Japanese - Design B-65 cruiser

[lordroel]

Japanese - Design B-65 cruiser

The Design B-65 was a class of Super Type A cruisers planned by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) before and during World War II. As envisioned by the IJN, the cruisers were to play a key role in the Night Battle Force portion of the "Decisive battle" strategy which Japan hoped, in the event of war, to employ against the United States Navy.

Begun in 1939, plans were far enough along that tests were conducted with the main armament and against the underwater protection. Even though the ships were approved for construction under a 1942 fleet replenishment program, the prioritizing of aircraft carriers and smaller ships due to the war, followed by Japan's defeat, killed any chance of the B-65's construction.

YouTube (B65 class by Drachinifel)



Mission and plan

The Japanese navy's experience in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, especially the Battle of Tsushima, strongly influenced the creation of the IJN's "Decisive Battle" doctrine, which guided the development and deployment of the IJN's battle fleet into World War II. The Decisive Battle concept was the IJN's primary strategy for defeating the navies of the major Western powers, such as Great Britain or the United States, in the event of war. The strategy consisted of four main components: a decisive surface fleet engagement determined by big guns, attrition tactics against a numerically superior enemy, a reliance on quality over quantity in naval weaponry, and the employment of nighttime torpedo attacks.

B-65 in 1944

After the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930, each of which placed restrictions on the size of the IJN's fleet in comparison with the fleets of the western powers, notably the United States, the decisive battle strategy received increased emphasis within the IJN. In 1936, the IJN formed the Night Battle Force (Yasen Butai). As designed, the night battle force was to attack the hypothetical enemy's, usually envisioned by the Japanese to be the US Pacific Fleet, outer defense ring of cruisers and destroyers at night. After cracking the outer defense ring, IJN cruisers and destroyers were to launch torpedo attacks on the enemy's battleships. What remained of the enemy fleet was then to be finished-off by the IJN's main battleship line the following day.

A line drawing of the proposed Design B-65



The IJN assigned one division of fast battleships or battlecruisers to give additional firepower to the nocturnal attacks. The Kongō-class battlecruisers were initially assigned to this role and were upgraded to fast battleships over a seven-year period from 1933-1940. The IJN planned to eventually replace the four Kongō battleships with four heavy, "super" cruisers. As envisioned by the IJN in 1936, these ships, the B-65 cruisers, would mount 12-inch guns, carry armor designed to withstand hits from 8-inch shells, and be capable of speeds up to 40 knots. They would be designated as "super-A-class cruisers" to signify their greater status than the A-class ships (heavy cruisers).



B-65 in 1945

The plan for the cruiser class was finalized as part of the IJN's Circle Five and Circle Six warship construction plans of 7 January 1941. The plan called for six B-65s to be built in two increments, with the first two to be constructed in Circle 5 with the remainder in Circle 6. By this time, Japanese intelligence had learned the specifications for the United States Navy's Alaska-class large cruisers, which had been authorized for creation by the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Act and ordered on 5 September 1940. The Japanese believed that these ships would form part of the American battle fleet's screen in times of war. Thus, the B-65s were now intended to counter the threat posed by the Alaska-class cruisers.

Image I



Image II 



Design

Design work on the B-65s began in 1939. Preliminary plans for the new class were finished by September 1940, and they were far enough along that tests of the lower protection—the armor intended to counter any shell that fell short but still hit the ship (albeit underwater) and torpedoes—and main armament were conducted from 1940 to 1941.

These plans called for ships that bore a striking resemblance to the Yamato-class battleships, with the same "clipper bow, flush-deck construction, and a generally similar superstructure", albeit at a reduced size. Nine 310 mm (12.2 in)/50 caliber guns in three triple turrets, sixteen 100 mm (3.9 in)/65 caliber dual-purpose guns in dual mounts on either side of the superstructure, twelve paired 25 mm (0.98 in) anti-aircraft guns, four 13 mm (0.51 in) machine guns, and eight 610 mm (24 in) torpedo tubes were to be the primary weapons of the cruiser. The weight of the main battery turrets was to be around 1,000 long tons (1,100 short tons; 1,000 t), with 350 long tons (390 short tons; 360 t) of that devoted to armor; however, no plans of how this latter figure was to have been distributed has survived.

