Desgin the Iowa - Plan D

[lordroel]

So there where three plans for the Iowa, "A", "B", and "C" and latter the design that ended up becoming the Iowa, but what if there was a Plan "D", so how would you make the design for Plan "D".

Three improved plans – "A", "B", and "C" – were designed at the end of January. An increase in draft, vast additions to the armor,[N 3] and the substitution of twelve 6-inch (152 mm) guns in the secondary battery was common among the three designs.

"A" was the largest, at 59,060 long tons (60,010 t) standard, and was the only one to still carry the twelve 16-inch guns in four triple turrets (3-gun turrets according to US Navy). It required 277,000 shp (207,000 kW) to make 32.5 knots (60.2 km/h; 37.4 mph).

"B" was the smallest at 52,707 long tons (53,553 t) standard; like "A" it had a top speed of 32.5 knots, but "B" only required 225,000 shp (168,000 kW) to make this speed. It also carried only nine 16-inch guns, in three triple turrets.

"C" was similar but it added 75,000 shp (56,000 kW) (for a total of 300,000 shp (220,000 kW)), to make the original requirement of 35 knots (65 km/h; 40 mph). The weight required for this and a longer belt – 512 feet (156 m), compared with 496 feet (151 m) for "B" – meant that the ship was 55,771 long tons (56,666 t) standard.[13]

[belushitd]

Do you mean Montana, rather than Iowa? Yes, those plans mentioned were contemplated as alternative Iowas, but they pretty much morphed into the Montana class once the 2nd London treaty was rendered nugatory by the start of WWII.

Belushi TD

[lordroel]

Sept 14, 2021 14:02:45 GMT belushitd said:

Do you mean Montana, rather than Iowa? Yes, those plans mentioned were contemplated as alternative Iowas, but they pretty much morphed into the Montana class once the 2nd London treaty was rendered nugatory by the start of WWII.

Belushi TD

What i read on the Iowa Wikipedia page i toughed Plan A to C where early designs of the Iowa.

[simon darkshade]

Let us examine it this way:

The BB-61 class were a marriage of two factors - the escalator clause from 35,000 to 45,000 and the desire for a fast battleship. Removing the former restriction means that you can get the speed of the latter with some of the attributes of the former. Design C is already going to be very difficult given that the Iowa hull form was going to struggle to get above 33 knots with any reasonable armour. B and C are much of a muchness.

It simply depends how much you are willing to pay.

Battleship design was not approached on the basis of Speed, Displacement and Guns, but Guns, Armour and Speed, which combine to give you the package. Displacement comes later as a consequence of these, unless you are working in the particular circumstance of Treaty battleships which had an artificial limitation on their overall displacement because of early 1920s events to prevent WW1 (dissonance intended). Now, there are some hard limitations on USN and RN designs based on the Panama Canal locks and availability of drydocks around the British Empire, but those are also...a matter of what you are willing to pay.

I'm less interested in total displacement than in protection, range, guns and the delicate balance between them. A larger ship will take longer to get to the fight.

Having a 6" secondary battery rather than 5"/38 is not a net gain in my view.

We don't need a Plan D, just a better Plan B. 9 guns are enough, but let us talk about belts and decks if we want to have any meaningful discussion of how to improve a design. Bigger isn't necessarily better; it depends on what makes a design better.

As it stands, the Iowas were not the best design in any event because of some of the compromises in their design. Improving protection whilst maintaining speed ameliorates that...but what does it matter? By the time they are commissioned, there isn't an enemy battle line to fight nor are there any major engagements with enemy capital ships where the Iowas came close to service. Leyte Gulf saw them taken off with Halsey's carriers chasing the phantom of enemy carriers, demonstrating the real order of priorities and where they sat in it; and there really wasn't a realistic chance that any chances were going to be taken with Yamato off Okinawa. After 1945, whatever belt armour they have doesn't matter, as it is a complete anachronism.

Finally, please don't read too much into Wikipedia. Its track record with battleship articles lurches between the silly and outright fantasy.

[lordroel]

Sept 14, 2021 14:26:50 GMT simon darkshade said:

Finally, please don't read too much into Wikipedia. Its track record with battleship articles lurches between the silly and outright fantasy.

Well if you have a good website about the history of the Iowa design, i am open to use that instead of Wikipedia.

[simon darkshade]

You're better off looking at some of the books available on the matter, which can be found on the likes of Scribd. If you are really interested, be prepared to shell out 200-1000 USD for the seminal hardback battleship tomes.

