly thereafter the Japanese Sixteenth Army invades the Netherlands portion of the island of Borneo—scrupulously avoiding portions administered by the United Kingdom— then rapidly follows up with attacks on Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and other major islands in the East Indies archipelago. The puny Royal Netherlands East Indies Army garrisons are swiftly overrun, the Royal Netherlands Navy bases at Batavia and Surabaya quickly fall, and by the end of February 1942, Japan has secured the Netherlands East Indies’ cornucopia of petroleum, natural gas, tin, manganese, copper, nickel, bauxite, and coal.

The Japanese government had taken the first step toward an attack on the East Indies in July 1941, when it demanded and received from Vichy France the right to station troops, construct airfields, and base warships in southern Indochina. The German invasion of the Soviet Union the previous month had removed any threat from that direction and cleared the way for a thrust southward. The southward move, in turn, was predicated on Japan’s desire to secure enough natural resources to become self-sufficient. It was dangerously dependent on America for scrap iron, steel, and above all oil: 80 percent of its petroleum came from the United States. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration had been attempting for years to use economic sanctions as leverage to force Japan to abandon its invasion of China. As expected, the move into southern Indochina triggered a total freeze of Japanese assets in the United States and a complete oil embargo.

Japanese leaders initially assume that if they proceed with their intention to grab the Netherlands East Indies, the inevitable consequence will be war with both the British Commonwealth and the United States. Consequently, plans also include attacks on British bases at Singapore and Hong Kong, American bases in the Philippine Islands, and even the forward base of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Careful review of the British and American situations, however, prompts a reconsideration by Japan’s planners. They conclude that the beleaguered British cannot afford to add Japan to their existing adversaries, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Britain especially cannot do so without a guarantee that the United States will enter a war with Japan. And although the Roosevelt administration might engage in threats, American public opinion is so averse to war that the president has been unable to persuade the country to enter the fight against the Nazis despite their conquest of most of Europe. Indeed, a July 1941 bill to extend the nation’s peacetime draft—which the Roosevelt administration deemed fundamental to United States national security—passed by a single vote. The revised Japanese plan therefore contemplates an attack on the Dutch East Indies alone, albeit with most of the Imperial Japanese Navy held in reserve should either Great Britain or the United States declare war. Events completely vindicate Japan’s gamble. British prime minister Winston Churchill reinforces Singapore but otherwise adopts a defensive posture in Southeast Asia. Already thwarted in his efforts to make the case for war against Hitler’s Germany, neither Roosevelt nor his advisers can think of a rationale persuasive enough to convince the public that American boys should fight and die because the Japanese have overrun an obscure European colony.

How plausible is this scenario? There is little doubt that Japan could have swiftly defeated the Netherlands and seized the East Indies in mid December 1941. Even when (as occurred historically) the Americans, British, and Australians added their available warships to the defense of the Netherlands colony, the Japanese had little trouble overrunning the entire archipelago by March 1942. The harder question to answer definitively is what course Britain and America actually would have pursued if Japan had bypassed their Pacific possessions and also, of course, refrained from an air strike against Pearl Harbor. The British plainly could not have sustained such a war without American help. True, Great Britain and the United States had been steadily making common cause against Nazi Germany. The United States Congress had passed the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941, and United States Navy destroyers had begun escorting convoys bound for Great Britain to the mid-Atlantic before handing them off to their British counterparts. In August, Churchill and Roosevelt had met for a secret conference in the waters off Newfoundland, a summit that had included military as well as diplomatic discussions. And by the autumn of 1941, the United States Navy Navy was engaged in an undeclared but lethal war with German U-boats. Cooperation to prepare for a conflict with Japan, however, was considerably less advanced. At the Atlantic Conference, the British had given the Americans text for a proposed warning to Japan to be sent jointly by Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States, stating that if Japan pursued further aggression in Southeast Asia, the three countries “would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war.” Roosevelt agreed to make such a stern statement— but unilaterally, not jointly—and as matters turned out, the president told the Japanese ambassador merely that if Japan struck southward, he would take steps “toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.” As the crisis with Japan deepened, Roosevelt’s top military advisers told him that while they preferred a less provocative diplomatic line toward Japan, the United States could not stand by if the Japanese struck American, British, or Netherlands possessions and would have no choice but to take military action in that case. Privately Roosevelt agreed, and on December 1st he told the British ambassador that in the event Japan attacked the Netherlands East Indies or British possessions in Southeast Asia, “we should all be in this together.” When the ambassador pressed him to be specific, Roosevelt replied that the British could count on “armed support” from the United States. But the president also worried about his ability to do so if American possessions continued to be spared by the Japanese.

