Australia's Collins-class replacements

[miletus12]

Jan 3, 2022 15:56:09 GMT stevep said:

That would depend on their propaganda aims.  It was Britain that protected China from partition for much of the 19thC.  More recently the US was the power that supporter the KMT and has protected Taiwan and is the power that China has to overcome to become the desired top dog.

Actually, I agree, but I was thinking of the "Century of Shame"

The Chinese really have a mad on about that one. Not just the PRC, either.

[miletus12]

This is countered...



That is more than about submarines? When one talks information warfare, that means attacks on command, control, communications and information collection. IOW, AUKUS is about disrupting Chinese *(and Russian) operations through the global communications systems.

Incidentally, PM Morrison has a big mouth. One should not have revealed an Indian Ocean sonar tracking network to the PLAN.

[stevep]

Jan 4, 2022 6:29:27 GMT miletus12 said:

This is countered...



That is more than about submarines? When one talks information warfare, that means attacks on command, control, communications and information collection. IOW, AUKUS is about disrupting Chinese *(and Russian) operations through the global communications systems.

Incidentally, PM Morrison has a big mouth. One should not have revealed an Indian Ocean sonar tracking network to the PLAN.

  Watching the 1st one - most of it anyway - it does seem that things are falling apart quickly.  Both an apparent lack of interest in the US in the programme and chaotic and irresponsible statements in Australia. 

  The 2nd video isn't loading for me but even if he thinks the Chinese already know about he I would agree that its bloody stupid to reveal such details.  Edit - it worked on a 2nd attempt.  Most of those two minutes were waffle.  The only bit I noticed he mentioned that might have hinted about such a capacity was a line about "joint undersea capability" when he was talking about information gathering and exchange.  Was that what you meant?

[lordroel]

Okay can we bring this thread back to the topic and if anybody want to contusion this discussion, the The AUKUS alliance ore the The Australia thread are the place to put it in.

[miletus12]

Jan 4, 2022 12:42:28 GMT stevep said:

Jan 4, 2022 6:29:27 GMT miletus12 said:

This is countered...



That is more than about submarines? When one talks information warfare, that means attacks on command, control, communications and information collection. IOW, AUKUS is about disrupting Chinese *(and Russian) operations through the global communications systems.

Incidentally, PM Morrison has a big mouth. One should not have revealed an Indian Ocean sonar tracking network to the PLAN.

  Watching the 1st one - most of it anyway - it does seem that things are falling apart quickly.  Both an apparent lack of interest in the US in the programme and chaotic and irresponsible statements in Australia. 

  The 2nd video isn't loading for me but even if he thinks the Chinese already know about he I would agree that its bloody stupid to reveal such details.  Edit - it worked on a 2nd attempt.  Most of those two minutes were waffle.  The only bit I noticed he mentioned that might have hinted about such a capacity was a line about "joint undersea capability" when he was talking about information gathering and exchange.  Was that what you meant?

1. I am not on the ground in Australia, so I cannot speak to the specific politics and personalities behind the Australian side of the issue. From this remote distance, Labor party politicians seem to be for "building" the boats in Adelaide as a mere jobs program as mentioned upthread. Some of them may be clueless about how building the boats is actually a two phase buy of foreign first tranche and domestic second tranche or why the jobs program they want is not going to happen overnight. Or rather they are trying to pin the current government down for the blame, when the next Labor government voted in, decides to cancel the deal because it is too expensive and will never "arrive in time".

2. On the American side, I have more local information. The USN has a vested interest in the program.

Article.

SUMMARY: The goal of the new Australia–U.K.–U.S. (AUKUS) agreement is to develop an Australian nuclear-submarine program. A close ally, such as Australia, that can contribute nuclear submarines is invaluable to the maritime competition with China. Success will depend on all three allies being serious about the AUKUS partnership, and taking equally serious steps to quickly establish an irreversible pathway to an Australian nuclear submarine. If the project falls into the cost-and-delay trap that characterized the trajectory of the French program, it will meet the same end and risk further eroding the ability of the United States and its allies to deter China from further aggression.
KEY TAKEAWAYS

The Australia–U.K.–U.S. (AUKUS) partnership to deliver an Australian nuclear submarine could provide invaluable deterrence against China.But, if not managed well, AUKUS could just as easily become a diplomatic and engineering fiasco, further setting back U.S. and allied interests.The United States should meet certain short-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives to ensure that AUKUS fulfills its mission.

