Italy stays out of the war in 1940. Effects on the British Empire's fight?

[James G]

Let us say that Italy doesn't jump into the war in June 1940 and Mussolini waits for a 'perfect' time. He remains an ally of Hitler and there is the Greece mess still.
Without a fight in the Med. and North Africa, where does the UK take the fight to Germany / its allies?
Does Japan put up a threatening move, taking IndoChina, and if it does, what UK forces can move to the Far East? Would that stop the Japanese?

[stevep]

Apr 18, 2021 19:10:17 GMT James G said:

Let us say that Italy doesn't jump into the war in June 1940 and Mussolini waits for a 'perfect' time. He remains an ally of Hitler and there is the Greece mess still.
Without a fight in the Med. and North Africa, where does the UK take the fight to Germany / its allies?
Does Japan put up a threatening move, taking IndoChina, and if it does, what UK forces can move to the Far East? Would that stop the Japanese?

  James

  Assuming everything else goes the same way then the 1st question is would Britain declare war on Italy in support of Greece.  Its probably not a very intelligent thing to do militarily although it does given Britain a chance to decide when things happen.  However was there any guarantee of Greek neutrality/borders like there was for Poland?  Plus given that Churchill [and some of the military according to some reports] saw Greece as a foothold to get back into Europe and also a position from which Ploiesti could possibly be attacked.  It may not be wise but I can see an argument for doing it.  Or Britain sending some sort of military aid to Greece, although in late 40 there was little available which might be the basis for an Italian dow on the UK.  If war develops with Italy via those means then relatively little changes.

  If this doesn't happen then how does the behaviour of all the powers but probably especially Italy and Japan change?  Italy has substantial forces in both Libya and Ethiopia which pose threats to vital British interests and could attack at any point.  Their weakness isn't that clear at this point although they might display it against Greece, although that latter can't last far into 1941 without external aid even with no German support for Italy.

  If Britain isn't clearly tied down in the ME then is Japan more cautious?  Or does Britain send more forces east in which case could that make Japan more aggressive earlier.

  If Britain doesn't support Greece does the anti-Axis coup in Yugoslavia still happen?  If it doesn't then that stays a weakly pro-Axis state, which might deter a later attack by Italy.  Also that would mean that the Germans would have a bit more resources for the opening stages of Barbarossa?

  If Britain isn't fighting extensively in the ME then does that delay the exhaustion of its fiscal reserves much?  That would in turn delay the introduction of L-L.  The latter not starting until after Barbarossa might change the dynamics in terms of US aid to the USSR.

  If Britain isn't in open conflict with Italy after June 40 does that change its reaction to Vichy France?  Most importantly would it prevent the Attack on Mers-el-Kébir and what butterflies might come from that?

  If Britain isn't at war with Italy for say a year or two, say it takes until late 41 before Italy has overrun Greece and then recovered from the effort, then Britain has a big boost in terms of not having the drain of both combat in the Med - by land, sea and air - and also being able to move men, equipment, supplies etc via the Med rather than around the Cape of Good Hope.  A lot would depend on how Britain spent this boost as it could be wasted or could mean that Britain is able to strengthen its position in many areas including the Atlantic, ME and SE Asia.

  In terms of Britain taking the war to Germany the only way in the short term without supporting Greece would probably be an even larger strategic bombing campaign.

  Anyway initial thoughts on the matter.

  Steve

[James G]

Apr 19, 2021 15:05:48 GMT stevep said:

Apr 18, 2021 19:10:17 GMT James G said:

Let us say that Italy doesn't jump into the war in June 1940 and Mussolini waits for a 'perfect' time. He remains an ally of Hitler and there is the Greece mess still.
Without a fight in the Med. and North Africa, where does the UK take the fight to Germany / its allies?
Does Japan put up a threatening move, taking IndoChina, and if it does, what UK forces can move to the Far East? Would that stop the Japanese?

  James

  Assuming everything else goes the same way then the 1st question is would Britain declare war on Italy in support of Greece.  Its probably not a very intelligent thing to do militarily although it does given Britain a chance to decide when things happen.  However was there any guarantee of Greek neutrality/borders like there was for Poland?  Plus given that Churchill [and some of the military according to some reports] saw Greece as a foothold to get back into Europe and also a position from which Ploiesti could possibly be attacked.  It may not be wise but I can see an argument for doing it.  Or Britain sending some sort of military aid to Greece, although in late 40 there was little available which might be the basis for an Italian dow on the UK.  If war develops with Italy via those means then relatively little changes.

  If this doesn't happen then how does the behaviour of all the powers but probably especially Italy and Japan change?  Italy has substantial forces in both Libya and Ethiopia which pose threats to vital British interests and could attack at any point.  Their weakness isn't that clear at this point although they might display it against Greece, although that latter can't last far into 1941 without external aid even with no German support for Italy.

  If Britain isn't clearly tied down in the ME then is Japan more cautious?  Or does Britain send more forces east in which case could that make Japan more aggressive earlier.

  If Britain doesn't support Greece does the anti-Axis coup in Yugoslavia still happen?  If it doesn't then that stays a weakly pro-Axis state, which might deter a later attack by Italy.  Also that would mean that the Germans would have a bit more resources for the opening stages of Barbarossa?

  If Britain isn't fighting extensively in the ME then does that delay the exhaustion of its fiscal reserves much?  That would in turn delay the introduction of L-L.  The latter not starting until after Barbarossa might change the dynamics in terms of US aid to the USSR.

  If Britain isn't in open conflict with Italy after June 40 does that change its reaction to Vichy France?  Most importantly would it prevent the Attack on Mers-el-Kébir and what butterflies might come from that?

  If Britain isn't at war with Italy for say a year or two, say it takes until late 41 before Italy has overrun Greece and then recovered from the effort, then Britain has a big boost in terms of not having the drain of both combat in the Med - by land, sea and air - and also being able to move men, equipment, supplies etc via the Med rather than around the Cape of Good Hope.  A lot would depend on how Britain spent this boost as it could be wasted or could mean that Britain is able to strengthen its position in many areas including the Atlantic, ME and SE Asia.

  In terms of Britain taking the war to Germany the only way in the short term without supporting Greece would probably be an even larger strategic bombing campaign.

  Anyway initial thoughts on the matter.

  Steve

Yep, that's half a million cans of worms.
Churchill always had his eye on the Near East (Greece/Turkey) too, making something there rather likely.

[575]

At least Britain have most of 2.ANZAG in ME theatre training. Churchill may well decide to send troops to Greece but as long as the Greeks are able to hold their own leave them do and supply with arms - ITTL they may get their US fighterplanes.

Turkey - think it would be unwise too to do something to annoy that driving it into the "Axis". The Turks may end up holding a line in the mountainous east before German troops arrive through Romania and Bulgaria.

Vichy-France.. difficult one though why wouldn't Churchill go for the French Navy. Even if it won't beef up the Italians in the Med it will be a constant pain in the rear just to watch over - resources better used somewhere else like mid-Atlantic or FE. De Gaulle may still team up with the Brits but depending on Brits-Vichy relations he may have less support in the French Colonial Empire which certainly in the ME may deter doing something to Turkey as it would either mean to north from Mosul or through Syria/Lebanon. First option may leave the Turks even more troops to defend a lesser area, second will draw the Vichy in siding with the Turks. Vichy Levant problem will be close to no suppport moved in as OTL as Greece is still uoccupied and those would have to go by the German route and through Romania and Bulgaria - second Churchill would have to neutralize the French Navy!

Its 17 months till the Japanese may enter - the situation in the FE doesn't seem altered.
17 months for Churchill to ponder where to use the ME strategic reserve..

[1bigrich]

Apr 18, 2021 19:10:17 GMT James G said:

Let us say that Italy doesn't jump into the war in June 1940 and Mussolini waits for a 'perfect' time. He remains an ally of Hitler and there is the Greece mess still.
Without a fight in the Med. and North Africa, where does the UK take the fight to Germany / its allies?
Does Japan put up a threatening move, taking IndoChina, and if it does, what UK forces can move to the Far East? Would that stop the Japanese?

James,

If Italy doesn't jump into attacking a falling France in June of 1940, I'm not sure Greece would still be a target.  Mussolini leapt to war because he thought the war would be over soon and he wanted to be at the table to get a few scraps.    Greece didn't come under attack by Italy until late October.   I think the Italian thinking might change, stay on the sidelines without provoking the UK.   Italian commerce is controlled by Britain after all, via Suez and Gibraltar.   The war has dragged on for more than six more months, and 'war will be over soon' view should have passed.   Italy still needs oil, and at this point I don't think Italy can count on German-controlled imports even if they are a non-belligerent ally. 

On the other hand, Mussolini seems to have been about as intellectually nimble as the Jahre Viking, so nothing is certain. 

