Australia's Collins-class replacements

[stevep]

Nov 13, 2021 11:52:46 GMT lordroel said:

Nov 13, 2021 11:46:24 GMT stevep said:

  Shows the complexity of such high tech projects and how much has to be considered as well as how much time it will take.  If Australia does get SSNs then I suspect they will end up with the 1st class being built in either the US or UK, which as the article shows will have to spend heavily and/or cut back their own plans to make such a resource available.  A 2nd generation might be built in Australia IF successive governments is willing to make the commitment in time, money and a lot of development work, especially in training skilled men.  However that's probably not going to start producing new subs until somewhere probably past 2060. 

True, so Australia might end up with no submarines for a period ore having older submarines that have to face Chinese submarines who are a lot newer and more capable that what Australia currently has in its possession.

  Well its certain they will have to soldier on with the Collins for a while yet.  As the article you displayed mentioned a new design isn't going to be in service before 2040 and if the UK managed to build and deliver some new Astute's they wouldn't be available until the late 30's.  It takes a long time to build SSNs, even without the industrial base being distinctly run down, as it definitely is in the UK and seem to a degree to be in the US.

[lordroel]

Nov 13, 2021 13:22:55 GMT stevep said:

Nov 13, 2021 11:52:46 GMT lordroel said:

True, so Australia might end up with no submarines for a period ore having older submarines that have to face Chinese submarines who are a lot newer and more capable that what Australia currently has in its possession.

  Well its certain they will have to soldier on with the Collins for a while yet.  As the article you displayed mentioned a new design isn't going to be in service before 2040 and if the UK managed to build and deliver some new Astute's they wouldn't be available until the late 30's.  It takes a long time to build SSNs, even without the industrial base being distinctly run down, as it definitely is in the UK and seem to a degree to be in the US.

Well if they had gone for the French design it would also take long, but not as longer as going fully nuclear and especially going to do it from the ground up.

[stevep]

Nov 13, 2021 13:25:22 GMT lordroel said:

Nov 13, 2021 13:22:55 GMT stevep said:

  Well its certain they will have to soldier on with the Collins for a while yet.  As the article you displayed mentioned a new design isn't going to be in service before 2040 and if the UK managed to build and deliver some new Astute's they wouldn't be available until the late 30's.  It takes a long time to build SSNs, even without the industrial base being distinctly run down, as it definitely is in the UK and seem to a degree to be in the US.

Well if they had gone for the French design it would also take long, but not as longer as going fully nuclear and especially going to do it from the ground up.

  True although they would have been markedly less capable, especially in terms of being able to project a presence into the S China Sea and by some reports the project was already in deep trouble.  - Which may have been because of a combination of corruption in the Australian government and the insistence of them all being produced in Australia.

[lordroel]

Australia to get the first of its nuclear submarines FIVE YEARS ahead of schedule as America fast-tracks $90billion project in face of rising tensions with China

Rising tensions with China have fast-tracked the delivery of the first Australian nuclear submarine under the $90billion deal with the USA and the UK.

Australia now looks set to launch its first nuclear-powered submarine five years ahead of schedule as the West braces for confrontation with China.

The controversial deal - which saw Australia abandon its contract with France for a fleet of diesel submarines - could now see the new subs coming into operation in the first half of the 2030s.

They were originally not expected to join the Australian naval fleet until 2040 at the earliest, but the US Defense Department is pushing to bring the timeline forward.

It comes as fears grow of a stand-off between the West and China over Taiwan, with Australian pledging to support any US response if the situation escalates.

'I think we are advancing at a quicker pace than what we could have imagined even at the time of the announcement,' Mr Dutton told The Australian.

'There has been no game-playing, no roadblocks, they are pulling out all stops to make this work. It’s a capability that we want to acquire quickly and we are in those discussions right now.'

He added: ' I think it’s the Americans’ desire to see us with capability much sooner than 2040 and obviously options are being explored at the moment.

'I believe very much we can realise the capability in the first half of the 2030s and we are absolutely working towards that and I am only encouraged, not discouraged, out of the conversations we have had.'

Mr Dutton also hinted the submarines could even be built in Australia, despite the current lack of suitable shipyard facilities or nuclear power knowledge.

Australia has yet to decide if they will be using the US Virginia Class nuclear submarine design or the UK's similar Astute Class.

But any move to manufacture them in Australia will require training shipyard workers, new equipment and specialist nuclear experts.

Some experts have predicted that may not be possible within the new shortened timeframe to rush the submarines into service.

However moving production to Australia may be inevitable as Mr Dutton said the UK and US had limited spare production capacity to build the Australian submarines.

And he said work was already underway with the international partners on designing local shipyards.

The new timeframe now matches the original plan for the introduction of the axed French submarines which were due to come into service in 2035.

Australia's current Collins Class submarines would need major overhauls to extend their service life beyond 2038, making it vital to get the nuclear subs in the water as soon as possible.

The deal with the US and UK is for eight nuclear submarines, and they are likely to be built in Adelaide if the plan to manufacture them locally goes ahead.

China branded the AUKUS deal as 'extremely irresponsible" and has now pushed its backing for a nuclear-free treaty for south-east Asia.

A Chinese government official Lijian Zhao said the deal will 'intensify regional tensions, provoke a military arms race and threaten regional peace and stability.'

Mr Dutton said the rhetoric against Australia should be seen as just part of China's attacks on all the other nations which oppose it and speak up against them.

He added: 'We want a productive and fruitful friendship with China.

'But we have values that we adhere to and we will not deviate from those values and adherence to international law.'

[miletus12]

Nov 2, 2021 8:16:59 GMT simon darkshade said:

The biggest factor in our choice was the need to get up to the potential battle areas as quickly as possible and to be able to sustain that presence. The French boats couldn’t do that in a month of Sundays. They’ve got to get from Perth to the SCS and beyond, the better part of 2600nm, and the only way to do that is a nuke. This was the only end point from the moment the prospect of new subs was first raised.

The reason for the buggerising about with SSKs was twofold: Firstly, nuclear power of all sorts is like a crucifix to the Australian left (former Environment Minister Peter Garrett spent his time discordantly bleating “Leave it in the ground!” when protesting uranium mining during his Midnight Oil pop career). Secondly, when left leaning Malcolm Turnbull deposed Tony Abbott in 2015, he owed a big debt to his consigliere, South Australian ‘moderate’ leader Christopher Pyne. He was looking in trouble in his well-heeled blue ribbon seat in the subsequent election, so Turnbull made a huge song and dance about subs being built in Adelaide.

At no stage was in the Rudd/Gillard or Turnbull governments the issue of subs viewed through an operational military prism. This may be a bit different for particularly the American readers to get their heads around, but Australian military gear are decidedly not viewed as weapons. They are presented to the mainstream public almost entirely as job making programmes. Capability doesn’t matter, comparative quality doesn’t matter. There will never be a war of any sort, you Neanderthal throwbacks! We shall never need to actually use any of it and we definitely will never lose any ships/aircraft/vehicles in combat. That would be against the rules. The sole purpose of subs is to make work for unemployed car workers in Adelaide and other such unsophisticated types who can’t get a proper job in the public service or health care.

There is a saying in a few countries that there are no votes in defence and that is very true here.

Hmmm.

My masters was on the Australian strategic defense problem with respect to logistics from WW II to the present, so there is at least one of us who understands how "weapons programs" in Australia are very like the same in the United States, "jobs programs". Refer to the F-22 or the KC 46 as examples.

Now as to this discussion:

Some facts that are not generally well known or understood. See maps.



Australia...



Pacific operations area 

1. The lighter the blues, the shallower the depths.  The operating areas off China are extremely shallow and the ASW problem for the Chinese is comparatively simple. Diesel electric boats have to snort and they are easy to find and kill in the shallow waters off an enemy seacoast. ASW planes sniff for hydrocarbons and use magnetic anomaly detectors. Air independent propulsion boats put out heat that can be detected shallow. 

