Nieuport 161 - A Stronger French Air Force in May 1940

[lordroel]

Dec 24, 2021 11:38:18 GMT DMZ said:

- The loss of the Blücher delayed the capture of Oslo and allowed the government, the king and the parliament to escape capture, the resistance was decided;

Nice to see Oberst Eriksen doing the right thing here as well.

[miletus12]

The Curtiss folks never topped the Hawk series. P-36 and P-40. And by folks I mean Donovan Berlin. After the P-40, his aircraft projects he delegated to subordinates and adopted a "supervisory capacity". So projects like the Curtiss Ascender and Seamew and further developments of the P-40 and the Commando transport turned into disasters. GM did not look at his track record closely enough so they hired him to run their aviation section. Don Berlin created another disaster, the P-75 Eagle for them. From GM, Berlin wandered over to MacDonald Douglas and produced the "Goblin", the "Sea Demon" and the "Voodoo". Three more disasters. With this trail of ruin behind him, Berlin migrated over to Piasecki Helicopter, and became part of the politics that forced out Piasecki. He did for the company what he did at Curtiss, GM, and McDD. He wrecked it. Boeing took the carcass over in 1961 and saved the company when their own design department rescued the Chinook after Berlin screwed that program up.

Berlin was given a face job at Boeing and parked out of the way. He did not last long before Boeing got rid of him. The rest of his aviation career was his second stint at Curtiss where he finished the ruin he started. After they turned toes up grinning at the sky; Berlin migrated to Pat Crow Forgings and did them in. He ended up at E.F. Felt company. Never heard of them either? Guess why.

Berlin was a good aviation showman and politician. When it came to aircraft? He was ... not too good.

[stevep]

Dec 24, 2021 11:38:18 GMT DMZ said:

Thanks to 575 , a Christmas tale 

LN 161 - Norway

April 9, 1940 - Operation Weserrübung
The invasion of Denmark and Norway went perfectly except in three points:
- The loss of the Blücher delayed the capture of Oslo and allowed the government, the king and the parliament to escape capture, the resistance was decided;
- At Narvik, the loss of the supply tankers blocked the German destroyers;
- In the air, the Norwegian Curtiss Hawk 75A inflicted significant losses on the Ju 52s carrying paratroopers to Oslo Fornebu airport.

Of the 24 Hawk 75A received a few weeks earlier (1), 21 were operational at Rygge, at the entrance to the Oslo fjord. Warned by the echoes of the fight between the fortress of Oscarsborg and the Blücher, a dozen pilots were able to take to the air at daybreak, while the airfield was being approached by He 111s that had come to bomb it. Without escort, two German bombers were destroyed and little damage was inflicted on the airfield, although two Hawks were destroyed on the ground.

Shortly afterwards, the first waves of Ju 52s bound for Oslo Fornebu were intercepted and seven of them went down. The slow reaction of the Norwegian army did not prevent the Fallschirmjäger from taking the field. But the Norwegian fighters shot down or destroyed several Ju 52 on the ground, prohibiting its use from the middle of the day.

The retreat
The next day, the Bf 110s, now based in Denmark, escorted the bombers and the Rygge airfield became untenable. The Curtiss were evacuated to Gardermoen, north of Oslo. Three days later, faced with the German advance and the threat of the first aircraft based at Fornebu, a new retreat was decided. All the airfields up to Tondheim being occupied or under German fire, the 17 remaining Hawks flew to Rinnleiret, 65 km NE of Trondheim, while the Gladiators equipped with skis operated from Vangsmjøse, a frozen lake 175 km NW of Oslo. However, the proximity of the fjord made them fear a naval intervention and a new move was decided towards Hattfjelldal, 200 km further north, as soon as the ground had been cleared of the snow that still covered it, which was done on the 25th with the help of hundreds of civilian volunteers, as the airmen did not have the help of reindeer in transhumance (2). There will be only nine hunters left in flying condition.

From 17 April onwards, the Curtiss supported the defenders of the Hegra fortress, some ten kilometers from Værnes, making aerial bombardments inoperative. They also opposed with relative success the bombardment of Namsos, but the landed equipment, stored without any protection near the docks, was largely destroyed.

1) OTL, 19 Hawk 75s had been delivered and were being assembled at Kjeller, five being practically in flying condition but without armament and none had been taken into account by the Norwegian Army Aviation Service. Thirty-six others were on order. ITTL, as France didn't order Curtiss H-75, Norway would have received theirs earlier.

2) South of Trondheim, between Andalsnes and Dombåss, Lake Lesjaskog had been chosen as the site for the British Gladiators and snow removal had barely begun when three thousand reindeer appeared. The Lappish driver of the herd agreed, in exchange for a bottle of pure medicinal alcohol, to have the necessary surface trampled on, and within a few hours the field was ready... except that the gasoline was missing.

  You think Santa's reindeer are actually biological?  He needed some oil to fuel them for his winter run.

[575]

Dec 24, 2021 11:38:18 GMT DMZ said:

Thanks to 575 , a Christmas tale 

LN 161 - Norway

April 9, 1940 - Operation Weserrübung
The invasion of Denmark and Norway went perfectly except in three points:
- The loss of the Blücher delayed the capture of Oslo and allowed the government, the king and the parliament to escape capture, the resistance was decided;
- At Narvik, the loss of the supply tankers blocked the German destroyers;
- In the air, the Norwegian Curtiss Hawk 75A inflicted significant losses on the Ju 52s carrying paratroopers to Oslo Fornebu airport.

Of the 24 Hawk 75A received a few weeks earlier (1), 21 were operational at Rygge, at the entrance to the Oslo fjord. Warned by the echoes of the fight between the fortress of Oscarsborg and the Blücher, a dozen pilots were able to take to the air at daybreak, while the airfield was being approached by He 111s that had come to bomb it. Without escort, two German bombers were destroyed and little damage was inflicted on the airfield, although two Hawks were destroyed on the ground.

Shortly afterwards, the first waves of Ju 52s bound for Oslo Fornebu were intercepted and seven of them went down. The slow reaction of the Norwegian army did not prevent the Fallschirmjäger from taking the field. But the Norwegian fighters shot down or destroyed several Ju 52 on the ground, prohibiting its use from the middle of the day.

The retreat
The next day, the Bf 110s, now based in Denmark, escorted the bombers and the Rygge airfield became untenable. The Curtiss were evacuated to Gardermoen, north of Oslo. Three days later, faced with the German advance and the threat of the first aircraft based at Fornebu, a new retreat was decided. All the airfields up to Tondheim being occupied or under German fire, the 17 remaining Hawks flew to Rinnleiret, 65 km NE of Trondheim, while the Gladiators equipped with skis operated from Vangsmjøse, a frozen lake 175 km NW of Oslo. However, the proximity of the fjord made them fear a naval intervention and a new move was decided towards Hattfjelldal, 200 km further north, as soon as the ground had been cleared of the snow that still covered it, which was done on the 25th with the help of hundreds of civilian volunteers, as the airmen did not have the help of reindeer in transhumance (2). There will be only nine hunters left in flying condition.

From 17 April onwards, the Curtiss supported the defenders of the Hegra fortress, some ten kilometers from Værnes, making aerial bombardments inoperative. They also opposed with relative success the bombardment of Namsos, but the landed equipment, stored without any protection near the docks, was largely destroyed.

1) OTL, 19 Hawk 75s had been delivered and were being assembled at Kjeller, five being practically in flying condition but without armament and none had been taken into account by the Norwegian Army Aviation Service. Thirty-six others were on order. ITTL, as France didn't order Curtiss H-75, Norway would have received theirs earlier.

2) South of Trondheim, between Andalsnes and Dombåss, Lake Lesjaskog had been chosen as the site for the British Gladiators and snow removal had barely begun when three thousand reindeer appeared. The Lappish driver of the herd agreed, in exchange for a bottle of pure medicinal alcohol, to have the necessary surface trampled on, and within a few hours the field was ready... except that the gasoline was missing.