For a straightforward look, cruise some of the technical boards. They provide a good free education. The loss of Warships Projects still stings as it was a darn wise community.

But Wikipedia? The land of the H-45? No.

[lordroel]

Sept 20, 2021 15:07:05 GMT simon darkshade said:

You're better off looking at some of the books available on the matter, which can be found on the likes of Scribd. If you are really interested, be prepared to shell out 200-1000 USD for the seminal hardback battleship tomes.

For a straightforward look, cruise some of the technical boards. They provide a good free education. The loss of Warships Projects still stings as it was a darn wise community.

But Wikipedia? The land of the H-45? No.

Thanks, for the advice, but also this board could act as a good information source as so far i got you, stevep and 1bigrich to be my personal naval encyclopedias.

[1bigrich]

Sept 13, 2021 15:54:23 GMT lordroel said:

So there where three plans for the Iowa, "A", "B", and "C" and latter the design that ended up becoming the Iowa, but what if there was a Plan "D", so how would you make the design for Plan "D".

Three improved plans – "A", "B", and "C" – were designed at the end of January. An increase in draft, vast additions to the armor,[N 3] and the substitution of twelve 6-inch (152 mm) guns in the secondary battery was common among the three designs.

"A" was the largest, at 59,060 long tons (60,010 t) standard, and was the only one to still carry the twelve 16-inch guns in four triple turrets (3-gun turrets according to US Navy). It required 277,000 shp (207,000 kW) to make 32.5 knots (60.2 km/h; 37.4 mph).

"B" was the smallest at 52,707 long tons (53,553 t) standard; like "A" it had a top speed of 32.5 knots, but "B" only required 225,000 shp (168,000 kW) to make this speed. It also carried only nine 16-inch guns, in three triple turrets.

"C" was similar but it added 75,000 shp (56,000 kW) (for a total of 300,000 shp (220,000 kW)), to make the original requirement of 35 knots (65 km/h; 40 mph). The weight required for this and a longer belt – 512 feet (156 m), compared with 496 feet (151 m) for "B" – meant that the ship was 55,771 long tons (56,666 t) standard.[13]

The Escalator Clause of Second London comes in two parts:   The Caliber Increase, on 1 April 1937, and the Tonnage Increase, on 31 March, 1938.

These Iowa concepts are going beyond the tonnage limit of the Escalator Clause, and are clearly looking at an environment without treaty limits.

All are fulfilling the US requirement for a fast wing, and all are heavily armed and armored, able to stand in the battleline.   But both of those attributes were accomplished by the historic Iowa for less tonnage.  It would be tempting to call the historic Iowa 'Plan D.' 

These also make an interesting comparison with the later BB-65-8 concept

Caption:  "Battleship Study - BB65 - Scheme 8 - (1940 Studies)"

Preliminary design plan prepared for the General Board as part of the process leading to the Montana class (BB-67--71) battleship design.
This plan, dated 15 March 1940, is for a ship of 70,000 tons standard displacement and 82,000 ton trial displacement, with a main battery of twelve 16"/50 guns, a secondary battery of twenty 5"/54 guns and a 320,000 horsepower powerplant for a speed of 33 knots. Ship's dimensions are: waterline length 1050'; waterline beam 120'; draft 35'. Scale of the original drawing is 1/32" = 1'.
Port side 5" gun arrangement is labeled "previous secondary battery arrangement". Starboard side has a "proposed secondary battery arrangement."
The original plan is in the 1939-1944 "Spring Styles Book" held by the Naval Historical Center.
U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph.

Looking at these three, we have ships between 53,000 and 60,000 tons standard, speed between 32.5 and 35 knots, and 9 to 12 x 16in guns. 

Historically, the USN favored even fore-and-aft firepower, the treaties drove them to the 9 main battery gun uneven arrangement.  A request for proposals might say 'nine guns required, twelve guns preferred'.  

The 6in secondary of A reflects a larger round, with a larger kill-zone for anti-aircraft fire.   

So I'll say my "D" proposal would be something in between the A, B and C proposals, like this:

57,000 tons

9 x 16in/50 (probably Mk II and Mk III guns from the cancelled Washington Treaty ships at this point) with superheavy shells

24 x 5in/38 to provide increased secondary DP firepower over existing designs

armored against the 16in superheavy shell.

I may try a sketch later if time permits.

