The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

[lordroel]

Day 86 of the Spanish–American War, July 14th 1898

Off Santiago - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

TELEGRAM

Off Santiago, July 14, 1898.

The preparation of ships for the foreign service advancing with all speed, but I deem it my duty to lay before the Department the fact that the heavy ships should have extensive overhauling before attempting a cruise far from a base. The “Iowa”, “Indiana” and “New York” have been steadily under steam seven months and for six of these actually at sea, moving or ready to move at a moment’s notice. They need docking imperatively and need refitting and overhauling seriously. Many of the boats are at Key West, some destroyed. The speed of the “Iowa” and the “Indiana” is reduced much. Two of the “Brooklyn’s” 5-inch B.L.R., R.F.G. (1) and several carriages for 5-inch B.L.R.,R.F.G. disabled; the “Texas” is in bad condition. Of course I do not know the basis of the action of the Department. There may be overpowering reasons of which I am ignorant, but unless these exist, I recommend the Department to take this state of affairs into serious consideration. The U.S.Navy prestige, which is now great, would surely be impaired if our ships in foreign waters were not prepared to fight or to cruise. It is imperatively necessary to closely blockade Cienfuegos, which has just been entered by vessel thought to be the “Alfonso XIII.” Adding Manzanillo, Batbano, Gibara, Nuevitas and Saguala Grande, will effectually cut off Havana. Gibara and Manzanillo control Holguin. My vessels are equal to a campaign against Porto Rico, to which monitors, in my opinion, are wholly unequal. They are unfitted for such duty and should not be used for it; if all the armored vessels and three converted cruisers were sent away, or expedition started for porto Rico, conveyed by monitors, I foresee that the demands for naval assistance will cause us practically to abandon a large part of our blockade.

SAMPSON.

Footnote 1: That is, Breach Loading Rifles and Rapid Fire Guns.

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore John C. Watson, Commander, Eastern Squadron

TELEGRAM

Washington, July 14, 1898.

Colwell reports Suez Canal company guarantees the passage through of vessels drawing 25 feet, 7 inches. The British Battleship “Victorious” lately passed through and as lightened to the draft. She originally drew 27 feet, 6 inches. There is 27 feet, 9inches in the channel of the canal.

LONG.

[miletus12]

Jul 10, 2022 8:09:25 GMT lordroel said:

Day 82 of the Spanish–American War, July 10th 1898

Spanish artillery forces at Santiago de Cuba engage in a firefight with U.S. Army artillery in the hills surrounding the city, supported by US Navy cannon fire offshore.

1. Having learned the wrong lessons at Guasimas and El Caney, did Shafter put the balloon the American taxpayers supplied him to spot his artillery fire? Did Shafter arrange an army shore to ship semaphore system with the navy to enable naval gunfire support and fall of shot correction? Did Shafter manage a plan whereby the navy bombardment would cover zones within their reach about six miles inland, so he could concentrate his own very few field guns to cover the two northern escape routes out of the city? No.

Jul 10, 2022 8:09:25 GMT lordroel said:

Portsmouth, N.H. - Captain Caspar F. Goodrich To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U. S. S. St L O U I S.

Portsmouth, N.H.,

July 10, 1898

Personal

My dear Mr Long:-

By careful husbanding of our fuel I have been able to make a cruise of six weeks from the day of leaving New York until my arrival here. During that time the ship has been very useful, as Admiral Sampson was good enough to say to me. What with cutting cables, blockading off Cape Cruz, taking prizes, landing the Army and bringing home the captives, she has certainly not been idle. It is pleasant to think that she has been able to cut no less than three foreign cables leading to Cuba-while the Army boat ADRIA, a steamer completely equipped for the purpose, only cut the one which I had already cut three weeks before. The newspapers give the credit to General Greely and his “able assistants in Cuban waters” but as a matter of fact the St. LOUIS did the work. For instance, in one night she found and cut a second Jamaica cable which the ADRIA had grappled for in vain for days.

I am a bit apprehensive that totally unnecessary changes are contemplated in this ship which will be costly in the first instance and much more costly when she comes to be refitted for transatlantic trade. As things are, the St LOUIS could be handed back to her owners on a Monday-be coaled and provisioned Tuesday and sail her regular trip Wednesday. A few hundred dollars would pay for the damage done to the upper rail where it was removed to make way for her battery; and a few hundred more for overhauling and repairing her boats which suffered somewhat in landing the army-a couple of hundred more for miscellaneous items and there you have practically the whole bill. Yet no one can say that the St LOUIS has not done well.

With a couple of larger guns and no more men I am ready to join the fleet going abroad-or return to Sampson. I can do the work on board. For this there is no necessity of sending the St LOUIS to Cramps or indeed any Navy Yard. The war is drawing to a close and I am anxious to see the end from the deck of my ship while cruising-and not at a dockyard undergoing alterations.

If it must be give me at most, four six inch guns one forward, one aft and one on each side, with twenty more marines to man them and please send me not another soul. We are all as happy as clams on board and we only ask to be let alone. I have never commanded a more harmonious ship. I hear we are to have a Paymaster. Please countermand his orders; I have no need of him at all. The Officers accounts are taken up at some office or other on shore and those of the marines can be similarly dealt with. The business of the ship and her crew is done by the American Line purser in a business way. A Paymaster is superfluous; were one sent to replace the Purser dire confusion would result.

It is but right to commission the officers (yet unexamined by the way), but it would be a great mistake, in my judgement to enlist the crew. They are content with their present status and compensation. Why alter an arrangement which has served its purpose well?.

I have diligently sought these four things, harmony, efficiency, usefulness and economy. I am happy to be able to think I have succeeded in all. When the St LOUIS goes back to the American Line, her crew and her staff will be justly proud of the part she played in the war.

Admiral Sampson told me that in recognition of my services he had purposed giving me command of the CRISTOBAL COLON-the least injured of the vessels of Cervera’s fleet-but she proved to be too badly aground to get off speedily. I can’t express my disappointment. I hope you will see your way clear to giving me an armored ship now-one that is to go to Spain. The heroes of the 3d of July can well afford to give others a chance. Some of them need a change of air although they won't say so-Evans among the number; he would flay me alive if he heard me say so, but it's true. But-any fighting ship that is to take part in the last act of the drama will do. I have worked faithfully and well-as Sampson will tell you-with the tools at hand-now put a weapon into them, I pray you.

I wish the Army appreciated the excellent work done for it by the Navy, but our sister branch of the service is a spoiled child and takes every exertion on our part as a matter of course. From its point of view the Navy is but a handmaid to the Army. Some of the things done lately have not been calculated to soothe the nautical temper. Especially is it hard for us to put up with an irritating assumption of superiority. Of its only maritime enterprise-the moving of the troops from Tampa to Daiquiri-it is well not to speak. Some day a grave scandal will probably be unearthed. After getting the troops there the Army was as helpless as a babe until the Navy stepped in and landed them. Had the Army frankly said; “This is a matter appertaining to ships-let the Navy manage it” the case would have been different-but it assumed the task gaily. The coming accountability will be heavy. Then too, with lots of empty transports lying idle off Siboney and Daiquiri-it must needs call on the Navy for its big liners to bring more troops from home. I hear that even this noble vessel was to have had its share of this disagreeable, dirty and thankless task. I can’t tell you how glad I am to have escaped it. Had it been a real national exigency no one would have responded to the call more promptly or cheerfully than I, but knowing, as I did, the Army’s wealth in transports that are doing nothing but burn up their coal in port it was impossible to take interest or pleasure in the prospect. Every such employment will entail a large expenditure in refitting these vessels at the end of the war-something I have up to the present time been able to avoid.

It will be just like the Army to want the St LOUIS and her sister ships to bring north any prisoners whom General Shafter may have taken. Of course this would not be an emergency and therefore would not be permitted. I found in my intercourse with Army officers that a most courteous “No” always worked well. It achieved its immediate purpose and was of educational value as well. They need lots of the same kind.

We have no news from our prize the TWICKENHAM. If the court should decide to acquit the ship - a very dangerous precedent will be established under shadow of which neutrals can serve a belligerent - practically with impunity. Should such an unfortunate decision be reached, I know Admiral Sampson will be glad to have the government appeal the case. A very important principle is at stake.

Recurring to the personal matter of giving me a fighting ship, I hear that Captain Philip9 who is on the eve of promotion is quite ready to give up the TEXAS now that he has had his fight and done so well.

Was I not right about Sampson? and is not his fight the most complete victory on record?

Pardon the length of this letter and believe me

Very sincerely and respectfully

C. F. Godorich

2. My comments about this letter concerning the admirable CAPT C.F Goodrich will be quite SARCASTIC as I translate his USN navalese into plain English.
--a. First, Goodrich reminds Long of just what the USS St Louis with a commercial crew and some USMC gunners did, while the rest of the fleet and the army were fouling up around and in Cuba. What the army was doing trying to perform a navy mission with the SS Apria is especially noteworthy as to incompetence. 
--b. Here I scoff at Goodrich's claims about saving the navy money by not sending the USS St Louis back home for service m,odifications. Goodrich is afraid of three things:
---time at a dockyard will see his wartime career ended before he can rack up combat time for seniority on the captain's list. 
---the people at Cramp and Sons will see what actual damage he did to the USS St Louis. 
---the actual chance that the USS St Louis will be converted into a troop transport and he will have to carry the army to and from as a mere transport captain, instead of remaining the captain of an actual warship. 
---he claims he can rejoin the fleet if his ship is armed with a few more guns, either with the squadron going to Spain or to join Sampson. The claim is malarkey for there is no way his crew can reframe the ship or reinforce the deck plating or create additional gun galleries to mount the 6 inch bore diameter guns he requests. 
---Why would Goodrich object to a navy paymaster? Guess who has been handling the ship's monies and whose cash accounts cannot stand a close look by a trained USG accountant? It is not that American Lines Bursar as Goodrich claims. 
---Commissioning merchant ship officers into the regular navy would make them eligible for veterans' benefits. Notice how Goodrich intends to shaft the ordinary sailors in the ship's crew in his recommendation? They are lower deck and therefore to be ignored as they are happy with their lot. This is Gilded Age class snobbery and presumption at its typical worst. 
--- Of the four things: "harmony, efficiency, usefulness and economy" Goodrich claims, we can ascertain that USS St Louis has been efficient and useful, but economical and harmonious Goodrich has not been. We can see signs that Goodrich does not want a cost accounting of monies spent, nor a close look at his politicking, though this letter to SecNav Long, over Sampson's and Watson's heads (Goodrich's immediate superiors in the chain of responsibility. M.) actually reeks of disharmony. 
---Writing further about disharmony and angling for a better command, we have:
----the alleged, though never proven Sampson promise about the Cristobol Colon.

Colon was not that badly damaged. But her salvage was bungled. 

Spanish Cruiser Cristobal Colon

GENERAL:

On paper the most fearsome vessel in Admiral Cervera's fleet, the CRISTOBAL COLON was the only authentic Spanish armored cruiser. Extensively armored, she was the best cruiser in the Spanish fleet, but the 254 mm main guns were never installed because a conflict with Armstrong. Colon had many sisterships: GIUSSEPPE GARIBALDI, VARESE and FRANCESCO FERRUCIO of Italy, GENERAL GARIBALDI, GENERAL SAN MARTIN, GENERAL BELGRANO and GENERAL PUYRREDON of Argentina, and KASUGA and NISSHIN of Japan. She was lost in the Battle of Santiago.

BACKGROUND:

CRISTOBAL COLON was the third ship out of Santiago Bay on July 3rd, 1898. She took advantage of the confusion of battle and her speed, and for a while it appeared she may escape. Soon, however, the COLON's fireboxes had used up the last of her high-grade Cardiff coal and when the stokers were forced to switch to inferior coal obtained in Cuba her speed dropped off dramatically. The COLON's commander, Capitán de Navío Emilio Díaz Moreu, also made a serious tactical error, hugging the coastline instead of heading for the open sea. Just before 2 PM the American fleet came within firing range and the Captain, declining a fight, turned his undamaged ship for the rocks, opened the sea cocks to scuttle the ship, and hauled down his flag. He was about 75 miles west of Santiago. An American salvage crew quickly went aboard, but later that evening the inexplicable decision^1 was made to tow the CRISTOBAL COLON off the rocks although watertight integrity had not been restored. She quickly capsized and sank, a total loss.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES:

The CRISTOBAL COLON was modern and speedy, almost brand new and the finest Armored Cruiser in the Spanish fleet. However, the Ministry of Marine had rejected the 10 inch guns of her main battery and the war broke out before replacements could be obtained. Thus, she sailed for Cuba with wooden dummies in their place, a major disadvantage in battle!

