Countering Plan Z - What would the Royal Navy have done?

[lordroel]

Countering Plan Z - What would the Royal Navy have done?

Do not think there is a thread for this, but a while back Drachinifel posted a video discussing the Royal Navy’s probable response to the German Plan Z. Part of the plan involves expansion of the battleship fleet to 31 ships*, including six Lion-class successor ships, to be laid down in 1940-1942. That said, there is no plan for what such a ship would be. So, how would you design it among other ships in the Royal Navy if there is no war until at least 1945.

[miletus12]

Dec 5, 2021 11:02:53 GMT lordroel said:

Countering Plan Z - What would the Royal Navy have done?

Do not think there is a thread for this, but a while back Drachinifel posted a video discussing the Royal Navy’s probable response to the German Plan Z. Part of the plan involves expansion of the battleship fleet to 31 ships*, including six Lion-class successor ships, to be laid down in 1940-1942. That said, there is no plan for what such a ship would be. So, how would you design it among other ships in the Royal Navy if there is no war until at least 1945.

While I respect Drachinifel's historicity and his scholarship with real naval events and outcomes, I do not tend to agree with his take on naval theory. Part of this is a direct 21st century hindsight, but another part is an imaginative exercise of taking what the people responsible of the era knew and could reasonably expect.

There were two ways to look at the German problem that such RN CNS naval authorities as Admirals Ernle Chatfield and Roger Backhouse could anticipate. Both individuals were aware of the Wegener Thesis and of the thinking of Erich Raeder, though not so familiar with the ideas of Karl Donitz. This was because the Germans published their own naval thinking as lessons learned from the Great War.

I suppose that the arguments among the interwar German admirals can be simplified as to how to conduct a guerre de course, since almost all the German admirals agreed that the Tirpitz risk fleet idea was discredited by Jutland and the idea of distant blockade.

In other words, the Germans had reread their Mahan and finally cognated that it was not decisive battle that was the object of Mahan's work; but use and denial of the sea and that the twin elements of blockade and trade defense were the mechanisms that provoked "decisive battle" as a derivative result of a naval campaign. That the naval campaign, itself, was geographically driven by shoreline constraints adjacent to thr sea and that it was the form and function of the naval campaign which was simplified down to the use and denial of the sea as means of transport from port to port that was the true heart of Alfred Thayer Mahan.

The British were thinking differently. The navy was an instrument of state policy and war strategy and it purely existed to project that national policy and strategy. This was Corbett and it was wrong. One can see this error in the continuous admiralty preoccupation with ideas like "power projections" and targeted interruption of trade schemes such as Operation Paul against Germany, or the Allied Norway Campaign, the misuse of the new naval tools of the aircraft carrier and shore based long ranged maritime patrol aircraft and attempts to thrust surface fleets into the South China Sea and the Baltic.

Add to this error the constant bean counting simplification that plagued British admiralty thinking. This type of thinking led to the error of the KGVs, a badly compromised battleship design which was supposed to be an example for other nations to follow as to what the upper limit of battleships under an arms control regime should look like. Well, how did that work out? Not too good. Neither ally (France) or enemy (Japan, Germany, Italy) paid any attention to British thinking or desires and Britain's competitor, the United States was not even thinking Corbett at all. *(They had their own problems with Stark and Turner and Leahy, but at least they had Mahan to keep them straight. Plan Dog was the worst piece of strategic nonsense ever produced by an American military professional. Thank goodness there was Marshall to counteract Stark and Leahy.^1)

^1 Most of this analysis comes from Samuel Eliot Morison and Andrew Boyd. Morison wrote extensively about the Germans and US thinking in his epic history of the USN in WWII. Andrew Boyd covers a lot of RN thinking here:

link 1.

and

link 2.

Summarizing further; the British sought to maintain "coverage" with battle fleets by region and theater without paying attention to the actual mechanisms of use and denial of the trade lanes. They thought "presence" was enough and they counted that "presence" as in numbers of battleships and patrolling trade protection cruisers. Like Raeder, the Pound crew were thinking of surface raiders as being projected by Germany and Italy and Japan either into the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean or Indian Ocean. The British bean counted what they thought they needed to counter two oceans and confidently thought they would be able to command an ally to cover the ocean the RN would not be able to establish presence in.

Hence the 31 battleship number Drachinifel asserts was never a real planning number. The British lacked the capacity to build such a fleet. It was more like replace the R's with the Lions, build the KGVs to play treaty politics with the Yanks, modernize the QEs and the battlecruisers and build up a force of trade protection cruisers and sprinkle with a few aircraft carriers to splice the gaps and to keep pace with the Americans and Japanese. That was Dudley Pound and company reading their Julian Corbett and being mindful of what build limits were in British capacity and hoping for a more realistic 20 battleships, 60 cruisers and maybe a dozen fleet carriers.

In that schema, with presence they would handle the North Atlantic expecting a couple of Raeder surface raider groups built around a flattop, 3 or 4 battleships, a couple of escort heavy 0cruisers and a trio of "panzer ships" (armored cruisers in the 19th century sense of the word) which would "by presence" disrupt the normal flow of South American and North American trade and interrupt empire trade into the Indian Ocean area. France would cover the Italians and the British would allocate a presence fleet to Singapore to overawe the Japanese. When France fell, the British substituted the Americans into the Atlantic, assumed they would handle the Mediterranean themselves and also the Indian Ocean. That was what they planned. How did that work out?

Not well at all.

========================================================

Raeder never built his Z fleet and Hitler and crew never paid attention to his guerre de course scheme. The NAZI regime adopted Wegener (Seize Norway and the French Atlantic coasts.) and the U-boat weapon and tried and failed to fight a sea denial war. This was not what the British expected. Pearl Harbor and the thrust east by the Japanese was not what the British expected, either.

Being practical, the British built escorts (too late), relearned 18th century naval convoy warfare and applied Mahan in practice while continuing to deride him in theory. Admiral Pound and his protege' Admiral Phillips lost the empire and Somerville hung on to the western Indian Ocean sea lines of communication only by the paint of his obsolete ships' sea-ruined hulls in 1942 after being defeated off Sri Lanka. What happened in the Atlantic was a severe shortage of escorts for the British who did not build enough of them to counter the 550 U-boats Germany built in 2 years. The Americans were caught destroyer short because they had to send everything they had afloat to the Pacific to stop the Japanese and thus they sacrificed their own Atlantic coastal and Caribbean coverage for a whole year until they could build enough replacement escorts of their own to cover the Allied deficits in the North Atlantic.

This is not what is taught in the popular histories, is it? The Allied navies got it wrong. They should have read Raoul Castex. and reread Mahan. Castex was all about the trade war and the interruption of sea lines of communication. Those, who paid attention, would have known that the airplane and the submarine were the decisive offensive naval weapons and would have planned and built accordingly.

Map.



According to Wegener, the Norwegian Fjords would allow the Germans to outflank coverage from the British east coast ports as far north as Scapa Flow. It was not until well after the Bismarck broke out into the North Atlantic that the incompetent RAF figured out it had to mount a recon presence in the Shetlands and Faeroes. As to that fiasco, it was an RN PBY that found Bismarck as she exited the Denmark Strait. One wonders what would have happened if the Home Fleet had decent air recon and shore based air support to catch Bismarck as she hugged Norway's coasts transiting the North Sea.

Similarly, one wonders about the Tirpitz. Naval power is not just ships. Perhaps it is a severe criticism to suggest that one lousy German battleship tied up a huge chunk of the Royal Navy to no purpose because nobody in the RN seemed to really think about bombing it out of existence until Barnes Wallis suggested it?