My thoughts,

[miletus12]

Sept 14, 2021 14:26:50 GMT simon darkshade said:

Let us examine it this way:

The BB-61 class were a marriage of two factors - the escalator clause from 35,000 to 45,000 and the desire for a fast battleship. Removing the former restriction means that you can get the speed of the latter with some of the attributes of the former. Design C is already going to be very difficult given that the Iowa hull form was going to struggle to get above 33 knots with any reasonable armour. B and C are much of a muchness.

My objection to this analysis is that by the time the Iowas are being designed, it was understood that these were not true line of battleships as was the case of the Montanas, which do and did follow the design logics and criteria one has laid out for a "US battleship" as written above. The Iowas were intended as bodyguard ships for the new large fast fleet carriers being built and were to function as "battle cruisers" in that role in the similar way the British planned to use their own battle cruisers of the Renown and Hood classes. As early as 1935, as a result of Fleet Problemsa US constructors and naval tacticians had considered that aircraft carrier forces roving independently of the slow battleline would need capital ship protection from "cruiser destroyers" such as was seen in the Dunkerques and Scharnhorsts and the alleged Japanese B-65 cruisers expected for which the bungled US Alaska class were a US planned response.

It simply depends how much you are willing to pay.

About 45% more per unit as compared to a combat equivalent South Dakota class. Not worth the money.

Battleship design was not approached on the basis of Speed, Displacement and Guns, but Guns, Armour and Speed, which combine to give you the package. Displacement comes later as a consequence of these, unless you are working in the particular circumstance of Treaty battleships which had an artificial limitation on their overall displacement because of early 1920s events to prevent WW1 (dissonance intended). Now, there are some hard limitations on USN and RN designs based on the Panama Canal locks and availability of drydocks around the British Empire, but those are also...a matter of what you are willing to pay.

See my previous comments. US constructors in their new battleships were getting near combat gun parity at 35,000 tonnes SD to a 71,000 tonne Yamato, though they could not know this was the case. The thing they could not do was get those extra six knots they wanted for a really fast battleship at 35,000 tonnes. That was going to be expensive. The Montanas, they planned, were going to be far more powerful than the vaunted Yamatos with the SHW 40.6 cm main battery having near 30% more broadside throw mass and almost 1.5 times faster firing cycle times. Strictly as a log square exercise in artillery, the Montanas would have been ferociously effective Yamato killers. And from the American constructors looked as they designed the gun barges in 1939, the BBs would be needed to counter potential theoretical and known Japanese, German and Italian so called "super battleships".

I'm less interested in total displacement than in protection, range, guns and the delicate balance between them. A larger ship will take longer to get to the fight.

Uhmm, a larger ship takes longer to construct. It will get to the fight faster,

Having a 6" secondary battery rather than 5"/38 is not a net gain in my view.

Willis Lee was very concerned about the lack of a stronger secondary battery versus Japanese cruisers and destroyers in his night fights with Japanese surface forces. he was leery of closing the range to PBR at Second Guadalcanal. The shot up South Dakota was ample evidence he had reason to be concerned. SoDak's damage was mainly 20.3 and 15.2 cm superstructure hits from Japanese cruiser mains and BB secondaries.

We don't need a Plan D, just a better Plan B. 9 guns are enough, but let us talk about belts and decks if we want to have any meaningful discussion of how to improve a design. Bigger isn't necessarily better; it depends on what makes a design better.

Turning circle, compartmentation, torpedo defense, fire control and a better Class A plate. US class A was face hardened too deep and was susceptible to shatter under 35.5 cm or larger shell fire. Class B non-face hardened actually was better belt plate if backed by STS. Fixing that Class A armor plate mistake on US BBs during WW II, as in re-belting the Iowas, and the North Carolinas with better more elastic plates that did not shatter like glass under impact, was EXPENSIVE in time and money.

As it stands, the Iowas were not the best design in any event because of some of the compromises in their design. Improving protection whilst maintaining speed ameliorates that...but what does it matter? By the time they are commissioned, there isn't an enemy battle line to fight nor are there any major engagements with enemy capital ships where the Iowas came close to service. Leyte Gulf saw them taken off with Halsey's carriers chasing the phantom of enemy carriers, demonstrating the real order of priorities and where they sat in it; and there really wasn't a realistic chance that any chances were going to be taken with Yamato off Okinawa. After 1945, whatever belt armour they have doesn't matter, as it is a complete anachronism.

