Some curiosities about the sinking of the USS Indianapolis.

[miletus12]

The interview of the Japanese captain; Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto 


Points to note are in bold. These are inaccurate answers. since Hashimoto, Mochitsura either did not know or deliberately misled his interrogators.  

Editorial comment. WWII era racism is very evident in the slurs applied to the Japanese personnel interrogated and references to the Japanese people. In those specific cases where the diminutive "Jap" has been used, the complete correct ethnographic word Jap[Japanese] has been edited and included with the bracketed correction. 

(I have added comments in parentheses.)

Interrogator: J.H. Alberti

Interpreter: R.J. Fox



Hashimoto stated that submarines were always considered as secondary targets, to be attacked only if nothing more important were available. He had heard of other U-boat commanders attacking submarines, although he never practiced such tactics. Hashimoto cited two cases in which U.S. submarines were sunk by Jap [Japanese] submarines. One was sunk in early 1942 between Hawaii and San Francisco [pencilled note: "didn't have any there"] [no allied submarine confirmed sunk in this area.] by the I-26 or I-27 and the other was sunk in 1943 in the Solomons area by the I-176. [Confirmed as USS Corvina sunk on 16 November 1943 south of Truk by I-176.] In addition, a British or Dutch submarine was sunk by a Jap sub near Singapore in early 1942 by the I-165 or I-166. [No allied submarine confirmed as sunk in early 1942 in this area.]



The general policy of the Imperial Japanese Navy regarding submarines was to make use of these craft as offensive weapons. However, this was impossible due to unwise orders which exposed subs to excessive risks, thereby resulting in heavy losses. Hashimoto criticized severely the submarine policy upheld by the Japanese Navy.



Questions Submitted by Operational Research Group:



I. Organization and Tactical Employment of Jap Sub Force.

[Question] What were the main objectives of the Jap Sub Force? Were they used exclusively on scouting and supply missions or were they employed primarily to attack U.S. Task Forces? Were any patrols made with the object of sinking U.S. Subs?

[Answer] At one time half of the Jap fleet was used for supply purposes, the balance being used for offensive action. The policy of the Japanese Navy was to attack escorts (Task Forces) primarily, merchant vessels being considered very secondary. In one instance two submarines (Jap[Japanese]) were sent out specifically to sink subs, but the efforts were fruitless and the practice discontinued.



II. [Question] What working arrangements were there between Jap[Japanese] Subs and anti-submarine forces? What recognition methods were used to prevent Jap[Japanese] subs from being sunk by own forces? Were any arrangements specifically made for Jap subs to collaborate with their own A/S forces (e.g. planes) against U.S. subs?

[Answer] Working arrangements were not very thoroughly worked out between Jap[Japanese] Subs and anti-submarine forces, as proven by the case of a Jap[Japanese] sub sunk by a Jap[Japanese] plane. The only protection against their own forces was notification of time, course and area. In spite of usually faulty working arrangements, the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales [British battleship] was the result of a combined air/sub action. The sub spotted the target and called in the planes.



III. Tactics used on Patrol.

[Question] What areas were patrolled? Was the sub surfaced or submerged? What sort of doctrine did they follow on this? Did Jap[Japanese] subs make much use of radar? For surface search? Air warning? How about radar search receivers?

[Answer] Normally, Jap submarines submerged by day and surfaced at night, although wide latitude was given to the discretion of the Commanding Officers. In the early part of the war the area of patrol averaged 20 to 30 miles from a given point, but heavy losses resulted, so the areas were enlarged to an average area of 200 to 300 miles. Excessive risks were involved due to rigidity of patrol areas and consequently the Commanding Officers simply ignored strict adherence to instructions. No set pattern (like the German) was used and usually Jap[Japanese] subs followed a zig-zag course along a definite line.

Although there was much opposition to the use of radar and many Naval leaders did not believe in it, Hashimoto made full use of it against surface targets. He used radar search receivers against planes.



IV. Special Equipment.

[Question] Had he heard about the echo nullifier for use against sonar? How does it work?

[Answer] Hashimoto had rubber-coating on his sub against sonar and radar, considering it effective. The conning-tower and most of the hull to well below the water line were covered and experts considered the rubber-coating 30% effective. However, as much as one-third would come off on patrol. The rubber contained powdered iron. (Similar to the "Wesch" coating on the German Schnorkel).



Questions Submitted by Naval Ordnance Laboratory:



1. [Question] Were the exploders (devices used to initiate the explosion of the [torpedo] warhead) used in the torpedoes fired at the U.S.S. Indianapolis a German or a Japanese development?

[Answer] The exploders were Japanese-built, but Hashimoto did not know whether or not of German or Japanese design. (Description indicates this to be a copy of the German Pi 3). The Japanese, to my knowledge, never used this device. However, the KM in their G7s had in their nomenclature a fuse called the Pi 30.which used a mechanical arm connector to an upper switch or probe which rode as a contact detonator above the torpedo. This may be the reference.  The Type 95 torpedo has / had a towed kite or paravane assembly which it towed above it in its run to target. This was a mechanical keel-breaker and operated like and unto the Hertz principle.Hull contact completed an electrical circuit and set off a deep running Japanese torpedo under the keel of the ship it would otherwise miss. It was unreliable. Whether or not the translator botched his understanding, it is my guess that THIS is the device that Hashimoto used to keelbreak USS Indianapolis and not the magnetic influence feature which was a rarity in Japanese torpedoes, only a hundred or so examples having been made.  The "kite" was fairly common from 1938 forward.)  


2. [Question] If German, what was the German name for this exploder?

[Answer] No answer.



3. [Question] Was it necessary for these torpedoes to strike the ship in order for the exploder to function?

[Answer] Impact is not necessary for the exploder to function.

4. [Question] If not, how far below the keel of the ship could the torpedo pass and still fire?

[Answer] The torpedo could pass below the ship a maximum of 4 meters and still fire. #1 (Kite limit. Also see 7.)


5. [Question] Were your instructions for depth setting on torpedoes carrying a magnetic exploder the same as those for torpedoes carrying a contact exploder only?

[Answer] No, the instructions were different. Magnetics were fired on deeper settings. #2 (Hashimoto is having some fun with his interrogators.)


6. [Question] Is it true that the torpedoes fired at the U.S.S. Indianapolis carried exploders that were actuated by the magnetic field of the ship?

[Answer] Yes. #3 (Unknown. The IJN followed orders to destroy their operational records. It is a miracle that the USN was able to harvest battle diaries at all.)


7. [Question] When you fired these torpedoes did you choose a depth setting which would permit the exploders to operate magnetically?

[Answer] According to Hashimoto there was no time to make a more suitable setting. Consequently it was left as it was, at 4 meters. #4 (Default at 4 meters is battleship side impact depth for IJN torpedoes. This is why I know Hashimoto is having fun with his interrogators.)


8. [Question] Did the torpedoes carry a mechanical exploder which would operate on contact with the ship as well as the magnetic exploder?

[Answer] The torpedoes carried combination magnetic and impact exploders.



9. [Question] Was there any other reason for choosing the depth setting used than that of exploder performance? If so, what was the reason or reasons?

[Answer] See #7. (Ironic. I chuckled.)


10. [Question] Do you believe that the torpedoes which sank the U.S.S. Indianapolis did so by striking the ship before exploding?

[Answer] Yes.



11. [Question] If not, how far below the ship do you believe the explosions occurred?

[Answer] No answer.



12. [Question] Could you see well enough through the periscope to tell whether the torpedoes exploded on the near or the far side of the ship? If so, describe where you believe they exploded.

[Answer] Yes, the torpedoes hit the near side of the ship.



13. [Question] What did you estimate the draft of the U.S.S. Indianapolis to be?

[Answer] 7 meters. Hashimoto believed his target to be an old-style BB [US battleship]. (Hashimoto thought at first it was the USS Idaho, so he knew that draft was 9 meters. When he took a second look he was unsure of the target identification. It could have been a cruiser.   USS Indianapolis had a draft of 5.25 meters. See 20.)


14. [Question] If the exploders used against the Indianapolis were not magnetically operated, what was their operating principal? (Acoustic, electromagnetic, electric.)

[Answer] They were combination magnetic and impact. # 5 (See 7.)


15. [Question] How many pockets were provided in the torpedo to house various parts of the exploder? Where were they located?

[Answer] There were two pockets, the magnetic one in the nose of the torpedo and the impact on the top. The impact exploder was believed by Hashimoto to be an inertia type (pendulum).



16. [Question] Did the exploders used against the Indianapolis require any maintenance aboard the submarine? Explain.

[Answer] There was no maintenance aboard.



17. [Question] Did the exploders require any servicing upon return from a war patrol? Explain.

[Answer] Probably.



18. [Question] Did you have torpedoes aboard equipped with exploders of any other type? Why didn't you use them?

[Answer] There were no torpedoes of any other exploder-type aboard. All were combination magnetic and impact, except the KAITENS which were impact only. #6 (See 20. His interrogators have caught on.)