DMZ:

No such thing as a Christmas tale; nice to have been of assistance

Keep the good work going - and I know worse tales of the Norse than a Lapp reindeer driver and medicinal alcohol though its only tales of course.

[DMZ]

Dec 24, 2021 11:38:18 GMT DMZ said:

South of Trondheim, between Andalsnes and Dombåss, Lake Lesjaskog had been chosen as the site for the British Gladiators and snow removal had barely begun when three thousand reindeer appeared. The Lappish driver of the herd agreed, in exchange for a bottle of pure medicinal alcohol, to have the necessary surface trampled on, and within a few hours the field was ready... except that the gasoline was missing.

This story was not a Christmas tale as it actually happened in April 1940
Sometime reality surpasses imagination.

[miletus12]

Dec 24, 2021 20:53:28 GMT DMZ said:

Dec 24, 2021 11:38:18 GMT DMZ said:

South of Trondheim, between Andalsnes and Dombåss, Lake Lesjaskog had been chosen as the site for the British Gladiators and snow removal had barely begun when three thousand reindeer appeared. The Lappish driver of the herd agreed, in exchange for a bottle of pure medicinal alcohol, to have the necessary surface trampled on, and within a few hours the field was ready... except that the gasoline was missing.

This story was not a Christmas tale as it actually happened in April 1940
Sometime reality surpasses imagination.

Perhaps it inspired the Russians.

New memorial honors WW II reindeer batallion
By Craig Medred
Updated: September 27, 2016
Published: March 1, 2012
According to the Barents Observer, a new war memorial in the Arctic Russian town of Naryan-Mar recognizes the contribution and sacrifice during World War II of the world's only reindeer-based military transport battalion.

Some 1,000 indigenous reindeer herders, from across Russia's Arctic, and about 6,000 of their reindeer, were pressed into service at the Karelian Front between 1941 and 1944, where the Soviet Union fought against Nazi Germany and Finland.

In modern history, the Karelian Front was the setting of the only major military operations ever conducted above the Arctic circle.

The Nenets, Komi and Saami reindeer units and their herders served as couriers, kept supply lines going, towed disabled equipment for repair, and even conducted covert missions behind enemy lines.

Read more and see the memorial at the Barents Observer, here, and learn much more about indigenous Russia's sometimes reluctant contribution to the Soviet war effort, here.

Alaska Dispatch Publishing

There's many a British and American sailor who would dispute the underlined.

[DMZ]

Dec 24, 2021 21:52:35 GMT miletus12 said:

In modern history, the Karelian Front was the setting of the only major military operations ever conducted above the Arctic circle.

There's many a British and American sailor who would dispute the underlined.

As well as for the Norwegians, Poles, British and French that fought in Narvik.

[miletus12]

I offer this only as a source of information and discussion.

USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #32
Air Power, Armies, and the War in the West, 1940
R.J. Overy, 1989

Read the document at the link.

M.

[DMZ]

Mar 26, 2023 19:11:50 GMT miletus12 said:

I offer this only as a source of information and discussion.

USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #32
Air Power, Armies, and the War in the West, 1940
R.J. Overy, 1989

Read the document at the link.

M.

Interresting document with a good overall analysis but hampered by few common errors:
- Only less than 1,500 modern fighters was in service on may 1940 in French Armée de l'Air and Aéronautique Navale.
- French Armée de l'air devoted most of its combat planes to the North-East front : 22 GC (fighter groups) out of 29 was assigned to the front line (760 operational planes), including five GC protecting Paris and lower Seine, three being temporarily transferred in the South-East for transformation on D.520 or MB 152-155.
Only two (one on MS 406, one on MB 152) faced Italy, four was in FNA (two on MS 406, one with a mix of MS 406 and outdated D.510 and one on D.510) and one in Lebanon on MS 406.
Some Bombers units was on training in the South East but ready to intervene on the front.

- Although considered as modern, the MS 406 was nevertheless obsolete and decision was taken to withdraw it and the replacement process by D.520, MB 152-155, H-75 was underway. Only half of the 1,000 delivered Morane-Saulnier was still in operational units.

The conclusion notably emphasis on this:

In 1940 German forces did not outnumber the Allies; they had no special technological lead; they were not notably more courageous; but without question the Allies were outmatched by the German ability to fight.

- German air force far outnumbered Allies in bombers and slightly in fighter taking into account both Luftflotte 2 and 3.
- No special technological lead but definitively better aircraft than the French ones except the too few D.520, MB 174, LeO 451 and Amiot 354.
- They were definitely not more courageous: they were fighting on better and more numerous aircraft and often aborted bombing missions when encountering strong opposition.
- But indeed better German ability to fight than Allies (but the British Fighter Command).

[miletus12]

Mar 27, 2023 6:45:44 GMT DMZ said:

Mar 26, 2023 19:11:50 GMT miletus12 said:

I offer this only as a source of information and discussion.

Read the document at the link.

M.

Interresting document with a good overall analysis but hampered by few common errors:
- Only less than 1,500 modern fighters was in service on may 1940 in French Armée de l'Air and Aéronautique Navale.
- French Armée de l'air devoted most of its combat planes to the North-East front : 22 GC (fighter groups) out of 29 was assigned to the front line (760 operational planes), including five GC protecting Paris and lower Seine, three being temporarily transferred in the South-East for transformation on D.520 or MB 152-155.
Only two (one on MS 406, one on MB 152) faced Italy, four was in FNA (two on MS 406, one with a mix of MS 406 and outdated D.510 and one on D.510) and one in Lebanon on MS 406.
Some Bombers units was on training in the South East but ready to intervene on the front.

- Although considered as modern, the MS 406 was nevertheless obsolete and decision was taken to withdraw it and the replacement process by D.520, MB 152-155, H-75 was underway. Only half of the 1,000 delivered Morane-Saulnier was still in operational units.

The conclusion notably emphasis on this:

In 1940 German forces did not outnumber the Allies; they had no special technological lead; they were not notably more courageous; but without question the Allies were outmatched by the German ability to fight.

- German air force far outnumbered Allies in bombers and slightly in fighter taking into account both Luftflotte 2 and 3.
- No special technological lead but definitively better aircraft than the French ones except the too few D.520, MB 174, LeO 451 and Amiot 354.
- They were definitely not more courageous: they were fighting on better and more numerous aircraft and often aborted bombing missions when encountering strong opposition.
- But indeed better German ability to fight than Allies (but the British Fighter Command).

Article

The French Air Force in 1940

RYAN THOMAS JUN 18, 2019

Throughout the Interwar years, France had been a constant innovator in aerial technology, had possessed what had always been a powerful air force and at times was in all probability the strongest in the world, and had boasted a tradition of victory from the First World War when its aviators had played an important role in victory over the German army and aviation service. In 1940, its fighters were swept from the sky, its bombers failed to achieve anything of note, its aircraft were forced to retreat to North Africa when they survived at all, and it would be a favorite scapegoat of the new Vichy regime for the failings of the armed forces in 1940. What had gone wrong in these twenty years since French aviators won the First World War? Why was the French Air Force so poorly prepared for 1940?

Material

Most famous among all of the problems plaguing the French air force was lack of sufficient planes, and an insufficient quality of the planes that the air force had. This is broadly true, as the French air force was outnumbered by its German equivalents, and suffered heavily in terms of quality: a general rule of thumb were that French technological developments were 3 years later than their German equivalents. French production had been plagued by the problems of an inefficient aircraft industry, then the chaos of industry nationalization, and constant changes in ministerial objectives.