2. Now the other facts not discussed

a. The reason for fission powered steam turb0-electric submarines is patrol time on station and dash speed to clear datum, when detected. They can outrun surface pursuit and dodge sonar buoy fences. If the Collins class tries to fight near China, she dies. Modernization does not help. 
b. Nuclear boats have a useful hull life measured in dive cycles as to depths and times dived. That is because of compression-expansion loading on their pressure hulls. This is not years  in service but how many times a boat submerges and ascends. Each time the tonnage pressure per square meter applies a live load on the pressure hull. The LA boats have been used hard. Their operating cycles left are unknown, but every sortie means more dives, more hull stress and less useful cycles remaining. Expect that the safety floors (How deep a boat can dive, to be degraded or become shallower as well as the flank dash speed to diminish over time.)
c. Australia, for political reasons, will not opt for a submarine that will be refueled in Australia (or anywhere else.). This holds true for the United States as a policy decision. Two reasons, to prevent the danger of spent fuel from falling into the wrong hands to be turned into bomb grade fissionables or "kernels" and it makes no sense to design a refuellable reactor to outlast the hull, when the average nuclear reactor as a power egg can be designed and built as a heat bulb to last just as long as the hull. How long is that? US boats are expected to last a minimum of twenty-five years. This is new US technology shared with the British and soon with the Australians. The power egg is built in the US. The Australian boats would be fitted with such "power eggs". 
c. The British Astute class would have to be modified with US weapon systems, sensors and interfaces. This is what the RAN has now. They do not use British (Read French.) sensors or interface systems. The British do use a British version  of the American torpedo, but the Australians go one better and BUILD Mark 48s in country. (Jobs program.)
d. SSN(X) looks to be an updated or modernized Seawolf. If Australia opts for the Virginia replacement, it will be a FAT submarine. It will require new docks and piers and weighs. The ASC LLD corporation will have to build an entire new and much larger assembly yard and maintenance facility. The same would be true for an Astute Block II, or Virginia Block III or Block IV. The SSN(R) is likely a VSEL updated Astute.
e. The Virginias were designed to fight in the shallows with a secondary blue water mission. The Astutes are blue water boats.
f. Another thing about the Astutes, if one looks at them bows on, one notices the planar slab sided almost faceted hull profile. This is sonar "stealth" based on angle refraction deflection to diminish enemy active sonar echo return offset, a type of range gating obfuscation against supposedly quieter enemy diesel boats who wait for an Astute to trundle into ambush rate. The idea is that the diesel boat will not ping a range accurately or at all, and this gives the British boat the first torpedo out of the tube in an underwater shark-fight. Theory put into practice. 
g. The American answer to the problem remains sheer power of transmission and the golf-ball, other active arrays and a classified range extension detection technique. I would be very surprised if American boats become as facetted as Norwegian and German boats are about to become.   

======================================================

Cancellation.

The reason the ATTACK program died was "jobs". The Australian government thought it had a contract with Naval Systems Group where the French government owned company would prototype a training boat: but also build a from the keel blocks up submarine construction facility in Australia, train Australians how to build this redesigned Amethyst nuclear submarine into diesel electric powered boat and do it all by 2030 originally. The program was scheduled for 40 billion Australian dollars, sold as a package deal for that amount and then the bow wake showed up.  Naval Systems Group sent an advance party to build survey the requirements for the navy yard to start anew the Australian submarine building industry. The sunk costs that both the Australian government and NSG put into the effort up to the moment of contract cancellation came to about 1 billion Australian dollars total, before Canberra pulled the plug. A lot of money, French and Australian had been spent.       
         
Bow Wake.

An American term, this means to underbid the true costs and misrepresent the true program parameters to get funding from the legislature to approve the program in the first place (KC-46 and F-35 programs are American examples.). The ATTACK program doubled its initial estimate to 80 billion Australian dollars. NSG took one look at Australian facilities and work forces offered and told the Australian government that it would take 20 years to build the shipyard submarine fabrication facility. Otherwise to meet the deadline, the submarines would have to built in France. ALL of them. Incidentally, the reason the Japanese option was scuppered, besides memories of WWII, was because the Japanese were more directly honest and told the Australian government the exact same thing upfront without French caveats and "promises".  The Tokyo government was prepared to finesse "article five" to sell their boats, but the boats to meet program costs had to be built in Japan. This was not going to swim in Australia. Incidentally the Germans told the Australians the same thing. I do not know what the Koreans said. 

Enter AUKUS. 

The Australian government had to do something once the ATTACK program started to resemble Collins 2.0. They had made many mistakes, but to the program managers, dealing with domestic politics, an Australian PM who had bungled the Japanese source negotiations and now this French boomerang of date in service delays and cost escalations, this looked like the Kockums fiasco, again, where the Swedes involved in the Collins prototype had taken their small coastal submarine, inflated it to 250% over original size, botched the power train, and created a hull form full of non-correctable sound shorts and managed to completely bollix the sensors / fire control system interface and then presented it as the prototype.  The Australians home-built three more duplicates of it before they fully realized what a pig of a boat they had on their hands. The RAN called in Electric Boat to fix the mess. 

Better to pull the plug on ATTACK and reset to zero. Who is left in the vendor queue and what do they offer?      

Two choices. General Dynamics and VSEL. What is the offering? Virginia and Astute, still building, both proven and both probably costing about 3.6 billion Australian dollars per unit in 2021 dollars. 12 x 3.6 = 43.2 billion dollars ... on paper. 

Problems:

The US has two yards running flat out. They take 2 to 5 years to build each boat. They will have to build a 3rd yard. Either in the US or Australia, but they will have to build another yard to build the hulls. The power egg has to be built in the US. 
     
The UK has one yard winding down and awaiting the SSN(R). They could keep going with at least two prototypes of the Astute, but the British boat has to be built with US systems to meet RAN current technical requirements. Or the RAN has to completely retrain and refit their submarine force. Add that it takes the British 7 years to build a boat from first plate bent to getting her wet. Plus the British power-eggs have to be built ... in the US.   

The Astute would be a marginally better option. It can be prototyped and ready as a training boat or pair of them (Two slides at the VSEL facility.) as early as 2032 if it is pushed.  The US boats would show up around 2035. Either case would be foreign built.   

It will take the Americans a decade to stand up a new naval yard if they start now. The British may take longer. Say 15 years. The American style yard "could" build an Astute but American and British module assembly practices differ... radically. The Americans welding practices appear to be much more through hull and are inherently safer. Lose Thresher and Scorpion and those lessons stick.  

I am reluctant to suggest the fact at this point, but the Australian government has locked itself into at least two or possibly FOUR foreign built boats before their jobs program puts a hull into the water. To meet their deadline and to support their 12 (now 8) hull program by the date we expect war with the PRC (2035?), the first boats will be built in the UK, because my money is on the Astutes, again for domestic Australian politics reason.       

[simon darkshade]

The big difference between the US and Australian defence is that the former country has a more realistic, hard power view on defence, whereas in Australia it is somewhere on a quaternary level of political priority. The very concept that equipment ever be used is anathema; this is something that doesn’t come through enough through academic sources, but has to be lived and experienced to get a sense of just how visceral it is. I did my thesis on the security policy of the Clinton administration, which in its first term was marked by a pretty anti-military culture among some elements, but that does pale compared to the breadth of similar disengagement in Australia.

You mention the Japanese boats being dropped because of WW2 memories, which simply isn’t the case. The last vestige of real anti-Japanese sentiment was in the 1980s. In 2014/2015, the overwhelming majority of the WW2 generation was dead, not just out of political and cultural influence; as of 2021, there are 3000 left out of a million. Turncoat wasn’t anti-Jap, nor were any of his power base on the soft bleeding heart left/Black Hand of the Liberals, nor were the mandarins of Defence, nor were the upper echelons of the RAN. Nor, for that matter, was there some residual anti-Japanese movement in the Nationals.

You are more on the mark with talk of costs and where they would be built.

