Post by simon darkshade on Aug 3, 2021 11:22:04 GMT
One interesting memorandum from Fisher to Sir Edward Grey on naval arms limitation treaties, based on a proposal by President Roosevelt in 1907. It deals with British naval advantages, strategy, warship design, technology, evolutionary changes and national policy.
Written for Sir Edward Grey on
January 29th, 1907, in Reply to a
Communication from President Roosevelt
MEMORADUM ON:-
1. LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS;
2. LIMITATION OF SIZE OF BATTLESHIPS.
As regards the suggested agreement to limit new construction amongst the Great Powers to repairs and renewals so as to keep to keep the total and relative strength of their respective navies as it is at present, the attitude of the Admiralty is as follows:-
From the selfish standpoint of pure opportunism, it seems clear that our present relative naval position is so good that we might express our adhesion to the principle, on condition that other countries were willing to do likewise.
But, having gone this length, it would scarcely be possible to avoid allusion to the weak points upon which other Governments – if not our own – will be likely to fasten, in criticising any such proposal.
How serious these difficulties are will be immediately apparent on examination of the scheme.
In the first place, who is to see that each country loyally carries out its pledge to limit its navy? Are penalties to be imposed for evasions or failures to do so, and, if so, who is to exact these penalties?
And next, what is to be done with old ships; are they to be destroyed or broken up? And, if so, when is this to be done?–before the keel of the new ship is laid or at the date of her launch, or on the day she hoists her pendant for the first time; or at what particular point?
A clear understanding on this matter is vital to the success of the scheme, for unless some practical means can be devised for keeping Europe informed that such obsolescent vessels have been effectively got rid of beyond possibility of resuscitation, there will be nothing to prevent an unscrupulous Government from building new ships on the plea that the new vessels are being constructed to replace older ones, without any real intention to get rid of the latter.
And again, will a country in Russia’s present naval plight be likely to find the scheme palatable? Will not Russia insist that her relative maritime position must be that which she occupied three years ago?
The notorious hostility of Germany to any limitation of armaments is also a stumbling-block which bids fair to effectually frustrate the pious intentions of the advocates of “limitation of armaments.” For how can this country or (still more) France agree to check the growth of her navy, while a potential navy as enterprising and unscrupulous as Germany’s is adding ship to ship in this ruthless game of beggar my neighbour? So easily, it seems, might a single dissentient voice wreck the good intentions of the concert of Europe on such a point.
And if, indeed, a majority of the Great Powers was so strongly in favour of the scheme as to incline them to endeavour to forcibly impose their will upon the minority, we can scarcely suppose that the latter would gracefully acquiesce or would consent to see their freedom of action fettered by diplomatic pressure.
In such an event, the peaceful objects of those in favour of a limitation might, so far from being fulfilled, result in precipitating war.
Possible eventualities such as these, however, by no means exhaust the list of objections to which the proposal to limit naval armaments is open.
A great range of practical difficulties are also involved.
For example, what is there to prevent a state (which has agreed to the convention) from devoting its ship building energies to the construction of numbers of large, swift, steamers, ostensibly for mercantile purposes, but of a character which would fit them for employment as auxiliary cruisers and corsairs in war? The distinctions between vessels of such character and ordinary merchant steamers would be almost impossible to draw, and yet it is certainly undesirable to limit (by international convention) the expansion of the mercantile marine of any of the signatory Powers.
The vested interests concerned in war-ship construction are, moreover, nowadays, very large, with ramifications in almost every branch of manufacture and trade.
The immediate effect of any proposal to limit naval armaments will be to deal a heavy blow at these interests, with the results that the latter would in all probability array themselves against the movement, and the consequent opposition thus created would be a formidable obstacle.
And, again, this country, more than any other, has a supreme interest in the maintenance of her shipbuilding trade in a flourishing and healthy condition. Will it be advisable for Britain to enrol herself under the banner of “Limited Naval Armaments” if, as seems inevitable, such limitation will react with serious effect upon one of our premier national industries?
With regard to the second proposal to “limit the size of vessels to that of the largest now under construction,” the following are points demanding serious consideration.
In the first place it will be necessary for the Admiralty to insist that, on a naval technical point of this kind, naval opinion must be decisive, just as on a point of military technique His Majesty’s Government would naturally look to the War Office for guidance.
And the question before the Admiralty is a simple one. Would a limitation upon the size of ships affect British naval interests favourably or unfavourably, or would it leave those interests unaffected altogether?
In answering this question the Admiralty would point in the first place to the fact that in existing ships of similar date and classes British types are almost without exception larger than foreign ones. The average tonnage of modern British battleships exceeds that of French and German battleships by at least 2,500 tons, and the same feature will be observed on an analysis of British armoured and protected cruisers.
The persistence in our warship designs for many years past of this remarkable excess of British over foreign displacements can scarcely be regarded by even the most ignorant as a mere fortuitous and accidental circumstance.
It is, on the contrary, notoriously a corollary to the primary strategical principle that the British Fleet exists for one purpose only, viz., to seek out and destroy the armed vessels of our enemies, wherever they may be! And, inasmuch as the continued existence of our Empire depends absolutely upon the ability of the fleet to discharge this fundamental duty, of firstly pursuing the ships of an enemy if necessary to the world’s end, and secondly conquering them when overtaken, it is plain that no reasonable precautions should be neglected that will ensure that the material of the Fleet is endowed with the requisite qualifications to this vitally important end. With interests so tremendous at stake, Britain can afford to leave nothing to chance. The British Empire being world wide, it follows that British ships must possess sufficient coal capacity to carry them across the ocean in any weather, which necessitates their possessing better sea going qualities than the German and French Fleets, which exist primarily for action in the immediate vicinity of the coasts of the motherland. The British Fleet must be prepared to move swiftly to and strike with effect in almost every quarter of the inhabitable world. In a word, while the functions and duties of the fleets of Continental nations are, generally speaking, local, defensive, and confined to narrow seas, the role of the British Fleet is a ubiquitous one! Once this is grasped, it becomes clear that our ships must carry more coal than their foreign rivals. And since it would be the height of folly to sacrifice armament or protection in order to provide increased bunker capacity, the British ships are and are likely to remain of larger displacement than foreign ones. A notable case in this connection is the Italian design of the “Regina Elena,” which may be a good fighting ship in still waters near a base, but which would be quite unacceptable as a British design, as she could not fight many of her guns in a seaway, nor could she maintain her crew in good condition at sea in bad weather.