B-65 with 36cm guns in 1944

The cruisers were to be protected by 190 mm (7.5 in) belt armor sloped at 20° and 125 mm (4.9 in) deck armor. Four geared turbine sets would have generated about 42,500 shp each; for a total of about 167,674 shp, enough to power the ships through the water at 34 kn (39 mph; 63 km/h), faster than the "fundamental design requirement" of 33 kn (38 mph; 61 km/h).

In an attempt to counter the Alaska-class cruisers' 305 mm (12.0 in) guns, a proposal to increase both the main battery to six 356 mm (14 in) and armor protection to resist against the same was put forth. However, the increase in displacement (to almost 40,000 long tons (45,000 short tons; 41,000 t)) and reduction in performance this entailed meant that nothing came of the proposed changes.



Final plans and cancellation

As war with the United States loomed in 1941, the navy found that it had a more pressing need for aircraft carriers and auxiliary vessels. This need, plus a desire to complete the ongoing Circle Three and Four construction programs, delayed initiation of the Circle Five plan.

Following the Japanese navy's defeat at the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Circle Five plan was significantly revised and Circle Six was postponed indefinitely. The new plan still called for the construction of two ships of Design B-65, which were given the hull numbers 795 and 796 with projected commissioning dates of 1945 and 1946, respectively. As the war progressed, however, strategic requirements further delayed the plans for the two cruisers. In the end, the B-65s' plans were never finalized and no contracts for their construction were ever placed.

[stevep]

Oct 16, 2021 12:14:58 GMT lordroel said:

Japanese - Design B-65 cruiser

The Design B-65 was a class of Super Type A cruisers planned by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) before and during World War II. As envisioned by the IJN, the cruisers were to play a key role in the Night Battle Force portion of the "Decisive battle" strategy which Japan hoped, in the event of war, to employ against the United States Navy.

Begun in 1939, plans were far enough along that tests were conducted with the main armament and against the underwater protection. Even though the ships were approved for construction under a 1942 fleet replenishment program, the prioritizing of aircraft carriers and smaller ships due to the war, followed by Japan's defeat, killed any chance of the B-65's construction.

YouTube (B65 class by Drachinifel)



Mission and plan

The Japanese navy's experience in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, especially the Battle of Tsushima, strongly influenced the creation of the IJN's "Decisive Battle" doctrine, which guided the development and deployment of the IJN's battle fleet into World War II. The Decisive Battle concept was the IJN's primary strategy for defeating the navies of the major Western powers, such as Great Britain or the United States, in the event of war. The strategy consisted of four main components: a decisive surface fleet engagement determined by big guns, attrition tactics against a numerically superior enemy, a reliance on quality over quantity in naval weaponry, and the employment of nighttime torpedo attacks.

B-65 in 1944

After the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930, each of which placed restrictions on the size of the IJN's fleet in comparison with the fleets of the western powers, notably the United States, the decisive battle strategy received increased emphasis within the IJN. In 1936, the IJN formed the Night Battle Force (Yasen Butai). As designed, the night battle force was to attack the hypothetical enemy's, usually envisioned by the Japanese to be the US Pacific Fleet, outer defense ring of cruisers and destroyers at night. After cracking the outer defense ring, IJN cruisers and destroyers were to launch torpedo attacks on the enemy's battleships. What remained of the enemy fleet was then to be finished-off by the IJN's main battleship line the following day.

