People's War

[lordroel]

Sept 14, 2021 18:17:10 GMT James G said:

They are thinking pre-emptive action less that happen in the future. An air campaign, like what was done OTL in 1999 to Yugoslavia.

But unlike Yugoslavia which was by then made up mostly of Serbia, East Germany has a bigger air force.

This would be the NVA in 1989.

Combat/Trainer Aircraft	Number in Use
MIG-21	251
MIG-29	24
MIG-23BN	18
SU-22	54
L-39	52

[stevep]

Sept 14, 2021 18:18:49 GMT James G said:

Sixteen – Ultimatum


In light of what East Germany had recently done, though on the back of all that they had done previously too, a coalition of NATO countries issued an ultimatum to the DDR. They spoke as ‘the Coalition’ rather than the forty-plus year-old Atlantic Alliance. Not everyone who had come to Rotterdam could agree to that, West Germany and most of the Southern European countries foremost. West German opposition to the consequences of East Germany refusing to accede to the demands issued upon it remained immensely strong though Chancellor Schäuble couldn’t stop his allies doing what they intended to do. The tide from non-intervention to intervention had turned so dramatically and those governments seeking to strike against the regime in East Berlin had committed themselves to a position where Schäuble was completely out-manoeuvred. Military action by the Coalition would be launched from their soil too yet with assurances made that Schäuble’s country would be protected in that from a counterstrike. He left the Netherlands before the ultimatum was made though, refusing to give any sign of acceptance even without signing onboard.

There were three demands made of the DDR.

The first was that East Germany was to cease with immediate effect its missile attacks against neighbouring countries. No more Scud nor Spider ballistic missiles were to be fired into Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia nor anywhere else.

Second on the list was for the country to pull out all military forces from the Czech Republic be they ground troops, aircraft making use of Czech airbases and so-called military advisers. Additionally, East German military aircraft were also to cease flying in Czech airspace and there were to be no more firing of SAMs against aircraft also above that nation from out of DDR territory.

The third demand was that the East Germans were to cease at once development of nuclear weapons. They were to open up all of their development work to international inspectors sent by an independent organisation such as the International Atomic Energy Agency with IAEA operatives allowed free access to anywhere that they wished within East Germany.

All of these demands were to met… or else. The Coalition’s ultimatum was that unless East Germany accepted all of these requirements, and acted upon them with honesty in good time too, military action would be taken against the country. Their missile systems would be put out of action, they would be forced to vacate the Czech Republic and their nuclear facilities would be likewise subject to attack. The language used in the statement issued on behalf of all of those Coalition countries speaking as one was vague on what they meant by how the DDR was to exactly comply with their demands though when it came to the ultimatum and the consequences of not following it, military action was cleared affirmed as the outcome. The commitment was there in no uncertain terms of what would happen if the Coalition wasn’t satisfied with the East German response to what they were directed to do. Ten countries signed up to the Coalition: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the United States. Recent reverses in the positions of the Canadians, the Italians & the Norwegians had come following the latest East German missile strikes though for all of them, their outlook on how to deal with the DDR was something new. That country had just gone too far doing all that it had against its neighbours and then topped that off by the revelations about just how advanced its nuclear bomb project reportedly was. The mood was there that there was no choice but for action to be taken.


The ten leaders – Cuomo, Fabius and Heseltine prominent among them – stood looking solemn for a series of photographs after their statement containing their ultimatum was released. It went to the world’s media at the same time as there were simultaneous government-to-government contacts between their nations as the East Germans where the same thing was issued to them via official channels. The emergency summit in the Netherlands at which NATO had failed to agree as one on the matter thus forming the temporary Coalition afterwards broke up. Presidents, prime ministers and a chancellor all went home. There would be domestic difficulties at home for many of them. In no country which had committed itself to the Coalition, America, Britain & France included, was there solid political & public support for military action. The momentum for action was there but those against that weren’t about to go away. As to Schäuble, he went back to Bonn. West Germany was split on the issue ahead of the Rotterdam meeting though the news about the significant numbers of civilian deaths in Poznan did change things at home somewhat with outrage across his country at what the East Germans had done to Poland. Nonetheless, West Germany’s leader went back to his nation into a firestorm concerning what the Coalition had threatened to do to the DDR. No solution was going to come to solve the matter of how West Germans felt about the whole thing.

A HVA team had been active in Rotterdam when all of those NATO heads of government were there. East Germany spying activities across the Netherlands, as they were across Western Europe, were quite extensive though the quality of their mounted operations was never the best despite successes reported to Stasi bosses back home. Many operatives were engaged in criminal enterprises, using skills and contacts that they had made while doing that officially for the HVA. The Rotterdam operation came last minute and was pretty clumsy. Nothing of any significance was gained in the attempt at espionage when it came to discovering what was going on during the discussions held there through their efforts. Anything that East Germany’s spies really wanted to know was already readily available via the media anyway. Official leaks coming out of the impromptu summit came quick and fast and there was also all of the comment made back in the home countries of the participants too. West German refusal to back any idea of military action was known early on and so too was the about-turn in American & British behaviour where they suddenly pushed for intervention when DDR nuclear activities started dominating their agenda. The Italian reversal was something that exploded across the ‘lively’ Italian media and from the Canadian government, there was the public resignation of a junior minister back home that was reported on where he openly spoke of his opposition to his country being part of a European conflict. The operational controller back in East Berlin who the team in Rotterdam reported to would claim credit for so much of what he heard via the media rather than what he sent his HVA operatives to do. He did that to save his own behind and it denied his organisation the understanding that its intelligence-gathering capability in Western Europe were actually pretty poor.


Notwithstanding that issue, the regime led by Margot Honecker was aware ahead of the gathering in Rotterdam of what was coming due to how much of what happened being done in the open. The free societies in the West gave their media and politicians the ability to say what they wanted for everyone to hear. Republicans in America pushing for military action arguing against their intervention-shy Democratic president, the UK Labour opposition siding with war-mongering Conservatives in the Commons and the massive West Germany schism was all out there in the public arena. Press briefings were held where spokespeople for Western leaders hell-bent either on war or against it took place to explain the positioning of their governments. In East Germany, there was none of that though there were no fools in the Politburo who didn’t understand how all of that worked. The second ballistic missile attack undertaken against Poland had been passionately argued against by certain members where they said that NATO was looking for an excuse to act. Those for that attack in reply to the Poles putting troops into the Czech Republic claimed – and they were correct too – that NATO itself, especially West Germany, would never act against them in any pre-emptive fashion and so that that strike, regarded as necessary, could go ahead. The forming of the Coalition surprised them all though no matter what side of the argument they had been on. Differences among member states of that organisation when it came to military action to be taken or not with regard to the former Yugoslavia had long been prominent, so too European opposition to American war-making outside of Europe. With all the information in front of them to see what would happen, Politburo members had read the lay of the land completely wrong. To admit that though was difficult for them.

The diplomatic communiques arrived synchronously from those ten countries in East Berlin. Nations of the Coalition issued their demands and gave their ultimatum as to what would happen if those weren’t acted upon. A complete absence of West German participation was something that was paid attention to though the non-involvement of NATO members Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Spain & Turkey didn’t get a mention: they weren’t important but West Germany was. What the Coalition was threatening to do in terms of making attacks was translated among the Politburo as air and missile strikes. Yes, they could do that from every direction yet there would need to be the use of military bases inside West Germany and the use of that country’s airspace to really make it work. The West Germans were utterly opposed to conflict with open remarks made by their politicians, media and public that East Germany would retaliate by striking back at them whether they took part or not. The Coalition threatening military action was regarded as something that they couldn’t do without Schäuble on-board. Honecker and Minister of Security Schwanitz took that position. The defence & foreign ministers firmly agreed too. Others in the Politburo, those who had been arguing against all that had been done in the Czech Republic and against Poland as well, were less sure though didn’t actually fully disagree with that assessment. It made sense to them all.

The Coalition was bluffing. Their leaders had made their threats but wouldn’t be able to back them up without the West Germans onboard with that. When Schäuble didn’t reverse course, Cuomo, Fabius & Heseltine would wring their hands, blame Bonn and try something else. What those who’d issued that ultimatum from Rotterdam were hoping for was that East Germany would blink and back down. That wouldn’t happen. They would continue onwards with what they were doing.

Such was the thinking in East Berlin. Honecker gave instructions that there should be a pause in ballistic missile strikes and that defensive measures to protect the DDR should take place, just in case, but everything else would remain the same with the nation defending itself and its interests. A public statement was to be made with the General Secretary herself fronting that where she would address her country and the world directly, not ‘hiding behind written remarks’ as Schwanitz said that the Coalition leaders had done. That happened the night after what came out of Rotterdam. East Germany faced down those seeking to threaten it. A denial was made of nuclear weapons development and there was also the explanation that what the DDR was doing in Eastern Europe was all about national defence as well as answering a call for help from the government in Prague. She ended her remarks by firmly asserting that should any attack take place against the people of East Germany by Western countries, it would be met with an armed counterstrike. She didn’t have to say what exactly that would entail nor where it would take place. The imaginations of those abroad were already active: it would be West Germany should that occur.