The fact that Great Britain possesses numerous coaling stations in distant seas, at which our which our ships can replenish their stocks of coal, has sometimes been adduced as an argument for diminishing their bunker capacity. But while it is not denied that such coaling stations are of the utmost value, it must not be forgotten that it is the coal onboard a vessel which alone measures her sea-keeping capacity, and that no reserve of coal on shore at a depot, however ample, could make up for a shortage in the bunkers of British ships when in touch with an enemy.
But this argument by no means exhausts the case of the Admiralty in support of their demand that British ships should be of larger size than foreign ships. The British Empire floats on the British Navy. It is our all in all. Victory at sea, desirable to Foreign States, is a sine qua non to our continued existence. We must win at sea or perish as a nation.
Other things being equal, victory will be on the side of the more powerful of the two antagonists. Now, in any future naval war, it may safely be predicted that decisive naval actions between organised battle-fleets will be comparatively rare. There was but one “Trafalgar” in the campaign of 1805; there has been but one “Tsushima” in the recent Russo-Japanese war. In the century that divided those epoch-making sea-fights, no fleet action (unless exceptions be made in the cases of Lissa and the Yalu) on anything approaching the same scale has taken place. What history justifies us in anticipating is that in the future, as in the past, naval wars will be marked by two or three great fleet actions at most, and by numerous smaller sea-fights between ships detached for special purposes, such as scouting and lookout vessels, and ships employed on the attack and protection of trade, and the convoy of overseas expeditions, &c. For purposes such as these our potential rivals have undoubtedly made preparation, and, in the event of a war with any first-class Naval Power, Britain would have to anticipate some dissemination of her ships on services of this kind.
Single vessels thus detached from the main fleets will in all likelihood frequently meet at sea, and naval duels will take place, in which, ceteris paribus, victory will lie with the more powerful of the two antagonists. Now, from the British nation’s point of view, come what may, the British ship must be the victor.
How can this condition (the success of the British side) be best assured? Given equal fighting qualities in the personnel, there must be but two alternatives. Either the individual British ship must be stronger than her antagonist, or there must be two British ships to meet the (hypothetical) single ship of the enemy. For (it must be remembered) no fraction short of the unit can be admitted. We cannot send 1¼ British ships to deal with one foreign one, or 1½ British ships, or 1¾ British ships, or any number more than one but is less than two.
Pushed to its logical conclusion, this implies that wherever there is a single enemy’s ship there the Admiralty must, in order to ensure victory, provide either a single British ship of greater power or two British ships of equal power; in other words, that as regards detached vessels we must be in double strength everywhere. Faced by these alternatives, there can be no question that the Admiralty solution of the problem is the correct one. The decision to build each individual British ship of somewhat greater power and sea-endurance then the similar types of our potential enemies is the logical outcome of this consideration.
The proposed limitation of displacements to the 18,000 tons of the “Dreadnought” is, it must be remembered, even at the present moment a belated one. Already in the mercantile marine displacements of 45,000 tons have been recently reached in the case of the “Mauritania” and the “Lusitania,” and tonnages of between 25,000 and 30,000 are by no means uncommon, while even in warship construction the displacement of the “Dreadnought” has already been greatly exceeded by in the two new Japanese battleships “Satsuma” and “Aki” (19,370 tons). The current ship building program of the United States herself, oddly enough, includes a battleship of 20,000 tons or more.
Thus it is evident that the arbitrary limit to warship displacement proposed by President Roosevelt has already gone by the board, and the only practical question that remains is whether any purely empirical maximum can be assigned, in a matter so liable to change and so susceptible to radical improvements and modifications resultant upon modern advances in applied sciences such as metallurgy, as is the art of naval architecture.
The more this latter question is examined the less does it appear desirable for this country to fetter her future naval development by giving British adhesion to any suggestion of this kind.
Providence has endowed the British Isles (and indeed the British Empire) with a splendid extent of coast-line, enriched by a large number of deep indentations forming magnificent natural deep water harbours. This gift of nature has been denied to some of our naval rivals and potential enemies, and, more particularly in the case of the United States and Germany, the shallowness of the approaches to the great naval arsenals is a grave disability. The shoals at the mouth of the Elbe and the Jade, and along the German North Sea and Baltic Coast, impose limitations in the draft of the German warships, which could only be overcome by huge and costly dredging operations; and so long as the Kiel canal remains at its present depth and breadth, the difficulty of any large increase in the displacement of German warships is likely to be a serious matter. For Great Britain to consent to limit (by International agreement) the size of battleships would thus be tantamount to throwing away an important natural advantage. To compel our potential enemy to spend money in time of peace upon a large scheme of dredging German harbours cannot be spent in building German battleships.
If it could be shown that the British taxpayer would benefit by the proposal to limit the size of warships, and that our Naval predominance would not thereby be jeopardised, something might be said for the President’s proposal.
On the hypothesis that the International limitation imposed referred merely to the size of individual ships, and not to the numbers of such ships to be built by each Power, it is manifest that no financial gain on the ship building program would result. Britain would still be compelled to preserve her Naval supremacy by laying down annually a certain definite proportion of tonnage, measured by the tonnage of new construction by her potential enemies. Whether the British new construction took shape as two ships of 18,000 tons or three ships of 12,000 would be immaterial from the point of view of the Estimates, or rather the gain in economy in construction would be, if anything, slightly on the side of the larger units, big ships being under modern conditions somewhat cheaper to build ton for ton than small ones.