French air production had been plagued with problems for the last two decades. If France had had the world's best air industry during WW1, its very size meant that following the war, capacity was hugely in excess of needs. Naturally, a culling of the number of companies resulted, but this was not as much as was needed : companies survived on small orders and prototypes, encouraged by a government prototype policy which propped up small companies, resisted state attempts at their integration (decrying it as the heavy hand of government on them while simultaneously being almost entirely dependent on government purchases of aircraft and on the state's subsidies), and bided their time in the hopes of large aircraft deals in the future. Thus, when the need did come for France to have large production of aircraft, in the 1930s, France was left with a vast array of small companies which were incapable of assuming real economies of scale to produce aircraft cheaply and in numbers, and with poor research capacities next to the German giants across the border. In response to this situation, the Popular Front launched a nationalization of the air industry in 1936 : while nationalization ultimately did result in gains in aircraft production, it threw the industry further into chaos and opposition for a period of time (and had some inherent flaws - the new companies for example, were organized by region, instead of by any economic criterion), and led to an intensely political debate about the air industry. Huge French investments into building up production capacity were finally starting to bear fruit by 1940, but problems with the size of this build up and the move from skilled workers to large numbers of unskilled laborers (many of them women) continued to plague production and spare part availability. Throughout the period, French economies of scale were further prevented by the attempt to decentralize aircraft production throughout the country, particularly to the south and west, where they would be less vulnerable to strategic bombing: the anticipated strategic bombardment never came, and it prevented achieving greater industrial concentrations in the Paris basin.



The Curtiss Hawk 75,an American fighter utilized by the French to good effect.

The mainstay of the French air force in 1940 was the Bloch MB 151/152, and the Morane Saulnier M.S. 406. Both of these aircraft were inferior to their German counterpart, the Bf 109, with lower firepower and inferior speed. While the new D.520 fighters were equivalent, they had only just arrived and were barely entering service. American H-75s proved to be perhaps the best of French fighters, being available in numbers due to having already been equipped, and being combat capable. French heavy fighters meanwhile, were so slow they were often incapable of catching German bombers. Even this insufficient number of French fighters was not always well guarded, as the French, confident that D.520 production would quickly enable them to produce enough fighters to match the Germans, had sold hundreds of MS.406s and other aircraft to Turkey and Finland, as well as sending important groups of modern aircraft to Syria in preparation for a potential Balkans campaign. The general picture painted, with the exception of the H-75, is one of an air force with inferior aircraft available in insufficient numbers: this is generally true.

French bombers were in an even worse state, and when the war started, there were no modern French bombers at all. The French air force was equipped with a motley array of slow Bloch MB. 131 fast reconnaissance bombers, obsolete Amiot 143s, Potez 200s and 210s, and Farman 220 strategic bombers. The Breguet 693, Amiot 354, and LeO 451 offered modern French bombers and ground attack aircraft, but they were barely entering service at the time of the German invasion. Out of 31 French GBs (groupements de bombardement), 20 were in the process of being re-equipped when the German attack occurred.

Thus the French entered the true campaign on May 10th with some 640 fighters and 240 bombers, compared to 1200 fighters and 1700 bombers on the German side. The disparity in numbers was all too often further amplified by a disparity in aircraft quality. Spare parts were commonly lacking for newly delivered French aircraft, such as sights, radios, offensive armament, and defensive armaments, which meant that they were militarily useless until supplies of new spare parts arrived. Technically there were 850 fighters in the Armée de l'air's ranks, but 30% of these were un-serviceable due to these equipment problems, arriving thus at the 640 fighter figure.

French difficulties in matters of production capacity were further amplified by a heterogenous aircraft production. The German air force during the Battle of France equipped itself with only one single-engine fighter, the BF 109, while the French and French-equipped forces deployed the Caudron C.710, D.500 which was being retired, D.520, M.S. 406, MB.151/152, with imported American Curtiss H-75s and Dutch F.K.58s. For a nation desperately in need of uniformity in its fighter production, to ensure economies of scale - even more so than Germany with its larger aviation industry - the French air force failed to impose discipline in its own house, and paid the price in an eclectic array of aircraft that made rationalization of French aircraft production harder. The same chaos reigned in reconnaissance and bombers. More French aircraft models than German ones was probably an inevitability given that the Luftwaffe had the privilege of starting from nothing and building its desired air force, but the extent to which the French built excessive models of aircraft compared to the Germans is startling.

These low production rates led the French to look elsewhere for supplies, and they turned to the US to purchase aircraft. The United States possessed a huge industrial capacity, by far the largest in the world, but its aviation industry was small for providing for the vast needs of the French air force. But the United States was the only friendly country available from which aircraft could be purchased, and hence it was there that France turned. At the time of the declaration of war, France had ordered close to 800 American machines, which had swelled to 2,100 by May 10, combined with thousands of various aircraft parts ranging from propellors to motors. Total French orders amounted to around 5,000 aircraft, including 2,000 fighters, 2,000 bombers, and 1,000 trainers, with 1,000 deliveries achieved at the time of the armistice. However, these numbers were less impressive in combat, for although the American planes ordered tended to be combat effective, such as the Curtiss H-75 and the Martin Maryland, their lengthy arrival time had prevented their widespread integration into service, as French pilots were still training on the new aircraft as they transitioned from older models to this new equipment. Out of 24 groupements de chasse present in France in May, 1940, 10 were re-equipping at the beginning or re-equipped throughout the campaign with either new French or American fighters, thus impacting readiness.

French production was improving rapidly throughout the 1940, but like with American aircraft, the new planes arrived too late to make much of an impact. The French had gambled on being able to put their 1936 model planes into production, such as the new D.520, LeO 451, Amiot 354, Breguet 693s, and other aircraft, and had henceforth cancelled the production of MS.406 - just when its production was starting to hit its stride. If they had instead chosen a more gradual phase in of their new aircraft instead of placing all of their bets on being able to produce them in sufficient number for Spring 1940, they might have been able to come much closer to match the Luftwaffe in the air. Some of the future developments of the French Air Force presuming that it was not defeated in 1940 are discussed in another post of mine, linked below.

And If France Had Not Fallen? Weapons of the French Army and Air Force After 1940

A myth has emerged that the French were unprepared technologically for the 1940 campaign : they seem to have been determined to shatter that with a dazzling variety of advanced weapons planned.


M.S. 406

Pilots and Personnel

While the lack of sufficient amounts of French planes is famous, less famous but even more critical was insufficient pilots. At one point the air force was assured that it might expect deliveries of ~500 aircraft per month, but claimed that it would only be able to main 50. As with many other air forces before the war, becoming an officer or non-commissioned officer in the French air force was more than simply one's capability as a fighting officer, management capability, and leadership - the directly necessary elements of an officer's job - but required also skills in French composition, language and literature, history, geography, arithmetic, algebra, trigonometry, geometry, physics, chemistry, and foreign languages. Of course, many of these were useful, and helped to provide a better broad understanding for officers, but too many simply decreased the available officer pool. A reduced curriculum for pilots, changing from 3 years to 6 months, entered into service in 1939, but as with other French proposals, it was too late to have an effect. Aircrew passed from school to school in a dizzying array of scattered small training schools, including Écoles Élémentaires (basic flight schools), Écoles Auxiliares (advanced flight training), École Principales (final stage training for one of three combat specialities), and Centres d'Instruction (for specialized training in bombardment, reconnaissance, or pursuit). Thus students went through at least four different bases in training. Expansion in the urgent need to train more pilots and ground crew was undertaken before the war, but many of the new schools were inadequately staffed and equipped for carrying out their rôle. As with the rest of the French army, the air force had short term conscripts available for many roles, but these lacked the necessary technical skills due to their short lengths of service. While French education tended to be good and produce skilled pilots and support crew capable of flexibly responding to situations, it produced too few.

The French were quite aware of these problems in having insufficient personnel. They would attempt to rectify this in 1940 by withdrawing experienced personnel from combat units to train new pilots, done around a month before the invasion by German commenced. The only effect was to deprive French aircraft units of desperately needed men at the front when the Germans actually arrived : done six months earlier (it was intended that the pilots would be detached for training roles for 6 months as well), this might have been a logical and intelligent policy, but as it came, it did much to further weaken the French Air Force in the critical battles of May, 1940. Less self-destructive policies, like responding to the lack of security of Metropolitan training installations by opening up bases in Africa, foundered upon poor infrastructure which caused extensive delays in moving to this region.