Air power theory is currently very much Alfred Thayer Mahan in its underpinnings.

[stevep]

  miletus12 ,

   A somewhat partisan description of events. There was a problem of limitations by the politicians, which lead to the KGV class.  They proved adequate militarily but failed to achieve their political aims, which is easy to predict in hindsight but unfortunately given the dire position of the RN after the WNT disaster and the political situation inside the UK, which like the US saw very powerful pacifistic elements.The big issue was not that the RN didn't build enough escorts for its needs.  As you pointed out it had far more than the USN when that entered the war, despite having two more years to prepare, although King's stupidity was a big issue here.  It was the unexpected loss of France which not only denied the use of its fleet but more importantly meant that the Germans could use ports on the Bay of Biscay.  After the mistakes made in WWI Britain was definitely aware of the threat to trade and shipping links and this showed in the following years when they had to fight hard to maintain that focus despite the lower priority given to it by the US military and political leadership.

  Similarly Britain didn't expect the USN to step in and cover the Atlantic after the fall of France.  For all of Churchill's beliefs about Roosevelt most of Britain's leaders knew that the US wasn't a reliable ally.  Hence the serious overstretch that resulted from a situation where it suddenly changed from Britain + France v Germany with a need to watch Italy and Japan to Britain v Germany + Italy with a need to watch a Japan now encouraged by the vulnerability of the British, French and Dutch colonies in the region.

  Also your missing the primarily point of the question.  Its what would the RN have done IF the Germans did wait until 44-45 and complete the Z Plan.  Which was pretty much impossible given the dire situation of the German economy without a continued stream of conquests.  In that circumstance and without the ruinous losses of WWII OTL then Britain could have afforded to have maintained a markedly larger fleet.  I agree that its unlikely to reach the proposed 31BBs but I suspect that in part it would be because the attention would have been switched to carriers more I suspect.

  Steve

[miletus12]

Dec 5, 2021 22:45:32 GMT stevep said:

  miletus12 ,

   A somewhat partisan description of events. There was a problem of limitations by the politicians, which lead to the KGV class.  They proved adequate militarily but failed to achieve their political aims, which is easy to predict in hindsight but unfortunately given the dire position of the RN after the WNT disaster and the political situation inside the UK, which like the US saw very powerful pacifistic elements.The big issue was not that the RN didn't build enough escorts for its needs.  As you pointed out it had far more than the USN when that entered the war, despite having two more years to prepare, although King's stupidity was a big issue here.  It was the unexpected loss of France which not only denied the use of its fleet but more importantly meant that the Germans could use ports on the Bay of Biscay.  After the mistakes made in WWI Britain was definitely aware of the threat to trade and shipping links and this showed in the following years when they had to fight hard to maintain that focus despite the lower priority given to it by the US military and political leadership.

As a technical exercise, for what the British wanted, the KGVs were about 5,000 tonnes short in displacement. Shock mounting was poorly implemented, subdivision of compartments was not well thought out and damage control as in flood control paths seemed to have been unheard of by British shipwrights.

a. Technically the KGVs had worse torpedo defense than the North Carolinas, which battleship design was generally known to be awful in that respect.
b. The KGVs' 35.6 cm artillery was not well designed for stable ballistic profiles in salvoes. In addition; the mechanical systems supporting transport of ammunition and propellant as well as the point and elevation of the artillery repeatedly failed on KGV and PoW. It was not until late 1943 in the North Cape Action that DoY gives evidence that British engineers had fixed those problems.
[/div]

  Similarly Britain didn't expect the USN to step in and cover the Atlantic after the fall of France.  For all of Churchill's beliefs about Roosevelt most of Britain's leaders knew that the US wasn't a reliable ally.  Hence the serious overstretch that resulted from a situation where it suddenly changed from Britain + France v Germany with a need to watch Italy and Japan to Britain v Germany + Italy with a need to watch a Japan now encouraged by the vulnerability of the British, French and Dutch colonies in the region.

Actually if one reads Plan Dog and the minutes of the ABC 1 and ABC 2 conferences that is exactly what Pound and Stark agreed to do. As to a reliable ally... FDR was not the fool the British thought he was. Once he fired Stark and hired King, he had his own ideas about how the naval war would be fought. I will have something to write about the myth surrounding King in a moment.

  Also your missing the primarily point of the question.  Its what would the RN have done IF the Germans did wait until 44-45 and complete the Z Plan.  Which was pretty much impossible given the dire situation of the German economy without a continued stream of conquests.  In that circumstance and without the ruinous losses of WWII OTL then Britain could have afforded to have maintained a markedly larger fleet.  I agree that its unlikely to reach the proposed 31BBs but I suspect that in part it would be because the attention would have been switched to carriers more I suspect.

  Steve

I noticed some things in the statement about that I missed the thesis about Plan Z.

I did cover what the British "could have done" to handle the Raeder plan.

They could have used air power. They were building a bomber force after all. Geography (Jomini) gave them interior lines in the naval and air power sense. As Operation Rhine illustrated (see map)



As an exercise in how to stop Plan Z operations, notice how air coverage out of the Shetlands, Orkneys and Faeroes should have worked to force multiply the Home Fleet and double its effective combat power? Never happened throughout WWII. Why? Bomber Harris was fixated on the Ruhr. Later I will comment on how King handled HAP Arnold who bollixed a similar problem for the USN.

One might now turn to who was responsible for the Atlantic Seaboard defensive mess in 1941-1942 until King tgook over in APRIL of that year. The man was the author of the Plan Dog Memo.

He was the most incompetent naval officer in the United States Navy. FDR packed him off to London to tour the British cocktail circuit and put in the man who famously said; “When they get in trouble, they send for the sons-of-bitches.”

King inherited Stark's mess with the torpedo crisis (Stark was BuOrd Actual when the Mark 13, 14, and 15 were screwed up 1934-1937.) , Drumbeat, the British collapse in the Indian Ocean, the ABDA crisis, and the Atlantic and Caribbean sea frontiers defensive collapses. King could not really do anything about it until he assumed duties as CNO around March April 1942. He was rather quick once he got the authority so that by August 1942 he had some ad hoc defenses in place. Famously King is the one as LantFlt Actual who pushed for sonobuoys and acoustic ASW torpedoes. Both of those innovations were one year emergency programs that helped the Allied ASW effort by MARCH 1943. Those innovations famously neutered the U-boat snort innovation and made even that German attempt to hide from Allied naval air power totally ineffective.

He had to fight HAP Arnold for the VLR Liberator assets he wanted (See above for why.) out of Iceland and admittedly that was a huge mistake on his part not to go to the mat for it, but he got the Atlantic Gap closed at last by March 1943. The British never did figure that one out.

King's mistakes were real (Not pushing for escorts when he was asked for advice on The Two Ocean Bill, and resisting TORCH because it would interfere with WATCHTOWER, but as to his record as an admiral leading a navy from where he started?

But a lot of criticisms against him are based on misapprehension of what was actually happening when he took over as Chief of Naval Operations and had to retrieve the global disaster that the Allied naval war was in March April 1942. In point of fact the Allies were losing the naval war everywhere. The sour grapes crowd post-war (Leahy and Stark cliques who did not want to shoulder the blame for the 1942 catastrophes they caused by their incompetent leadership.) created a lot of myths around Ernest King, blaming HIM for the lack of resources and the misallocation of assets that was not his fault. Down to the present a lot of dubious scholarship has bought into these myths. The truth is that FDR knew exactly what he did when he made Leahy a supernumerary to a JCS run by Marshall and packed "Betty" Stark off to London to social gadfly to get him out of the way in a reverse Gatehouse move that kind of amused the British, who would later pack that incompetent off to Washington after he screwed up at El Alamein. Why not imitate success?