19. [Question] Did you ever have torpedoes equipped with an external towed devised for controlling or exploding the torpedo?

[Answer] Hashimoto never used such devices, but was familiar with them. #7 (I suspect he was evasive.)


20. [Question] Do you consider the towed exploding device satisfactory? If not, why not?

[Answer] Hashimoto considers the device no good. #8 (Bingo. He used it.)


21. [Question] Did you ever have trouble with torpedoes exploding before they reached the target? What type of exploders did this?

[Answer] Both magnetic and impact exploders are subject to premature explosions. The reason for this was never cleared up properly, but magnetics were almost sure to premature in a rough sea. *(The kite would not work at shallow depths.) 


22. [Question] Did you have any instructions regarding the minimum safe depth for firing torpedoes with special exploders? What were they? What was the minimum safe depth?

[Answer] The minimum safe depth was 1½ meters. #8a (See 21.)


23. [Question] Did you have trouble with torpedoes coming out of water in a rough sea and firing before they should have?

[Answer] Hashimoto stated they had little trouble with torpedoes coming out of the water (but see #21 above). 


24. [Question] What were the special instructions for firing the torpedo due to the use of the magnetic exploder? Was it necessary to know the size of the [target] ship, material of ship construction, ship's heading, latitude, etc.?

[Answer] There were no special instructions as regards ship's heading or latitude, but depth settings for magnetics were deeper.



25. [Question] What material is the [torpedo] warhead made of?

[Answer] Probably steel. #8 (This steel interferes with the magnetic influence fuse. The Germans used an external detector on top of the torpedo, called a magnetich. This has confused the American interrogators until question 21.) 


26. [Question] How far must the torpedo run before the exploder can operate? Is this distance the same for all types of exploders? Explain.

[Answer] The torpedo must run from 300 to 500 meters. Hashimoto did not remember exact information on this subject.



27. [Question] Was it necessary to stop the submarine screws [propeller] before or immediately after firing torpedoes with any type of exploder you have used?

[Answer] It was not necessary to stop the screws.



28. [Question] How long has the magnetic exploder used on the Indianapolis been in use?

[Answer] It has been in use since the middle of 1944. #9 (This contradicts other testimony that the device was in use in 1945.)


29. [Question] Where was it manufactured?

[Answer] It was manufactured in Kure.



30. [Question] Did ships' noise influence its operation?

[Answer] The ships' noise did not influence its operation. 


31. [Question] Under what conditions would magnetic or other non-contact exploders not have been used?

[Answer] Magnetics would not be used in a rough sea. #10 (See the answers about the kite function.)


32. [Question] Was there more than one type of non-contact exploder in use? Describe the significant features of each type.

[Answer] There was no more than one type, i.e. the magnetic. (This is subtgle. The "kite" was a contact switch actuated device.)


33. [Question] Under what conditions would you use a non-contact exploder? Under what conditions would you use a contact exploder?

[Answer] Contact exploders are generally preferred, especially in rough seas, because of the possibility of premature explosions in the magnetics. The submarines are usually loaded about half and half of each kind of exploder torpedoes. Also many sub commanders lacked confidence in the magnetic exploder and used the impact exploders at all times. #11 *(See 32.)


34. [Question] What is the recommended time interval between successive shots in a spread?

[Answer] 3 seconds.



35. [Question] What type of exploder do you believe was most effective in sinking ships? Why?

[Answer] Relatively few magnetics were used. Hashimoto personally was very favorable to magnetics except in rough seas.



36. [Question] What weight of explosive material was used in torpedo warheads fired at the Indianapolis?

[Answer] Although he was not certain, Hashimoto thought the weight was 550 kilograms [approximately 1,210 lbs].



37. [Question] What is the composition of the explosive material?

[Answer] It is Shimose powder. (Lyddite, Hashimoto claims; what was actually used was Hexanite.)


38. [Question] Have you fired torpedoes with aluminum included in the composition of the explosive?

[Answer] Hashimoto is not familiar with the composition of explosives. #12 (This brissiance booster was known to the Japanese. The British told them. I do not think the Japanese wasted aluminum for filler booster material, when more and cheaper chemical explosive was available. They needed airplanes more than bubbles.)


39. [Question] Have you noticed any significant difference in damage resulting from the use of different weights or compositions of explosive material? Explain.

[Answer] Hashimoto has not noticed any notable difference.



40. [Question] Could any submarine fire the non-contact type torpedoes. If not, what types could?

[Answer] All types could fire the non-contact torpedoes.



41. [Question] Were non-contact exploders used in aircraft torpedoes?

[Answer] No answer. (Lack of information].



42. [Question] How many tail fins did the torpedoes fired at the Indianapolis have?

[Answer] Four.



43. [Question] Fill out the following table concerning torpedoes carried on your last cruise:

[Answer]

Torpedo Type: Oxygen

Torpedo Designation: 95

Warhead Designation: 95 Magnetic

Exploder Designation: Magnetic No. 5, Impact No. 2



44. [Question] Did Japanese submarines use torpedoes of German design?

[Answer] No information.



45. [Question] Were German ideas used in the design of Japanese torpedoes?

[Answer] No information.



46. [Question] Did any electrically-driven torpedoes reach service use? What was its range and speed?

[Answer] Very few electrically-driven torpedoes reached service use. Range and speed are 7000 meters and 28 knots. (Type 92 introduced in 1932, obviously. Performance figures are as claimed. ) 


47. [Question] When did Japanese submarines first employ torpedoes powered with fuel and oxygen?

[Answer] In 1940. (1938. Hashimoto might not have known the correct date.)


48. [Question] How many different types of fuel-oxygen torpedoes were used?

[Answer] Three (93, 95, 97). (There was a Type 95 and Type 96 as well as a Type 2 and a Type 4.)


49. [Question] What was the speed and range of each type?

[Answer]



93 - 45 knots - 9000 meters

95 - 48 knots - 5000 meters

97 - no information.

(See here.)



50. [Question] How much was known about the German Ingolin torpedo? Were any of them used against the U.S. Navy?

[Answer] Nothing. (That was a hydrogen peroxide propelled torpedo.)


51. [Question] Were you troubled with accidental oxygen explosions? What precautions were necessary?

[Answer] In the early days of the war the [Japanese] were troubled with accidental oxygen explosions. However, fuel and oil were kept away from the oxygen until the last minute. Every effort was made to avoid heat.



52. [Question] What types of fuel were used with the oxygen torpedo? What form was the oxygen supply? Liquid or gas?

[Answer] Coal-oil was used with the oxygen torpedo. The oxygen supply was in gas form.



53. [Question] How much was known about American torpedoes? Name various types known, together with their significant properties.

[Answer] Nothing was known regarding American torpedoes in this case. *(True. Even Americans did not know what their torpedoes would or could do.)


54. [Question] What accuracy of steering was realized on Japanese torpedoes?

[Answer] Regarding steering, at 5500 meters, deviation is not over 200 meters. (Hashimoto was unaware of the nose wander problem.)


55. [Question] Were any Japanese torpedoes equipped with special figure run devices? Explain.

[Answer] No. (Pattern running installed in the tail control.)


56. [Question] Are there any types of Japanese torpedoes that follow the target even though they are not aimed at the target?

[Answer] No. (Wake homers.)


57. [Question] If yes, what method was used to make them follow the target (acoustic, magnetic, electric, electromagnetic)?

[No response necessary]



58. [Question] Did these target-seeking torpedoes receive steering signals directly from the ship or from reflection of a searching signal transmitted by the torpedo itself?

[No response necessary]



59. [Question] When did target-seeking torpedoes come into general use by Japanese submarines?

[No response necessary]



60. [Question] Under what conditions were human torpedoes used? How many did each submarine carry? Was the operator expendable?

[Answer] Human torpedoes were used if target was out of range of other torpedoes and sometimes in order to avoid detection. Big subs carried 6 human torpedoes; 300-Type carried 3; I-Type carried 2. The operator was 100% expendable. KAITENS were about 1/3 successful. Hashimoto's only success with them was on the I-58 which sank a U.S. escort carrier (converted) near Guam in January 1945. He observed through the periscope that one hit out of the four launched.



61. [Question] Which type of torpedo was best liked by Japanese submarine commanders? Why? Was it responsible for most sinkings?

[Answer] Most Japanese submarine commanders preferred impact-type exploders. Human torpedoes were only used as emergency weapons.



62. [Question] How were torpedoes launched from Japanese submarines (compressed air, powder charge)?

[Answer] Torpedoes were launched by compressed air.



63. [Question] What steps were taken to prevent detection due to air or gas escaping from tubes after launching?

[Answer] Valves for return of air were used. (Unique tech. Before the water ram, this suppressor was considered to be a technical exploit.) 


Questions Submitted by Commander D.R.E. Brown, USNR:



1. [Question] What was the name of their [the Japanese] research agency investigating:

(a) Light conditions.

(b) Visibility - day and night.

