The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

[oscssw]

Jan 28, 2022 11:25:05 GMT lordroel said:

Jan 28, 2022 0:41:10 GMT oscssw said:

Today we, in the US armed forces, call it "stop-loss". 

I would assume in those times that when a sailor who had done their time would leave in the first port they got ore would they stay until they got to a US port.

Lordroel my friend, that is a good question.  I'll have to research it. 

I do know many long term WestPac sailors retired in WestPac and made their home there with their local wives.  The dream of old "China hands" was to get their 20 years, marry a young local lady and then buy a bar in Shanghai or the P.I.  A navy pension went a long way in Asia in those days.  That made for a very lucrative and comfortable life.   

[lordroel]

Jan 28, 2022 14:49:08 GMT oscssw said:

Jan 28, 2022 11:25:05 GMT lordroel said:

I would assume in those times that when a sailor who had done their time would leave in the first port they got ore would they stay until they got to a US port.

Lordroel my friend, that is a good question.  I'll have to research it. 

I do know many long term WestPac sailors retired in WestPac and made their home there with their local wives.  The dream of old "China hands" was to get their 20 years, marry a young local lady and then buy a bar in Shanghai or the P.I.  That made for a very lucrative and comfortable life.   

Well just asking as it is strange for in that time period for US sailors to remain onboard US navy ships after they completed their service, i tough they would go of board and then take a merchant back home instead of staying onboard a US navy ships without getting paid.

[oscssw]

Jan 28, 2022 14:52:01 GMT lordroel said:

Jan 28, 2022 14:49:08 GMT oscssw said:

Lordroel my friend, that is a good question.  I'll have to research it. 

I do know many long term WestPac sailors retired in WestPac and made their home there with their local wives.  The dream of old "China hands" was to get their 20 years, marry a young local lady and then buy a bar in Shanghai or the P.I.  That made for a very lucrative and comfortable life.   

Well just asking as it is strange for in that time period for US sailors to remain onboard US navy ships after they completed their service, i tough they would go of board and then take a merchant back home instead of staying onboard a US navy ships without getting paid.

Got the answer.  I have a reprint of the 1902 "BlueJacket's Manual".  I am assuming the same regs applied to 1898.

Under the Heading Discharge the following is stated.

According to Naval Regs 878 (1) "No person shall be discharged outside the United States unless by order of the NAVY DEPRTMENT........ with the following exceptions.

(a) Upon the expiration of of the term of enlistment of a man enlisted in the United States, whose retention on board is not consider essential to the public interests, he may be discharged on his own request, by order of the senior officer present; provided such request states that the applicant waves all claim for transportation at the public expense and all consular aid."

If you enlisted outside the US you have the right to be discharged at end of enlistment outside the US.

[lordroel]

Jan 28, 2022 15:51:36 GMT oscssw said:

Jan 28, 2022 14:52:01 GMT lordroel said:

Well just asking as it is strange for in that time period for US sailors to remain onboard US navy ships after they completed their service, i tough they would go of board and then take a merchant back home instead of staying onboard a US navy ships without getting paid.

Got the answer.  I have a reprint of the 1902 "BlueJacket's Manual".  I am assuming the same regs applied to 1898.

Under the Heading Discharge the following is stated.

According to Naval Regs 878 (1) "No person shall be discharged outside the United States unless by order of the NAVY DEPRTMENT........ with the following exceptions.

(a) Upon the expiration of of the term of enlistment of a man enlisted in the United States, whose retention on board is not consider essential to the public interests, he may be discharged on his own request, by order of the senior officer present; provided such request states that the applicant waves all claim for transportation at the public expense and all consular aid."

If you enlisted outside the US you have the right to be discharged at end of enlistment outside the US.

Senior Chief (oscssw ) thanks for the answer.

[lordroel]

February 1st 1898

Cuba

Spanish forces are beaten at Rejondon de Baguanos. This and other previous operations by Garcia, cause the Spanish to abandon the strategically important interior of Oriente Province, and effectively isolating Santiago de Cuba by land from other coastal Spanish garrisons.

[lordroel]

February 9th 1898

United States

Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, the Spanish Minister to the United States, is forced to resign after the De Lôme Letter is published in the New York Journal. This document, a private letter written to friend in Cuba, characterizes US President McKinley as "weak" and a "would-be politician" who catered to the most jingoistic elements of the Republican Party and public. The American public is outraged at the depiction of the United States as immature, militarily weak, and lacking in diplomatic skill.