Second Guadalcanal, Surigao Strait and what would stand in the way, if Yamato had made it to Okinawa? Aircraft carriers until the Battle of the Philippine Sea, tended to neutralize each other leaving both sides with nothing but their shore based naval air and their gunships. Remember this fact. There were 6 aircraft carrier battles. The British lost the one off Sri Lanka. The Australians and Americans fought a draw with the Japanese at the Coral Sea. The Americans won at Midway and Eastern Solomons and lost at Santa Cruz. Philippine Sea was a nail biter that the Americans won via superior naval aviator skill. Six battles those were with the record 3-2 and 1. How many surface battles were there? 20, Three of them were battleship actions. The record there was 10-9-1 with the Japanese winning most of them and only losing decisively when American battleships were present or a proximate threat over the horizon.

Finally, please don't read too much into Wikipedia. Its track record with battleship articles lurches between the silly and outright fantasy.

I recommend Norman Friedman.


[/quote]

[lordroel]

Dec 4, 2021 9:27:22 GMT miletus12 said:

I recommend Norman Friedman.

His U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History book.

[simon darkshade]

Dec 4, 2021 9:27:22 GMT miletus12 said:

Sept 14, 2021 14:26:50 GMT simon darkshade said:

Let us examine it this way:

The BB-61 class were a marriage of two factors - the escalator clause from 35,000 to 45,000 and the desire for a fast battleship. Removing the former restriction means that you can get the speed of the latter with some of the attributes of the former. Design C is already going to be very difficult given that the Iowa hull form was going to struggle to get above 33 knots with any reasonable armour. B and C are much of a muchness.

My objection to this analysis is that by the time the Iowas are being designed, it was understood that these were not true line of battleships as was the case of the Montanas, which do and did follow the design logics and criteria one has laid out for a "US battleship" as written above. The Iowas were intended as bodyguard ships for the new large fast fleet carriers being built and were to function as "battle cruisers" in that role in the similar way the British planned to use their own battle cruisers of the Renown and Hood classes. As early as 1935, as a result of Fleet Problemsa US constructors and naval tacticians had considered that aircraft carrier forces roving independently of the slow battleline would need capital ship protection from "cruiser destroyers" such as was seen in the Dunkerques and Scharnhorsts and the alleged Japanese B-65 cruisers expected for which the bungled US Alaska class were a US planned response.

It simply depends how much you are willing to pay.

About 45% more per unit as compared to a combat equivalent South Dakota class. Not worth the money.

Battleship design was not approached on the basis of Speed, Displacement and Guns, but Guns, Armour and Speed, which combine to give you the package. Displacement comes later as a consequence of these, unless you are working in the particular circumstance of Treaty battleships which had an artificial limitation on their overall displacement because of early 1920s events to prevent WW1 (dissonance intended). Now, there are some hard limitations on USN and RN designs based on the Panama Canal locks and availability of drydocks around the British Empire, but those are also...a matter of what you are willing to pay.

See my previous comments. US constructors in their new battleships were getting near combat gun parity at 35,000 tonnes SD to a 71,000 tonne Yamato, though they could not know this was the case. The thing they could not do was get those extra six knots they wanted for a really fast battleship at 35,000 tonnes. That was going to be expensive. The Montanas, they planned, were going to be far more powerful than the vaunted Yamatos with the SHW 40.6 cm main battery having near 30% more broadside throw mass and almost 1.5 times faster firing cycle times. Strictly as a log square exercise in artillery, the Montanas would have been ferociously effective Yamato killers. And from the American constructors looked as they designed the gun barges in 1939, the BBs would be needed to counter potential theoretical and known Japanese, German and Italian so called "super battleships".

I'm less interested in total displacement than in protection, range, guns and the delicate balance between them. A larger ship will take longer to get to the fight.

Uhmm, a larger ship takes longer to construct. It will get to the fight faster,

Having a 6" secondary battery rather than 5"/38 is not a net gain in my view.

Willis Lee was very concerned about the lack of a stronger secondary battery versus Japanese cruisers and destroyers in his night fights with Japanese surface forces. he was leery of closing the range to PBR at Second Guadalcanal. The shot up South Dakota was ample evidence he had reason to be concerned. SoDak's damage was mainly 20.3 and 15.2 cm superstructure hits from Japanese cruiser mains and BB secondaries.

We don't need a Plan D, just a better Plan B. 9 guns are enough, but let us talk about belts and decks if we want to have any meaningful discussion of how to improve a design. Bigger isn't necessarily better; it depends on what makes a design better.