TECHNOTES:
Classification:..........................Steel Armored Cruiser
Laid down:..............................1895
Launched:...............................September, 1896
Completed:.............................May 1897
Rig:........................................One military mast
Armament:..............................Two 25.4 cm (10 inch) Armstrong guns (Not installed)
..............................................Ten 15.2 cm (6 inch) guns
..............................................Six 12.0 cm QF guns
..............................................Ten 57 mm Nordenfeldt QF guns
..............................................Ten 37 mm guns
..............................................Two 22 mm machine guns
..............................................5 torpedo tubes
Contractor:..............................Cantieri Sestri Ponenti of Ansaldo Shipbuilder, Genoa, Italy
Length:...................................100 meters
Beam:.....................................18.20 meters
Mean draft:................................7.75 meters
Displacement:......................6,840 tons
Complement:..........................543 Officers and Men under the command of Capt. Emilio Diaz Moreu.
Engine type:......................14,000 hp. engines, twin screw.
Speed:....................................19.5 knots
Endurance @ 10 knots:.........8,300 miles
Armor:...................................150 mm steel compound side belt, 150 mm turrets, 30 mm deck.

Bibliography:

Blow, Michael, A Ship to Remember , (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992).
Clerk of Joint Committee on Printing, The Abridgement of Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899). Vol. 2, Vol. 4
González López, Manuel P., Personal Internet Contact.
Pérez-Reverte, Arturo, "July 3, 1898 - The Ultimate Day for Imperial Spain, The Battle of Santiago" (image of crew in action). The image was sent to us by Federico Iborra.

Who was the idiot who ordered her pulled off before she was ready to be towed to Key West? Sampson. 

----the reference to maybe replacing Captain Evans of the USS Iowa as Iowa Actual. 

How was that it was even possible that the Captain of America's best battleship was thinking of abandoning his command and that Goodrich knew about it? 
      

Captain Robley D. Evans To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U. S. S. I O W A, 1st Rate.

Off Key West, Fla.,

May 20th, 1898.

S i r :-

I beg to submit the following statement:-

1. At 8:20 P. M., on the evening of the 17th instant, having cast off the tow of the AMPHITRITE, this vessel proceeded with all dispatch under natural draft to Key West,1 to take coal on board and to be ready for any immediate service that might be ordered.

2. The IOWA anchored off Key West at 6:30 P. M. on the evening of the 18th of May.

3. The Paymaster and other subordinate officers in the ship were immediately sent on shore to communicate with the Commandant and General Storekeeper, and copies of requisitions for provisions and stores urgently needed were furnished them before 9:00 P. M. of the same day.

4. Upon the arrival at Key West all preparations were made for taking coal immediately. Not a pound of coal was placed alongside of this vessel until 8:00 O’Clock of the following morning, the 19th instant.

5. The provisions ordered were not delivered until about 1:30 A. M., during the night, of the 20th.

6. It was urgently desired that 25 men of the Engineers Force and several men of the Seaman Branch should be furnished this ship during her stay at Key West. It is believed that these men arrived in Key West on board the FLORIDA by 6:00 P. M. on the 19th instant, and in spite of frequent appeals, this vessel was obliged to leave Key West at 11:40 A. M., of to-day, upon urgent service to meet the enemy, without having received the men. This to the great detriment to her efficiency.

Very respectfully,

R.D. Evans
Captain, U. S. Navy,

Commanding.

Source Note: TLS, DNA, RG 313, Entry 48. Addressed below close: “ To/THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,/U.S.NAVAL FORCE,/N. A. STATION.” Docketed: “U. S. S. IOWA,/Off Key West/May 20th 98/Evans R.D./CAPTAIN U. S. NAVY,/COMMANDING./Reports arrival/at Key West, etc.”

Footnote 1: Natural draft refers to the intended or designed depth of a ship in the water.

What CAPT Evans wrote to RADM Sampson was a letter of protest for the record. Apparently, Sampson wanted to know why the USS Iowa was tardy and laid up at Key West, instead of with the fleet headed for its next mission. So CAPT Evans wrote his reply. I will translate it.

"Because of your stupid joyride to San Juan, Puerto Rico, in which you had the USS Iowa drag the USS Amphitrite behind her, you damaged the USS Amphitrite in rough seas she was never meant to handle, and you caused USS Iowa to overtax her own engines, requiring her to lay up at Key West to effect repairs, and burned up more coal than she would otherwise have needed to burn on that trip. You are also responsible for wearing out so many of USS Iowa's crew that I* need additional men to repair the damage your stupidity caused to my ship. Furthermore, the delays caused in getting the additional men I needed to repair the ship and the parts to repair the ship and the coal to refuel the ship are also your fault because of your lax and incompetent staff and your own bungled administration of the fleet."

CAPT Evans had a bellyful of RADM Sampson's incompetence and wanted a transfer out of the chickendip outfit he, Sampson, ran and he SAID so to Goodrich. 

---The army had disgraced itself at Daiquiri and Siboney during the landings, drowning hundreds of horses and mules and more than a hundred soldiers. Goodrich, rightfully predicts that the wretched ride from Tampa to Daquiri aboard the transports will become a major newspaper scandal. He wants no part of that business. The complaint about empty army transports burning down coal and doing nothing off Daquiri is extremely valid. 
---The SS Twickenham is a clear case of Goodrich wanting to ensure that he gets his "prize money". Not to put to fine a point on it, the British collier had a fat load of Cardiff coal sent to fuel Cervera's fleet. That was a hefty sum of cash to let slip if the US admiralty courts allowed that the SS Twickenham was engaged in free trade and not a "blockade runner" as she obviously was.
---If CAPT Evan will not give up USS Iowa, how about CAPT Philip? Beach him and give Goodrich the USS Texas? One has to laugh at the gall involved.   
                      

Jul 10, 2022 8:09:25 GMT lordroel said:

Guantanomo Bay, Cuba - Eastern Squadron General Order No. 1

U. S. Flagship NEWARK,

Guantanomo Bay, Cuba,

July 10, 1898.

SQUADRON GENERAL ORDER No. 1-

By direction of the Honorable Secretary of the Navy I have this day assumed command of the Eastern Squadron; and will transfer my broad pennant to the U. S. S. Oregon when that vessel shall have completed coaling.

My person staff will consist of the following officers:-

Captain Charles E. Clark, Chief of Staff.

Lieutenant Commander, R. G. Davenport, Flag Lieutenant.

Ensign, Leon S. Thompson, Flag Secretary.

The Squadron at present assembled consists of the following vessels:-

-U. S. S. MASSACHUSETTS.
-U. S. S. NEWARK.
-U. S. S. Oregon.
-U. S. S. DIXIE.

The order will be read at General Muster on board all vessels of the Squadron upon its receipt.

J. C. Watson,
Commodore U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief,
Eastern Squadron.

Well, there is Long's bluff to recall Camara's expedition given concrete form. Is it a waste of time and effort? In hindsight, of course it is. At the time, Long thought he still needed this raid force to force Spain to negotiate an end to the war.   

[miletus12]

Jul 11, 2022 2:46:39 GMT lordroel said:

Day 83 of the Spanish–American War, July 11th 1898

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, General Order Number 13 North Atlantic Station

U.S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK (1st Rate),

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba,

Squadron General Order No. 13. July 11, 1898.

1.―By direction of the Navy Department, the vessels of this command, including those of the Flying Squadron, are organized in two Squadrons,1 as follows:

2.―Flagship of Commander-in-Chief:

U. S. S. NEW YORK.

Attached to flag of Commander-in-Chief2 for dispatch and special duty:

Gloucester,}

Vixen, } and all torpedo boats

Vesuvius, }

--•--‎●--•--

3. FIRST SQUADRON.

---

Commodore J. A. HOWELL, Commanding.

San Francisco (flag)

Castine

Hudson.

Puritan.

Nashville.

Mayflower.

Woodbury

Terror.

Newport.

Leyden.

Windom.

Miantonomoh.

Annapolis.

Tecumseh.

McLane.

Amphitrite.

Vicksburg.

Uncas.

Hawk.

Montgomery.

Dolphin.

Hamilton.

Wasp.

Machias.

Bancroft.

Morrill.

Armeria.


--•--‎●--•--

4. SECOND SQUADRON.

---

Commodore W. S. SCHLEY, Commanding.

Brooklyn (flag)

New Orleans.

Scorpion.

Hornet.

Iowa.

Marblehead.

Suwanee.

Eagle.

Indiana.

Detroit.

Wompatuck.

Hist.

Texas.

Helena.

Osceola.

Mangrove.

Wilmington.

Yankton.

Manning.

5.―The St. Paul, Yale, Harvard, and St. Louis are not at present assigned to either Squadron.

6.―The Solace, Resolute, supply vessels and colliers, are not assigned to either Squadron, but will be detailed as circumstances require.

7.―New vessels will be assigned as they arrive, and the exigencies of the service will require frequent changes between the Squadrons, which will be made from time to time.

8.―Experience on the Cuban blockade having demonstrated the difficulties and delays incident to communication between ships, it is directed that papers shall be sent by Commanding Officers directly to the Commander-in-Chief, when, to send them through the division Commander, would impede public business, but in such exigencies the division Commander shall be informed then, or subsequently, if the matter is important, that this has been done.

9.―The following vessels have been assigned by the Department to the Eastern Squadron, intended for Special Service, under the command of Commodore J. C. Watson.

Oregon (flag)

Newark.

Yankee.

Massachusetts.

Dixie.

Yosemite.

A supply vessel and several colliers.

William T. Sampson,

Rear Admiral,

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,

North Atlantic Station

Another ruffle-shuffle of ships that would be best handled by higher headquarters or anybody other than Sampson. Notice who gets stuck with the damaged USS Indiana and loses the excellent USS Oregon and who is demoted to "Second Squadron" status with the "also rans"? If you guessed Commodore Howell, then you have not paid attention to the politics inside the North Atlantic Squadron.

And to that end... higher headquarters pulls the rug out from under Sampson... Specifically, the War Board rearranges things in a more logical fashion.    

Jul 11, 2022 2:46:39 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Navy Department,

Office of Naval War Board,

Washington, D. C. July 11, 1898.

The board recommends that the following telegram be sent to Admiral Sampson.

Respectfully,

M. Sicard

Rear Admiral,

Pres. of the Board.

The Department intends to send all the armored vessels except monitors to accompany Watson’s division, and to see it safely though Straits of Gibraltar. You will therefore, with utmost expedition, coal and fill with ammunition all Watson’s division;2 also New York, Brooklyn, Iowa, Indiana, Texas, New Orleans, Prairie Badger and Mayflower, assigning publicly and to your captains as the reason preparation for the expedition against Porto Rico. Order the monitors Amphitrite, Puritan and Terror to proceed from Key West to Nipe Bay, directing upon the latter place a division of three or more small vessels under an enterprising officer to arrive there three days before monitors, in order to reconnoitre, ascertain if mines, exist, etc., and if practicable to enter the port. It is the intention to let monitors anchor there until the expedition for Porto Rico is ready. Empty steam collier Southery at once and send to Hampton Roads where the fleet of colliers to accompany the squadron for Gibraltar will be organized. The America and Yankee will probably be ready to sail to you from Hampton Roads at the end of this week, with ammunition to fill the ships detailed for the service herein contemplated. It is proposed to confide to the monitors such service at Porto Rico as will require armored vessels. Send Dixie or Yosemite to Hampton Roads soon as practicable to convoy the colliers from thence. May possibly reserve Texas but prepare her.

Long

As one can see... Sampson is ordered to assemble everything armored available except the three hopefully working monitors to cover Watson's entry into the Mediterranean past Cadiz and The Rock. Who will command that covering force while Sampson is bungling the concurrent naval movements to Nipe Bay? 

Schley.

Nipe Bay is where Sampson will wait with the hopefully repaired monitors; while Nelson Miles arranges things properly for the Puerto Rico excursion. 

[miletus12]

Jul 12, 2022 2:51:02 GMT lordroel said:

Day 84 of the Spanish–American War, July 12th 1898

Major General Nelson A. Miles, having arrived in Cuba the previous day, consults with General Shafter and Admiral Sampson about the situation in Cuba. Later that day, the USS Eagle forces the Spanish merchant blockade runner Santo Domingo aground on the Isla de la Juventud.

Consults? Miles is there to read those two gentlemen the riot act. By now, even McKinley has to agree that someone who knows what he is doing has to go to Santiago de Cuba and straighten that mess out. So, against his better political judgment, McKinley lets his best general go look-see and find out what needs to happen to resolve the issue. What Miles discovers is "not too good" if your name is Shafter or Sampson.