De Lôme Letter as written by Enrique Dupuy de Lôm:

LEGATION DE ESPANA, WASHINGTON
Eximo Senor DON JOSE CANALEJAS:

My Distinguished and Dear Friend: - You need not apologize for not having written to me; I also ought to have written to you, but have not done so on account of being weighed down with work and nous sommes quites.

Minister Enrique Dupuy DeLomeThe situation here continues unchanged. Everything depends on the political and military success in Cuba. The prologue of this second method of warfare will end the day that the Colonial Cabinet shall be appointed , and it relieves us in the eyes of this country of a part of the responsibility for what happens there, and they must cast the responsibility upon the Cubans, whom they believe to be so immaculate.

Until then we will not be able to see clearly, and I consider it to be a loss of time and an advance by the wrong road - the sending of emissaries to the rebel field, the negotiations with the Autonomists not yet declared to be legally constituted, and the discovery of the intentions and purpose of this government. The exiles will return oneby one, and when they return, will come walking into the sheepfold, and the chiefs will gradually return. Neither of these had the courage to leave en masse, and they will not have the couragethus to return.

The message has undeceived the insurgents who expected something else, and has paralyzed the action of Congress, but I consider it bad.

Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness with which he repeats all that the press and public opinion of Spain has said of Weyler, it shows once more what McKinley is: weak and catering to the rabble, and, besides, a low politician, who desires to leave a door open to me and to stand well with the jingoes of his party.

Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, it will only depend on ourselves whether he proves bad and adverse to us. I agree entirely with you; without a military success nothing will be accomplished there, and without military and political success, there is here always danger that the insurgents will be encouraged, if not by the government, at least bypart of the public opinion.

I do not believe you pay enough attention to the role of England. Nearly all that newspaper canaille which swarms in your hotel are English, and at the same time are correspondents of the Journal, they are also correspondents of the best newspapers and reviews of England. Thus it has been since the beginning. To my mind the only object of England is that the Americans should occupy themselves with us and leave her in peace,and if there is a war, so much the better; that would further remove what is threatening her - although that will never happen.

It would be most important that you should agitate the question of commercial relations, even though it would be only for effect, and that you should send here a man of importance in order that I might use him to make a propaganda among the senators and others in opposition to the Junta and win over exiles.

There goes Amblard. I believe he comes deeply taken up with little political matters, and there must be something very great or we shall lose.

Adela returns your salutations, and we wish you in the new year to be a messenger of peace and take this New Year's present to poor Spain.

Always you attentive friend and servant, who kisses your hands.

ENRIQUE DUPUY DE LOME

Puerto Rico

Spanish Governor-General Manuel Macías y Casado inaugurates the new government of Puerto Rico under the Autonomous Charter, a law approved the previous November by the Cortes (the Spanish national legislature) which gives town councils complete autonomy in local matters. Subsequently, the governor has no authority to intervene in civil and political matters unless authorized to do so by the Cabinet.

[lordroel]

February 10th 1898

United States - Captain Charles D. Sigsbee To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S.S. MAINE, 1st. Rate,

Havana, Cuba,

February 10, 1898. 

Sir:—

1. I have to report that matters in Havana have been quiet since my last letter was written. Referring to the department’s telegram of February 1st., 1898, relating to calling on the Civil Authorities of Havana, I beg to state that no question of that kind has been presented to me here by the Spanish authorities, not even by suggestion.

2. I suggest that it is highly probable that the question is brought up by Dr. Congosto, the Secretary General of the Island, (1) as a diplomatic measure intended to put the United States on the defensive before the people of Havana. In line with that view is Dr. Congosto’s more recent action in respect to the American Steam Yacht “BUCCANEER”, now in this harbor. He has written to Consul General Lee complaining that signals were exchanged between the MAINE and the BUCCANEER while the latter was off the port or entering, and that certain signals were made on shore in conjunction therewith, all of which is untrue so far as the MAINE is concerned. My estimates of Spanish official administration, I should always expect this course to be pursued by them, but they will weaken when the same course is pursued with positiveness towards themselves.

3. My official relations with the Spaniards here have been in all respects pleasant, but my efforts to get Spanish officers on board the MAINE in a social way, that is to convince them that they were welcome and would please me by visiting the ship have been entirely unavailing. A few days ago a small party of Spanish Army officers appeared on board and remained for a short time. They declined hospitality and also declined to make a tour of the ship, while polite, they were evidently constrained. I was absent from the ship at the time.

. . . I have gone just as far in the direction of extending invitations to Spanish Officials to visit the MAINE as my official self respect will permit. The Spanish officers know that they are welcome on board the MAINE, but I shall extend no more pointed invitations. I have paid no visits to private persons, either Spanish or Cubans, since I have been in Havana, desiring to keep myself free from all entanglements, but I have entertained a great many people on board and I have made full use of my opportunities to gather information from them. . . .