Turning circle, compartmentation, torpedo defense, fire control and a better Class A plate. US class A was face hardened too deep and was susceptible to shatter under 35.5 cm or larger shell fire. Class B non-face hardened actually was better belt plate if backed by STS. Fixing that Class A armor plate mistake on US BBs during WW II, as in re-belting the Iowas, and the North Carolinas with better more elastic plates that did not shatter like glass under impact, was EXPENSIVE in time and money.

As it stands, the Iowas were not the best design in any event because of some of the compromises in their design. Improving protection whilst maintaining speed ameliorates that...but what does it matter? By the time they are commissioned, there isn't an enemy battle line to fight nor are there any major engagements with enemy capital ships where the Iowas came close to service. Leyte Gulf saw them taken off with Halsey's carriers chasing the phantom of enemy carriers, demonstrating the real order of priorities and where they sat in it; and there really wasn't a realistic chance that any chances were going to be taken with Yamato off Okinawa. After 1945, whatever belt armour they have doesn't matter, as it is a complete anachronism.

Second Guadalcanal, Surigao Strait and what would stand in the way, if Yamato had made it to Okinawa? Aircraft carriers until the Battle of the Philippine Sea, tended to neutralize each other leaving both sides with nothing but their shore based naval air and their gunships. Remember this fact. There were 6 aircraft carrier battles. The British lost the one off Sri Lanka. The Australians and Americans fought a draw with the Japanese at the Coral Sea. The Americans won at Midway and Eastern Solomons and lost at Santa Cruz. Philippine Sea was a nail biter that the Americans won via superior naval aviator skill. Six battles those were with the record 3-2 and 1. How many surface battles were there? 20, Three of them were battleship actions. The record there was 10-9-1 with the Japanese winning most of them and only losing decisively when American battleships were present or a proximate threat over the horizon.

Finally, please don't read too much into Wikipedia. Its track record with battleship articles lurches between the silly and outright fantasy.

I recommend Norman Friedman.

1.) I don’t disagree with any of your points here. The desire for the fast battleship I referred to is directly analogous to the role you outlined. It is a rose by any other name.

2.) Agreed. The extra cost of the Iowas was quite a bit and not really worth it in terms of their contribution when measured by traditional measures.

3.) There is nothing here I disagree with. It is mainly on how the Montanas were superior to the inefficient Yamatos.

4.) My point was that the extra construction time means that they won’t get to the “front” until after the matter is largely decided. It does take a step back from the tactical employment, role and circumstance of the battleships that you seem to be focusing on, which is all well and good. However, by virtue of their size, expense and time involved from initiation of the design to commissioning, I would argue that a capital ship in WW2 was more of a national/strategic level asset rather than a disposable one.

The other part to this matter, which we can’t really avoid in a historical context, as that the @ Iowas reached the fleet after the war was won. This wasn’t their “fault”, but the nature of how long the US took to build its counteroffensive fleet and push forward to a position for blockade and bombardment of Japan. I don’t believe any piece of the jigsaw can be removed from this context and measured properly. It wasn’t the war they were designed and built for, but the war they got.

5.) That is a matter of the exception not proving the rule. Going for 6” would detract from the AA firepower of the fast battleships from that point onwards. It would have been handy at Guadalcanal, but any change would have come 2-2.5 years down the production pipeline when it wasn’t a need. Swings and roundabouts.

6.) Yes.

7.) Second Guadalcanal was 14/15 November 42, some ~3 months before Iowa was commissioned and 6 months before New Jersey. I’d say that unless there is a major change to accelerate the design, they won’t be present.

Surigao Strait was never going to be a fast BB engagement, with the old US BBs taking on the Southern Force. 

The potential clash between Halsey and the Centre Force in the broader Leyte Gulf Battle would see 2 Kongos, Nagato and Yamato, 6 CA, 2 CL and 11 DD up against, at worst, TF 34 (6 BB, 5 CA/CL and 14 DD). However, throwing in any of the CVs and CVLs turns it from a lopsided American win into an execution, like Musashi or Yamato off Okinawa.

Regarding Yamato, it wasn’t going to make it to Okinawa. The Brown Shoes were not going to let the Black Shoes get one over at that late point.

The role of battleships in carrier battles prior to the Turkey Shoot:

Coral Sea: None
Midway: Two Kongos doing bugger all
Eastern Solomons: North Carolina shot down 5-7 aircraft and saw no surface action
Santa Cruz: SoDak shot down a number of Japanese aircraft and saw no surface action

I wouldn't say that Philippine Sea was a close run thing overall. They outnumbered the Japanese, outclassed their aircraft, outclassed their pilots and had a superior fleet strategy.