As historian David Reynolds points out, “Roosevelt could only propose war; Congress had to declare it. From a purely diplomatic point of view, Pearl Harbor was therefore a godsend.” It would have been difficult to persuade Congress that an attack upon the Netherlands East Indies alone demanded a military response; it might well have proved impossible. In the end the dilemma never arose because the Japanese never considered such an alternative strategy. Once the Japanese government decided that it must seize the natural resources of the Netherlands East Indies, it never seriously considered any plan but a simultaneous attack against the British and the United States in the Pacific. This decision was driven overwhelmingly by operational considerations: Japan’s military planners believed they could not run the risk of leaving the American air and naval bases in the Philippines athwart their line of communications with the East Indies. For that reason they concluded the Philippines must be captured as well. Ironically, by refusing to run such an operational risk, they wound up taking an even larger strategic risk, for the attack on Pearl Harbor was premised on the highly tenuous assumption of a short war with the United States followed by a negotiated peace that would allow Japan to keep its territorial gains. Japan bet that American public opinion would never countenance a prolonged and bloody Pacific war and that the combination of the blow to the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor and Japan’s erection of a hermetic defensive perimeter in the Central and South Pacific would convince America to throw in the towel. As actual events subsequently showed, that was a poor bet.

[stevep]

  oscssw , lordroel ,

  This is a very complex subject and I also have my doubts about what the US would do in this situation and have often argued that Japan should have avoided attacking the US.  Heard it argued either way as to whether Roosevelt would be able to get a dow.  Even if he did Japan's position would be drastically improved compared to OTL because as it was the US that declared war there would be less motivation for the war effort.  Also with Japan then attacking the Philippines while it was the plan, sitting around and doing nothing to relieve the islands would have been politically very difficult while an attempt to send a relief force it tempting fate as it fits into Japanese plans.  A disaster on such a mission, with the loss of a fair number of men and quite possibly at much of the fleet as at Pearl Harbour might have given Japan the exact conditions to prompt an overwhelming peace movement in the US.

  For Britain I suspect Churchill would declare war.  Because of his character, because the Free Dutch in charge of the DEI were allies and because he would realise how vulnerable British colonies and dominions including Australia, Malaya, N Borneo and Burma at least would be once the Japanese were established there.  Also possibly because both for racial reasons and given the poor Japanese performance against the Soviets in 39 and the similarly poor performance of the Soviets against the Finns in the Winter War Japanese strength was grossly underestimated.  This would be a disaster for Britain, possibly as bad as OTL although its likely that less allied losses would occur as Force Z wouldn't be present and similarly I doubt there would be time to send reinforcements to Malaya, although after that defending India and Australia would be difficult.

  However the saving grace here is that I can't see the Japanese striking in both directions.  They wouldn't assault Siberia on 22-6-41 without a drastic change of plans by Germany as Germany while asking for Japanese support once Operation Barbarossa started didn't include them in any of the planning.  As such they would have to decide to strike north, quickly allocate resources, then make such an attack and probably quickly find it was tougher than they expected and have additional resources drawn in.  Also as stated such an attack, even assuming that the occupation of southern FIC doesn't occur, would be likely to prompt a US embargo and hence start the clock clicking on oil supplies.  Without bases in the latter territory then a strike into SE Asia is a hell of a lot more difficult as there's no real capacity for land based air support for such operations.

