The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

[lordroel]

February 27th 1898

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

From COM’D’R’-IN-CHIEF

To Secretary of the Navy.

Hongkong.

Date February 27, 1898.

Subject Acknowledging orders

Scarcity of coal, etc

Orders have been received.

Cannot understand 9th and 19th words (1).

please repeat.

Will carry out instructions (2).

Great scarcity of coal within the limits of the station.

It is suggested that coal and ammunition should be sent from San Francisco without delay.

Source Note: Cy, DLC-MSS, PGD.

Footnote 1: The previous message was sent by Asst. Sec. of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to Dewey on 26 February and was sent in code. The 9th and 19th words in that message were “to” and “declaration.” 

Footnote 2: Dewey’s instructions are to keep full of coal, assemble all ship of the Asiatic Squadron at Hong Kong (except the Monocacy), and to keep the Olympia with the Squadron.

[lordroel]

February 28th 1898

United States - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Captain Charles O’Neil, Chief Of The Ordnance Bureau

[Washington, D.C.] February 28, 1898.

My dear Captain O’Neil:

The enclosed statement explains itself. I don’t want to bring this matter in any way officially before the Department, but, writing to you personally, don’t you think it inadvisable for Prof. Alger (1) to express opinions in this way? Captain Bradford (2) has all along believed that Prof. Alger is absolutely in error in his views. He believes that the explosion was not accidental. Captain Clover (3) is inclined to the same belief. I should certainly feel that it was not advisable for either of them to make public any such statement, and it seems to me that it is inadvisable for Prof. Alger to make these statements. I don’t know the conditions under which he made them; and, besides, I don’t want to bother the Secretary (4), or to bring on any wrangle in the Department, and I should just like to get your views about the matter unofficially. Mr. Alger cannot possibly know anything about the accident. All the best men in the Department agree that, whether probable or not, it certainly is possible that the ship was blown up by a mine which might, or might not, have been towed under her; and when we have a court sitting to find out these facts it seems to me to the last point inadvisable for any person connected with the Navy Department to express his opinion publicly in the matter, and especially to give elaborate reasons for one side or the other. The fact that Mr. Alger happens to take the Spanish side and to imply that the explosion was probably due to some fault of the Navy, whether in the Construction Department, or whether among the officers, has, of course, nothing to do with the matter.

Very truly yours,

Theodore Roosevelt

Footnote 1: Capt. Philip R. Alger is professor of mathematics at the United States Naval Academy and an expert on ordnance and the chemistry of explosives. 

Footnote 2: Capt. Royal B. Bradford is chief of the Bureau of Equipment and holds the rank of Rear Admiral.

Footnote 3: Cmdr. Richardson Clover is the head of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Footnote 4: Secretary of the Navy John D. Long.

United States - Journal Of Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

[Extract]

Washington, D.C., Monday, February 28th, 1898.

One of the loveliest days of the year, with a fine promise of spring.

Congressmen Boutelle and Senator Hale in this morning, with regard to preparations for war; both of them depricating, as I do, any undue activity or sensation in this respect.

. . . At half past seven, . . . comes a message to go to the White House. Helen goes with me there (1). Judge Day and the President (2) are in session over a message from Havanna, giving some probable explanation of the explosion. I send for Commodore O’Neil, who is familiar with explosives, being the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. General Lee (3) is very clearly of the opinion that the Spanish Government had no connection with or participation in the disaster. It is possible that some individual may have sunk a mine, which means a barrel or cask or two filled with gun cotton (4), of which only some hundred pounds would be necessary, at a point where, in the course of her swinging, the hull of the Maine would hit it, and the explosion of this communicated with the magazine in which the saluting powder was kept and blew that up. However, everything is still more or less a matter of speculation, but I believe was will be averted, for I am satisfied that the Spanish Government is not responsible for the disaster.

Footnote 1: Helen Long is John D. Long’s daughter.

Footnote 2: Assistant Secretary of State William R. Day and President William McKinley.

Footnote 3: Capt. Charles O’Neil and Fitzhugh Lee, the American general-consul in Havana.

Footnote 4: Gun cotton or nitrocellulose is an explosive created by exposing cellulose to nitric acid or another strong nitrating agent.

[stevep]

  lordroel ,

  Damn it.  Sounds like Roosevelt is intent on war regardless.  To dismiss a professional in ordinance as compared to naval officers like that.  Coupled with the fact he's undermining his superior who is taking exactly the opposite stance. 