Regardless of the tactical analysis of it, after the Essexes start to pour into the fleet, then the era where any surface engagement could potentially be strategically decisive was over.

The armament and main belt protection of the battleships after the beginning of 1943 was irrelevant to their new role, whereby their battery of 5"/38s and four Mark 37s became their main one. Delaying their construction to incorporate 6" and heavier armour pushes their period of action to a smaller and smaller part of the war.

[miletus12]

Dec 4, 2021 11:03:41 GMT simon darkshade said:

Dec 4, 2021 9:27:22 GMT miletus12 said:

My objection to this analysis is that by the time the Iowas are being designed, it was understood that these were not true line of battleships as was the case of the Montanas, which do and did follow the design logics and criteria one has laid out for a "US battleship" as written above. The Iowas were intended as bodyguard ships for the new large fast fleet carriers being built and were to function as "battle cruisers" in that role in the similar way the British planned to use their own battle cruisers of the Renown and Hood classes. As early as 1935, as a result of Fleet Problemsa US constructors and naval tacticians had considered that aircraft carrier forces roving independently of the slow battleline would need capital ship protection from "cruiser destroyers" such as was seen in the Dunkerques and Scharnhorsts and the alleged Japanese B-65 cruisers expected for which the bungled US Alaska class were a US planned response.

About 45% more per unit as compared to a combat equivalent South Dakota class. Not worth the money.

See my previous comments. US constructors in their new battleships were getting near combat gun parity at 35,000 tonnes SD to a 71,000 tonne Yamato, though they could not know this was the case. The thing they could not do was get those extra six knots they wanted for a really fast battleship at 35,000 tonnes. That was going to be expensive. The Montanas, they planned, were going to be far more powerful than the vaunted Yamatos with the SHW 40.6 cm main battery having near 30% more broadside throw mass and almost 1.5 times faster firing cycle times. Strictly as a log square exercise in artillery, the Montanas would have been ferociously effective Yamato killers. And from the American constructors looked as they designed the gun barges in 1939, the BBs would be needed to counter potential theoretical and known Japanese, German and Italian so called "super battleships".

Uhmm, a larger ship takes longer to construct. It will get to the fight faster,

Willis Lee was very concerned about the lack of a stronger secondary battery versus Japanese cruisers and destroyers in his night fights with Japanese surface forces. he was leery of closing the range to PBR at Second Guadalcanal. The shot up South Dakota was ample evidence he had reason to be concerned. SoDak's damage was mainly 20.3 and 15.2 cm superstructure hits from Japanese cruiser mains and BB secondaries.

Turning circle, compartmentation, torpedo defense, fire control and a better Class A plate. US class A was face hardened too deep and was susceptible to shatter under 35.5 cm or larger shell fire. Class B non-face hardened actually was better belt plate if backed by STS. Fixing that Class A armor plate mistake on US BBs during WW II, as in re-belting the Iowas, and the North Carolinas with better more elastic plates that did not shatter like glass under impact, was EXPENSIVE in time and money.

Second Guadalcanal, Surigao Strait and what would stand in the way, if Yamato had made it to Okinawa? Aircraft carriers until the Battle of the Philippine Sea, tended to neutralize each other leaving both sides with nothing but their shore based naval air and their gunships. Remember this fact. There were 6 aircraft carrier battles. The British lost the one off Sri Lanka. The Australians and Americans fought a draw with the Japanese at the Coral Sea. The Americans won at Midway and Eastern Solomons and lost at Santa Cruz. Philippine Sea was a nail biter that the Americans won via superior naval aviator skill. Six battles those were with the record 3-2 and 1. How many surface battles were there? 20, Three of them were battleship actions. The record there was 10-9-1 with the Japanese winning most of them and only losing decisively when American battleships were present or a proximate threat over the horizon.

I recommend Norman Friedman.

1.) I don’t disagree with any of your points here. The desire for the fast battleship I referred to is directly analogous to the role you outlined. It is a rose by any other name.

It would have been cheaper to build Baltimores and arm them with decent torpedoes.

2.) Agreed. The extra cost of the Iowas was quite a bit and not really worth it in terms of their contribution when measured by traditional measures.

More cost effective than the Alaskas?

3.) There is nothing here I disagree with. It is mainly on how the Montanas were superior to the inefficient Yamatos.