A line drawing of the proposed Design B-65



The IJN assigned one division of fast battleships or battlecruisers to give additional firepower to the nocturnal attacks. The Kongō-class battlecruisers were initially assigned to this role and were upgraded to fast battleships over a seven-year period from 1933-1940. The IJN planned to eventually replace the four Kongō battleships with four heavy, "super" cruisers. As envisioned by the IJN in 1936, these ships, the B-65 cruisers, would mount 12-inch guns, carry armor designed to withstand hits from 8-inch shells, and be capable of speeds up to 40 knots. They would be designated as "super-A-class cruisers" to signify their greater status than the A-class ships (heavy cruisers).



B-65 in 1945

The plan for the cruiser class was finalized as part of the IJN's Circle Five and Circle Six warship construction plans of 7 January 1941. The plan called for six B-65s to be built in two increments, with the first two to be constructed in Circle 5 with the remainder in Circle 6. By this time, Japanese intelligence had learned the specifications for the United States Navy's Alaska-class large cruisers, which had been authorized for creation by the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Act and ordered on 5 September 1940. The Japanese believed that these ships would form part of the American battle fleet's screen in times of war. Thus, the B-65s were now intended to counter the threat posed by the Alaska-class cruisers.

Image I



Image II 



Design

Design work on the B-65s began in 1939. Preliminary plans for the new class were finished by September 1940, and they were far enough along that tests of the lower protection—the armor intended to counter any shell that fell short but still hit the ship (albeit underwater) and torpedoes—and main armament were conducted from 1940 to 1941.

These plans called for ships that bore a striking resemblance to the Yamato-class battleships, with the same "clipper bow, flush-deck construction, and a generally similar superstructure", albeit at a reduced size. Nine 310 mm (12.2 in)/50 caliber guns in three triple turrets, sixteen 100 mm (3.9 in)/65 caliber dual-purpose guns in dual mounts on either side of the superstructure, twelve paired 25 mm (0.98 in) anti-aircraft guns, four 13 mm (0.51 in) machine guns, and eight 610 mm (24 in) torpedo tubes were to be the primary weapons of the cruiser. The weight of the main battery turrets was to be around 1,000 long tons (1,100 short tons; 1,000 t), with 350 long tons (390 short tons; 360 t) of that devoted to armor; however, no plans of how this latter figure was to have been distributed has survived.

B-65 with 36cm guns in 1944

The cruisers were to be protected by 190 mm (7.5 in) belt armor sloped at 20° and 125 mm (4.9 in) deck armor. Four geared turbine sets would have generated about 42,500 shp each; for a total of about 167,674 shp, enough to power the ships through the water at 34 kn (39 mph; 63 km/h), faster than the "fundamental design requirement" of 33 kn (38 mph; 61 km/h).

In an attempt to counter the Alaska-class cruisers' 305 mm (12.0 in) guns, a proposal to increase both the main battery to six 356 mm (14 in) and armor protection to resist against the same was put forth. However, the increase in displacement (to almost 40,000 long tons (45,000 short tons; 41,000 t)) and reduction in performance this entailed meant that nothing came of the proposed changes.



Final plans and cancellation

As war with the United States loomed in 1941, the navy found that it had a more pressing need for aircraft carriers and auxiliary vessels. This need, plus a desire to complete the ongoing Circle Three and Four construction programs, delayed initiation of the Circle Five plan.

Following the Japanese navy's defeat at the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Circle Five plan was significantly revised and Circle Six was postponed indefinitely. The new plan still called for the construction of two ships of Design B-65, which were given the hull numbers 795 and 796 with projected commissioning dates of 1945 and 1946, respectively. As the war progressed, however, strategic requirements further delayed the plans for the two cruisers. In the end, the B-65s' plans were never finalized and no contracts for their construction were ever placed.

  lordroel,

  Ironic the comment

By this time, Japanese intelligence had learned the specifications for the United States Navy's Alaska-class large cruisers, which had been authorized for creation by the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Act and ordered on 5 September 1940. The Japanese believed that these ships would form part of the American battle fleet's screen in times of war. Thus, the B-65s were now intended to counter the threat posed by the Alaska-class cruisers.

  as IIRC the Alaska's were order in part because of what the US had heard about the B-65 class. As such they were being adjusted to be a counter to ships ordered to counter them. 