(c) Transmission of light through water.

[Answer] No information.



2. [Question] What reports were published on these subjects?

[Answer] No information.



3. [Question] Were these subjects used as part of submarine officers training?

[Answer] Yes, especially as to depth at which submarines can be seen from the air, including taking flights for this purpose.



4. [Question] How did submarine officers estimate visibility:

(a) Of their own ships?

(b) Of enemy ships?

[No answer given]



5. [Question] Do they [the Japanese] have tables or charts on the subject of visibility?

[No answer given]



6. [Question] Do they have pictures?

[No answer given]



7. [Question] What were their lookout procedures?

[No answer given]



8. [Question] What size and type of binoculars were used by their sky and sea lookouts?

[Answer] The size 7 to 10 power was standard equipment. In addition they had 15 to 20 x 150 and 20 x 120.



9. [Question] At what depth does he think his submarine was visible to aircraft?

(a) In moderate sea?

(b) In China Sea?

(c) In clear, calm water?

[Answer] In the China Sea, 25 meters, keel depth. Around the Marshals in calm sea, 35 meters.



10. [Question] How far could he be seen by a surface ship

(a) Clear starlight night?

(b) Clear moonlight night?

[Answer] With standard binoculars he could be seen at 10,000 meters by moonlight and at 5,000 meters by starlight.



11. [Question] How far could be seen CA [cruiser], BB [battleship], DD [destroyer] on a

(a) Clear starlight night?

(b) Clear moonlight night?

[Answer] With standard binoculars --

Moonlight Starlight

CA 12,000 6,000

BB 15,000 7,500

DD 10,000 5,000



12. [Question] What was Japanese Submarine Force opinion of Ship Camouflage? Their own and ours?

[Answer] They felt it was only moderately effective.



13. [Question] Were there any specific cases where our patterns led to course deception sufficient

(a) To prevent a submarine from contact, i.e. from gaining a firing position?

(b) To cause torpedo misses?

[Answer] There were none.



14. [Question] Did patterns retard or prevent recognition and/or identification?

[Answer] Not too much.



15. [Question] Did patterns or any other camouflage increase or decrease visibility of ships or aircraft?

[Answer] Only slightly.

Systemic analysis of the sinking.

The questions raised of why MAGIC was not used to warn a captain pre-sortie or mission run is best answered by noting that US officers had proven careless in their handling of top-secret crypto and signals intelligence. What they did not know they could not tell the enemy. Captain McVay did not need to know.

Why was no destroyer escort provided? Why give a known Japanese submarine two targets? 

Why was the zig-zag key to court martialing Captain McVay? He was responsible for bungling the routing, but the USN needed a firmer excuse to ruin him. The failure to zig-zag in the specification was a violation of standard USN practice and standing orders. He was guilty. 

Why was he exonerated? Beats me. He was guilty.

Why was the USS Indianapolis crew in the water for three days and not rescued? Well, two days were burned up because the presumption of radio silence during the passage until presumed date of arrival. The standard practice on late arrivals was wait one day before declared "Overdue and missing." The USN was following policy and was blameless. USS Indianapolis was supposed to report the attack. She never did make contact via radio, despite claims to the contrary. 
 

[575]

I didn't find the failure to zig-zag in the Systemic analysis of the sinking but the Pennlivehave it. I didn't know that much before reading this post.
So the Captain was guilty of not following orders but anyway the ship would have been sunk whatever he did - right?
In the time of war and in service orders must be obeyed and failure to do so will carry a penalty. Its system foundation. So yes the Captain was guilty of not following orders. Which in hinsight takes on another dimension as a moral/ethic question if such Court Martial was morally right. Even on the last leg of battle you still need to keep the rank and file on their toes - nobody knows what tomorrow brings.
Its those actions of the past that makes such big headlines today.. now lets get on!

[miletus12]

Jan 1, 2022 10:49:05 GMT 575 said:

I didn't find the failure to zig-zag in the Systemic analysis of the sinking but the Pennlivehave it. I didn't know that much before reading this post.
So the Captain was guilty of not following orders but anyway the ship would have been sunk whatever he did - right?

In the time of war and in service orders must be obeyed and failure to do so will carry a penalty. Its system foundation. So yes the Captain was guilty of not following orders. Which in hinsight takes on another dimension as a moral/ethic question if such Court Martial was morally right. Even on the last leg of battle you still need to keep the rank and file on their toes - nobody knows what tomorrow brings.

Its those actions of the past that makes such big headlines today.. now lets get on!

From the citation.

Four days before USS "INDY" CA-35 departed from Guam, Japanese Commander Saichi Oba, skipper of submarine I-53, torpedoed and sank American destroyer escort USS UNDERHILL DE-682, with Kamikaze-like precision. Although CA-35 would cruise within range of Japanese submarine I-58's path, due to insufficient systematic teamwork common to that period, CAPT McVay was not informed. Later, at CAPT McVay's court martial, Japanese submarine commander Mochitsura Hashimoto testified that once he had detected USS INDIANAPOLIS, torpedo attack would have succeeded whether or not the American Cruiser was zig-zagging. Instead of accepting a Japanese Commander's opinion on the matter, consider DE-682. When this Destroyer Escort was attacked by manned Kaiten torpedoes, despite its anti-submarine capabilities and partially successful evasive tactics, it was sunk nevertheless.


Despite healthy skepticism, evidence indicates that (1) "zigging" would not have evaded pilot guided torpedoes, and (2) an escort by either destroyer (DD) or destroyer escort (DE) would have been insufficient to deter an attack on CA-35 by "Kaiten-kazes." However, any escort may have been useful to pick up or credibly signal the need to pick up survivors. Still any escort without armor, if present, may itself have become a target and if attacked, sunk. From hierarchical analysis the systems approach was inadequately applied at that time period with devastating and negative results. CA-35 was alone on a journey to gather with a main force where safety in numbers ruled the sea. Without doubt, a destroyer's mission was more than to pick up survivors even though according to some that is all a destroyer escort could have done.

1. The USN collected Commander Hashimoto and flew him all the way from Japan to Captain McVay's court martial to establish him as a witness who saw him violate standing-orders. Whether the orders mattered a jot, was not at issue. Disobedience was the specification in the charge of recklessly hazarding the ship, and that was the actual point of law. McVay was adjudged accurately as guilty of the charge and specification. 

2. The USN is a curious institution. Follow along as I enumerate how it behaves.

a. At Pearl Harbor, when Kimmel lost the fleet, one reads in the record about Royal Ingersol, future CincLant, then a captain, who is with the British at Taranto as a ride-along observer. He watches carefully as the British prepare their Swordfish with the special cable dropping mechanisms that attached the Mark XII fish to the torpedo bombers.  The purpose of the mechanism was to reel the torpedo in a controlled drop so that its nose entry angle and level out into the water would not exceed a depth of 10-12 meters so that the torpedoes would operate in the 17-20 meter shallows of Taranto harbor instead of running nose first into the bottom. Ingersol sent letters to (CNO) Harold Stark and (CominchUS (Pacific) fleet) Husband Kimmel to that effect and to the Bureaus of Aeronautics (John Tower) and Bureau of Ordnance (William Furlong),

--Stark was fired in March 1942 for incompetence. He was sent to the UK to get him away from the prying US press sniffing for people responsible for losing the Battle of the Atlantic off the US coast. But one can read in the Congressional testimony post Pearl Harbor where he failed to warn Kimmel, or instruct in the nature of prudent anti-torpedo defense at anchorage. All he had to do was forward his copy of Royal Ingersoll's letter and order torpedo nets strung off Middle Sound.
--Kimmel HAD that letter and Ingersoll's recommendations about torpedo nets, defensive anti-aircraft dispositions and the need of and for the USN to check its torpedoes and develop a shallow water drop system of its own. He, Kimmel, failed to act.   
--Tower went to PACFLT in February 1942 as admin head of its air service. He was a chairborne commando. Nimitz kept him away from important stuff for most of the war. In addition to failing to develop a US shallow run torpedo method or tactics for same, a blame he shares with George Blandy, the Atomic Playboy, who also skates away from a provable dereliction of duty, he fumbled the F4F engine and weight improvement program, screwed up the TBD Devastator improvement program of similar urgency, and failed to implement the latest USN aircraft carrier battle doctrine developed by Lantfleet as regards to air defense tactics and RADAR, during the grace period of 1939-1940. His insistence on the Brewster Buffalo and the British version of the Wildcat (The 6 gun Martlet F4F mod 4 instead of the lighter and nimbler Mod 3) killed about 500 USN and USMC aviators in air-to-air combat with the Japanese, because the death trap planes could NOT climb or hang with a Zero in a vertical fight. Tower also delayed the Corsair, screwed up the Hellcat delaying it a half year, promoted the deathtrap Curtiss Helldiver, killed the F5F Skyrocket, promoted the deathtrap Curtiss Seamew and protected his buddies, Miles Browning and that incompetent, Marc Mitscher, from courts martials they deserved after their performances at Midway. Did I mention Commander Waldron of Torpedo Eight who disobeyed Mitscher's orders and told his CAG Stanhope Ring to "go to hell" over an open mike and went off on his own and FOUND the Japanese? Good thing he died in leading that banzai charge and became a hero? HE would have been court martialed for conduct prejudicial to maintaining of good order and discipline. 
--William Furlong got out of Bu-Ord one horse ahead of the Congressional posse. 
--George Blandy, the Atomic Playboy, is moved out of Bu-Ord a la Stark, after he fails to fix the torpedo crisis fast enough. King fires him as Roosevelt fired Stark. Blandy career rehabs himself and postwar screws up a series of Pacific atomic bomb tests poisoning some Polynesian islanders in the Able Baker shots, giving the USN bad publicity and hence earning the nickname, "The Atomic Playboy".  