King won the global naval war. That is all that mattered, despite his real mistakes.

[stevep]

Dec 6, 2021 2:50:17 GMT miletus12 said:

Dec 5, 2021 22:45:32 GMT stevep said:

  miletus12 ,

   A somewhat partisan description of events. There was a problem of limitations by the politicians, which lead to the KGV class.  They proved adequate militarily but failed to achieve their political aims, which is easy to predict in hindsight but unfortunately given the dire position of the RN after the WNT disaster and the political situation inside the UK, which like the US saw very powerful pacifistic elements.The big issue was not that the RN didn't build enough escorts for its needs.  As you pointed out it had far more than the USN when that entered the war, despite having two more years to prepare, although King's stupidity was a big issue here.  It was the unexpected loss of France which not only denied the use of its fleet but more importantly meant that the Germans could use ports on the Bay of Biscay.  After the mistakes made in WWI Britain was definitely aware of the threat to trade and shipping links and this showed in the following years when they had to fight hard to maintain that focus despite the lower priority given to it by the US military and political leadership.

As a technical exercise, for what the British wanted, the KGVs were about 5,000 tonnes short in displacement. Shock mounting was poorly implemented, subdivision of compartments was not well thought out and damage control as in flood control paths seemed to have been unheard of by British shipwrights.

a. Technically the KGVs had worse torpedo defense than the North Carolinas, which battleship design was generally known to be awful in that respect.
b. The KGVs' 35.6 cm artillery was not well designed for stable ballistic profiles in salvoes. In addition; the mechanical systems supporting transport of ammunition and propellant as well as the point and elevation of the artillery repeatedly failed on KGV and PoW. It was not until late 1943 in the North Cape Action that DoY gives evidence that British engineers had fixed those problems.

[/div]

  Similarly Britain didn't expect the USN to step in and cover the Atlantic after the fall of France.  For all of Churchill's beliefs about Roosevelt most of Britain's leaders knew that the US wasn't a reliable ally.  Hence the serious overstretch that resulted from a situation where it suddenly changed from Britain + France v Germany with a need to watch Italy and Japan to Britain v Germany + Italy with a need to watch a Japan now encouraged by the vulnerability of the British, French and Dutch colonies in the region.

Actually if one reads Plan Dog and the minutes of the ABC 1 and ABC 2 conferences that is exactly what Pound and Stark agreed to do. As to a reliable ally... FDR was not the fool the British thought he was. Once he fired Stark and hired King, he had his own ideas about how the naval war would be fought. I will have something to write about the myth surrounding King in a moment.

  Also your missing the primarily point of the question.  Its what would the RN have done IF the Germans did wait until 44-45 and complete the Z Plan.  Which was pretty much impossible given the dire situation of the German economy without a continued stream of conquests.  In that circumstance and without the ruinous losses of WWII OTL then Britain could have afforded to have maintained a markedly larger fleet.  I agree that its unlikely to reach the proposed 31BBs but I suspect that in part it would be because the attention would have been switched to carriers more I suspect.

  Steve

I noticed some things in the statement about that I missed the thesis about Plan Z.

I did cover what the British "could have done" to handle the Raeder plan.

They could have used air power. They were building a bomber force after all. Geography (Jomini) gave them interior lines in the naval and air power sense. As Operation Rhine illustrated (see map)



As an exercise in how to stop Plan Z operations, notice how air coverage out of the Shetlands, Orkneys and Faeroes should have worked to force multiply the Home Fleet and double its effective combat power? Never happened throughout WWII. Why? Bomber Harris was fixated on the Ruhr. Later I will comment on how King handled HAP Arnold who bollixed a similar problem for the USN.

One might now turn to who was responsible for the Atlantic Seaboard defensive mess in 1941-1942 until King tgook over in APRIL of that year. The man was the author of the Plan Dog Memo.

He was the most incompetent naval officer in the United States Navy. FDR packed him off to London to tour the British cocktail circuit and put in the man who famously said; “When they get in trouble, they send for the sons-of-bitches.”

King inherited Stark's mess with the torpedo crisis (Stark was BuOrd Actual when the Mark 13, 14, and 15 were screwed up 1934-1937.) , Drumbeat, the British collapse in the Indian Ocean, the ABDA crisis, and the Atlantic and Caribbean sea frontiers defensive collapses. King could not really do anything about it until he assumed duties as CNO around March April 1942. He was rather quick once he got the authority so that by August 1942 he had some ad hoc defenses in place. Famously King is the one as LantFlt Actual who pushed for sonobuoys and acoustic ASW torpedoes. Both of those innovations were one year emergency programs that helped the Allied ASW effort by MARCH 1943. Those innovations famously neutered the U-boat snort innovation and made even that German attempt to hide from Allied naval air power totally ineffective.

He had to fight HAP Arnold for the VLR Liberator assets he wanted (See above for why.) out of Iceland and admittedly that was a huge mistake on his part not to go to the mat for it, but he got the Atlantic Gap closed at last by March 1943. The British never did figure that one out.

King's mistakes were real (Not pushing for escorts when he was asked for advice on The Two Ocean Bill, and resisting TORCH because it would interfere with WATCHTOWER, but as to his record as an admiral leading a navy from where he started?

But a lot of criticisms against him are based on misapprehension of what was actually happening when he took over as Chief of Naval Operations and had to retrieve the global disaster that the Allied naval war was in March April 1942. In point of fact the Allies were losing the naval war everywhere. The sour grapes crowd post-war (Leahy and Stark cliques who did not want to shoulder the blame for the 1942 catastrophes they caused by their incompetent leadership.) created a lot of myths around Ernest King, blaming HIM for the lack of resources and the misallocation of assets that was not his fault. Down to the present a lot of dubious scholarship has bought into these myths. The truth is that FDR knew exactly what he did when he made Leahy a supernumerary to a JCS run by Marshall and packed "Betty" Stark off to London to social gadfly to get him out of the way in a reverse Gatehouse move that kind of amused the British, who would later pack that incompetent off to Washington after he screwed up at El Alamein. Why not imitate success?

King won the global naval war. That is all that mattered, despite his real mistakes.

[/quote][/div]

  Were any of the KGV in action between Denmark Straits and the sinking of Scharhorst apart from the forlorn hope that was force Z?  There were problems with KGV in the final battle against Bismarck but not cripplingly so.

  There were problems with the bomber barons, which was worsened by Churchill's support of them and I agree that it would have been better to have committed most of those resources to other areas, most noticeably the battle against the U boats.  As you say the US had a similar issue that it wasn't able to properly resolve either.

  The dramatic increase in losses in early 42 was however due to the USN's rejection of the idea of convoys and of using their warships for escort duties, instead pointless sweeps.  Along with other issues like the delay in getting a proper blackout established.  This continued for quite a while after April 42.

  Interesting that you criticism Stark so much given that he was a key supporter of King. 

  Arguably Roosevelt was a bigger fool that your suggesting.  With his eagerness to screw Britain into the ground while pandering to the Soviets, not helped by Truman continuing the former policy after the war.   Plus his failure to control US military operations caused a lot of problems.  The double advance in the Pacific/Far East, the obsession with N France at all costs, failure to reign in the US bomber barons being some of the most obvious that come to mind.

 

[miletus12]

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

  Were any of the KGV in action between Denmark Straits and the sinking of Scharhorst apart from the forlorn hope that was force Z?  There were problems with KGV in the final battle against Bismarck but not cripplingly so.