  I wonder if his statement

The fact that Mr. Alger happens to take the Spanish side and to imply that the explosion was probably due to some fault of the Navy, whether in the Construction Department, or whether among the officers, has, of course, nothing to do with the matter.

  Could be a large factor in the entire thing.  At least in mobilizing professional officers who don't want the navy 'blamed' for the mess to add to political and other interests who are fairly intent on war.

  Steve

[lordroel]

Feb 28, 2022 9:26:35 GMT stevep said:

  lordroel ,

  Damn it.  Sounds like Roosevelt is intent on war regardless.  To dismiss a professional in ordinance as compared to naval officers like that.  Coupled with the fact he's undermining his superior who is taking exactly the opposite stance. 

Also the fact that Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long has not countermanded Roosevelt order on February 26th shows that even Long knows that War is coming despite thinking otherwise.

[lordroel]

March 1st 1898

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Captain William T. Sampson

CONFIDENTIAL. [Washington, D.C.] March 1, 1898

Sir:-

As soon as the Court of Inquiry of which you are President has reached its findings, you will transmit the same privately, through the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Station, to the Department. You will not, however, adjourn, but will continue your sittings for the purpose of putting your findings in proper form, etc.

The object of the Department in giving you these instructions is to enable the Administration to determine upon a policy in advance of the official announcement of the findings of the Court. You will, therefore, use the utmost caution to prevent the fact becoming public that the Court has reached a finding or that its finding has been transmitted privately to the Department.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA,

HONGKONG,

MARCH 1, 1898.

Sir:

1. I have the honor to report the following movements of foreign war vessels on this station during the month of February, 1898.

2. BRITISH: This fleet with the exception of one vessel, left Chemulpo (1) on February 10th for Nagasaki, and is now believed to be at Tinghai, in the Chusan Island (2). off the mouth of the Yang-tse River. The new Commander-in-Chief, Vice Admiral Sir E.H. Seymour (3), was there on the 21st in the CENTURION. The torpedo boat destroyers HART and HANDY are used to carry mail between Shanghai and Tinghai. The following vessels are at Hong Kong: POWERFUL, EDGAR, and PHOENIX. The POWERFUL will leave for the north in a few days. It is believed that a vessel remains at Port Arthur.

3. RUSSIAN: The Commander-in-Chief, in the PAMIAT AZOVA, was, on the 25th instant at Port Arthur. The Rear Admiral, Second-in-Command (4). in the DMITRI DORSKOI, was on the 20th instant at Nagasaki. The ADMIRAL NACHIMOFF and the ROBBIA arrived here on the 22d, and the NACHIMOFF left on the 27th, homeward bound. It is reported from Chemulpo that the Russian fleet is expected there shortly.

4. FRENCH: None of the vessels of this squadron are at Hong Kong or to the northward.

5. GERMAN: The Squadron under Vice Admiral von Diedrichs (5) remains at Kiau Chou Bay. The squadron under Prince Henry of Prussia (6) has arrived at Singapore and it expected here shortly.

6. JAPANESE: This fleet is reported to be at Shimidzu (7), in the inland sea (8) for target practice manouvres.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

George Dewey.

Commodore, U.S. Navy,

Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

Footnote 1: Chemulpo was renamed Incheon, Korea.

Footnote 2: Vice Adm. Edward H. Seymour.

Footnote 3: Chusan Islands were renamed the Zhoushan Islands, China.

Footnote 4: Vice-Adm. Fyodor Vasilyevich Dubasov.

Footnote 5: Vice Adm. Otto von Deidrichs.

Footnote 6: Prince Wilhelm Heinrich of Prussia.

Footnote 7: Shimizu Island.

Footnote 8: The inland sea referred to is the Seto Inland Sea that separates the three main Japanese Islands.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA,

HONGKONG,

MARCH 1, 1898.

Sir:

1. I have the honor to report the following distribution and employment of the vessels attached to the Squadron under my command for the month of February, 1898.

2. On February 3d, I called officially on the U.S.Minister at Tokio (1) and on the 4th, was received in audience by the Emperor and Empress of Japan, accompanied by the Commanding Officer of the OLYMPIA (2) and my staff. The Minister returned my call on the 8th and received the usual honors.