Comparing, however, the cost of upkeep of –
(a) 2 – 18,000 tons “Dreadnought’s,”
(b) 3 – 12,900 tons “Albion’s,”
the saving is all on the size of the larger ships.
1. The cost of docking and repairs to a ship of each type would be approximately the same, and the total cost would work out in favour of the two “Dreadnoughts” nearly in the ratio of 2 to 3, and fewer docks would be required.
2. The cost of coal, oil, and stores consumed by the two large ships would be much less than for the three smaller ones.
3. The largest money saving in favour of the “Dreadnoughts” will, however, be due to reduction in personnel and the votes required to maintain it, and it must be remembered that, whereas we buy coal, oil, and stores cheaper than Continental Powers can do, our personnel is not only more difficult to obtain in sufficient numbers, but is, man for man, much more costly, owing to our system of voluntary enlistment.
Comparing the complements from two “Dreadnought’s” and three “Albion’s,” the number of officers and men required are 1,384 and 2,202 respectively, a saving of 818 in favour of the large ships.
If it be decided in the future to replace the 30 battleships of the “Formidable,” “Duncan,” “Canopus,” “Caesar,” and “Swiftsure” classes by 20 “Dreadnoughts,” there would be a saving of over 8,000 officers and men, a sufficient number to man 12 more “Dreadnoughts,” or if it were preferred to reduce the total of the personnel in the service by this number, the savings on the Wages, Victualling and Clothing Votes, would approximate to half a million pounds a year, besides savings on pensions and votes for medical and educational services. Comparing the broadside gun-fire and armour protection of the above vessels, the larger ships show to great advantage.
Broadside Fire
20 “Dreadnoughts” - - - 160 12-inch guns
30 older types- - - - - 112 12-inch guns
+ 8 10-inch guns
Giving a balance of 40 12-inch guns in favour of the heavy ships; more than sufficient to deal with the 6-inch and 7.5-inch guns carried by the lighter ships.
As regards side armour, the greatest thickness carried by the older types is 9 inches, eight carry a maximum thickness of 7 inches, and six are protected by 6 inches only; the “Dreadnoughts” have a greater thickness than 9 inches over all vitals, and are consequently much more efficiently protected against heavy gun-fire.
From these figures it will be seen that the cost of upkeep of the 20 “Dreadnoughts” would be much less than that of 30 smaller vessels of greatly inferior power.
The advocates of moderate dimensions may maintain that the three 12,000 ton ships could be built of equal power to two 18,000 ton ships.
But, insomuch as “moderate dimensions” inevitably implies moderate speed, advocates of moderate-sized ships must be very carefully scanned.
All the factors which make up a fighting vessels power depend ultimately upon the displacement. For a given increase of displacement definite improvements can be obtained in speed, coal endurance, gun-power or protection.
One of the stock arguments of those who pin their faith to “moderate dimensions” is the quasi historical, but entirely fallacious parallel, of the three-decker and the 74-gun ship of the line. The error of the reasoning in this particular, however, will very quickly appear.
When after two-and-a-half centuries of experience, the sailing line-of-battle ships reached the acme of their development, history teaches us that the great majority of the Capital ships were two decked 74’s and 80’s. Even at that day, however, as now, the great advantage of concentration of power was fully recognised.
Wood was however, the only material available for construction, and consequently it was practically impossible to increase the length of ships. Thus, the only method of increasing power was to add an additional tier of guns; and this addition involved an inevitable decrease in speed, weatherliness, and seagoing quality generally. In other words, the increase in displacement on a limited length meant a decrease of speed and mobility, and displacement of wooden sailing line-of-battleships had therefore reached its practical maximum in Nelson’s day. Incidentally it is to be remarked that this maximum was at least equal to the displacement of the largest merchant vessels then afloat and greatly in excess of the immense majority of such.
Now turn to the present. The material used for building battleships was changed some 50 years ago from wood to iron, and 25 years ago was again changed from iron to steel, and we certainly have not yet reached the practical limits of displacement for steel shipbuilding.
The “Great Eastern,” constructed of iron some two generations ago, was born before her time, and, though her displacement has recently been far exceeded, may be regarded as a solitary instance of an iron or steel vessel of impractically large displacement.
So far as from the steel battleship being at least as large as the largest modern merchant vessels, we have seen that many of the mail steamers now afloat are of double the displacement of the largest battleships.
It is fair to deduce from the foregoing facts that whatever was the case in Nelson’s day, the battleship of the present has not reached the practical limit of size.
It is true that as the dimensions of warships increase it will be necessary to do a certain amount of dredging and to enlarge the engraving docks. This contingent disadvantage will, however, bear less hardly upon Britain than upon our potential enemies.
Next, let us examine the effect of increased displacement upon fighting qualities. Other things being equal, if we increase displacement we can by utilising that increase for giving greater length, obtain a higher speed. If heavier or more numerous guns, more torpedoes, more ammunition, or, in short, more offensive power be desired, what is needed can be obtained by adding to the displacement.
If better protection or greater coal endurance is demanded, these qualities can only be obtained, if offensive power is not to be sacrificed, at the expense of a greater displacement. We see, then that by increasing displacement, under present conditions we can, if necessary, obtain better motive power without sacrificing fighting power, or, if preferred, get stronger fighting power without any loss of speed.”
As shown above the sailing line-of-battle ship having reached its practical maximum of efficiency in Nelson’s day, either of these courses would have been impossible. The endeavour to prove that, because the large three decked wooden was a less efficient unit than the smaller one, instantly breaks down when brought to the tribunal of fact. This theory would be true if the large battleship was a slower and less weatherly vessel than the small; but the precise contrary is the case.