8. I have always found in the management of the crews of ships under my command that even the most hot headed and bad tempered men on board, although they may have attacked shipmates on the spur of the moment and even drawn knives on them, have been able nevertheless, to control their tempers perfectly in my presence and when subjected to my harsh criticisms and sentences. This they have done, undoubtedly, from a sense of my power over them, the amount of which they could not accurately measure, but which they knew to be great. There is, doubtless, considerable analogy between this state of things and that involved in the quieting influence of a man of war over a hot headed populace. The people of Havana know how far they can go in violent opposition to their own government, but in the presence of a restraining factor which they cannot measure in respect to either its intention or strength they are well able to control themselves.

9. After continued reflection, I can find no reason to withdraw the recommendations contained in my previous letters as to the visits of the United States men of war in Havana. I have had no communication whatever from the Montgomery since her arrival in Cuban waters, from which I infer that her Commanding Officer is free to act without reference to the MAINE’s actions (2).

Footnote 1: Dr. Juan Cognosto.

Footnote 2: Montgomery, Comdr. George A Converse, commanding, had been sent to visit Matanzas, Cuba, and report on conditions in that province. In February, as a result of that report, the United States decided to ship relief supplies to Matanzas and later that month, the Navy offered to transport them, which the Spanish government described as “a very grave act, which would cause immediate complications.” 

[lordroel]

February 11th 1898

Japan

USS Olympia departs Japan for Hong Kong.

[lordroel]

February 12th 1898

Cuba

General Máximo Gómez issued a call to various Cuban autonomist groups for formation of a united effort against Spain.

Spain - Admiral Pascual Cervera Y Topete To Minister Of Marine Segismundo Bermejo Y Merelo

Cartagena [Spain], February 12, 1898.

His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo (1).

My Dear Admiral and Friend:

... I am very anxious for this ship as well as the Vizcaya (2) to complete their voyages and be incorporated with the fleet, either at Havana or in Spain, without running into the mouth of the wolf. I can not help thinking of a possible war with the United States, and I believe it would be expedient if I were given all possible information on the following points:

1. The distribution and movements of the United States ships.

2. Where are their bases of supplies?

3. Charts, plans, and routes of what may become the scene of operations.

4. What will be the objective of the operations of this squadron—the defense of the Peninsula and Balearic Islands, (3) that of the Canaries or Cuba, or, finally, could their objective be the coasts of the United States, which would seem possible only if we had some powerful ally?

5. What plans of campaign does the Government have in either event? I should like also to know the points where the squadron will find some resources and the nature of these; for, strange to say, here, for instance, we have not even found 4-inch rope, nor boiler tubes, nor other things equally simple. (4) It would also be well for me to know when the Pelayo, Carlos V, Vitoria, and Numancia (5) may be expected to be ready, and whether they will be incorporated with the squadron to form an independent division, and in that event what will be its connection with ours? If I had information on these matters I could go ahead and study and see what is best to be done, and if the critical day should arrive we could enter without vacillations upon the course we are to follow. This is the more needful for us, as their squadron is three or four times as strong as ours, and besides they count on the alliance of the insurgents in Cuba, which will put them in possession of the splendid Cuban harbors, with the exception of Havana and one or two others perhaps. The best thing would be to avoid the war at any price; but, on the other hand, it is necessary to put an end to the present situation, because this nervous strain can not be borne much longer....

Yours, etc.

Pascual Cervera.

Footnote 1: Rear Admiral Segismundo Bermejo y Merelo is the Minister of Marine under the Sagasta government.

Footnote 2: Vizcaya, an armored cruiser under the command of Capt. Antonio Eulante y Fery, has been sent to New York City on a courtesy call after Maine was dispatched to Havana. 

Footnote 3: A reference to Spain, which is on the Iberian Peninsula. The Balearic Islands belong to Spain and are due east in the Mediterranean.

Footnote 4: Chronic problems plague the Spanish Navy because Madrid was unable to provide adequate funding.

Footnote 5: Pelayo is Spain’s only battleship.

Japan - Commander Asa Walker To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S.S. Concord, 3d Rate,

Yokohama, Japan,

Feb. 12, 1898.

S i r :-

1. I have to report that, in obedience to the Department’s telegraphic orders of January 5th 1898, I left the Navy Yard, Mare Island on January 8th with this ship, and proceeded directly to sea. The passage to Honolulu was made in nine days, during which time the ship was five days under half boiler power, and four days under three quarters boiler power.