Jul 13, 2022 2:54:03 GMT lordroel said:

Day 85 of the Spanish–American War, July 13th 1898

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

[Extract]

“Dated Washington, July 13th,1898.

The Department intends to send all armored vessels except monitors to accompany Commodore No. 10, Register January,1898 (Watson) division and to see it safely through Strait of Gibraltar. You will therefore with utmost expedition coal and fill with ammunition all Commodore No. 10 (Watson) division, also New York and Brooklyn, the Iowa and Indiana, Texas the Mayflower and Aux. No. 413 (Badger) assigning publicly and to your Captain as the reason preparation for the expedition against Porto Rico. Order monitors Amphitrite and Puritan and Terror to proceed from Key West to Port Nipe,Cuba and direct upon the latter place a division of three or more small vessels under an enterprising Officer to arrive there three days before the monitors in order to reconnoiter to ascertain if mines exist etc. and, if practicable to enter the port. It is the intention to let the monitors anchor there until expedition to Port Rico is ready. Empty Aux. No. 551 (Southery) at once and send to Hampton Roads, where the fleet of colliers to accompany Squadron for Gibraltar will be organized. The America and Yankee will probably sail to you from Hampton Roads at the end of this week with ammunition to fill the vessels detailed for the service contemplated. It is proposed to confide to the monitors such service at Port Rico as will require armored vessels. Send Aux. No. 434 (Dixie) or 596, (Yosemite) to Hampton Roads as soon as practicable to convoy colliers from thence. May reserve possibly the Texas but prepare her.

L O N G.”

It is that direct order from Long to Sampson. Will Sampson obey it? As a practical matter... he will not, but it will be a moot disobedience as circumstances are about to change. Unfortunately, not for the better. 

Jul 13, 2022 2:54:03 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Journal Of Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

[Extract]

thirteenth of July [1898, Washington, DC]

We had a long sit-down of two or three hours, beginning with the President, myself, Admiral Sicard, and Captain Mahan on the one side, and General Alger on the other—terminating in a meeting of the whole Cabinet. We are all pained at the delays at Santiago. Our men there are up to their knees in water one minute, and under the blaze of the sun the next. The commanding officers have been ordered over and over again to bring the matter to a head, but they delay—perhaps for a good reason, although we are inclined to think the Spanish commander is tricking them along with truces and offers of terms of surrender.

There was a very pretty scrimmage between Captain Mahan and Secretary Alger. Alger began his usual complaint about the Navy. We have furnished him transports to carry his men, on account of his own neglect in making provision for transportation. We have landed them; have helped him in every way we can; and have destroyed the Spanish fleet. Now he is constantly grumbling because we don’t run the risk of blowing up our ships by going over the mines at the entrance of Santiago harbor and capturing the city, which he ought to capture himself, having some 20,000 troops against perhaps 5000 or 6000. Of course the Navy ought to help all it can, and it is under orders to do so.

But Mahan, at last, lost his patience and sailed into Alger; told him he didn’t know anything about the use or purpose of the Navy, and that he didn’t propose to sit by and hear the Navy attacked. It rather pleased the President, who, I think, was glad of the rebuke. The matter was at last settled by an order to the Commanding Officer of the Army in Santiago, and to-day I think something will be done one way or the other—that is, either a surrender made on our terms or an assault begun.

In the margin Governor Long added the following postscript in his own hand.

Since I dictated this, Sec. Alger has come in. He apologized for his attitude yesterday. And he seemed so dejected at the condition of the troops under the risk of yellow fever and at the burdens which are on them, that my heart was touched for him. He is a sanguine, generous man, but the task—and it is a tremendous one—is too much for him.

It remains remarkable, to this day, amazing just how generous John Long is to Russell Alger. This council of war was to ascertain just how badly things were going in Santiago de Cuba, for this was the main US effort that was stalled. People in Washington had forgotten all about poor George Dewey out there in Manila Bay, up to his armpits in dissembling Spaniards, tricky Aguinaldo and Blustering Otto von Diederichs. George was not complaining about his problems or getting reported on by the newspaper correspondents in a negative way... yet. 

As for Alfred Mahan and Russell Alger, how many times has a navy captain called a war minister a stupid worthless son of a you know what and gotten away with it and on top of that insult had made the minister of the army apologize to the navy minister for being such a ninny about navy matters?     

I think of maybe one other time this happened, about when Louis Johnson apologized to George C. Marshal for he, Johnson, being an absolutely worthless SedDef after Arleigh Burke called Johnson an incompetent imbecile during the Admirals Revolt. 

[miletus12]

Jul 14, 2022 2:54:25 GMT lordroel said:

Day 86 of the Spanish–American War, July 14th 1898

Off Santiago - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

TELEGRAM

Off Santiago, July 14, 1898.

The preparation of ships for the foreign service advancing with all speed, but I deem it my duty to lay before the Department the fact that the heavy ships should have extensive overhauling before attempting a cruise far from a base. The “Iowa”, “Indiana” and “New York” have been steadily under steam seven months and for six of these actually at sea, moving or ready to move at a moment’s notice. They need docking imperatively and need refitting and overhauling seriously. Many of the boats are at Key West, some destroyed. The speed of the “Iowa” and the “Indiana” is reduced much. Two of the “Brooklyn’s” 5-inch B.L.R., R.F.G. (1) and several carriages for 5-inch B.L.R.,R.F.G. disabled; the “Texas” is in bad condition. Of course I do not know the basis of the action of the Department. There may be overpowering reasons of which I am ignorant, but unless these exist, I recommend the Department to take this state of affairs into serious consideration. The U.S.Navy prestige, which is now great, would surely be impaired if our ships in foreign waters were not prepared to fight or to cruise. It is imperatively necessary to closely blockade Cienfuegos, which has just been entered by vessel thought to be the “Alfonso XIII.” Adding Manzanillo, Batbano, Gibara, Nuevitas and Saguala Grande, will effectually cut off Havana. Gibara and Manzanillo control Holguin. My vessels are equal to a campaign against Porto Rico, to which monitors, in my opinion, are wholly unequal. They are unfitted for such duty and should not be used for it; if all the armored vessels and three converted cruisers were sent away, or expedition started for porto Rico, conveyed by monitors, I foresee that the demands for naval assistance will cause us practically to abandon a large part of our blockade.

SAMPSON.

Footnote 1: That is, Breach Loading Rifles and Rapid Fire Guns.

Only now does Sampson complain about the monitors and the condition of the rest of the fleet as Schley did BEFORE the 3 July put up and shut up? Why now? Could it be that yellow streak showing again, now that it is demanded that HE, Sampson, produce the kind of results, that W. S. Schley and his captains did when they had the damaged ships and were left abandoned by Sampson to face Cervera alone?  

Jul 14, 2022 2:54:25 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Commodore John C. Watson, Commander, Eastern Squadron

TELEGRAM

Washington, July 14, 1898.

Colwell reports Suez Canal company guarantees the passage through of vessels drawing 25 feet, 7 inches. The British Battleship “Victorious” lately passed through and as lightened to the draft. She originally drew 27 feet, 6 inches. There is 27 feet, 9inches in the channel of the canal.

LONG.

Cowell's numbers are off. The Suez Canal in 1898 was 30 feet at the main channel. 

[lordroel]

Day 87 of the Spanish–American War, July 15th 1898

Spanish forces under General Toral capitulated to US forces at Santiago de Cuba.

United States - Commodore George C. Remey, Commandant, Key West Naval Base, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

NAVAL BASE, KEY WEST [Fla.]

U. S. Flagship Lancaster, July 15, 1898

Sir:

As the extension of the blockade on the north side of Cuba increases the need of vessels, I have the honor to request that you will send as many around from the south side as you can spare. Every available vessel here is kept out on the blockade as long as she can stay, but this number is occasionally drawn on for convoys. The NEWPORT has just been sent north by the Department’s order, convoying four prize steamers to New York, and the DOLPHIN has not yet returned from being repaired at Norfolk. Commodore Howell3 has expressed a particular desire for all the small vessels to be had.

(2) The Department has sent here the Torpedo Boats MORRIS, TALBOT and GWIN, to be used on blockade between the Isle of Pines and Batabano. I have sent the NASHVILLE down to examine into the practicability of maintaining these small craft in that vicinity, with a sub-base at Siguanea Bay or near there. I expect the NASHVILLE to return in a few days.

(3) Regarding the monitors for service in Porto Rican waters, I have just reported to the Department that all four can be ready, as far as known, on the 20th instant, the PURITAN being obliged to go with two defective boilers blanked off. I have said they can go to Guantanamo with their own steam, convoyed by one vessel, but to go direct to Porto Rico they would need towing vessels, one of them to be a steam collier. There is no steam collier here now, the nearest one being the POMPEY, stationed at Cardenas.

(4) The CINCINNATI has just arrived from the North.

Very respectfully,

Geo. C. Remey

Commodore Commanding

Bacoor - Emilio Aguinaldo Y Famy To Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron

TRANSLATION.

His Excellency, the Admiral of the Squadron

of the U.S.in the Islands.

Bacoor, July 15, 1898.

Sir:

The Revolution having taken possession of the various provinces of the Archipelago this Government has found it necessary to adopt the form and organization best suited to the popular will.

I have therefore the pleasure (desire) and honor of placing in your hand the enclosed decrees which contain the organization referred to,1 begging that you will communicate to you Government that the desires of this Government are to remain always in friendship with the Great North American Nation to which we are under many obligations.

I beg, also, that your Excellency will have the kindness to forward the enclosed package H.B.M. Consul,2 with a request from me that he will forward them their respective destinations.

For which favor the Filipino people and your humble servant will most deeply grateful to Your Excellency.

Very Respectfully etc. etc.

Emilio Aguinaldo

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

LETTER

Washington, [D.C.] July 15, 1898.

Sir:

As has been previously stated, the Department sometime since decided to send a squadron to Manila to reinforce Admiral Dewey. This decision was arrived at, in view of the then recent departure of Admiral Camara’s squadron from Spain for the Philippine Islands.

2. Though Admiral Camara has returned from the Suez Canal to Spain, the Department still intends to send a reinforcing squadron to Manila; and as Camara’s force, when united with other armored ships, now presumably disposable in Spanish waters, would be, on paper, stronger than the squadron proposed to be sent to the East Indies, it has been decided to send with the latter a covering squadron strong enough to guarantee against the possible efforts of all such armored ships of the Spanish Navy as may now be in condition for cruising in the straits of Gibraltar, and to hold any such force as Spain may collect, blockaded in its own ports until our squadron for the East is well on its way.

3. With this end in view, the Department has directed the two squadrons to be prepared at once, as below designated, the whole to be under one command until separated by order of the Commander-in-Chief:

4. Covering Squadron. Eastern Squadron.

Armored Ships. Armored Ships.

NEW YORK MASSACHUSETTS

BROOKLYN OREGON

IOWA

INDIANA

Cruisers. Cruisers.

NEWARK YOSEMITE

NEW ORLEANS DIXIE

BADGER

YANKEE

MAYFLOWER Food Ships.

With the proper number of

colliers to be designated by the Department.

5. The men-of-war composing this expedition are to be filled with provisions, coal, ammunition, etc., and will sail from the point that is thought most convenient in the vicinity of the Windward Passage, directly to a point 200 miles, W.S.W., magnetic from the town of Punta Delgada, in the Azores, where the Department will direct the colliers to rendezvous, the latter sailing from Hampton Roads under convoy of a cruiser, which will be designated by the Department.

6. As it is the desire of the Department to conceal the movements of this fleet as much as possible, it is thought best that only a single small vessel should be sent in to Punta Delgada, and this without showing an Admiral’s or Commodore’s flag. Communication should be had with the U.S.Consul, to whom will be addressed any important matter for the Commander-in-Chief.

7. It is not now thought expedient that the fleet should coal at this rendezvous, unless found necessary, but it should proceed to such a point on the coast of Morocco or the coast of Spain as can be occupied in comparative safety from Spanish attack, sufficiently near the straits of Gibraltar, and smooth enough for coaling of ships. In this connection the coast between Cadiz and Huelva, and between Melilla and other points on the African coast, should be considered.

8. As the speed of the fleet is regulated by that of the colliers, it would appear that about ten knots per hour can probably be maintained, in ordinary weather, though it is thought that the most economical speed of several of the men-of-war may perhaps be more than that. Great care must be taken to keep the machinery and boilers of the colliers in an efficient working condition. A few of them could, under favorable conditions, make twelve knots; but as a rule, ten will probably be as much as should be expected of most of them.