1. Denmark Strait...

a. Prince of Wales' aft turret was inoperative.
b. Prince of Wales' B mount main armament had a misfire of the port barrel.
c. Only 6 main armament barrels functioned as they ought in that action.
d. The fire control system packed it in. Cause? Shock of guns firing.
e. There was an attempt to court martial the captain because he ran for it after Hood blew up, (Churchill) but it was correctly pointed out (Tovey) that hanging around to add to the butcher's bill and Bismarck's glory would have been "insane".

2. KGV in action against Bismarck.

a. Shell ladders were observed to be widely dispersed,.
b. Reload problems were encountered at the midrange engagement.
c. Optics in the fore control fogged up.
d. Tovey decided to let Rodney mainly pommel Bismarck because that old girl was actually known to work well and he had reports of PoW's troubles and his own captain reported issues with KGV that were disturbingly similar.

3. Gulf of Siam Action.

a. One lousy puny Type 95 torpedo hit the PoW in the prop. That was all that was needed to sink her.
b. Attendant to that prop hit, the generator, actioned to the PTO shaft that served the screw and with no backup, died. No power to the AAA guns.
c. The PTO shaft snapped, the broken end backed out of its chocks and opened a flood path along the shaft alley straight to the engine room that was impossible to isolate or contain.
d. Due to longitudinal compartmentation (Not correctable in any of the KGVs.) as opposed to the transverse bulkhead scheme in American warships, the PoW turned turtle with an uncorrectable list, making her impossible to fight once some power was rigged up.
e. Compare with USS Pennsylvania or KMS Bismarck which suffered similar aerial torpedo hits.

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

  There were problems with the bomber barons, which was worsened by Churchill's support of them and I agree that it would have been better to have committed most of those resources to other areas, most noticeably the battle against the U boats.  As you say the US had a similar issue that it wasn't able to properly resolve either.

FDR ordered it done and it was done after King complained (Trident Conference). So... The US did remedy the situation. Meanwhile Western Approaches and Coastal Command had to await the replacement of Dudley Pound by The Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope before they got their own decent LRMP air cover (Same again. Trident Conference, One might note the interaction between Slessor (Coastal Command) and King?). You might have heard of Cunningham. He fought and won Matapan.

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

The dramatic increase in losses in early 42 was however due to the USN's rejection of the idea of convoys and of using their warships for escort duties, instead pointless sweeps.  Along with other issues like the delay in getting a proper blackout established.  This continued for quite a while after April 42.

LANTFLT had three destroyer flotillas and a cruiser division. They were running convoys to Iceland and out to England. Those "sweeps" were distant cover operations along the trade lanes... sanitation sweeps which were effective for the limited forces available, which seems to have escaped the notice of British historians who gloss over the ineptitude and incompetence of Coastal Command and Western Approaches to manage British coastal traffic at the same time period.

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

Interesting that you criticism Stark so much given that he was a key supporter of King. 

Is that why Stark politicked to have King beached and career dead-ended to the General Board? They hated each other.

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

Arguably Roosevelt was a bigger fool that your suggesting.  With his eagerness to screw Britain into the ground while pandering to the Soviets, not helped by Truman continuing the former policy after the war. " class="smile"]   Plus his failure to control US military operations caused a lot of problems.  The double advance in the Pacific/Far East, the obsession with N France at all costs, failure to reign in the US bomber barons being some of the most obvious that come to mind.

I do not disagree that FDR was out to destroy the British Empire. That was US policy for decades. Colonialism and imperialism, whatever its form, was an international evil that had to be removed if any system of international order and justice was to mature. As for Truman, he did not sell jet engines to the Russians, generate a nest of spies, that materially aided the Russians, nor did his administration just sit on its hands and fail to come up with a workable grand strategy that has so far prevented the immolation of humanity.

As for the US bomber barons? Big Week and the Transportation Plan = death of the Luftwaffe.

The double advance in the Pacific or more properly the Spruance / Halsey / MacArthur three step actually doubled the speed of the Pacific advance. It takes time to assemble logistics and plan operations. Having three headquarters working away cut time between operations from 6 months per op (Europe) down to 30 days to 6 weeks.

[stevep]

Dec 6, 2021 19:52:30 GMT miletus12 said:

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

  Were any of the KGV in action between Denmark Straits and the sinking of Scharhorst apart from the forlorn hope that was force Z?  There were problems with KGV in the final battle against Bismarck but not cripplingly so.

1. Denmark Strait...

a. Prince of Wales' aft turret was inoperative.
b. Prince of Wales' B mount main armament had a misfire of the port barrel.
c. Only 6 main armament barrels functioned as they ought in that action.
d. The fire control system packed it in. Cause? Shock of guns firing.
e. There was an attempt to court martial the captain because he ran for it after Hood blew up, (Churchill) but it was correctly pointed out (Tovey) that hanging around to add to the butcher's bill and Bismarck's glory would have been "insane".

2. KGV in action against Bismarck.

a. Shell ladders were observed to be widely dispersed,.
b. Reload problems were encountered at the midrange engagement.
c. Optics in the fore control fogged up.
d. Tovey decided to let Rodney mainly pommel Bismarck because that old girl was actually known to work well and he had reports of PoW's troubles and his own captain reported issues with KGV that were disturbingly similar.

3. Gulf of Siam Action.

a. One lousy puny Type 95 torpedo hit the PoW in the prop. That was all that was needed to sink her.
b. Attendant to that prop hit, the generator, actioned to the PTO shaft that served the screw and with no backup, died. No power to the AAA guns.
c. The PTO shaft snapped, the broken end backed out of its chocks and opened a flood path along the shaft alley straight to the engine room that was impossible to isolate or contain.
d. Due to longitudinal compartmentation (Not correctable in any of the KGVs.) as opposed to the transverse bulkhead scheme in American warships, the PoW turned turtle with an uncorrectable list, making her impossible to fight once some power was rigged up.
e. Compare with USS Pennsylvania or KMS Bismarck which suffered similar aerial torpedo hits.

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

  There were problems with the bomber barons, which was worsened by Churchill's support of them and I agree that it would have been better to have committed most of those resources to other areas, most noticeably the battle against the U boats.  As you say the US had a similar issue that it wasn't able to properly resolve either.

FDR ordered it done and it was done after King complained (Trident Conference). So... The US did remedy the situation. Meanwhile Western Approaches and Coastal Command had to await the replacement of Dudley Pound by The Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope before they got their own decent LRMP air cover (Same again. Trident Conference, One might note the interaction between Slessor (Coastal Command) and King?). You might have heard of Cunningham. He fought and won Matapan.

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

The dramatic increase in losses in early 42 was however due to the USN's rejection of the idea of convoys and of using their warships for escort duties, instead pointless sweeps.  Along with other issues like the delay in getting a proper blackout established.  This continued for quite a while after April 42.

LANTFLT had three destroyer flotillas and a cruiser division. They were running convoys to Iceland and out to England. Those "sweeps" were distant cover operations along the trade lanes... sanitation sweeps which were effective for the limited forces available, which seems to have escaped the notice of British historians who gloss over the ineptitude and incompetence of Coastal Command and Western Approaches to manage British coastal traffic at the same time period.

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

Interesting that you criticism Stark so much given that he was a key supporter of King. 

Is that why Stark politicked to have King beached and career dead-ended to the General Board? They hated each other.