I often wonder why people overrate the Yamatos and underate US 35,000 tonners.

4.) My point was that the extra construction time means that they won’t get to the “front” until after the matter is largely decided. It does take a step back from the tactical employment, role and circumstance of the battleships that you seem to be focusing on, which is all well and good. However, by virtue of their size, expense and time involved from initiation of the design to commissioning, I would argue that a capital ship in WW2 was more of a national/strategic level asset rather than a disposable one.

One can do what the British did with the HMS Valiant. In the US case, recycle surplus US M1918 16/50 barrels and barbette mounts left over from the aborted 1923 SoDaks and mount those on beamy Plan Echo hulls and widen the Panama Canal as a necessity to make the passage problem a non-issue. Of course one needs to start in 1935 and go into it with the mindset that both the Canal and the fat Iowas are going to break the London Treaty. But then France, Germany, Italy and one presumes Japan had already started to break the naval arms limitations conventions so why should the US or the UK play to a broken rules book, too?

The other part to this matter, which we can’t really avoid in a historical context, as that the @ Iowas reached the fleet after the war was won. This wasn’t their “fault”, but the nature of how long the US took to build its counteroffensive fleet and push forward to a position for blockade and bombardment of Japan. I don’t believe any piece of the jigsaw can be removed from this context and measured properly. It wasn’t the war they were designed and built for, but the war they got.

See previous comments. Aim for 30 knots, shave off a year designing new guns and barbettes, go for a fat teardrop hull and accept 55,000 tonnes and LIE that it is 45,000 tonnes. Ready by 1940.

5.) That is a matter of the exception not proving the rule. Going for 6” would detract from the AA firepower of the fast battleships from that point onwards. It would have been handy at Guadalcanal, but any change would have come 2-2.5 years down the production pipeline when it wasn’t a need. Swings and roundabouts.

The 5 / 38 DP was less effective barrel for barrel in the AAA role than the 3 / 50until the VT fuse comes in. Might as well go with 6 /43 and load up on the 3 / 50s. If the 1.1s had worked as intended and 3 / 50s been fitted as planned then AAA torpedo bomber defense would have been much better and the Kates would have had less chance to kill Hornet and Yorktown and Lexington. But that is not what happened. The 5 / 38s earned their lethal reputation after the VT shells came into general issue.

6.) Yes.

7.) Second Guadalcanal was 14/15 November 42, some ~3 months before Iowa was commissioned and 6 months before New Jersey. I’d say that unless there is a major change to accelerate the design, they won’t be present.

Second Guadalcanal would not have been necessary if Santa Cruz had not been bungled and if Lee got there to replace Callaghan and had Scott in charge of the screen at FIRST Guadalcanal. BAD timing and admiralty can be cited and the one responsible... Bull Halsey.

Surigao Strait was never going to be a fast BB engagement, with the old US BBs taking on the Southern Force. 

But Samar should have beemn.

The potential clash between Halsey and the Centre Force in the broader Leyte Gulf Battle would see 2 Kongos, Nagato and Yamato, 6 CA, 2 CL and 11 DD up against, at worst, TF 34 (6 BB, 5 CA/CL and 14 DD). However, throwing in any of the CVs and CVLs turns it from a lopsided American win into an execution, like Musashi or Yamato off Okinawa.

Halsey was bringing 2 BBs, 2 CAs, 1 CL and maybe 10 DDs to the fight. The DDs were in ballast and were fuel short after that 8 hour speed run. That means Thomas Sprague has to commit TAFFY 1 and TAFFY 2 to the fight in direct combat. Now Clifton Sprague spent 2 CVEs, 3 DDs and DEs and 120 aircraft shot down or splashed to stop Kurita. Kurita left 2 CAs and a destroyer behind as losses when he retreated and also cost Japanese aviation some 55-65 planes during that sad affair. It was proof that aircraft carriers could fight off enemy battleships if conditions were just right. Nevertheless, as Halsey's bungling seems to indicate, if he had shown up with his rump TF 34, there was a good chance he would have screwed up the surface action and lost both Iowas. It would have been up to Jesse Oldendorf and the old Standards to save the situation after.

Regarding Yamato, it wasn’t going to make it to Okinawa. The Brown Shoes were not going to let the Black Shoes get one over at that late point.

300+ planes and 6.5 hours to put Yamato and half her escorts under. USS Archerfish whacked Shinano with four fish in 20 minutes.

The role of battleships in carrier battles prior to the Turkey Shoot:

Review.