2. Advantage was taken of the opportunity for target practice with the ship’s battery.

3. Arriving at Honolulu on the afternoon of January 17th, I reported to Rear Admiral Miller, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron, who facilitated my preparations for an early departure.

4. Having taken on board two hundred and eighty tons of George’s Creek (1) coal, I left Honolulu on the morning of January 22d for Yokohama.

5. I arrived in Yokohama at two P.M. February 9th, and reported for duty to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Squadron (2).

6. The passage from Honolulu was made in seventeen days and nine hours under half boiler power at the expense of 301 and 870/2240 tons of coal, which gives an average of about eleven miles for each ton of coal consumed, for all purposes.

7. By order of the Commander-in-Chief I shall proceed to Chemulpo (3), Korea, as soon as stores shall have been received and the crew given liberty.

Footnote 1: Refers to coal from George’s Creek Valley, Maryland.

Footnote 2: Commodore George Dewey.

Footnote 3: Chemulpo is modern day Incheon.

[lordroel]

February 13th 1898

Evening Star (Washington) article - U.S. Navy And Possibility Of Mines In Harbor At Havana, Cuba

Naval Officials Not Alarmed.

Naval officials are not alarmed over the report that the harbor of Havana is protected by torpedoes and submarine mines inasmuch the same is true of the harbors of all up-to-date countries, including our own. It is incomprehensible to them, however, that the battle ship Maine is in any danger in the port of the Cuban capital while the United States and Spain are at peace. The port is in daily use by the vessels of all countries, and it is not believed that the Maine is in any greater jeopardy than the vessels of Great Britain and Germany or even those of the Spanish navy or the merchant ships that visit the harbor daily. A naval officer stated that while the harbor may be arranged for submarine mines and torpedoes he was confident that they were not charged inasmuch as it would be unusual and as dangerous to Spanish shipping as well as to others to adopt such a course in time of peace with the outside world.

[lordroel]

February 14th 1898

Spain - General Stewart L. Woodford (1) to Mr. John Sherman (2)

[Telegram.]

Legation of the United States,

Madrid, February 14, 1898.

Telegram received. I have written the following letter to Spanish minister for foreign affairs. I repeat the text:

On the afternoon of last Thursday, the 10th day of February, and after the adjournment of His Majesty’s council of ministers I had the honor to call upon your excellency and to read to you a copy of a telegram which I had received that morning from my Government and which related to a letter written by the Spanish minister at Washington. I then stated that I would communicate to my Government at once by telegraph such answer as your excellency might make, and I left with you a copy of such telegram and statement. I understood your excellency to reply that the Spanish Government sincerely regretted the indiscretion of the Spanish minister at Washington and that his resignation had been asked and accepted by cable before our then interview. I telegraphed to my Government at once that the resignation had been asked and accepted by cable before our then interview. It is possible that I misunderstood your excellency in what was said about the minister’s resignation having been asked for by your Government, It is now the fourth day since I had the honor of calling upon your excellency and I have not yet had the satisfaction of receiving any formal indication that His Majesty’s Government regrets and disavows the language and sentiments which were employed and expressed in such letter addressed by the Spanish minister at Washington to a distinguished Spanish citizen. It is my hope and pleasure to believe that the Spanish Government can not have received the text of the letter written by Señor Dupuy de Lôme to Señor Canalejas in regard to which I called upon your excellency last Thursday, and it therefore becomes my duty to acquaint your excellency with the following extracts from such letter which are notably objectionable to my Government.

Here follow two Spanish extracts as telegraphed by the Department.

I beg to point out to your excellency the insulting character of the first passage and the insincerity which underlies the suggestions of the second.

Customary conclusion.

Woodford.

Footnote 1: General Stewart L. Woodford, the United States minister to Spain.

Footnote 2: United States Secretary of State.

[lordroel]

February 15th 1898

Havana harbour, Cuba

USS Maine had been at Havana for three weeks, lying at the buoy assigned her by the authorities of the port. The usual formal courtesies were exchanged between her captain and the local officials. Her errand was announced as a friendly visit, and her presence evoked practically no demonstration of hostility, the only exceptions being a few derisive calls from a passing ferryboat crowded with people returning from the bullfight at Regla, and a circular, copies of which were sent to captain Sigsbee, denouncing the cochinos 'yankees (Yankee pigs) and their podrida escuadra (rotten squadron). As was natural and proper, the captain had enjoined an extra degree of watchfulness upon all those responsible for the care of the ship, but there was no alarm of any sort until twenty minutes to ten o'clock on the night of Tuesday, February 15th. Then, without a moment's warning, from deep down in the bowels of the vessel there came the shock and roar of a tremendous explosion-or rather of two explosions with a brief but distinct interval-instantly transforming the entire forward part of the Maine into a shattered wreck, scattering debris over other vessels anchored in the harbour, and breaking windows and extinguishing lights along the water front of the city. 