Dec 6, 2021 16:49:29 GMT stevep said:

Arguably Roosevelt was a bigger fool that your suggesting.  With his eagerness to screw Britain into the ground while pandering to the Soviets, not helped by Truman continuing the former policy after the war. " class="smile"]   Plus his failure to control US military operations caused a lot of problems.  The double advance in the Pacific/Far East, the obsession with N France at all costs, failure to reign in the US bomber barons being some of the most obvious that come to mind.

I do not disagree that FDR was out to destroy the British Empire. That was US policy for decades. Colonialism and imperialism, whatever its form, was an international evil that had to be removed if any system of international order and justice was to mature. As for Truman, he did not sell jet engines to the Russians, generate a nest of spies, that materially aided the Russians, nor did his administration just sit on its hands and fail to come up with a workable grand strategy that has so far prevented the immolation of humanity.

As for the US bomber barons? Big Week and the Transportation Plan = death of the Luftwaffe.

The double advance in the Pacific or more properly the Spruance / Halsey / MacArthur three step actually doubled the speed of the Pacific advance. It takes time to assemble logistics and plan operations. Having three headquarters working away cut time between operations from 6 months per op (Europe) down to 30 days to 6 weeks.

a)  So three isolated clashes.  Two very early in the class''s career and with the POW not yet fully completed let alone worked up.  The 3rd ignoring the issue of the restarting of the shaft which seems to be the primary cause of the issue.  Compared to the failure of the South Dakota when it was paralyzed electrical damage.

b)  You have a point that Britain had a problem with the bomber barons [and Churchill] and the US had slightly more success in bringing them under control but the vast majority of US heavy bombers still went on raids into Europe with limited direct effect until the final months of the war when the advance of allied forces in France overrun most of their defence infrastructure.  I say direct impact as the primary role the daytime raids had was in breaking the Luftwaffe by drawing them into combat with long ranged escort fighters.

c)  Well according to sources those sweeps were useful for U boat commanders in checking their watches as they were so regular and did nothing to prevent any attacks.

d)  Interesting when wiki also says, under King's entry

King's career was resurrected by his friend, Admiral Harold "Betty" Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) who realized King's talent for command was being wasted on the General Board. Stark appointed him Commander, Atlantic Squadron, in 1940

e) BS and only an idiot would believe that.  The US was hostile to Britain because it was an economic and maritime rival.  Nothing else.  The US is on very rocky ground trying to claim any moral superiority in its imperial policy over Britain given its own behaviour.   It was doubly stupid because the two nations have very similar interests and a stronger Britain would be a serious boost to American security.

f)  Again BS.  Committing something like twice the resources to two different routes sped up nothing and was a massive resource drain.  It was a case of the US army and navy being unwilling to accept the primacy of the other.

[lordroel]

Can we go back to discussing what the Royal Navy would have have done regarding Plan Z, thanks.

[simon darkshade]

www.tapatalk.com/groups/alltheworldsbattlecruisers/rn-tentative-fleet-plan-by-sirgoodall-t8593.html

This is what you are after. The budget numbers aren’t available for the years that never happened, naturally, but we can look at the prewar years for what could be done per year:

1930: 52.274m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 4 sloops
1931: 51m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 minesweepers
1932: 50.164m, 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 minesweepers
1933: 53.443m 3 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 2 minesweepers
1934: 56.616m, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 2 sloops, 2 patrol vessels, 2 minesweepers.
1935: 64.887m, 3 6in cruisers, 16 destroyers, 3 submarines, 1 sloops, 2 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1936: 80.976m, 2 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 6in cruisers, 5 5.25in cruisers, 18 destroyers, 8 submarines, 2 sloops, 1 patrol vessel, 3 minesweepers
1937: 101.892m, 3 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 5 6in cruisers, 2 5.25in cruisers, 15 destroyers, 7 submarines, 3 sloops, 3 patrol vessels, 4 minesweepers.
1938: 126.17m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 4 6in cruisers, 3 5.25in cruisers, 3 fast minelayers, 3 submarines, 1 aircraft maintenance ship
1939 149.399m, 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 2 6in cruisers, 1 fast minelayer, 16 detroyers, 20 hunts, 2 sloops, 56 corvetes, 20 minesweepers

[belushitd]

when did plan Z become known to the British? I think we have to accept that there could have been no changes to the RN's building program until after the extent of plan Z was discovered. I am, of course, assuming it was secret at the time.

Once it becomes known, does the RN analyze it? Plan Z was ludicrous overreach on the part of the Kriegsmarine, as I don't think there was enough steel being made each year to provide the material needed for Plan Z as well as all the other various needs for steel in the Nazi war machine. If the RN looks at it and says "No way they can do this. Lets figure out what they CAN do, and build to meet that" that might be a better question to answer.

Belushi TD

[lordroel]

Dec 7, 2021 15:57:48 GMT belushitd said:

when did plan Z become known to the British? I think we have to accept that there could have been no changes to the RN's building program until after the extent of plan Z was discovered. I am, of course, assuming it was secret at the time.

Once it becomes known, does the RN analyze it? Plan Z was ludicrous overreach on the part of the Kriegsmarine, as I don't think there was enough steel being made each year to provide the material needed for Plan Z as well as all the other various needs for steel in the Nazi war machine. If the RN looks at it and says "No way they can do this. Lets figure out what they CAN do, and build to meet that" that might be a better question to answer.

Belushi TD

Well the Germans starting to build a lot of big ships might be a indication the Germans are trying to catch up with the Royal Navy, but even then the Royal Navy will always be bigger than the Kriegsmarine.

[stevep]

Dec 7, 2021 16:08:55 GMT lordroel said:

Dec 7, 2021 15:57:48 GMT belushitd said:

when did plan Z become known to the British? I think we have to accept that there could have been no changes to the RN's building program until after the extent of plan Z was discovered. I am, of course, assuming it was secret at the time.

Once it becomes known, does the RN analyze it? Plan Z was ludicrous overreach on the part of the Kriegsmarine, as I don't think there was enough steel being made each year to provide the material needed for Plan Z as well as all the other various needs for steel in the Nazi war machine. If the RN looks at it and says "No way they can do this. Lets figure out what they CAN do, and build to meet that" that might be a better question to answer.

Belushi TD

Well the Germans starting to build a lot of big ships might be a indication the Germans are trying to catch up with the Royal Navy, but even then the Royal Navy will always be bigger than the Kriegsmarine.

  That would be a big point in terms of knowledge of German plans, although possibly the Nazi desire to boast of their 'achievements' and military prestige might make that a bit easier if someone boasts a bit.  However the other issue here of course is that Britain has to consider Japan and Italy as well - along with possibly any intelligence coming out of the USSR about their mega-designs.  As such there will be substantial new construction even if Germany doesn't come near their over-ambitious plans.  Of course in reality without war, especially given such a programme the Nazi system is likely to implode within a couple of years.

[lordroel]

Taking this from the other thread on the forum, Doubt everything on this list will be completed before 1945 and also would older ships be decommissioned with newer ships entering service.

(Royal Navy) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

In 1936, the RN was the largest navy in the world and was responsible for holding together the vast British Empire. However, the RN was old and was quickly being outclassed by Japan and the US. Japan's navy in particular was considered the greatest threat to the RN, mostly because Japan's battleships and carriers were ahead of their western counterparts in terms of firepower, speed, and reliability, a direct result of Japanese ingenuity that was later copied by the other navies (see Japanese entry). To add to the RN's problems, due to the various naval treaties limiting the number and size of capital ships as well as the global depression, the RN was unable to modernize and had to rely on ships built during and shortly after WW1. The most important of which, when concerning the slow pace of RN modernization, was the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, which forbid construction of battleships for 10 years and limited all signatories to hard limits. The RN was hurt the most by the treaty, as it exceeded the capital ship limits right from the start. All of that changed as a result of the German Deutschland-class Heavy Cruisers launched in the early '30s.