Another article which has slipped notice...

UK nuclear-powered submarine visit to Perth (AUS)

Joint Media Release:

Secretary of State for Defence (UK), The Right Honourable Ben Wallace
A Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarine will conduct a port visit to Perth, demonstrating the strong existing naval partnership between Australia and the United Kingdom.

The Astute class submarine, will go alongside HMAS Stirling in Rockingham, Western Australia on Friday 29 October 2021.

The submarine has been part of the UK Carrier Strike Group deployment to the Indo-Pacific which had recently exercised with a range of Royal Australian Navy units alongside numerous engagements with regional partners.

Her visit to Australia is to provide the crew with a short period of respite. The Ship’s company have conducted a 14-day quarantine period prior to entering Australia and will abide by all COVID-19 restrictions set by the Western Australian Government.

Correct interpretation: "Here you go, mates. Take a look at what we want to sell you."

In context, why the Indian Ocean and other "strategic seas" surveillance system is part of the submarine program.

AUKUS: Why Australia's submarine deal with the US and UK has set off 'a very big alarm' in China

Taiwanese MP Wang Ting-yu - who serves on his parliament's foreign affairs and national defence committee - has told The Australian that Beijing fears the allies aim to block China's navy in shallow seas and prevent it from projecting power into the blue waters of the Pacific.

====================================================

He said the Chinese government believes the AUKUS pact is more of a threat than the Quad alliance between the US, Australia, Japan and India. 'We have information from ­inside China. They regard AUKUS more seriously than the Quad, ­especially the submarine [agreement],' Mr Wang told the newspaper. 'That's a very big alarm to ­Beijing. They're facing historical challenges, or historical co-operation, to choke them inside of their near seas.'

That means: the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy have gone to their army warlords and plutocrat rulers and told them that the denial of access strategy they, the PLAN possess, will not work against a submarine force they cannot fight. The enemy can move into the adjacent seas and prevent blue water sorties by the PLAN.

Jan 4, 2022 15:55:49 GMT lordroel said:

Okay can we bring this thread back to the topic and if anybody want to contusion this discussion, the The AUKUS alliance ore the The Australia thread are the place to put it in.

I agree that grand strategy belongs in that thread. The submarine Australia picks, will depend on what slice of coverage the RAN is allotted in an alliance war. If they buy Astutes, then it is blue water operations. If it is Virginia, it is inshore or brown or shallow seas areas. The submarine, if it is British, is anti-ship and anti-submarine in the Indian Ocean and other deep waters in mission. If it is a Virginia or something like it, the sea denial will be coastal. According to the Taiwanese source, the PLAN is frightened that the Australian choice may be an American designed weapon platform.

As to whether the AUKUS program is in trouble in the US, that depends on how one looks at the news globally. The American president has been adjudged by some of the American ruling elites as a placeholder who may be a one term folly. He is likely going to be replaced in 2024. This may affect the near-term news coverage of the AUKUS deal in America for this reason. In the specific terms of AUKUS, this is, from the American point of view, one piece in a vast political jigsaw puzzle of where the Americans want to go and do with China. Strictly in terms of AUKUS, therefore, one will see that submarine deal drowned out in a lot of "noise" as the Americans debate what their next president and his administration will decide, because this Elmer Fudd is not cutting margarine with a razor knife, he is so incompetent or at least many of the American people think he is. #1

The things to remember and consider are:

a. The Morrison government announced a 90 day review of options with recommendations to be sifted. This means a news blackout of sorts as far as American vendors are concerned.
b. The extant news about AUKUS has been recycled stale information with occasional recent blurbs such as the Taiwan story above. Or the news has been speculations, which I identify as bleating by such personages as Paul Keating in Australia and our idiot secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin, who are subject clueless.
c. Americans specifically involved have largely kept their mouths shut. They either want the program to succeed or they want to sell a submarine. Either way, the best way to jinx the deal is to say something wrong. Better, it is, to say nothing and work quietly.

If that goes for the Americans, it goes TRIPLE for the UK HMG which have their own troubles trying to keep the AUKUS deal afloat.

[miletus12]

AUKUS has a website.

Roadmarker.

Australian Department of Defence press release

The signing of the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (the Agreement) with our AUKUS partners – the United Kingdom and the United States – is another important step in Australia’s pursuit of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

Minister for Defence the Hon Peter Dutton MP said the Agreement will further advance consultations by permitting the United Kingdom and the United States to exchange sensitive and classified naval nuclear propulsion information with a third country for the first time.