Furthermore, French pilots were reduced in the their amount on the frontline by the lack of an auxiliary flying corp as was found in the United States or United Kingdom. There, aircraft produced by factories would be delivered by the flying corp to the military units. In France, the lack of such a flying corp meant that pilots had to fly the aircraft from the aircraft parks to their formation, spending valuable time on a simple ferry operations.

While pilots may have been the most obvious part of the personnel of any air force, there were a variety of other factors concerning air force personnel management. The French produced superb aeronautical engineers from the National Aeronautical Institute, under the purview of the Air Ministry from 1928 onwards. However, the French made little usage of the civilian skills of their reserve air officers who had gone to work in the peace-time air sector, beyond their flying skills: this was in contrast to the Germans who collaborated extensively with Lufthansa upon their technological developments. One of the world's best air designers, Marcel Bloch, was retired, brought back, and retired again.

Ultimately the French had enough pilots in 1940, but that was only because their production had not nearly hit what their objectives were. If the French had actually managed to produce as many aircraft as they wanted then they would have faced severe deficiencies in the number of pilots. This was compounded by the poor usage of foreign pilots: thousands of Czech and Polish aircrew had arrived in France following the annexations of these countries by Germany, but the French had not done well in using them, this despite major shortages of ferry pilots and other support roles.

Direct support personnel were often lacking. When the war broke out, there were only 40% of the required radiomen for the French air force, and only 23% of the number of needed mechanics, a situation which the French were belated in fixing. Many skilled aircraft workers were called up for the war, causing industrial disruptions, before they were returned back to the factories.

Infrastructure

In 1939, France only had 1 paved runway in the entire country, and in 1933 it had only had 2 radio beacons that provided for aeronautical navigation: a project to improve aviation infrastructure in 1936 had achieved little by 1940. Weaknesses of French civil aviation, despite heavy subsidies for them, meant that the Germans had had a much more secure civilian market throughout the 1920s and 1930s, which compensated for lack of military orders. French anti-aircraft guns at their bases were insufficient to ward off Luftwaffe attacks.


The French had far too few anti-aircraft guns defending their front and their airfields, and much of what they had were 75mm guns that were not useful enough against strafing aircraft.

Supporting Air Defense

Aerial detection and observation was also insufficient. The French, unlike the Germans or English, had no significant deployed radar. This was less important in the French situation than it would be in the English situation during the Battle of Britain, due to shorter times to spot incoming aircraft, but it still represented another advantage leveled against the Armée de l'air. Furthermore, while there were a few radar sets provided by the English, the lack of a centralized system to take advantage of this and direct fighters like with Fighter Command in the UK meant that the radar that did exist was of little help. Not only was detecting German aircraft made much harder, but engaging them was too: while during the Battle of Britain nearly 100% of fighter sorties would engage German attackers, during the Battle of France, many French sorties simply closed on empty air.

(INSERTED COMMENT: The average climb rate of the H75 was 17 m/s. To reach combat air patrol atitude (5,000 meters) from rolling start on the runway took 300 seconds. RADAR which would give at least 5 minutes warning: about 60 kilometers out at 100 m/s at ANGELs 3,000 which was the typical German bomber operating characteristic and time of flight in 1940, would have meant the AdA would had been able to alert 5 with step-back from the frontier of about 100 kilometers. That is 55 nautical miles at 15,000 feet altitude at alert 5 in USN speak. M.)

Furthermore, the French were concerned about the prospect of a German attack on their cities and factories behind the lines. This meant that much of the French airpower that did exist was scattered with fighters behind the front, and local air defense units of small detachments of planes for factory defense, which played almost no role in the 1940 campaign. At the time period, the belief was that cities were horrifically vulnerable to air assault and that their bombardment would entail their destruction - it would take the experience of the war to show that while vast damage could be wrought on cities from the air, it was not anywhere near as apocalyptic as had been thought in 1930s theorizing. The French air force had been fixated on the idea of strategic retaliation against Germany during this period, such as how many strategic bombers they could fly above and bombs they could drop over Berlin, which had taken away emphasis from their tactical air force. The price was paid in 1940.

Coordination

The French air force was intensely linked to the army by its doctrine, for supporting it by protecting it via its fighters, conducting reconnaissance, and launching bombing raids on enemy front-line troops and rear area targets. This was hardly controversial for an air force in the 1930s and 40s : the German air force on the other side of the Rhine had roughly the same mission profile. However, the French air force was much more under the influence of the army than was its German equivalent. When war came in September 1939, previous large autonomous aerial regions established by Pierre Cot were broken up with air units divided into smaller packages to support army units. Instead of the cardinal rule of military operations - concentration of force - the French air force was forced to cover everywhere on the front, and resultantly could be strong nowhere, unable to concentrate forces for decisive operations. Under land force authority, these aircraft often were relegated to being forgotten, not being given missions and then panically thrown into the battle when things went south. Furthermore, army commanders would want their air commanders to be at their headquarters, which deprived them of the capability to manage their units.

(INSERTED COMMENT: Nobody knew how airpower worked. Down to the present most people still do not understand that an air force is more like a navy than an army. This means that naval concepts, such as blockade, presence and use and denial of the air are more applicable than any tactical versus strategic bombing concepts of the era or today. An air force is unique in that it can only locally persist as long as it can fly, as measured in minutes as opposed to a fleet which can float and persist for days, but otherwise it performs the same exact military functionas in a fluid environment as to control and effect. I think the one person of the era who understood this "navalness" best was Alexander P. de Seversky who is often misunderstood as one of the strategic bombardment gurus. M.)

Coordination with units on the ground was very poor, surprisingly so for an air force which supposedly had cooperation with the army as its principal objective. Air support over a target would take some five hours to arrive from being signaled to attacking, a situation which grew worse when taking into account enemy fighter opposition. This was in contrast to German forces which could expect support within near minutes of requests, and the Luftwaffe had 3 signal regiments, 63 signal companies, and 115 special signal units coordinating air attacks and air-ground cooperation. Royal Air Force times to target were even longer, since reports had to be sent back to London.

Ironically this was not viewed as a problem by the army, which as a whole cared little for tactical air support. Conversely, it was above all else most interested in reconnaissance and observation that the air force could provide. On many occasions it utterly neglected to use the ground support assets given to it: French troops advancing into the Netherlands to support the country against the Germans were granted multiple groups of naval dive bombers to support them, but French commanders apparently didn't even think of using them to attack German units holding positions during their advance into the country. Instead, they only used them once their own situation was turning south, at which point they were just a speck of dust in a storm instead of a decisive asset at a critical stage of battle.


Not only did the French have insufficient aircraft, but the aircraft they had were often not even used, as the French LN.401 dive bombers showed.

Sortie Rates and Aircraft Employment

France and Britain in 1940 planned for a long war. Blessed with superior combined resources and industry than Germany, particularly once their blockade of Germany was taken into account, and with access to world markets such as from America, in a long war they could mobilize more war capacity and continually increase their strength relative to the Germans. By contrast, the Germans, well aware of this, desperately sought to seek a resolution quickly. German sortie rates throughout the Battle of France were much higher than their French counterparts, which were .9 sorties per day for fighters, and .25 sorties per day for French bombers, while German fighters sortied 4 times per day. A bomber which flies once per day will have much less effect upon the battlefield than another which flies four times: thus larger German numbers were further magnified upon the frontlines. French squadrons had to devote pilots to personally ferry their aircraft from the factories to the front, instead of having ferry pilots like in other air forces, which restricted their sortie rates.

(INSERTED COMMENT: That is called volume of fire and PRESENCE, two terms borrowed from the naval world of missile, gun and torpedo, where the side that could put more throw weight into the fight per unit and which could stay in the fight usually won the exchange of effect, all other qualities being equal. M.)