So much for the individual ship. We have next to examine how the matter stands with the fleet. The question to be settled is whether the fighting power of a hypothetical fleet of given displacement would be better distributed in many ships or few.
Taking the four principle qualities which make up fighting efficiency, seriatim, they may be dealt with in the following order:-
(1) Protection.
(2) Coal endurance.
(3) Mobility or speed.
(4) Offensive power.
It will be assumed for the purposes of the argument, that the relative merits of two fleets are under discussion, whose total displacements are equal, but one of which, “A,” is composed of a smaller number of vessels than “B.”
(1) As regards armour protection, it is plain that the area to be defended against gun attack must be less in the case of fleet “A” than in fleet “B,” consequently, for an equal weight of armour “A” will obtain better protection than “B.” As regards internal subdivision against torpedo attack, the “A” ships for equal expenditure of weight can be rendered less liable to total dismemberment or foundering; “B,” on the other hand, will have the advantage in losing a smaller proportionate force as a result of a successful torpedo attack.
(2) As regards coal endurance, that “A” fleet will be able to cover a greater distance than “B,” for an equal expenditure of coal is also a matter which admits of mathematical demonstration; e.g., 5 “Renown’s” would be approximately equal in displacement to 4 “Majestic’s,” but as each of these at 10 knots would consume 60 tons a day against 62 tons consumed by the “Majestic’s,” it is apparent that the latter would, as a fleet, have an advantage of 52 tons a day at 10 knots.
(3) As regards speed, the advantage most clearly lies with the larger vessels. High speed can only be obtained in small vessels for comparatively short distances in smooth water, and then only by the sacrifice of offensive and defensive power. For continuous high speed at sea, great length is absolutely necessary; the fact is simply not open to argument. Mobility does not consist solely of high speed; seaworthiness and manoeuvring power are also necessary. As regards the former quality, the large ship has the advantage, and in regard to the latter, the inherent disadvantage of large dimensions is by no means so great as is commonly supposed, since by careful design, the 15,000-ton battleships of to-day have been rendered far more handy than were their predecessors of 10,000 tons.
(4) In regard to offensive power, the advantages obtainable by increased displacement in the individual ships are twofold:-
Firstly. – By the concentration of the gun-power in a relatively small number of ships, the length of the line is reduced, so that the Fleet, when opposed to a more numerous enemy, will be able to attack one end of his line, while the other is by distance and bearing precluded from fully developing the power of its attack.
Secondly. – It is only by means of great displacements that vessels can be made capable of carrying the great armament of large calibre guns, for which the necessity has been so fully exemplified in the recent war.
Amongst the naval Powers, Great Britain, by reason of the greater size of her sea-going fleets, necessarily has greater opportunities of perfecting her warship designs, and effecting improvements in details of their armaments and hulls.
To limit (by an arbitrary International rule) the size of warships, would be to deprive Britain of her right to benefit by the unique experience we have thus dearly bought, for, as has been shown, improvements in warships almost invariably imply an increase of displacement; The proposal would also help those countries in which natural or other bars to increase of size of ship already exist, i.e. whose coastal waters are shallow, and whose dock accommodation is limited. Such countries are the United States and Germany at the present moment. In both cases there has been a tendency to limit the draught of water of their battleships. If there being during the next few years a progressive increase in the size of ship it would be difficult for Germany to meet the new conditions, and to some extent for the United States also.
As already said, one of the principle gains in increase of size is economy of propulsion. You can drive a bigger ship more cheaply. But in order to reap the full advantage of this consideration, the bigger ship must not only be longer but deeper. Increased draught of water is, however, a source of considerable risk in the vicinity of a large portion of the American and German coasts and harbours.
The enormous costs of increased dock accommodation, deepening of canals, &c., multiplies many-fold the mere costs of bigger ships themselves.
Besides these direct advantages to a country with shallow coastal waters and docks of limiting the size of warships, there is a further important consideration arising out of the effect of the bigger ships in making the smaller to be relatively out of date and inefficient. This may affect the United States with respect to Germany quite as much as with regard to England. At the present moment the United States fleet is undoubtedly superior to the German fleet, largely because of this very factor of “individual size of ship.” If Germany be driven to building bigger ships, this superiority of the United States fleet may tend to disappear more than if such limit were imposed.
The proposed limitation would be a most difficult one to define. The displacement of a ship varies with the weight of coal, water, stores, ammunition, &c., she carries from time to time; the nominal displacements merely indicate the total weights of the ships and their contents on the occasion of their official trials. Before joining in any arbitrary figure of 20,000 tons it would be necessary to define what proportion of a total load, say, of 3,000 tons of fuel should be on board, and so on for all the other disputable items. With such incentives to overreach an opponent, and with no possibility of effective inspection in other countries, such a proposal is really impracticable.
That the considerations mentioned above are of great importance are clear from the significant stoppage of shipbuilding in nearly all the principle navies. The naval authorities of these countries are obviously seeking for the best way to extricate themselves from the difficulty in which the appearance of bigger ship in England and Japan has placed them. “The easiest way possible for them would be the general adoption of President Roosevelt’s proposal.” And what would be their gain would be loss to Great Britain and Japan, with their greater natural advantages, and their more commodious docking accommodation.
It can hardly be doubted that some such difficulties were present in the mind of President Roosevelt when he made his proposal.
To sum up. The conclusion reached is that, as regards the proposal to keep the total relative strength of all navies as it is at present, the interest of this country should incline us to cordially acquiesce in principle, on condition that other nations would do likewise.
The difficulties in practice, in giving effect to such a scheme, although not necessarily insuperable, are, however, very serious, and the scheme will demand the hearty concurrence and good will of the Powers, in order to be effective.
For Great Britain, the United States, and France, to thus limit their naval armaments, while Governments as retrograde as those of Germany and Russia declined to do so, would be the supreme limit of human folly, and might jeopardise the cause of liberal progress and civilisation throughout the world.