Captain Sigsbee was sitting in his cabin writing a letter when the upheaval came. As he reached the door an orderly, from whom no explosion could shock the habit of discipline, stumbled against him in the darkness-the ship's lights had gone out and reported that the Maine had been blown up. The captain ran on deck and ordered that the magazines should be flooded; but the magazines, partly exploded, were already filled by the water that rushed through the rent frame of the vessel. The Maine was blazing fiercely and sinking fast. In a few minutes·she had settled down in about thirty feet of water, her upper works, a mass of wreckage, remaining above the surface, and continuing to burn, with occasional explosions of ammunition, for four hours more. Three of her boats, which hung aft, were intact, and were launched before she sank and in these, and in boats from two neighboring vessels, the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII and the American steamer City of Washington, of the Ward line-the survivors were carried ashore. Most of the crew, whose quarters were directly above the seat of the explosion, were instantly killed, or were drowned with the sinking ship, the total loss being two hundred and sixty men, including two officers, Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt. A third officer, Lieutenant Blandin, died some months later from causes attributed to the shock of the disaster.

Photo: The sunken USS Maine in Havana harbor



United States - Captain Charles D. Sigsbee To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Secnav

Washington, D.C.

Maine blown up in Havana harbor at nine forty to night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more Killed or drowned Wounded and others on board Spanish man of war and Ward Line Steamer. (1)  City of Wash Send Light House Tenders  from Key West— want the derricks for removable effects to take movable equipment from wreck, some of which is above water for crew and the few pieces of equipment above water_ Noone has clothing other than that upon him_ Public Opinion should be suspended until further report_ All Officers believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for (2) Sigsbee Span Representative of General Many Spanish Officers including representative of General Blanco now with me to express Sympathy (3).

The cable is undated, but was sent the night of 15 February. It was written on the stationery of the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company, James E. Ward & Co., Agents. The heading includes information about the company and the mail steamships routes. It is numbered “189.” On 25 February, a New York newspaper printed a “facsimile [of the] rough copy of telegram,” much to the distress of the Secretary of the Navy.

Telegram: the Telegram from James A. Forsythe to Secretary of the Navy



Footnote 1: The Spanish warship is Alphonso XII, the flagship of the Spanish fleet in Cuba. The Ward Line Steamer is S.S. City of Washington, the name of which Sigsbee began to write, but then crossed through. 

Footnote 2: The missing officers, Lt. Friend W. Jenkins and Assistant Engineer Darwin R. Merritt, had been killed.

Footnote 3: Ramón Blanco Erenas y Polo, the Spanish Governor General of Cuba. Frank B. Rea, a correspondent from Harper’s Weekly who had been able get on board City of Washington a short time after the explosion, reports that Capt. Sigsbee was writing the text of this cable when Blanco’s representatives, Cuban Secretary General Dr. Juan Congosto and the police chief of Havana, arrived. After receiving their condolences, Sigsbee returned to the cable, crossed out his name, added the last sentence, and then re-signed it. In his report on the Navy’s actions prior to and during the war, the head of the Bureau of Navigation RAdm. Arent S. Crowninshield wrote of Sigsbee’s telegram:

“The cool, clear-headed telegram of Captain Sigsbee did much to strengthen the Department in its purpose to take the fairest and most dispassionate view of every question which the continually increasing menacing attitude of Spain was constantly bringing us to face.”

Spain - Minister Of Marine Segismundo Bermejo Y Merelo To Admiral Pascual Cervera Y Topete

The Minister of Marine,

Madrid, February 15, 1898.

His Excellency Pascual Cervera.

My Dear Admiral and Friend:

. . . As to the war with the United States, I will tell you my ideas about it. A division composed of the Numancia, Vitoria, Alfonso XIII (or Lepanto), the destroyers Audaz, Osado, and Proserpina, and three torpedo boats would remain in Spain in the vicinity of Cadiz (1). In Cuba the Carlos V, Pelayo, Colón, Vizcaya, Oquendo, Maria Teresa, three destroyers, and three torpedo boats, in conjunction with the eight larger vessels of the Havana Navy-Yard, would take up a position to cover the channels between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic and try to destroy Key West, where the United States squadron has established its principal base of provisions, ammunition, and coal.