9. During the operation of coaling, which should be conducted as speedily as practicable, a vigilant lookout must be kept against the enemy’s torpedo craft, the fleet being got underway, if necessary, at nightfall, to stand off shore or to shift position, as may be thought best.

10. It must also be habitually so disposed as to properly meet any attack of the enemy’s men-of-war, or torpedo boats, and to cover the colliers and weaker vessels, the cruisers being expected to guarantee all against the attacks of torpedoboats and destroyers.

11. After coaling the fleet, such colliers as may be nearly empty should be discharged into the others - enough coal being left in the “empties” to enable them to reach the United States, or some port where it is certain that they can procure coal.

12. It might, perhaps, be more desirable to pass the straits at night, carrying the whole fleet into the Mediterranean, far enough to the eastward of the coast of Spain to make it difficult for the Spanish torpedo boats to act conveniently, and then anchoring on the north coast of Africa, or elsewhere, accomplish the coaling as rapidly as possible. However, the Commander-in-Chief will follow any plan that may seem to him most convenient, the fleet’s safety being secure by proper arrangements on his part. If off the coast of a neutral country, it will be necessary to coal beyond the marine league from shore, if practicable.

13. After the operation of coaling, the entire fleet has been completed, the division for the East Indies and the colliers detailed for it, will be directed to proceed as mentioned at close of sixteenth paragraph. The separation should, if possible, be made by night, and the covering squadron will then hold the Spanish fleet under observation and blockade it if necessary, till time has been allowed the Eastern Squadron to reach the Suez Canal. The covering squadron will then return to the United States, sending a vessel into Lisbon to inquire if there be any orders for it.

14. In conclusion, the Department attaches importance to preserving the armored fleet in full efficiency. Therefore, while any opportunity that may offer to destroy the enemy’s armed ships must be used to the utmost, the vessels must not be exposed any more than may be imperatively necessary, to the fire of the coast fortifications.

15. On approaching the coast of Europe, one of the cruisers will be sent ahead to call on the Minister at Lisbon for any orders the Department may have sent to his care; the cruiser to depart from Lisbon immediately and rejoin off Cape St. Vincent, or any other point that may be designated by the commander of the combined force.

16. The Department designated by the commander of the combined force, Eastern Squadron. Admiral Sampson will command the covering squadron and also the combined force until it separates, when Commodore Watson will proceed, without delay, with the “MASSACHUSETTS,” “OREGON,” colliers and store ship, to Manila, using every endeavor to make his way without any other delays than those that are absolutely necessary.

17. You will furnish Commodore Watson with a copy of this order, and you will hold the vessels designated, in such a state of readiness that they will be able to sail at the earliest practicable moment after the receipt by you of an order from the Department for them to proceed.

18. You will inform the Department, by telegraph, when they are ready for the service herein mentioned.

Very respectfully,

John D. Long,

Secretary.

Cuba - Preliminary Agreement For The Surrender Of Santiago De Cuba

PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT for the capitulation of the Spanish Forces which constitute the division of Santiago de Cuba occupying the territory herein set forth, said capitulation authorized by the Commander-in-Chief of the Island of Cuba,1 agreed to by General Toral and awaiting the approbation of the Government at Madrid and subject to the following conditions:

Submitted by the undersigned Commissioners, Brigadier General Don Frederick Escario, Lieutenant Colonel of Staff Don Ventura Fontan and Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, representing General Toral, Commanding Spanish Forces, to Major General Joseph Wheeler, U.S.V., Major General H.W.Lawton, U.S.V., and 1st Lieutenant J. D. Miley, 2nd Artillery, A. D. C., representing General Shafter, Commanding American Forces, for the capitulation of Spanish Forces comprised in that portion of the Island of Cuba east of a line passing through Asseradero, Dos Palmas, Palma Soriano, Cauto abajo, Recondida, Tanamo, and Aguilera, said territory being known as the Eastern District of Santiago, Commanded by General Jose Toral.

1. That pending arrangements for capitulation all hostilities between American and Spanish Forces in this District shall absolutely and unequivocally cease.

2. That this capitulation includes all the Forces and war material in said territory.

3. That after the signing of the final capitulation the United States agrees, with little delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said District to the Kingdom of Spain the troops as near as possible, to embark at the Port nearest the garrisons they now occupy.

4. That the Officers of the Spanish Army be permitted to retain their side arms and both Officers and enlisted men their personal property.

5. That after final capitulation the Spanish authorities agree without delay to remove or assist the American Navy in removing all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the Harbor of Santiago and its mouth.

6. That after final capitulation the Commander of the Spanish Forces deliver without delay a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish Forces, and a roster of the said Forces now in above described District to the Commander of the American Forces.

7. That the Commander of the Spanish Forces, in leaving said District, is authorized to carry with him all the military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish Army now in said District.

8. That all of that portion of the Spanish Forces known as Volunteers, Movilizadoes and Guerillas, who wish to remain in the Island of Cuba are permitted to do so under parole not to take up arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States, delivering up their arms.

9. That the Spanish Forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba, with honors of War, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United States Government it being understood that the United States Commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

ENTERED INTO this fifteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, by the undersigned Commissioners, acting under instructions from their respective Commanding Generals.

(Signed):

Joseph Wheeler, Frederick Escario,

Major General Vols.

H. W. Lawton,

Major General Vols. Ventura Pentan,

J. D. Miley, Robt.Mason.

1st Lieut., 2d Artillery,

A.D.C.

[lordroel]

Day 88 of the Spanish–American War, July 16th 1898

Cuban rebels seize the town of Gibara from the Spanish Army without a fight.

France - Intelligence Memorandum From Lieutenant William S. Sims, United States Naval Attaché In Paris

[Extract]

Translation of Cablegram

From Paris,

Recd Washington, July 16/98.

Bureau of Navigation.

Special agent at Madrid reports that the Spanish Naval authorities are discussing a plan to divide Camara’s squadron, thus forcing division of the United States squadron; definite decision will not be made until Camara’s return.

Orotava, Canary Islands, near Santa Cruz de Teneriffe, lightly defended. Could be taken easily. La Luz, three miles from Palma, Canary Islands, is being hastily fortified to protect deposit of coal. A battery of four twenty-four centimetre guns is being installed at Santa Cruz de Teneriffe.

SIMS.

---oo0oo---

Translation of Cablegram

From Paris,

Recd Washington, July 18/98.

Bureau of Navigation.

From Special Agent at Barcelona:

Audaz, Osado, Proserpina, have arrived at Port Mahon, Minorca; Pelayo is expected.

Camara’s fleet will be concentrated at Cartagena.

Gijon, Spain, being fortified; eight modern guns will be mounted upon Mount St. Catherine, and various points of the bay.

SIMS.

France - Lieutenant William S. Sims, Naval Attaché In Paris, To Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief Of The Bureau Of Navigation

TRANSLATION OF CIPHER DISPATCH

FROM PARIS,

Received Washington, July 18, 1898.

Bureau of Navigation,

From Special Agent at Canary Islands: (1).

One hundred and sixty thousand to 200,000 tons of coal at Canary Islands. Batteries being rapidly mounted, but service badly disorganized and with insufficient ammunition. Example: two guns at Arrecif de Lanzarette, Canary Islands,2 were supplied with ammunition of different caliber. The Spanish officers severely criticize the government and believe they will make a stout but unsuccessful resistance.

At Palma, Canary Islands, 6500 men. Four batteries of 24-centimeter guns completed between La Luz and the city, and battery being mounted behind port on peninsula north of Palma, Canary Islands, also three batteries of artillery.

At Santa Cruz de Teneriffe5 same number of guns and troops.

At Lanzarette, Canary Islands, Fuerteventura, Canary Islands, Palma, Canary Islands, Gomers, Canary Islands, Hierro, Canary Islands, each two modern guns and 5000 men in all.

Arneas and Guia and Galdar and Agnaete and Telde and Ingenio and Aguimes each 250 men. All abovementioned troops do not include militia.

Sentiment of islanders very lukewarm for Spain: bitterly hostile to United States and to England. They would welcome annexation to France. Further details later.

SIMS.

Footnote 1: The Eastern Squadron was considering stopping at the Canary Islands, a possession of Spain that was located off the coast of Africa.

[lordroel]

Day 89 of the Spanish–American War, July 17th 1898

Cuba: Siege of Santiago

Spanish general Toral offers the surrender of the 12,000 men at Santiago de Cuba, the 12,000 men at Guantánamo, and six other small Spanish Army garrisons throughout Cuba. Leonard Wood, promoted to brigadier general, accepts the surrender and is named military governor of Santiago de Cuba. Land combat effectively ends in Cuba for the duration of the war.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba - Commodore John A. Howell, Commander, Second Blockading Squadron, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U.S.Flagship San Francisco.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba.

July 17, 1898.

Sir:--

I have to report the following report in regard to the blockade of the north coast of the Island of Cuba:-

1. In obedience to your telegraphic order of the 9th instant forwarded to me through the Commander-in-Chief of the Key West Naval Base,I have extended the Cuban blockade through the entire northern coast of the island,as far as the number of vessel under my control will admit.

2. The vessels in question are at this date stationed as follows:-

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Gorda----Topeka and Maple.

Gibara and vicinity----Prairie.

Nuevitas and vicinity----Badger.

Cardenas2 and Matanzas----Pompey, Uncas and Hudson.

Havana,Mariel, and Bahia Honda----I left Havana on July 11,leaving Captain Ludlow of the Terror in charge there, so that I cannot give the exact distribution of the vessels in that vicinity.

3. In my opinion this distribution is not sufficient to give a thorough blockade of the coast, and if possible ships should be assigned as follows:

In vicinity of Baracoa----------------------------------1.

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Godra--------------------1.

Gibara and vicinity-------------------------------------1.

Porto Padre,Porto Malagasta and Port Manati-------------1.

Nuevitas and vicinity-----------------------------------1.

Boca de Caravela and Boca de Guajaba--------------------1.

From Santa Maria Cay to Frageso Cay---------------------1.

From Frageso Cay to Dromedary Cay-----------------------1.

From Bahia de Cadiz Cay to Piedras Cay------------------1.

Matanzas and vicinity-----------------------------------2.

Havana-------------------------------------------------10.

Mariel and vicinity-------------------------------------1.

Bahia Honda and vicinity--------------------------------1.

Pass of Jutlas to Pass of Buena Vista-------------------1.

Pass of Buena Vista to Cape San Antonio-----------------1.

Total--------------------------------------------------27.

4. Of the vessels off Havana four should have a draft of not more than ten feet,if possible,two or more should be heavy ships,and the remainder should be vessels of good speed. All present efforts seem to be towards funning the blockade at this port by creeping along the shore, especially from westward, and small,light draft vessels are necessary to detect and stop this,while some ships of higher speed should be on hand to take up the chase. The heavy ships should be kept there because of the moral effect,to serve as a rallying point for the lighter ships,to run under the batteries, to destroy blockade runners if necessary, and to respond to the fire of the batteries if desired.

5. At least six small vessels of not more than six feet draft and of considerable size,similar to those used on the rivers during our civil war,should be kept inside the keys between Cardenas and Nuevitas,and two or three more inside the keys to the westward of Bahia Honda.

6. I find that ships can be on their stations for a really greater length of time if they are able to go into Key West or some other port where they can get water for their boilers about once in three weeks,than they can if coaled inside the keys, and I am in favor of that method of coaling and watering wherever it is possible. The better condition of the machinery resulting from the use of fresh water in the boilers makes the hips more serviceable where this method can be followed. To do this would of course call for about a third more ships than those actually on station,so that they could be relieved in turn.

7. Thus a force of forty ships and twelve of the craft for work inside the keys would make a complete and perfect blockade possible,keeping twenty-seven ships on station all the time.

8. Realizing that probably this number of vessels cannot be sent to the duty and that some parts of the coast will therefore probably have to be neglected,I have to recommend as specially worthy of care the following:-

Havana and vicinity, including Mariel and Bahia Honda.

Cardenas to Nuevitas,

Nuevitas to Porto Tanano. The importance of this last section will be very largely diminished after the conquest of the Province of Santiago,and the blockade could probably be discontinued there before very long.

9. Assuming that the main object of the blockade is to facilitate the fall of Havana by preventing the ingress of stores into that city,there are two sections of the north coast to be considered. Blockade running at Bahia Honda and Mariel can be easily prevented,especially as lack of railroad connections with Havana makes the transportation of stores from these points difficult. Havana itself is easily closed if only ten vessels of proper description can be kept there. Two ships at Matanzas will fully close that port. Thus the ships in hand can easily guard this first section.