No Mediterranean Campaign redounds greatly to the benefit of the UK and Commonwealth, but especially to the Royal Navy and British logistics.   Essentially, there are no German/hostile forces on any Mediterranean shore, meaning the Med is 'safe passage' for merchantmen carrying goods to and from the UK.   Not only do forces in Middle East not have to be supplied (garrison forces needing less than forces actively in combat with large opposing forces) but there is also a benefit in shorter transit times.  No need for heavily escorted convoys through the Med, no merchants going around the Cape of Good Hope.  Those shorter transit times also mean more good can be carried by the same hulls, resulting in more efficiency as those ships will be available for new cargoes sooner.  I think there will still be some U-boats in the Med, but they won't be as large a threat without open bases (some may be replenished though Spain, but it would never be numbers possible if Italy were an active ally.)

Historically, the RAF wanted to purchase a number of Re 2000s from Italy (I don't recall the numbers, but several hundred).    That alone could significantly help the RAF.   In the Far East they would be better than Buffaloes.   In Europe, even if not on the front line, they would be great for training.    Speaking of the Buffalo, Tom Blackburn said in his book, The Jolly Rogers, that when the Buffaloes were pulled from the front line, they greatly improved training because new pilots now had a high-performance, stressed-metal skinned MONOPLANE fighter to practice air combat in.  

I think there would still be a Mediterranean Fleet, but it would not be as large as the historic war-time organization.    I think the RN might use the Med more for training and work ups, assigning new ships to the Med to gain experience in a more peaceful environment, while the veterans continue to prosecute the war in the Atlantic.  I think the Gibraltar Force/Force H would be more actively involved in the Atlantic, and would likely have more modern ships than the Med Fleet.

I think without a desert campaign, the situation in the Far East should be better, but once Russia is attacked, forces intended or stationed there might wind up on Germany's Eastern Front.   If an Eastern Fleet is formed in the Fall of 1941, it might well be the QEs and Rs, Eagle and Ark Royal (though the latter is in need of refit and modernization, but that could be done at Singapore).  Hopefully the RAF will have Spitfires, Hurricanes, Tomahawks, Blenhiems and Beaufighters in Singapore with the Hudsons, but that might not be allowed.   Similarly the Army should have some tanks in Singapore, but again, they might be in Russia instead....

My thoughts,

[stevep]

May 29, 2021 13:41:38 GMT 1bigrich said:

Apr 18, 2021 19:10:17 GMT James G said:

Let us say that Italy doesn't jump into the war in June 1940 and Mussolini waits for a 'perfect' time. He remains an ally of Hitler and there is the Greece mess still.
Without a fight in the Med. and North Africa, where does the UK take the fight to Germany / its allies?
Does Japan put up a threatening move, taking IndoChina, and if it does, what UK forces can move to the Far East? Would that stop the Japanese?

James,

If Italy doesn't jump into attacking a falling France in June of 1940, I'm not sure Greece would still be a target.  Mussolini leapt to war because he thought the war would be over soon and he wanted to be at the table to get a few scraps.    Greece didn't come under attack by Italy until late October.   I think the Italian thinking might change, stay on the sidelines without provoking the UK.   Italian commerce is controlled by Britain after all, via Suez and Gibraltar.   The war has dragged on for more than six more months, and 'war will be over soon' view should have passed.   Italy still needs oil, and at this point I don't think Italy can count on German-controlled imports even if they are a non-belligerent ally. 

On the other hand, Mussolini seems to have been about as intellectually nimble as the Jahre Viking, so nothing is certain. 

No Mediterranean Campaign redounds greatly to the benefit of the UK and Commonwealth, but especially to the Royal Navy and British logistics.   Essentially, there are no German/hostile forces on any Mediterranean shore, meaning the Med is 'safe passage' for merchantmen carrying goods to and from the UK.   Not only do forces in Middle East not have to be supplied (garrison forces needing less than forces actively in combat with large opposing forces) but there is also a benefit in shorter transit times.  No need for heavily escorted convoys through the Med, no merchants going around the Cape of Good Hope.  Those shorter transit times also mean more good can be carried by the same hulls, resulting in more efficiency as those ships will be available for new cargoes sooner.  I think there will still be some U-boats in the Med, but they won't be as large a threat without open bases (some may be replenished though Spain, but it would never be numbers possible if Italy were an active ally.)

Historically, the RAF wanted to purchase a number of Re 2000s from Italy (I don't recall the numbers, but several hundred).    That alone could significantly help the RAF.   In the Far East they would be better than Buffaloes.   In Europe, even if not on the front line, they would be great for training.    Speaking of the Buffalo, Tom Blackburn said in his book, The Jolly Rogers, that when the Buffaloes were pulled from the front line, they greatly improved training because new pilots now had a high-performance, stressed-metal skinned MONOPLANE fighter to practice air combat in.  

I think there would still be a Mediterranean Fleet, but it would not be as large as the historic war-time organization.    I think the RN might use the Med more for training and work ups, assigning new ships to the Med to gain experience in a more peaceful environment, while the veterans continue to prosecute the war in the Atlantic.  I think the Gibraltar Force/Force H would be more actively involved in the Atlantic, and would likely have more modern ships than the Med Fleet.

I think without a desert campaign, the situation in the Far East should be better, but once Russia is attacked, forces intended or stationed there might wind up on Germany's Eastern Front.   If an Eastern Fleet is formed in the Fall of 1941, it might well be the QEs and Rs, Eagle and Ark Royal (though the latter is in need of refit and modernization, but that could be done at Singapore).  Hopefully the RAF will have Spitfires, Hurricanes, Tomahawks, Blenhiems and Beaufighters in Singapore with the Hudsons, but that might not be allowed.   Similarly the Army should have some tanks in Singapore, but again, they might be in Russia instead....

My thoughts,

  1bigrich, James G,

  Good point on the possibility that Italy might not attack Greece.  Although I suspect that Mussolini would want to show he's a great leader of a powerful nation and he did desire land from both Greece and Yugoslavia, among others.  He might even think that with Britain on the defensive and him not formally allied to Germany Britain would be unwilling to go to war with Italy.  Difficult to tell how things will go here.

  As you say there are massive advantages to Britain from having no fighting in N Africa and the Med.  Which makes me think that if Italy does nothing sooner or later Hitler might want to establish a base in the Med from which subs could be supported and aircraft operate against those very important British supply lines.  Either by press ganging an 'ally' into the war or conquering somewhere.  However that could take some time or not occur at all if Italy continues to stay neutral throughout the war.  The biggest possibility here might be Hitler trying to turn the screw more on Franco but there could be some action in the Balkans,  although if Britain is lucky then the lure of the east might well mean Germany never goes that way.

  One other wildcard here?  I know that Italian attacks on the French border were fairly ineffective but how might no direct attack from Italy or threats to locations such as N Africa affect French decisions.  Unlikely that France will avoid falling by this stage but could it mean that the elements who wish to fight on from N Africa more powerful?  Which in turn might then close the loop as with continued resistance from France Hitler is free to offer French territory/colonies to both Italy and Spain.  However if that doesn't happen then things could be even better for the allies with the bulk of the French fleet and its colonies continuing the war and a longer and more costly battle for France for the Germans.  Plenty of potential butterflies here.

  In terms of continued Italian neutrality then that has one plus side for Germany, especially when the latter attacks the Soviets and cuts off trade to the east.    With a desire to keep Italy neutral then Britain can't afford to press it too much on its imports and as such it can be a conduct for vital imports to Germany, albeit that Mussolini is likely to demand a high profit from such operations.  Also there are shifts in manpower and military resources.  The Germans don't have the demand of maintaining the Afrika Corp and also air units in the Med or supplies to Italy but at the same time their not going to have Italian troops supporting them in Russia.  Which wouldn't make a big difference in 41 as that was overwhelmingly a German operation with support from the Romanians and Finns especially but from 42 onward as German manpower was stretched that could be an issue.

  I can't see British forces serving on the eastern front apart from possibly some air units for the simple reason that while offered Stalin refused such an idea.  It would mean too much contact between British people and the Soviet subjects for one thing.  Probably a lot more supplies to Russia, initially via Murmansk and then also Iran but not fighting troops. 

  How those changes affect the Far East depends on a hell of a lot of circumstances of course and many butterflies that will flutter.  Assuming that the Med stays quiet then Britain still has to maintain precautions against Italy joining the Axis so forces will have to be maintained in Egypt and E Africa against that potential.  Plus possibly also against Vichy French intervention if that's still formed.  However without the OTL fighting there's going to be a lot more land, air and naval forces available both for the war in Europe and potentially for the Far East.  I suspect relatively few of the additional resources will go east because Britain, especially assuming Churchill is in charge, will throw more effort into the war against Germany which will probably be even more into the bomber offensive.  However it definitely leaves more free to be sent east as tensions rise and/or when war actually comes.  One big factor is that the bulk of British subs were designed for war in the Pacific again Japan.  OTL they were pulled westward to operate against German held Norway and then into the Med where they took heavy losses.  If their sent back into the Far East that could have a significant effect there.  Plus simply the huge losses that the RN took in the Med in 1941 will be avoided should mean more capital ships and cruisers will be available.  Plus as you say a lot more MS available to move things.  Also its likely that a lot more Australian and Indian forces will be deployed in the region. Of course Britain also has to consider a potential Italian attack if it strips too much from the Med and Africa.