If we succeed in this, and the season is favorable, the blockade could be extended to the Atlantic coast, so as to cut off communications and commerce with Europe—all this subject to the contingencies which may arise from your becoming engaged in battles in which it will be decided who is to hold empire of the sea. For your guidance in these matters, you are acquainted with the preliminary plans of the staff of this ministry, which I placed at your disposal, including the attack upon Key West. I will advise you as to the location of the United States ships and other data for which you ask.

I will also inform you that twelve or fifteen steamers will be equipped as auxiliaries to our fleet, independent of privateering, and in confidence I will tell you that if any ship of real power can be found, either cruiser or battle ship, we shall buy it, provided it can be ready by April. My life is getting to be a burden, for to all that is already weighing upon me under the circumstances are now added the elections and candidates for representatives.

I believe, my dear Admiral, that all the energy and all the good will of those who are wearing uniforms can do but very little toward preparing for the events which may happen (2).

Yours, etc.

Segismundo Bermejo.

Footnote 1: Cadiz is home port to the Spanish fleet.

Footnote 2: Bermejo responded to the previous letter from Admiral Cervera three days before. The contrast between Bermejo’s effusion of patriotic glory and potential of Spanish might, irrespective of personal feelings, made it incumbent upon him to write this letter in official language.

[lordroel]

February 16th 1898

United States

The Light House tender Mangrove departs Key West for Havana harbour, Cuba.

Photo: The United States Lighthouse Service lighthouse tender USHLT Mangrove



United States - Commander James M. Forsyth, Commandant, Key West Naval Base, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

COMMANDANT’S OFFICE,

U.S. Naval Station, Key West, Florida,

February 16, 1898.

SIR:

About twelve thirty (12.30) this A.M. I received a telegram from Captain Sigsbee of the U.S.S. “MAINE”, a copy of which I wired you, announcing the loss of that ship.  Lieutenant Comdr. Cowles (1), commanding Fern, was in the telegraph office when the message was received, and immediately sent a copy to the Torpedo Boat “ERICSSON” for transmittal to the Commander-in-Chief, N.A. Squadron (2). The ERICSSON got underway with quick dispatch and left at twelve fifty-five (12.55) for Tortugas. I at once notified Comdr. Belden of the Mongrove (3), and he made hurried preparations to leave, getting away at three (3.00) A,M,

Assistant Surgeon Spear, U.S.N. (4). of the U.S.S. “NEW YORK”, being here I ordered him to take passage in the Mangrove and render any medical assistant he could. Commander Belden also sent to the U.S. Barracks and, through the courtesy of the Commanding Officer, Captain Merrill, 1st. Artillery, secured the service of Captain Clendenin, Assistant Surgeon, U.S. Army, who also took passage in the Mangrove with his hospital steward, prepared to render medical assistant (5), At four thirty (4.30) A.M., having received telegraphic orders from the Navy Department, I ordered the U.S.S. “Fern” to proceed to Havana. She left the port at five fifteen (5.15) A.M.

I have put myself in communication with the Marine Hospital Surgeon and the Commanding Officer of the Key West barracks and made arrangement for reception of wounded at the Hospital and the quartering and messing of the uninjured at the Barracks, on their arrival from Havana (6), I have also wired the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts for authority to purchase, to supply survivors, necessary clothing. Captain Sigsbee hav-ing stated that they are almost destitute.8 The leading citizens of this place have offered any assistance I may need and seem most earnest in a desire to do anything possible to help me.

The Spanish Consul and Vice Consul have called and offered their sympathy and condolence in this trouble.

Very Respectfully,

Jas. M. Forsyth

Commander, U.S. Navy,

Commandant

Footnote 1: Lt. Comdr. Walter C. Cowles.

Footnote 2: RAdm. Montgomery Sicard was commander of the North Atlantic Squadron. Sicard had notice of the disaster on 16 February and later in the day received instructions from the Navy Department concerning disposition of the surviving crew and convening of a board of inquiry into the disaster.

Footnote 3: Comdr. Samuel Belden of the Light House tender Mangrove.

Footnote 4: Asst. Surgeon Raymond Spear.

Footnote 5: Capt. Abner H. Merrill; Capt. Paul Clendenin.

Footnote 6: On this same day, Long ordered Sicard to send clothing to Havana for the survivors of Maine. 

United States - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

[Washington, D.C.] February 16, 1898

Sir:

In view of the accident of the MAINE, I venture respectfully, but most urgently, to advise that the monitors, instead of being laid up, be put in commission forthwith. If we had gone to war with Spain a year ago we should have had seven armored ships against three; and there would be no chance of any serious loss to the American Navy. Month by month the Spanish Navy has been put into a better condition to meet us. A week ago it would have been seven seagoing armored ships against seven. Today it would be six against seven. When the NUMANCIA is ready, as she soon will be, it will be six against eight. By adding the three monitors and the Ram KATAHDIN we can make it ten to eight (1). We have lost in peace one of our battleships, a loss which I do not believe we would have encountered in war.