  Well the regime is refusing to accept the 'coalition' is serious but I think their going to find out their totally wrong.  Furthermore if their counter strike to any allied actions is largely against W Germany that could backfire heavily on them as its likely to move both the bulk of the population in W Germany and also other NATO countries still opposing military action into the active camp. 

  This is going to get bloodier before it gets better but glad that their nukes aren't advanced enough to be used.

[James G]

Sept 14, 2021 18:34:48 GMT lordroel said:

Sept 14, 2021 18:17:10 GMT James G said:

They are thinking pre-emptive action less that happen in the future. An air campaign, like what was done OTL in 1999 to Yugoslavia.

But unlike Yugoslavia which was by then made up mostly of Serbia, East Germany has a bigger air force.

This would be the NVA in 1989.

Combat/Trainer Aircraft	Number in Use
MIG-21	251
MIG-29	24
MIG-23BN	18
SU-22	54
L-39	52

The East Germans have more MiG-29s - they got some from Moldova - and they, plus the MF versions of the MiG-23 are fighters capable of holding their own somewhat. Bases are back near the Polish border, so not forward deployed, and there are many, many dispersal sites including ex Soviet bases and highway strips (the one near Frost) being one example.
Still... against the best the USAF can field, aided by everyone else, they would be toast in a protracted air battle.
They will rely upon SAMs and deception. In OTL 1990, when the Luftwaffe took over the NVA AF, they kept the MiG-29s and nothing else but the deception outfit in-place. What the Yugoslavs did in 1999 with fake targets, which looked damn realistic, is what the East Germans (plus the Soviets who taught them) had ready to put to use in war.
Missiles and trickery will be EG defences rather than fighters.

Sept 15, 2021 15:16:41 GMT stevep said:

  Well the regime is refusing to accept the 'coalition' is serious but I think their going to find out their totally wrong.  Furthermore if their counter strike to any allied actions is largely against W Germany that could backfire heavily on them as its likely to move both the bulk of the population in W Germany and also other NATO countries still opposing military action into the active camp. 

  This is going to get bloodier before it gets better but glad that their nukes aren't advanced enough to be used.

Absolutely wrong. They'll get the message soon enough though when the military build-up begins and the WGs are ridden rough-shot over.
WG will be right in the firing line though Denmark and the Low Countries (just) are targetable too. That will be the hit-back strategy with the expected results. 

[James G]

Seventeen – Growing isolation


The cargo ship MV Rosa Luxemburg arrived in St. Petersburg the day after the Coalition issued its ultimatum upon East Germany. That vessel was part of the DDR’s state maritime fleet and had sailed on a scheduled voyage to Russia long before the West decided to make demands upon its home country. The crew onboard contained among them two Stasi officers as well as a pair of unofficial informers – those IM’s were everywhere – to keep watch on things. Expected, the Rosa Luxemburg docked with the anticipation that there would be a quick turn around time. A range of cargo was to be loaded to be taken back to Rostock and that included certain military ammunition direct from several Russian arms factories. The West had long ago imposed an arms embargo upon East Germany yet Russia never had: the DDR had been buying arms from Russia where it couldn’t steal them from aboard. There was to be no loading of that particular cargo, nor anything else either too. The captain, then the senior Stasi man, both made a scene but couldn’t change what was happening. No reason was given apart the retort of ‘I’m only following orders’ from port officials as to why that was the case. The ship wouldn’t be returning to East Germany laden with what she had come to collect (what was already paid for too) in terms of agricultural & industrial supplies as well as over fifty surface-to-air missiles.

In Moscow, the East German ambassador was called upon to see the foreign minister while across in East Berlin, the Russian ambassador there requested an audience with the DDR foreign minister at the same time. Pointed questions were asked by the Russians in the two capitals. Those concerned the assertion from the West that East Germany was manufacturing nuclear weapons. Was there any truth to that? How could the DDR’s diplomats explain the alleged wealth of evidence that the Americans & the Western Europeans said that they had? The response which came was the same as what Margot Honecker had said: it was all a lie, all a fabrication. The DDR didn’t have a nuclear weapons programme nor had any inclination to begin one. The ambassador and the foreign minister both followed the pre-established script on that matter though with only the latter knowing that the truth of the matter was completely the opposite: that diplomat there in Moscow had no inkling of what was really going on. Both East Germans were made to understand that the Russian Federation, the recognised successor state of the Soviet Union, one of the victors of World War Two who had responsibilities towards maintaining the peace in Europe with regard to the divided Germany’s, wouldn’t accept the DDR developing weapons of mass destruction. The country was explicitly prohibited from doing so. There were more denials and more claims that it was all part of a Western plot to find an excuse for aggression. No, East Germany wasn’t trying to arm itself with nukes!

What was said in both East Berlin and Moscow didn’t change things with the Rosa Luxemburg where that ship remained in St. Petersburg not allowed to take on any cargo at all. A Russian ship in the Baltic, on its way to East Germany carrying other munitions in the face of the arms sanctions that the West had imposed, was given instructions to turn back around and return to Kaliningrad. A cargo aircraft due to fly later that day from Russia to the DDR also with lighter imports that what ships could carry saw its flight plan refused too. No matter what diplomats said, Russia imposed a sudden block upon the transference of military & non-military goods to East Germany. That was official in terms of instructions direct from President Chernomyrdin being followed though in communications with East Germans involved, his name wasn’t invoked: those down the line, such as at the quayside at St. Petersburg, could only say that they had orders from on-high to cease trade with their long-established partners. How long such an unofficial blockade was going to go on for, no one knew. It began though and East Germany could do nothing about it.

Belarus and Bulgaria took another day to do the same. East Germany had previous good relationships with the governments of those two nations when it came to defying sanctions, especially in terms of the DDR importing military supplies, but out of Minsk and Sofia both, there came directions from the highest levels for a cessation of trade with the East Germans. For the two of them, it wasn’t really about the nuclear issue as was the case with the Russians, but rather they saw the way that the wind was blowing. East Germany was on a collision course with the West no matter what attitude there was in East Berlin that the West would do nothing. Ties were cut, important ones for them though more so for the DDR. To stand with the East Germans at such a time was considered to be disadvantageous, even dangerous. Should the situation change, everything would return to normal. The Belorussians and Bulgarians didn’t act harshly where they cut off ties because they were prepared to pick things up again in the future. However, they might as well have done when it came to how sudden and unexplained it all was as far as East Germany was concerned. All of a sudden, while the West was making threats, allies were running away from them and causing them serious damage.

That growing isolation wasn’t the case with regard to Iraq though. Saddam was a different beast indeed. He pledged support for the DDR, even making a statement to that effect for overseas consumption. Just like his country was, Saddam claimed that the DDR was threatened by the West with unjust and illegal military action born out by a desire to control their countries and steal the wealth of their people. Such words didn’t on their own mean anything though. They didn’t cause any real concern in the West and also gave the East Germans nothing either… or so it seemed. Hours after Saddam said what he did, he acted in a manner which, unbeknown to everyone at the time – him, Honecker and the leaders of the Coalition –, would down the line assist the DDR in its dispute with the West. Over the deserts of Southern Iraq, where he was facing down American-led military forces based outside of Iraq yet constantly violating his airspace, Saddam ordered the night-time flight of a pair of fighters. Two MiG-25s flew into the no-fly zone that the victors of the Gulf War had established above Iraq. An American AWACS aircraft picked them up upon lift-off though lost them some time afterwards. From out of Kuwait flew a flight of F-15 Eagles who had been on strip-alert due to similar Iraqi actions since the previous year. Saddam wasn’t allowed to fly aircraft over the south of his country as per UN resolutions on the matter and so the US Air Force jets went up to intercept them. When the AWACS once more got a track on the Iraqis, only one MiG-25 was detected: the second had vanished. A trap was smelt rather than the assumption being that the other had turned for home. The Americans were correct in that, just not quick enough to act. The second MiG fired off several missiles towards those American fighters with the other one used as bait to distract them. Four years previously, the MiG-25 had been partially successful in engaging American & allied aircraft where other Iraqi jets had spectacularly failed. That hadn’t been against F-15s supported by AWACS though, the very best that the Americans could field. That night over Iraq, things did go very different. One of the F-15s was hit by a long-range missile despite evading and jamming. It went down with the pilot managing to eject (and later recovered by CSAR operators). Both MiGs were then downed by the other F-15 ahead of fighter reinforcements for the US Air Force aircraft aloft arriving.

Since Operation Desert Knight had commenced late in 1994, the United States had been seeking to wind down the immense and costly military commitment made to face off against the Iraqis. Saddam had kept his army in-place near the border with Kuwait though and also continued to violate the no-fly zones. That incident where the Americans lost a fighter, taking down two Iraqi top-of-the-range ones in reply, meant that there wasn’t likely to be a drawn-down on the cards. Ground troops, naval assets and a fleet or aircraft were all involved in keeping the Iraqis in-check. It was all a serious drain upon American military resources. In addition, in light of the situation with the Coalition making demands upon the East Germans, there was an intention in Washington for a limited pull-back to begin so a portion of the air assets could be redeployed to Europe. That was cancelled once the shoot-downs occurred. Unintentionally, Saddam aided his East German allies by keeping the United States, the most-powerful member of the Coalition formed against the DDR, from having an easy time in assembling forces ready to enforce their demands & ultimatum via promised military action.