Other examples...

--Pye screws up the relief of Wake. He is sent to play battleships off the coast of California and is kept out of the way. It is suspected that he suffered mental collapse as a result of Pearl Harbor and that Nimitz was being kind.
--Adolfus Andrews, the guy actually is guilty of dereliction and responsible for those oil tankers burning off New Jersey gets administratively promoted sideways after stealing the SS Normandy and then letting it burn at pier-side after he stole it.
--Robert Ghormley goes insane from rotten teeth, Vichyite French politicians in New Caledonia and after he fumbles WATCHTOWER. Nimitz hoists him out on a medical and sends in Halsey.
--Halsey backstabs Fletcher who won Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons; but Nimitz, Turner (Who should have killed himself as Captain Bode of the USS Chicago actually did for his, Turner's, role in Savo Island. Bode ate bullets when he found out he was the nominated fall guy for Savo Island. With him gone, the new goat was Fletcher, but one could not court martial Fletcher. He was a genius and it would raise too many drowned sailors as ghosts at that legal proceeding.), and Tower and King are the real villains in that disgraceful conspiracy, sends in Kinkaid to lose Santa Cruz. The reason that Fletcher was knifed, was because the USN needed another fall guy for Savo Island. Fletcher had been wounded in battle when USS Saratoga was torpedoed and was on a medical. He was made to order for the noose... BUT he was too good an officer to waste on the beach, so he was sent North to Alaska to sort out the mess the army and navy had made of the Northwest Sea Frontier (Simon Buckner and Charles McMorris who screwed up the Aleutians campaign.). Fletcher did what Fletcher does and Samuel Eliot Morison is also part of the "Get Fletcher Mob."  He writes the official Navy history  coverup on what happened to Fletcher.      
--More Halsey. Rennell Islands (Bode again.), Santa Cruz (already mentioned), Choiseul, the series of night surface battles (defeats) up the Slot, and the monumental screw up at Leyte and the two typhoons, add up. One might also note Halsey's known mental instability and one asks, why was he not fired and beached?

Yes…but not for his errors in judgement at Leyte, but for sailing his forces into, not one, but two typhoons. Adding Leyte to those errors in judgement and court martial should have been a given. No Admiral in today’s Navy would be forgiven the errors allowed Halsey. Not to mention his reaction to his own failure upon learning that the tin cans are all alone and needing his help.

I’ll reprint Ken Fishkin point here:

“RADM Robert Carney, Halsey’s Chief of Staff (who had argued strongly in favor of pursuing the carriers), witnessed Halsey’s emotional outburst and reportedly grabbed him by the shoulders and shook him, shouting “Stop it! What the hell’s the matter with you? Pull yourself together!” Recognizing his failure, Halsey sulked in inactivity for a full hour while Taffy 3 was fighting for its life – falsely claiming to be refueling his ships – before eventually turning around with his two fastest battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers and heading back to Samar, too late to have any impact on the battle.[13]”

Simply unimaginable in today’s Navy. To have a Fleet Admiral sulk himself into inaction while US warriors are fighting for their very survival.

So YES, without a doubt, he should have been cashiered. Just as Kimmel, Short and McVay had to answer for their actions, Halsey should have had to answer for his as well. IMHO

Rodney Patterson

He was part of the "Brown Shoe Fraternity." And to be fair, when the USN needed a PR Hollywood hero and a flag-waver to lead the charge, Halsey was it. They knew what they were getting with Halsey and judged his pluses outweighed his minuses. But it was close.                      
       
Circle the wagons.

The Captain of the Carrier USS ‘Franklin’ Is a Case Study in How Not to Lead

Capt. Leslie Gehres left his warship worse off.

Seldom does your humble scribe come away incensed from reading history. The saga of the World War II aircraft carrier USS Franklin constitutes an exception.



We normally think of Franklin’s history as a parable about the importance of shipboard firefighting and damage control. It’s about materiel and methods, in other words. And these things are important without a doubt. Fighting ships are metal boxes packed with explosives and flammables. Suppressing fire represents a crucial function, which is why the first thing a new sailor does after reporting aboard is qualify in rudimentary damage control.



But a ship is more than a hunk of steel. The hunk of steel plus the crew that lives on board it comprises the ship. Bad leadership marred Franklin’s human component. In the end, then, this is a story with mixed lessons. It is not merely about the material dimension of naval warfare.



USS Franklin lived a short but eventful life, joining the Pacific Fleet in mid-1944. Franklin was the first fleet carrier to absorb a direct strike from a Japanese kamikaze, in the aftermath of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. But the flattop was to endure her worst trial in March 1945, while operating with Task Force 58 off the Japanese seacoast.


On the morning of March 19 a “Judy” dive bomber eluded the fleet’s air defenses, dumping two bombs on a Franklin whose decks were crowded with fully armed, fully fueled aircraft preparing to raid sites on Kyushu.



Armor plating shielded the carrier’s innards — in particular the engineering plant — from destruction. The crew eventually managed to restart propulsion, and Franklin made the fleet anchorage at Ulithi Atoll under her own power. In the interim, however, dozens of secondary explosions spanning five hours transformed the flight and hangar decks into something out of Dante.



It was a charnel house. The blasts killed the damage-control team while disabling fire fighting equipment on the hangar deck. Ammunition “cooked off,” amplifying the destruction. Aircraft fuselages melted. Rivers of burning fuel sluiced into the hangar deck and beneath from fractured pipes. Over 800 perished out of a crew of around 3,400 sailors and aviators.



Recovery operations were fitful under these circumstances. The crew managed to start a diesel-powered fire pump and organize makeshift fire parties. Cruiser USS Santa Fe came alongside and executed a controlled crash with the flattop so seamen could pass across supplies, render such firefighting aid as they could, and take aboard Franklin crewmen. The carrier survived, returning to New York via the Panama Canal.


This is a Pacific War story rich in insights for practitioners of sea power. For instance, it reveals much about the strategic and operational environment in Eurasian waters today.



To wit — a foe with no navy of consequence can still exert influence at sea.



It can deploy shore-based implements of sea power to punish a hostile navy cruising off its shores. The Imperial Japanese Navy met its doom at Leyte Gulf in October 1944. It could do little despite a flashy last-ditch effort or two to stem the American advance. But airfields in the home islands could act as unsinkable if stationary aircraft carriers once U.S. Navy task forces came within reach.



Japan fielded an array of tactical aircraft along with munitions to arm them and pilots to fly them or, in the case of the kamikaze, crash them into American vessels. Tokyo waged an “anti-access” strategy long before the term was invented.



Franklin’s ordeal also yielded hard-won lessons about naval architecture and shipboard practices, and about firefighting and damage control in particular. These are the standard lessons of the affair.



To oversimplify, the chief lesson was — equip ships with more of everything.



Assigning more people to a damage-control organization would give it a better chance of withstanding damage. Installing more and longer fire hoses would bolster fire parties’ capacity to get at blazes in remote recesses of the ship. Furnishing more portable pumps would let firefighters do their work should fireplugs fail. More high-capacity foam systems would help control and extinguish flaming fuel. Mounting quick-access “scuttles” on armored hatches would allow crewmen to escape compartments should hatches become jammed or too hot to handle. And on and on.



These are all valuable insights. To me, though, the tale of USS Franklin represents a cautionary tale about the scourge of “toxic leadership.”



When I reported at the Surface Warfare Officers’ School a few brief years ago, my check-in interview with the skipper amounted to this — leave the place better than you found it. Toxic leaders leave the place worse than they found it. They put themselves ahead of the institution, and they deploy leadership and management tactics that advance their personal interests — even at the expense of colleagues or subordinates.



I’ve known toxic leaders. So have you if you’ve worn a military uniform. They appear from time to time, often as ship captains. Why them in particular? It’s been said a ship captain is the world’s last absolute monarch once underway. And like any absolute monarch, the skipper can be a tyrant if he rules in his selfish interest rather than the common good. He can abuse his authority in an effort to get ahead.