I would not intrude on you with any suggestion or advice did I not feel, sir, the greatest regard and respect for you personally, no less than a desire to safeguard the honor of the Navy. It may be impossible to ever settle definitely whether or not the Maine was destroyed through some treachery upon the part of the Spaniards. The coincidence of her destruction with her being anchored off Havana by an accident such as has never before happened, is unpleasant enough to seriously increase the many existing difficulties between ourselves and Spain. It is of course not my province to in any way touch on the foreign policy of this country; but the Navy Department represents the arm of the government which will have to carry out any policy upon which the administration may finally determine, and as events of which we have not the slightest control may, at any moment, force the administration’s hand, it seems to me, sir, that it would be well to take all possible precautions. If ever some such incident as the de Lome affair, or this destruction of the Maine, war should suddenly arise, the Navy Department would have to bear the full brunt of the displeasure of Congress and the country if it were not ready. It would in all probability take two or three weeks to get ready vessels laid up in reserve, and these two or three weeks would represent the golden time for striking a paralyzing blow at the outset of the war.

I would also suggest that the Merritt Wrecking, or else some other as good, be directed at once to make preparations to get the Maine up.

I note Captain Sigsbee and Consul General Lee advise against a warship going to Havana at present. It seems to me they would not thus advise unless they felt that there was at least some grave suspicion as to the cause of the disaster. In any event I hope that no battleship will be again sent there. In point of force it is either too great or too small. The moral effect is gained as much by the presence of any cruiser flying the American flag, a cruiser such as the MARBLEHEAD, for instance. If there is need for a battleship at all there will be need for every battleship we possess; and the loss of a cruiser is small compared to the loss of a battleship.

I venture again to point out how these events emphasize the need that we should have an ample Navy. Secretary Tracy, in his address at Boston the other day, was able to show that he had no responsibility for our present inadequate Navy; that he had given advice which, if followed by Congress, would have [insured us] at the present moment, a Navy which would have forbid any danger of trouble with either Spain or Japan. The question of economy is very important; but it is wholly secondary when compared with the question of national honor and national defense. An unsuccessful war would cost many times over more than the cost of the most extravagant appropriations that could be imagined. Congress may, or may not, adopt your recommendations, if you recommend, in view of what has happened, the increase of the Navy to the size which we should have, but at any rate the skirts of the Department will then be cleared; and it is certain that until the Department takes the lead, Congress will not only refuse to grant ships, but will hold itself justified in its refusal. For a year and a half now we have been explaining to Spain that we might and very probably would, in certain contingencies interfere in Cuba. We have therefore been giving her ample notice, of which she has taken advantage to get ready all the fleet she could, until the margin of difference between our force and hers has become so small that by the sinking of the Maine it had been turned in her favor so far as the units represented by the seagoing armorclads on the Atlantic are concerned. It is of course true that the Navy be increased, as it should be increased, and as the interests of the nation demand; but this blame will be baseless, and we can well afford to stand it, whereas it may be held against us for all time to come, not merely by the men of today, but by those who read history in the future, if we fail to point out what the naval needs of the nations are, and how they should be met.

Very respectfully

Theodore Roosevelt

Assistant Secretary

Footnote 1: How Roosevelt has come up with these numbers is unclear and his fears are overstated. The U.S. Navy still has seven armored ships after MAINE exploded in Havana Harbor. These are the armored cruisers New York and Brooklyn and the battleships Iowa, Indiana, Texas, Massachusetts, and Oregon. It is possible he excluded Oregon because it is on the Pacific Coast at the time.

United States - Newspapers

Clips of several Newspapers on February 16th 1898



Newspaper, The World on February 16th 1898

[lordroel]

February 17th 1898

United States

In order to find the cause of the explosion, a Naval Board of Inquiry into the loss of the battleship Maine is establish ("the Sampson Board") which is to headed by Captain William T. Sampson. The Spanish governor of Cuba Ramón Blanco y Erenas, had proposed instead a joint Spanish-American investigation of the sinking. Captain Sigsbee had written that "many Spanish officers, including representatives of General Blanco, now with us to express sympathy (1)." In a cable, the Spanish minister of colonies, Segismundo Moret, had advised Blanco "to gather every fact you can, to prove the Maine catastrophe cannot be attributed to us."

Footnote 1: as can be read on the February 15th 1898 communication by Captain Charles D. Sigsbee To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long.