  Sounds like they might have been good cruiser killers, although possibly themselves overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of cruisers that the USN was likely to have by the time they were completed.  However with 12.2" guns and the traditional aggressive instincts of the Japanese military at the time would they have avoided clashing with capital ships?  Also of course by that time they would have been vulnerable to air attack.  Not necessarily at night, at least before the final stages of the war or against the RN but in daytime if detected within range of allied air power.

  Steve

[lordroel]

Oct 16, 2021 13:39:30 GMT stevep said:

Oct 16, 2021 12:14:58 GMT lordroel said:

Japanese - Design B-65 cruiser

The Design B-65 was a class of Super Type A cruisers planned by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) before and during World War II. As envisioned by the IJN, the cruisers were to play a key role in the Night Battle Force portion of the "Decisive battle" strategy which Japan hoped, in the event of war, to employ against the United States Navy.

Begun in 1939, plans were far enough along that tests were conducted with the main armament and against the underwater protection. Even though the ships were approved for construction under a 1942 fleet replenishment program, the prioritizing of aircraft carriers and smaller ships due to the war, followed by Japan's defeat, killed any chance of the B-65's construction.

YouTube (B65 class by Drachinifel)



Mission and plan

The Japanese navy's experience in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, especially the Battle of Tsushima, strongly influenced the creation of the IJN's "Decisive Battle" doctrine, which guided the development and deployment of the IJN's battle fleet into World War II. The Decisive Battle concept was the IJN's primary strategy for defeating the navies of the major Western powers, such as Great Britain or the United States, in the event of war. The strategy consisted of four main components: a decisive surface fleet engagement determined by big guns, attrition tactics against a numerically superior enemy, a reliance on quality over quantity in naval weaponry, and the employment of nighttime torpedo attacks.

B-65 in 1944

After the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930, each of which placed restrictions on the size of the IJN's fleet in comparison with the fleets of the western powers, notably the United States, the decisive battle strategy received increased emphasis within the IJN. In 1936, the IJN formed the Night Battle Force (Yasen Butai). As designed, the night battle force was to attack the hypothetical enemy's, usually envisioned by the Japanese to be the US Pacific Fleet, outer defense ring of cruisers and destroyers at night. After cracking the outer defense ring, IJN cruisers and destroyers were to launch torpedo attacks on the enemy's battleships. What remained of the enemy fleet was then to be finished-off by the IJN's main battleship line the following day.

A line drawing of the proposed Design B-65



The IJN assigned one division of fast battleships or battlecruisers to give additional firepower to the nocturnal attacks. The Kongō-class battlecruisers were initially assigned to this role and were upgraded to fast battleships over a seven-year period from 1933-1940. The IJN planned to eventually replace the four Kongō battleships with four heavy, "super" cruisers. As envisioned by the IJN in 1936, these ships, the B-65 cruisers, would mount 12-inch guns, carry armor designed to withstand hits from 8-inch shells, and be capable of speeds up to 40 knots. They would be designated as "super-A-class cruisers" to signify their greater status than the A-class ships (heavy cruisers).



B-65 in 1945

The plan for the cruiser class was finalized as part of the IJN's Circle Five and Circle Six warship construction plans of 7 January 1941. The plan called for six B-65s to be built in two increments, with the first two to be constructed in Circle 5 with the remainder in Circle 6. By this time, Japanese intelligence had learned the specifications for the United States Navy's Alaska-class large cruisers, which had been authorized for creation by the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Act and ordered on 5 September 1940. The Japanese believed that these ships would form part of the American battle fleet's screen in times of war. Thus, the B-65s were now intended to counter the threat posed by the Alaska-class cruisers.

Image I



Image II 



Design

Design work on the B-65s began in 1939. Preliminary plans for the new class were finished by September 1940, and they were far enough along that tests of the lower protection—the armor intended to counter any shell that fell short but still hit the ship (albeit underwater) and torpedoes—and main armament were conducted from 1940 to 1941.