10. The section section,from Piedras City Cay to Nuevitas is much more difficult to handle,and at present is the principal source of supplies to Havana. According to our best information there is rail connection to the eastward from Havana as far as San Juan de los Raemedios. Cargo landed anywhere inside these keys can be readily transshipped by boat and rail to Havana,and my reports show that much of this traffic has been going on. I have as yet been able to do nothing to stop it,from lack of ships,but I will give my attention to the matter as soon as possible. It is here that the very light draft vessels are needed,and this matter is of prime importance if the supply of provisions to Havana is to be stopped. Nuevitas should be blockaded for the same reason.

11. I do not fear that supplies introduced to the eastward of Nuevitas or to the westward of Bahia Honda,on the north coast,can be gotten into Havana.

12. While off Port Nipe I communicated with some Cuban insurgents at Port Banes. There were about twenty-five of them there,and no Spaniards,but they reported about one thousand Spanish troops at Port Nipe. There is a small gunboat at Nipe,but I could not find out whether there were any batteries of not. Apparently there was one,but it would not open fire,although the Topeka stood in close enough to exchange shots with the gunboat but without effect.

13. I have endeavored to find some ports of refuge to be used in case of hurricanes,especially for the smaller craft. Pot Banes is available for the small vessels,but that is the only one I have been able to find. There seems to be absolutely nothing of the sort in the vicinity of Havana.

14. The Cubans at Banes offer to furnish pilots to take vessels into that port,and I have directed the Commanding Officer of the Topeka ascertain whether that port is available for larger vessels,and whether it is possible to coal there from a collier.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) J. A. Howell,

Commodore,U.S.Navy,

Commanding North Cuba Blockade.

[stevep]

Jul 17, 2022 6:29:43 GMT lordroel said:

Day 89 of the Spanish–American War, July 17th 1898

Cuba: Siege of Santiago

Spanish general Toral offers the surrender of the 12,000 men at Santiago de Cuba, the 12,000 men at Guantánamo, and six other small Spanish Army garrisons throughout Cuba. Leonard Wood, promoted to brigadier general, accepts the surrender and is named military governor of Santiago de Cuba. Land combat effectively ends in Cuba for the duration of the war.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba - Commodore John A. Howell, Commander, Second Blockading Squadron, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U.S.Flagship San Francisco.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba.

July 17, 1898.

Sir:--

I have to report the following report in regard to the blockade of the north coast of the Island of Cuba:-

1. In obedience to your telegraphic order of the 9th instant forwarded to me through the Commander-in-Chief of the Key West Naval Base,I have extended the Cuban blockade through the entire northern coast of the island,as far as the number of vessel under my control will admit.

2. The vessels in question are at this date stationed as follows:-

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Gorda----Topeka and Maple.

Gibara and vicinity----Prairie.

Nuevitas and vicinity----Badger.

Cardenas2 and Matanzas----Pompey, Uncas and Hudson.

Havana,Mariel, and Bahia Honda----I left Havana on July 11,leaving Captain Ludlow of the Terror in charge there, so that I cannot give the exact distribution of the vessels in that vicinity.

3. In my opinion this distribution is not sufficient to give a thorough blockade of the coast, and if possible ships should be assigned as follows:

In vicinity of Baracoa----------------------------------1.

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Godra--------------------1.

Gibara and vicinity-------------------------------------1.

Porto Padre,Porto Malagasta and Port Manati-------------1.

Nuevitas and vicinity-----------------------------------1.

Boca de Caravela and Boca de Guajaba--------------------1.

From Santa Maria Cay to Frageso Cay---------------------1.

From Frageso Cay to Dromedary Cay-----------------------1.

From Bahia de Cadiz Cay to Piedras Cay------------------1.

Matanzas and vicinity-----------------------------------2.

Havana-------------------------------------------------10.

Mariel and vicinity-------------------------------------1.

Bahia Honda and vicinity--------------------------------1.

Pass of Jutlas to Pass of Buena Vista-------------------1.

Pass of Buena Vista to Cape San Antonio-----------------1.

Total--------------------------------------------------27.

4. Of the vessels off Havana four should have a draft of not more than ten feet,if possible,two or more should be heavy ships,and the remainder should be vessels of good speed. All present efforts seem to be towards funning the blockade at this port by creeping along the shore, especially from westward, and small,light draft vessels are necessary to detect and stop this,while some ships of higher speed should be on hand to take up the chase. The heavy ships should be kept there because of the moral effect,to serve as a rallying point for the lighter ships,to run under the batteries, to destroy blockade runners if necessary, and to respond to the fire of the batteries if desired.

5. At least six small vessels of not more than six feet draft and of considerable size,similar to those used on the rivers during our civil war,should be kept inside the keys between Cardenas and Nuevitas,and two or three more inside the keys to the westward of Bahia Honda.

6. I find that ships can be on their stations for a really greater length of time if they are able to go into Key West or some other port where they can get water for their boilers about once in three weeks,than they can if coaled inside the keys, and I am in favor of that method of coaling and watering wherever it is possible. The better condition of the machinery resulting from the use of fresh water in the boilers makes the hips more serviceable where this method can be followed. To do this would of course call for about a third more ships than those actually on station,so that they could be relieved in turn.

7. Thus a force of forty ships and twelve of the craft for work inside the keys would make a complete and perfect blockade possible,keeping twenty-seven ships on station all the time.

8. Realizing that probably this number of vessels cannot be sent to the duty and that some parts of the coast will therefore probably have to be neglected,I have to recommend as specially worthy of care the following:-

Havana and vicinity, including Mariel and Bahia Honda.

Cardenas to Nuevitas,

Nuevitas to Porto Tanano. The importance of this last section will be very largely diminished after the conquest of the Province of Santiago,and the blockade could probably be discontinued there before very long.

9. Assuming that the main object of the blockade is to facilitate the fall of Havana by preventing the ingress of stores into that city,there are two sections of the north coast to be considered. Blockade running at Bahia Honda and Mariel can be easily prevented,especially as lack of railroad connections with Havana makes the transportation of stores from these points difficult. Havana itself is easily closed if only ten vessels of proper description can be kept there. Two ships at Matanzas will fully close that port. Thus the ships in hand can easily guard this first section.

10. The section section,from Piedras City Cay to Nuevitas is much more difficult to handle,and at present is the principal source of supplies to Havana. According to our best information there is rail connection to the eastward from Havana as far as San Juan de los Raemedios. Cargo landed anywhere inside these keys can be readily transshipped by boat and rail to Havana,and my reports show that much of this traffic has been going on. I have as yet been able to do nothing to stop it,from lack of ships,but I will give my attention to the matter as soon as possible. It is here that the very light draft vessels are needed,and this matter is of prime importance if the supply of provisions to Havana is to be stopped. Nuevitas should be blockaded for the same reason.

11. I do not fear that supplies introduced to the eastward of Nuevitas or to the westward of Bahia Honda,on the north coast,can be gotten into Havana.

12. While off Port Nipe I communicated with some Cuban insurgents at Port Banes. There were about twenty-five of them there,and no Spaniards,but they reported about one thousand Spanish troops at Port Nipe. There is a small gunboat at Nipe,but I could not find out whether there were any batteries of not. Apparently there was one,but it would not open fire,although the Topeka stood in close enough to exchange shots with the gunboat but without effect.

13. I have endeavored to find some ports of refuge to be used in case of hurricanes,especially for the smaller craft. Pot Banes is available for the small vessels,but that is the only one I have been able to find. There seems to be absolutely nothing of the sort in the vicinity of Havana.

14. The Cubans at Banes offer to furnish pilots to take vessels into that port,and I have directed the Commanding Officer of the Topeka ascertain whether that port is available for larger vessels,and whether it is possible to coal there from a collier.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) J. A. Howell,

Commodore,U.S.Navy,

Commanding North Cuba Blockade.

  lordroel,

  Have you noticed that the 2nd half of the text is crossed out?  Assuming that's an error and suspect I know what it is as I've seen it before.  It starts with a missing "s" as the hips should be ships.  Did you mean to put something in square brackets?  Have done this in the past and for some reason the system takes it as a "[" "s" which is the htmp code for striking out the following text.  It can be a pain to repair as well IIRC as it then seems to hide the code so you can't simply delete it.

  Steve

[lordroel]

Jul 17, 2022 8:24:41 GMT stevep said:

Jul 17, 2022 6:29:43 GMT lordroel said:

Day 89 of the Spanish–American War, July 17th 1898

Cuba: Siege of Santiago

Spanish general Toral offers the surrender of the 12,000 men at Santiago de Cuba, the 12,000 men at Guantánamo, and six other small Spanish Army garrisons throughout Cuba. Leonard Wood, promoted to brigadier general, accepts the surrender and is named military governor of Santiago de Cuba. Land combat effectively ends in Cuba for the duration of the war.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba - Commodore John A. Howell, Commander, Second Blockading Squadron, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U.S.Flagship San Francisco.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba.

July 17, 1898.

Sir:--

I have to report the following report in regard to the blockade of the north coast of the Island of Cuba:-

1. In obedience to your telegraphic order of the 9th instant forwarded to me through the Commander-in-Chief of the Key West Naval Base,I have extended the Cuban blockade through the entire northern coast of the island,as far as the number of vessel under my control will admit.

2. The vessels in question are at this date stationed as follows:-

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Gorda----Topeka and Maple.

Gibara and vicinity----Prairie.

Nuevitas and vicinity----Badger.

Cardenas2 and Matanzas----Pompey, Uncas and Hudson.

Havana,Mariel, and Bahia Honda----I left Havana on July 11,leaving Captain Ludlow of the Terror in charge there, so that I cannot give the exact distribution of the vessels in that vicinity.

3. In my opinion this distribution is not sufficient to give a thorough blockade of the coast, and if possible ships should be assigned as follows:

In vicinity of Baracoa----------------------------------1.

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Godra--------------------1.

Gibara and vicinity-------------------------------------1.

Porto Padre,Porto Malagasta and Port Manati-------------1.

Nuevitas and vicinity-----------------------------------1.

Boca de Caravela and Boca de Guajaba--------------------1.

From Santa Maria Cay to Frageso Cay---------------------1.

From Frageso Cay to Dromedary Cay-----------------------1.

From Bahia de Cadiz Cay to Piedras Cay------------------1.

Matanzas and vicinity-----------------------------------2.

Havana-------------------------------------------------10.

Mariel and vicinity-------------------------------------1.

Bahia Honda and vicinity--------------------------------1.

Pass of Jutlas to Pass of Buena Vista-------------------1.

Pass of Buena Vista to Cape San Antonio-----------------1.

Total--------------------------------------------------27.

4. Of the vessels off Havana four should have a draft of not more than ten feet,if possible,two or more should be heavy ships,and the remainder should be vessels of good speed. All present efforts seem to be towards funning the blockade at this port by creeping along the shore, especially from westward, and small,light draft vessels are necessary to detect and stop this,while some ships of higher speed should be on hand to take up the chase. The heavy ships should be kept there because of the moral effect,to serve as a rallying point for the lighter ships,to run under the batteries, to destroy blockade runners if necessary, and to respond to the fire of the batteries if desired.

5. At least six small vessels of not more than six feet draft and of considerable size,similar to those used on the rivers during our civil war,should be kept inside the keys between Cardenas and Nuevitas,and two or three more inside the keys to the westward of Bahia Honda.

6. I find that ships can be on their stations for a really greater length of time if they are able to go into Key West or some other port where they can get water for their boilers about once in three weeks,than they can if coaled inside the keys, and I am in favor of that method of coaling and watering wherever it is possible. The better condition of the machinery resulting from the use of fresh water in the boilers makes the hips more serviceable where this method can be followed. To do this would of course call for about a third more ships than those actually on station,so that they could be relieved in turn.

7. Thus a force of forty ships and twelve of the craft for work inside the keys would make a complete and perfect blockade possible,keeping twenty-seven ships on station all the time.

8. Realizing that probably this number of vessels cannot be sent to the duty and that some parts of the coast will therefore probably have to be neglected,I have to recommend as specially worthy of care the following:-

Havana and vicinity, including Mariel and Bahia Honda.

Cardenas to Nuevitas,

Nuevitas to Porto Tanano. The importance of this last section will be very largely diminished after the conquest of the Province of Santiago,and the blockade could probably be discontinued there before very long.

9. Assuming that the main object of the blockade is to facilitate the fall of Havana by preventing the ingress of stores into that city,there are two sections of the north coast to be considered. Blockade running at Bahia Honda and Mariel can be easily prevented,especially as lack of railroad connections with Havana makes the transportation of stores from these points difficult. Havana itself is easily closed if only ten vessels of proper description can be kept there. Two ships at Matanzas will fully close that port. Thus the ships in hand can easily guard this first section.