French Potez 633.11 reconnaissance aircraft

The French had built up a very large number of observation and reconnaissance aircraft, but had not built up the fighter fleet needed to protect them. This lack of fighter cover meant that they could not be employed effectively. Fewer reconnaissance aircraft and observation aircraft, and more fighters, or better yet simply focusing more on fighters instead of the strategic-focused LeO 451 bombers, would have enabled the French to much more effectively use their reconnaissance aircraft. As it stood, this most important part of the army's hopes for the aircraft's direct utility to them, behind defending themselves from German air attack, was ill used in the battle: the French flew far fewer reconnaissance flights than the Germans, to less ambitious distances, and the lack of detailed information had critical ramifications on certain stages of the battle, such as the inability to determine the precise dispositions and advance orientation of German troops after the breakthrough at Sedan. Of course, not all information was effectively believed and acted upon, such as when reconnaissance units had noted German advances through the Ardennes: as always, the French army and its air units did not work very well together.

(INSERTED COMMENT: Blaming an air force for an army's / navy's incompetence in reconnaissance is a general charge I see in too many historical contexts. The aircraft can be up there and report, but so can the scouts and forces in contact. That is why you have PICKETS and cavalry on land and what the expletive deleted naval screen is for. In this specific case, Huntziger was told the situation by his air recon, by his scouts and by his cavalry screen, but a combination of army tactical radio network failure and an idiot in command, made the information arrive too late and the idiot being too stupid to make the correct countermoves once the French air told him that the Germans were in a massive traffic jam stalled in the Ardennes. Big fat ARTILLERY target and Huntziger just played ducks and drakes for 72 hours. And do not get me started on Gamelin. M.)

When the Germans broke through the front lines from Sedan to Dinant and the French needed to respond, the French threw all of their bombers into the battle, sending in even big four-engine Farman heavy bombers. But at the same time they ignored their reconnaissance squadrons which had been equipped with light bombing capabilities and their older MB.210 and D.510 aircraft. While doubtless outmatched, in limited, short ranged engagements, in a critical time of operations, against an enemy who was advancing rapidly and hence had disorganized air defenses, they might have achieved something and there was no time to waste in saving lives when the fate of France hung in the balance. In 1918 the French had thrown everything they had into the battle to strafe, bomb, and conduct close air support against rapidly advancing German units during the Spring Offensive, and had done enough to slow them down for the land forces to halt the breach. In 1940, they had lacked the will or the imagination to do so.

Allies

If the French Air Force had its problems, it could take little comfort in the assistance of its allies. France's principal ally in 1940 was the United Kingdom, but England's assistance to the continent would prove terribly insufficient for the coming storm. French and British air doctrine was fundamentally different in 1940, and would continue to remain so throughout the war. French air doctrine saw air power as a subsidiary to the army, despite previous flirtations with strategic bombing by the air force. French doctrine was firmly established by 1940 as providing reconnaissance for the army, protecting it from air assault, bombing enemy troops in the field, and attacking rear-line support infrastructure. French air power thus existed to serve strategic purposes, but it was not in of itself strategic.

*(INSERTED COMMENT: By 1930s thinking, this doctrine made more sense than the incompetent doctrine of the RAF and the USAAF, which was stuck on strategic bombing (city killing), and was not only stupid and wasteful with the means available, but amounted to waging war-crimes through terrorism. As the mad-bomber, Curtis LeMay, once remarked in a moment of candor: "If we lose this war, it will be us who are charged with war-crimes."  The French doctrine still used an air force inefficiently, but it was less inefficient than RAF BOMBER COMMAND which burned up 40% of the British war effort, slaughtered 40,000 aircrew and achieved NOTHING. At least the USAAF stumbled into force on force and destroyed the Luftwaffe in their terror raids of 1944 and 1945. That was how long it took for the Allied air forces to figure out that killing the Luftwaffe and going after the transportation network (blockade) was the means to hand and the only sensible effect to apply with the air force weapons they had. M.)  

British doctrine meanwhile, saw air power as holding a specifically strategic role for aviation. The RAF, unlike the French Air Force had to wait until 1932 to gain its independence from the army, or the German air force which didn't exist until 1935, had been independent from just after WW1. It was not dominated by the army like in the French air force, and aimed to protect the home islands, dominions and colonies, and trade routes, by utilizing its bombers in an offensive fashion to weaken enemy nations. Much like a naval blockade, an air war would be a long-term battle of attrition against an entire enemy state, and it wished to directly damage enemy aircraft numbers in attacks upon their production, although they were less sanguine about the possibility of attacking heavily defended airfields.

(INSERTED COMMENT: That is not accurate. You see what an air force or any organization thinks collectively by what it does. The RAF during the 1930s through its procurement and its active employment conducted itself as a defense of the homeland fighter interceptor force in the British Isles. Overseas, it substituted for the massive land garrisons other colonial imperialist powers used to maintain control over colonies. It did this by procuring light and medium bomber / transports which it used as overflight and overwatch of colonial and local population settlements. Occasionally the RAF resorted to strafing and terror bombing to keep the local populations cowed and under control. The "strategic bomber force" did not exist at all. What few heavy bombers that began to roll off British factory floors were not even sufficient to be effectors and until the Invasion of France were not even used in any meaningful operations that resembled that "supposed RAF doctrine. When the RAF began to apply any doctrine seriously of an offensive nature, it took on the form of city killing and terrorism. M.)


British Bristol Blenheim bombers with the RAF Advanced Striking Force: English aircraft were deployed to the continent in small number with obsolete aircraft, and performed badly during the 1940 campaign.

(INSERTED COMMENT: The Blenheim shows what the RAF was actually thinking. It was far more numerous than the Stirlings or the Halifaxes at the time. It had a radius of action of about 600 km or 400 miles and an endurance aloft of about 7 hours at cruise unloaded or 4 hours burdened / bomb loaded. It was remarkably like an He 111 in characteristics. Does that look like a strategic bomber to you? It was designed for colonial police work. M.)

Britain, with over 2,000 modern aircraft, only deployed around 200 single-seat fighters to the continent. At the same time, it kept 700 single-seat fighters at home in air defense squadrons, when the threat from German bombers was minimal : in order to make any significant impact on England, the Germans would have to secure bases in France first. Instead of defending their first line of defense, France and the low countries, the RAF kept its fighters hidden in the UK, denying itself the capacity to play a part in the decisive battle on the continent. The RAF avoided the possibility of attacking ground troops and participating in army cooperation, preferring to strike static industrial and transportation complexes. Later in the war the British would increase the amount of tactical cooperation with the ground forces, but in typical arrogant attitude would dismiss French tactical support as "unprofitable". Meanwhile, the policy of striking industrial and city targets in 1940 whatever may have been its merits, and these were probably very few with little benefits for the vital battle, was politically impossible due to French fears that it would instigate a bombing war where the Germans would bomb French cities, something that the inferior French air force would be unable to respond to. Coordination between the two air forces was extremely poor: in effect, they were both fighting different wars, and by the end of May 1940, the RAF had elected to abandon the French on the continent, retreating back to the UK.

*(INSERTED COMMENT: The terror bombinmg started after the Blitz. Priot to that Luftwaffe action, the RAF conducted pamphlet runs and port raids. I do agree with the author that the RAF was notably arrogant and incompetent as well as being intensely politicized much like the USAAF. M.)

Thus, in 1940, the British contribution to the continent, from one of the world's largest and most powerful air forces, was small and ineffective, and played an important part in their failure to support the French against the Germans and the resultant German victory in the West. By the end of May the small elements sent to France were already being withdrawn, essentially leaving the French on their own. The entire world would pay a bitter price for British stupidity and inflexibility for years to come.