These plans called for ships that bore a striking resemblance to the Yamato-class battleships, with the same "clipper bow, flush-deck construction, and a generally similar superstructure", albeit at a reduced size. Nine 310 mm (12.2 in)/50 caliber guns in three triple turrets, sixteen 100 mm (3.9 in)/65 caliber dual-purpose guns in dual mounts on either side of the superstructure, twelve paired 25 mm (0.98 in) anti-aircraft guns, four 13 mm (0.51 in) machine guns, and eight 610 mm (24 in) torpedo tubes were to be the primary weapons of the cruiser. The weight of the main battery turrets was to be around 1,000 long tons (1,100 short tons; 1,000 t), with 350 long tons (390 short tons; 360 t) of that devoted to armor; however, no plans of how this latter figure was to have been distributed has survived.

B-65 with 36cm guns in 1944

The cruisers were to be protected by 190 mm (7.5 in) belt armor sloped at 20° and 125 mm (4.9 in) deck armor. Four geared turbine sets would have generated about 42,500 shp each; for a total of about 167,674 shp, enough to power the ships through the water at 34 kn (39 mph; 63 km/h), faster than the "fundamental design requirement" of 33 kn (38 mph; 61 km/h).

In an attempt to counter the Alaska-class cruisers' 305 mm (12.0 in) guns, a proposal to increase both the main battery to six 356 mm (14 in) and armor protection to resist against the same was put forth. However, the increase in displacement (to almost 40,000 long tons (45,000 short tons; 41,000 t)) and reduction in performance this entailed meant that nothing came of the proposed changes.



Final plans and cancellation

As war with the United States loomed in 1941, the navy found that it had a more pressing need for aircraft carriers and auxiliary vessels. This need, plus a desire to complete the ongoing Circle Three and Four construction programs, delayed initiation of the Circle Five plan.

Following the Japanese navy's defeat at the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Circle Five plan was significantly revised and Circle Six was postponed indefinitely. The new plan still called for the construction of two ships of Design B-65, which were given the hull numbers 795 and 796 with projected commissioning dates of 1945 and 1946, respectively. As the war progressed, however, strategic requirements further delayed the plans for the two cruisers. In the end, the B-65s' plans were never finalized and no contracts for their construction were ever placed.

  lordroel,

  Ironic the comment

By this time, Japanese intelligence had learned the specifications for the United States Navy's Alaska-class large cruisers, which had been authorized for creation by the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Act and ordered on 5 September 1940. The Japanese believed that these ships would form part of the American battle fleet's screen in times of war. Thus, the B-65s were now intended to counter the threat posed by the Alaska-class cruisers.

  as IIRC the Alaska's were order in part because of what the US had heard about the B-65 class. As such they were being adjusted to be a counter to ships ordered to counter them. 

  Sounds like they might have been good cruiser killers, although possibly themselves overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of cruisers that the USN was likely to have by the time they were completed.  However with 12.2" guns and the traditional aggressive instincts of the Japanese military at the time would they have avoided clashing with capital ships?  Also of course by that time they would have been vulnerable to air attack.  Not necessarily at night, at least before the final stages of the war or against the RN but in daytime if detected within range of allied air power.

  Steve

Well we know what happen to most of the Japanese heavy ships during the war, got sunk not by other warships but from the air, and the Alaskans did not serve to long as well in the end.

[1bigrich]

My compliments to the article's author for not falling into the trap that the B-65s would have carried 14.2in guns. When the Japanese went to metric designations in the teens, the 14in/356mm became the '36cm'. Similarly, the 16in guns of the Nagatos became the 41cm.

I have my own doubts at to whether the class would have truly had 12.2in guns for the same reason. Japan had plenty of experience with 12in/30.5cm guns, and while all those were now designated 31cm, it would seem odd that a new caliber would be developed. But in full disclosure, I have never seen that corroborated.