Newspaper: New York Journal, February 17th 1898



Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To United States Consul At Manila Oscar F. Williams

Confidential

Hong Kong, February 17, 1898

Dear Sir:

Having recently assumed command of the United States Naval Force on this Station, and being without definite information regarding the Philippines and our relations with them, I beg to address myself to you in that connection. I am considering the question of sending one of the smaller vessels of my squadron to Manila to communicate with you and to exchange salutes and calls with the Spanish authorities and will be glad if you will inform me if in your opinion this is advisable in view of the recent strained relations between the United States and Spain.

I beg also that you will inform me what Spanish war vessels are at present at Manila and in the Philippines and what if any, changes there have been in the land defenses of that port in recent years.

I regret that it is not practicable for me to visit Manila in person at present.

Very sincerely yours

(Signed) George Dewey.

Commodore, U.S. Navy.

Spain - General Stewart L. Woodford (1) to Mr. John Sherman (2)

Legation of the United States,

Madrid, February 17, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to report that the Gaceta de Madrid of this date publishes officially the decree of the Queen Regent accepting the resignation of Señor Dupuy de Lome as Spanish minister at Washington. It is dated February 10 instant, and contains no expression of commendation of his official service.

I inclose two copies of same for files of Department.

Yesterday afternoon, February 16, Señor Aguera, the subsecretary of the ministry of state, and Senor Polo de Barnabé, chief of the commercial bureau of same ministry, called on me in behalf of the minister of foreign affairs and notified me informally that Señor Polo de Barnabé had been appointed as minister from Spain to the United States at Washington in place of Senor Dupuy de Lôme resigned, and that such new appointment would be officially announced yery soon.

I telegraphed you to-day in regard to such appointment as follows:

Legation of the United States,

Madrid, February 17, 1898.

Polo de Barnabé will be appointed minister to Washington. He is the son of Admiral Polo, formerly minister. Is now chief of commercial bureau in Spanish state department. Speaks English and is familiar with commercial affairs. Was secretary of legation at Washington when his father was minister.

Woodford.

I have, etc.,

Stewart L. Woodford.

Footnote 1: General Stewart L. Woodford, the United States minister to Spain.

Footnote 2: United States Secretary of State.

[oscssw]

Good work Lordroel. Not much I can add except to share with you the analysis of the Maine Explosion by Admiral Hyman Rickover (SOB First class)concluded.

3. SUMMARY
1. The object of this examination was to determine if present-day knowledge of explosion phenomena and their effects on ship structures could providenew insight into the question of whether the Maine explosion was initiated
externally or internally.

2. The analyzed factual knowledge concerning the Maine disaster was obtained from the records of the American and Spanish courts of inquiry of 1898, the records from the American board of inspection and survey of 1911, and certain other contemporary technical data. The evidence from the Maine explosion is of three kinds: (1) data from examination of the wreckage, (2) the recorded statements of witnesses, and (3) other types of evidence. The
analysis of the wreckage made here has been based on the 1911 data, since it has to be considered more reliable than the data obtained from the 1898 inspections.

3. The general character of the overall wreck as revealed in photographs, drawings, and descriptions leaves no doubt that a large internal explosion occurred. The explosion was, without a doubt, a magazine explosion, since
only the magazines contained sufficient explosive material to do the documented damage. Examination of the structural details of the wreck show that the explosion was centered in the 6-inch reserve magazine (A-14-M) which is on the port side around frame 27. This location of the explosion center was correctly determined by the 1911 board. From an analysis of the extent of the damage to the ship it is concluded that most of the 11,190 pounds
of powder in the 6-inch reserve magazine (A-14-M) exploded, possibly together with parts of the contents of adjacent magazines. This amount is approximately one-sixth of the total amount of powder in the forward magazine complex.

4. CONCLUSION
We have found no technical evidence in the records examined that an external explosion initiated the destruction of the Maine. The available evidence is consistent with an internal explosion alone. We therefore conclude that an internal source was the cause of the explosion. The most likely source was heat from a fire in the coal bunker adjacent to the 6-inch reserve magazine. However, since there is no way of proving this, other internal
causes cannot be eliminated as possibilities.

If anyone is interested,(Be warned it is a real boring document that reflects the humorless engineer and martinet that Rickover was) you can read Rickover's entire report at
HOW THE BATTLESHIP MAINE WAS DESTROYED
by H. G. RICKOVER

www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/NHC/NewPDFs/USN/USN%20Manuals%20and%20Reports/USN.HOW%20.THE.BATTLESHIP.MAINE.WAS.DESTROYED.Rickover.pdf