The proposal to limit the size of our individual warships is one which this country must strenuously oppose.
Written for Sir Edward Grey on
January 29th, 1907, in Reply to a
Communication from President Roosevelt
MEMORADUM ON:-
1. LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS;
2. LIMITATION OF SIZE OF BATTLESHIPS.
As regards the suggested agreement to limit new construction amongst the Great Powers to repairs and renewals so as to keep to keep the total and relative strength of their respective navies as it is at present, the attitude of the Admiralty is as follows:-
From the selfish standpoint of pure opportunism, it seems clear that our present relative naval position is so good that we might express our adhesion to the principle, on condition that other countries were willing to do likewise.
But, having gone this length, it would scarcely be possible to avoid allusion to the weak points upon which other Governments – if not our own – will be likely to fasten, in criticising any such proposal.
How serious these difficulties are will be immediately apparent on examination of the scheme.
In the first place, who is to see that each country loyally carries out its pledge to limit its navy? Are penalties to be imposed for evasions or failures to do so, and, if so, who is to exact these penalties?
And next, what is to be done with old ships; are they to be destroyed or broken up? And, if so, when is this to be done?–before the keel of the new ship is laid or at the date of her launch, or on the day she hoists her pendant for the first time; or at what particular point?
A clear understanding on this matter is vital to the success of the scheme, for unless some practical means can be devised for keeping Europe informed that such obsolescent vessels have been effectively got rid of beyond possibility of resuscitation, there will be nothing to prevent an unscrupulous Government from building new ships on the plea that the new vessels are being constructed to replace older ones, without any real intention to get rid of the latter.
And again, will a country in Russia’s present naval plight be likely to find the scheme palatable? Will not Russia insist that her relative maritime position must be that which she occupied three years ago?
The notorious hostility of Germany to any limitation of armaments is also a stumbling-block which bids fair to effectually frustrate the pious intentions of the advocates of “limitation of armaments.” For how can this country or (still more) France agree to check the growth of her navy, while a potential navy as enterprising and unscrupulous as Germany’s is adding ship to ship in this ruthless game of beggar my neighbour? So easily, it seems, might a single dissentient voice wreck the good intentions of the concert of Europe on such a point.
And if, indeed, a majority of the Great Powers was so strongly in favour of the scheme as to incline them to endeavour to forcibly impose their will upon the minority, we can scarcely suppose that the latter would gracefully acquiesce or would consent to see their freedom of action fettered by diplomatic pressure.
In such an event, the peaceful objects of those in favour of a limitation might, so far from being fulfilled, result in precipitating war.
Possible eventualities such as these, however, by no means exhaust the list of objections to which the proposal to limit naval armaments is open.
A great range of practical difficulties are also involved.
For example, what is there to prevent a state (which has agreed to the convention) from devoting its ship building energies to the construction of numbers of large, swift, steamers, ostensibly for mercantile purposes, but of a character which would fit them for employment as auxiliary cruisers and corsairs in war? The distinctions between vessels of such character and ordinary merchant steamers would be almost impossible to draw, and yet it is certainly undesirable to limit (by international convention) the expansion of the mercantile marine of any of the signatory Powers.
The vested interests concerned in war-ship construction are, moreover, nowadays, very large, with ramifications in almost every branch of manufacture and trade.
The immediate effect of any proposal to limit naval armaments will be to deal a heavy blow at these interests, with the results that the latter would in all probability array themselves against the movement, and the consequent opposition thus created would be a formidable obstacle.
And, again, this country, more than any other, has a supreme interest in the maintenance of her shipbuilding trade in a flourishing and healthy condition. Will it be advisable for Britain to enrol herself under the banner of “Limited Naval Armaments” if, as seems inevitable, such limitation will react with serious effect upon one of our premier national industries?
With regard to the second proposal to “limit the size of vessels to that of the largest now under construction,” the following are points demanding serious consideration.
In the first place it will be necessary for the Admiralty to insist that, on a naval technical point of this kind, naval opinion must be decisive, just as on a point of military technique His Majesty’s Government would naturally look to the War Office for guidance.
And the question before the Admiralty is a simple one. Would a limitation upon the size of ships affect British naval interests favourably or unfavourably, or would it leave those interests unaffected altogether?
In answering this question the Admiralty would point in the first place to the fact that in existing ships of similar date and classes British types are almost without exception larger than foreign ones. The average tonnage of modern British battleships exceeds that of French and German battleships by at least 2,500 tons, and the same feature will be observed on an analysis of British armoured and protected cruisers.
The persistence in our warship designs for many years past of this remarkable excess of British over foreign displacements can scarcely be regarded by even the most ignorant as a mere fortuitous and accidental circumstance.
It is, on the contrary, notoriously a corollary to the primary strategical principle that the British Fleet exists for one purpose only, viz., to seek out and destroy the armed vessels of our enemies, wherever they may be! And, inasmuch as the continued existence of our Empire depends absolutely upon the ability of the fleet to discharge this fundamental duty, of firstly pursuing the ships of an enemy if necessary to the world’s end, and secondly conquering them when overtaken, it is plain that no reasonable precautions should be neglected that will ensure that the material of the Fleet is endowed with the requisite qualifications to this vitally important end. With interests so tremendous at stake, Britain can afford to leave nothing to chance. The British Empire being world wide, it follows that British ships must possess sufficient coal capacity to carry them across the ocean in any weather, which necessitates their possessing better sea going qualities than the German and French Fleets, which exist primarily for action in the immediate vicinity of the coasts of the motherland. The British Fleet must be prepared to move swiftly to and strike with effect in almost every quarter of the inhabitable world. In a word, while the functions and duties of the fleets of Continental nations are, generally speaking, local, defensive, and confined to narrow seas, the role of the British Fleet is a ubiquitous one! Once this is grasped, it becomes clear that our ships must carry more coal than their foreign rivals. And since it would be the height of folly to sacrifice armament or protection in order to provide increased bunker capacity, the British ships are and are likely to remain of larger displacement than foreign ones. A notable case in this connection is the Italian design of the “Regina Elena,” which may be a good fighting ship in still waters near a base, but which would be quite unacceptable as a British design, as she could not fight many of her guns in a seaway, nor could she maintain her crew in good condition at sea in bad weather.