The genesis of the Large Cruisers that became the Alaskas is a little more complicated than simple replies to foreign design, real, conceptual or imagined.

King was an aviator, and when he became head of the USN he was one of the main advocates of the class. The early war had seen the RN disperse its battleships and battlecruisers, or in King's terms, weaken its battleline. This was a risk the RN could easily take, fighting a much smaller navy like the KM. King felt, with some justification, that the USN battleline was likely to be preoccupied with the IJN battleline and couldn't be counted on for heavy gun support in other places. He also felt, as the interwar fleet problem had showed, that aircraft carriers were very vulnerable in a surface action and needed heavy firepower that could kill a raiding enemy (read Japanese) heavy cruiser quickly. So the caliber became the new 12in with a super heavy shell, and ship needed to carry it was descended/developed from USN cruiser lineage.

Regards,

[simon darkshade]

The Japanese fleet plans would only make sense if they delayed war for another 6-7 years AND if naval airpower developments somehow went backwards.

Does this mean that the IJN were disconnected from reality in this respect? Not necessarily. They were certainly disconnected from reality in a lot of ways, but this was one of the lesser examples. Using the Kongos or their replacements as heavy fast carrier escorts was fine in theory, as was the notion of using them to lead cruiser groups. However, the issue was that the IJN also needed them as fast battleships as part of their battleline, given their paucity of numbers.

The four Fusos and Ises were sort of matches for the Nevadas, but the other Standards had them outclassed, not least in all or nothing armour, and the small matter that there were nine of them. Nagato and Mutsu were reasonable, but are both outnumbered and outperformed by the Big Five. The IJN needed the Kongos in the battleline, where they wouldn’t be able to really use their major asset of speed.

The B-65s were a manifestation of the major Japanese problem - they were alright as long as no one responded, no one else built and no one else fought in a manner other than how the Japs wanted them to.

As it stood, the @ correlation of forces was as good as it was going to get for Japan. A slight change means they are looking at the RN finishing the Lions as well as the KGVs PLUS the USN doubling their effective modern BB force with the 12 fast battleships. The Yamato and Peace Goddess option was never going to cut it against that threat, even if we somehow handwave the Montanas.

[1bigrich]

Oct 18, 2021 7:15:42 GMT simon darkshade said:

The Japanese fleet plans would only make sense if they delayed war for another 6-7 years AND if naval airpower developments somehow went backwards.

Does this mean that the IJN were disconnected from reality in this respect? Not necessarily. They were certainly disconnected from reality in a lot of ways, but this was one of the lesser examples. Using the Kongos or their replacements as heavy fast carrier escorts was fine in theory, as was the notion of using them to lead cruiser groups. However, the issue was that the IJN also needed them as fast battleships as part of their battleline, given their paucity of numbers.

True. I've read that Ise and Hyuga really were obsolete but the battleline got seriously short without them.

The four Fusos and Ises were sort of matches for the Nevadas, but the other Standards had them outclassed, not least in all or nothing armour, and the small matter that there were nine of them. Nagato and Mutsu were reasonable, but are both outnumbered and outperformed by the Big Five. The IJN needed the Kongos in the battleline, where they wouldn’t be able to really use their major asset of speed.

It would be an interesting wargame for the Naval War College or someone to tackle just how the Kongos were to help the cruiser divisions and DesRon penetrate the USN screen without getting involved with the USN battleline themselves. I wounder if any would be able to take part in the later 'decisive battle' in an undamaged state?

The B-65s were a manifestation of the major Japanese problem - they were alright as long as no one responded, no one else built and no one else fought in a manner other than how the Japs wanted them to.

And that is the key, especially the enemy fighting as expected.

As it stood, the @ correlation of forces was as good as it was going to get for Japan. A slight change means they are looking at the RN finishing the Lions as well as the KGVs PLUS the USN doubling their effective modern BB force with the 12 fast battleships. The Yamato and Peace Goddess option was never going to cut it against that threat, even if we somehow handwave the Montanas.