Minister Dutton said:

“This Agreement will support Australia in completing the 18 months of intensive and comprehensive examination of the requirements underpinning the delivery of nuclear-powered submarines.

The United Kingdom and the United States will be able to share naval nuclear propulsion information with Australia, which they cannot with any other country, in the determination of the optimal pathway to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for operation by the Royal Australian Navy.

With access to the information this Agreement delivers, coupled with the decades of naval nuclear-powered experience our UK and US partners have, Australia will also be positioned to be responsible and reliable stewards of this technology.”

Biden's role in the AUKUS deal and why it will be a BRITISH submarine that is the hull selected.

Between the lines: The Biden administration was first approached by Australia and the U.K. about AUKUS in February and March, at which point the Australians said they would cancel the diesel submarine deal they'd signed with France in 2016 in favor of gaining nuclear technology and expertise from the U.S. and U.K.

Before agreeing to anything, the Biden administration sought assurances from Australia that its decision to abandon the French contract was a fait accompli and not dependent on U.S. actions, a senior State Department official told Axios.
Even after Australia assured the U.S. that this was the case, Biden expressed concerns about moving forward due to the deal's implications for nuclear nonproliferation — if Australia was permitted to obtain sensitive nuclear propulsion technology, who else could claim an exception?
The Australians told the Americans in June that they had all but told France that they were pulling the plug, both in writing and in direct conversations between Macron and Australia Prime Minister Scott Morrison, according to two sources familiar with the assurances.
The Biden administration decided to move ahead, convinced a budding technology and intelligence-sharing partnership in the Indo-Pacific could play an important role in its 21st century strategy for confronting China.

That may not be true.

By the way, the Morrison government approached the British government first. The British told the Australians that the reactor tech was American and it would heve to be the Americans who supplied it.

[miletus12]

It is a rumor.



The upfront rumor "here" is that the Americans will chop over a nuclear boat to be reflagged with an Australian flag. Why? The Americans are ten boats short themselves and would have to crew the boat until Australians were trained to take it over.

The "defense expert" seems like he thinks the rumor is a joke. I think he might be correct.

[lordroel]

Jan 7, 2022 8:24:33 GMT miletus12 said:

It is a rumor.



The upfront rumor "here" is that the Americans will chop over a nuclear boat to be reflagged with an Australian flag. Why? The Americans are ten boats short themselves and would have to crew the boat until Australians were trained to take it over.

The "defense expert" seems like he thinks the rumor is a joke. I think he might be correct.

Well India does with with Russian boats, so why not Australia.

[miletus12]

Jan 7, 2022 8:27:43 GMT lordroel said:

Jan 7, 2022 8:24:33 GMT miletus12 said:

It is a rumor.



The upfront rumor "here" is that the Americans will chop over a nuclear boat to be reflagged with an Australian flag. Why? The Americans are ten boats short themselves and would have to crew the boat until Australians were trained to take it over.

The "defense expert" seems like he thinks the rumor is a joke. I think he might be correct.

Well India does with with Russian boats, so why not Australia.

There is no technical reason to prevent the attempt. I think it has to be a difference in attitudes, politics and in finances. The Russians were looking for three things when they leased their obsolete Charlie:

a. an ally against China.
b. a "mark" who could be pumped for cash and access to western tech which the Russians sorely needed.
c. a relationship which allowed the Russians to spread political influence and infiltrate a foreign navy with their agents. 

This is not to suggest that these same ideas have not occurred to the Americans, but the blowback; if the con were discovered (It would be discovered.), is too great. The lease option is not going to happen. A purchase would be different. The question is which Los Angeles boat might it be? 

[lordroel]

Jan 7, 2022 8:39:37 GMT miletus12 said:

Jan 7, 2022 8:27:43 GMT lordroel said:

Well India does with with Russian boats, so why not Australia.

There is no technical reason to prevent the attempt. I think it has to be a difference in attitudes, politics and in finances. The Russians were looking for three things when they leased their obsolete Charlie:

a. an ally against China.
b. a "mark" who could be pumped for cash and access to western tech which the Russians sorely needed.
c. a relationship which allowed the Russians to spread political influence and infiltrate a foreign navy with their agents. 

This is not to suggest that these same ideas have not occurred to the Americans, but the blowback; if the con were discovered (It would be discovered.), is too great. The lease option is not going to happen. A purchase would be different. The question is which Los Angeles boat might it be? 