Conclusion

Despite its many problems, the French air force probably did better than it would seem destined. It probably achieved some 550 aircraft shot down throughout the Battle of France, a hardly insignificant figure : balanced against this were slightly smaller losses of aircraft on its side in direct combat against the enemy, 400-500. However, adding in losses to destruction on the ground and accidents, both around 230, raise these numbers closer to 1,000, although the German air force also suffered from significant accident numbers which increased its losses. French fighters generally shot down more enemies than they lost, but a simple ratio like this tells little about an air force's effectiveness on a war. Similarly while the Germans never succeeded in the utter destruction of the armée de l'air, which continued to exist and even had more units at the end of the campaign than at the beginning (as greatly increased numbers of aircraft deliveries and produced aircraft became available), they accomplished their objective of preventing French aerial attacks on their advancing formations and on supporting their own ground troops.

As with many of the stories of the Battle of France, it was not for want of courage that the French military collapsed, but rather due to poor doctrine, insufficient preparation for many combat aspects that the Germans prepared, and poor planning. If the Armée de l'air failed, it was not alone in this.

Now I will add my two Euros. The problems of the Armée de l'air in the 1930s were not fixable in just terms of mere equipment or doctrine or material.  As with any human enterprise, the problem was human-centered. It was not that the French polity lacked the will or the means. That will was there, if disorganized. The LeO 45 series surely proved the technical knowledge and ability to move good products from the factory floor to the aerodrome was there. The airpower doctrine was flawed, but no more so than anyone else's, as the British and the Americans stubbornly would prove with their own incompetent efforts.        

What lacked was leadership and management. This usually is the case whenever a major disaster happens. 

What could good leadership do? Apply synergistics.

a. Unemployed French citizens? Concrete is cheap, France is fairly rich, and there are a lot of non-arable flat pieces of ground that scream "Pave me!" for all weather runways. 
b. The Republic of China through bitter experience learned to create a ground observer corps and construct a telephone system linking them back to fighter dorector centers, in some cases 100s of kilometers deep. This GOC took the place of radar and reported Japanese raiders at times up to an hour in advance of raid arrival over target. The Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) would be aloft and waiting. Why do you think the Japanese developed the A6M Zero? It was a bomber escort fighter for the China War long before it became the terror of the Pacific War.
c. France is not as deep as China, so a different method to establish a fighter wall has to be employed. A step-back from the frontier and layered primary and secondary air strips are obvious (As seen in the helpful historical map above, M.); but without aircraft shelters and a radar network, this does not work for France. Taking the American lesson from Pearl Harbor, putting up earth berms around aircraft hardstands, and at least provide spall overhead cover could have saved 200-250 machines destroyed on the ground.  Radar was present in the American case. ALERT 30 was sent to the fighter director center, but we know what happened then, don't we? Stupid leadership killed 2,500 people and lost a BILLION 1941 dollars of material. 
d. A "fighter wall" or air blockade, requires a good base structure, a ground support establishement (parts, fuel, munitions and mechanics) , and a pilot reserve force (at least 2 pilots per fighter so one can rest between sorties) and USE so that all of it can be exercised such that the sortie rates can be maintained.  You can trade "some" technical and material inferiority to the enemy, but you do have to practice with the tools at hand to know how to use them. Without massed practice in sham air operations, there is no familarity with the means available. The AdA did not do this.         

One technical note must be made.

e. Inadequate radios, no ground observer corps, no radar and an army with NO RADIOs for itself, much less to cooperate with the air force and a nation of drug-crazed penguins led by a baboon (A fairly good description of the Hitlerite regime.), could overcome France. Here was a simple quick if somewhat expensive fix that would take less than a year provided the French high command made the correct decisions in mid 1938. If France could not make the radios and we KNOW the British sets were garbage, then there was Holland or the United States.  They could provide.      

It really comes down to those two words: "stupid leadership".
 

[DMZ]

miletus12,

Once again, a very good analysis but somehow plaged by common errors or misconceptions. See below my comments.

Most famous among all of the problems plaguing the French air force was lack of sufficient planes, and an insufficient quality of the planes that the air force had.

That says it all. Starting production of the LN 161 in September 1936 would, as I seem to have shown, have greatly improved this situation.

I will underline some aspects that could have been improved by the LN 161, but remember that I didn't change any organizational aspect.

the French, confident that D.520 production would quickly enable them to produce enough fighters to match the Germans, had sold hundreds of MS.406s and other aircraft to Turkey and Finland, as well as sending important groups of modern aircraft to Syria in preparation for a potential Balkans campaign.

Not exactly true, Finland and Turkey received a grand total of 75 Morane-Saulnier 406 out of 1084 produced. Adding 13 sold to China but retained in FIC where they fought against Japanese. Please remember MS 406 was to be withdraw from front line and no unit hase been disbanded for that. All exports have been stopped from September 1939 to February 1940.

In Lebanon, there was only one Groupe de chasse with 24 MS 406.

French difficulties in matters of production capacity were further amplified by a heterogenous aircraft production.

The main reason of the numerous different types of fighters in AdA (MS 406, MB 151-152-155, H-75, D.520) was due to the bad performance and the difficulties of production of the Morane-Saulnier 406. The Nieuport 161 speed and climb rate, will have addressed the first point. Its ease of construction, similar to the D.520 would have settled the second. That's why there is only LN 161-162 in French Air Force in my uchrony.

Out of 24 groupements de chasse present in France in May, 1940, 10 were re-equipping at the beginning or re-equipped throughout the campaign with either new French or American fighters, thus impacting readiness.
Only one fighter: LN 161-162...

French production was improving rapidly throughout the 1940, but like with American aircraft, the new planes arrived too late to make much of an impact. The French had gambled on being able to put their 1936 model planes into production, such as the new D.520, LeO 451, Amiot 354, Breguet 693s, and other aircraft, and had henceforth cancelled the production of MS.406 - just when its production was starting to hit its stride. If they had instead chosen a more gradual phase in of their new aircraft instead of placing all of their bets on being able to produce them in sufficient number for Spring 1940, they might have been able to come much closer to match the Luftwaffe in the air.

I fully desagree, testimony of a GC commander flying on MS 406: " Nos avions, mais ils font de nous d'excellentes cibles pour le tir aux pigeons ! "
"Our planes, there made us perfect target for turkey shoot!"
Replacing the MS 406 as soon as possible was the best decision to save the lives of French pilots.

Pilots

A reduced curriculum for pilots, changing from 3 years to 6 months, entered into service in 1939, but as with other French proposals, it was too late to have an effect.

I assume that pilots shortage would have arrose earlier should the LN 161 have been chosen due to the earlier delivery, and such decision should have been taken one year earlier, delivering effect on time. The second bottleneck was the shortage of advanced planes in CIC (Centre d'instrution à la chasse, Advance Fighting School), with more fighters, the third school in FAN would have been oppened in 1939 instead of 1940.
There was other bottlenecks that couldn't have been avoided.

(INSERTED COMMENT: The average climb rate of the H75 was 17 m/s. To reach combat air patrol atitude (5,000 meters) from rolling start on the runway took 300 seconds. RADAR which would give at least 5 minutes warning: about 60 kilometers out at 100 m/s at ANGELs 3,000 which was the typical German bomber operating characteristic and time of flight in 1940, would have meant the AdA would had been able to alert 5 with step-back from the frontier of about 100 kilometers. That is 55 nautical miles at 15,000 feet altitude at alert 5 in USN speak. M.)

It took 40 seconds less to the LN 161 to reach 5,000 m level, that is 4 km for the intruder, not so much but not to be neglected.

This meant that much of the French airpower that did exist was scattered with fighters behind the front, and local air defense units of small detachments of planes for factory defense, which played almost no role in the 1940 campaign.
False. Most of the fighters was devoted to the Army and the DAT (Défense Aérienne du Territoire) patrols was created on May 1th or after, using manly second hand fighters manned by civilian or foreigner pilots.