That's true. There was an avalanche of USN steel on the way. Any later and there would be no hope. Any earlier, and the hardware at hand, especially aircraft, mostly would have been at a disadvantage.

Regards,

[stevep]

Oct 18, 2021 23:22:46 GMT 1bigrich said:

Oct 18, 2021 7:15:42 GMT simon darkshade said:

The Japanese fleet plans would only make sense if they delayed war for another 6-7 years AND if naval airpower developments somehow went backwards.

Does this mean that the IJN were disconnected from reality in this respect? Not necessarily. They were certainly disconnected from reality in a lot of ways, but this was one of the lesser examples. Using the Kongos or their replacements as heavy fast carrier escorts was fine in theory, as was the notion of using them to lead cruiser groups. However, the issue was that the IJN also needed them as fast battleships as part of their battleline, given their paucity of numbers.

True. I've read that Ise and Hyuga really were obsolete but the battleline got seriously short without them.

The four Fusos and Ises were sort of matches for the Nevadas, but the other Standards had them outclassed, not least in all or nothing armour, and the small matter that there were nine of them. Nagato and Mutsu were reasonable, but are both outnumbered and outperformed by the Big Five. The IJN needed the Kongos in the battleline, where they wouldn’t be able to really use their major asset of speed.

It would be an interesting wargame for the Naval War College or someone to tackle just how the Kongos were to help the cruiser divisions and DesRon penetrate the USN screen without getting involved with the USN battleline themselves. I wounder if any would be able to take part in the later 'decisive battle' in an undamaged state?

The B-65s were a manifestation of the major Japanese problem - they were alright as long as no one responded, no one else built and no one else fought in a manner other than how the Japs wanted them to.

And that is the key, especially the enemy fighting as expected.

As it stood, the @ correlation of forces was as good as it was going to get for Japan. A slight change means they are looking at the RN finishing the Lions as well as the KGVs PLUS the USN doubling their effective modern BB force with the 12 fast battleships. The Yamato and Peace Goddess option was never going to cut it against that threat, even if we somehow handwave the Montanas.

That's true. There was an avalanche of USN steel on the way. Any later and there would be no hope. Any earlier, and the hardware at hand, especially aircraft, mostly would have been at a disadvantage.

Regards,

  I would suspect the logical approach - although we are talking about imperial Japan here - would be that the Kongo's stay a bit behind their own cruisers and destroyers using their gun range and weight to pound any concentrations of US cruisers they encounter.  If not to sink them then disable them - for later destruction they would hope - and prevent those ships disrupting too much their own light units seeking to attack the US battlefleet.  Then if any US heavies are detected approaching withdraw quickly.  They could easily get away from the older US ships unless they suffered a crippling hit and the newer faster US BBs, as well as still being a bit slower would be taking a hell of a risk seeking to pursue them into the Japanese cruiser and destroyer formations as they might risk being isolated and badly damaged or sunk themselves.  Especially in the early 40's when such fast ships would still be relatively few in numbers.

  Talking here of course as an armchair admiral so could be totally off.  Plus with the aggressive attitude of the entire Japanese military/society at the time whether a Kongo captain would actually withdraw in such circumstances rather than going on a glory ride is another matter.

[belushitd]

Well, keep in mind that the Kongos had 14" guns. Nothing in the US Cruiser arsenal has armor against that. I strongly suspect that one or two hits and the ship in question would be, at the very least, mission killed, if not turned into a cloud of smoke and shrapnel.

I have a vision of a 14" shell slicing through the armor right into a magazine and exploding. The cruiser would be promptly converted into two states. Vapor and navigation hazards.

Belushi TD

[lordroel]

Oct 19, 2021 14:17:10 GMT belushitd said:

I have a vision of a 14" shell slicing through the armor right into a magazine and exploding. The cruiser would be promptly converted into two states. Vapor and navigation hazards.

Belushi TD

Well we saw that happening with the Hood, one right shell and it does not matter how good armored you are.