The fact that Great Britain possesses numerous coaling stations in distant seas, at which our which our ships can replenish their stocks of coal, has sometimes been adduced as an argument for diminishing their bunker capacity. But while it is not denied that such coaling stations are of the utmost value, it must not be forgotten that it is the coal onboard a vessel which alone measures her sea-keeping capacity, and that no reserve of coal on shore at a depot, however ample, could make up for a shortage in the bunkers of British ships when in touch with an enemy.
But this argument by no means exhausts the case of the Admiralty in support of their demand that British ships should be of larger size than foreign ships. The British Empire floats on the British Navy. It is our all in all. Victory at sea, desirable to Foreign States, is a sine qua non to our continued existence. We must win at sea or perish as a nation.
Other things being equal, victory will be on the side of the more powerful of the two antagonists. Now, in any future naval war, it may safely be predicted that decisive naval actions between organised battle-fleets will be comparatively rare. There was but one “Trafalgar” in the campaign of 1805; there has been but one “Tsushima” in the recent Russo-Japanese war. In the century that divided those epoch-making sea-fights, no fleet action (unless exceptions be made in the cases of Lissa and the Yalu) on anything approaching the same scale has taken place. What history justifies us in anticipating is that in the future, as in the past, naval wars will be marked by two or three great fleet actions at most, and by numerous smaller sea-fights between ships detached for special purposes, such as scouting and lookout vessels, and ships employed on the attack and protection of trade, and the convoy of overseas expeditions, &c. For purposes such as these our potential rivals have undoubtedly made preparation, and, in the event of a war with any first-class Naval Power, Britain would have to anticipate some dissemination of her ships on services of this kind.
Single vessels thus detached from the main fleets will in all likelihood frequently meet at sea, and naval duels will take place, in which, ceteris paribus, victory will lie with the more powerful of the two antagonists. Now, from the British nation’s point of view, come what may, the British ship must be the victor.
How can this condition (the success of the British side) be best assured? Given equal fighting qualities in the personnel, there must be but two alternatives. Either the individual British ship must be stronger than her antagonist, or there must be two British ships to meet the (hypothetical) single ship of the enemy. For (it must be remembered) no fraction short of the unit can be admitted. We cannot send 1¼ British ships to deal with one foreign one, or 1½ British ships, or 1¾ British ships, or any number more than one but is less than two.
Pushed to its logical conclusion, this implies that wherever there is a single enemy’s ship there the Admiralty must, in order to ensure victory, provide either a single British ship of greater power or two British ships of equal power; in other words, that as regards detached vessels we must be in double strength everywhere. Faced by these alternatives, there can be no question that the Admiralty solution of the problem is the correct one. The decision to build each individual British ship of somewhat greater power and sea-endurance then the similar types of our potential enemies is the logical outcome of this consideration.
The proposed limitation of displacements to the 18,000 tons of the “Dreadnought” is, it must be remembered, even at the present moment a belated one. Already in the mercantile marine displacements of 45,000 tons have been recently reached in the case of the “Mauritania” and the “Lusitania,” and tonnages of between 25,000 and 30,000 are by no means uncommon, while even in warship construction the displacement of the “Dreadnought” has already been greatly exceeded by in the two new Japanese battleships “Satsuma” and “Aki” (19,370 tons). The current ship building program of the United States herself, oddly enough, includes a battleship of 20,000 tons or more.
Thus it is evident that the arbitrary limit to warship displacement proposed by President Roosevelt has already gone by the board, and the only practical question that remains is whether any purely empirical maximum can be assigned, in a matter so liable to change and so susceptible to radical improvements and modifications resultant upon modern advances in applied sciences such as metallurgy, as is the art of naval architecture.
The more this latter question is examined the less does it appear desirable for this country to fetter her future naval development by giving British adhesion to any suggestion of this kind.
Providence has endowed the British Isles (and indeed the British Empire) with a splendid extent of coast-line, enriched by a large number of deep indentations forming magnificent natural deep water harbours. This gift of nature has been denied to some of our naval rivals and potential enemies, and, more particularly in the case of the United States and Germany, the shallowness of the approaches to the great naval arsenals is a grave disability. The shoals at the mouth of the Elbe and the Jade, and along the German North Sea and Baltic Coast, impose limitations in the draft of the German warships, which could only be overcome by huge and costly dredging operations; and so long as the Kiel canal remains at its present depth and breadth, the difficulty of any large increase in the displacement of German warships is likely to be a serious matter. For Great Britain to consent to limit (by International agreement) the size of battleships would thus be tantamount to throwing away an important natural advantage. To compel our potential enemy to spend money in time of peace upon a large scheme of dredging German harbours cannot be spent in building German battleships.
If it could be shown that the British taxpayer would benefit by the proposal to limit the size of warships, and that our Naval predominance would not thereby be jeopardised, something might be said for the President’s proposal.
On the hypothesis that the International limitation imposed referred merely to the size of individual ships, and not to the numbers of such ships to be built by each Power, it is manifest that no financial gain on the ship building program would result. Britain would still be compelled to preserve her Naval supremacy by laying down annually a certain definite proportion of tonnage, measured by the tonnage of new construction by her potential enemies. Whether the British new construction took shape as two ships of 18,000 tons or three ships of 12,000 would be immaterial from the point of view of the Estimates, or rather the gain in economy in construction would be, if anything, slightly on the side of the larger units, big ships being under modern conditions somewhat cheaper to build ton for ton than small ones.