  Steve

[575]

stevep;

If France fight on slightly longer there may be no basis for a Vichy Government. This also makes for German bases on the Cote d'Azur all the way to Spain. With Toulon they have a base for their U-boats and E-Boats.
Corsica will be more than difficult to defend for the French. OTOH there is only on airport on marshy ground! Not much airoperations out of it before the LW have rolled out some concrete. Anyway the distance to French NA is great enough to prevent much airbattle.
If the French is still in and without having to take out Italian Libya what to do next. French reinforce Indochina and blunt the Japanese in that area?
The RN will love to have the extra Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers and Submarines.
The French still have their Gold Boullion in the Bank of Dakar so they may feel like going their own ways with orders on aircraft and trucks still placed with US industry. They will of course want to go back to France ASAP but where to train Amphibious Warfare in Europe?
With de Gaulle a minor Minister of Cabinet no Normandie fighter Regiment in SU.

If France is out as OTL the Germans may want to occupy the south coast of France or part of it for U-boat bases to get at the British.
Still it won't make for much other action except long-range reconnaisance flights over the western Med.

[1bigrich]

May 30, 2021 10:33:59 GMT stevep said:

  1bigrich , James G ,

  Good point on the possibility that Italy might not attack Greece.  Although I suspect that Mussolini would want to show he's a great leader of a powerful nation and he did desire land from both Greece and Yugoslavia, among others.  He might even think that with Britain on the defensive and him not formally allied to Germany Britain would be unwilling to go to war with Italy.  Difficult to tell how things will go here.

  As you say there are massive advantages to Britain from having no fighting in N Africa and the Med.  Which makes me think that if Italy does nothing sooner or later Hitler might want to establish a base in the Med from which subs could be supported and aircraft operate against those very important British supply lines.  Either by press ganging an 'ally' into the war or conquering somewhere.  However that could take some time or not occur at all if Italy continues to stay neutral throughout the war.  The biggest possibility here might be Hitler trying to turn the screw more on Franco but there could be some action in the Balkans,  although if Britain is lucky then the lure of the east might well mean Germany never goes that way.

[/div]

Hi Steve,

I think that's a possibility,but I think once Barbarossa is in the works, a Balkans campaign would be unlikely.

Which brings up another point: How does not having to supply Italy with petroleum products, and additional troops and material affect Germany's campaign in Russia?

  One other wildcard here?  I know that Italian attacks on the French border were fairly ineffective but how might no direct attack from Italy or threats to locations such as N Africa affect French decisions.  Unlikely that France will avoid falling by this stage but could it mean that the elements who wish to fight on from N Africa more powerful?  Which in turn might then close the loop as with continued resistance from France Hitler is free to offer French territory/colonies to both Italy and Spain.  However if that doesn't happen then things could be even better for the allies with the bulk of the French fleet and its colonies continuing the war and a longer and more costly battle for France for the Germans.  Plenty of potential butterflies here.

I think things would largely go the same for France. Metropolitan France collapses, the Germans occupy the Atlantic coast and a Vichy government takes hold. I think there will still be Free French, possibly still under De Gaulle or possibly someone else. I think for the navy to fight on, Admiral Darlan has to escape France. He was too respected in the MN, but he was also part of the government and loyal to a fault. I think he could have been a Free French leader.

Speaking of the government, I think France was in the hands of too many men of World War I experience. I have said before I wonder if younger or different leadership for Army might have made a difference.

Gamelin was 68 in 1940. He was replaced by Weygand, recalled from Syria, who was 73 at the time. Pétain was 78 when he became Minister of War in 1934, and turned 84 in 1940.

Gamelin's departure came just as he was about to launch a counter-offensive to cut off the German divisions that had punched through the French Lines. Weygand cancelled it, only to launch it when it was too late.

For a specific option, I wonder if d'Espèrey, by all accounts a pretty good general in WWI, might have made a difference. His campaign in Greece and the Balkans in the First World War was competently run despite the fact his army was a mixed bag (French, Greeks, Italians, Serbs and British), and his experience was taking ground, not holding it. But he was the same age as Pétain and was well into retirement when the Second World War started.

But I think when the blitz tore through France, they didn't know how to react. They just accepted defeat because their experience told them they were defeated instead of looking at options.

  In terms of continued Italian neutrality then that has one plus side for Germany, especially when the latter attacks the Soviets and cuts off trade to the east.    With a desire to keep Italy neutral then Britain can't afford to press it too much on its imports and as such it can be a conduct for vital imports to Germany, albeit that Mussolini is likely to demand a high profit from such operations.  Also there are shifts in manpower and military resources.  The Germans don't have the demand of maintaining the Afrika Corp and also air units in the Med or supplies to Italy but at the same time their not going to have Italian troops supporting them in Russia.  Which wouldn't make a big difference in 41 as that was overwhelmingly a German operation with support from the Romanians and Finns especially but from 42 onward as German manpower was stretched that could be an issue.

I think Italy could put itself in a very good position, trading with both sides, having observers with both sides, and sitting out the war, it status as a European power intact.

Several years ago on the BC board (the EZ Board days) I posited a hypothetical where a Monarchist coup ousts Mussolini and a new government is formed. Italy stays out of the war and decides to sell the four rebuilt battleships. The question was who would want them. There were a number of responses, but it was posited that the Netherlands might want the first pair as a shortcut to capital ships for the Far East while the 1047s are building. The consensus on the second pair was the UK would buy them to keep them out of anyone else's hands. I've even written some fiction on the four ships (not on the web).

  I can't see British forces serving on the eastern front apart from possibly some air units for the simple reason that while offered Stalin refused such an idea.  It would mean too much contact between British people and the Soviet subjects for one thing.  Probably a lot more supplies to Russia, initially via Murmansk and then also Iran but not fighting troops. 

I wasn't trying to imply British ground forces (or air forces for that matter) would be on the Eastern Front, but I think British tanks and aircraft could well be given to the Russians instead of used to reinforce the Empire and stockpiled for future use against Germany.

  How those changes affect the Far East depends on a hell of a lot of circumstances of course and many butterflies that will flutter.  Assuming that the Med stays quiet then Britain still has to maintain precautions against Italy joining the Axis so forces will have to be maintained in Egypt and E Africa against that potential.  Plus possibly also against Vichy French intervention if that's still formed.  However without the OTL fighting there's going to be a lot more land, air and naval forces available both for the war in Europe and potentially for the Far East.  I suspect relatively few of the additional resources will go east because Britain, especially assuming Churchill is in charge, will throw more effort into the war against Germany which will probably be even more into the bomber offensive.  However it definitely leaves more free to be sent east as tensions rise and/or when war actually comes.  One big factor is that the bulk of British subs were designed for war in the Pacific again Japan.  OTL they were pulled westward to operate against German held Norway and then into the Med where they took heavy losses.  If their sent back into the Far East that could have a significant effect there.  Plus simply the huge losses that the RN took in the Med in 1941 will be avoided should mean more capital ships and cruisers will be available.  Plus as you say a lot more MS available to move things.  Also its likely that a lot more Australian and Indian forces will be deployed in the region. Of course Britain also has to consider a potential Italian attack if it strips too much from the Med and Africa.

  Steve

[/quote]

I agree, what goes East depends on what is lost and what the threat situation is in the Med. But largely, if the RN is only facing the Germans in active combat, they had a lot of resources, and not just in capital ships.

I think Australia and New Zealand will still pull their ships back to their waters. but the RN should be in a better position in the East.

Regards,

[575]

Some time ago I found an Italian writing on the coal situation in Italy up to WWII may be of interest www.resilience.org/stories/2010-04-12/dark-side-coal-some-historical-insights-energy-and-economy/
Generally without British coal since 1920 Italy had to get its coal from Germany and stick to Germany unless the Brits sold some of its own. Italian biased but anyway. Should the US be willing to sell coal to Italy it might do the trick?

[stevep]

May 31, 2021 1:25:18 GMT 1bigrich said:

May 30, 2021 10:33:59 GMT stevep said:

  1bigrich , James G ,

  Good point on the possibility that Italy might not attack Greece.  Although I suspect that Mussolini would want to show he's a great leader of a powerful nation and he did desire land from both Greece and Yugoslavia, among others.  He might even think that with Britain on the defensive and him not formally allied to Germany Britain would be unwilling to go to war with Italy.  Difficult to tell how things will go here.

  As you say there are massive advantages to Britain from having no fighting in N Africa and the Med.  Which makes me think that if Italy does nothing sooner or later Hitler might want to establish a base in the Med from which subs could be supported and aircraft operate against those very important British supply lines.  Either by press ganging an 'ally' into the war or conquering somewhere.  However that could take some time or not occur at all if Italy continues to stay neutral throughout the war.  The biggest possibility here might be Hitler trying to turn the screw more on Franco but there could be some action in the Balkans,  although if Britain is lucky then the lure of the east might well mean Germany never goes that way.