Enter Capt. Leslie E. Gehres, who assumed command of Franklin at Ulithi on the heels of the October 1944 kamikaze strike. Historian Joseph Springer, the author of a gripping oral history of the carrier’s travails, recounts how the new skipper introduced himself to the crew. Gehres relieved Captain J. M. Shoemaker at Ulithi.



At the change-of-command ceremony, according to one Franklin sailor, Gehres proclaimed: “‘It was your fault because you didn’t shoot [the kamikaze] down. You didn’t do your duty; you’re incompetent, lazy and careless. Evidently you don’t know your jobs and I’m going to do my best to shape up this crew!’ We just stood there and couldn’t believe our ears. He sure got a lot of cheers for that.”



Imagine that. You’ve just been through hell. Dozens of your shipmates are dead, dozens more wounded. And the first thing your new commanding officer does is upbraid you and your shipmates while insulting his predecessor in his presence. That’s extreme toxicity.



According to crew accounts relayed by Springer, as many as 300 sailors jumped ship in Bremerton, Washington, when the carrier made port there for shipyard repairs. They did so in large part because they believed Franklin was jinxed following the suicide strike. In part, though, they fled to escape Capt. Gehres and his noxious brand of leadership.


It gets worse. Japanese warplanes harried Task Force 58 relentlessly in the hours leading up to the March 19 attack. Franklin had gone to general quarters a dozen times in six hours, so Gehres relaxed the ship’s posture to allow the crew to get a hot meal.



The captain’s after-action report and the official war damage report indicate that the skies were clear the morning of March 19. The deck log — the official record of a ship’s doings — says otherwise. At 0654 the ship’s Combat Information Center reported a “bogey,” or unidentified aircraft, 30 miles off. Two other sightings followed. The range was decreasing.

(Tampering with the official record (action logs in some navies, war diaries in others. is a chargeable offense, then and now. Mitscher did it at Midway to: 
a. cover up his errors in judgement.
b. protect the careers of Ring, Massey and Waldron.
c. protect the reputation of USS Hornet.
d. protect his own promotion, just approved as of 1 June 1942, but not yet in effect, to rear admiral from captain. 
  

Raymond Spruance in his report stated that USS Hornet's "official" record of events was not to be used for history or lessons learned, but that all emendations should follow the USS Enterprise war diary of that battle. He called Mitscher a liar. That is about as bad as it officially gets in the USN. Since Spruance is the gold standard just behind Nimitz and King for USN admirals, one can see where this USS Franklin business heads?)
  
At last, at 0708, lookouts on board USS Hancock positively identified the Judy. Hancock radioed Franklin: “Bogey closing you!” The dive bomber was 12 miles off at that point, and inbound fast. The aircraft would cover that distance in under three minutes, scant reaction time for the best-trained crew.



Yet Gehres never ordered Franklin to general quarters — meaning the bombs struck the flattop when she was less than fully ready for battle.



When Santa Fe came alongside he ordered the wounded evacuated and then, writes Springer, issued an order that “could not possibly have been more vague.” Gehres directed the air officer to evacuate anyone who “would not be needed to save the ship.”


A mass exodus to the cruiser ensued as those who defined themselves as nonessential fled. Ship-wide communications were out, and in the confusion many crewmen believed “abandon ship” had been ordered. The skipper then stopped the evacuation.



He later directed around 100 sailors — including some blown overboard by bomb blasts — to return to Franklin, whereupon he demanded that they state in writing why they had “left this vessel while she was in action and seriously damaged when no order had been issued to abandon ship.”



Springer opines that his action “nearly tainted” the carrier’s gallant struggle to survive.



Nearly tainted? Gehres announced that 215 Franklin crewmen would be charged with desertion, and insisted that ships carrying them treat them as prisoners. He founded the “Big Ben 704 Club” to honor the crewmen who had remained on board, ostentatiously excluding everyone else, barred evacuees from attending the memorial service for fallen shipmates, made sure no evacuee received a medal, and laid the legal groundwork for courts-martial against officers and chief petty officers who took refuge in Santa Fe.



Thankfully the Navy leadership ignored his legal maneuvering. “The treatment of these Franklin crewmen,” concludes Springer, constituted “one of the greatest but least-known injustices involving the U.S. Navy in World War II.”



And how. No bad deed went unrewarded in the case of Leslie Gehres. The Navy whitewashed his misdeeds. He was decorated with the Navy Cross, its loftiest award for martial valor, and ultimately promoted to a rear admiral. Here was a Navy captain who assumed command of a wounded vessel, shattered its culture, scapegoated his way out of high-seas disaster, and in fact garnered promotions and high honors for his trouble.



Many individual Franklin mariners — the ship’s chaplain and one of her engineering officers in particular — displayed conspicuous gallantry following the March 19 cataclysm. Indeed, the flattop is the most decorated U.S. Navy warship ever. Yet this was far from the Navy’s finest hour.



This is a story worth telling and retelling. It supplies insight into material matters, along with examples of grit and fortitude. It also supplies a case study in how not to lead. Let’s detoxify the sea service.



This article originally appeared at The National Interest.

Exactly the behaviors of Mitscher, Turner, Tower, Halsey and Browning, who Spruance almost had arrested for his insubordination at Midway. These "people" were "brown shoes", first and second cohort naval aviators coming into command billets. They formed a "clique" opposed to the "gun-clubbers" which included Spruance, Kincaid, Fletcher, the future CNO Arleigh Burke and by association, Royal Ingersoll. Jesse Oldendorff, and Willis Lee. Then there was King, Nimitz, Lockwood and Christie, who were the sub drivers, but the brown shoes, I named, lumped them in with the rest of the despised black shoes. Now mind you; the brown shoe fraternity also included the Spragues, Bogan, McCain, Wilson Brown, the Shermans, Felix Stump and many other first raters of the third and fourth naval aviation cohorts who were "excellent" officers. But they were not "Tower's Boys".   

Birds of a feather and all that. USN politics dictated who was covered and who was canned.     

[575]

Jan 1, 2022 17:03:43 GMT miletus12 said:

Jan 1, 2022 10:49:05 GMT 575 said:

I didn't find the failure to zig-zag in the Systemic analysis of the sinking but the Pennlivehave it. I didn't know that much before reading this post.
So the Captain was guilty of not following orders but anyway the ship would have been sunk whatever he did - right?

In the time of war and in service orders must be obeyed and failure to do so will carry a penalty. Its system foundation. So yes the Captain was guilty of not following orders. Which in hinsight takes on another dimension as a moral/ethic question if such Court Martial was morally right. Even on the last leg of battle you still need to keep the rank and file on their toes - nobody knows what tomorrow brings.

Its those actions of the past that makes such big headlines today.. now lets get on!

From the citation.

Four days before USS "INDY" CA-35 departed from Guam, Japanese Commander Saichi Oba, skipper of submarine I-53, torpedoed and sank American destroyer escort USS UNDERHILL DE-682, with Kamikaze-like precision. Although CA-35 would cruise within range of Japanese submarine I-58's path, due to insufficient systematic teamwork common to that period, CAPT McVay was not informed. Later, at CAPT McVay's court martial, Japanese submarine commander Mochitsura Hashimoto testified that once he had detected USS INDIANAPOLIS, torpedo attack would have succeeded whether or not the American Cruiser was zig-zagging. Instead of accepting a Japanese Commander's opinion on the matter, consider DE-682. When this Destroyer Escort was attacked by manned Kaiten torpedoes, despite its anti-submarine capabilities and partially successful evasive tactics, it was sunk nevertheless.


Despite healthy skepticism, evidence indicates that (1) "zigging" would not have evaded pilot guided torpedoes, and (2) an escort by either destroyer (DD) or destroyer escort (DE) would have been insufficient to deter an attack on CA-35 by "Kaiten-kazes." However, any escort may have been useful to pick up or credibly signal the need to pick up survivors. Still any escort without armor, if present, may itself have become a target and if attacked, sunk. From hierarchical analysis the systems approach was inadequately applied at that time period with devastating and negative results. CA-35 was alone on a journey to gather with a main force where safety in numbers ruled the sea. Without doubt, a destroyer's mission was more than to pick up survivors even though according to some that is all a destroyer escort could have done.

1. The USN collected Commander Hashimoto and flew him all the way from Japan to Captain McVay's court martial to establish him as a witness who saw him violate standing-orders. Whether the orders mattered a jot, was not at issue. Disobedience was the specification in the charge of recklessly hazarding the ship, and that was the actual point of law. McVay was adjudged accurately as guilty of the charge and specification. 