The German Panzerschiffe prompted the French, who hadn't yet reached the treaty limitations on battleships, to begin construction of the Dunkerque-class Fast Battleship, which in turn prompted the Italians to begin construction of their Vittorio Veneto-class Battleships, which in turn prompted the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, ultimately cascading into a new global arms race involving the naval powers of the US, UK, USSR, Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands, Japan, and Spain. However, because the UK maintained strict treaty adherence even while Japan, its chief rival, withdrew from the treaty in '36, the RN's ships were outdated, outgunned, and ultimately outclassed by Japan's ships, and as a result the RN suffered horribly in the Asian theater.

The 1936 RN OOB, commissioned ships only:

3 Courageous-class Carriers

1 Hermes-class Escort Carrier

1 Eagle-class Escort Carrier

1 Argus-class Escort Carrier

2 Nelson-class Battleships

5 Revenge-class Battleships (8 ordered prior to WW1, 2 converted to Renown-class BCs, 1 never finished)

5 Queen Elizabeth-class Super Dreadnoughts (6 ordered prior to WW1, 1 never finished)

1 Admiral-class Battlecruiser (4 ordered prior to WW1, only the HMS Hood completed)

2 Renown-class Battlecruisers (converted Revenge-class BBs)

2 York-class Heavy cruisers (5 planned, 2 completed)

2 Norfolk-class Heavy Cruisers (4 planned, 2 completed)

4 London-class Heavy Cruisers

7 Kent-class Heavy Cruisers

4 Hawkins-class Heavy Cruisers (5 completed, 1 lost in the interwar period)

2 Arethusa-class Light Cruisers (6 ordered, 4 finished)

5 Leander-class Light Cruisers (8 ordered, all finished)

2 Emerald-class Light Cruisers (3 ordered, 2 finished)

8 Danae-class Light Cruisers (12 ordered, 8 finished)

13 C-class Light Cruisers (28 completed, 15 scrapped by '36)

18 E & F-class Destroyers

14 C & D-class Destroyers

20 A & B-class Destroyers

27 V & W-class Destroyers (67 ordered, 27 completed)

8 Scott-class Destroyers (10 ordered, 8 completed)

3 River-class Submarines

12 S-class Submarines (62 completed in total, most of the 50 not in service were lost during storms in the interwar period)

4 Rainbow-class Submarines (6 ordered, 4 completed)

6 Parthian-class Submarines

12 Odin-class Submarines

10 R-class Submarines (12 ordered, 10 completed)

26 H-class Submarines (42 completed, 8 lost pre-war, 6 sold to Chile, 2 transferred to Canada)

The 1936 RN OOB, launched ships only:

2 Arethusa-class Light Cruisers (2 more were planned but ultimately canceled)

18 G & H-class Destroyers

Additional commissioned ships by the start of the war

1 Ark Royal-class Aircraft Carrier (launched in '37, commissioned in '38, designed to provide protection against enemy aircraft)

10 Town-class Light Cruisers

9 I-class Destroyers

16 Tribal-class Destroyers

8 J-class Destroyers (9 ordered, 1 canceled)

1 K-class Destroyer

3 U-class Submarines

15 T-class Submarines (71 ordered, 18 cancelled)

Additional launched ships by the start of the war (aka they were "in the build queue")

3 Illustrious-class Aircraft Carriers (launched in '39)

2 King George V-class Battleships

2 Lion-class Battleships* (4 planned, all cancelled; these ships were never launched, but construction did start on them hence why they're included)

1 Pretoria Castle-class Escort Carrier (repurposed armed merchant ship, purchased by the RN in October '39)

4 Crown Colony-class Light Cruisers

5 Dido-class Light Cruisers

4 I-class Destroyers (these were meant to be sold to Turkey, but 2 were delivered to Turkey and the other 2 acquired by the RN)

7 K-class Destroyers

Ships completed by the end of the war:

2 Implacable-class Aircraft Carriers (launched in '42, completed in '44)

3 King George V-class Battleships

1 Unicorn-class Light Carrier (launched in '41, commissioned in '43)

4 Colossus-class Light Carriers (16 planned, 7 re-purposed, 1 cancelled)

2 Colossus-class Maintenance Carriers (repurposed Colossus CVLs, these ships were meant to act as mobile aircraft repair-yards, as RN carriers were too small to fulfill that role)

1 Activity-class Escort Carrier (launched & commissioned in '42)

3 Nairana-class Escort Carriers (launched in '42, 2 commissioned in '42, last commissioned in '43)

1 Audacity-class Escort Carrier (originally the German merchant ship Hannover, captured in '40 and repurposed as a CVE in '41)

3 Minotaur-class Light Cruisers (8 planned, 5 cancelled; the first was transferred to Canada immediately after commissioning. All ships launched in '43 and completed in '44)

7 Crown Colony-class Light Cruisers (1 was transferred to the New Zealand navy)

5 Battle-class Destroyers (5 done by the end of the war, 10 launched; 26 total finished; 2 were given to Australia)

8 C-class Destroyers

8 Z-class Destroyers

8 W-class Destroyers

8 V-class Destroyers

8 U-class Destroyers

8 T-class Destroyers

8 S-class Destroyers

8 R-class Destroyers

8 Q-class Destroyers

8 P-class Destroyers

8 O-class Destroyers

8 M-class Destroyers

8 L-class Destroyers

83 Hunt-class Destroyer Escorts

22 V-class Submarines (42 planned, 20 cancelled)

4 Oruç Reis-class Submarines (originally for the Turkish navy, requisitioned by the RN in '40)

46 U-class Submarines

38 T-class Submarines

Ships still under construction at the end of the war:

4 Audacious-class Aircraft Carriers (4 planned, 2 completed in the '50s, other 2 cancelled)

4 Colossus-class Light Carriers

5 Majestic-class Light Carriers (renamed and updgraded Colossus CVLs)

1 Vanguard-class Battleship (launched in '44, commissioned in '46)

10 Battle-class Destroyers

24 C-class Destroyers

46 Amphion-class Submarines (only 16 completed)

[stevep]

Dec 11, 2021 11:33:34 GMT lordroel said:

Taking this from the other thread on the forum, Doubt everything on this list will be completed before 1945 and also would older ships be decommissioned with newer ships entering service.

(Royal Navy) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

In 1936, the RN was the largest navy in the world and was responsible for holding together the vast British Empire. However, the RN was old and was quickly being outclassed by Japan and the US. Japan's navy in particular was considered the greatest threat to the RN, mostly because Japan's battleships and carriers were ahead of their western counterparts in terms of firepower, speed, and reliability, a direct result of Japanese ingenuity that was later copied by the other navies (see Japanese entry). To add to the RN's problems, due to the various naval treaties limiting the number and size of capital ships as well as the global depression, the RN was unable to modernize and had to rely on ships built during and shortly after WW1. The most important of which, when concerning the slow pace of RN modernization, was the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, which forbid construction of battleships for 10 years and limited all signatories to hard limits. The RN was hurt the most by the treaty, as it exceeded the capital ship limits right from the start. All of that changed as a result of the German Deutschland-class Heavy Cruisers launched in the early '30s.