[miletus12]

Dec 28, 2021 2:01:34 GMT simon darkshade said:

Quote

The big difference between the US and Australian defence is that the former country has a more realistic, hard power view on defence, whereas in Australia it is somewhere on a quaternary level of political priority. The very concept that equipment ever be used is anathema; this is something that doesn’t come through enough through academic sources, but has to be lived and experienced to get a sense of just how visceral it is. I did my thesis on the security policy of the Clinton administration, which in its first term was marked by a pretty anti-military culture among some elements, but that does pale compared to the breadth of similar disengagement in Australia

The "doves" in the United States could be considered hawks anywhere else, but it would be an exaggerated view of the situation in either country to suggest that there exists a "quality" of reluctance to use the stuff once it is there. East Timor was not that long ago. Current Australian politics seems to regard their north as something about which to be worried and then there is this:

Australia to buy surplus M1 tanks.

Why?

It has notably been explained to me, that Australian defense policy has been centered around the notion that for Australia to be invited to the table or guarantee that her "ally" will show up when she needs help, she makes herself "useful" or at least shows up when the ally asks for participation, even if the shooting matter has nothing to do with central Australian interests or political concerns. Mind you, this is internalized by the professional governing class and the civil service and the professional military, and therefore is not out in the wild among the voting Australian public until election time, but it does explain why Australia bought a heavy armored battalion equipment set for two billion Australian dollars. Where do they expect to use that battalion? Fighting dingoes and rabbits?

Two sides of a policy.

In reference to the above, the "liberals" (Americans would call them populists or socialists.) in Australia tend to argue that defense policy should be localized to Australia and the waters around the continent, and that monies should be spent for sea control and air patrol to the continent's approaches. Note that this includes the "green" element in Australian politics and if the populace does pay attention at all between elections or white papers, this appears to be the polity's favored course.

Then there are the "special interests" and the "concerned citizenry" who while a decided minority are the voices who clamor for Australia to be participatory at least in the broader global issues and to "punch above their weight" and make their influence felt. They favor a "power projection" approach to military affairs.

Awareness

Now look at the submarine issue. The Collins debacle did hold Australian public or at least professional news media attention for the life of the program, which is to state, that the technical problems and the politics is common knowledge among Australians more-so than the catastrophes that are the F-22 Lightning, and the KC-46 Pegasus are among the American electorate as a comparison (Clinton Administration and I will get to it in a moment.) Not even the Littoral Combat Ship is as well-known as a problem among the average American voters as the Collins is among Australians, which is not to say that your average Australian voter pays / paid much attention to it at all until he is told the sticker shock price of what it will cost to replace or possibly life extend (LOTE) the Collins class because the ATTACK program has gone to the dogs.

The presence of the topic on this forum shows that the issue has gone "global", with global interests and concerns. The bumbling Clinton administration never had a "global interest" in its military procurement decision making mistakes like this. France did not howl when the Airbus air tanker to be built by Northrop in the US was nixed in favor of the Boeing entry. There is a "jobs program" for you and a

Dec 28, 2021 2:01:34 GMT simon darkshade said:

concept that equipment ever be used is anathema

example for you in the American context. That was a "Democrat" jobs program based on an offering of a decidedly inferior air-frame to be built in Seattle, Washington; as opposed to the Airbus version (EU rather meaning France led aviation consortium, with Northrop Grumman as the American window dressing.) to be built in South Carolina, a Republican state. Neither plane was any good as a combat tanker aircraft, but at least the Airbus AR 330 MRTT pretended to meet actual US power projection and sustainment needs with faster refueling in the air, more burden aloft and more hours aloft and more aircraft refuelable per fuel transfer cycle over time. Republicans were "power projectionists" and democrats were "stay at home" and do not use the tools.

Now look at AUKUS.

Does it not strike one, that the Australian political factions had their latest political set-too and that the ATTACK program came afoul of the lastr election cycle? The "Australia needs to punch above her weight and she needs to show up when asked" so that her ally will show up to help her when called is what this observer sees.

Nov 1, 2021 17:58:09 GMT belushitd said:

I strongly suspect the reason for the sudden dropping of the French design and the search for an established nuclear boat design is because Washington has told Canberra "We're not going to be able to do for you the tasks a nuclear boat is designed to do, starting in the year 20XX."

Assuming I'm correct in this, Washington will offer nary a peep no matter which boat the Aussies decide to go with. You'll be able to figure out which one it is when you see either long lead items (read as reactors) being contracted for (or assuming the issue is slipways) additional ground is being cleared for expanded/new slipways.

Belushi TD

This is a wrong read. What has happened is that the Americans let their navy run down hoping for a peace dividend and then the Chinese began to build access denial systems and started to assert control and sea denial off their coasts and then they power projected into trade lanes and choke points vital to American survival as a free state. See Map.



That is what the American admiralty sees.

It is not that the Americans could not run local coverage around Australia. It is that the Americans asked Australia for help in the global coverage, particularly IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. The ATTACK class was actually able to cover that area with the types of blue water boats, NSG offered. Believe me, if the French could have fulfilled what they promised, Washington would have been ecstatic with the results.

But then Australian domestic politics and the "jobs program" intervened.

So the Australian government with their "conservatives" (Americans would call them liberals, always one has to remember that Australians are more leftist than your average American voter.), had to figure a new way to make it work and get in good with the ally to boot. The conservatives saw an opportunity to buy a heavy armor battalion on the cheap and create an even bigger jobs program and possibly get the ally to pay part of the tab as part of their own defense needs. It is ridiculous. Who needs a nuclear-powered submarine to defend Australia unless the patrol areas are north of the Indonesian archipelago, or off the coasts of east Africa? In other words, become an adjunct to an allied global coverage effort?

This is called "leverage", political and military. Australia will have a seat at the table as important as the UK or France if she has her own coverage area in the global scheme of things.

Dec 28, 2021 2:01:34 GMT simon darkshade said:

You mention the Japanese boats being dropped because of WW2 memories, which simply isn’t the case. The last vestige of real anti-Japanese sentiment was in the 1980s. In 2014/2015, the overwhelming majority of the WW2 generation was dead, not just out of political and cultural influence; as of 2021, there are 3000 left out of a million. Turncoat wasn’t anti-Jap, nor were any of his power base on the soft bleeding heart left/Black Hand of the Liberals, nor were the mandarins of Defence, nor were the upper echelons of the RAN. Nor, for that matter, was there some residual anti-Japanese movement in the Nationals.

Publicly.

How is the Battle of the Coral Sea remembered and commemorated in Australia?
Each year since 1946 Coral Sea Week has been celebrated in Australia with marches by service personnel from both Australia and the USA, and official functions for visiting American dignitaries. These celebrations express gratitude to the United States for its part in the battle, and the support given to Australia by America in World War 2.

More recently the commemorative emphasis has moved from the ‘Battle that saved Australia’ to the broader concept of the ‘Battle for Australia’, held on the first Wednesday in September. This now marks not only the Battle of the Coral Sea, but also the contribution and significance of all those who helped defend Australia at its most vulnerable time – the men on the Kokoda Track, the airmen in northern Australia and Papua, the sailors and merchant seamen keeping supply lines open, and the men and women in Australia in the services, as civilian workers, or volunteers on the home front.

Americans hardly celebrate Midway or even remember it as well. But they remember Pearl Harbor. I think that "anti-something" always taints politics and clouds the ability of rational folks to meet at the common center. This is precisely why the AUKUS combine was set up, because the three nations involved do not want "them" to avenge "the century of shame" upon us.

The Japanese had the first go at it. Notice that the Japanese (And the Indians.) were not invited into the AUKUS combine? There is talk that Canada will be.

As for the costing...

My suggestions are based on published UK and US defense estimates. The British option is more blue water, less expensive and probably delivers sooner , much sooner if the British build the first four on the Clyde. The US build option could see Fremantle become its WWII self again. The naval yard (Is Port River deep enough for a fat Astute or Seawolf derivative?) at Osbourne; Australia has to be enlarged maybe 5x to build the Australian hulls.

It will be one of the largest regional government jobs programs by manpower / costs per worker spent (20 billion AusD estimated to build the yard and train the new workforce, for 2,400 current boosted to near 10,000 new strength with economic knockon effects worth maybe 100 billion Australian 2021 dollars. That is huge. One can see that cost spread over a decade at 2 billion AusD a year. It is about what a new US based assembly facility would cost if built on the Pacific coast.

[simon darkshade]

You write a lot when a more succinct approach would suffice.