2. The USN is a curious institution. Follow along as I enumerate how it behaves.

a. At Pearl Harbor, when Kimmel lost the fleet, one reads in the record about Royal Ingersol, future CincLant, then a captain, who is with the British at Taranto as a ride-along observer. He watches carefully as the British prepare their Swordfish with the special cable dropping mechanisms that attached the Mark XII fish to the torpedo bombers.  The purpose of the mechanism was to reel the torpedo in a controlled drop so that its nose entry angle and level out into the water would not exceed a depth of 10-12 meters so that the torpedoes would operate in the 17-20 meter shallows of Taranto harbor instead of running nose first into the bottom. Ingersol sent letters to (CNO) Harold Stark and (CominchUS (Pacific) fleet) Husband Kimmel to that effect and to the Bureaus of Aeronautics (John Tower) and Bureau of Ordnance (William Furlong),

--Stark was fired in March 1942 for incompetence. He was sent to the UK to get him away from the prying US press sniffing for people responsible for losing the Battle of the Atlantic off the US coast. But one can read in the Congressional testimony post Pearl Harbor where he failed to warn Kimmel, or instruct in the nature of prudent anti-torpedo defense at anchorage. All he had to do was forward his copy of Royal Ingersoll's letter and order torpedo nets strung off Middle Sound.
--Kimmel HAD that letter and Ingersoll's recommendations about torpedo nets, defensive anti-aircraft dispositions and the need of and for the USN to check its torpedoes and develop a shallow water drop system of its own. He, Kimmel, failed to act.   
--Tower went to PACFLT in February 1942 as admin head of its air service. He was a chairborne commando. Nimitz kept him away from important stuff for most of the war. In addition to failing to develop a US shallow run torpedo method or tactics for same, a blame he shares with George Blandy, the Atomic Playboy, who also skates away from a provable dereliction of duty, he fumbled the F4F engine and weight improvement program, screwed up the TBD Devastator improvement program of similar urgency, and failed to implement the latest USN aircraft carrier battle doctrine developed by Lantfleet as regards to air defense tactics and RADAR, during the grace period of 1939-1940. His insistence on the Brewster Buffalo and the British version of the Wildcat (The 6 gun Martlet F4F mod 4 instead of the lighter and nimbler Mod 3) killed about 500 USN and USMC aviators in air-to-air combat with the Japanese, because the death trap planes could NOT climb or hang with a Zero in a vertical fight. Tower also delayed the Corsair, screwed up the Hellcat delaying it a half year, promoted the deathtrap Curtiss Helldiver, killed the F5F Skyrocket, promoted the deathtrap Curtiss Seamew and protected his buddies, Miles Browning and that incompetent, Marc Mitscher, from courts martials they deserved after their performances at Midway. Did I mention Commander Waldron of Torpedo Eight who disobeyed Mitscher's orders and told his CAG Stanhope Ring to "go to hell" over an open mike and went off on his own and FOUND the Japanese? Good thing he died in leading that banzai charge and became a hero? HE would have been court martialed for conduct prejudicial to maintaining of good order and discipline. 
--William Furlong got out of Bu-Ord one horse ahead of the Congressional posse. 
--George Blandy, the Atomic Playboy, is moved out of Bu-Ord a la Stark, after he fails to fix the torpedo crisis fast enough. King fires him as Roosevelt fired Stark. Blandy career rehabs himself and postwar screws up a series of Pacific atomic bomb tests poisoning some Polynesian islanders in the Able Baker shots, giving the USN bad publicity and hence earning the nickname, "The Atomic Playboy".  

Other examples...

--Pye screws up the relief of Wake. He is sent to play battleships off the coast of California and is kept out of the way. It is suspected that he suffered mental collapse as a result of Pearl Harbor and that Nimitz was being kind.
--Adolfus Andrews, the guy actually is guilty of dereliction and responsible for those oil tankers burning off New Jersey gets administratively promoted sideways after stealing the SS Normandy and then letting it burn at pier-side after he stole it.
--Robert Ghormley goes insane from rotten teeth, Vichyite French politicians in New Caledonia and after he fumbles WATCHTOWER. Nimitz hoists him out on a medical and sends in Halsey.
--Halsey backstabs Fletcher who won Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons; but Nimitz, Turner (Who should have killed himself as Captain Bode of the USS Chicago actually did for his, Turner's, role in Savo Island. Bode ate bullets when he found out he was the nominated fall guy for Savo Island. With him gone, the new goat was Fletcher, but one could not court martial Fletcher. He was a genius and it would raise too many drowned sailors as ghosts at that legal proceeding.), and Tower and King are the real villains in that disgraceful conspiracy, sends in Kinkaid to lose Santa Cruz. The reason that Fletcher was knifed, was because the USN needed another fall guy for Savo Island. Fletcher had been wounded in battle when USS Saratoga was torpedoed and was on a medical. He was made to order for the noose... BUT he was too good an officer to waste on the beach, so he was sent North to Alaska to sort out the mess the army and navy had made of the Northwest Sea Frontier (Simon Buckner and Charles McMorris who screwed up the Aleutians campaign.). Fletcher did what Fletcher does and Samuel Eliot Morison is also part of the "Get Fletcher Mob."  He writes the official Navy history  coverup on what happened to Fletcher.      
--More Halsey. Rennell Islands (Bode again.), Santa Cruz (already mentioned), Choiseul, the series of night surface battles (defeats) up the Slot, and the monumental screw up at Leyte and the two typhoons, add up. One might also note Halsey's known mental instability and one asks, why was he not fired and beached?

Yes…but not for his errors in judgement at Leyte, but for sailing his forces into, not one, but two typhoons. Adding Leyte to those errors in judgement and court martial should have been a given. No Admiral in today’s Navy would be forgiven the errors allowed Halsey. Not to mention his reaction to his own failure upon learning that the tin cans are all alone and needing his help.

I’ll reprint Ken Fishkin point here:

“RADM Robert Carney, Halsey’s Chief of Staff (who had argued strongly in favor of pursuing the carriers), witnessed Halsey’s emotional outburst and reportedly grabbed him by the shoulders and shook him, shouting “Stop it! What the hell’s the matter with you? Pull yourself together!” Recognizing his failure, Halsey sulked in inactivity for a full hour while Taffy 3 was fighting for its life – falsely claiming to be refueling his ships – before eventually turning around with his two fastest battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers and heading back to Samar, too late to have any impact on the battle.[13]”

Simply unimaginable in today’s Navy. To have a Fleet Admiral sulk himself into inaction while US warriors are fighting for their very survival.

So YES, without a doubt, he should have been cashiered. Just as Kimmel, Short and McVay had to answer for their actions, Halsey should have had to answer for his as well. IMHO

Rodney Patterson

He was part of the "Brown Shoe Fraternity." And to be fair, when the USN needed a PR Hollywood hero and a flag-waver to lead the charge, Halsey was it. They knew what they were getting with Halsey and judged his pluses outweighed his minuses. But it was close.                      
       
Circle the wagons.

The Captain of the Carrier USS ‘Franklin’ Is a Case Study in How Not to Lead

Capt. Leslie Gehres left his warship worse off.

Seldom does your humble scribe come away incensed from reading history. The saga of the World War II aircraft carrier USS Franklin constitutes an exception.



We normally think of Franklin’s history as a parable about the importance of shipboard firefighting and damage control. It’s about materiel and methods, in other words. And these things are important without a doubt. Fighting ships are metal boxes packed with explosives and flammables. Suppressing fire represents a crucial function, which is why the first thing a new sailor does after reporting aboard is qualify in rudimentary damage control.



But a ship is more than a hunk of steel. The hunk of steel plus the crew that lives on board it comprises the ship. Bad leadership marred Franklin’s human component. In the end, then, this is a story with mixed lessons. It is not merely about the material dimension of naval warfare.



USS Franklin lived a short but eventful life, joining the Pacific Fleet in mid-1944. Franklin was the first fleet carrier to absorb a direct strike from a Japanese kamikaze, in the aftermath of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. But the flattop was to endure her worst trial in March 1945, while operating with Task Force 58 off the Japanese seacoast.


On the morning of March 19 a “Judy” dive bomber eluded the fleet’s air defenses, dumping two bombs on a Franklin whose decks were crowded with fully armed, fully fueled aircraft preparing to raid sites on Kyushu.



Armor plating shielded the carrier’s innards — in particular the engineering plant — from destruction. The crew eventually managed to restart propulsion, and Franklin made the fleet anchorage at Ulithi Atoll under her own power. In the interim, however, dozens of secondary explosions spanning five hours transformed the flight and hangar decks into something out of Dante.



It was a charnel house. The blasts killed the damage-control team while disabling fire fighting equipment on the hangar deck. Ammunition “cooked off,” amplifying the destruction. Aircraft fuselages melted. Rivers of burning fuel sluiced into the hangar deck and beneath from fractured pipes. Over 800 perished out of a crew of around 3,400 sailors and aviators.



Recovery operations were fitful under these circumstances. The crew managed to start a diesel-powered fire pump and organize makeshift fire parties. Cruiser USS Santa Fe came alongside and executed a controlled crash with the flattop so seamen could pass across supplies, render such firefighting aid as they could, and take aboard Franklin crewmen. The carrier survived, returning to New York via the Panama Canal.


This is a Pacific War story rich in insights for practitioners of sea power. For instance, it reveals much about the strategic and operational environment in Eurasian waters today.



To wit — a foe with no navy of consequence can still exert influence at sea.