Comparing, however, the cost of upkeep of –
(a) 2 – 18,000 tons “Dreadnought’s,”
(b) 3 – 12,900 tons “Albion’s,”
the saving is all on the size of the larger ships.
1. The cost of docking and repairs to a ship of each type would be approximately the same, and the total cost would work out in favour of the two “Dreadnoughts” nearly in the ratio of 2 to 3, and fewer docks would be required.
2. The cost of coal, oil, and stores consumed by the two large ships would be much less than for the three smaller ones.
3. The largest money saving in favour of the “Dreadnoughts” will, however, be due to reduction in personnel and the votes required to maintain it, and it must be remembered that, whereas we buy coal, oil, and stores cheaper than Continental Powers can do, our personnel is not only more difficult to obtain in sufficient numbers, but is, man for man, much more costly, owing to our system of voluntary enlistment.
Comparing the complements from two “Dreadnought’s” and three “Albion’s,” the number of officers and men required are 1,384 and 2,202 respectively, a saving of 818 in favour of the large ships.
If it be decided in the future to replace the 30 battleships of the “Formidable,” “Duncan,” “Canopus,” “Caesar,” and “Swiftsure” classes by 20 “Dreadnoughts,” there would be a saving of over 8,000 officers and men, a sufficient number to man 12 more “Dreadnoughts,” or if it were preferred to reduce the total of the personnel in the service by this number, the savings on the Wages, Victualling and Clothing Votes, would approximate to half a million pounds a year, besides savings on pensions and votes for medical and educational services. Comparing the broadside gun-fire and armour protection of the above vessels, the larger ships show to great advantage.
Broadside Fire
20 “Dreadnoughts” - - - 160 12-inch guns
30 older types- - - - - 112 12-inch guns
+ 8 10-inch guns
Giving a balance of 40 12-inch guns in favour of the heavy ships; more than sufficient to deal with the 6-inch and 7.5-inch guns carried by the lighter ships.
As regards side armour, the greatest thickness carried by the older types is 9 inches, eight carry a maximum thickness of 7 inches, and six are protected by 6 inches only; the “Dreadnoughts” have a greater thickness than 9 inches over all vitals, and are consequently much more efficiently protected against heavy gun-fire.
From these figures it will be seen that the cost of upkeep of the 20 “Dreadnoughts” would be much less than that of 30 smaller vessels of greatly inferior power.
The advocates of moderate dimensions may maintain that the three 12,000 ton ships could be built of equal power to two 18,000 ton ships.
But, insomuch as “moderate dimensions” inevitably implies moderate speed, advocates of moderate-sized ships must be very carefully scanned.
All the factors which make up a fighting vessels power depend ultimately upon the displacement. For a given increase of displacement definite improvements can be obtained in speed, coal endurance, gun-power or protection.
One of the stock arguments of those who pin their faith to “moderate dimensions” is the quasi historical, but entirely fallacious parallel, of the three-decker and the 74-gun ship of the line. The error of the reasoning in this particular, however, will very quickly appear.
When after two-and-a-half centuries of experience, the sailing line-of-battle ships reached the acme of their development, history teaches us that the great majority of the Capital ships were two decked 74’s and 80’s. Even at that day, however, as now, the great advantage of concentration of power was fully recognised.
Wood was however, the only material available for construction, and consequently it was practically impossible to increase the length of ships. Thus, the only method of increasing power was to add an additional tier of guns; and this addition involved an inevitable decrease in speed, weatherliness, and seagoing quality generally. In other words, the increase in displacement on a limited length meant a decrease of speed and mobility, and displacement of wooden sailing line-of-battleships had therefore reached its practical maximum in Nelson’s day. Incidentally it is to be remarked that this maximum was at least equal to the displacement of the largest merchant vessels then afloat and greatly in excess of the immense majority of such.
Now turn to the present. The material used for building battleships was changed some 50 years ago from wood to iron, and 25 years ago was again changed from iron to steel, and we certainly have not yet reached the practical limits of displacement for steel shipbuilding.
The “Great Eastern,” constructed of iron some two generations ago, was born before her time, and, though her displacement has recently been far exceeded, may be regarded as a solitary instance of an iron or steel vessel of impractically large displacement.
So far as from the steel battleship being at least as large as the largest modern merchant vessels, we have seen that many of the mail steamers now afloat are of double the displacement of the largest battleships.
It is fair to deduce from the foregoing facts that whatever was the case in Nelson’s day, the battleship of the present has not reached the practical limit of size.
It is true that as the dimensions of warships increase it will be necessary to do a certain amount of dredging and to enlarge the engraving docks. This contingent disadvantage will, however, bear less hardly upon Britain than upon our potential enemies.
Next, let us examine the effect of increased displacement upon fighting qualities. Other things being equal, if we increase displacement we can by utilising that increase for giving greater length, obtain a higher speed. If heavier or more numerous guns, more torpedoes, more ammunition, or, in short, more offensive power be desired, what is needed can be obtained by adding to the displacement.
If better protection or greater coal endurance is demanded, these qualities can only be obtained, if offensive power is not to be sacrificed, at the expense of a greater displacement. We see, then that by increasing displacement, under present conditions we can, if necessary, obtain better motive power without sacrificing fighting power, or, if preferred, get stronger fighting power without any loss of speed.”
As shown above the sailing line-of-battle ship having reached its practical maximum of efficiency in Nelson’s day, either of these courses would have been impossible. The endeavour to prove that, because the large three decked wooden was a less efficient unit than the smaller one, instantly breaks down when brought to the tribunal of fact. This theory would be true if the large battleship was a slower and less weatherly vessel than the small; but the precise contrary is the case.
So much for the individual ship. We have next to examine how the matter stands with the fleet. The question to be settled is whether the fighting power of a hypothetical fleet of given displacement would be better distributed in many ships or few.