[/div]

Hi Steve,

I think that's a possibility,but I think once Barbarossa is in the works, a Balkans campaign would be unlikely.

Which brings up another point: How does not having to supply Italy with petroleum products, and additional troops and material affect Germany's campaign in Russia?

  One other wildcard here?  I know that Italian attacks on the French border were fairly ineffective but how might no direct attack from Italy or threats to locations such as N Africa affect French decisions.  Unlikely that France will avoid falling by this stage but could it mean that the elements who wish to fight on from N Africa more powerful?  Which in turn might then close the loop as with continued resistance from France Hitler is free to offer French territory/colonies to both Italy and Spain.  However if that doesn't happen then things could be even better for the allies with the bulk of the French fleet and its colonies continuing the war and a longer and more costly battle for France for the Germans.  Plenty of potential butterflies here.

I think things would largely go the same for France. Metropolitan France collapses, the Germans occupy the Atlantic coast and a Vichy government takes hold. I think there will still be Free French, possibly still under De Gaulle or possibly someone else. I think for the navy to fight on, Admiral Darlan has to escape France. He was too respected in the MN, but he was also part of the government and loyal to a fault. I think he could have been a Free French leader.

Speaking of the government, I think France was in the hands of too many men of World War I experience. I have said before I wonder if younger or different leadership for Army might have made a difference.

Gamelin was 68 in 1940. He was replaced by Weygand, recalled from Syria, who was 73 at the time. Pétain was 78 when he became Minister of War in 1934, and turned 84 in 1940.

Gamelin's departure came just as he was about to launch a counter-offensive to cut off the German divisions that had punched through the French Lines. Weygand cancelled it, only to launch it when it was too late.

For a specific option, I wonder if d'Espèrey, by all accounts a pretty good general in WWI, might have made a difference. His campaign in Greece and the Balkans in the First World War was competently run despite the fact his army was a mixed bag (French, Greeks, Italians, Serbs and British), and his experience was taking ground, not holding it. But he was the same age as Pétain and was well into retirement when the Second World War started.

But I think when the blitz tore through France, they didn't know how to react. They just accepted defeat because their experience told them they were defeated instead of looking at options.

  In terms of continued Italian neutrality then that has one plus side for Germany, especially when the latter attacks the Soviets and cuts off trade to the east.    With a desire to keep Italy neutral then Britain can't afford to press it too much on its imports and as such it can be a conduct for vital imports to Germany, albeit that Mussolini is likely to demand a high profit from such operations.  Also there are shifts in manpower and military resources.  The Germans don't have the demand of maintaining the Afrika Corp and also air units in the Med or supplies to Italy but at the same time their not going to have Italian troops supporting them in Russia.  Which wouldn't make a big difference in 41 as that was overwhelmingly a German operation with support from the Romanians and Finns especially but from 42 onward as German manpower was stretched that could be an issue.

I think Italy could put itself in a very good position, trading with both sides, having observers with both sides, and sitting out the war, it status as a European power intact.

Several years ago on the BC board (the EZ Board days) I posited a hypothetical where a Monarchist coup ousts Mussolini and a new government is formed. Italy stays out of the war and decides to sell the four rebuilt battleships. The question was who would want them. There were a number of responses, but it was posited that the Netherlands might want the first pair as a shortcut to capital ships for the Far East while the 1047s are building. The consensus on the second pair was the UK would buy them to keep them out of anyone else's hands. I've even written some fiction on the four ships (not on the web).

  I can't see British forces serving on the eastern front apart from possibly some air units for the simple reason that while offered Stalin refused such an idea.  It would mean too much contact between British people and the Soviet subjects for one thing.  Probably a lot more supplies to Russia, initially via Murmansk and then also Iran but not fighting troops. 

I wasn't trying to imply British ground forces (or air forces for that matter) would be on the Eastern Front, but I think British tanks and aircraft could well be given to the Russians instead of used to reinforce the Empire and stockpiled for future use against Germany.

  How those changes affect the Far East depends on a hell of a lot of circumstances of course and many butterflies that will flutter.  Assuming that the Med stays quiet then Britain still has to maintain precautions against Italy joining the Axis so forces will have to be maintained in Egypt and E Africa against that potential.  Plus possibly also against Vichy French intervention if that's still formed.  However without the OTL fighting there's going to be a lot more land, air and naval forces available both for the war in Europe and potentially for the Far East.  I suspect relatively few of the additional resources will go east because Britain, especially assuming Churchill is in charge, will throw more effort into the war against Germany which will probably be even more into the bomber offensive.  However it definitely leaves more free to be sent east as tensions rise and/or when war actually comes.  One big factor is that the bulk of British subs were designed for war in the Pacific again Japan.  OTL they were pulled westward to operate against German held Norway and then into the Med where they took heavy losses.  If their sent back into the Far East that could have a significant effect there.  Plus simply the huge losses that the RN took in the Med in 1941 will be avoided should mean more capital ships and cruisers will be available.  Plus as you say a lot more MS available to move things.  Also its likely that a lot more Australian and Indian forces will be deployed in the region. Of course Britain also has to consider a potential Italian attack if it strips too much from the Med and Africa.

  Steve

[/quote]

I agree, what goes East depends on what is lost and what the threat situation is in the Med. But largely, if the RN is only facing the Germans in active combat, they had a lot of resources, and not just in capital ships.

I think Australia and New Zealand will still pull their ships back to their waters. but the RN should be in a better position in the East.

Regards,

[/quote][/div]

  1bigrich,

  Replying here to points as I see them as otherwise its getting rather too many layers of embedding.

a)  Agree once Barbarossa starts then its very unlikely that Germany gets involved in the Balkans directly, unless either Britain or Italy does something and they feel a need to respond.  If say by 43 Britain is in a stronger position and the eastern war is going roughly as OTL that might become practical for Britain but then I doubt Greece would welcome British troops under those circumstances, nor Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania will be in the Axis camp.  As such the Balkans could have a quiet war, at least until the Red Army comes calling.

b)  Italy could suffer for petrol and is rather between a rock and a hard place if its decided to stay neutral.  Germany will be unwilling to supply it when it needs everything itself and if Italy is not supporting them.  Britain might be unwilling to sell on the fear that some could end up in German hands.  Ditto with the US as it presumably becomes more heavily involved although possibly some deals could be made like with Spain OTL.  Italy will want more than it was using pre-war anyway, given its own military build up which isn't going to stop with a world war raging around it.  Both the expansion of the navy and air force especially let alone training to keep them proficient will demand a lot.  Although as you say they could get rid of the old rebuilds as the new capital ships enter service.

  In terms of manpower and other military resources it probably balances out.  Germany doesn't have to send men and equipment to N Africa and later Italy itself but won't have Italian manpower in the east. Which isn't important in 41 but was in 42 and to a lesser degree later. Nor in the Balkans but without Mussolini's actions Yugoslavia might not end up being carved up and Greece be occupied so less/no occupation forces would be needed here.  Thinking about it Hitler might pay at least some attention to a possible back stab if/when things start going badly for Germany but that's unlikely to be significant.

c)  Yes too much of the French military were very old and the mindset was too set in the fixed warfare of the previous conflict. I can't see France holding and think something like the OTL result is the most likely but there's always the chance without Italian intervention that the pro-resistance politicians could win rather than lose so mentioned it as an option.

d)  Yes Italy could make quite a killing financially/economically if it plays its cards right.  We are talking about Benny here but its a possibility once he realises that Britain is going to continue fighting and Germany can't quickly know us out.  Plus IIRC his military build up was planned to be completed in about 42-43 so it could be assorted military and political figures persuade him to wait until then and then throw a fully mobilised Italy into the fray especially if they think the other powers are exhausted.  Of course if things go as OTL by 43 the US is in the war and sending masses of equipment to its allies as well as building up large forces itself so that could persuade him to continue staying out and making money.  Of course the big issue might be regime survival as hard liners could oppose him not supporting other fascists, at least early in the war and if the allies are presenting it as a war against fascism at the very least he's going to be pretty isolated after an allied victory post war.

e)  If Italy did sell the older BBs and they went as you suggested then that could make it interesting.  Britain might not man its two simply due to manpower constraints although with their speed - not sure about their range - they might be preferred over the 4 surviving R's possibly.  The only issue with the Dutch is they would need to buy them before the German invasion, i.e. before the POD as later the Dutch wouldn't have the resources and I don't thing the new Littorio's were in service in time as I couldn't see Italy selling until they were.  A quick wiki check says the two were 'completed' - which might not mean fully worked up - in May 1940.  By which time German forces are in the Netherlands.  The other issue, even more with a sell of the 2nd two to Britain, - even if that's in some sort of auction - is its going to chill relations with Berlin selling 4 ships to what are enemies.