In the first instance, you cite East Timor and the Abrams tank buy. East Timor was a generation ago under the Howard government, the last to take defence seriously. They were also the ones to buy M1s back in 2006, which was hugely contentious at the time and lead to the recent expanded buy of M1A2s.

They were acquired for the reason you point out, but that is the bleeding edge of hard realism in the pollies and is very rare - at the moment, it would probably be limited to Jim Molan, Peter Dutton and Andrew Hastie. The majority of the Liberal government comes from the wets, who regard Defence as a bit of a waste with the sole redeeming feature of creating jobs. To the ordinary bloke on the street, the famous pub test, it isn’t a factor. They don’t know what tanks we have or why we have them. Most don’t care.

Defence is culturally and politically back from the pack in terms of power and status. After the PM comes the Treasurer, then Health, Deputy PM/the Nationals, Foreign Affairs and probably Industrial Relations. Dutton is nominally ranked higher not because of his portfolio, but because he is Leader of the House, a big beast and leader of the Liberal Right, having lead the charge that took down Turnbull in 2018. Defence has cropped up in the news a bit more because of China throwing their weight around, but a lot of people are fundamentally mystified by the whole business.

The Attack programme was a product of 2016 and only continued on for this long as it wasn’t that important. Hopefully that might change, but I won’t hold my breath.

In the second instance, of the Coral Sea, you take one event/circumstance and twist it to serve your point. Now, it is true that there are annual marches, but no one notices or speaks of it, besides colour articles in most newspapers (all of which are declining). It gets covered in the national paper of note, The Australian, but that isn’t widely read by the average bloke on the street. There are perhaps 5 national journalists in Australia who regularly write about defence and security, and only Greg Sheridan in The Oz makes a fuss about the Coral Sea…and he’s a pro-Japanese alliance fellow who advocated the Jap subs. It has nothing to do with residual hatred of Japan. Heck, even the old veterans who I knew no longer had any hatred for the Japs when I was last able to talk with them.

For the argument that Japan got knocked out of contention because of memories of the war, this example doesn’t work. The premise does not support the conclusion.

As for the last point on costing, I disagree with nothing that you say. The Port River isn’t that deep outside of the main channel and the ASC yard is fairly small - have a look on Google Earth, where there is a ship alongside for scale. I haven’t been there for many years; last time would have been 1996, when there was no security I remembered. As an interesting coda, my mother translated a lot of the material from Kockums back in the day and a young Simon was assigned the duty of typing it up on the whizzbang Microsoft Works on the IBM PS2.

[miletus12]

Dec 28, 2021 10:30:07 GMT simon darkshade said:

You write a lot when a more succinct approach would suffice

It is a very complex topic with many twists and turns in the history. I try to summarize, but the explanations become expository to cover the issues. 

Dec 28, 2021 10:30:07 GMT simon darkshade said:

In the first instance, you cite East Timor and the Abrams tank buy. East Timor was a generation ago under the Howard government, the last to take defence seriously. They were also the ones to buy M1s back in 2006, which was hugely contentious at the time and lead to the recent expanded buy of M1A2s.

To transport that 70 tonne tank one needs sea lift; for Australia is an island as well as a continent. I do not remember the Howard government buying the specialized deck reinforced cargo ships or making STUFT lease arrangements to transport the tank battalion. Would it not have made more sense to buy equipment for marines or light infantry if the East Timor excuse was invoked?

Dec 28, 2021 10:30:07 GMT simon darkshade said:

They were acquired for the reason you point out, but that is the bleeding edge of hard realism in the pollies and is very rare - at the moment, it would probably be limited to Jim Molan, Peter Dutton and Andrew Hastie. The majority of the Liberal government comes from the wets, who regard Defence as a bit of a waste with the sole redeeming feature of creating jobs. To the ordinary bloke on the street, the famous pub test, it isn’t a factor. They don’t know what tanks we have or why we have them. Most don’t care.

Hard realism would have made cognizance of the logistic totality from a to b in the procurement rational of M1 tanks. The Howard government plainly intended for the Australian army to have an expeditionary battalion of heavy armor that could be employed outside Australia. Who was going to lift and carry it? Where? Why? These are questions the "stay at homes" would and should have asked. I think they did ask those questions. Those questions have never been answered. The "wets" have a practical point, even if all they ask the other side; "Why do we have a tank battalion; if we cannot move it to where we want it?" The answer of "So we can show up." in light of the reasoning of "punching above our weight" is kind of fantastic without strategic transport. The Australian army is going to the Middle East? A Red Horse battalion of airfield engineers might make sense in a show the flag exercise in such combined allied operations. It would make as many jobs in Australia and is actually militarily useful in any conceivable context for both sides of the political argument. And the ally would see it as being extremely helpful, too. More on practicality and common sense in a moment.

Dec 28, 2021 10:30:07 GMT simon darkshade said:

Defence is culturally and politically back from the pack in terms of power and status. After the PM comes the Treasurer, then Health, Deputy PM/the Nationals, Foreign Affairs and probably Industrial Relations. Dutton is nominally ranked higher not because of his portfolio, but because he is Leader of the House, a big beast and leader of the Liberal Right, having lead the charge that took down Turnbull in 2018. Defence has cropped up in the news a bit more because of China throwing their weight around, but a lot of people are fundamentally mystified by the whole business.

Ahhh. Social security, servicing the debt, paying off the health insurance and drug companies, taking care of Silicon Valley, buying off the labor unions, and the ideological intelligentsia, "rebuilding the infrastructure" (jobs programs) and so forth in the American context is why we have our own problems. Defense has not received any attention either. At least the polity has perked up ears and asked; "Why are the PRC running Port Los Angeles? Why are they running the Panama Canal?" Why cannot I buy what I want?" This awareness happened because our shelves were somewhat empty this Christmas and a lot of Americans were introduced to logistics in a manner they could understand as the denied end-user of a supply chain. Turkeys that cost $100.00 dollars made an impression as well as no videogames, no fresh produce and other items. The political fall-out has been hilarious. To blame it all on our current real-life version of Elmer Fudd is far too simplistic. And yes; many people are mystified. Why build submarines HERE when I cannot get fresh tomatoes and my turkey costs as much as a microwave oven?

Then one explains that if a foreign nation controls your overseas supply chains, and infrastructure, then you have to build submarines to choke them in return as well as take other actions (See the Ukraine thread where I discuss Mearsheimer's thesis, about pawn sacrifice to bring Putin onside to choke the Silk Road project, *See map.). Tit for tat.

Dec 28, 2021 10:30:07 GMT simon darkshade said:

The Attack programme was a product of 2016 and only continued on for this long as it wasn’t that important. Hopefully that might change, but I won’t hold my breath.

That program is dead. AUKUS may go the same route, but I would lay odds that Xi Ping is as stupid as his belligerent actions represent him. So AUKUS may just lurch ahead.

Dec 28, 2021 10:30:07 GMT simon darkshade said:

In the second instance, of the Coral Sea, you take one event/circumstance and twist it to serve your point. Now, it is true that there are annual marches, but no one notices or speaks of it, besides colour articles in most newspapers (all of which are declining). It gets covered in the national paper of note, The Australian, but that isn’t widely read by the average bloke on the street. There are perhaps 5 national journalists in Australia who regularly write about defence and security, and only Greg Sheridan in The Oz makes a fuss about the Coral Sea…and he’s a pro-Japanese alliance fellow who advocated the Jap subs. It has nothing to do with residual hatred of Japan. Heck, even the old veterans who I knew no longer had any hatred for the Japs when I was last able to talk with them.

Coral Sea may be as effervescent as Lexington and Concord or Gallipoli, but there is still residual memory.



The civil service never forgets ancient enmities.

Dec 28, 2021 10:30:07 GMT simon darkshade said:

For the argument that Japan got knocked out of contention because of memories of the war, this example doesn’t work. The premise does not support the conclusion.

The comedy of it is that while one might suggest so, reality is that as in the case of Britain and France (See video.), there is a certain residual negative feeling about buying one's defense from an "enemy". The naval example I will use, and it is comedic, is the Type 42 frigate. The ASTER SAM missile and its associated radars had to be Britishfied to a extended boost version, because the French MN were not going to tell the British RN how to arm "their British frigate".