The French air force was intensely linked to the army by its doctrine, for supporting it by protecting it via its fighters, conducting reconnaissance, and launching bombing raids on enemy front-line troops and rear area targets.

Having more GC would have freed more units for general Vuillemin giving him opportunity to apply his stategy. The LN 161-162 higher production would had allowed that.

French troops advancing into the Netherlands to support the country against the Germans were granted multiple groups of naval dive bombers to support them, but French commanders apparently didn't even think of using them to attack German units holding positions during their advance into the country.

Not only did the French have insufficient aircraft, but the aircraft they had were often not even used, as the French LN.401 dive bombers showed.

False, the LN 401-411 was used on ground targets, achieving good results at the expense of most of them shooted down mainly by the Flak in three missions. At least one mission was carried out to support the Ire Armée advancing into the Netherlands.

The French had built up a very large number of observation and reconnaissance aircraft, but had not built up the fighter fleet needed to protect them.

False, there was a doctrine but the lack of coordination and the poor speed of the MS 406 made too many reconnaissance aircraft shot down without proper fighter cover.

the lack of detailed information had critical ramifications on certain stages of the battle, such as the inability to determine the precise dispositions and advance orientation of German troops after the breakthrough at Sedan.

False, the reconnaissance flights had correclty identified the main axes of progression before May 10th and until Sedan but the information was rejected by Hight Command. After Sedan, all was lost into the panic and disorganization. Please re-read "Flight to Arras" by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry.

Huntziger was told the situation by his air recon, by his scouts and by his cavalry screen, but a combination of army tactical radio network failure and an idiot in command, made the information arrive too late and the idiot being too stupid to make the correct countermoves once the French air told him that the Germans were in a massive traffic jam stalled in the Ardennes. Big fat ARTILLERY target and Huntziger just played ducks and drakes for 72 hours. And do not get me started on Gamelin. M.

I fully agree.

I also agree on your comment on the strategic role of the RAF.

If I agree with your conclusion:

It really comes down to those two words: "stupid leadership".

I desagree on general Vuillemin. He was an officer out of the ranks and consequently disdained by the Armée de terre. He really tried to improve the situation and almost succeded in building a simplier and independant organization but was doomed at the end. He was advocating for small planes instead of big multi-engine bombers and tried to address the pilots' issue with general Mouchard. He lacked strength of character to face the Establishment and to reach his goals.

[miletus12]

Mar 27, 2023 17:12:38 GMT DMZ said:

In Lebanon, there was only one Groupe de chasse with 24 MS 406.

That was symoptomatic of frittering away the resource in driblets. Air forces are like navies, they can flow anywhere where they can fly, but they are ultimately logistically tied to their air bases and the plane's endurance aloft. If the air base is in Syria, then the airplane is not fighting Germans, is it?

Mar 27, 2023 17:12:38 GMT DMZ said:

Starting production of the LN 161 in September 1936 would, as I seem to have shown, have greatly improved this situation.

I will underline some aspects that could have been improved by the LN 161, but remember that I didn't change any organizational aspect.

the French, confident that D.520 production would quickly enable them to produce enough fighters to match the Germans, had sold hundreds of MS.406s and other aircraft to Turkey and Finland, as well as sending important groups of modern aircraft to Syria in preparation for a potential Balkans campaign.

Not exactly true, Finland and Turkey received a grand total of 75 Morane-Saulnier 406 out of 1084 produced. Adding 13 sold to China but retained in FIC where they fought against Japanese. Please remember MS 406 was to be withdraw from front line and no unit hase been disbanded for that. All exports have been stopped from September 1939 to February 1940.

I think I covered this one, but lets try another way:

Loire-Nieuport L.N.161 1935

During 1934, the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire amalgamated with the Societe Nieuport-Astra to result in the Groupement Aviation Loire-Nieuport. The two concerns maintained separate design offices which, at times, were to find themselves in competition, a case in point being the LN 161. This, like the Loire 250, was intended to meet the requirements of the 1934 Service Technique specification for a new single-seat fighter. Designed by engineers Mary and Dieudonne, it was of advanced structural concept with an all-metal monocoque fuselage and a metal stressed-skin wing. Armament comprised a 20mm engine-mounted cannon and two wing-mounted 7.5mm machine guns. Although designed for the 860hp Hispano-Suiza 12Ycrs engine, the non-availability of this power plant dictated installation of a 690hp HS 12Xcrs engine driving a twobladed fixed-pitch propeller. The prototype flew as the Nieuport 160 on 5 October 1935. In the following November, it was returned to the factory for various modifications and installation of the definitive engine, resuming flight test at the end of March 1936 as the Nieuport 161 fitted with a three-bladed two-pitch propeller. The prototype showed considerable promise and was the favoured contender for Armee de l'Air orders, three additional prototypes being contracted. The first prototype crashed on 22 September 1936, and the second prototype, temporarily designated SNCAO 161 (Loire-Nieuport having meanwhile been absorbed by the Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques de l'Ouest), did not enter flight test until 15 October 1937. The third prototype, bearing the definitive designation of Loire-Nieuport 161, followed in March 1938. During the next month, the second prototype was written off in a landing accident, but the results of testing were by then of purely academic interest as the Morane-Saulnier contender had been ordered into production. Consequently, the fourth prototype was not completed.

================================================================================

Specification
WEIGHTS
Take-off weight 2278 kg 5022 lb
Empty weight 1748 kg 3854 lb
DIMENSIONS
Wingspan 11.00 m 36 ft 1 in
Length 9.56 m 31 ft 4 in
Height 2.95 m 10 ft 8 in
Wing area 15.00 m2 161.46 sq ft
PERFORMANCE
Max. speed 478 km/h 297 mph

I want to point out two things that really bother me about the LN 161. It had a finicky center of mass which means that a more powerful heavier aeroengine was not possible to install into it without a major ballast redistribution. This can be seen in the example of the Curtiss Hawk series planes, where that inept aircraft designer Don Berlin just tried to rehash an old P-36 air frame and plonk a new engine in its nose to produce the P-40 which was a mediocre bird. Another example is the Spitfire which never outgrew its role as a target defense interceptor because the airframe was too small to take a bigger heavier engine and a ton of added fuel to support the desired added range for bomber escort.

Both of those examples were dustbinned by the P-51 Mustang, which was designed to purpose. What I mean is that the AdA Technical Department was not wrong at the time to choose the Morane. A flying brick that could take progressively more powerful aeroengines was of more use in the immediate 1935 AdA future than a design limited dead end, no matter how 'modern" and clean it looked on its wheels. 

Mar 27, 2023 17:12:38 GMT DMZ said:

The main reason of the numerous different types of fighters in AdA (MS 406, MB 151-152-155, H-75, D.520) was due to the bad performance and the difficulties of production of the Morane-Saulnier 406. The Nieuport 161 speed and climb rate, will have addressed the first point. Its ease of construction, similar to the D.520 would have settled the second. That's why there is only LN 161-162 in French Air Force in my uchrony.

Out of 24 groupements de chasse present in France in May, 1940, 10 were re-equipping at the beginning or re-equipped throughout the campaign with either new French or American fighters, thus impacting readiness.
Only one fighter: LN 161-162...

As previously mentioned the Morane for all of its outdated constgruction methods and the difficulties involved with getting it out of the factory, it still at the time, had one advantage. It could be fitted with a better engine. That was what the Finns and Swiss did. WATTS was the baseline for WWII fighters. That was what limited performance characteristics.

========================================================   

Mar 27, 2023 17:12:38 GMT DMZ said:

I fully desagree, testimony of a GC commander flying on MS 406: " Nos avions, mais ils font de nous d'excellentes cibles pour le tir aux pigeons ! "
"Our planes, there made us perfect target for turkey shoot!"
Replacing the MS 406 as soon as possible was the best decision to save the lives of French pilots.

I translated "pigeons" but I get the point. The MS406 was "heavy": hence my description of it as a flying brick. But then what? The point of the watts is to add work on and through the propeller. Drag, lift, gravity, thrust.  The "horsepower to weight" of the era was never the right mantra; it was "watts through props".