It can deploy shore-based implements of sea power to punish a hostile navy cruising off its shores. The Imperial Japanese Navy met its doom at Leyte Gulf in October 1944. It could do little despite a flashy last-ditch effort or two to stem the American advance. But airfields in the home islands could act as unsinkable if stationary aircraft carriers once U.S. Navy task forces came within reach.



Japan fielded an array of tactical aircraft along with munitions to arm them and pilots to fly them or, in the case of the kamikaze, crash them into American vessels. Tokyo waged an “anti-access” strategy long before the term was invented.



Franklin’s ordeal also yielded hard-won lessons about naval architecture and shipboard practices, and about firefighting and damage control in particular. These are the standard lessons of the affair.



To oversimplify, the chief lesson was — equip ships with more of everything.



Assigning more people to a damage-control organization would give it a better chance of withstanding damage. Installing more and longer fire hoses would bolster fire parties’ capacity to get at blazes in remote recesses of the ship. Furnishing more portable pumps would let firefighters do their work should fireplugs fail. More high-capacity foam systems would help control and extinguish flaming fuel. Mounting quick-access “scuttles” on armored hatches would allow crewmen to escape compartments should hatches become jammed or too hot to handle. And on and on.



These are all valuable insights. To me, though, the tale of USS Franklin represents a cautionary tale about the scourge of “toxic leadership.”



When I reported at the Surface Warfare Officers’ School a few brief years ago, my check-in interview with the skipper amounted to this — leave the place better than you found it. Toxic leaders leave the place worse than they found it. They put themselves ahead of the institution, and they deploy leadership and management tactics that advance their personal interests — even at the expense of colleagues or subordinates.



I’ve known toxic leaders. So have you if you’ve worn a military uniform. They appear from time to time, often as ship captains. Why them in particular? It’s been said a ship captain is the world’s last absolute monarch once underway. And like any absolute monarch, the skipper can be a tyrant if he rules in his selfish interest rather than the common good. He can abuse his authority in an effort to get ahead.


Enter Capt. Leslie E. Gehres, who assumed command of Franklin at Ulithi on the heels of the October 1944 kamikaze strike. Historian Joseph Springer, the author of a gripping oral history of the carrier’s travails, recounts how the new skipper introduced himself to the crew. Gehres relieved Captain J. M. Shoemaker at Ulithi.



At the change-of-command ceremony, according to one Franklin sailor, Gehres proclaimed: “‘It was your fault because you didn’t shoot [the kamikaze] down. You didn’t do your duty; you’re incompetent, lazy and careless. Evidently you don’t know your jobs and I’m going to do my best to shape up this crew!’ We just stood there and couldn’t believe our ears. He sure got a lot of cheers for that.”



Imagine that. You’ve just been through hell. Dozens of your shipmates are dead, dozens more wounded. And the first thing your new commanding officer does is upbraid you and your shipmates while insulting his predecessor in his presence. That’s extreme toxicity.



According to crew accounts relayed by Springer, as many as 300 sailors jumped ship in Bremerton, Washington, when the carrier made port there for shipyard repairs. They did so in large part because they believed Franklin was jinxed following the suicide strike. In part, though, they fled to escape Capt. Gehres and his noxious brand of leadership.


It gets worse. Japanese warplanes harried Task Force 58 relentlessly in the hours leading up to the March 19 attack. Franklin had gone to general quarters a dozen times in six hours, so Gehres relaxed the ship’s posture to allow the crew to get a hot meal.



The captain’s after-action report and the official war damage report indicate that the skies were clear the morning of March 19. The deck log — the official record of a ship’s doings — says otherwise. At 0654 the ship’s Combat Information Center reported a “bogey,” or unidentified aircraft, 30 miles off. Two other sightings followed. The range was decreasing.

(Tampering with the official record (action logs in some navies, war diaries in others. is a chargeable offense, then and now. Mitscher did it at Midway to: 
a. cover up his errors in judgement.
b. protect the careers of Ring, Massey and Waldron.
c. protect the reputation of USS Hornet.
d. protect his own promotion, just approved as of 1 June 1942, but not yet in effect, to rear admiral from captain. 
  

Raymond Spruance in his report stated that USS Hornet's "official" record of events was not to be used for history or lessons learned, but that all emendations should follow the USS Enterprise war diary of that battle. He called Mitscher a liar. That is about as bad as it officially gets in the USN. Since Spruance is the gold standard just behind Nimitz and King for USN admirals, one can see where this USS Franklin business heads?)
  
At last, at 0708, lookouts on board USS Hancock positively identified the Judy. Hancock radioed Franklin: “Bogey closing you!” The dive bomber was 12 miles off at that point, and inbound fast. The aircraft would cover that distance in under three minutes, scant reaction time for the best-trained crew.



Yet Gehres never ordered Franklin to general quarters — meaning the bombs struck the flattop when she was less than fully ready for battle.



When Santa Fe came alongside he ordered the wounded evacuated and then, writes Springer, issued an order that “could not possibly have been more vague.” Gehres directed the air officer to evacuate anyone who “would not be needed to save the ship.”


A mass exodus to the cruiser ensued as those who defined themselves as nonessential fled. Ship-wide communications were out, and in the confusion many crewmen believed “abandon ship” had been ordered. The skipper then stopped the evacuation.



He later directed around 100 sailors — including some blown overboard by bomb blasts — to return to Franklin, whereupon he demanded that they state in writing why they had “left this vessel while she was in action and seriously damaged when no order had been issued to abandon ship.”



Springer opines that his action “nearly tainted” the carrier’s gallant struggle to survive.



Nearly tainted? Gehres announced that 215 Franklin crewmen would be charged with desertion, and insisted that ships carrying them treat them as prisoners. He founded the “Big Ben 704 Club” to honor the crewmen who had remained on board, ostentatiously excluding everyone else, barred evacuees from attending the memorial service for fallen shipmates, made sure no evacuee received a medal, and laid the legal groundwork for courts-martial against officers and chief petty officers who took refuge in Santa Fe.



Thankfully the Navy leadership ignored his legal maneuvering. “The treatment of these Franklin crewmen,” concludes Springer, constituted “one of the greatest but least-known injustices involving the U.S. Navy in World War II.”



And how. No bad deed went unrewarded in the case of Leslie Gehres. The Navy whitewashed his misdeeds. He was decorated with the Navy Cross, its loftiest award for martial valor, and ultimately promoted to a rear admiral. Here was a Navy captain who assumed command of a wounded vessel, shattered its culture, scapegoated his way out of high-seas disaster, and in fact garnered promotions and high honors for his trouble.



Many individual Franklin mariners — the ship’s chaplain and one of her engineering officers in particular — displayed conspicuous gallantry following the March 19 cataclysm. Indeed, the flattop is the most decorated U.S. Navy warship ever. Yet this was far from the Navy’s finest hour.



This is a story worth telling and retelling. It supplies insight into material matters, along with examples of grit and fortitude. It also supplies a case study in how not to lead. Let’s detoxify the sea service.



This article originally appeared at The National Interest.

Exactly the behaviors of Mitscher, Turner, Tower, Halsey and Browning, who Spruance almost had arrested for his insubordination at Midway. These "people" were "brown shoes", first and second cohort naval aviators coming into command billets. They formed a "clique" opposed to the "gun-clubbers" which included Spruance, Kincaid, Fletcher, the future CNO Arleigh Burke and by association, Royal Ingersoll. Jesse Oldendorff, and Willis Lee. Then there was King, Nimitz, Lockwood and Christie, who were the sub drivers, but the brown shoes, I named, lumped them in with the rest of the despised black shoes. Now mind you; the brown shoe fraternity also included the Spragues, Bogan, McCain, Wilson Brown, the Shermans, Felix Stump and many other first raters of the third and fourth naval aviation cohorts who were "excellent" officers. But they were not "Tower's Boys".   

Birds of a feather and all that. USN politics dictated who was covered and who was canned.     

OK - I understood the From the citation by reading the Pennlive. I'm quite well acquainted with the woolen stuff of state administration - I work in it.

[miletus12]

Jan 1, 2022 20:25:27 GMT 575 said:

Jan 1, 2022 17:03:43 GMT miletus12 said:

From the citation.

1. The USN collected Commander Hashimoto and flew him all the way from Japan to Captain McVay's court martial to establish him as a witness who saw him violate standing-orders. Whether the orders mattered a jot, was not at issue. Disobedience was the specification in the charge of recklessly hazarding the ship, and that was the actual point of law. McVay was adjudged accurately as guilty of the charge and specification. 