The German Panzerschiffe prompted the French, who hadn't yet reached the treaty limitations on battleships, to begin construction of the Dunkerque-class Fast Battleship, which in turn prompted the Italians to begin construction of their Vittorio Veneto-class Battleships, which in turn prompted the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, ultimately cascading into a new global arms race involving the naval powers of the US, UK, USSR, Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands, Japan, and Spain. However, because the UK maintained strict treaty adherence even while Japan, its chief rival, withdrew from the treaty in '36, the RN's ships were outdated, outgunned, and ultimately outclassed by Japan's ships, and as a result the RN suffered horribly in the Asian theater.

The 1936 RN OOB, commissioned ships only:

3 Courageous-class Carriers

1 Hermes-class Escort Carrier

1 Eagle-class Escort Carrier

1 Argus-class Escort Carrier

2 Nelson-class Battleships

5 Revenge-class Battleships (8 ordered prior to WW1, 2 converted to Renown-class BCs, 1 never finished)

5 Queen Elizabeth-class Super Dreadnoughts (6 ordered prior to WW1, 1 never finished)

1 Admiral-class Battlecruiser (4 ordered prior to WW1, only the HMS Hood completed)

2 Renown-class Battlecruisers (converted Revenge-class BBs)

2 York-class Heavy cruisers (5 planned, 2 completed)

2 Norfolk-class Heavy Cruisers (4 planned, 2 completed)

4 London-class Heavy Cruisers

7 Kent-class Heavy Cruisers

4 Hawkins-class Heavy Cruisers (5 completed, 1 lost in the interwar period)

2 Arethusa-class Light Cruisers (6 ordered, 4 finished)

5 Leander-class Light Cruisers (8 ordered, all finished)

2 Emerald-class Light Cruisers (3 ordered, 2 finished)

8 Danae-class Light Cruisers (12 ordered, 8 finished)

13 C-class Light Cruisers (28 completed, 15 scrapped by '36)

18 E & F-class Destroyers

14 C & D-class Destroyers

20 A & B-class Destroyers

27 V & W-class Destroyers (67 ordered, 27 completed)

8 Scott-class Destroyers (10 ordered, 8 completed)

3 River-class Submarines

12 S-class Submarines (62 completed in total, most of the 50 not in service were lost during storms in the interwar period)

4 Rainbow-class Submarines (6 ordered, 4 completed)

6 Parthian-class Submarines

12 Odin-class Submarines

10 R-class Submarines (12 ordered, 10 completed)

26 H-class Submarines (42 completed, 8 lost pre-war, 6 sold to Chile, 2 transferred to Canada)

The 1936 RN OOB, launched ships only:

2 Arethusa-class Light Cruisers (2 more were planned but ultimately canceled)

18 G & H-class Destroyers

Additional commissioned ships by the start of the war

1 Ark Royal-class Aircraft Carrier (launched in '37, commissioned in '38, designed to provide protection against enemy aircraft)

10 Town-class Light Cruisers

9 I-class Destroyers

16 Tribal-class Destroyers

8 J-class Destroyers (9 ordered, 1 canceled)

1 K-class Destroyer

3 U-class Submarines

15 T-class Submarines (71 ordered, 18 cancelled)

Additional launched ships by the start of the war (aka they were "in the build queue")

3 Illustrious-class Aircraft Carriers (launched in '39)

2 King George V-class Battleships

2 Lion-class Battleships* (4 planned, all cancelled; these ships were never launched, but construction did start on them hence why they're included)

1 Pretoria Castle-class Escort Carrier (repurposed armed merchant ship, purchased by the RN in October '39)

4 Crown Colony-class Light Cruisers

5 Dido-class Light Cruisers

4 I-class Destroyers (these were meant to be sold to Turkey, but 2 were delivered to Turkey and the other 2 acquired by the RN)

7 K-class Destroyers

Ships completed by the end of the war:

2 Implacable-class Aircraft Carriers (launched in '42, completed in '44)

3 King George V-class Battleships

1 Unicorn-class Light Carrier (launched in '41, commissioned in '43)

4 Colossus-class Light Carriers (16 planned, 7 re-purposed, 1 cancelled)

2 Colossus-class Maintenance Carriers (repurposed Colossus CVLs, these ships were meant to act as mobile aircraft repair-yards, as RN carriers were too small to fulfill that role)

1 Activity-class Escort Carrier (launched & commissioned in '42)

3 Nairana-class Escort Carriers (launched in '42, 2 commissioned in '42, last commissioned in '43)

1 Audacity-class Escort Carrier (originally the German merchant ship Hannover, captured in '40 and repurposed as a CVE in '41)

3 Minotaur-class Light Cruisers (8 planned, 5 cancelled; the first was transferred to Canada immediately after commissioning. All ships launched in '43 and completed in '44)

7 Crown Colony-class Light Cruisers (1 was transferred to the New Zealand navy)

5 Battle-class Destroyers (5 done by the end of the war, 10 launched; 26 total finished; 2 were given to Australia)

8 C-class Destroyers

8 Z-class Destroyers

8 W-class Destroyers

8 V-class Destroyers

8 U-class Destroyers

8 T-class Destroyers

8 S-class Destroyers

8 R-class Destroyers

8 Q-class Destroyers

8 P-class Destroyers

8 O-class Destroyers

8 M-class Destroyers

8 L-class Destroyers

83 Hunt-class Destroyer Escorts

22 V-class Submarines (42 planned, 20 cancelled)

4 Oruç Reis-class Submarines (originally for the Turkish navy, requisitioned by the RN in '40)

46 U-class Submarines

38 T-class Submarines

Ships still under construction at the end of the war:

4 Audacious-class Aircraft Carriers (4 planned, 2 completed in the '50s, other 2 cancelled)

4 Colossus-class Light Carriers

5 Majestic-class Light Carriers (renamed and updgraded Colossus CVLs)

1 Vanguard-class Battleship (launched in '44, commissioned in '46)

10 Battle-class Destroyers

24 C-class Destroyers

46 Amphion-class Submarines (only 16 completed)

  lordroel,

  A few comments.

a)  The reason why the RN was "outdated, outgunned, and ultimately outclassed by Japan's ships" was less strict adherence to the 1936 Treaty than that because of the earlier treaties it had been basically frozen since pretty much 1919 and war came for Britain too early to do more than touch on new capital ships being completed.  Coupled with the collapse of France and the following heavy losses in the Med - as well as the idiotic losses of Courageous and Glorious - Britain was always playing catch up and staggered from crisis to crisis.

b)  Neither of the 1st two KGV class were commissioned by the start of the war.  Famously PoW went into the Denmark Straits battle with workers still on board completing part of the ship.

c)  The list above is basically OTL and hence dominated by events and especially the war.  If war hadn't occurred until ~1944/45 the RN would have been greatly different in terms of ships and capacity.  Definitely some of the older ships, especially the R class BBs would have been scrapped to free up manpower and money for newer ships but what exactly got built would have depended on circumstances.  Assuming of course no war with Japan or that Germany somehow last's until that date without imploding without loot from its OTL conquests.

  Steve

[lordroel]

Dec 11, 2021 13:56:10 GMT stevep said:

Dec 11, 2021 11:33:34 GMT lordroel said:

Taking this from the other thread on the forum, Doubt everything on this list will be completed before 1945 and also would older ships be decommissioned with newer ships entering service.

(Royal Navy) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

In 1936, the RN was the largest navy in the world and was responsible for holding together the vast British Empire. However, the RN was old and was quickly being outclassed by Japan and the US. Japan's navy in particular was considered the greatest threat to the RN, mostly because Japan's battleships and carriers were ahead of their western counterparts in terms of firepower, speed, and reliability, a direct result of Japanese ingenuity that was later copied by the other navies (see Japanese entry). To add to the RN's problems, due to the various naval treaties limiting the number and size of capital ships as well as the global depression, the RN was unable to modernize and had to rely on ships built during and shortly after WW1. The most important of which, when concerning the slow pace of RN modernization, was the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, which forbid construction of battleships for 10 years and limited all signatories to hard limits. The RN was hurt the most by the treaty, as it exceeded the capital ship limits right from the start. All of that changed as a result of the German Deutschland-class Heavy Cruisers launched in the early '30s.