Coral Sea: None

Inoue and Takagi retreated because their flattops were neutered. They feared Allied gun cruiser superiority. Crace was quite effective in putting the fear of an RAN SAG into them as he swanned around the Jomard Passage. Yamamoto was furious.

Midway: Two Kongos doing bugger all.

They prevented Spruance from closing Nagumo for a night surface action.

Eastern Solomons: North Carolina shot down 5-7 aircraft and saw no surface action

And kept the japanese away from closing for a night surface battle.

Santa Cruz: SoDak shot down a number of Japanese aircraft and saw no surface action

Both carrier forces were neutered. The Japanese sent in battleships to shoot up Henderson Field to neuter US shore based air power. So what did USS South Dakota and USS Washington do? After Callaghan was killed and USS San Francisco redeemed her vmistake in shooting Scott's flagship up and killing him by next trashing the Hiei in a straight up gun action, at first Guadalcanal, those two battleships which did nothing during the Santa Cruz, during Second Guadalcanal bought two precious days for the Marine garrison at Henderson Field to get it back into operation. Part of that action was the bonus bonus of Kirishima wrecked and the Japanese learning one did not tangle with American battleships.

I wouldn't say that Philippine Sea was a close run thing overall. They outnumbered the Japanese, outclassed their aircraft, outclassed their pilots and had a superior fleet strategy.

The Japanese won the recon battle, held the weather gauge and the attack initiative. The opposing air forces both land and sea based were approximately numerically equal. Japanese aircraft had longer air endurance and better sortie radii than their American opposites. Japanese aircraft carrier deck handling was still supoerior to Americqan deck crews. And Mitscher completely botched the air battle. The difference actually was the American submarines got in there and disrupted Japanese fleet operations and started sinking flattops. Then Spruance took the battle away from Mitscher as he had taken the air battle away from Miles Browning at Midway and for much the same reason, the black shoe cruiser captain / turned aircraft carrier admiralactually listened to his pilots and not to his "so-called" aircraft carrier experts.

Regardless of the tactical analysis of it, after the Essexes start to pour into the fleet, then the era where any surface engagement could potentially be strategically decisive was over.

The armament and main belt protection of the battleships after the beginning of 1943 was irrelevant to their new role, whereby their battery of 5"/38s and four Mark 37s became their main one. Delaying their construction to incorporate 6" and heavier armour pushes their period of action to a smaller and smaller part of the war.

One has to be prescient. Given what the builders knew when the Iowas were designed in 1938, they probably were more correct than we with our hindsight allow them. See VIDEO for why.

WWII lessons learned. Aircraft carriers neutered each other. Shore based air was iffy, but Battleships and later cruisers were all weather weapon platforms.  
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[simon darkshade]

1.) Baltimores with good torpedoes would do the job well enough, but just to cover all bases, SoDaks are sufficient.
2.) A drover’s dog would have been more cost efficient than the Alaskas. Point taken.
3.) Grass is greener on the other side + Weeaboo tendencies + the mythologising of the defeated Other.
4.) An ideal yet idealised scenario. If there is a start in 1935, so much can be changed. I’d be able to comment further if I had my copies of Friedman and Garzke and Dulin, which goes for this entire topic, really.
5.) I reckon that it could be done on 50,000t, allowing for a nominal (wink wink nudge nudge) adherence to 45,000t, which would be an easier sell to the politicians.
6.) The VT hits the fleet at the end of 1942, so the window is fairly narrow to justify keep 6” for 1942’s surface battle alone. The utility of the 5”/38 from 1943-45 on the battleships outweighs that in my view.
7.) Guadalcanal did have its stuff ups, including Santa Cruz, but none were ultimately strategically costly for the USN.
8.) I’m not convinced that Samar has to turn into a surface battleship fight, nor that the numbers would be nerfed to such an extent. If Halsey does not take the FCTF after the bait, Yamato and co are deader than disco.
9.) Yes.
Subsequent Points on Battleship Employment in 1942.) Taken, but their role was ultimately secondary.
11.) PS is one of those battles where one can make an argument for tactical parity in many areas, but the Yanks ended up turning it into a strategic thrashing through more than luck. There is a fair bit of design involved for me.
12.) I’m working from my phone and can’t watch more than a snippet ATM, but the prewar Fleet Problems, whilst prescient in some ways, ended up being more capable than the RL Orange Fleet, especially the 1943-45 iteration.
13.) Concur on both points.