========================================================

Mar 27, 2023 17:12:38 GMT DMZ said:

It took 40 seconds less to the LN 161 to reach 5,000 m level, that is 4 km for the intruder, not so much but not to be neglected.

     
 
I used the H75 as the base example to illustrate why RADAR was more important than some fighter. If you can get aloft and you have radio and you have a fighter director to guide you in, then you can position your fighters respective to the enemy to have the first firing pass initiative. Air combat history has taught us that 80% of aircraft kills are ambush kills from first firing pass.  

=========================================================

Mar 27, 2023 17:12:38 GMT DMZ said:

read "Flight to Arras" by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry.

That is why I had high confidence in stating that French air recon had told Huntziger what happened in the Ardennes and why I called him an imbecile. 

========================================================= 

Let me summarize again. Air forces are composed of thousands of systems, even in 1940. No single magic bullet is going to alter the outcome of such a complex system  of systems if the fundamentals are ignored. 

By your testimony, Joseph Vuillemin knew what the poroblems were; but like General Short, when he had some common sense solutions to fix some of his problems that he did not need army permission to do, such as build up a GOC or talk to his RAF counterparts and ask for radar support or redistribute aircraft or ask the air ministry to make sure planes were delivered in operational condition instead of forwarded sans guns, radios or still in the shipping crates. He did none of those things. 

What am I to conclude?

M.     

[DMZ]

Mar 27, 2023 17:45:07 GMT miletus12 said:

I want to point out two things that really bother me about the LN 161. It had a finicky center of mass which mweans that a more powerful heavier aero-engine was not possible to install into it without a major ballast redistribution.

Where did you see the LN 161 had a finicky center of mass? I have read lots of documents including official ones in SHD (Service Historique de la Défense) and never saw it.

Remember that it initialy flew as LN 160 with a 12Xcrs engine weighing 380 kg. It was replaced by a 12Ycrs (12Y 31) weighing 468 kg on the very same airframe to become the LN 161 within two months.

Mar 27, 2023 17:45:07 GMT miletus12 said:

What I mean is that the AdA Technical Department was not wrong at the time to choose the Morane. A flying brick that could take progressively more powerful aeroengines was of more use in the immediate 1935 AdA future than a design limited dead end, no matter how 'modern" and clean it looked on its wheels.

Flying a brick is flying a brick, not a fighter.

Why the hell chosing a plane not able to reach 400 km/h when you have another one achieving 478 km/h with the same engine at the same time (1936). Remember the LN 161-03 flew at 498 km/h (1938) when theMS 406 hardly reached 465 km/h three years later (1939). And moreover, the climbing rate was and remained horrible (400 seconds to 4,000 m!), that was the worst defect of this plane, lots of pilots being killed when failing to escape on vertical plan.

When you read in an official report that the head of CEMA (Air Ministry Technical Department) told the Minister and general Vuillemin during a "Comité du Matériel" meeting that the MS 406 was able to 480 km/h when it didn't even achieved 440 km/h at that time, you can understand that I hate those people who, for undetermined reasons, lied to impose a very bad fighter to the AdA, having perhaps a bigger responsibility in the French collapse than Gamelin himself.

[miletus12]

Mar 27, 2023 19:34:55 GMT DMZ said:

Where did you see the LN 161 had a finicky center of mass? I have read lots of documents including official ones in SHD (Service Historique de la Défense) and never saw it.

Here.

It is obvious.


took along crossword

Mar 27, 2023 19:34:55 GMT DMZ said:

Flying a brick is flying a brick, not a fighter.

Both a flying brick and a fighter.

Mar 27, 2023 19:34:55 GMT DMZ said:

Why the hell chosing a plane not able to reach 400 km/h when you have another one achieving 478 km/h with the same engine at the same time (1936). Remember the LN 161-03 flew at 498 km/h (1938) when theMS 406 hardly reached 465 km/h three years later (1939). And moreover, the climbing rate was and remained horrible (400 seconds to 4,000 m!), that was the worst defect of this plane, lots of pilots being killed when failing to escape on vertical plan.

I think y/z axis? (dive / climb). The problem with the history cited is that the LN 161 was a crasher because of the problems I mentioned above.

[DMZ]

LN 161 - Retreat of Norway

April 28 - The Decision to abandon Central Norway was taken.

May 1 - King Haakon VII and his government arrive in Tromsø.

May 2 - Sickleforce escaped at Åndalsnes just hours before the German 196th Division captured the port.

Maurice Force is evacuated from Namsos.

May 3 - The air cover from the few Curtiss P-36 gives opportunity to part of the remains of 5th Norvegian division to escape with fisher boats to Rørvik on Inner Vinka island. Out of 100 officers and nearly 2,000 mens, half could be saved from captivity (1).

May 5 - Germans start the pursuit of the Norwegian I/IR 14 from Grong, East of Namsos, to Mosjøen, 190 km to the North.

May 7 - The defenders of Hegra fort surrender, leading to the end of organized Norwegian resistance in central Norway (2).

May 8 - The British take over the defense of Mosjøen.

May 10 - Germans land at Hemnesberget, 50 km North of Mosjøen with the small coaster Nord Norge and two Dornier floatplanes without opposition.

Cuiser Cairo and destoyer Zulu destroy the Nord Norge with most of the supply not yet get ashore.
Furter attemps to resupply German force with floatplanes are hampered by the P-36s (3).

May 11 - Threatened by the German advance, Hattfjeldal field is abandonned and the P-36s flew to Bardufoss.

May 12 - Abandonment of Mosjøen.

May 14 - The Polish liner MS Chrobry is attacked in the Vestfjorden by dive bombers and badly damaged despite the intervention of P-36s that perturb the intruders and prevent them to finish off the wounded ship. The 1st Irish Guards onboard the liner suffers some casualties but could be landed in Bodø with most of its equipment (4).

May 15 - Germans take Finneid, British and Norvegians retreat to Mo i Rana - Selfors.

May 17 - The HSM Effingham run aground in a nearow channel and cannot be cleared. Most of the equipement of the 24th Brigade is lost.

British decide to rely only on more safer Norvegian trawlers and coasters for logistic.

May 19 - Norwegian patrol boats Heilhorn et Honningsvåg sank the trawler Albion. Germans abandon the seaway to resupply their troops.

May 20 - Mo i Rana falls.

May 21 - RAF 263 Squadron lands at Bardufoss, reinforcing the last five operational Norwegian P-36s.

May 23 - Reinforced by the 1st Irish Guards, the 1st Scots Guards resists at Krokstranda for two days (5).

May 26 - RAF 36 Squadron on Hurricanes is operational in Bardufoss.

May 27 - First skirmishs at Storjord, 30 km north of Arctic Circle. The 24th Brigade is now complete with the 2nd South Wales Borderers, reinforced with two Independant Companies and three Mk VI light tanks.

Big aerial unoposed raid against Bodø (6).
Narvik retaken by Allies.

May 28 - Frontal German attack failed.

May 30 - Being outflanked once more, Gubbins orders a fall back to Pothus, 10 km south of Rognan, last village on the Skjerstad Fjord. Number 2 and Number 3 Independent Companies are left back to ambush Germans on the narrow valley from the mountain walls.

(1) IOTL, all these men surrendered.
(2) Two more days of resistance, thanks to the aerial support given by the Norwegian Curtiss.
(3) IOTL, the lost equipement have been resupplied by floatplanes, enabling Germans to move forward quickly.
(4) IOTL, without air opposition, the Chrobry was devastated by German bombers and all equipment, including the only british tanks available in Norway, was lost. First Irish Guards had to be brought back to Harstad and re-equiped.
(5) IOTL, British withdraw from Krokstranda this very day.
(6) Could have happened earlier as Hattfjeldal was already cleared and paved by the Norwegians.