3. The OLYMPIA left Yokohama on February 11th and arrived at Hong Kong on the 17th. On the following day I received your telegram announcing the MAINE disaster. All the men-of-war in harbor joined in half-masting colors and the British Commander-in-Chief (3), Russian Commander-in-Chief and Russian Rear Admiral Second-in-Command (4) sent telegrams of condolence. The Governor of Hong Kong6 sent a letter of condolence.

4. The BOSTON remained at Chemulpo (5) until February 28th, when in obedience to your telegraphic orders of the 26th, she left for this port (6).

5. The RALEIGH arrived at Singapore on February 6, left there on the 10th and arrived at Hong Kong on the 18th.

6. The MONOCACY has remained at Shanghai.

7. The CONCORD arrived at Yokohama on February 9th, left on the 19th for Chemulpo to relieve the BOSTON, arrived there on the 26th, and left for this port on the 28th in obedience to the orders above referred to.

8. The PETREL left Canton (7) on February 14th and arrived here on the same day. On the 20th and 21st, I inspected her.

9. The health of the Squadron is good.

Very Respectfully, your obedient servant,

George Dewey

Commodore, U.S. Navy

Commanding U.S.Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

Footnote 1: United States Minister at Tokyo Alfred E. Buck.

Footnote 2: Capt. Charles V. Gridley.

Footnote 3: Vice-Admiral Sir Edward H. Seymour.

Footnote 4: Vice-Adm. Fyodor Vasilyevich Dubasov.

Footnote 5: Governor General Wilson Black. Hong Kong was a British colony in 1898.

Footnote 6: Chemulpo is modern day Incheon, Korea.

Footnote 7: This is in reference to the order for Dewey to collect the Asiatic Squadron at Hong Kong. See: Roosevelt to Dewey, 26 February 1898.

Footnote 8: Canton is modern day Guangzhou, China.

[stevep]

  lordroel ,

   One small point in the last post, with footnote 1,

Footnote 1: Chemulpo and Port Arthur were was renamed Incheon, Korea.

  I suspect this should exclude Port Arthur as this is now the Lushunkou_District in southern Manchuria.  Incheon is in Korea, famously as the location of MacArthur's counter attack in the Korean war and checking its wiki entry it was previously called Chemulpo.

  Steve

[lordroel]

Mar 1, 2022 15:46:04 GMT stevep said:

  lordroel ,

   One small point in the last post, with footnote 1,

Footnote 1: Chemulpo and Port Arthur were was renamed Incheon, Korea.

  I suspect this should exclude Port Arthur as this is now the Lushunkou_District in southern Manchuria.  Incheon is in Korea, famously as the location of MacArthur's counter attack in the Korean war and checking its wiki entry it was previously called Chemulpo.

  Steve

A okay, will send a message to the US Naval History and Heritage Command and thier trolls.

In the mean time i will edit it.

[lordroel]

March 2nd 1898

United Kingdom - Henry D. White, Secretary Of The United States Embassy In London, To Secretary Of State John Sherman

[Extract]

American Embassy,

Confidential London, March 2, 1898.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a cipher telegram which I sent you on the 26th (1) instant at the instance of Mr. Hiram S. Maxim, the well know inventor (2).

Mr. Maxim called upon that morning and stated at some length the views which I summarized in my telegram. Our Naval Attaché being absent, I thought it best to comply with Mr. Maxim’s request and to cable you the information and advice which he imparted, without in any way endorsing them myself. He was very emphatic as to his absolute knowledge of Spain’s efforts (3) to buy any ships of war now building upon which she can lay her hands, the difficulty in her way being apparently that of finding the wherewithal to pay for them which Mr. Maxim seemed to think would eventually be overcome and his particular reason for advising the purchase by us of the two ships now building at Armstrong’s was to prevent Spain from getting them… (4).

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Henry White

Footnote 1: On 26 Feb. White cabled Sherman: ”I am requested by Hiram S. Maxim, in the absence of Naval Attaché, to inform the Navy Department that he knows that Spain is making great efforts to buy war vessels all over Europe and notably two cruisers at Armstrongs, one now ready, and the other will be delivered in eight months. He strongly advises our buying them. Thinks Armstrongs would rather sell to us than to Spain at the same price.” 

Footnote 2: Sir Hiram S. Maxim is the inventor of the Maxim gun; the first fully automatic portable machine gun.