10. The section section,from Piedras City Cay to Nuevitas is much more difficult to handle,and at present is the principal source of supplies to Havana. According to our best information there is rail connection to the eastward from Havana as far as San Juan de los Raemedios. Cargo landed anywhere inside these keys can be readily transshipped by boat and rail to Havana,and my reports show that much of this traffic has been going on. I have as yet been able to do nothing to stop it,from lack of ships,but I will give my attention to the matter as soon as possible. It is here that the very light draft vessels are needed,and this matter is of prime importance if the supply of provisions to Havana is to be stopped. Nuevitas should be blockaded for the same reason.

11. I do not fear that supplies introduced to the eastward of Nuevitas or to the westward of Bahia Honda,on the north coast,can be gotten into Havana.

12. While off Port Nipe I communicated with some Cuban insurgents at Port Banes. There were about twenty-five of them there,and no Spaniards,but they reported about one thousand Spanish troops at Port Nipe. There is a small gunboat at Nipe,but I could not find out whether there were any batteries of not. Apparently there was one,but it would not open fire,although the Topeka stood in close enough to exchange shots with the gunboat but without effect.

13. I have endeavored to find some ports of refuge to be used in case of hurricanes,especially for the smaller craft. Pot Banes is available for the small vessels,but that is the only one I have been able to find. There seems to be absolutely nothing of the sort in the vicinity of Havana.

14. The Cubans at Banes offer to furnish pilots to take vessels into that port,and I have directed the Commanding Officer of the Topeka ascertain whether that port is available for larger vessels,and whether it is possible to coal there from a collier.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) J. A. Howell,

Commodore,U.S.Navy,

Commanding North Cuba Blockade.

  lordroel,

  Have you noticed that the 2nd half of the text is crossed out?  Assuming that's an error and suspect I know what it is as I've seen it before.  It starts with a missing "s" as the hips should be ships.  Did you mean to put something in square brackets?  Have done this in the past and for some reason the system takes it as a "[" "s" which is the htmp code for striking out the following text.  It can be a pain to repair as well IIRC as it then seems to hide the code so you can't simply delete it.

  Steve

Damm you trolls, seems a mistake on my part, thanks for the notice, will fix it.

[lordroel]

Day 90 of the Spanish–American War, July 18th 1898

Cuba: Third Battle of Manzanillo

At 07:00am, the gunboats USS Wilmington, USS Helena, auxiliary cruisers USS Hist, USS Scorpion and armed tugboats USS Osceola and USS Wompatuck enter the harbor at Manzanillo, Cuba, having rendezvoused at Guayabal the night before. Just four minutes later the battle began when Spanish shore batteries noticed the approaching Americans and began firing at them, although they scored no hits. Some fifteen minutes later, the Scorpion and Osceola replied by opening fire on the shore batteries, although they likewise were unable to score any hits. At 07:50am, the Americans sighted the three Spanish transports lying at anchor, these being the El Gloria, Jose Garcia and El Purísima Concepción. El Gloria and Jose Garcia were merchant steamers used for transporting troops while the El Purísima Concepción was a blockade runner. All three vessels were destroyed over a two and a half hour period by the Americans, who were careful to remain out of the range of the Spanish batteries.

Upon seeing the plight of their fellow vessels, several Spanish gunboats set sail and moved to repulse the American warships, however they found themselves being repulsed and forced to retreat further inside the harbor due to being outgunned. Hist, Hornet, and Wompatuck pursued the gunboats to their moorings and engaged them. The American vessels continued their advance into the harbor, but they soon ran into issues with the shallow depth of Manzanillo's bay, forcing them to reconnoiter passages so that the deeper-drafted gunboats, the Wilmington and the Helena, would not beach themselves accidentally. Advancing upon the Spanish positions, Todd realised that his forces were focusing too much of their fire upon transports taking refuge in the harbor alongside the immobile pontoon present, the hulk and storeship Maria, and ordered the Helena to switch to targeting the cornered gunboats instead of assisting the Willmington with finishing the transports and pontoon off.

With the transports and pontoons destroyed, all the American efforts were switched to finishing off the badly damaged gunboats. One by one, the four gunboats were finished off, with three being destroyed, one being sunk and another beaching itself before sinking later. At 10:22am, just three hours after initiating the engagement, Todd gave the order to withdraw from the harbor. On their way out, much as they had done on their way in, they made sure to keep out of the range of the Spanish batteries, who had helplessly watched the battle unfold.

United States - Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

LETTER

NAVAL WAR BOARD,

Washington, July 18, 1898.

Memorandum for the Naval War Board.

Assuming that the Spanish force in the ports of Spain ought to be considered as more than a match for Watson’s two battleships; and that if another armored ship were added to his squadron, the said Spanish force, when properly handled, must be considered as able to inflict serious damage upon the squadron thus augmented; a plan of campaign in which the covering squadron figures is, of course, the ideal one; because this plan provides against all the contingencies that can be reasonably imagined to occur. Therefore, the only valid reason for advocating the omission of the covering squadron from our plans would be, because it was thought that Watson with three armored ships would certainly, without material damage, be able to beat off the strongest force that the enemy could at the time concentrate against him. And this view would rest upon two principal assumptions :

1st. The inherent superiority of our ships and their personel, as compared with the Spaniards.

2nd. The comparative speed with which our three armored ships would pass these xxxxxxx regions, within which it is reasonable to expect that a Spanish attack might be delivered.

It will thus be seen that the advocates of the single squadron do not base their opinion upon any of the absolute rules of war, but upon their professional judgment as to the condition of affairs, the correctness of which depends entirely upon the correctness of their said judgment, which, of course, might possibly be at fault, in one or more respects.

While the plan of sending the three ships is not the safer, or the more correct one; I feel personally so satisfied of the inferiority of our enemy, in the matter of ships and men, as demonstrated in the late operations against him, that I am willing to assume that the risk of passing Watson’s squadron through the Straits, and through the enemy’s waters, is not one which need be seriously regarded by the Department in considering its plans; though I wish distinctly to admit that it is not the ideal campaign, as is the first one above mentioned.

M. SICARD,

I concur in the above statement,

A.S.CROWNINSHIELD.

[miletus12]

Jul 15, 2022 8:36:35 GMT lordroel said:

Day 87 of the Spanish–American War, July 15th 1898

Spanish forces under General Toral capitulated to US forces at Santiago de Cuba.

It was a combination of factors which caused Toral to pack it in:
a. Unlike Linnares; Toral was cognizant that "honor" was less important than the hail of shells and Gatling gun bullets that made movement and operations inside Santiago de Cuba impossible, once the US V Corps had the high ground and could rain shells down on the trapped Spanish defenders with impunity.
b. The best Spanish troops had been Linnares squandered and the limited ammunition and food the defenders had, was almost gone.    
c. Once the Spanish fleet was gone, what was the point of holding the place? Blanco had ordered it to sortie and be slaughtered. Toral was not made of the same fatalist nonsense as Admiral Cervera. 

Jul 15, 2022 8:36:35 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Commodore George C. Remey, Commandant, Key West Naval Base, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

NAVAL BASE, KEY WEST [Fla.]

U. S. Flagship Lancaster, July 15, 1898

Sir:

As the extension of the blockade on the north side of Cuba increases the need of vessels, I have the honor to request that you will send as many around from the south side as you can spare. Every available vessel here is kept out on the blockade as long as she can stay, but this number is occasionally drawn on for convoys. The NEWPORT has just been sent north by the Department’s order, convoying four prize steamers to New York, and the DOLPHIN has not yet returned from being repaired at Norfolk. Commodore Howell3 has expressed a particular desire for all the small vessels to be had.

(2) The Department has sent here the Torpedo Boats MORRIS, TALBOT and GWIN, to be used on blockade between the Isle of Pines and Batabano. I have sent the NASHVILLE down to examine into the practicability of maintaining these small craft in that vicinity, with a sub-base at Siguanea Bay or near there. I expect the NASHVILLE to return in a few days.

(3) Regarding the monitors for service in Porto Rican waters, I have just reported to the Department that all four can be ready, as far as known, on the 20th instant, the PURITAN being obliged to go with two defective boilers blanked off. I have said they can go to Guantanamo with their own steam, convoyed by one vessel, but to go direct to Porto Rico they would need towing vessels, one of them to be a steam collier. There is no steam collier here now, the nearest one being the POMPEY, stationed at Cardenas.

(4) The CINCINNATI has just arrived from the North.

Very respectfully,

Geo. C. Remey

Commodore Commanding

See Map.



1. The area of coverage CMMDR Remey seeks ships to fill is the Gulfo de Batabano.
2. This is the USS Lancaster

Screw Sloop of War:

Laid down in December 1857, at Philadelphia Navy Yard
Launched, 20 October 1858
Commissioned USS Lancaster, 12 May 1859, CAPT. John Rudd, in command
Assigned to the Pacific Squadron until 1866
Decommissioned, 19 March 1867, at Norfolk Navy Yard, Portsmouth, VA.
Recommissioned, 26 August 1869, to serve as flagship for the South Atlantic squadron
Decommissioned, 31 July 1875, at Portsmouth, N.H.
Recommissioned, 26 August 1881, to serve as flagship for the European squadron
Reassigned as flagship for the South Atlantic squadron in 1885
Reassigned as flagship for the European squadron in 1888
Decommissioned, 7 September 1889 at New York Navy Yard and was towed to Portsmouth, N.H. for repairs
Recommissioned, 19 March 1891 to serve as flagship for the Asiatic squadron
Decommissioned, 30 June 1894, at New York Navy Yard
Recommissioned, 12 September 1895, for assignment to the South Atlantic squadron
Decommissioned, 31 December 1897, at Boston Navy Yard
Recommissioned, 5 May 1898, to serve as station ship at Key West during the Spanish American War
Reassigned, 3 September 1898 as gunnery training ship at Portsmouth, N.H.
Decommissioned, 1 May 1902, at Philadelphia Navy Yar
Lancaster served as receiving ship at the Philadelphia Navy Yard from 16 November 1903 to 31 March 1912

Transferred to the Bureau of Public Health Service, Treasury Department, 1 February 1913
Stuck from the Naval Register, 31 December 1915

Ex-USS Lancaster served as quarantine detention ship at Reedy Island, DE. Quarantine Station from 1916 to 1920.
New York Quarantine Station from 1920 to 1929
Final Disposition, sold in 1929, broken up in 1933.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifications:

Displacement.......................................... 2,362 t. 3,250 t.(fl)
Length...................................................... 235' 8"
Beam..........................................................46'
Draft...........................................................18' 6"
Speed.........................................................10 kts.
Complement 367
Armament (As Built)...............................two 11" smoothbores (Muzzle loader chaser or pivot guns of the Ericcson wine bottle type. M.) 
............................................................two 9" smoothbores (Muzzle loader guns of the Dahlgren coke bottle type. M.)
................May 1863..............................four 9" smoothbores (Muzzle loader guns of the Dahlgren coke bottle type. M.)
............................................................two 30-pdr smoothbores added (Type of smaller guns used to support land operations and to give blockade runners something to consider, being faster to fire and more cost effective than the larger Dahlgren ship killers. M.) 
............................................................two 100-pdr muzzle loading rifles (Parrott guns. M)
......................18..................................sixteen 9" smoothbores (Muzzle loader guns of the Dahlgren coke bottle type. M.)
Propulsion (As Built)................................two direct-acting double piston-rod engines (61" x 2'9") IHP 1,000 = 10kts
....................1865.................................two compound engines / two boilers / single propeller

Does one get the feeling the USN still did not get it in 1898? Those ARE muzzle loaders.

3. USS Puritan is hors de combat.  The USS Terror and the others have to be towed because their engines are subject to breakdown.   

hors de com·bat

[ˌôr də ˌkämˈbä]

ADJECTIVE
out of action due to injury or damage:
"their pilots had been rendered temporarily hors de combat"

That could be a Whitehead Mark I short. The USS Morris (TB-14) was ordered in 1896 and commissioned April 1898. She is a larger version of the Talbot class torpedo boats (USS Gwin and USS Talbot) built at Herreschoff Manufacturing Company. None of them was intended for blue water operations. 

---------------------------------------------------------------
 

Jul 15, 2022 8:36:35 GMT lordroel said:

Bacoor - Emilio Aguinaldo Y Famy To Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron

TRANSLATION.

His Excellency, the Admiral of the Squadron of the U.S.in the Islands.

Bacoor, July 15, 1898.