Dec 28, 2021 10:30:07 GMT simon darkshade said:

As for the last point on costing, I disagree with nothing that you say. The Port River isn’t that deep outside of the main channel and the ASC yard is fairly small - have a look on Google Earth, where there is a ship alongside for scale. I haven’t been there for many years; last time would have been 1996, when there was no security I remembered. As an interesting coda, my mother translated a lot of the material from Kockums back in the day and a young Simon was assigned the duty of typing it up on the whizzbang Microsoft Works on the IBM PS2.

Amazing. Wish I had you as a primary source when I was researching what went wrong with the Collins program. 

[lordroel]

So while Australia is waiting for the Collins-class replacements wich are going to be nuclear, they might buy second-hand Japanese boats as they could rapidly expand Australia’s submarine force as a temporary solution.

Australia may have a way of very cheaply and quickly expanding its submarine force, improving its defences this decade and preparing for its planned nuclear-powered boats.

We might do this by buying good second-hand submarines from Japan. The possibility would present some problems and could in fact be unworkable, but it offers such great potential advantages that we must look hard at whether it could be achieved.

It should not be summarily dismissed as unconventional and managerially complicated.

Australia’s first nuclear submarine won’t be ready until about 2040 if it’s built in Adelaide. By importing nuclear boats, that might be brought forward to 2031 or even 2030. But that would still leave the submarine force at its current, inadequate level in the 2020s, which are looking increasingly dangerous.

We’ll also have the challenge of generating crews for the nuclear submarines, whenever they appear. The more submarines in service, even if they are diesel powered, the easier it will be to create crews.

One proposal that would address the training problem has been to buy new diesel submarines as stopgaps, ideally using a design based on the current Collins class.

This solution has three serious drawbacks. Even Collins derivatives probably couldn’t be delivered until the 2030s. Construction would be expensive and, for a small batch, highly uneconomical. And Australia would end up stuck with new submarines with a form of propulsion that it already regards as inadequate for the long term.

Second-hand Japanese submarines, by contrast, might be acquired very quickly and cheaply, and, having perhaps seven years of life left in them, wouldn’t hang around as doubtful assets into the 2060s.

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force takes delivery of one submarine a year. For any other navy, that would imply a fleet of about 30 boats, since a submarine can typically serve for something like 30 years. But the force is not funded to operate so many and instead retires them early.

Until a few years ago, the fleet comprised 18 submarines. The number is now 23 and soon due to rise to 24, including two training boats.

The submarines we might lay our hands on are contemporaries of the Collins class, the Oyashio class, commissioned between 1998 and 2008.

Their surface displacement is 2,800 tonnes, compared with 3,100 tonnes for the Collins class. Their endurance and range are probably adequate for Australian missions. Their silencing and sensor performance are unlikely to be second-rate, but their crew size is largish at 70.

Oyashios in Australian service would be used closer to home than the long-range Collins class. They could cover the archipelagic straits of the approaches to our continent and help deal with targets that got through. All Collins boats would then be available for more distant missions.

Japan has already demoted the two oldest Oyashios to training roles, modifying them accordingly. Nine more remain in frontline service, still with full combat capability and each seemingly destined for retirement at age 23.

These include seven confirmed in 2018 as refitted to give them longer lives than originally planned and to bring them to almost the technology standard of the later Soryu class, itself once a candidate to replace the Collins boats. The other two front-line Oyashios have presumably been similarly refitted since then.

Since Japan’s submarine fleet still needs to expand by one, we should assume the country won’t decommission an Oyashio in 2022 as it takes delivery of a new vessel. Instead, the oldest frontline boat of the class, the Uzushio, may become available in 2023.

Australia could ask Japan for the Uzushio and the other eight frontline Oyashios as they leave service at yearly intervals. The purchase price shouldn’t be much above scrap value.

Japan would be delighted by the closer defence relationship, and it would get business in supporting the vessels.

Many countries operate high-quality second-hand warships, often bought from the US or UK. Australia has done so many times, and it has lately sold two capable upgraded frigates to Chile.

The Australian collection of Oyashio-class boats would reach seven in 2029 and remain at that level until 2031, assuming, roughly, that their age limit is 30. After that period, the number would decline by one a year—conveniently in step with a feasible schedule for arrival of imported nuclear boats. One in, one out.

Notice that with this proposal Australia could have 13 diesel submarines in service 25 years earlier than it was planning to have 12 under the cancelled Attack-class contract.

Mission availability of second-hand Oyashios might be better than that of the Collins class, because they would never go into the two-year major refits the Collins boats will undertake.

Supporting a completely unique class of vessels might look like an unattractive proposition, but it wouldn’t be impossible: the Collins-class boats are similarly full of systems and weapons not found elsewhere in the navy.

The support problem could be enormously reduced by relying as far as possible on Japan’s mature maintenance establishment for these submarines. Whenever necessary, they would be sent back to Japan for work. Keeping them in the hands of engineers and technicians who have long familiarity with them would greatly improve our confidence in prolonged operation.

Doing so should also be highly economical. Australia wouldn’t pay for plant and training to create elaborate domestic support infrastructure. For minor maintenance, Japanese shipbuilders and system suppliers could help by stationing people in Australia.

Japan would surely be a reliable partner for Australia in this. The two countries have the same strategic problem: China.

The big unknown in this proposal is how hard it would be to keep the Japanese submarines serving beyond 23 years.

Their physical condition upon retirement from the Japanese navy shouldn’t be a problem. Consider the Japanese reputation for excellent production and maintenance of physical articles. In 2016 then-ambassador Sumio Kusaka wrote that, by applying the Japanese maintenance routine, Australia could operate Soryu-class submarines for ‘a long period of time’.

Still, the Oyashios’ current maintenance timetable is presumably phased so that each submarine is due for more work at the point of retirement. Each boat might therefore need a routine refit before commissioning into the Royal Australian Navy.

The potential showstopper is whether old electronics and software could be supported to age 30. That would depend in part on the depth of the modernisation the boats have had. Problems in this respect might be addressed with a little more updating, the cost of which should still make these submarines a bargain.

To get started with operations, we could ask Japan to lend a complete crew. Needing adequate English, these people would train Australians and gradually go home as the locals became familiar with how to operate the boats. Since the Japanese navy has so many submarines, it should be able to conjure up one more crew without too much difficulty.

Manuals would have to be translated to English, but display text of electronic systems would not, since such fiddling would be an unnecessary complication.

The idea of Australian sailors looking at, for example, combat-system menus written in Japanese may seem challenging, but members of armed services all over the world have to learn enough English to operate imported equipment. There’s no reason why Australian sailors shouldn’t be able to learn a little Japanese.

With Oyashios arriving annually from 2023, time available for training would be short. But the delivery timeframe is so attractively quick that slowish achievement of operational capability would be acceptable.

The government should urgently examine this possibility. And it should insist that the navy and Department of Defence look not just for problems in operating second-hand Japanese submarines but also for solutions.

[miletus12]

Edit.

Jan 1, 2022 20:24:56 GMT lordroel said:

So while Australia is waiting for the Collins-class replacements wich are going to be nuclear, they might buy second-hand Japanese boats as they could rapidly expand Australia’s submarine force as a temporary solution.

Upholder disaster.

Australia may have a way of very cheaply and quickly expanding its submarine force, improving its defences this decade and preparing for its planned nuclear-powered boats.

One would like to be cautious about buying "used submarines".

We might do this by buying good second-hand submarines from Japan. The possibility would present some problems and could in fact be unworkable, but it offers such great potential advantages that we must look hard at whether it could be achieved.

I have commented on life cycle wear and tear of submarines measured in numbers of dives and stress on the hulls.

It should not be summarily dismissed as unconventional and managerially complicated.

It is managerially complicated.

Australia’s first nuclear submarine won’t be ready until about 2040 if it’s built in Adelaide. By importing nuclear boats, that might be brought forward to 2031 or even 2030. But that would still leave the submarine force at its current, inadequate level in the 2020s, which are looking increasingly dangerous.

This would be the state of affairs if the ATTACK program was on time and on budget. The planning date for war is 203o BTW.