  However if butterflies were such it happened then it complicates matters for the Japanese somewhat with 2-4 more BBs to consider, although that would depend on how well the Dutch government in exile could support them.  Depending on what facilities they had in the DEI they might be operating part of the time out of Singapore.  Getting spares, ammo and the like might be awkward as well.

f)  Sorry I misread it.  Agree that a lot more equipment would go to Russia without Britain fighting in the Med.  Only way I could see significant British/allied forces entering Soviet territory might be if the latter suffered a markedly more serious collapse and it was possibly necessary to keep Baku out of German hands.  Which still seems unlikely.

g)  definitely more forces available for the Far East although many might be late arrivals as London is concentrating on events in Europe.  However should definitely be more ships available as well as possibly more a/c.  The big issue might be more land units in place.  I think the Aussies had 2-3 divisions in the ME even without losses there and in Greece.  If their decently equipped and in place in locations like Malaya and Rabaul then the Japanese operations in the south are markedly more complex.  Add in say a couple of Indian divs even if Britain sends nothing else then the odds are stacked even more against the drive south where logistics greatly limited what Japan could move south.  Especially if they get some more modern equipment without Britain losing so much production in the Med and N Africa.  Add in the subs to operate against those vulnerable supply lines and everything could come badly unstuck for the IJA and IJN.  Which would probably lead to a blame game between the two which considering we're talking about imperial Japan in this period could literally become murderous!

  Damn this was meant to be short but become another monster post!

[EwellHolmes]

With no Balkans mess, the Germans launch Barbarossa in May or (most likely) early June of 1941. The double envelopment called for until March-when the British began reinforcing Greece-is enacted since 12th Army is available. This results in the destruction of 6th, 12th, and 26th Armies in Western Ukraine in the opening border battles. 16th and 19th Armies cannot be transferred from Kiev to Smolensk, meaning that pocket is closed off sooner and at vastly less cost to the Germans. There's need for 2nd Panzer Group to be diverted to Kiev to assist AGS here, while AGN will be done by early August assisting AGN with clearing its flanks and breaking the Luga Line. By mid August, we are thus set up for Operation Typhoon, six weeks ahead of schedule and a very, very bad time for the Soviets given how costly July-August ATL have been compared to OTL, the better state of the German Panzer Groups compared to OTL and, finally, the fact that Soviet force generation in September is very poor.

Moscow falls sometime in early September, Leningrad falls sometime that winter with AGN taking the Svir and linking up with the Finns. AGS is free to take Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad, finishing at Rostov and having secured the Donets Basin in its entirety in 1941. End result of this is the Soviets are far too weak to mount any sort of effective counter-attack that winter and 1942 basically sees the economic collapse become acute, with the Germans essentially conducting mop up operations up to the A-A Line. USSR is dead then, full stop, and the Germans can finish the matter by moving up to the Urals in 1943. Anglo-Americans, presuming Japan still strikes South and brings the U.S. into the war, are forced to sign an armistice in 1943 or 1944 at the latest. They may make an attempt at an Operation Sledgehammer in late 1942 but that would be an unmitigated disaster and the high casualties combine with the general hopelessness of continued war without the Soviet Union would mean peace would soon follow.

[stevep]

Jun 3, 2021 0:28:58 GMT EwellHolmes said:

With no Balkans mess, the Germans launch Barbarossa in May or (most likely) early June of 1941. The double envelopment called for until March-when the British began reinforcing Greece-is enacted since 12th Army is available. This results in the destruction of 6th, 12th, and 26th Armies in Western Ukraine in the opening border battles. 16th and 19th Armies cannot be transferred from Kiev to Smolensk, meaning that pocket is closed off sooner and at vastly less cost to the Germans. There's need for 2nd Panzer Group to be diverted to Kiev to assist AGS here, while AGN will be done by early August assisting AGN with clearing its flanks and breaking the Luga Line. By mid August, we are thus set up for Operation Typhoon, six weeks ahead of schedule and a very, very bad time for the Soviets given how costly July-August ATL have been compared to OTL, the better state of the German Panzer Groups compared to OTL and, finally, the fact that Soviet force generation in September is very poor.

Moscow falls sometime in early September, Leningrad falls sometime that winter with AGN taking the Svir and linking up with the Finns. AGS is free to take Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad, finishing at Rostov and having secured the Donets Basin in its entirety in 1941. End result of this is the Soviets are far too weak to mount any sort of effective counter-attack that winter and 1942 basically sees the economic collapse become acute, with the Germans essentially conducting mop up operations up to the A-A Line. USSR is dead then, full stop, and the Germans can finish the matter by moving up to the Urals in 1943. Anglo-Americans, presuming Japan still strikes South and brings the U.S. into the war, are forced to sign an armistice in 1943 or 1944 at the latest. They may make an attempt at an Operation Sledgehammer in late 1942 but that would be an unmitigated disaster and the high casualties combine with the general hopelessness of continued war without the Soviet Union would mean peace would soon follow.

  That assumes that no butterflies unfavourable to the Germans occur.  Such as Stalin being less rash due to the stronger German attack or the logistical problems of OTL being overcome.  Also that the US will quit the war so early.  Plus assuming that Hitler would allow them to.   Although the fact the Japanese offensives are very likely in dire crisis could make him consider a cease-fire.

  I agree that Sledgehammer would be a disaster but it was never a realistic proposal and would be even more stupid in this proposed scenario if the Germans were doing so well in the east.  Much better use of the allies forces are available.  In the case of a Soviet collapse then securing a Caucasus line to enable some support of a rump Russian forces and deny the Germans access to Baku and Iran would be a more likely plan.  I fear both allied powers would commit more towards a strategic bombing campaign which could be bloody costly for all involved.

[EwellHolmes]

Jun 3, 2021 10:51:24 GMT stevep said:

Jun 3, 2021 0:28:58 GMT EwellHolmes said:

With no Balkans mess, the Germans launch Barbarossa in May or (most likely) early June of 1941. The double envelopment called for until March-when the British began reinforcing Greece-is enacted since 12th Army is available. This results in the destruction of 6th, 12th, and 26th Armies in Western Ukraine in the opening border battles. 16th and 19th Armies cannot be transferred from Kiev to Smolensk, meaning that pocket is closed off sooner and at vastly less cost to the Germans. There's need for 2nd Panzer Group to be diverted to Kiev to assist AGS here, while AGN will be done by early August assisting AGN with clearing its flanks and breaking the Luga Line. By mid August, we are thus set up for Operation Typhoon, six weeks ahead of schedule and a very, very bad time for the Soviets given how costly July-August ATL have been compared to OTL, the better state of the German Panzer Groups compared to OTL and, finally, the fact that Soviet force generation in September is very poor.

Moscow falls sometime in early September, Leningrad falls sometime that winter with AGN taking the Svir and linking up with the Finns. AGS is free to take Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad, finishing at Rostov and having secured the Donets Basin in its entirety in 1941. End result of this is the Soviets are far too weak to mount any sort of effective counter-attack that winter and 1942 basically sees the economic collapse become acute, with the Germans essentially conducting mop up operations up to the A-A Line. USSR is dead then, full stop, and the Germans can finish the matter by moving up to the Urals in 1943. Anglo-Americans, presuming Japan still strikes South and brings the U.S. into the war, are forced to sign an armistice in 1943 or 1944 at the latest. They may make an attempt at an Operation Sledgehammer in late 1942 but that would be an unmitigated disaster and the high casualties combine with the general hopelessness of continued war without the Soviet Union would mean peace would soon follow.

  That assumes that no butterflies unfavourable to the Germans occur.  Such as Stalin being less rash due to the stronger German attack or the logistical problems of OTL being overcome.  Also that the US will quit the war so early.  Plus assuming that Hitler would allow them to.   Although the fact the Japanese offensives are very likely in dire crisis could make him consider a cease-fire.

  I agree that Sledgehammer would be a disaster but it was never a realistic proposal and would be even more stupid in this proposed scenario if the Germans were doing so well in the east.  Much better use of the allies forces are available.  In the case of a Soviet collapse then securing a Caucasus line to enable some support of a rump Russian forces and deny the Germans access to Baku and Iran would be a more likely plan.  I fear both allied powers would commit more towards a strategic bombing campaign which could be bloody costly for all involved.

I honestly cannot foresee any negative changes for Germany in this situation in the 1940-1941 timeframe. Without North Africa, there is no way for the British to attack them sans suicidal landing attempts in France or Norway or the ineffectual bombing effort they made historically anyway. You could have the Brits, given the strategic circumstances, undercut the Army in terms of resources in order to beef up the RAF faster so that their 1943-1945 effectiveness comes sooner, but that only show results in 1942 on or, at absolute most, late 1941. Realistically though, British strategic thinking in 1940 was so deluded I'd doubt they would do that; their white papers at the time foresaw Germany collapsing in 1941 due to the economic blockade and having to also supply occupied-Western Europe. I think History speaks for itself on that front.