Sir:

The Revolution having taken possession of the various provinces of the Archipelago this Government has found it necessary to adopt the form and organization best suited to the popular will.

I have therefore the pleasure (desire) and honor of placing in your hand the enclosed decrees which contain the organization referred to,1 begging that you will communicate to you Government that the desires of this Government are to remain always in friendship with the Great North American Nation to which we are under many obligations.

I beg, also, that your Excellency will have the kindness to forward the enclosed package H.B.M. Consul,2 with a request from me that he will forward them their respective destinations.

For which favor the Filipino people and your humble servant will most deeply grateful to Your Excellency.

Very Respectfully etc. etc.

Emilio Aguinaldo

The expression is "Lead Balloon"

Jul 15, 2022 8:36:35 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

LETTER

Washington, [D.C.] July 15, 1898.

Sir:

1. As has been previously stated, the Department sometime since decided to send a squadron to Manila to reinforce Admiral Dewey. This decision was arrived at, in view of the then recent departure of Admiral Camara’s squadron from Spain for the Philippine Islands.

2. Though Admiral Camara has returned from the Suez Canal to Spain, the Department still intends to send a reinforcing squadron to Manila; and as Camara’s force, when united with other armored ships, now presumably disposable in Spanish waters, would be, on paper, stronger than the squadron proposed to be sent to the East Indies, it has been decided to send with the latter a covering squadron strong enough to guarantee against the possible efforts of all such armored ships of the Spanish Navy as may now be in condition for cruising in the straits of Gibraltar, and to hold any such force as Spain may collect, blockaded in its own ports until our squadron for the East is well on its way.

3. With this end in view, the Department has directed the two squadrons to be prepared at once, as below designated, the whole to be under one command until separated by order of the Commander-in-Chief:

4. Covering Squadron. Eastern Squadron.

Armored Ships.

-NEW YORK
-MASSACHUSETTS
-BROOKLYN
-OREGON
-IOWA
-INDIANA

Cruisers.

-NEWARK
-YOSEMITE
-NEW ORLEANS
-DIXIE
-BADGER
-YANKEE
-MAYFLOWER

Food Ships.

With the proper number of colliers to be designated by the Department.

5. The men-of-war composing this expedition are to be filled with provisions, coal, ammunition, etc., and will sail from the point that is thought most convenient in the vicinity of the Windward Passage, directly to a point 200 miles, W.S.W., magnetic from the town of Punta Delgada, in the Azores, where the Department will direct the colliers to rendezvous, the latter sailing from Hampton Roads under convoy of a cruiser, which will be designated by the Department.

6. As it is the desire of the Department to conceal the movements of this fleet as much as possible, it is thought best that only a single small vessel should be sent in to Punta Delgada, and this without showing an Admiral’s or Commodore’s flag. Communication should be had with the U.S.Consul, to whom will be addressed any important matter for the Commander-in-Chief.

7. It is not now thought expedient that the fleet should coal at this rendezvous, unless found necessary, but it should proceed to such a point on the coast of Morocco or the coast of Spain as can be occupied in comparative safety from Spanish attack, sufficiently near the straits of Gibraltar, and smooth enough for coaling of ships. In this connection the coast between Cadiz and Huelva, and between Melilla and other points on the African coast, should be considered.

8. As the speed of the fleet is regulated by that of the colliers, it would appear that about ten knots per hour can probably be maintained, in ordinary weather, though it is thought that the most economical speed of several of the men-of-war may perhaps be more than that. Great care must be taken to keep the machinery and boilers of the colliers in an efficient working condition. A few of them could, under favorable conditions, make twelve knots; but as a rule, ten will probably be as much as should be expected of most of them.

9. During the operation of coaling, which should be conducted as speedily as practicable, a vigilant lookout must be kept against the enemy’s torpedo craft, the fleet being got underway, if necessary, at nightfall, to stand off shore or to shift position, as may be thought best.

10. It must also be habitually so disposed as to properly meet any attack of the enemy’s men-of-war, or torpedo boats, and to cover the colliers and weaker vessels, the cruisers being expected to guarantee all against the attacks of torpedoboats and destroyers.

11. After coaling the fleet, such colliers as may be nearly empty should be discharged into the others - enough coal being left in the “empties” to enable them to reach the United States, or some port where it is certain that they can procure coal.

12. It might, perhaps, be more desirable to pass the straits at night, carrying the whole fleet into the Mediterranean, far enough to the eastward of the coast of Spain to make it difficult for the Spanish torpedo boats to act conveniently, and then anchoring on the north coast of Africa, or elsewhere, accomplish the coaling as rapidly as possible. However, the Commander-in-Chief will follow any plan that may seem to him most convenient, the fleet’s safety being secure by proper arrangements on his part. If off the coast of a neutral country, it will be necessary to coal beyond the marine league from shore, if practicable.

13. After the operation of coaling, the entire fleet has been completed, the division for the East Indies and the colliers detailed for it, will be directed to proceed as mentioned at close of sixteenth paragraph. The separation should, if possible, be made by night, and the covering squadron will then hold the Spanish fleet under observation and blockade it, if necessary, till time has been allowed the Eastern Squadron to reach the Suez Canal. The covering squadron will then return to the United States, sending a vessel into Lisbon to inquire if there be any orders for it.

14. In conclusion, the Department attaches importance to preserving the armored fleet in full efficiency. Therefore, while any opportunity that may offer to destroy the enemy’s armed ships must be used to the utmost, the vessels must not be exposed any more than may be imperatively necessary, to the fire of the coast fortifications.

15. On approaching the coast of Europe, one of the cruisers will be sent ahead to call on the Minister at Lisbon for any orders the Department may have sent to his care; the cruiser to depart from Lisbon immediately and rejoin off Cape St. Vincent, or any other point that may be designated by the commander of the combined force.

16. The Department designated by the commander of the combined force, Eastern Squadron. Admiral Sampson will command the covering squadron and also the combined force until it separates, when Commodore Watson will proceed, without delay, with the “MASSACHUSETTS,” “OREGON,” colliers and store ship, to Manila, using every endeavor to make his way without any other delays than those that are absolutely necessary.

17. You will furnish Commodore Watson with a copy of this order, and you will hold the vessels designated, in such a state of readiness that they will be able to sail at the earliest practicable moment after the receipt by you of an order from the Department for them to proceed.

18. You will inform the Department, by telegraph, when they are ready for the service herein mentioned.

Very respectfully,

John D. Long,

Secretary.

Commentary will of necessity be sarcastic, as this is "Long" (Actually the War Board. M.), telling Sampson what (they) he expects Sampson to do. So: it will be translated into English to explain the reality beyond the "politeness" of the age. M.

1. We now intend to rescue Dewey, stuck out there in the Philippine Islands, all this time while you dithered in the Caribbean Sea and did not do in the First Spanish Cruiser Squadron. We noticed your inactivity which is why we send you this letter of advice...
2. Even though our bluff worked, and Camara scurried back to Spain, we still intend to reinforce Dewey (Pesky Germans). Our reinforcements need a cover force to make it to the Suez Canal, which is where, despite our misgivings, you come in.
3. We now know you cannot competently plan the movement intended in 2. So: to help you out, we will do it for you.
4. Organize as follows:
--a. battle line of armored cruisers and battleships.
--b. scouting force of cruisers.
--c. fleet trains.
5. See Map. This is what we expect. Note that you will meet the fleet trains at Ponta Delgado in the Portuguese Azores. 

6. Do not do anything else, until you reach Ponta Delgada, rendezvous with the colliers we sent there, and receive cabled instructions from us. In no circumstances do like you did when you made that showy demonstration at San Juan, Puerto Rico and alerted the Spanish navy as to where you were and how to evade you like Cervera did when he ran into Santiago under your nose. And do not upset the Portuguese
7. 

Spain might not be a good option for a forward anchorage? How about Spanish North Africa? 



Ceuta looks like a good USMC target.
8. This paragraph, directed at Sampson specifically, detailing to him what to expect of his ships, is quite telling. Most of his battleline should be capable of fourteen knots or better, yet he is advised not to exceed a fleet speed of twelve knots and a cruise transit of ten knots is recommended. In specific terms, we do not see such a direct written instruction to Watson, Dewey, Schley or Howell that a recommended speed of transit is advised. To Sampson it is. Why? Because this IDIOT never listens to his engineers. Specifically: we can now credit him with damaging the four monitors laid up at Key West still under repair, the USS Indiana (Not able to exceed nine knots, though the department does not know it still since Sampson hides it, M.), the USS Massachusetts and now the USS New York, fixing her engines after the belated and futile speed run to catch up to Schley when he chased Cervera.           

Great care must be taken to keep the machinery and boilers of the colliers in an efficient working condition.

That is a poke about the USS Merrimac fiasco.

9. Use the cruisers as intended by doctrine to protect the fleet. Screen against torpedo boats and light raiders.  Sampson did not post scouting lines until after Cervera sneaked past him in May. One remembers the letter of instruction from the War Board at that time to establish such lines addressed to Sampson around 20 May 1898? He failed to do so prior and only did so post facto after Cervera reached sanctuary. 
10. Repeated and reiterated from 9., bearing in mind what the French did at Fouzhou  and the Japanese did at Wei Hei Wei, and what Vilaamil tried to do at Bahia de Santiago and which Sampson had NOT expected, otherwise he would have disposed his own light forces to anticipate Cervera's charge and Vilaamil's bungled torpedo attack on the USS Indiana.     
11. Did Howell, Schley or Dewey need specific instructions on how to handle coaling? Here, Sampson is told to redistribute coal among his ships, so as to allow empties to head out and load up again while still keeping an operational supply on hand. It was noticed in Washington (Schley's telegrams and messenger boats? M.) that Sampson did not handle coaling operations or fleet administration (Hotel load services.) with much competency off Santiago de Cuba.
12. Going back to 7., Ceuta sure does look like a good operating forward anchorage for blanking off Cadiz and getting Watson on his way to the Suez Canal. Passing Gibraltar Straits at night is something I might expect that Dewey or Schley could handle, even in those busy shipping lanes, but to expect Sampson to pass through without waking up the whole Spanish navy at Cadiz or the British at Gibraltar; is like asking a drunken elephant on roller skates in an ice rink filled with stacks of teacups not to announce his presence by doing something stupid. It is a rather futile exercise to suggest such an evolution.
13. Again, asking Sampson to operate with nighttime subtlety to separate Watson off and cover his passage to the Suez Canal would require a competency that just is not indicated that Sampson is capable of doing by his past actions. Inasmuch as the Spanish might try (Definitely will offer.) battle to interfere with the operation, it may be fairly suggested that Sampson is the LAST American admiral one wants to fight at Ceuta. The Lisbon coda is rather funny. It is a French cable line that runs from there. Apparently, Washington does not trust London.   
14. 

In conclusion, the Department attaches importance to preserving the armored fleet in full efficiency. Therefore, while any opportunity that may offer to destroy the enemy’s armed ships must be used to the utmost, the vessels must not be exposed any more than may be imperatively necessary, to the fire of the coast fortifications.

This is in direct reference to Sampson's San Juan, Puerto Rico fiasco in which one third of the gunpower of the USN battleline was damaged by mechanicals and several ships were shot up to no purpose. This is the second time Sampson is directly ordered not to risk ships against forts. 
15. Updated orders will be sent ahead, so Sampson will not do anything stupid. Again, Lisbon is the trusted cable station? 
16. USS Massachusetts and USS Oregon make sense as reinforcements for Dewey. Bringing the fleet home also makes sense, in case things with Spain drag out, as Cuba is still full of Tercios and 'provincia de Cuba occidental', specifically Havana, has about 80,000 tercios still in the Cubana. The fleet has to reinforce the 'paper blockade' CMMDR Reyes complains he has too few ships to cover...     
17. Sampson and Schley never talked to each other before or after Bahia de Santiago de Cuba about battle plans. This is why Bahia de Santiago was such a confused mess. These instructions are Sampson-specific to prevent such a recurrence of USN battle confusion which HE created.
18. Keep us posted. Another feature of Sampson's incompetence was that he tended to not advise Washington as to how he intended to comply or carry out orders.         
        
====================================================================

Personal comments about the above suggested plans. I would not have risked such a lunatic operation. It was high risk and quite injudicious. The USS Monterey and the USS Monadnock were already fumble-dorking their way across the Pacific Ocean and would reach Dewey before Sampson was ready to execute this insane movement. If Otto von Diederichs was still a problem for Dewey, they were more than enough to handle him and that long before USS Oregon ever cleared the Suez Canal. It should be mentioned that these two monitors did not break down in their long dangerous 7,000 nautical mile passage. Note that they had to coal five times? What was the deal here? Why could the Pacific Squadron do routinely what the North Atlantic Squadron could not? Could it be that RADM Joseph N. Miller ran a better fleet command than RADM Sampson? You better believe it. Take the USS Oregon as an example of a Pacific Squadron ship that outperformed her Atlantic counterparts. Leadership and training matters. 