We’ll also have the challenge of generating crews for the nuclear submarines, whenever they appear. The more submarines in service, even if they are diesel powered, the easier it will be to create crews.

No data, but 12 Astutes with blue/gold crews and 10% padding = 7,000 men. Twice the current Collins force + 1,000 men.

One proposal that would address the training problem has been to buy new diesel submarines as stopgaps, ideally using a design based on the current Collins class.

It was an "evolved" Collins class.

This solution has three serious drawbacks. Even Collins derivatives probably couldn’t be delivered until the 2030s. Construction would be expensive and, for a small batch, highly uneconomical. And Australia would end up stuck with new submarines with a form of propulsion that it already regards as inadequate for the long term.

True.

Second-hand Japanese submarines, by contrast, might be acquired very quickly and cheaply, and, having perhaps seven years of life left in them, wouldn’t hang around as doubtful assets into the 2060s.

300 dives? I would not bet my life on it. The JMSDF trains hard and patrols hard.

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force takes delivery of one submarine a year. For any other navy, that would imply a fleet of about 30 boats, since a submarine can typically serve for something like 30 years. But the force is not funded to operate so many and instead retires them early.

The Japanese replacement schedules is 1/3 , 1/3 , 1/3. it actually is a holdover from IJN practice. The one a year is in rough six year increments. So squadrons are supposed to be cycled for 18 years service and roughly 550-700 dive cycles with a 300 dive cushion on the estimated 1,000 dives in a boat. One can push the safety margins if one is Canada or Indonesia or Argentina, but I would not gamble my life on it.

Until a few years ago, the fleet comprised 18 submarines. The number is now 23 and soon due to rise to 24, including two training boats.

More Chinese at sea. Squadrons have grown from 6 boats to 8 boats in the JMSDF.

The submarines we might lay our hands on are contemporaries of the Collins class, the Oyashio class, commissioned between 1998 and 2008.

Arguably fine boats when new. Dimensionally the Oyashio boats might be a bit of a human factors problem. How "big" is your average Australian submariner? The Japanese boats are "tight".

Their surface displacement is 2,800 tonnes, compared with 3,100 tonnes for the Collins class. Their endurance and range are probably adequate for Australian missions. Their silencing and sensor performance are unlikely to be second-rate, but their crew size is largish at 70.

They are evolved Barbels. It is likely that their combat systems will be dated, but their planform and physical plant is superior to what their enemies have now. Hull? Maybe 300 dives per average. Safety margins will be reduced from "new" condition.

Oyashios in Australian service would be used closer to home than the long-range Collins class. They could cover the archipelagic straits of the approaches to our continent and help deal with targets that got through. All Collins boats would then be available for more distant missions.

I have provided maps to show why this will not work.

Japan has already demoted the two oldest Oyashios to training roles, modifying them accordingly. Nine more remain in frontline service, still with full combat capability and each seemingly destined for retirement at age 23.

Not an assumption that fits the actual replacement cycle.

These include seven confirmed in 2018 as refitted to give them longer lives than originally planned and to bring them to almost the technology standard of the later Soryu class, itself once a candidate to replace the Collins boats. The other two front-line Oyashios have presumably been similarly refitted since then.

Same again.

Since Japan’s submarine fleet still needs to expand by one, we should assume the country won’t decommission an Oyashio in 2022 as it takes delivery of a new vessel. Instead, the oldest frontline boat of the class, the Uzushio, may become available in 2023.

This is a situation, where inspection of the prospective boat must be undertaken. As the Canadians discovered, used submarine salesmen and used car salesmen are remarkably similar the world over.

Australia could ask Japan for the Uzushio and the other eight frontline Oyashios as they leave service at yearly intervals. The purchase price shouldn’t be much above scrap value.

Ask the Canadians about that one.

Japan would be delighted by the closer defence relationship, and it would get business in supporting the vessels.

Ask the Canadians or the AMERICANS about that one.

Many countries operate high-quality second-hand warships, often bought from the US or UK. Australia has done so many times, and it has lately sold two capable upgraded frigates to Chile.

A frigate is not a submarine. Submarines are critical never fail systems in a one-time fail only environment.

The Australian collection of Oyashio-class boats would reach seven in 2029 and remain at that level until 2031, assuming, roughly, that their age limit is 30. After that period, the number would decline by one a year—conveniently in step with a feasible schedule for arrival of imported nuclear boats. One in, one out.

Assumption. The subs would have to nursed along in a LOTE program. Where is the economy in that choice?

Notice that with this proposal Australia could have 13 diesel submarines in service 25 years earlier than it was planning to have 12 under the cancelled Attack-class contract.

By my mathematics it is actually 9 boats.

Mission availability of second-hand Oyashios might be better than that of the Collins class, because they would never go into the two-year major refits the Collins boats will undertake.

Why not?

Supporting a completely unique class of vessels might look like an unattractive proposition, but it wouldn’t be impossible: the Collins-class boats are similarly full of systems and weapons not found elsewhere in the navy.

But they are found in the American navy and thus a vendor with a stockpile of spares is available a telex away.

The support problem could be enormously reduced by relying as far as possible on Japan’s mature maintenance establishment for these submarines. Whenever necessary, they would be sent back to Japan for work. Keeping them in the hands of engineers and technicians who have long familiarity with them would greatly improve our confidence in prolonged operation.

Ask the Canadians about that notion.

Doing so should also be highly economical. Australia wouldn’t pay for plant and training to create elaborate domestic support infrastructure. For minor maintenance, Japanese shipbuilders and system suppliers could help by stationing people in Australia.

Australia is about to embark upon nuclear submarines. Australia would pay for plant and training to create elaborate domestic support infrastructure.

Japan would surely be a reliable partner for Australia in this. The two countries have the same strategic problem: China.

Why turn to AUKUS? Why not short circuit the second-hand boat problem and buy new boats from Japan?

The big unknown in this proposal is how hard it would be to keep the Japanese submarines serving beyond 23 years.

If one does not know the answer to that question, (Ask the Canadians.), then one should not be buying or building submarines. The RAN professionals can run the numbers and calculate to within 10%.

Their physical condition upon retirement from the Japanese navy shouldn’t be a problem. Consider the Japanese reputation for excellent production and maintenance of physical articles. In 2016 then-ambassador Sumio Kusaka wrote that, by applying the Japanese maintenance routine, Australia could operate Soryu-class submarines for ‘a long period of time’.

Pessimism. With submarines and submariners, the glass is half empty. I have an interview published on this forum with the captain of the I-58 about the sinking of the USS Indianapolis. Hashimoto was a "used sub salesman" who tried to con his interrogators. He almost got away with it.

Still, the Oyashios’ current maintenance timetable is presumably phased so that each submarine is due for more work at the point of retirement. Each boat might therefore need a routine refit before commissioning into the Royal Australian Navy.

Upholders. Canadians. Complete refit and validation, cubic centimeter by centimeter.

The potential showstopper is whether old electronics and software could be supported to age 30. That would depend in part on the depth of the modernisation the boats have had. Problems in this respect might be addressed with a little more updating, the cost of which should still make these submarines a bargain.

Americans.

To get started with operations, we could ask Japan to lend a complete crew. Needing adequate English, these people would train Australians and gradually go home as the locals became familiar with how to operate the boats. Since the Japanese navy has so many submarines, it should be able to conjure up one more crew without too much difficulty.

They already know English.

Manuals would have to be translated to English, but display text of electronic systems would not, since such fiddling would be an unnecessary complication.

Who wrote this article? Schematics have to be in the language of the usage.

The idea of Australian sailors looking at, for example, combat-system menus written in Japanese may seem challenging, but members of armed services all over the world have to learn enough English to operate imported equipment. There’s no reason why Australian sailors shouldn’t be able to learn a little Japanese.

Same again. Ask the Americans who operated a Swedish submarine for a decade.

With Oyashios arriving annually from 2023, time available for training would be short. But the delivery timeframe is so attractively quick that slowish achievement of operational capability would be acceptable.

Same again. Ask the Americans who operated a Swedish submarine for a decade.