As for Stalin, I'm not sure what you mean by him acting rash? Could you elaborate on that? I think it's worth noting Soviet intelligence was projecting 220+ Axis Divisions for Barbarossa anyway, so even this alternate attack is well below their expectations. It's also done nothing to change Stalin's fundamental nature, which repeated itself time and time again not just in 1941 but into 1942; it was not until 1943 that Stalin began to exert a cautious nature and that was born from blood experience and the incapability of the Soviet manpower pool to sustain such an offensive mindset.

As for the Americans, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and the JCS were fully in support of Sledgehammer in 1942, it was FDR and British intransigence that killed it; it was very serious and had quite a few backers so it should not be dismissed. Particularly here, given there is literally nowhere else for the Anglo-Americans to go but France because there is no North African Theater. Even without though, we don't have to speculate on the Americans making peace because their own documents explicitly stated they would:

"Conditions under Which an Armistice Might Be Negotiated between the United Nations and the European Powers", on June 11, 1942 by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong (S Document 22)



Col. Nevins, ‘‘Courses of Action Open to the United States in the Event the Prospective 1942 German Offensive Forces Russia to Capitulate,’’ memo, Apr. 1942, and unsigned memo to Nevins, Apr. 25, 1942, Wedemeyer Papers, box 76, folder 2, HI



With the removal of the Russian Front, the conclusion by American planners was the need to shift from the Europe First to Pacific First strategy at the minimum, drawing down forces in the Atlantic purely to those sufficient to safe guard the United Kingdom from a German invasion. With the benefit of hindsight we know this wasn't a realistic concern in terms of invasion, but the JCS was concerned with such given they didn't have said benefit. In the first document, written by Maj. Gen. Strong, it was recommended negotiations be opened to convene an armistice, as it was not thought possible to defeat the Germans without the Red Army tying down large elements of it. Is there a specific reason you can see why American military planners would suddenly change their entire viewpoints held in OTL when faced with an even worse situation than historical?

Finally, on the matter of the Middle East, Britain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, 1940-45 reveals the British could not defend Turkey against a German invasion. British estimates of the Turkish railway network suggested it could sustain about 20 German divisions, a figure close to what the Germans themselves expected they could put into the area. With the USSR effectively dead in 1942, Berlin can now bring pressure onto the Turks to bring them into the Axis on threat of invasion; given the inability of the British to even defend them IOTL, why exactly would Ankara have reason to refuse here? The situation becomes even more dire if we assume the British have poured more resources into the RAF to the detriment of the British Army. We find the same story for the Americans, in that even if they re-route all available Army shipping and repurpose all historical Soviet lend lease shipping for this purpose from April of 1942 onward, they can only have six divisions in theater by late 1942 and 13-14 in 1943; they would all be poorly supplied and the USAAF could not supply any air wings because the logistics simply would not be there to support such.

On a final note, Hitler has no reason to continue the war with the Anglo-Americans because he has no real interests against either; control of Europe and the European USSR was his goal, a goal which has now been accomplished. German planning in the 1940-1942 environment was entirely based around achieving the resources needed to fend off the expected Anglo-American air campaign and becoming masters of Europe, not ultimately carrying the war on until Swastikas fly over the White House in the 1950s or something. Indeed, the entire impetus behind the Ardennes Offensive in 1944 was to bring the Anglo-Americans to the peace table so Hitler could focus on the Soviets.

[stevep]

Jun 4, 2021 1:42:50 GMT EwellHolmes said:

Jun 3, 2021 10:51:24 GMT stevep said:

  That assumes that no butterflies unfavourable to the Germans occur.  Such as Stalin being less rash due to the stronger German attack or the logistical problems of OTL being overcome.  Also that the US will quit the war so early.  Plus assuming that Hitler would allow them to.   Although the fact the Japanese offensives are very likely in dire crisis could make him consider a cease-fire.

  I agree that Sledgehammer would be a disaster but it was never a realistic proposal and would be even more stupid in this proposed scenario if the Germans were doing so well in the east.  Much better use of the allies forces are available.  In the case of a Soviet collapse then securing a Caucasus line to enable some support of a rump Russian forces and deny the Germans access to Baku and Iran would be a more likely plan.  I fear both allied powers would commit more towards a strategic bombing campaign which could be bloody costly for all involved.

I honestly cannot foresee any negative changes for Germany in this situation in the 1940-1941 timeframe. Without North Africa, there is no way for the British to attack them sans suicidal landing attempts in France or Norway or the ineffectual bombing effort they made historically anyway. You could have the Brits, given the strategic circumstances, undercut the Army in terms of resources in order to beef up the RAF faster so that their 1943-1945 effectiveness comes sooner, but that only show results in 1942 on or, at absolute most, late 1941. Realistically though, British strategic thinking in 1940 was so deluded I'd doubt they would do that; their white papers at the time foresaw Germany collapsing in 1941 due to the economic blockade and having to also supply occupied-Western Europe. I think History speaks for itself on that front.

    I agree that the belief in the bomber offensive was deluded.  It wasted a lot of resources that could have been used better elsewhere.

As for Stalin, I'm not sure what you mean by him acting rash? Could you elaborate on that? I think it's worth noting Soviet intelligence was projecting 220+ Axis Divisions for Barbarossa anyway, so even this alternate attack is well below their expectations. It's also done nothing to change Stalin's fundamental nature, which repeated itself time and time again not just in 1941 but into 1942; it was not until 1943 that Stalin began to exert a cautious nature and that was born from blood experience and the incapability of the Soviet manpower pool to sustain such an offensive mindset.

    What you said later in the post.  Many of the Soviet losses in 41 especially but also later, such as in the offensive near Kharkov that Lordroel has been reported, were because he refused to allow withdrawals until too late.  With an earlier and faster German advance this attitude could quite possibly change.  The other issue is whether, without fighting in N Africa Stalin listens more to his military and intel staff and actually take precautions against an attack.

As for the Americans, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and the JCS were fully in support of Sledgehammer in 1942, it was FDR and British intransigence that killed it; it was very serious and had quite a few backers so it should not be dismissed. Particularly here, given there is literally nowhere else for the Anglo-Americans to go but France because there is no North African Theater. Even without though, we don't have to speculate on the Americans making peace because their own documents explicitly stated they would:

  British common sense is what makes it impossible.  Britain knows that such an attack is almost certain to fail, especially if Russia had already collapsed west of the Urals.  Even OTL they knew that it would be a high problem with little/no amphibious assault resources and issues of supply and logistics.  Churchill was eager to bend over backward toward the US but there was no way even  he was going to sacrifice the bulk of the British army - as the vast majority of the forces involved would have been British land as well as air and sea - in a clear suicide mission.  Given that also it would rely on British bases as well as forces that make it a dead duck.  We might have to sacrifice some units at Dieppe as OTL unfortunately as OTL to make this clear.

  I have read that the initial impulse was from Roosevelt.  The Soviets sent a diplomat to both Britain and the US calling for a landing in France in 42.  Churchill made it clear that this would be impossible and the US military initially took the same stance until Roosevelt badgered them into saying they would look at possibilities.  The diplomatic then returned home via Britain claiming without any evidence that an invasion had been agreed, which caused some consternation in London.

"Conditions under Which an Armistice Might Be Negotiated between the United Nations and the European Powers", on June 11, 1942 by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong (S Document 22)

Col. Nevins, ‘‘Courses of Action Open to the United States in the Event the Prospective 1942 German Offensive Forces Russia to Capitulate,’’ memo, Apr. 1942, and unsigned memo to Nevins, Apr. 25, 1942, Wedemeyer Papers, box 76, folder 2, HI

With the removal of the Russian Front, the conclusion by American planners was the need to shift from the Europe First to Pacific First strategy at the minimum, drawing down forces in the Atlantic purely to those sufficient to safe guard the United Kingdom from a German invasion. With the benefit of hindsight we know this wasn't a realistic concern in terms of invasion, but the JCS was concerned with such given they didn't have said benefit. In the first document, written by Maj. Gen. Strong, it was recommended negotiations be opened to convene an armistice, as it was not thought possible to defeat the Germans without the Red Army tying down large elements of it. Is there a specific reason you can see why American military planners would suddenly change their entire viewpoints held in OTL when faced with an even worse situation than historical?

  Well not dumping huge US land units in Britain would probably help although I suspect that the USAAF would still push for their day bomber offensive.  Most of the US army can't really be used in the Pacific unless the allies are doing that much better and the US are willing to commit them in fighting in SE Asia - which might be the case in this scenario.  Their no good for island hopping on small Pacific atolls and the like.  Its only if fighting for larger locations such as in the DEI, mainland Indo-China and possibly China that you need large ground forces.  Of course if you secure the DEI and related then while politics inside the US will prompt a return to the Philippines there's no great need for large forces unless and until your willing to invade Japan itself if that proves necessary. 