Back in Europe, the East Germans had fulfilled one of the trio of demands made by the Coalition when its issued its ultimatum from Rotterdam. There were no more firings of ballistic missiles towards it neighbours. Scuds nor the more accurate Spiders, even the shorter-range Scarabs, weren’t sent into either of the three countries to where they had gone beforehand when the DDR had launched those missile strikes. Nonetheless, while there were no launches after the Coalition told East Germany that it had to cease doing that or else, it didn’t mean that it was never going to happen again. On demand #2, that of East Germany withdrawing from the Czech Republic in terms of both physical presence and the fighting from afar into that small nation’s civil war, that carried on. There was that invite from the rebel government occupying Prague and most of the country which Honecker had pointed to. Her response to the Coalition’s threats had been that the ‘legitimate’ Czech government’ had requested DDR aid after an apparent Polish invasion. What the rest of the world considered to be the legal Czech government, who had moved to Ostrava from Olomouc, was in the process of being saved from extinction by those Poles on Czech soil. Polish troops and aircraft continued to engage rebel Czechs with the East Germans coming to their aid. DDR aircraft remained active above the country with ground support and fighter missions launched. Losses came to each side in that. East German troops moved towards the front-lines too, approaching battle with the Poles ahead of air activity.

The Coalition had their eyes upon the Trebbin secret military site south of Berlin, in addition to other identified nuclear development installations. East Germany had flatly denied that they had such a programme but there was plentiful evidence on that note. The West knew it and so too did the Russians when, at presidential direction, the CIA passed information on it to them. A deniable conduit was made use of with everything done unofficially yet Cuomo made sure that Chernomyrdin knew exactly what was going on with that issue. There was activity at the various East German locations which the Coalition was watching. It looked like camouflage measures were being enacted – it was a bit late for that – at some while there was the view taken that at other dispersed sites, the East Germans were moving out. So much for a fabrication when all that was happening! Ceasing the development and allowing IAEA inspectors in, providing them with full access too, was the third demand issued. The East Germans were acting in complete disregard to that just like they were with the second. The official estimate remained that they were months away from being able to make a viable weapon yet discussions were had between London, Paris & Washington on a worse case scenario. What if they sped things up dramatically where corners were cut? What if following that they tried nuclear blackmail against the threatened Coalition military action? A plausible series of events was plotted along those lines with an outlook which caused real concern among the three leaders in those capitals though also elsewhere.

No timescale had been issued at Rotterdam. The East Germans hadn’t been given a dead-line to act by, or at least take reasonable steps ahead of that. It had been decided that by going down that route, there could be ‘games’ played there from the DDR where that could be used to their advantage. The exact consequences of what form of military action would take hadn’t be laid out either – there was no ‘we will bomb here, here & here’ – for the same reason. Plans were being drafted for military action and a dead-line for their own actions was being discussed among Coalition leaders though. Before they could do that, something that there was determination to do despite so much previous hesitancy, forces needed to be assembled and readied for action. The deployments started the moment that the Rotterdam mini-summit was over with, all while the East Germans continued to believe that nothing was going to happen apart from more angry words.

[kyuzoaoi]

Now, the East Germans have to call their North Korean friends to distract the Americans...

[lordroel]

Sept 17, 2021 0:42:24 GMT kyuzoaoi said:

Now, the East Germans have to call their North Korean friends to distract the Americans...

Like sending some of their special forces into South Korea.

[stevep]

Sept 16, 2021 18:11:59 GMT James G said:

Sept 14, 2021 18:34:48 GMT lordroel said:

But unlike Yugoslavia which was by then made up mostly of Serbia, East Germany has a bigger air force.

This would be the NVA in 1989.

Combat/Trainer Aircraft	Number in Use
MIG-21	251
MIG-29	24
MIG-23BN	18
SU-22	54
L-39	52

The East Germans have more MiG-29s - they got some from Moldova - and they, plus the MF versions of the MiG-23 are fighters capable of holding their own somewhat. Bases are back near the Polish border, so not forward deployed, and there are many, many dispersal sites including ex Soviet bases and highway strips (the one near Frost) being one example.
Still... against the best the USAF can field, aided by everyone else, they would be toast in a protracted air battle.
They will rely upon SAMs and deception. In OTL 1990, when the Luftwaffe took over the NVA AF, they kept the MiG-29s and nothing else but the deception outfit in-place. What the Yugoslavs did in 1999 with fake targets, which looked damn realistic, is what the East Germans (plus the Soviets who taught them) had ready to put to use in war.
Missiles and trickery will be EG defences rather than fighters.

Sept 15, 2021 15:16:41 GMT stevep said:

  Well the regime is refusing to accept the 'coalition' is serious but I think their going to find out their totally wrong.  Furthermore if their counter strike to any allied actions is largely against W Germany that could backfire heavily on them as its likely to move both the bulk of the population in W Germany and also other NATO countries still opposing military action into the active camp. 

  This is going to get bloodier before it gets better but glad that their nukes aren't advanced enough to be used.

Absolutely wrong. They'll get the message soon enough though when the military build-up begins and the WGs are ridden rough-shot over.
WG will be right in the firing line though Denmark and the Low Countries (just) are targetable too. That will be the hit-back strategy with the expected results. 

  Can you clearify here please James?  What are you saying is wrong?  It sounds like their going to face military opposition from the west, which I predict and it sounds like their going to lash out when that happens, with a lot of the grief being directed against W Germany.  Are  you saying that I'm wrong in that this will harden W Germany against them?  Or simply possibly agreeing with me that the regime is wrong to think the west will stay out of it??

[James G]

Sept 17, 2021 0:42:24 GMT kyuzoaoi said:

Now, the East Germans have to call their North Korean friends to distract the Americans...

It is something under consideration by me.

Sept 17, 2021 9:41:31 GMT lordroel said:

Like sending some of their special forces into South Korea.

That would be 'fun'. Been done before too.

Sept 17, 2021 10:29:08 GMT stevep said:

  Can you clearify here please James?  What are you saying is wrong?  It sounds like their going to face military opposition from the west, which I predict and it sounds like their going to lash out when that happens, with a lot of the grief being directed against W Germany.  Are  you saying that I'm wrong in that this will harden W Germany against them?  Or simply possibly agreeing with me that the regime is wrong to think the west will stay out of it??

Ah, I see the issue.
I meant they are very wrong on that.
The thinking there is that the West is bluffing but the default action will be missile strikes westwards.

[James G]

Eighteen – First deployments


The US Air Force’s 1st Fighter Wing had one of its component squadrons on a Middle Eastern deployment during June 1995. The other pair, each with two dozen F-15 Eagles, had been held ready at Langley AFB in Virginia ready to reinforce them. Redeployment orders came for the rest of the 1 FW but it was to West Germany it was sent instead of Saudi Arabia. Using airborne refuelling done over the North Atlantic as well as external tanks carried in the place of weapons, the F-15s moved fast went ordered from Virginia to the Rhineland. At Ramstein AB – near to Kaiserlauten – there were hardened aircraft shelters which had housed F-16s during the later stages of the Cold War and they were saw rush refurbishment. RED HORSE airfield engineers were busy all over Ramstein making ready for the arrival of the F-15s. One-by-one, the jets which had made that long trans-Atlantic deployment, which had been done in complete radio silence too, including during tanking, touched down at the airbase which lay only a short flying time from East Germany. As to the West Germans, they weren’t consulted upon the arrival of the 1 FW. Ramstein was an American military base where sovereignty was theirs. It was to be the same elsewhere where further deployments were made to: American combat aircraft arrived and the West Germans had no say in that.

There were a lot of West Germans who believed that they should have a say though, that their objection to the threatened war with the DDR was a matter for them & their country. West German media covered the incoming flights with fantastic images of the F-15s coming in slow with their landing gear down. A camera crew from Deutsche Welle, then later another one from the new-fangled Euronews, each were shooed away from the very edges of the perimeter fencing when they sought to gain some good images for broadcast across the country and the continent too. They and other media teams had been tipped off ahead of the deployment via the CIA who used a conduit to provide the information. As to that footage, plus news stories elsewhere that the Americans, British & others were moving combat forces into strike positions, West Germans paid a lot of attention to all of that. The talk for several days beforehand among large parts of the country had been that an attack against East Germany by the Coalition was sure to bring about a retaliatory strike. Now jets like those F-15s were arriving with the clear intention of beginning that process. Action was demanded of politicians. Chancellor Schäuble was the country’s leader but he was only at the top of the pile. His CDU/CSU government, the SPD, FDP, the Greens and others all had members who represented West Germans. The matter of the Coalition’s demands upon and ultimatum to the DDR was a contentious issue with there being a large number of West Germans in fact believing that it was the right thing to do. They were constantly being drowned out by those opposed to the idea of such a thing though who had more of a vocal presence as well as a simpler message: that being ‘NO!’. Politicians of all stripes had something to say on the American’s first deployments when the story broke.