2. The USN is a curious institution. Follow along as I enumerate how it behaves.

a. At Pearl Harbor, when Kimmel lost the fleet, one reads in the record about Royal Ingersol, future CincLant, then a captain, who is with the British at Taranto as a ride-along observer. He watches carefully as the British prepare their Swordfish with the special cable dropping mechanisms that attached the Mark XII fish to the torpedo bombers.  The purpose of the mechanism was to reel the torpedo in a controlled drop so that its nose entry angle and level out into the water would not exceed a depth of 10-12 meters so that the torpedoes would operate in the 17-20 meter shallows of Taranto harbor instead of running nose first into the bottom. Ingersol sent letters to (CNO) Harold Stark and (CominchUS (Pacific) fleet) Husband Kimmel to that effect and to the Bureaus of Aeronautics (John Tower) and Bureau of Ordnance (William Furlong),

--Stark was fired in March 1942 for incompetence. He was sent to the UK to get him away from the prying US press sniffing for people responsible for losing the Battle of the Atlantic off the US coast. But one can read in the Congressional testimony post Pearl Harbor where he failed to warn Kimmel, or instruct in the nature of prudent anti-torpedo defense at anchorage. All he had to do was forward his copy of Royal Ingersoll's letter and order torpedo nets strung off Middle Sound.
--Kimmel HAD that letter and Ingersoll's recommendations about torpedo nets, defensive anti-aircraft dispositions and the need of and for the USN to check its torpedoes and develop a shallow water drop system of its own. He, Kimmel, failed to act.   
--Tower went to PACFLT in February 1942 as admin head of its air service. He was a chairborne commando. Nimitz kept him away from important stuff for most of the war. In addition to failing to develop a US shallow run torpedo method or tactics for same, a blame he shares with George Blandy, the Atomic Playboy, who also skates away from a provable dereliction of duty, he fumbled the F4F engine and weight improvement program, screwed up the TBD Devastator improvement program of similar urgency, and failed to implement the latest USN aircraft carrier battle doctrine developed by Lantfleet as regards to air defense tactics and RADAR, during the grace period of 1939-1940. His insistence on the Brewster Buffalo and the British version of the Wildcat (The 6 gun Martlet F4F mod 4 instead of the lighter and nimbler Mod 3) killed about 500 USN and USMC aviators in air-to-air combat with the Japanese, because the death trap planes could NOT climb or hang with a Zero in a vertical fight. Tower also delayed the Corsair, screwed up the Hellcat delaying it a half year, promoted the deathtrap Curtiss Helldiver, killed the F5F Skyrocket, promoted the deathtrap Curtiss Seamew and protected his buddies, Miles Browning and that incompetent, Marc Mitscher, from courts martials they deserved after their performances at Midway. Did I mention Commander Waldron of Torpedo Eight who disobeyed Mitscher's orders and told his CAG Stanhope Ring to "go to hell" over an open mike and went off on his own and FOUND the Japanese? Good thing he died in leading that banzai charge and became a hero? HE would have been court martialed for conduct prejudicial to maintaining of good order and discipline. 
--William Furlong got out of Bu-Ord one horse ahead of the Congressional posse. 
--George Blandy, the Atomic Playboy, is moved out of Bu-Ord a la Stark, after he fails to fix the torpedo crisis fast enough. King fires him as Roosevelt fired Stark. Blandy career rehabs himself and postwar screws up a series of Pacific atomic bomb tests poisoning some Polynesian islanders in the Able Baker shots, giving the USN bad publicity and hence earning the nickname, "The Atomic Playboy".  

Other examples...

--Pye screws up the relief of Wake. He is sent to play battleships off the coast of California and is kept out of the way. It is suspected that he suffered mental collapse as a result of Pearl Harbor and that Nimitz was being kind.
--Adolfus Andrews, the guy actually is guilty of dereliction and responsible for those oil tankers burning off New Jersey gets administratively promoted sideways after stealing the SS Normandy and then letting it burn at pier-side after he stole it.
--Robert Ghormley goes insane from rotten teeth, Vichyite French politicians in New Caledonia and after he fumbles WATCHTOWER. Nimitz hoists him out on a medical and sends in Halsey.
--Halsey backstabs Fletcher who won Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons; but Nimitz, Turner (Who should have killed himself as Captain Bode of the USS Chicago actually did for his, Turner's, role in Savo Island. Bode ate bullets when he found out he was the nominated fall guy for Savo Island. With him gone, the new goat was Fletcher, but one could not court martial Fletcher. He was a genius and it would raise too many drowned sailors as ghosts at that legal proceeding.), and Tower and King are the real villains in that disgraceful conspiracy, sends in Kinkaid to lose Santa Cruz. The reason that Fletcher was knifed, was because the USN needed another fall guy for Savo Island. Fletcher had been wounded in battle when USS Saratoga was torpedoed and was on a medical. He was made to order for the noose... BUT he was too good an officer to waste on the beach, so he was sent North to Alaska to sort out the mess the army and navy had made of the Northwest Sea Frontier (Simon Buckner and Charles McMorris who screwed up the Aleutians campaign.). Fletcher did what Fletcher does and Samuel Eliot Morison is also part of the "Get Fletcher Mob."  He writes the official Navy history  coverup on what happened to Fletcher.      
--More Halsey. Rennell Islands (Bode again.), Santa Cruz (already mentioned), Choiseul, the series of night surface battles (defeats) up the Slot, and the monumental screw up at Leyte and the two typhoons, add up. One might also note Halsey's known mental instability and one asks, why was he not fired and beached?

He was part of the "Brown Shoe Fraternity." And to be fair, when the USN needed a PR Hollywood hero and a flag-waver to lead the charge, Halsey was it. They knew what they were getting with Halsey and judged his pluses outweighed his minuses. But it was close.                      
       
Circle the wagons.

Exactly the behaviors of Mitscher, Turner, Tower, Halsey and Browning, who Spruance almost had arrested for his insubordination at Midway. These "people" were "brown shoes", first and second cohort naval aviators coming into command billets. They formed a "clique" opposed to the "gun-clubbers" which included Spruance, Kincaid, Fletcher, the future CNO Arleigh Burke and by association, Royal Ingersoll. Jesse Oldendorff, and Willis Lee. Then there was King, Nimitz, Lockwood and Christie, who were the sub drivers, but the brown shoes, I named, lumped them in with the rest of the despised black shoes. Now mind you; the brown shoe fraternity also included the Spragues, Bogan, McCain, Wilson Brown, the Shermans, Felix Stump and many other first raters of the third and fourth naval aviation cohorts who were "excellent" officers. But they were not "Tower's Boys".   

Birds of a feather and all that. USN politics dictated who was covered and who was canned.     

OK - I understood the From the citation by reading the Pennlive. I'm quite well acquainted with the woolen stuff of state administration - I work in it.

You have my sympathies. Does the term "careerist" mean anything to you?  

[575]

Jan 1, 2022 23:43:25 GMT miletus12 said:

Jan 1, 2022 20:25:27 GMT 575 said:

OK - I understood the From the citation by reading the Pennlive. I'm quite well acquainted with the woolen stuff of state administration - I work in it.

You have my sympathies. Does the term "careerist" mean anything to you?  

Thank you - but been through that particular phase which was cut short by a car accident years ago. Now I'm just the grumpy old hand who knows everything and who tries to cheer everybody up and grill the management when needed.

[oscssw]

Miletus12 Thanks much for posting the interview with I-58's CO. Very interesting reading.

"The interview of the Japanese captain; Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto"

I spent half my career chasing subs. They will always be "The enemy" no matter which flag they fly.

[oscssw]

575

I think you would benefit from the wisdom of LtCol.'Andy' Tanner (Red Dawn 1984)
"All that hate's gonna burn you up, kid."

[575]

Jan 2, 2022 19:36:43 GMT oscssw said:

575

I think you would benefit from the wisdom of LtCol.'Andy' Tanner (Red Dawn 1984)
"All that hate's gonna burn you up, kid."

oscssw;

Hate's a thing of the past; being the old hand make you do the seemingly impossible lefthanded but also allows wellfunded critique to be aired cause they know You be right! Just don't overdo it..

[oscssw]

Jan 2, 2022 21:09:42 GMT 575 said:

Jan 2, 2022 19:36:43 GMT oscssw said:

575

I think you would benefit from the wisdom of LtCol.'Andy' Tanner (Red Dawn 1984)
"All that hate's gonna burn you up, kid."

oscssw;

Hate's a thing of the past; being the old hand make you do the seemingly impossible lefthanded but also allows wellfunded critique to be aired cause they know You be right! Just don't overdo it..

575 Fair enough.

Happy New year

[miletus12]

Court of Inquiry: Captain Charles McVay

The court met at 10 a. m.
Present:
Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, Junior, U. S. Navy,
Vice Admiral George D. Murray, U. S. Navy,
Rear Admiral Francis E. M. Whiting, U. S. Navy, members; and
Captain William E. Hilbert, U. S. Navy, judge advocate

The board of inquiry constitutes the best leadership in the staff and midlevel grades that the USN had.

Summary: the questioning established that Captain McVay was not following SOP in zigzagging and that he had not requested escort. After he admitted he violated standing orders and did not request escort, he laid the grounds for his court martial.

This is not mentioned ever by the persons invested in the efforts to rehabilitate the captain. McVay was responsible for these omissions and therefore he was guilty.