Footnote 3: American officials are aware of the great financial and naval problems that confronted Spain. The noted armament manufacturer Sir W.G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co Ltd., is located at Newcastle and its shipbuilding complex at Elswick. It is founded by the gun inventor Sir William G. Armstrong and recently merged with a rival Joseph Whitworth. See: Journal of Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, 8 March 1898.

Footnote 4: The Naval War Board took great pains to thwart any efforts by Spain to purchase war vessels.

Footnote 5: Henry D. White was a career diplomat appointed by President William McKinley to serve as the secretary of the London embassy.

[lordroel]

March 3rd 1898

Philippines

Fernando Primo de Rivera, Governor-General of the Philippines, informs the Spanish government in Madrid that the US Asiatic Fleet has orders to attack Manila, capital of the Philippines, in the event of war.

Hong Kong - Ensign Harry H. Caldwell To United States Consul At Manila Oscar F. Williams

Confidential Copy

FLAGSHIP Olympia

Hongkong, March 3, 1898.

O.F. Williams, Esq,

U.S. Consul, Manila.

Dear Sir:

About two weeks ago, Commodore Dewey, Comd’g our squadron in these waters, wrote you in regard to some information he is desirous of obtaining regarding the defenses of Manila. You having telegraphed that his letter was not received, he now wishes me to ask you if you will be good enough to send him the following information if you can obtain it. What naval vessels are at Manila or in that vicinity and are they kept manned and equipped for service? Are there any considerable land defenses (modern)? Are there any torpedoes or sub-marine mines in Manila Bay or the channels? The Commodore suggests that you send your answer to me, at the Hong Kong Club without addressing it to the ship, thinking that in this way a letter may escape a possibility of being tampered with.

Faithfully yours,

H.H. Caldwell

Flag Sec’y.

[lordroel]

March 4th 1898

United States - Secretary of The Navy John D. Long To Rear Admiral William A. Kirkland, Commandant, Mare Island Navy Yard

Mch. 4,1898.

Sir:

The Department has this date directed, by telegraph, that the ammunition now at the navy yard, Mare Island, intended for the Asiatic Station and for the U.S.F.S Baltimore, shall be shipped to that vessel by the “Mohican.”

You will please prepare the “Mohican” to receive this ammunition and have her proceed to Honolulu at the earliest practicable date.

Very respectfully,

John D Long

Secretary.

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

Mch. 4, 1898.

Sir:

The “Baltimore” has been directed to proceed to Hong Kong with ammunition for the Asiatic Station. Upon her arrival, that vessel is attached to the station under your command.

Very respectfully,

J. D. Long

Secretary.

[lordroel]

March 5th 1898

Havana harbour, Cuba

Spanish cruiser Vizcaya arrives at Havana harbour, Cuba where she rendezvoused with her sister ship Almirante Oquendo.

[lordroel]

March 6th 1898

Spain - General Stewart L. Woodford (1) to John Hay (2)

Legation of the United States

Madrid, March 6, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt this morning of Department dispatch by telegraph in cipher, which I translate as follows:

Washington, March 4, 1898.

Woodford, Minister, Madrid:

Spanish chargé d’affaires presented here yesterday matter covered in yours fourth. Explained to him that vessels are the Montgomery and Nashville, small cruiser and gunboat. Montgomery has called at Cuban ports recently. At the request (of) relief committee these ships will take load of supplies Key West to Matanzas and Sagua next week. This is the most prompt and efficient means of getting supplies to people greatly in need.

Day.

My dispatch to which you refer as dated March 4 was delivered at the telegraph office here in Madrid on Thursday evening, March 3, at about half past 9 o’clock, Madrid time. If Señor du Bosc saw you on March 3, he must have had instructions from Minister Gullon at the same time that Gullon was seeing me and getting me to send his request.

I can see no just ground of complaint by the Spanish Government because the United States put war vessels at the disposal of charity to feed starving women and children. The United States is not responsible for the policy of reconcentration, with its horrible results of famine, disease, and wholesale murder. Spain has no just cause of complaint, but should be grateful that our people and Government are doing so much to protect Spanish citizens against the results of Spanish methods of administration and warfare. I appreciate all the difficulties of the present Liberal Government, but I am not sure that it is wisest to be over punctilious with them in these matters of detail in the performance of a great work of humanity and charity. I shall be very careful and very considerate in my conversations and correspondence with the Spanish foreign office, but I am inclined to tell the Spanish minister very courteously, but so that he will not misunderstand me, that our Government and people can not see old men, women, and children dying with starvation by our very shores and not help them in the most prompt and effective manner.