  The US planners did change their plans several times as you mentioned.  Also note those references are memos, i.e. suggestions as to what might happen.  Its quite possible that rather than concede domination of Europe and western Eurasia to an expansionist and extremely xenophobia regime that has repeatedly shown itself untrustworthy they would be willing to list to British advice about a longer containment operation.  After all if they agree an armistice, for which an over-confident Hitler will probably demand territorial and other concessions how do they know that Hitler will this time keep his word?  Or are they planning to maintain a huge army in places like the ME to guard against betrayal?

Finally, on the matter of the Middle East, Britain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, 1940-45 reveals the British could not defend Turkey against a German invasion. British estimates of the Turkish railway network suggested it could sustain about 20 German divisions, a figure close to what the Germans themselves expected they could put into the area. With the USSR effectively dead in 1942, Berlin can now bring pressure onto the Turks to bring them into the Axis on threat of invasion; given the inability of the British to even defend them IOTL, why exactly would Ankara have reason to refuse here? The situation becomes even more dire if we assume the British have poured more resources into the RAF to the detriment of the British Army. We find the same story for the Americans, in that even if they re-route all available Army shipping and repurpose all historical Soviet lend lease shipping for this purpose from April of 1942 onward, they can only have six divisions in theater by late 1942 and 13-14 in 1943; they would all be poorly supplied and the USAAF could not supply any air wings because the logistics simply would not be there to support such.

  That was OTL with markedly higher British/allied losses and ongoing conflict in Libya and the Med.  Here manpower and resource wise Britain and its allies should be a lot stronger.  Especially probably avoiding the OTL early losses to Japan in SE Asia.  You can argue about logistics but then I can point out one of the references linked to, a discussion about Germany improving logistical railways in Bulgaria.  As the poster says "Don't you know the Germans are not allowed to act rationally in any respect whatsoever? "  The same applies to the allies.

On a final note, Hitler has no reason to continue the war with the Anglo-Americans because he has no real interests against either; control of Europe and the European USSR was his goal, a goal which has now been accomplished. German planning in the 1940-1942 environment was entirely based around achieving the resources needed to fend off the expected Anglo-American air campaign and becoming masters of Europe, not ultimately carrying the war on until Swastikas fly over the White House in the 1950s or something. Indeed, the entire impetus behind the Ardennes Offensive in 1944 was to bring the Anglo-Americans to the peace table so Hitler could focus on the Soviets.

  Hitler had no logical reason to start the war in the 1st place, or then to attack the Soviets while also heavily engaged against Britain.  He was delusional about the desire of racial conflict and conquest and he desired an economic base at least as large as the US so he could fight it militarily as well as economically.  He might decide to sign an armistice, especially if he can get concessions for free and also a free hand in mopping up more of the former Soviet state  but the likelihood of him complying with such an agreement any longer than he wants to is slim and even the most die-hard isolationist in the US should know that by now.

[EwellHolmes]

Jun 4, 2021 12:48:46 GMT stevep said:

Jun 4, 2021 1:42:50 GMT EwellHolmes said:

I honestly cannot foresee any negative changes for Germany in this situation in the 1940-1941 timeframe. Without North Africa, there is no way for the British to attack them sans suicidal landing attempts in France or Norway or the ineffectual bombing effort they made historically anyway. You could have the Brits, given the strategic circumstances, undercut the Army in terms of resources in order to beef up the RAF faster so that their 1943-1945 effectiveness comes sooner, but that only show results in 1942 on or, at absolute most, late 1941. Realistically though, British strategic thinking in 1940 was so deluded I'd doubt they would do that; their white papers at the time foresaw Germany collapsing in 1941 due to the economic blockade and having to also supply occupied-Western Europe. I think History speaks for itself on that front.

    I agree that the belief in the bomber offensive was deluded.  It wasted a lot of resources that could have been used better elsewhere.

As for Stalin, I'm not sure what you mean by him acting rash? Could you elaborate on that? I think it's worth noting Soviet intelligence was projecting 220+ Axis Divisions for Barbarossa anyway, so even this alternate attack is well below their expectations. It's also done nothing to change Stalin's fundamental nature, which repeated itself time and time again not just in 1941 but into 1942; it was not until 1943 that Stalin began to exert a cautious nature and that was born from blood experience and the incapability of the Soviet manpower pool to sustain such an offensive mindset.

    What you said later in the post.  Many of the Soviet losses in 41 especially but also later, such as in the offensive near Kharkov that Lordroel has been reported, were because he refused to allow withdrawals until too late.  With an earlier and faster German advance this attitude could quite possibly change.  The other issue is whether, without fighting in N Africa Stalin listens more to his military and intel staff and actually take precautions against an attack.

As for the Americans, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and the JCS were fully in support of Sledgehammer in 1942, it was FDR and British intransigence that killed it; it was very serious and had quite a few backers so it should not be dismissed. Particularly here, given there is literally nowhere else for the Anglo-Americans to go but France because there is no North African Theater. Even without though, we don't have to speculate on the Americans making peace because their own documents explicitly stated they would:

  British common sense is what makes it impossible.  Britain knows that such an attack is almost certain to fail, especially if Russia had already collapsed west of the Urals.  Even OTL they knew that it would be a high problem with little/no amphibious assault resources and issues of supply and logistics.  Churchill was eager to bend over backward toward the US but there was no way even  he was going to sacrifice the bulk of the British army - as the vast majority of the forces involved would have been British land as well as air and sea - in a clear suicide mission.  Given that also it would rely on British bases as well as forces that make it a dead duck.  We might have to sacrifice some units at Dieppe as OTL unfortunately as OTL to make this clear.

  I have read that the initial impulse was from Roosevelt.  The Soviets sent a diplomat to both Britain and the US calling for a landing in France in 42.  Churchill made it clear that this would be impossible and the US military initially took the same stance until Roosevelt badgered them into saying they would look at possibilities.  The diplomatic then returned home via Britain claiming without any evidence that an invasion had been agreed, which caused some consternation in London.

"Conditions under Which an Armistice Might Be Negotiated between the United Nations and the European Powers", on June 11, 1942 by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong (S Document 22)

Col. Nevins, ‘‘Courses of Action Open to the United States in the Event the Prospective 1942 German Offensive Forces Russia to Capitulate,’’ memo, Apr. 1942, and unsigned memo to Nevins, Apr. 25, 1942, Wedemeyer Papers, box 76, folder 2, HI

With the removal of the Russian Front, the conclusion by American planners was the need to shift from the Europe First to Pacific First strategy at the minimum, drawing down forces in the Atlantic purely to those sufficient to safe guard the United Kingdom from a German invasion. With the benefit of hindsight we know this wasn't a realistic concern in terms of invasion, but the JCS was concerned with such given they didn't have said benefit. In the first document, written by Maj. Gen. Strong, it was recommended negotiations be opened to convene an armistice, as it was not thought possible to defeat the Germans without the Red Army tying down large elements of it. Is there a specific reason you can see why American military planners would suddenly change their entire viewpoints held in OTL when faced with an even worse situation than historical?

  Well not dumping huge US land units in Britain would probably help although I suspect that the USAAF would still push for their day bomber offensive.  Most of the US army can't really be used in the Pacific unless the allies are doing that much better and the US are willing to commit them in fighting in SE Asia - which might be the case in this scenario.  Their no good for island hopping on small Pacific atolls and the like.  Its only if fighting for larger locations such as in the DEI, mainland Indo-China and possibly China that you need large ground forces.  Of course if you secure the DEI and related then while politics inside the US will prompt a return to the Philippines there's no great need for large forces unless and until your willing to invade Japan itself if that proves necessary. 

  The US planners did change their plans several times as you mentioned.  Also note those references are memos, i.e. suggestions as to what might happen.  Its quite possible that rather than concede domination of Europe and western Eurasia to an expansionist and extremely xenophobia regime that has repeatedly shown itself untrustworthy they would be willing to list to British advice about a longer containment operation.  After all if they agree an armistice, for which an over-confident Hitler will probably demand territorial and other concessions how do they know that Hitler will this time keep his word?  Or are they planning to maintain a huge army in places like the ME to guard against betrayal?

Finally, on the matter of the Middle East, Britain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, 1940-45 reveals the British could not defend Turkey against a German invasion. British estimates of the Turkish railway network suggested it could sustain about 20 German divisions, a figure close to what the Germans themselves expected they could put into the area. With the USSR effectively dead in 1942, Berlin can now bring pressure onto the Turks to bring them into the Axis on threat of invasion; given the inability of the British to even defend them IOTL, why exactly would Ankara have reason to refuse here? The situation becomes even more dire if we assume the British have poured more resources into the RAF to the detriment of the British Army. We find the same story for the Americans, in that even if they re-route all available Army shipping and repurpose all historical Soviet lend lease shipping for this purpose from April of 1942 onward, they can only have six divisions in theater by late 1942 and 13-14 in 1943; they would all be poorly supplied and the USAAF could not supply any air wings because the logistics simply would not be there to support such.