  I suspect the other issue would be that people tend to project their ideas & viewpoints onto others, when it comes to how they will act.  As such, with the US engaged in a massive military build up including greatly strengthening the garrisons and offensive forces in the Philippines, they probably didn't believe that the US wouldn't go to war if Japan attack the British and/or Dutch.

  Steve

[oscssw]

Steve given the IJA favored going for the Northern Resource Zone in OTL, I'd think a Coordinated attack by the Germans and Japanese was a very logical step. I don't see the Japanese conducting this war on the fly but after long planning with the Germans. Japanese believed in detailed planning, even over planning in OTL.

Since taking the NEI oil fields was largely an IJN Op with minimal IJA support in the OTL I see no reason Japan could not support both ops for a short period, at the same time. Once the oil is secured, without the US at war with Japan, most of Japan's resources, as in the OTL would be free for use against the Soviets.

[stevep]

Apr 6, 2021 11:03:02 GMT oscssw said:

Steve given the IJA favored going for the Northern Resource Zone in OTL, I'd think a Coordinated attack by the Germans and Japanese was a very logical step. I don't see the Japanese conducting this war on the fly but after long planning with the Germans. Japanese believed in detailed planning, even over planning in OTL.

Since taking the NEI oil fields was largely an IJN Op with minimal IJA support in the OTL I see no reason Japan could not support both ops for a short period, at the same time. Once the oil is secured, without the US at war with Japan, most of Japan's resources, as in the OTL would be free for use against the Soviets.

  I take your point but from everything I've read the Germans didn't seek to co-ordinate operations with Japan against Russia prior to their own invasion and the Japanese government did seem to consider that it would have to be either north or south rather than both.  If nothing else the clash over resources as both being at war would mean that each would be demanding more of a dwindling pool - at least for oil until the southern resources are captured and repaired - and longer for others.

[oscssw]

Steve, we are talking about an alternate time line. As I understand it we are dealing with what would happen with different decisions than those made in the OTL right?

I am working on the basis of what is theoretically possible. My contention is the Japanese are free to pursue a joint attack on the Soviets and still get the oil IF they don't have to fight the USA.

I also consider the fact in the OTL IJA favored a Northern strategy as evidence they thought an attack on Siberia was practicable.  I suspect IF the Japanese know of the German invasion of the Soviet union it would strengthen the opinion of the IJA the Northern plan was even more likely to succeed. Furthermore, I would suppose Hitler would welcome a joint Op and do everything in his power to see close coordination between Germany and Japan was in his best interest, maybe to the point of providing the IJA with with a few of his best Panzer generals to assist the Japanese.  

Just think of the possibilities.   Rommel leading the IJA tank force into Siberia.  Remember the anti tank gun traps Rommel used against the Brits?  He used his tanks to lure the Brits into the killing fields of his AT guns and slaughtered them.

The Japanese type 99 AA is actually a copy of a German 88mm AA gun.

Maybe these tactics would decimate the Soviet armor advantage.

The poissibilities boggle the mind!  

I also have read the Indonesians met the Japanese as liberators and there was no material damage done to the oil facilities, which means they come on line to support the Japanese war effort almost immediately.

I am also counting on the US people rejecting any war with Japan as long as Japan does not attack the US directly.

Given those factors, is this a plausible scenario for a joint German and Japanese attack on the Soviets leading to
a permanently debilitating nervous breakdown of Uncle Joe followed by the Soviets suing for peace after Moscow falls in 1942?

Not to worry lordroel, I have not started drinking yet! Just think how inventive I will be if I do. 

[stevep]

Apr 6, 2021 13:34:17 GMT oscssw said:

Steve, we are talking about an alternate time line. As I understand it we are dealing with what would happen with different decisions than those made in the OTL right?