Looking at this list: List of Los Angeles-class submarines

USS Providence and USS Oklahoma City might be good candidates, also both are Flight II with VLS.

[miletus12]

Jan 7, 2022 10:04:51 GMT lordroel said:

Jan 7, 2022 8:39:37 GMT miletus12 said:

There is no technical reason to prevent the attempt. I think it has to be a difference in attitudes, politics and in finances. The Russians were looking for three things when they leased their obsolete Charlie:

a. an ally against China.
b. a "mark" who could be pumped for cash and access to western tech which the Russians sorely needed.
c. a relationship which allowed the Russians to spread political influence and infiltrate a foreign navy with their agents. 

This is not to suggest that these same ideas have not occurred to the Americans, but the blowback; if the con were discovered (It would be discovered.), is too great. The lease option is not going to happen. A purchase would be different. The question is which Los Angeles boat might it be? 

Looking at this list: List of Los Angeles-class submarines

USS Providence and USS Oklahoma City might be good candidates, also both are Flight II with VLS.

37 years and 34 years service, respectively. How many dive cycles are left in those hulls?  

[lordroel]

Jan 7, 2022 10:27:20 GMT miletus12 said:

Jan 7, 2022 10:04:51 GMT lordroel said:

Looking at this list: List of Los Angeles-class submarines

USS Providence and USS Oklahoma City might be good candidates, also both are Flight II with VLS.

37 years and 34 years service, respectively. How many dive cycles are left in those hulls?  

Think we also might to add some years before a Australian crew can manned them as they need to be nuclear trained, the subs might be 40 + years old by then.

[ukron]

I just think it's more likely that the US Navy will decide to welcome Australian Navy officers aboard its submarines (I believe the US Navy and Royal Navy did the same during the Cold War).
And conversely, American-manned "nuclear submarines" could be loaned to Australia (of course with the establishment of a joint command structure).


Roughly speaking, a fusion of the manpower and the material of the two nations, leaving the advantage to Washington in this region of the world and allowing it to "control" an ally sometimes too impetuous (see the deterioration of the relations between Australia and China ).

[miletus12]

Jan 7, 2022 15:18:30 GMT ukron said:

I just think it's more likely that the US Navy will decide to welcome Australian Navy officers aboard its submarines (I believe the US Navy and Royal Navy did the same during the Cold War).
And conversely, American-manned "nuclear submarines" could be loaned to Australia (of course with the establishment of a joint command structure).


Roughly speaking, a fusion of the manpower and the material of the two nations, leaving the advantage to Washington in this region of the world and allowing it to "control" an ally sometimes too impetuous (see the deterioration of the relations between Australia and China ).

The "slot manning" is currently ridealong. It would have to become a full-on Perisher or the Prospective Submariner Courses of the Royal Navy and the USN respectively. I do not know if there are enough school boats and slots to create that first teaching crew for the Australians, yet.

The RAN candidates could be run through USN shore simulators and schools and assigned to a serving boat. One could even jackstaff an Australian ensign on the boat and slap an RANS designation on it. It just depends on what the 18 month pathway review is like.

[miletus12]

Buy American.

www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-the-ran-can-get-eight-nuclear-submarines-by-2038/

First, ditch the notion of building in Adelaide. Construction in Australia is the single factor that cripples Australia’s plan to acquire at least eight nuclear-powered submarines.

It’s the sole reason why delivery of the first boat to the Royal Australian Navy probably can’t occur until around 2040, making the program laughably—or tragically—irrelevant to our increasingly urgent regional security problem.

To build in Adelaide, as the government says we will, facilities there must be prepared and managers and workers must be hired and trained for an exotic new endeavor. Of course, it could all go off the rails and take longer than expected.

Worse, because we can’t begin building early, this plan implies that we’ll add a worrying additional source of risk to the schedule and budget: extensive development work. No submarine class for which deliveries would begin around 2040 can be a design that is now in production.

The only excuse for this madness is the one that supposedly justifies all our naval construction: that we allegedly can’t support naval vessels if we don’t build them. But more than a century of experience of any number of countries, including Australia, shows that that’s not true. Imported ships of off-the-shelf design can be supported locally simply by training maintainers and buying enough spare parts.

No less complex an organism than the entire fleet Australian Defence Force aircraft fleet is supported in that way.