The German Panzerschiffe prompted the French, who hadn't yet reached the treaty limitations on battleships, to begin construction of the Dunkerque-class Fast Battleship, which in turn prompted the Italians to begin construction of their Vittorio Veneto-class Battleships, which in turn prompted the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, ultimately cascading into a new global arms race involving the naval powers of the US, UK, USSR, Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands, Japan, and Spain. However, because the UK maintained strict treaty adherence even while Japan, its chief rival, withdrew from the treaty in '36, the RN's ships were outdated, outgunned, and ultimately outclassed by Japan's ships, and as a result the RN suffered horribly in the Asian theater.

The 1936 RN OOB, commissioned ships only:

3 Courageous-class Carriers

1 Hermes-class Escort Carrier

1 Eagle-class Escort Carrier

1 Argus-class Escort Carrier

2 Nelson-class Battleships

5 Revenge-class Battleships (8 ordered prior to WW1, 2 converted to Renown-class BCs, 1 never finished)

5 Queen Elizabeth-class Super Dreadnoughts (6 ordered prior to WW1, 1 never finished)

1 Admiral-class Battlecruiser (4 ordered prior to WW1, only the HMS Hood completed)

2 Renown-class Battlecruisers (converted Revenge-class BBs)

2 York-class Heavy cruisers (5 planned, 2 completed)

2 Norfolk-class Heavy Cruisers (4 planned, 2 completed)

4 London-class Heavy Cruisers

7 Kent-class Heavy Cruisers

4 Hawkins-class Heavy Cruisers (5 completed, 1 lost in the interwar period)

2 Arethusa-class Light Cruisers (6 ordered, 4 finished)

5 Leander-class Light Cruisers (8 ordered, all finished)

2 Emerald-class Light Cruisers (3 ordered, 2 finished)

8 Danae-class Light Cruisers (12 ordered, 8 finished)

13 C-class Light Cruisers (28 completed, 15 scrapped by '36)

18 E & F-class Destroyers

14 C & D-class Destroyers

20 A & B-class Destroyers

27 V & W-class Destroyers (67 ordered, 27 completed)

8 Scott-class Destroyers (10 ordered, 8 completed)

3 River-class Submarines

12 S-class Submarines (62 completed in total, most of the 50 not in service were lost during storms in the interwar period)

4 Rainbow-class Submarines (6 ordered, 4 completed)

6 Parthian-class Submarines

12 Odin-class Submarines

10 R-class Submarines (12 ordered, 10 completed)

26 H-class Submarines (42 completed, 8 lost pre-war, 6 sold to Chile, 2 transferred to Canada)

The 1936 RN OOB, launched ships only:

2 Arethusa-class Light Cruisers (2 more were planned but ultimately canceled)

18 G & H-class Destroyers

Additional commissioned ships by the start of the war

1 Ark Royal-class Aircraft Carrier (launched in '37, commissioned in '38, designed to provide protection against enemy aircraft)

10 Town-class Light Cruisers

9 I-class Destroyers

16 Tribal-class Destroyers

8 J-class Destroyers (9 ordered, 1 canceled)

1 K-class Destroyer

3 U-class Submarines

15 T-class Submarines (71 ordered, 18 cancelled)

Additional launched ships by the start of the war (aka they were "in the build queue")

3 Illustrious-class Aircraft Carriers (launched in '39)

2 King George V-class Battleships

2 Lion-class Battleships* (4 planned, all cancelled; these ships were never launched, but construction did start on them hence why they're included)

1 Pretoria Castle-class Escort Carrier (repurposed armed merchant ship, purchased by the RN in October '39)

4 Crown Colony-class Light Cruisers

5 Dido-class Light Cruisers

4 I-class Destroyers (these were meant to be sold to Turkey, but 2 were delivered to Turkey and the other 2 acquired by the RN)

7 K-class Destroyers

Ships completed by the end of the war:

2 Implacable-class Aircraft Carriers (launched in '42, completed in '44)

3 King George V-class Battleships

1 Unicorn-class Light Carrier (launched in '41, commissioned in '43)

4 Colossus-class Light Carriers (16 planned, 7 re-purposed, 1 cancelled)

2 Colossus-class Maintenance Carriers (repurposed Colossus CVLs, these ships were meant to act as mobile aircraft repair-yards, as RN carriers were too small to fulfill that role)

1 Activity-class Escort Carrier (launched & commissioned in '42)

3 Nairana-class Escort Carriers (launched in '42, 2 commissioned in '42, last commissioned in '43)

1 Audacity-class Escort Carrier (originally the German merchant ship Hannover, captured in '40 and repurposed as a CVE in '41)

3 Minotaur-class Light Cruisers (8 planned, 5 cancelled; the first was transferred to Canada immediately after commissioning. All ships launched in '43 and completed in '44)

7 Crown Colony-class Light Cruisers (1 was transferred to the New Zealand navy)

5 Battle-class Destroyers (5 done by the end of the war, 10 launched; 26 total finished; 2 were given to Australia)

8 C-class Destroyers

8 Z-class Destroyers

8 W-class Destroyers

8 V-class Destroyers

8 U-class Destroyers

8 T-class Destroyers

8 S-class Destroyers

8 R-class Destroyers

8 Q-class Destroyers

8 P-class Destroyers

8 O-class Destroyers

8 M-class Destroyers

8 L-class Destroyers

83 Hunt-class Destroyer Escorts

22 V-class Submarines (42 planned, 20 cancelled)

4 Oruç Reis-class Submarines (originally for the Turkish navy, requisitioned by the RN in '40)

46 U-class Submarines

38 T-class Submarines

Ships still under construction at the end of the war:

4 Audacious-class Aircraft Carriers (4 planned, 2 completed in the '50s, other 2 cancelled)

4 Colossus-class Light Carriers

5 Majestic-class Light Carriers (renamed and updgraded Colossus CVLs)

1 Vanguard-class Battleship (launched in '44, commissioned in '46)

10 Battle-class Destroyers

24 C-class Destroyers

46 Amphion-class Submarines (only 16 completed)

  lordroel,

  A few comments.

a)  The reason why the RN was "outdated, outgunned, and ultimately outclassed by Japan's ships" was less strict adherence to the 1936 Treaty than that because of the earlier treaties it had been basically frozen since pretty much 1919 and war came for Britain too early to do more than touch on new capital ships being completed.  Coupled with the collapse of France and the following heavy losses in the Med - as well as the idiotic losses of Courageous and Glorious - Britain was always playing catch up and staggered from crisis to crisis.

b)  Neither of the 1st two KGV class were commissioned by the start of the war.  Famously PoW went into the Denmark Straits battle with workers still on board completing part of the ship.

c)  The list above is basically OTL and hence dominated by events and especially the war.  If war hadn't occurred until ~1944/45 the RN would have been greatly different in terms of ships and capacity.  Definitely some of the older ships, especially the R class BBs would have been scrapped to free up manpower and money for newer ships but what exactly got built would have depended on circumstances.  Assuming of course no war with Japan or that Germany somehow last's until that date without imploding without loot from its OTL conquests.

  Steve

So what ships can be scrapped when newer ships come online.