At the same time as the politicians said what they did, there were others in the country who weren’t prepared to wait around for them to do something… or more likely just keep talking rather than take action. The domestic anti-war movement within West Germany when it came to the West’s plans to strike against East Germany sprung into action. It had started slow but those images from outside of Ramstein galvanised supporters of the notion that only people power could stop what was about to happen. There was a willingness among so many of them to take action, even if they had to drag others who gave them only general support along with them. An expectation was there that they would be called stooges of the DDR – a regime which almost all had no love for – and upset a lot of their fellow citizens with what they would do, but there was a growing commitment to do that. They would fight to oppose a conflict that would kill fellow Germans, bring the certain risk of their own country being attacked in return and also break the peace in Europe which had held for the previous fifty years.


Malcolm Rifkind went to Bonn. The UK foreign secretary paid a visit to the West German government in their capital following the walkout from Rotterdam of Schäuble when the NATO summit there saw the Coalition born. Sent to smooth over disputes and try to patch up strained relations, at the same time Rifkind had no brief to compromise on the issue when it came to Britain’s intent to use military bases within West Germany to strike at East Germany should the regime in East Berlin not do as it was told. He got nowhere. There was a mood in Bonn of opposition, at least from those with the largest say in things. The idea that Britain, along with others including the Americans and the French, was willing to do what they said they would without West German permission was causing too much anger for there to be any calming of tensions. Rifkind plugged away but it was all to no avail. His hosts were angry at what they saw as two slaps in the face – the planned action and also that it would be launched from their country – and so he wouldn’t get anywhere on dealing with one issue when the other one was causing such a stink. After meeting with his opposite number, Rifkind could have flown back home or even elsewhere in Europe. He was a busy man when tasked with the duty of fronting the British contribution to trying to excerpt diplomatic pressure on the DDR to change its behaviour instead of having to face air strikes. However, instructions came to him from back home, direct from Downing Street, that he was to do a press event there in Bonn. Rifkind complied and was asked questions by West German, UK and international media on the subject of the Coalition’s ultimatum to East Germany.

His remarks made clear that the Coalition intended to carry out its threatened course of action if the DDR continued to defy them. There was still ongoing fighting within the Czech Republic where East German forces were in action fighting the Poles on the ground now. As to their nuclear programme, Rifkind updated the media on what the West knew (in general terms, nothing specific) about attempts within the DDR to hide their development efforts long after it had been detected. He was asked by one of the British media pool as to whether that could be in fact the beginnings of an effort on their part to possibly begin halting that. No, that wasn’t the case at all: they were trying to hide what they were up to. A West German journalist asked when would military action commence. Rifkind gave the questioner from ZDF nothing to work with on that with regard to timescale though stated that it would happen even with West German opposition. East Germany needed to begin complying with what the Coalition demanded, or else.

Images from Ramstein, West German political uproar and what Rifkind had to say were all witnessed in East Berlin. The Politburo was meeting at least once, sometimes twice, a day. Paratroopers sent into the Czech Republic were fighting Polish troops near to Prostějov and that was something that was paid attention to. The Poles fought well but, aided by Czechs allied to them, East Germany’s soldiers overcame their opponents to seize control of that cross-roads town deep inside Moravia. It was a good start to the involvement on the ground of troops sent by the DDR: the first time that East Germany’s soldiers had ever seen action in fact. On the military front with regard to the Czech civil war (in what some in Poland were starting to call the Polish-German War), there were discussions among the DDR leadership about whether they would be wise to send in further numbers of troops. A limited deployment was discussed where a regiment-group of mixed units from the 7th Tank Division out of Saxony would be deployed. The Poles were still deploying their own forces out of Silesia including a lot of tanks making their way into the Czech Republic. Permission on whether to make that deployment was held off though alert orders were sent to those destined to be involved pending political approval to make the move. Of course though, more consideration was given to what was happening with the Coalition that had been formed against them. The attitude remained that the West was still bluffing and would back down rather than risk East German retaliation. Yet… Rifkind’s appearance before the media in Bonn spooked the Politburo. It really did look like he meant what he said there. That came alongside other diplomatic developments elsewhere including Russian actions taken to cut ties with the DDR. The confidence that there was nothing to worry about took a serious blow. Yet, Margot Honecker affirmed to her colleagues that the bluff was still just that when the wider Politburo met to discuss that matter.

There was another meeting though, one with a far small number of participants. The defence sub-committee met with just four attendees: Honecker, Schwanitz (Stasi chief) and the defence & foreign ministers. It was declared again that the Coalition would take no action but, at Schwanitz’s urging, Honecker authorised there to be a readiness undertaken to make sure that the country was in a position to defend itself. ‘Military adventurism’ from ‘Western imperialists’ was feared with a limited action from the Coalition considered highly unlikely yet not entirely impossible. That concession on that they might be wrong overall came about using the justification that those leaders in the West were out of control maniacs. No major military deployments internally, no calling up of reservists was done. Instead, it was just about taking low-key yet important measures to guard against a surprise air & missile attack. The public position of the DDR, even internally among the wider government, was that there was nothing to worry about and there was still that talk of expanding the troop commitment inside the Czech Republic. Nonetheless, preparations began to somewhat counter what the coalition was threatening while at the same time there was supposedly nothing to worry about.

[stevep]

Sept 17, 2021 17:25:49 GMT James G said:

Sept 17, 2021 0:42:24 GMT kyuzoaoi said:

Now, the East Germans have to call their North Korean friends to distract the Americans...

It is something under consideration by me.

Sept 17, 2021 9:41:31 GMT lordroel said:

Like sending some of their special forces into South Korea.

That would be 'fun'. Been done before too.

Sept 17, 2021 10:29:08 GMT stevep said:

  Can you clearify here please James?  What are you saying is wrong?  It sounds like their going to face military opposition from the west, which I predict and it sounds like their going to lash out when that happens, with a lot of the grief being directed against W Germany.  Are  you saying that I'm wrong in that this will harden W Germany against them?  Or simply possibly agreeing with me that the regime is wrong to think the west will stay out of it??

Ah, I see the issue.
I meant they are very wrong on that.
The thinking there is that the West is bluffing but the default action will be missile strikes westwards.

  OK thanks for clarifying.

[James G]

Nineteen – Grumbles, Gadflys & Gauntlets


The East German Air Force (the LSK) operated a fighter force of three hundred plus Soviet-era MiGs alongside attack and strike aircraft. The vast majority of those were older MiG-21s, though there were some more capable MiG-23s and especially the exceptional MiG-29s in service too. Those fighters could hold their own should the country face an all out assault by, for example, the West Germans combined with Eastern European air forces. If continental NATO countries – France excluded – joined in with such a hypothetical attack, the LSK was still believed capable of maintaining aerial defence of DDR skies. Yet the threat to East Germany in June 1995 didn’t fit the bill of what LSK planners assumed in their best-case scenarios where the fighters available would be able to do the job of protecting the nation. The West Germans weren’t the worry: instead it was most of European NATO, the British and French included, as well as the Americans. United States air power trumped everything else. The numbers but more so the capability of the aircraft which they could bring into play even with other global ‘distractions’ would allow them to dominate East German skies despite every trick that the LSK might deploy up above. They could fill land bases not just in West Germany but in nearby countries (aided by a mass of air refuelling aircraft) too with jets as well as parking an aircraft carrier, even two possibly, in the North Sea. With AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare jets aplenty and long-range air-launched cruise missiles, East Germany’s fighters would stand no chance. That was acknowledged among the air force leadership and also upwards throughout the Volksarmee too.

What the LSK had alongside its fighters was a surface-to-air missile force of some substance. That was a holdover from when the DDR was a Soviet client state with its military fully integrated into Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe. An expansion of the SAM network had been undertaken since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Missiles were cheaper to operate and gaining access to them had been easier than expanding the fighter force. Oh… and they didn’t have pilots who defected with priceless aircraft as almost half a dozen had done between 1990 & ‘95 too. The East German Army operated their own air defence missile forces but what the LSK had under its control was more significant. It was all Soviet-era gear though the most modern of that. Three particular SAM systems were prized above all else. The most-capable, with the longest range too, was the SA-10 Grumble. That was the NATO codename for the S-300P platform. It was a mobile system offering a defensive coverage that could extend outside of East Germany’s borders too. There were two medium-range SAM systems as well, again recent additions to the LSK’s missile force. The SA-11 Gadfly (the Buk) and the SA-15 Gauntlet (the Tor) were weapons which the Russians had supplied to the DDR. Those had different capabilities and less range than the Grumbles but they were damn fine weapons. The Gadflys and Gauntlets were designed to engage aerial targets at a closer range while staying undetected, and they had a capability against cruise missiles too.

Instructions came from a sub-committee of the Politburo in East Berlin for the LSK to take measures to prepare the nation for the reportedly ‘unlikely’ event that the Coalition would engage in their threatened air attack against the DDR. One of several variants of a national air defence plan was then followed, the particular one being to protect the country against an American attack. Aircraft began the process of being dispersed nationwide. The LSK had its combat bases down the eastern side of the country, near to the Polish frontier, though air operations conducted over the Czech Republic and then in opposition to the Poles over Czech skies too, had seen many in-country deployments already made. That was accelerated as per the alert order. Various abandoned Soviet bases within East Germany were first the sites of significant ground activity from engineering teams before jets started making short flights to them. A couple of highway strips, again near to the Polish border, were opened up. There wasn’t any real traffic on those roads to disrupt and everything was in-place for the aircraft to use the road surfaces as runways while remaining in shelter at nearby protected sites.