So let’s instead plan for a rapid import program for submarines of the US Virginia class. Most of the industrial and technical challenge then becomes expanding US facilities to meet our requirement. If all went well, US industry might deliver our first nuclear submarine nine years earlier than Adelaide could, with far greater dependability in time and specification and also at lower cost. Even if things slipped by a year or two, we would still be running far ahead of Adelaide time.

The UK, the other partner in our new AUKUS security arrangement, doesn’t feature in this proposed scheme because its smaller submarine industry would be too hard to gear up to build quickly for us.

The US industry, comprising two shipyards and an array of suppliers, is currently able to build two Virginias a year, more or less. It’s also preparing to build ballistic-missile submarines of the forthcoming Columbia class. (I say ‘more or less’ because the industry has in fact been struggling with its workload. More on that soon.)

Australia should simply pay to gear up the US companies to build a third Virginia a year. It so happens that we have an authoritative and fresh quote for the price of doing that: US$1.5–2 billion ($2.1–2.8 billion), according to a Pentagon statement in June.

Considering that we formerly expected to pay at least $50 billion (in 2018 dollars) for 12 large diesel submarines of French design built in Adelaide, that gearing-up cost is manageable.

Anyway, creating an Australian construction establishment would cost more than expanding the current US one. Duplicating existing facilities usually does.

Production costs in the US would also be lower, because the experienced operation there would build at a rate three times higher than could be achieved in Adelaide.

On top of this, our boost to the US building rate would probably cut the unit cost from the current US$3.5 billion per Virginia. A saving of 5% sounds plausible. And the US Navy would get that benefit, too.

There are two complications in gearing up the US industry. One is that, since the companies are already struggling with demand, we would have to expect Washington to firm up the US’s capacity to a genuine two boats a year as we invested for its expansion to three.

Second, there’s a chance that the US will want to increase its own order rate this decade, sometimes adding a third boat a year for itself. That would increase the ramp-up challenge.

But there is nothing impossible about even a very large surge in nuclear submarine construction. It has indeed been done on a far greater scale before. In 1952, the US laid down one nuclear submarine, the first ever. Over the following three years it laid down only two more, but then five in 1956, two in 1957 and 10 in 1958.

Note, too, that we wouldn’t have to gear up the whole production process instantly, because various activities start at various times during the eight years in which a Virginia is built. Making one of these boats begins with orders for certain parts (mostly for the nuclear propulsion plant) two to three years before the main construction effort starts.

So the pacing issue is the notice needed to increase the production rate for those long-lead parts. Considering the speed of earlier ramp-ups, two years’ notice is probably enough.

Australia should immediately propose to pay to expand US capacity for making the long-lead parts.

Receiving submarines quickly is so important that we should do this even before the US agrees to supply Virginias to us at all (and it hasn’t, yet). If for some reason the whole possibility falls through, we will at least have provided the US with useful additional capacity, probably at a cost to us of no more than a few hundred million dollars.

This, then, is the proposed timetable: agree in 2021 to begin gearing up the US industry, commence long-lead production for the first boat in 2023, begin the main construction effort on it in 2025 or 2026, and take delivery in 2031. And we would order an additional Virginia each year, receiving the eighth in 2038.

Weary observers of Australian naval shipbuilding programs will roll their eyes at this, thinking that nothing works so smoothly; they might want to add two years to the schedule. Well, we could add those two years—and we’d still have eight submarines from the US as quickly as Adelaide could give us one.

But I would point out that when I say the US industry has struggled lately to deliver submarines on time, I mean that it has run months late—not years and years late, as we’re used to seeing here.

For even an off-the-shelf import program, a little development work would be needed. The Virginia class has never been an export design, so the US Navy would need to review it and remove features. At least those for handling nuclear weapons would need to come out. But four or five years would be available for this work before general construction of the first boat commenced. That should be plenty when the task is taking out functions, not adding them.

There would be one more time saving, probably worth at least a year. After that first submarine was delivered, it would quickly become operational, because it would just be one more boat in the US’s stream of reliable, ready-to-go Virginias. Also, it would probably have a largely US crew, since Australian sailors would at first be learning how to run it. And we’d use well-oiled US Navy procedures for working up that crew to operational status.

Bradley Perrett is a defense and aerospace journalist. He was based in Beijing from 2004 to 2020. This first appeared in ASPIs the Strategist.

In this article:Astute-Class, AUKUS, Australia, Australia Nuclear Attack Submarines, Submarine, Virginia-class

Anybody want to take a crack at why that idea is dead on arrival and would be immediately rejected?