I am working on the basis of what is theoretically possible. My contention is the Japanese are free to pursue a joint attack on the Soviets and still get the oil IF they don't have to fight the USA.

I also consider the fact in the OTL IJA favored a Northern strategy as evidence they thought an attack on Siberia was practicable.  I suspect IF the Japanese know of the German invasion of the Soviet union it would strengthen the opinion of the IJA the Northern plan was even more likely to succeed. Furthermore, I would suppose Hitler would welcome a joint Op and do everything in his power to see close coordination between Germany and Japan was in his best interest, maybe to the point of providing the IJA with with a few of his best Panzer generals to assist the Japanese.  

Just think of the possibilities.   Rommel leading the IJA tank force into Siberia.  Remember the anti tank gun traps Rommel used against the Brits?  He used his tanks to lure the Brits into the killing fields of his AT guns and slaughtered them.

The Japanese type 99 AA is actually a copy of a German 88mm AA gun.

Maybe these tactics would decimate the Soviet armor advantage.

The poissibilities boggle the mind!  

I also have read the Indonesians met the Japanese as liberators and there was no material damage done to the oil facilities, which means they come on line to support the Japanese war effort almost immediately.

I am also counting on the US people rejecting any war with Japan as long as Japan does not attack the US directly.

Given those factors, is this a plausible scenario for a joint German and Japanese attack on the Soviets leading to
a permanently debilitating nervous breakdown of Uncle Joe followed by the Soviets suing for peace after Moscow falls in 1942?

Not to worry lordroel, I have not started drinking yet! Just think how inventive I will be if I do. 

  Its a possibility but I think, given the independence of each of the main fascists powers who only collaborated reluctantly and to a limited degree that its more likely that butterflies see Japan decide to attack Siberia in response to German requests after the German attack starts.  This is not only a smaller change but also more likely as that gives them a chance to see how successful the Germans are being.

  While the hot heads in the army wanted revenge for their defeat in Manchuria a couple of years before the more rational elements knew they had been comprehensively outfought so would be reluctant to support a new conflict with the Red Army once it looks to be on the ropes.    Just make sure they commit to it before any US and allies boycott come into place.  Possibly for some reason the occupation of southern FIC is delayed for a couple of months then follow on US reactions to the attack on the Soviets.

  I can't see Germany sending generals half way around the world both because both powers were intensely territorial and culturally very arrogant.  Italy only reluctantly accepted German help after their independent actions in Greece and N Africa ran into serious problems and after wards there were continued tensions.  This would be worsened in two more powerful and culturally alien nations such as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.  Even if it was agreed then I could see many Japanese refusing to listen to a foreigner, especially a westerner.  Not to mention the invasion of Russia is the core of Hitler's aims and he will want as many of his best men committed to leading German forces in that, not half way around the world with an ally who might decide for various reasons not to attack - such as western embargoes meaning they decide they can't go into Siberia because the south has a greater priority.

  Furthermore the only practical way I could see Germans reaching Japan is via the Soviets and their likely to be concerned about why Germany is sending generals to Japan and could raise some issues.  Even if they didn't those people are then lost to Germany until the Soviets are totally defeated and Axis personnel can move freely throughout its territory.  While the Germans are confident - although some continued to have doubts - this is an issue. 

[oscssw]

Apr 7, 2021 14:54:20 GMT stevep said:

 Its a possibility but I think, given the independence of each of the main fascists powers who only collaborated reluctantly and to a limited degree that its more likely that butterflies see Japan decide to attack Siberia in response to German requests after the German attack starts.  This is not only a smaller change but also more likely as that gives them a chance to see how successful the Germans are being.

  While the hot heads in the army wanted revenge for their defeat in Manchuria a couple of years before the more rational elements knew they had been comprehensively outfought so would be reluctant to support a new conflict with the Red Army once it looks to be on the ropes.    Just make sure they commit to it before any US and allies boycott come into place.  Possibly for some reason the occupation of southern FIC is delayed for a couple of months then follow on US reactions to the attack on the Soviets.