The missile systems went on the move too. The LSK had older missiles in-service – SA-2 Guidelines & SA-5 Gammons – which were re-deployable and they started to move out of garrisons into firing sites. To call them mobile systems like the newer SAMs was stretching things though. They were too large, too conspicuous to be hidden. That wasn’t the case with the Grumbles, Gadflys and Gauntlets. Launchers and support vehicles, including the radar systems and ground control stations, left their garrisons and began to ‘disappear’ into the countryside. Extensive camouflage measures went into play to hide them. If it came to it, if they were needed to fire off their missiles, the LSK’s air defences would acting in a pop-up fashion and use the shoot-&-scoot approach of modern battlefield artillery to stay in action when they, alongside whatever the Coalition might target, would be sought out by attacking enemy aircraft too. All of this was sold to those below the very top of the LSK leadership as an exercise. It was related to the ongoing fighting within the Czech Republic too but, in the main, just a test of the nation’s air defences. Pilots, missile operators and ground personnel weren’t told the truth of the matter. Though they weren’t alone in that: most of the Politburo didn’t know either about this apparent nationwide ‘exercise’.


The East Germans began that hidden movement of aircraft & missiles on June 21st. Out in the open, the same day witnessed further high-profile clashes relating to the Czech civil war where East German actions were once more negatively highlighted for the world to see.

LSK attack aircraft, flying from Czech bases, entered Polish airspace above Silesia. They didn’t penetrate far and stayed low on their missions. Bomb runs were made. Polish targets were struck at where the transport links supporting their intervention in the Czech Republic were attacked. One MiG-23 was shot down by a Polish short-range SAM and a Su-22 damaged by anti-aircraft fire though otherwise resistance was surprisingly light. Polish fighters had been distracted yet more than that was that they hadn’t expected that to happen. The war was supposed to be contained to the Czech Republic. No one told the East Germans that. They recognised that the Poles were relying heavily upon their communication links back into Poland and had a weakness of defences on home soil. The limited attacks did a great deal of damage to the efforts of the Poles back across the border where they were fighting Czech rebels as well as supporting East German paratroopers. It would have a rapid effect on curtailing their operations due to long and exposed supply lines being hit like they were that morning in a rather effective fashion. Tailbacks on roads and destroyed sections of rail track would play out to see a Polish slowdown on the front-lines. The DDR had previously hit Poland with ballistic missiles, striking airbases deep inside that country, but they proceeded to bomb tactical targets on the ground in Poland in the latest stepping up of their war. The Coalition had made that demand that the DDR cease doing what it was doing in fighting its neighbours. The answer to that threat of retaliatory air strikes was a raised middle finger. The air activity was monitored from the West. AWACS aircraft and also electronic listening platforms remotely witnessed the air strikes as they took place, which allowed the Coalition to firmly see just how seriously their threats were being taken by the East Germans.

That air activity was overshadowed by what happened in Ostrava though. The largest Czech city still in government hands, close to the Polish frontier and full of their soldiers, was struck by a short-range ballistic missile. A lone Scarab complete with a fragmentation warhead hit a residential area in the southwestern portion of Ostrava. There was no nearby military target of any possible note for that missile to have strayed from within an ‘acceptable’ miss range. Unless something had gone completely wrong with the targeting early on in the short flight, that Scarab was aimed at Ostrava and its civilian inhabitants.

The East Germans, both sides in the Czech civil war, the Poles and even the Slovaks operated that Soviet-manufactured missile. It had come from the northwest (clearly ruling out an already near impossible Slovak use) and outside of the area of control of Czech government forces. The general area of launch was that afternoon being fought over between Czech rebels on the defence against a Polish offensive: either of them could have fired it though so could the East Germans who had missile units not that far away. No one admitted that it was they who fired upon Ostrava with everyone blaming the other side for what happened. From East Berlin and Prague there came claims that the Poles had fired on Ostrava either by accident or that the Czech government had done it themselves as a ruse de guerre to incite the West. In Warsaw, the Poles asserted that the East Germans fired on Ostrava and they could prove it… their ‘evidence’ was rather thin though.

As the blame game went into overdrive, there were thirty-four dead people in Ostrava. Media teams from several countries were there in that city to which the Czech government of Klaus had fled to under Polish protection. Images came out of Ostrava fast of the dead and the injured. First it had been Poznan where a ballistic missile strike had claimed dozens of civilian casualties and then it was Ostrava. The Coalition had made firm its demand that East Germany cease firing ballistic missiles into neighbouring countries and it looked like they had again to many people. The truth of the matter might have been far more complicated than that yet the public perception and, more importantly, among Western leaders, was that they were responsible. They had started the whole civil war in the Czech Republic and had recent history of doing the same thing with missiles too. Any hope – a forlorn one at that – that maybe the Coalition would back down was gone after the events of that day with the air strikes on Poland and then all of those dead civilians (for the world to see) in Ostrava.

[lordroel]

Sept 18, 2021 17:55:39 GMT James G said:

Nineteen – Grumbles, Gadflys & Gauntlets


The East German Air Force (the LSK) operated a fighter force of three hundred plus Soviet-era MiGs alongside attack and strike aircraft. The vast majority of those were older MiG-21s, though there were some more capable MiG-23s and especially the exceptional MiG-29s in service too. Those fighters could hold their own should the country face an all out assault by, for example, the West Germans combined with Eastern European air forces. If continental NATO countries – France excluded – joined in with such a hypothetical attack, the LSK was still believed capable of maintaining aerial defence of DDR skies. Yet the threat to East Germany in June 1995 didn’t fit the bill of what LSK planners assumed in their best-case scenarios where the fighters available would be able to do the job of protecting the nation. The West Germans weren’t the worry: instead it was most of European NATO, the British and French included, as well as the Americans. United States air power trumped everything else. The numbers but more so the capability of the aircraft which they could bring into play even with other global ‘distractions’ would allow them to dominate East German skies despite every trick that the LSK might deploy up above. They could fill land bases not just in West Germany but in nearby countries (aided by a mass of air refuelling aircraft) too with jets as well as parking an aircraft carrier, even two possibly, in the North Sea. With AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare jets aplenty and long-range air-launched cruise missiles, East Germany’s fighters would stand no chance. That was acknowledged among the air force leadership and also upwards throughout the Volksarmee too.

What the LSK had alongside its fighters was a surface-to-air missile force of some substance. That was a holdover from when the DDR was a Soviet client state with its military fully integrated into Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe. An expansion of the SAM network had been undertaken since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Missiles were cheaper to operate and gaining access to them had been easier than expanding the fighter force. Oh… and they didn’t have pilots who defected with priceless aircraft as almost half a dozen had done between 1990 & ‘95 too. The East German Army operated their own air defence missile forces but what the LSK had under its control was more significant. It was all Soviet-era gear though the most modern of that. Three particular SAM systems were prized above all else. The most-capable, with the longest range too, was the SA-10 Grumble. That was the NATO codename for the S-300P platform. It was a mobile system offering a defensive coverage that could extend outside of East Germany’s borders too. There were two medium-range SAM systems as well, again recent additions to the LSK’s missile force. The SA-11 Gadfly (the Buk) and the SA-15 Gauntlet (the Tor) were weapons which the Russians had supplied to the DDR. Those had different capabilities and less range than the Grumbles but they were damn fine weapons. The Gadflys and Gauntlets were designed to engage aerial targets at a closer range while staying undetected, and they had a capability against cruise missiles too.

Instructions came from a sub-committee of the Politburo in East Berlin for the LSK to take measures to prepare the nation for the reportedly ‘unlikely’ event that the Coalition would engage in their threatened air attack against the DDR. One of several variants of a national air defence plan was then followed, the particular one being to protect the country against an American attack. Aircraft began the process of being dispersed nationwide. The LSK had its combat bases down the eastern side of the country, near to the Polish frontier, though air operations conducted over the Czech Republic and then in opposition to the Poles over Czech skies too, had seen many in-country deployments already made. That was accelerated as per the alert order. Various abandoned Soviet bases within East Germany were first the sites of significant ground activity from engineering teams before jets started making short flights to them. A couple of highway strips, again near to the Polish border, were opened up. There wasn’t any real traffic on those roads to disrupt and everything was in-place for the aircraft to use the road surfaces as runways while remaining in shelter at nearby protected sites.

The missile systems went on the move too. The LSK had older missiles in-service – SA-2 Guidelines & SA-5 Gammons – which were re-deployable and they started to move out of garrisons into firing sites. To call them mobile systems like the newer SAMs was stretching things though. They were too large, too conspicuous to be hidden. That wasn’t the case with the Grumbles, Gadflys and Gauntlets. Launchers and support vehicles, including the radar systems and ground control stations, left their garrisons and began to ‘disappear’ into the countryside. Extensive camouflage measures went into play to hide them. If it came to it, if they were needed to fire off their missiles, the LSK’s air defences would acting in a pop-up fashion and use the shoot-&-scoot approach of modern battlefield artillery to stay in action when they, alongside whatever the Coalition might target, would be sought out by attacking enemy aircraft too. All of this was sold to those below the very top of the LSK leadership as an exercise. It was related to the ongoing fighting within the Czech Republic too but, in the main, just a test of the nation’s air defences. Pilots, missile operators and ground personnel weren’t told the truth of the matter. Though they weren’t alone in that: most of the Politburo didn’t know either about this apparent nationwide ‘exercise’.