The government should urgently examine this possibility. And it should insist that the navy and Department of Defence look not just for problems in operating second-hand Japanese submarines but also for solutions.

Airpower Australia level of cognizance. This option was probably considered and rejected.

[stevep]

Jan 1, 2022 20:24:56 GMT lordroel said:

So while Australia is waiting for the Collins-class replacements wich are going to be nuclear, they might buy second-hand Japanese boats as they could rapidly expand Australia’s submarine force as a temporary solution.

Australia may have a way of very cheaply and quickly expanding its submarine force, improving its defences this decade and preparing for its planned nuclear-powered boats.

We might do this by buying good second-hand submarines from Japan. The possibility would present some problems and could in fact be unworkable, but it offers such great potential advantages that we must look hard at whether it could be achieved.

It should not be summarily dismissed as unconventional and managerially complicated.

Australia’s first nuclear submarine won’t be ready until about 2040 if it’s built in Adelaide. By importing nuclear boats, that might be brought forward to 2031 or even 2030. But that would still leave the submarine force at its current, inadequate level in the 2020s, which are looking increasingly dangerous.

We’ll also have the challenge of generating crews for the nuclear submarines, whenever they appear. The more submarines in service, even if they are diesel powered, the easier it will be to create crews.

One proposal that would address the training problem has been to buy new diesel submarines as stopgaps, ideally using a design based on the current Collins class.

This solution has three serious drawbacks. Even Collins derivatives probably couldn’t be delivered until the 2030s. Construction would be expensive and, for a small batch, highly uneconomical. And Australia would end up stuck with new submarines with a form of propulsion that it already regards as inadequate for the long term.

Second-hand Japanese submarines, by contrast, might be acquired very quickly and cheaply, and, having perhaps seven years of life left in them, wouldn’t hang around as doubtful assets into the 2060s.

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force takes delivery of one submarine a year. For any other navy, that would imply a fleet of about 30 boats, since a submarine can typically serve for something like 30 years. But the force is not funded to operate so many and instead retires them early.

Until a few years ago, the fleet comprised 18 submarines. The number is now 23 and soon due to rise to 24, including two training boats.

The submarines we might lay our hands on are contemporaries of the Collins class, the Oyashio class, commissioned between 1998 and 2008.

Their surface displacement is 2,800 tonnes, compared with 3,100 tonnes for the Collins class. Their endurance and range are probably adequate for Australian missions. Their silencing and sensor performance are unlikely to be second-rate, but their crew size is largish at 70.

Oyashios in Australian service would be used closer to home than the long-range Collins class. They could cover the archipelagic straits of the approaches to our continent and help deal with targets that got through. All Collins boats would then be available for more distant missions.

Japan has already demoted the two oldest Oyashios to training roles, modifying them accordingly. Nine more remain in frontline service, still with full combat capability and each seemingly destined for retirement at age 23.

These include seven confirmed in 2018 as refitted to give them longer lives than originally planned and to bring them to almost the technology standard of the later Soryu class, itself once a candidate to replace the Collins boats. The other two front-line Oyashios have presumably been similarly refitted since then.

Since Japan’s submarine fleet still needs to expand by one, we should assume the country won’t decommission an Oyashio in 2022 as it takes delivery of a new vessel. Instead, the oldest frontline boat of the class, the Uzushio, may become available in 2023.

Australia could ask Japan for the Uzushio and the other eight frontline Oyashios as they leave service at yearly intervals. The purchase price shouldn’t be much above scrap value.

Japan would be delighted by the closer defence relationship, and it would get business in supporting the vessels.

Many countries operate high-quality second-hand warships, often bought from the US or UK. Australia has done so many times, and it has lately sold two capable upgraded frigates to Chile.

The Australian collection of Oyashio-class boats would reach seven in 2029 and remain at that level until 2031, assuming, roughly, that their age limit is 30. After that period, the number would decline by one a year—conveniently in step with a feasible schedule for arrival of imported nuclear boats. One in, one out.

Notice that with this proposal Australia could have 13 diesel submarines in service 25 years earlier than it was planning to have 12 under the cancelled Attack-class contract.

Mission availability of second-hand Oyashios might be better than that of the Collins class, because they would never go into the two-year major refits the Collins boats will undertake.

Supporting a completely unique class of vessels might look like an unattractive proposition, but it wouldn’t be impossible: the Collins-class boats are similarly full of systems and weapons not found elsewhere in the navy.

The support problem could be enormously reduced by relying as far as possible on Japan’s mature maintenance establishment for these submarines. Whenever necessary, they would be sent back to Japan for work. Keeping them in the hands of engineers and technicians who have long familiarity with them would greatly improve our confidence in prolonged operation.

Doing so should also be highly economical. Australia wouldn’t pay for plant and training to create elaborate domestic support infrastructure. For minor maintenance, Japanese shipbuilders and system suppliers could help by stationing people in Australia.

Japan would surely be a reliable partner for Australia in this. The two countries have the same strategic problem: China.

The big unknown in this proposal is how hard it would be to keep the Japanese submarines serving beyond 23 years.

Their physical condition upon retirement from the Japanese navy shouldn’t be a problem. Consider the Japanese reputation for excellent production and maintenance of physical articles. In 2016 then-ambassador Sumio Kusaka wrote that, by applying the Japanese maintenance routine, Australia could operate Soryu-class submarines for ‘a long period of time’.

Still, the Oyashios’ current maintenance timetable is presumably phased so that each submarine is due for more work at the point of retirement. Each boat might therefore need a routine refit before commissioning into the Royal Australian Navy.

The potential showstopper is whether old electronics and software could be supported to age 30. That would depend in part on the depth of the modernisation the boats have had. Problems in this respect might be addressed with a little more updating, the cost of which should still make these submarines a bargain.

To get started with operations, we could ask Japan to lend a complete crew. Needing adequate English, these people would train Australians and gradually go home as the locals became familiar with how to operate the boats. Since the Japanese navy has so many submarines, it should be able to conjure up one more crew without too much difficulty.

Manuals would have to be translated to English, but display text of electronic systems would not, since such fiddling would be an unnecessary complication.

The idea of Australian sailors looking at, for example, combat-system menus written in Japanese may seem challenging, but members of armed services all over the world have to learn enough English to operate imported equipment. There’s no reason why Australian sailors shouldn’t be able to learn a little Japanese.

With Oyashios arriving annually from 2023, time available for training would be short. But the delivery timeframe is so attractively quick that slowish achievement of operational capability would be acceptable.

The government should urgently examine this possibility. And it should insist that the navy and Department of Defence look not just for problems in operating second-hand Japanese submarines but also for solutions.

  lordroel,

  Given the use of the we I assume that was a quote from someone in the Australian military or government or possibly press?  Unless your suddenly changed nationality or been hired by Australia to sort out their naval needs.

  I'm not sure that learning Japanese would be that easy, at least for symbols on systems as doesn't it like Chinese have thousands of characters so might think there are problems in misunderstanding text that in a submarine could be potentially dangerous.  Plus there might be problems with aging and foreign equipment but definitely an interesting idea.  It would offend Beijing even more but then pretty much everybody are on their hate list at the moment anyway.

  Steve

[lordroel]

Jan 2, 2022 11:39:02 GMT stevep said:

Jan 1, 2022 20:24:56 GMT lordroel said:

So while Australia is waiting for the Collins-class replacements wich are going to be nuclear, they might buy second-hand Japanese boats as they could rapidly expand Australia’s submarine force as a temporary solution.

Australia may have a way of very cheaply and quickly expanding its submarine force, improving its defences this decade and preparing for its planned nuclear-powered boats.

We might do this by buying good second-hand submarines from Japan. The possibility would present some problems and could in fact be unworkable, but it offers such great potential advantages that we must look hard at whether it could be achieved.

It should not be summarily dismissed as unconventional and managerially complicated.

Australia’s first nuclear submarine won’t be ready until about 2040 if it’s built in Adelaide. By importing nuclear boats, that might be brought forward to 2031 or even 2030. But that would still leave the submarine force at its current, inadequate level in the 2020s, which are looking increasingly dangerous.

We’ll also have the challenge of generating crews for the nuclear submarines, whenever they appear. The more submarines in service, even if they are diesel powered, the easier it will be to create crews.