  That was OTL with markedly higher British/allied losses and ongoing conflict in Libya and the Med.  Here manpower and resource wise Britain and its allies should be a lot stronger.  Especially probably avoiding the OTL early losses to Japan in SE Asia.  You can argue about logistics but then I can point out one of the references linked to, a discussion about Germany improving logistical railways in Bulgaria.  As the poster says "Don't you know the Germans are not allowed to act rationally in any respect whatsoever? "  The same applies to the allies.

On a final note, Hitler has no reason to continue the war with the Anglo-Americans because he has no real interests against either; control of Europe and the European USSR was his goal, a goal which has now been accomplished. German planning in the 1940-1942 environment was entirely based around achieving the resources needed to fend off the expected Anglo-American air campaign and becoming masters of Europe, not ultimately carrying the war on until Swastikas fly over the White House in the 1950s or something. Indeed, the entire impetus behind the Ardennes Offensive in 1944 was to bring the Anglo-Americans to the peace table so Hitler could focus on the Soviets.

  Hitler had no logical reason to start the war in the 1st place, or then to attack the Soviets while also heavily engaged against Britain.  He was delusional about the desire of racial conflict and conquest and he desired an economic base at least as large as the US so he could fight it militarily as well as economically.  He might decide to sign an armistice, especially if he can get concessions for free and also a free hand in mopping up more of the former Soviet state  but the likelihood of him complying with such an agreement any longer than he wants to is slim and even the most die-hard isolationist in the US should know that by now.

Okay, you're going too far with the RAF Bomber Command; in 1939-1942 it was definitely ineffectual in terms of direct impacts but starting in 1943 it had a serious role in the war. The German war industry was set to double munitions productions as it had in 1942 until the RAF's Ruhr Offensive managed to completely derail it. Had that not happened, the Germans likely would've halted the Soviets in 1943 and then been able to push them back in 1944 while keeping the Anglo-Americans at bay by virtue of much, much higher industrial output from 1943 onwards. Here, if you are suggesting they skimp on Bomber Command (despite it literally being the only weapon they have to attack Hitler with), then German production will be many times that of OTL given they also have the resources of the occupied USSR to utilize.

Expanding on the broader points of the U.S. and the UK, the shipping issue is based upon all available U.S. Army-reserved shipping being used to send forces to the Middle East; i.e. nothing for the UK itself, North Africa, the Pacific, etc. It's all going to the Middle East and the end result is a single Army Group by early 1943 which is poorly supplied and with no USAAF aircover. If we are assuming the British forces historically used in Egypt are being used in the Middle East as well, the picture is slightly better for the Allies there but now you have the added issue of the Italians having a clear shot to Suez and the Japanese are going to be running absolutely wild in the Pacific with no real ability by the Allies to contain them. Japan not being checked in 1942 and the Germans having effectively won the game in Europe is how FDR losses in the 1942 midterms and you get an armistice forced by Congress in 1943.

This also leans into some other things, which is what I'm getting at with regards to the size/resources of the British Army and RAF. If you have the OTL arrangements, the British can only be strong enough to deter invasion in the Home Islands and one other place; historically, that was Egypt because of the Italians and DAK. As a result, they were weak in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East, which allowed the Japanese to overrun them historically and they were only saved in the Middle East via the Red Army still fighting on. Here, they can be strong in the Middle East but not SEA and Egypt; what happens when Italy has finished its modernization and reorganization of its forces in 1942, sees the Germans and Japanese winning decisively everywhere, and suddenly has a virtually undefended Egypt sitting right next to Libya? 

As for the Soviets, there's absolutely no reason to assume Stalin would suddenly break with his fundamental personality over 1941-1942 over the 12th Army's envelopment operations in Ukraine. Second Kharkov, which you are referring to I assume, was in May of 1942; this was after the disasters of Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Vyazma, and Bryansk in 1941. If the loss of quite literally over three million troops wasn't enough to make him see sense in early 1942-with the end result being the loss of another 700,000+ Red Army soldiers due to Second Kharkov and early Case Blue encirclements-why, exactly, would the 12th Army carrying out the encirclement in June of 1941 do such? Likewise, Stalin was as prepared for Barbarossa as he could be in 1941, a partial mobilization was ordered in April and by June the reservists were beginning to arrive; four new armies as a whole were also being deployed as the German invasion began. There was nothing else Stalin could do, the Germans just had that much of an advantage over them in all ways.

Shifting gears again, we need to clear up several misconceptions you have. First, these were memos, yes, but they were accepted by the JCS and the President as the basis of American policy, building upon earlier agreements. I know it's been cited to you several times now so I'm not sure why you continue to attempt to err upon this. See Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, From Page 72:

Eisenhower and his subordinates were far from alone or original in perceiving the overriding importance of continued Soviet participation in the war. As previously noted, in the summer and fall of 1941 Roosevelt and army planners had begun to recognize that victory over Germany might not be possible unless the Red Army continued to tie down the bulk of the Wehrmacht, and they consequently had made assistance to Russia a focal point of their global strategy. The JB had forcefully reiterated this conclusion by informing Roosevelt on December 21 that ‘‘Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in Europe.’’ 26 The Soviets’ late 1941 success in stopping the German advance on Moscow and launching a counteroffensive, occurring at a time when Axis forces were everywhere else successful, further reinforced this belief. As a result virtually all Allied planning papers in late 1941– early 1942 stressed the critical importance of aiding the Russians so that they could survive a renewed German onslaught. Roosevelt agreed. ‘‘Nothing would be worse than to have the Russians collapse,’’ he told Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau on March 11. ‘‘I would rather lose New Zealand, Australia, or anything else than have the Russians collapse.’’ Five days earlier the JUSSC had bluntly stated that ‘‘Russia must be supported now by every possible means’’ because the absence of a Russian front would postpone ‘‘indefinitely’’ the end of the war.27 And as army planners realized, such postponement would only increase public and naval pressure to turn away completely from the indecisive European theater in favor of the Pacific.​

Page 80:

Marshall’s reasoning was based not only on Eisenhower’s February–March presentations but also on military and political events since then which had heavily reinforced the OPD’s original conclusions. Once again the focal point was the Soviet Union. ‘‘The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to Allied victory,’’ now acting chief of staff McNarney had emphasized on April 12; if German armies were allowed to turn west, ‘‘any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be virtually eliminated.’’ 56 In mid June the staff again warned that Russian collapse would necessitate a strategic reassessment, ‘‘possibly with the result of directing our main effort to the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.’’ 57​

Page 93:

As early as April–May, OPD, g-2, and the joint committees had begun to explore the appropriate response should this ‘‘desperate situation’’ result in a Soviet collapse, and in early August the JUSSC completed and forwarded to the JPS a massive study of such a contingency. This study indicated that Russian collapse would be a ‘‘catastrophe’’ of such magnitude as to put the United States in a ‘‘desperate’’ situation too, one in which it ‘‘would be forced to consider courses of action which would primarily benefit the United States rather than the United Nations.’’​

​

Indeed, it might be the only remaining major member of the United Nations, because the British Commonwealth might collapse and the British public react to Soviet defeat by overthrowing Churchill and agreeing to a negotiated peace that would leave Hitler in control of Eurasia. A revival of isolationism and an ‘‘increase in defeatism’’ within the country were also possible in this scenario. Even without British withdrawal, however, the only sound U.S. response to a Soviet collapse would be to ‘‘adopt the strategic defensive in the European Theater of War and to conduct the strategic offensive in the Japanese theater.’’ On August 19 the JPS the great strategic debate 93 approved this report, forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs as JCS 85, and ordered the preparation of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.40​

All of this shows that the military and political leadership were in agreement with the need to make peace with the Germans should they win their war against the USSR; Roosevelt, Marshall, etc were all fully aware of this and the President had signed off on all of these as the basis of policy in the event of such a disaster for the Allied cause. Were they all idiots or, is the much more rationale answer that they understood exactly as I said, in that Hitler will have achieved his war aims and thus a peace deal was not only the best solution to prevent further disaster but likely to work? I think you have settled on the wartime propaganda caricature of Hitler and the Nazis rather than looking at what the academic consensus and historical research since the war has shown on this matter, in that there was a lack of offensive/expansionistic desires vis-a-vis the British Empire and the United States in a general sense and the great pains Hitler took in late 1941 to avoid a direct confrontation with the Americans until the Japanese blindsided them with Pearl Harbor. Adam Tooze in particular goes into great detail on this, I would highly recommend you review such.

Finally, on a note about the Pacific Theater, you are fundamentally wrong about the role of the U.S. Army there to a degree that can't be emphasized enough. It wasn't until December of 1943 that American resources in Europe equaled those in the Pacific and it wasn't until 1944 that they exceeded them. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships. The U.S. only raised six marine divisions in WWII, but 91 U.S. Army divisions. The Solomons, New Guinea, the Philippines and even many of the island battles (especially Okinawa) were majority U.S. Army affairs, in some cases almost solely U.S. Army.