The East Germans began that hidden movement of aircraft & missiles on June 21st. Out in the open, the same day witnessed further high-profile clashes relating to the Czech civil war where East German actions were once more negatively highlighted for the world to see.

LSK attack aircraft, flying from Czech bases, entered Polish airspace above Silesia. They didn’t penetrate far and stayed low on their missions. Bomb runs were made. Polish targets were struck at where the transport links supporting their intervention in the Czech Republic were attacked. One MiG-23 was shot down by a Polish short-range SAM and a Su-22 damaged by anti-aircraft fire though otherwise resistance was surprisingly light. Polish fighters had been distracted yet more than that was that they hadn’t expected that to happen. The war was supposed to be contained to the Czech Republic. No one told the East Germans that. They recognised that the Poles were relying heavily upon their communication links back into Poland and had a weakness of defences on home soil. The limited attacks did a great deal of damage to the efforts of the Poles back across the border where they were fighting Czech rebels as well as supporting East German paratroopers. It would have a rapid effect on curtailing their operations due to long and exposed supply lines being hit like they were that morning in a rather effective fashion. Tailbacks on roads and destroyed sections of rail track would play out to see a Polish slowdown on the front-lines. The DDR had previously hit Poland with ballistic missiles, striking airbases deep inside that country, but they proceeded to bomb tactical targets on the ground in Poland in the latest stepping up of their war. The Coalition had made that demand that the DDR cease doing what it was doing in fighting its neighbours. The answer to that threat of retaliatory air strikes was a raised middle finger. The air activity was monitored from the West. AWACS aircraft and also electronic listening platforms remotely witnessed the air strikes as they took place, which allowed the Coalition to firmly see just how seriously their threats were being taken by the East Germans.

That air activity was overshadowed by what happened in Ostrava though. The largest Czech city still in government hands, close to the Polish frontier and full of their soldiers, was struck by a short-range ballistic missile. A lone Scarab complete with a fragmentation warhead hit a residential area in the southwestern portion of Ostrava. There was no nearby military target of any possible note for that missile to have strayed from within an ‘acceptable’ miss range. Unless something had gone completely wrong with the targeting early on in the short flight, that Scarab was aimed at Ostrava and its civilian inhabitants.

The East Germans, both sides in the Czech civil war, the Poles and even the Slovaks operated that Soviet-manufactured missile. It had come from the northwest (clearly ruling out an already near impossible Slovak use) and outside of the area of control of Czech government forces. The general area of launch was that afternoon being fought over between Czech rebels on the defence against a Polish offensive: either of them could have fired it though so could the East Germans who had missile units not that far away. No one admitted that it was they who fired upon Ostrava with everyone blaming the other side for what happened. From East Berlin and Prague there came claims that the Poles had fired on Ostrava either by accident or that the Czech government had done it themselves as a ruse de guerre to incite the West. In Warsaw, the Poles asserted that the East Germans fired on Ostrava and they could prove it… their ‘evidence’ was rather thin though.

As the blame game went into overdrive, there were thirty-four dead people in Ostrava. Media teams from several countries were there in that city to which the Czech government of Klaus had fled to under Polish protection. Images came out of Ostrava fast of the dead and the injured. First it had been Poznan where a ballistic missile strike had claimed dozens of civilian casualties and then it was Ostrava. The Coalition had made firm its demand that East Germany cease firing ballistic missiles into neighbouring countries and it looked like they had again to many people. The truth of the matter might have been far more complicated than that yet the public perception and, more importantly, among Western leaders, was that they were responsible. They had started the whole civil war in the Czech Republic and had recent history of doing the same thing with missiles too. Any hope – a forlorn one at that – that maybe the Coalition would back down was gone after the events of that day with the air strikes on Poland and then all of those dead civilians (for the world to see) in Ostrava.

I just can see CNN with christiane amanpour and other reporters live on the ground showing the world the fighting that is going on.

[stevep]

Sept 18, 2021 18:23:06 GMT lordroel said:

Sept 18, 2021 17:55:39 GMT James G said:

Nineteen – Grumbles, Gadflys & Gauntlets


The East German Air Force (the LSK) operated a fighter force of three hundred plus Soviet-era MiGs alongside attack and strike aircraft. The vast majority of those were older MiG-21s, though there were some more capable MiG-23s and especially the exceptional MiG-29s in service too. Those fighters could hold their own should the country face an all out assault by, for example, the West Germans combined with Eastern European air forces. If continental NATO countries – France excluded – joined in with such a hypothetical attack, the LSK was still believed capable of maintaining aerial defence of DDR skies. Yet the threat to East Germany in June 1995 didn’t fit the bill of what LSK planners assumed in their best-case scenarios where the fighters available would be able to do the job of protecting the nation. The West Germans weren’t the worry: instead it was most of European NATO, the British and French included, as well as the Americans. United States air power trumped everything else. The numbers but more so the capability of the aircraft which they could bring into play even with other global ‘distractions’ would allow them to dominate East German skies despite every trick that the LSK might deploy up above. They could fill land bases not just in West Germany but in nearby countries (aided by a mass of air refuelling aircraft) too with jets as well as parking an aircraft carrier, even two possibly, in the North Sea. With AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare jets aplenty and long-range air-launched cruise missiles, East Germany’s fighters would stand no chance. That was acknowledged among the air force leadership and also upwards throughout the Volksarmee too.

What the LSK had alongside its fighters was a surface-to-air missile force of some substance. That was a holdover from when the DDR was a Soviet client state with its military fully integrated into Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe. An expansion of the SAM network had been undertaken since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Missiles were cheaper to operate and gaining access to them had been easier than expanding the fighter force. Oh… and they didn’t have pilots who defected with priceless aircraft as almost half a dozen had done between 1990 & ‘95 too. The East German Army operated their own air defence missile forces but what the LSK had under its control was more significant. It was all Soviet-era gear though the most modern of that. Three particular SAM systems were prized above all else. The most-capable, with the longest range too, was the SA-10 Grumble. That was the NATO codename for the S-300P platform. It was a mobile system offering a defensive coverage that could extend outside of East Germany’s borders too. There were two medium-range SAM systems as well, again recent additions to the LSK’s missile force. The SA-11 Gadfly (the Buk) and the SA-15 Gauntlet (the Tor) were weapons which the Russians had supplied to the DDR. Those had different capabilities and less range than the Grumbles but they were damn fine weapons. The Gadflys and Gauntlets were designed to engage aerial targets at a closer range while staying undetected, and they had a capability against cruise missiles too.

Instructions came from a sub-committee of the Politburo in East Berlin for the LSK to take measures to prepare the nation for the reportedly ‘unlikely’ event that the Coalition would engage in their threatened air attack against the DDR. One of several variants of a national air defence plan was then followed, the particular one being to protect the country against an American attack. Aircraft began the process of being dispersed nationwide. The LSK had its combat bases down the eastern side of the country, near to the Polish frontier, though air operations conducted over the Czech Republic and then in opposition to the Poles over Czech skies too, had seen many in-country deployments already made. That was accelerated as per the alert order. Various abandoned Soviet bases within East Germany were first the sites of significant ground activity from engineering teams before jets started making short flights to them. A couple of highway strips, again near to the Polish border, were opened up. There wasn’t any real traffic on those roads to disrupt and everything was in-place for the aircraft to use the road surfaces as runways while remaining in shelter at nearby protected sites.

The missile systems went on the move too. The LSK had older missiles in-service – SA-2 Guidelines & SA-5 Gammons – which were re-deployable and they started to move out of garrisons into firing sites. To call them mobile systems like the newer SAMs was stretching things though. They were too large, too conspicuous to be hidden. That wasn’t the case with the Grumbles, Gadflys and Gauntlets. Launchers and support vehicles, including the radar systems and ground control stations, left their garrisons and began to ‘disappear’ into the countryside. Extensive camouflage measures went into play to hide them. If it came to it, if they were needed to fire off their missiles, the LSK’s air defences would acting in a pop-up fashion and use the shoot-&-scoot approach of modern battlefield artillery to stay in action when they, alongside whatever the Coalition might target, would be sought out by attacking enemy aircraft too. All of this was sold to those below the very top of the LSK leadership as an exercise. It was related to the ongoing fighting within the Czech Republic too but, in the main, just a test of the nation’s air defences. Pilots, missile operators and ground personnel weren’t told the truth of the matter. Though they weren’t alone in that: most of the Politburo didn’t know either about this apparent nationwide ‘exercise’.


The East Germans began that hidden movement of aircraft & missiles on June 21st. Out in the open, the same day witnessed further high-profile clashes relating to the Czech civil war where East German actions were once more negatively highlighted for the world to see.