One proposal that would address the training problem has been to buy new diesel submarines as stopgaps, ideally using a design based on the current Collins class.

This solution has three serious drawbacks. Even Collins derivatives probably couldn’t be delivered until the 2030s. Construction would be expensive and, for a small batch, highly uneconomical. And Australia would end up stuck with new submarines with a form of propulsion that it already regards as inadequate for the long term.

Second-hand Japanese submarines, by contrast, might be acquired very quickly and cheaply, and, having perhaps seven years of life left in them, wouldn’t hang around as doubtful assets into the 2060s.

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force takes delivery of one submarine a year. For any other navy, that would imply a fleet of about 30 boats, since a submarine can typically serve for something like 30 years. But the force is not funded to operate so many and instead retires them early.

Until a few years ago, the fleet comprised 18 submarines. The number is now 23 and soon due to rise to 24, including two training boats.

The submarines we might lay our hands on are contemporaries of the Collins class, the Oyashio class, commissioned between 1998 and 2008.

Their surface displacement is 2,800 tonnes, compared with 3,100 tonnes for the Collins class. Their endurance and range are probably adequate for Australian missions. Their silencing and sensor performance are unlikely to be second-rate, but their crew size is largish at 70.

Oyashios in Australian service would be used closer to home than the long-range Collins class. They could cover the archipelagic straits of the approaches to our continent and help deal with targets that got through. All Collins boats would then be available for more distant missions.

Japan has already demoted the two oldest Oyashios to training roles, modifying them accordingly. Nine more remain in frontline service, still with full combat capability and each seemingly destined for retirement at age 23.

These include seven confirmed in 2018 as refitted to give them longer lives than originally planned and to bring them to almost the technology standard of the later Soryu class, itself once a candidate to replace the Collins boats. The other two front-line Oyashios have presumably been similarly refitted since then.

Since Japan’s submarine fleet still needs to expand by one, we should assume the country won’t decommission an Oyashio in 2022 as it takes delivery of a new vessel. Instead, the oldest frontline boat of the class, the Uzushio, may become available in 2023.

Australia could ask Japan for the Uzushio and the other eight frontline Oyashios as they leave service at yearly intervals. The purchase price shouldn’t be much above scrap value.

Japan would be delighted by the closer defence relationship, and it would get business in supporting the vessels.

Many countries operate high-quality second-hand warships, often bought from the US or UK. Australia has done so many times, and it has lately sold two capable upgraded frigates to Chile.

The Australian collection of Oyashio-class boats would reach seven in 2029 and remain at that level until 2031, assuming, roughly, that their age limit is 30. After that period, the number would decline by one a year—conveniently in step with a feasible schedule for arrival of imported nuclear boats. One in, one out.

Notice that with this proposal Australia could have 13 diesel submarines in service 25 years earlier than it was planning to have 12 under the cancelled Attack-class contract.

Mission availability of second-hand Oyashios might be better than that of the Collins class, because they would never go into the two-year major refits the Collins boats will undertake.

Supporting a completely unique class of vessels might look like an unattractive proposition, but it wouldn’t be impossible: the Collins-class boats are similarly full of systems and weapons not found elsewhere in the navy.

The support problem could be enormously reduced by relying as far as possible on Japan’s mature maintenance establishment for these submarines. Whenever necessary, they would be sent back to Japan for work. Keeping them in the hands of engineers and technicians who have long familiarity with them would greatly improve our confidence in prolonged operation.

Doing so should also be highly economical. Australia wouldn’t pay for plant and training to create elaborate domestic support infrastructure. For minor maintenance, Japanese shipbuilders and system suppliers could help by stationing people in Australia.

Japan would surely be a reliable partner for Australia in this. The two countries have the same strategic problem: China.

The big unknown in this proposal is how hard it would be to keep the Japanese submarines serving beyond 23 years.

Their physical condition upon retirement from the Japanese navy shouldn’t be a problem. Consider the Japanese reputation for excellent production and maintenance of physical articles. In 2016 then-ambassador Sumio Kusaka wrote that, by applying the Japanese maintenance routine, Australia could operate Soryu-class submarines for ‘a long period of time’.

Still, the Oyashios’ current maintenance timetable is presumably phased so that each submarine is due for more work at the point of retirement. Each boat might therefore need a routine refit before commissioning into the Royal Australian Navy.

The potential showstopper is whether old electronics and software could be supported to age 30. That would depend in part on the depth of the modernisation the boats have had. Problems in this respect might be addressed with a little more updating, the cost of which should still make these submarines a bargain.

To get started with operations, we could ask Japan to lend a complete crew. Needing adequate English, these people would train Australians and gradually go home as the locals became familiar with how to operate the boats. Since the Japanese navy has so many submarines, it should be able to conjure up one more crew without too much difficulty.

Manuals would have to be translated to English, but display text of electronic systems would not, since such fiddling would be an unnecessary complication.

The idea of Australian sailors looking at, for example, combat-system menus written in Japanese may seem challenging, but members of armed services all over the world have to learn enough English to operate imported equipment. There’s no reason why Australian sailors shouldn’t be able to learn a little Japanese.

With Oyashios arriving annually from 2023, time available for training would be short. But the delivery timeframe is so attractively quick that slowish achievement of operational capability would be acceptable.

The government should urgently examine this possibility. And it should insist that the navy and Department of Defence look not just for problems in operating second-hand Japanese submarines but also for solutions.

  lordroel,

  Given the use of the we I assume that was a quote from someone in the Australian military or government or possibly press?  Unless your suddenly changed nationality or been hired by Australia to sort out their naval needs.

  I'm not sure that learning Japanese would be that easy, at least for symbols on systems as doesn't it like Chinese have thousands of characters so might think there are problems in misunderstanding text that in a submarine could be potentially dangerous.  Plus there might be problems with aging and foreign equipment but definitely an interesting idea.  It would offend Beijing even more but then pretty much everybody are on their hate list at the moment anyway.

  Steve

You are right stevep, the WE should be Australia.

[miletus12]

Jan 2, 2022 11:39:02 GMT stevep said:

I'm not sure that learning Japanese would be that easy, at least for symbols on systems as doesn't it like Chinese have thousands of characters so might think there are problems in misunderstanding text that in a submarine could be potentially dangerous. 

The Japanese had to write their own software and schematics. In some cases they use Kanji which makes it even more dangerous, since the ideographs and alphabetic corresponding words are not exactly the same. 舵 and "kaji" both supposedly mean rudder, but 舵制御 does not mean "steer control". It means more like rudder push.

Plus there might be problems with aging and foreign equipment but definitely an interesting idea.  It would offend Beijing even more but then pretty much everybody are on their hate list at the moment anyway.

The purchase of Astutes will make the politicians in Beijing extremely upset. That would be very bad. Worse than Virginias. The Chinese still think somewhat fondly of the Flying Tigers. I doubt their memories of the British are much less hostile than the Japanese, or the French.

[stevep]

Jan 2, 2022 20:13:12 GMT miletus12 said:

Jan 2, 2022 11:39:02 GMT stevep said:

I'm not sure that learning Japanese would be that easy, at least for symbols on systems as doesn't it like Chinese have thousands of characters so might think there are problems in misunderstanding text that in a submarine could be potentially dangerous. 

The Japanese had to write their own software and schematics. In some cases they use Kanji which makes it even more dangerous, since the ideographs and alphabetic corresponding words are not exactly the same. 舵 and "kaji" both supposedly mean rudder, but 舵制御 does not mean "steer control". It means more like rudder push.

Plus there might be problems with aging and foreign equipment but definitely an interesting idea.  It would offend Beijing even more but then pretty much everybody are on their hate list at the moment anyway.

The purchase of Astutes will make the politicians in Beijing extremely upset. That would be very bad. Worse than Virginias. The Chinese still think somewhat fondly of the Flying Tigers. I doubt their memories of the British are much less hostile than the Japanese, or the French.

  That would depend on their propaganda aims.  It was Britain that protected China from partition for much of the 19thC.  More recently the US was the power that supporter the KMT and has protected Taiwan and is the power that China has to overcome to become the desired top dog.