I have the honor, etc.,

Stewart L. Woodford.

Footnote 1: General Stewart L. Woodford, the United States minister to Spain.

Footnote 2: John Hay, United States minister to the United Kingdom.

[lordroel]

March 7th 1898

Spain

Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, who commands the Spanish Navy's Atlantic Squadron writes to Spanish Minister of the Marine Segismundo Bermejo y Merelo:

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island [Cuba] in the worst possible manner. But even supposing an improbability—that is, that we should obtain a victory—that would not change the final result of the campaign. The enemy would not declare himself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pretend to overcome the United States in wealth and production. The latter would recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victorious, and the ultimate result would always be a disaster.

United States

At a conference at the White House, William R. Day (Secretary of State), John Davis Long (Secretary of the Navy), Senator Eugene Hale (chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs), Representative Nelson Dingley Jr. (chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means) and Representative Cannon introduced a briefly worded bill (Fifty Million Bill) appropriating 50 million dollars "for the national defense, and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the President.' 

The U.S. House passes the Hawley Artillery Bill.

[lordroel]

March 8th 1898

United States

The U.S. House passes the Fifty Million Bill by a vote of three hundred and eleven to none, a signal demonstration of the fact that all political parties were united in support of a firm policy.

United Kingdom - Henry D. White, Secretary Of The United States Embassy In London, To Secretary Of State John Sherman

Translation of cipher telegram sent from the Embassy March 8, 1898:--

Sherman, Secretary, Washington.

I have had an interview with Minister of Brazil (1), who is instructed to sell us, at cost price, Amazonas, now about to sail from Gravesend, and Admiral Abreu, building at Armstrong’s, sister to Amazonas, not yet launched, nor ready for nine months, together with two coast defence ships, building at Toulon (2). He is not authorized to sell cruisers without French vessels, Government of Brazil being anxious, for financial reasons, to dispose of all four. An offer has been received and money deposited in London, but not yet accepted, from another Power, doubtless Spain, for the two cruisers alone. Our Naval Attaché (3) urges making every effort at Rio de Janeiro to purchase Amazonas and Barroso, another sister ship, now en route or just arrived in Brazil, whose sale the Brazilian Minister is not authorized to discuss. The latter thinks probable cost of the two cruisers offered about two hundred thousand pounds each (4). His advice, to which I concur, is that details of any purchase effected be completed by our Naval Attaché and the Agent of Brazilian Minister of Finance in London, thereby saving commissions to any Agents. He asks for prompt reply meanwhile has promised to detain Amazonas a few days

Footnote 1: The Brazilian minister is João Arthur Souza Corrêa.

Footnote 3: Toulon is a major French shipbuilding center and naval base.

Footnote 3: The naval attaché was Lt. John C. Colwell.

Footnote 4: At this time it took around 4.87 American dollars to purchase one British pound. 

[lordroel]

March 9th 1898

United States

After learning that Spain was attempting to buy Brazilian warships under construction in the United Kingdom, US President McKinley asks Congress for $50 million for national defense. Congress approves the request in a single day. The US Navy purchases the Brazilian ships instead.

The U.S. Senate passes the Fifty Million Bill without change or debate. 

United Kingdom - Assistant Secretary Of The Navy Theodore Roosevelt To Henry White, Secretary Of The United States Embassy In London

[Extract]

March 9, 1898.

Henry White, Esq.,

American Embassy, London, England.

My dear White:

. . .Yes, I knew about those Brazilian cruisers. I suppose we shall purchase them. I am not myself very much in favor of purchasing anything but 1st class armored cruisers or battleships, and large seagoing torpedo craft of the “destroyer” type. It would be a mistake to lumber our navy up with valueless craft. A year ago we could have ended a war with Spain with very little difficulty. The delay has steadily been to our disadvantage, but we can still end it without much difficulty if we act with promptness a decision. Of course the real time to strike was a year and a half ago, when we had most excuse and would have struck to most advantage. . . .

Faithfully yours,

Theodore Roosevelt