LSK attack aircraft, flying from Czech bases, entered Polish airspace above Silesia. They didn’t penetrate far and stayed low on their missions. Bomb runs were made. Polish targets were struck at where the transport links supporting their intervention in the Czech Republic were attacked. One MiG-23 was shot down by a Polish short-range SAM and a Su-22 damaged by anti-aircraft fire though otherwise resistance was surprisingly light. Polish fighters had been distracted yet more than that was that they hadn’t expected that to happen. The war was supposed to be contained to the Czech Republic. No one told the East Germans that. They recognised that the Poles were relying heavily upon their communication links back into Poland and had a weakness of defences on home soil. The limited attacks did a great deal of damage to the efforts of the Poles back across the border where they were fighting Czech rebels as well as supporting East German paratroopers. It would have a rapid effect on curtailing their operations due to long and exposed supply lines being hit like they were that morning in a rather effective fashion. Tailbacks on roads and destroyed sections of rail track would play out to see a Polish slowdown on the front-lines. The DDR had previously hit Poland with ballistic missiles, striking airbases deep inside that country, but they proceeded to bomb tactical targets on the ground in Poland in the latest stepping up of their war. The Coalition had made that demand that the DDR cease doing what it was doing in fighting its neighbours. The answer to that threat of retaliatory air strikes was a raised middle finger. The air activity was monitored from the West. AWACS aircraft and also electronic listening platforms remotely witnessed the air strikes as they took place, which allowed the Coalition to firmly see just how seriously their threats were being taken by the East Germans.

That air activity was overshadowed by what happened in Ostrava though. The largest Czech city still in government hands, close to the Polish frontier and full of their soldiers, was struck by a short-range ballistic missile. A lone Scarab complete with a fragmentation warhead hit a residential area in the southwestern portion of Ostrava. There was no nearby military target of any possible note for that missile to have strayed from within an ‘acceptable’ miss range. Unless something had gone completely wrong with the targeting early on in the short flight, that Scarab was aimed at Ostrava and its civilian inhabitants.

The East Germans, both sides in the Czech civil war, the Poles and even the Slovaks operated that Soviet-manufactured missile. It had come from the northwest (clearly ruling out an already near impossible Slovak use) and outside of the area of control of Czech government forces. The general area of launch was that afternoon being fought over between Czech rebels on the defence against a Polish offensive: either of them could have fired it though so could the East Germans who had missile units not that far away. No one admitted that it was they who fired upon Ostrava with everyone blaming the other side for what happened. From East Berlin and Prague there came claims that the Poles had fired on Ostrava either by accident or that the Czech government had done it themselves as a ruse de guerre to incite the West. In Warsaw, the Poles asserted that the East Germans fired on Ostrava and they could prove it… their ‘evidence’ was rather thin though.

As the blame game went into overdrive, there were thirty-four dead people in Ostrava. Media teams from several countries were there in that city to which the Czech government of Klaus had fled to under Polish protection. Images came out of Ostrava fast of the dead and the injured. First it had been Poznan where a ballistic missile strike had claimed dozens of civilian casualties and then it was Ostrava. The Coalition had made firm its demand that East Germany cease firing ballistic missiles into neighbouring countries and it looked like they had again to many people. The truth of the matter might have been far more complicated than that yet the public perception and, more importantly, among Western leaders, was that they were responsible. They had started the whole civil war in the Czech Republic and had recent history of doing the same thing with missiles too. Any hope – a forlorn one at that – that maybe the Coalition would back down was gone after the events of that day with the air strikes on Poland and then all of those dead civilians (for the world to see) in Ostrava.

I just can see CNN with christiane amanpour and other reporters live on the ground showing the world the fighting that is going on.

  Very likely, along with the Beeb and most of the other big news agencies, including a fair number of papers in this time period.

[James G]

Sept 18, 2021 18:23:06 GMT lordroel said:

Sept 18, 2021 17:55:39 GMT James G said:

Nineteen – Grumbles, Gadflys & Gauntlets


The East German Air Force (the LSK) operated a fighter force of three hundred plus Soviet-era MiGs alongside attack and strike aircraft. The vast majority of those were older MiG-21s, though there were some more capable MiG-23s and especially the exceptional MiG-29s in service too. Those fighters could hold their own should the country face an all out assault by, for example, the West Germans combined with Eastern European air forces. If continental NATO countries – France excluded – joined in with such a hypothetical attack, the LSK was still believed capable of maintaining aerial defence of DDR skies. Yet the threat to East Germany in June 1995 didn’t fit the bill of what LSK planners assumed in their best-case scenarios where the fighters available would be able to do the job of protecting the nation. The West Germans weren’t the worry: instead it was most of European NATO, the British and French included, as well as the Americans. United States air power trumped everything else. The numbers but more so the capability of the aircraft which they could bring into play even with other global ‘distractions’ would allow them to dominate East German skies despite every trick that the LSK might deploy up above. They could fill land bases not just in West Germany but in nearby countries (aided by a mass of air refuelling aircraft) too with jets as well as parking an aircraft carrier, even two possibly, in the North Sea. With AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare jets aplenty and long-range air-launched cruise missiles, East Germany’s fighters would stand no chance. That was acknowledged among the air force leadership and also upwards throughout the Volksarmee too.

What the LSK had alongside its fighters was a surface-to-air missile force of some substance. That was a holdover from when the DDR was a Soviet client state with its military fully integrated into Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe. An expansion of the SAM network had been undertaken since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Missiles were cheaper to operate and gaining access to them had been easier than expanding the fighter force. Oh… and they didn’t have pilots who defected with priceless aircraft as almost half a dozen had done between 1990 & ‘95 too. The East German Army operated their own air defence missile forces but what the LSK had under its control was more significant. It was all Soviet-era gear though the most modern of that. Three particular SAM systems were prized above all else. The most-capable, with the longest range too, was the SA-10 Grumble. That was the NATO codename for the S-300P platform. It was a mobile system offering a defensive coverage that could extend outside of East Germany’s borders too. There were two medium-range SAM systems as well, again recent additions to the LSK’s missile force. The SA-11 Gadfly (the Buk) and the SA-15 Gauntlet (the Tor) were weapons which the Russians had supplied to the DDR. Those had different capabilities and less range than the Grumbles but they were damn fine weapons. The Gadflys and Gauntlets were designed to engage aerial targets at a closer range while staying undetected, and they had a capability against cruise missiles too.

Instructions came from a sub-committee of the Politburo in East Berlin for the LSK to take measures to prepare the nation for the reportedly ‘unlikely’ event that the Coalition would engage in their threatened air attack against the DDR. One of several variants of a national air defence plan was then followed, the particular one being to protect the country against an American attack. Aircraft began the process of being dispersed nationwide. The LSK had its combat bases down the eastern side of the country, near to the Polish frontier, though air operations conducted over the Czech Republic and then in opposition to the Poles over Czech skies too, had seen many in-country deployments already made. That was accelerated as per the alert order. Various abandoned Soviet bases within East Germany were first the sites of significant ground activity from engineering teams before jets started making short flights to them. A couple of highway strips, again near to the Polish border, were opened up. There wasn’t any real traffic on those roads to disrupt and everything was in-place for the aircraft to use the road surfaces as runways while remaining in shelter at nearby protected sites.

The missile systems went on the move too. The LSK had older missiles in-service – SA-2 Guidelines & SA-5 Gammons – which were re-deployable and they started to move out of garrisons into firing sites. To call them mobile systems like the newer SAMs was stretching things though. They were too large, too conspicuous to be hidden. That wasn’t the case with the Grumbles, Gadflys and Gauntlets. Launchers and support vehicles, including the radar systems and ground control stations, left their garrisons and began to ‘disappear’ into the countryside. Extensive camouflage measures went into play to hide them. If it came to it, if they were needed to fire off their missiles, the LSK’s air defences would acting in a pop-up fashion and use the shoot-&-scoot approach of modern battlefield artillery to stay in action when they, alongside whatever the Coalition might target, would be sought out by attacking enemy aircraft too. All of this was sold to those below the very top of the LSK leadership as an exercise. It was related to the ongoing fighting within the Czech Republic too but, in the main, just a test of the nation’s air defences. Pilots, missile operators and ground personnel weren’t told the truth of the matter. Though they weren’t alone in that: most of the Politburo didn’t know either about this apparent nationwide ‘exercise’.


The East Germans began that hidden movement of aircraft & missiles on June 21st. Out in the open, the same day witnessed further high-profile clashes relating to the Czech civil war where East German actions were once more negatively highlighted for the world to see.

LSK attack aircraft, flying from Czech bases, entered Polish airspace above Silesia. They didn’t penetrate far and stayed low on their missions. Bomb runs were made. Polish targets were struck at where the transport links supporting their intervention in the Czech Republic were attacked. One MiG-23 was shot down by a Polish short-range SAM and a Su-22 damaged by anti-aircraft fire though otherwise resistance was surprisingly light. Polish fighters had been distracted yet more than that was that they hadn’t expected that to happen. The war was supposed to be contained to the Czech Republic. No one told the East Germans that. They recognised that the Poles were relying heavily upon their communication links back into Poland and had a weakness of defences on home soil. The limited attacks did a great deal of damage to the efforts of the Poles back across the border where they were fighting Czech rebels as well as supporting East German paratroopers. It would have a rapid effect on curtailing their operations due to long and exposed supply lines being hit like they were that morning in a rather effective fashion. Tailbacks on roads and destroyed sections of rail track would play out to see a Polish slowdown on the front-lines. The DDR had previously hit Poland with ballistic missiles, striking airbases deep inside that country, but they proceeded to bomb tactical targets on the ground in Poland in the latest stepping up of their war. The Coalition had made that demand that the DDR cease doing what it was doing in fighting its neighbours. The answer to that threat of retaliatory air strikes was a raised middle finger. The air activity was monitored from the West. AWACS aircraft and also electronic listening platforms remotely witnessed the air strikes as they took place, which allowed the Coalition to firmly see just how seriously their threats were being taken by the East Germans.