  I can't see Germany sending generals half way around the world both because both powers were intensely territorial and culturally very arrogant.  Italy only reluctantly accepted German help after their independent actions in Greece and N Africa ran into serious problems and after wards there were continued tensions.  This would be worsened in two more powerful and culturally alien nations such as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.  Even if it was agreed then I could see many Japanese refusing to listen to a foreigner, especially a westerner.  Not to mention the invasion of Russia is the core of Hitler's aims and he will want as many of his best men committed to leading German forces in that, not half way around the world with an ally who might decide for various reasons not to attack - such as western embargoes meaning they decide they can't go into Siberia because the south has a greater priority.

  Furthermore the only practical way I could see Germans reaching Japan is via the Soviets and their likely to be concerned about why Germany is sending generals to Japan and could raise some issues.  Even if they didn't those people are then lost to Germany until the Soviets are totally defeated and Axis personnel can move freely throughout its territory.  While the Germans are confident - although some continued to have doubts - this is an issue. 

All good points Steve. 

I think there has to be a way to get those German generals to Japan prior to Barbarossa without upsetting the Soviets.  How about over the border from France to Spain and then on to Lisbon and the Clipper to the USA.

Cross the US and board the Clipper for Manila.  Local connection to Tokyo.  Prior to US entry into war, the same route in reverse should be doable.

In order to save face I would not expect the Japanese to formally install Rommel and his fellow German Panzer officers to positions of command.  Given the Japanese genius for taking other folks ideas and then improving upon them, I'd suspect the IJA might still listen to them without them being in the formal chain of command of the IJA.  I believe the IJA had observers with the German forces that took Poland and the West.  These officers should have been very impressed and their reports to High Command should go a long way to convince the IJA that German advisors could be used to great advantage.

More to follow after I do more research.

[stevep]

Apr 7, 2021 17:10:34 GMT oscssw said:

Apr 7, 2021 14:54:20 GMT stevep said:

 Its a possibility but I think, given the independence of each of the main fascists powers who only collaborated reluctantly and to a limited degree that its more likely that butterflies see Japan decide to attack Siberia in response to German requests after the German attack starts.  This is not only a smaller change but also more likely as that gives them a chance to see how successful the Germans are being.

  While the hot heads in the army wanted revenge for their defeat in Manchuria a couple of years before the more rational elements knew they had been comprehensively outfought so would be reluctant to support a new conflict with the Red Army once it looks to be on the ropes.    Just make sure they commit to it before any US and allies boycott come into place.  Possibly for some reason the occupation of southern FIC is delayed for a couple of months then follow on US reactions to the attack on the Soviets.

  I can't see Germany sending generals half way around the world both because both powers were intensely territorial and culturally very arrogant.  Italy only reluctantly accepted German help after their independent actions in Greece and N Africa ran into serious problems and after wards there were continued tensions.  This would be worsened in two more powerful and culturally alien nations such as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.  Even if it was agreed then I could see many Japanese refusing to listen to a foreigner, especially a westerner.  Not to mention the invasion of Russia is the core of Hitler's aims and he will want as many of his best men committed to leading German forces in that, not half way around the world with an ally who might decide for various reasons not to attack - such as western embargoes meaning they decide they can't go into Siberia because the south has a greater priority.

  Furthermore the only practical way I could see Germans reaching Japan is via the Soviets and their likely to be concerned about why Germany is sending generals to Japan and could raise some issues.  Even if they didn't those people are then lost to Germany until the Soviets are totally defeated and Axis personnel can move freely throughout its territory.  While the Germans are confident - although some continued to have doubts - this is an issue. 

All good points Steve. 

I think there has to be a way to get those German generals to Japan prior to Barbarossa without upsetting the Soviets.  How about over the border from France to Spain and then on to Lisbon and the Clipper to the USA.

Cross the US and board the Clipper for Manila.  Local connection to Tokyo.  Prior to US entry into war, the same route in reverse should be doable.