Taking the four principle qualities which make up fighting efficiency, seriatim, they may be dealt with in the following order:-
(1) Protection.
(2) Coal endurance.
(3) Mobility or speed.
(4) Offensive power.
It will be assumed for the purposes of the argument, that the relative merits of two fleets are under discussion, whose total displacements are equal, but one of which, “A,” is composed of a smaller number of vessels than “B.”
(1) As regards armour protection, it is plain that the area to be defended against gun attack must be less in the case of fleet “A” than in fleet “B,” consequently, for an equal weight of armour “A” will obtain better protection than “B.” As regards internal subdivision against torpedo attack, the “A” ships for equal expenditure of weight can be rendered less liable to total dismemberment or foundering; “B,” on the other hand, will have the advantage in losing a smaller proportionate force as a result of a successful torpedo attack.
(2) As regards coal endurance, that “A” fleet will be able to cover a greater distance than “B,” for an equal expenditure of coal is also a matter which admits of mathematical demonstration; e.g., 5 “Renown’s” would be approximately equal in displacement to 4 “Majestic’s,” but as each of these at 10 knots would consume 60 tons a day against 62 tons consumed by the “Majestic’s,” it is apparent that the latter would, as a fleet, have an advantage of 52 tons a day at 10 knots.
(3) As regards speed, the advantage most clearly lies with the larger vessels. High speed can only be obtained in small vessels for comparatively short distances in smooth water, and then only by the sacrifice of offensive and defensive power. For continuous high speed at sea, great length is absolutely necessary; the fact is simply not open to argument. Mobility does not consist solely of high speed; seaworthiness and manoeuvring power are also necessary. As regards the former quality, the large ship has the advantage, and in regard to the latter, the inherent disadvantage of large dimensions is by no means so great as is commonly supposed, since by careful design, the 15,000-ton battleships of to-day have been rendered far more handy than were their predecessors of 10,000 tons.
(4) In regard to offensive power, the advantages obtainable by increased displacement in the individual ships are twofold:-
Firstly. – By the concentration of the gun-power in a relatively small number of ships, the length of the line is reduced, so that the Fleet, when opposed to a more numerous enemy, will be able to attack one end of his line, while the other is by distance and bearing precluded from fully developing the power of its attack.
Secondly. – It is only by means of great displacements that vessels can be made capable of carrying the great armament of large calibre guns, for which the necessity has been so fully exemplified in the recent war.
Amongst the naval Powers, Great Britain, by reason of the greater size of her sea-going fleets, necessarily has greater opportunities of perfecting her warship designs, and effecting improvements in details of their armaments and hulls.
To limit (by an arbitrary International rule) the size of warships, would be to deprive Britain of her right to benefit by the unique experience we have thus dearly bought, for, as has been shown, improvements in warships almost invariably imply an increase of displacement; The proposal would also help those countries in which natural or other bars to increase of size of ship already exist, i.e. whose coastal waters are shallow, and whose dock accommodation is limited. Such countries are the United States and Germany at the present moment. In both cases there has been a tendency to limit the draught of water of their battleships. If there being during the next few years a progressive increase in the size of ship it would be difficult for Germany to meet the new conditions, and to some extent for the United States also.
As already said, one of the principle gains in increase of size is economy of propulsion. You can drive a bigger ship more cheaply. But in order to reap the full advantage of this consideration, the bigger ship must not only be longer but deeper. Increased draught of water is, however, a source of considerable risk in the vicinity of a large portion of the American and German coasts and harbours.
The enormous costs of increased dock accommodation, deepening of canals, &c., multiplies many-fold the mere costs of bigger ships themselves.
Besides these direct advantages to a country with shallow coastal waters and docks of limiting the size of warships, there is a further important consideration arising out of the effect of the bigger ships in making the smaller to be relatively out of date and inefficient. This may affect the United States with respect to Germany quite as much as with regard to England. At the present moment the United States fleet is undoubtedly superior to the German fleet, largely because of this very factor of “individual size of ship.” If Germany be driven to building bigger ships, this superiority of the United States fleet may tend to disappear more than if such limit were imposed.
The proposed limitation would be a most difficult one to define. The displacement of a ship varies with the weight of coal, water, stores, ammunition, &c., she carries from time to time; the nominal displacements merely indicate the total weights of the ships and their contents on the occasion of their official trials. Before joining in any arbitrary figure of 20,000 tons it would be necessary to define what proportion of a total load, say, of 3,000 tons of fuel should be on board, and so on for all the other disputable items. With such incentives to overreach an opponent, and with no possibility of effective inspection in other countries, such a proposal is really impracticable.
That the considerations mentioned above are of great importance are clear from the significant stoppage of shipbuilding in nearly all the principle navies. The naval authorities of these countries are obviously seeking for the best way to extricate themselves from the difficulty in which the appearance of bigger ship in England and Japan has placed them. “The easiest way possible for them would be the general adoption of President Roosevelt’s proposal.” And what would be their gain would be loss to Great Britain and Japan, with their greater natural advantages, and their more commodious docking accommodation.
It can hardly be doubted that some such difficulties were present in the mind of President Roosevelt when he made his proposal.
To sum up. The conclusion reached is that, as regards the proposal to keep the total relative strength of all navies as it is at present, the interest of this country should incline us to cordially acquiesce in principle, on condition that other nations would do likewise.
The difficulties in practice, in giving effect to such a scheme, although not necessarily insuperable, are, however, very serious, and the scheme will demand the hearty concurrence and good will of the Powers, in order to be effective.
For Great Britain, the United States, and France, to thus limit their naval armaments, while Governments as retrograde as those of Germany and Russia declined to do so, would be the supreme limit of human folly, and might jeopardise the cause of liberal progress and civilisation throughout the world.
The proposal to limit the size of our individual warships is one which this country must strenuously oppose.