That air activity was overshadowed by what happened in Ostrava though. The largest Czech city still in government hands, close to the Polish frontier and full of their soldiers, was struck by a short-range ballistic missile. A lone Scarab complete with a fragmentation warhead hit a residential area in the southwestern portion of Ostrava. There was no nearby military target of any possible note for that missile to have strayed from within an ‘acceptable’ miss range. Unless something had gone completely wrong with the targeting early on in the short flight, that Scarab was aimed at Ostrava and its civilian inhabitants.

The East Germans, both sides in the Czech civil war, the Poles and even the Slovaks operated that Soviet-manufactured missile. It had come from the northwest (clearly ruling out an already near impossible Slovak use) and outside of the area of control of Czech government forces. The general area of launch was that afternoon being fought over between Czech rebels on the defence against a Polish offensive: either of them could have fired it though so could the East Germans who had missile units not that far away. No one admitted that it was they who fired upon Ostrava with everyone blaming the other side for what happened. From East Berlin and Prague there came claims that the Poles had fired on Ostrava either by accident or that the Czech government had done it themselves as a ruse de guerre to incite the West. In Warsaw, the Poles asserted that the East Germans fired on Ostrava and they could prove it… their ‘evidence’ was rather thin though.

As the blame game went into overdrive, there were thirty-four dead people in Ostrava. Media teams from several countries were there in that city to which the Czech government of Klaus had fled to under Polish protection. Images came out of Ostrava fast of the dead and the injured. First it had been Poznan where a ballistic missile strike had claimed dozens of civilian casualties and then it was Ostrava. The Coalition had made firm its demand that East Germany cease firing ballistic missiles into neighbouring countries and it looked like they had again to many people. The truth of the matter might have been far more complicated than that yet the public perception and, more importantly, among Western leaders, was that they were responsible. They had started the whole civil war in the Czech Republic and had recent history of doing the same thing with missiles too. Any hope – a forlorn one at that – that maybe the Coalition would back down was gone after the events of that day with the air strikes on Poland and then all of those dead civilians (for the world to see) in Ostrava.

I just can see CNN with christiane amanpour and other reporters live on the ground showing the world the fighting that is going on.

Sept 19, 2021 12:33:40 GMT stevep said:

  Very likely, along with the Beeb and most of the other big news agencies, including a fair number of papers in this time period.

When the shooting starts, media restrictions are going to come in heavy though.
That will cause problems.

[James G]

Twenty – 101 Targets


President Cuomo, his secretaries of state & defence plus key advisers in his administration were presented with a target list drawn up by US European Command (EUCOM) for the first round of planned Coalition air strikes. There were one hundred & one military and ‘government/regime’ targets which EUCOM planners – working with the British, French and others – had selected to be attacked within three nights. Those were located across East Germany and down into the Czech Republic too. The majority were fixed, immobile installations though there were a good number of mobile targets as well: where it was believed that missile launchers could be found.

Operation Allied Sword was the overall codename for the launching of that air campaign with cruise missiles to be used as well as bombs: different participating countries would use other codenames with that being the one for the media. Fighter air operations and many supporting missions of a non-offensive nature would take place in addition. Over three subsequent nights, with daytime operations as well, those being the fighter & recon tasks, the military capability of the DDR to continue its wars against its neighbours was meant to be destroyed for good. East Germany would too see a crushing blow struck against its nuclear programme and its ability to maintain the suppression of domestic dissent.

The opening stage of the air campaign would target nine major East German airbases. There were ongoing LSK dispersal operations but those were key facilities which everything else was still tied to according to EUCOM planners. Five more airbases inside the Czech Republic which the East Germans were making use of would likewise be hit. Four command bunkers for the LSK operational within the DDR were also to be struck. The aboveground East German Army HQ was another planned target along with the main garrisons of six combat divisions spread nationwide. Seven more targets consisted of where there were identified elements of the nuclear programme in an advanced stage of development. Trebbin was at the top of that list and the aim with the strikes would be to make sure that there was no leak of radiation or otherwise poisonous contamination: such places weren’t being flattened, just knocked out of action in a safe manner.

On the edges of East Berlin, the Stasi HQ was on the list along with fourteen separate ‘district department’ stations across the country where that organisation operated at a regional level. The main garrison for the Stasi’s own paramilitary force was on the list and so too was the main operational centre for the HVA spy agency. In Magdeburg there was was an aircraft maintenance/overall facility which was being made much use of to help keep LSK aircraft flying but was also doing missile refurbishment too. The modern port facility at Sassnitz, the television broadcast tower at Nauen and half a dozen bridges over the River Elbe were more of those non-military targets highlighted for destruction to seriously wound the DDR. Eleven major ammunition dumps were to be bombed with both above- & below-ground portions of them to be hit. The final thirty-two targets were the ballistic missile batteries where they launchers were spread out across the country. They were going to be difficult to locate, EUCOM conceded, but there was a lot of confidence that they would be found and destroyed.

Some of these targets would be hit once. Others would be gone after repeatedly. American air power was going to do a lot of the work though there would be significant Coalition strikes made as well as their assistance in the supporting role. The build-up of military strength was at that time still ongoing yet it was nearing completion. EUCOM, led by SACEUR from his Stuttgart headquarters in West Germany, had more plans ready for further strikes, including follow-up missions against the first hundred-plus if there was failure in that. Cuomo was too briefed that in anticipation of the DDR carrying out the threat made to launch missile strikes against the West Germany in response to Coalition attacks, special forces teams were held ready to go into East Germany. They would enter that country first and head towards those areas where the DDR ballistic missile force was suspected to be so to help to destroy those missiles. Patriot anti-ballistic missiles were deploying into defensive positions to engage missiles which air strikes and commando teams might fail to find. The Coalition naval force which was assembling ready to enter the western reaches of the Baltic would be from where many of the air & cruise missile strikes would come from as well. Operations would be mounted to seek downed Coalition air personnel and there would also be security operations mounted along the Inner-German Border to make sure that the East Germans didn’t ‘do anything silly’.


Cuomo took a red pen to a number of the targets. In consultation with his top people, there was a removal of many of those non-military targets. That wasn’t what the air campaign was all about as far as he was concerned. The 42nd President didn’t understand why SACEUR saw things in a different manner from him but that was another issue. Operation Allied Sword wasn’t about bringing down the regime of Margot Honecker. Instead, it was about eliminating its nuclear programme and halting its military adventurism across Eastern Europe. All of those Stasi targets, buildings within populated areas due to be hit by precision bombs to limit collateral damage, were knocked off the list though the garrison for the Felix Dzerzhinsky Guards Division remained. Also removed were the other non-military ones including the Elbe bridges. Two of the big ammo dumps which were within blast radius of urban areas were likewise cancelled as opening targets for air attack at presidential order. The worry which Cuomo expressed was that a lot of civilians would lose their lives and that wasn’t what he had authorised military action for to see happen. He moved to direct that SACEUR focus more on the ballistic missile threat and instructed that that should be the second priority only behind the nuclear programme for destruction. The East Germans remained highly likely to open fire against West Germany and he wanted to see the ability curtailed as much as possible straight away.

It wasn’t SACEUR and his US Armed Forces people alone who drew up that opening target list. There was significant Coalition involvement in it. By right of the size of its might, the United States was leading the Coalition in military terms but Cuomo had been sold himself, and was selling it internationally too, as a multi-national element. An agreement had been struck at Rotterdam when the Coalition was born to work together in the diplomatic sphere as well as militarily. European governments were taking the flak from those opposed to the idea of military action against East Germany just as the Americans were. Cuomo had his top people get to work talking to allies after his red pen incident. It was clear to him that the input from foreign military staffers assigned to prepare for the air campaign had been following the same script of striking at regime targets in the DDR. That wasn’t what he wanted and he set out to have allies persuaded of the same general understanding.

Operation Allied Sword wasn’t supposed to be about collapsing the East German regime. Neither was it, as far as Cuomo saw the whole thing, about seeing a full-scale war break out. The aim of the president was to see a quick conflict – up to a week of air strikes was envisioned – before the DDR gave in and accepted the demands imposed upon it. Flattening the military was fine to him but going further than that wasn’t what the wanted to see. There was solid reasoning behind that, one which he the senior people in his administration were aligned upon. If Honecker and her government were brought down and East Germany torn apart at American hands, it would be the responsibility of the United States to deal with the aftermath.

He had said to his vice president ‘if you break it, you own it and you have to fix it’. Cuomo had no desire in him to see such a situation as that play out.