In order to save face I would not expect the Japanese to formally install Rommel and his fellow German Panzer officers to positions of command.  Given the Japanese genius for taking other folks ideas and then improving upon them, I'd suspect the IJA might still listen to them without them being in the formal chain of command of the IJA.  I believe the IJA had observers with the German forces that took Poland and the West.  These officers should have been very impressed and their reports to High Command should go a long way to convince the IJA that German advisors could be used to great advantage.

More to follow after I do more research.

  I must admit I have my doubts but anyway I suspect Rommel wouldn't be one of them as at this time he's rather heavily involved in N Africa and in spring 41 making a big splash with his 1st campaign driving British forces out of Libya.  As such he's likely to be too busy to be moved in that time-span.  Unless he is switched before he launches that counter-attack, possibly if Hitler finds out he's about to breach the orders to stay on the defensive around Tripoli.  If he was moved then his replacement might obey orders in which case there are some substantial butterflies to the entire war in N Africa at least for a period.

[1bigrich]

A couple thoughts on this one:

The Japanese never interfered with Soviet merchantmen bringing supplies from he US west coast to Vladivostok. If Japan goes to war with the Soviet Union, that supply line is cut. First, that means Murmansk is the only avenue for the western allies to supply the Soviets until the Trans-Iranian Railway is seized in the August 1941 invasion of Iran. Even then, the railway was moving less than a thousand tons of cargo a day until the British expanded the rail yards and increased the amount of locomotives and rolling stock. By the second half of 1943, they were moving 5,400 tons per day on Iranian railroads.

Soviet logistics as immensely helped by the US supply of locomotives. Baldwin alone built about 1000, and another thousand were from other US manufacturers. An example, E2201:

upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/%D0%93%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B7_%D0%95%D0%90_2201_%2812%29.jpg

Many of those went to Vladivostok year-round where they could be put right onto the rails and enter service. The Russian railroads used 1520mm guage rails; Standard gauge is 1435mm. Getting those into Soviet service through Iran would be difficult at very least; the prospect would be to have specialized cars that could transport them to 1520mm tracks, and tunnel heights might make that impossible. The southern part of the Iranian line has 144 tunnels in 165 miles of track. The break-of-gauge still exists to this day at the Iran-Turkmenistan boarder. But hurting Soviet logistics would not only impeded war-fighting, manufacturing and mobility, it would also impact food distribution. A lot of food for the peoples of the Soviet Union came from the West during the war; less logistics could mean starvation in some parts of the country.

While the Soviets have a material quality advantage of the IJA, they are fighting for their very existence against Germany. They would have to fight Japan with the weaker hand, as it were. I think in the east they would give ground, let the Japanese occupy whatever they wanted in Siberia and let them over-extend themselves. The one question for me would be what about Japanese airpower? Could the IJAF make the shift to close support of ground troops? Perhaps with German advice?

As an aside, this might be of interest

sites.google.com/site/junkersju390/home/ju-390-flight-to-japan

It would be easy to fly plans for panzars, as well as advisors/personnel and coordinate operations if both Japan and Germany are at war with the Soviets at the same time via this air communications link.

I don't doubt the Allies will win in the end, especially if the US gets involved at some point, but with a two-front war, things will not go easy for Soviets.

My thoughts,

[lordroel]

Apr 11, 2021 8:19:34 GMT 1bigrich said:

A couple thoughts on this one:

The Japanese never interfered with Soviet merchantmen bringing supplies from he US west coast to Vladivostok.

Except on May 1st 1942 when a Japanese submarine sank SS Angarstroy thinking it was a American.

[1bigrich]

Apr 11, 2021 8:33:10 GMT lordroel said:

Except on May 1st 1942 when a Japanese submarine sank SS Angarstroy thinking it was a American.

To your point, that was mistaken identity rather than Japanese policy.

No different than the nine Spanish merchantmen sunk by U-boats in the Atlantic, or six six Irish.

Regards,