====================================================================

Jul 15, 2022 8:36:35 GMT lordroel said:

Cuba - Preliminary Agreement For The Surrender Of Santiago De Cuba

PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT for the capitulation of the Spanish Forces which constitute the division of Santiago de Cuba occupying the territory herein set forth, said capitulation authorized by the Commander-in-Chief of the Island of Cuba,1 agreed to by General Toral and awaiting the approbation of the Government at Madrid and subject to the following conditions:

Submitted by the undersigned Commissioners, Brigadier General Don Frederick Escario, Lieutenant Colonel of Staff Don Ventura Fontan and Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, representing General Toral, Commanding Spanish Forces, to Major General Joseph Wheeler, U.S.V., Major General H.W. Lawton, U.S.V., and 1st Lieutenant J. D. Miley, 2nd Artillery, A. D. C., representing General Shafter, Commanding American Forces, for the capitulation of Spanish Forces comprised in that portion of the Island of Cuba east of a line passing through Asseradero, Dos Palmas, Palma Soriano, Cauto abajo, Recondida, Tanamo, and Aguilera, said territory being known as the Eastern District of Santiago, Commanded by General Jose Toral.

1. That pending arrangements for capitulation all hostilities between American and Spanish Forces in this District shall absolutely and unequivocally cease.

2. That this capitulation includes all the Forces and war material in said territory.

3. That after the signing of the final capitulation the United States agrees, with little delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said District to the Kingdom of Spain the troops as near as possible, to embark at the Port nearest the garrisons they now occupy.

4. That the Officers of the Spanish Army be permitted to retain their side arms and both Officers and enlisted men their personal property.

5. That after final capitulation the Spanish authorities agree without delay to remove or assist the American Navy in removing all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the Harbor of Santiago and its mouth.

6. That after final capitulation the Commander of the Spanish Forces deliver without delay a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish Forces, and a roster of the said Forces now in above described District to the Commander of the American Forces.

7. That the Commander of the Spanish Forces, in leaving said District, is authorized to carry with him all the military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish Army now in said District.

8. That all of that portion of the Spanish Forces known as Volunteers, Movilizadoes and Guerillas, who wish to remain in the Island of Cuba are permitted to do so under parole not to take up arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States, delivering up their arms.

9. That the Spanish Forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba, with honors of War, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United States Government it being understood that the United States Commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

ENTERED INTO this fifteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, by the undersigned Commissioners, acting under instructions from their respective Commanding Generals.

(Signed):

Joseph Wheeler, Frederick Escario,
Major General Vols.

H. W. Lawton,
Major General Vols. Ventura Pentan,

J. D. Miley, Robt.Mason.
1st Lieut., 2d Artillery,
A.D.C.

See map.



The area between Manzanillo and Antilla is the realistic area under discussion.


   

[miletus12]

Jul 16, 2022 5:52:38 GMT lordroel said:

Day 88 of the Spanish–American War, July 16th 1898

Cuban rebels seize the town of Gibara from the Spanish Army without a fight.

See map.



That gives the Americans a coastal port foothold north of the Sierra Nuestra Mountain range. It is a bit far from Havana and the last stronghold of Spain on the island, but until the Americans had access to such a lodgment north of that mountain range, General Blanco could still hope to keep the Americans bottled up in the southeast. Now that hope was gone.

Jul 16, 2022 5:52:38 GMT lordroel said:

France - Intelligence Memorandum From Lieutenant William S. Sims, United States Naval Attaché In Paris

[Extract]

Translation of Cablegram

From Paris,

Recd Washington, July 16/98.

Bureau of Navigation.

Special agent at Madrid reports that the Spanish Naval authorities are discussing a plan to divide Camara’s squadron, thus forcing division of the United States squadron; definite decision will not be made until Camara’s return.

Orotava, Canary Islands, near Santa Cruz de Teneriffe, lightly defended. Could be taken easily. La Luz, three miles from Palma, Canary Islands, is being hastily fortified to protect deposit of coal. A battery of four twenty-four centimetre guns is being installed at Santa Cruz de Teneriffe.

SIMS.

---oo0oo---

Translation of Cablegram

From Paris,

Recd Washington, July 18/98.

Bureau of Navigation.

From Special Agent at Barcelona:

Audaz, Osado, Proserpina, have arrived at Port Mahon, Minorca; Pelayo is expected.

Camara’s fleet will be concentrated at Cartagena.

Gijon, Spain, being fortified; eight modern guns will be mounted upon Mount St. Catherine, and various points of the bay.

SIMS.

See maps>







Sims is not stupid. He has something in mind that he has suggested to Washington...

Jul 16, 2022 5:52:38 GMT lordroel said:

France - Lieutenant William S. Sims, Naval Attaché In Paris, To Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief Of The Bureau Of Navigation

TRANSLATION OF CIPHER DISPATCH

FROM PARIS,

Received Washington, July 18, 1898.

Bureau of Navigation,

From Special Agent at Canary Islands: (1).

One hundred and sixty thousand to 200,000 tons of coal at Canary Islands. Batteries being rapidly mounted, but service badly disorganized and with insufficient ammunition. Example: two guns at Arrecif de Lanzarette, Canary Islands,2 were supplied with ammunition of different caliber. The Spanish officers severely criticize the government and believe they will make a stout but unsuccessful resistance.

At Palma, Canary Islands, 6500 men. Four batteries of 24-centimeter guns completed between La Luz and the city, and battery being mounted behind port on peninsula north of Palma, Canary Islands, also three batteries of artillery.

At Santa Cruz de Teneriffe5 same number of guns and troops.

At Lanzarette, Canary Islands, Fuerteventura, Canary Islands, Palma, Canary Islands, Gomers, Canary Islands, Hierro, Canary Islands, each two modern guns and 5000 men in all.

Arneas and Guia and Galdar and Agnaete and Telde and Ingenio and Aguimes each 250 men. All abovementioned troops do not include militia.

Sentiment of islanders very lukewarm for Spain: bitterly hostile to United States and to England. They would welcome annexation to France. Further details later.

SIMS.

Footnote 1: The Eastern Squadron was considering stopping at the Canary Islands, a possession of Spain that was located off the coast of Africa.
Footnote 2: That is, Arrecife on the island of Lanzarote.
Footnote 3: That is, La Palma, the most northwesterly of the Canary Islands.
Footnote 4: La Luz is today a neighborhood in Santa Cruz de la Palma, which is undoubtedly the “city” referred to here.
Footnote 5: That is, Santa Cruz de Tenerife.
Footnote 6: Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, La Palma, La Gomera, El Hierro are all names of islands in the Canary Islands.
Footnote 7: Playa de la Arena and Guiade Islora are on the island of Tenerife; Gáldar, Agaete, Telde, Ingenio, and Agüimes are on the island of Gran Canaria.

Now we see what Sims has in mind...


Santa Cruz de Teneriffe in the 1890s.

The U.S. Plan to Invade the Canary Islands and Turn Them into a New Puerto Rico

24/05/2016

canariasUSA

1898 is remembered as a disastrous year for Spain, as the last overseas territories were lost in an unjust war against the United States. The archipelago of the Philippines, Cuba or Puerto Rico would fall like ripe fruit, but the hungry eyes of Yankee expansionism, still in diapers but well armed, also landed on a much closer Spanish island territory and located in a strategic position of great importance: the Canary Islands. This is the story of the American plan that was about to turn the wrinkled potatoes into wrinkled potatoes and incorporate them, with the mojo or the gofio, to the hypercaloric gastronomy of the USA.

1895-1897. American war plans against Spain

As the book The War with Spain in 1898, by David Trask, relates, the first plans for a war against our country were drawn up by the Naval War College in 1895 and sent in 1896 to the Navy department under the title of "Situation in case of War against Spain" in 1896. The first scenario of three presented was that of an attack against the Spanish peninsular territory that was seen by experts as risky and expensive. The other options were attacks on the Spanish possessions in the Pacific and the Caribbean, cheaper and simpler, but which perhaps would also require attacking the island territory.

On the initial proposal, according to an excellent study by Amós Farrujía Coello published in the Revista de Historia Canaria, the Navy Department detailed:

"William Kimball's Pacific squadron, instead of heading to the Philippines, would do so to the waters near the Strait of Gibraltar, where it would join the Atlantic flotilla. This combined power would have to operate from a base taken in the Canary Islands to attack merchant traffic from there."

This was the first formal proposal to capture at least one of the islands and would be abandoned by the subsequent invasion of the Philippines.

In 1897, three hundred bankers representing the 33 million U.S. dollars invested in the island since 1878, asked the U.S. Secretary of State to intervene in Cuba. Theodore Roosevelt, head of the U.S. Navy, who said for a long time (so calm and so pancho) "I would welcome almost any war, because I think our country needs one," took advantage of the financial claim to commission updated plans in the event of needing to declare one against Spain. In the new plans, the Canary Islands reappeared.

"The squadron stationed in Europe must urgently leave the Mediterranean, and the squadron must sail in Asian waters in order to move simultaneously. A squadron resulting from the combination of the previous two, reinforced with some ships of the national squadron, should conquer the Canary Islands, with a view to using them as a basis for further maneuvers against the Spanish navy in its own waters, as well as against the trade of the same nation."

This last paragraph alarmed naval War College President H.C. Taylor, who sent a letter to the secretary of the Navy Department in Washington D.C. expressing his disagreement with the proposed strategy.

"I do not agree with the suggestion about making a pretentious appearance in Spanish waters of Europe, given the difficulties and risks involved in an operation so committed to carry out 3,500 miles away from our bases; to carry out such a maneuver would be with the intention of providing the Spanish naval and military power with a serious offensive; I am not of the opinion that our presence in those waters and the planned campaign could inflict considerable damage on Spain. That is why I insist on recommending that all the force at the disposal of the United States be concentrated in Cuba.

Roosevelt, who was perhaps a Pythoness (PROPHET, the translation does not quite satisfy me.) and woke up sweating one night after dreaming that the battleship Maine would explode in a few months in the port of Havana thus giving a reason for the long-awaited Spanish-American War, continued to insist on the need to attack and responded to Taylor's letter.

"We thought Spain would not succeed with the U.S. fleet in Cuban waters. There could be rapid attacks on our blockade of Cuba by well-armed and protected Spanish cruise ships from Spanish waters. For that reason we proposed that a flying squadron, of two armoured cruisers and two destroyers and other ships should be sent to the Spanish coast for a show of force over their smaller cities and threaten to blockade the larger ones, causing the Spanish authorities to retain a squadron on their own coast. We think that the most dangerous Spanish ships for our blockade in Cuba should be stopped in Spanish waters."

Tension in the Canary Islands

Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, in February 1898, two American warships were spotted in the vicinity of the Canary Islands. There were two cruisers, the Bancroft and the San Francisco. The news spread like wildfire among the local population, causing great alarm. The defenses of the islands were outdated, outdated as were the naval units that protected them. On April 5, the Navy Command of Santa Cruz de Tenerife moved the gunboat Eulalia eight miles north of the island to warn of the presence of American ships. This order was the first measure taken by the military authorities of the region to counter a surprise naval attack on behalf of the US Navy.

On April 6, 1898, Admiral Cervera made the following reflection.

"... if our naval force were superior to that of the United States, the question would be very simple, because, closing the way would suffice, but since it is not only not superior, but very inferior, trying to close the way, that is, to present them with a naval battle with a decisive character, would be the greatest of the blunders, because it would be to seek a certain defeat, that would leave us at the mercy of the enemy, who would seize if he wanted some good position in the Canary Islands..."

In the end, the war

On April 25, 1898, after Spain rejected a U.S. ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Cuba, hostilities broke out between the two nations. The Spanish government sent reinforcement troops to the Canary Islands on the ships Montserrat, San Francisco, and Antonio López. The Captain General of the Canary Islands declared the state of war in force on the islands and suspended the constitutional guarantees. The city council of Las Palmas formed a Volunteer Battalion for the defense of Gran Canaria. On May 11, 1898, a state of war was proclaimed in Santa Cruz de Tenerife and a company of volunteers was also formed.

Antonio María Manrique, a chronicler who wrote in the newspaper Lanzarote, would later recall:

"... in the first half of 1898, everything was alarming in Lanzarote, because from moment to moment the Yankees were expected here. (...) Any enemy cruiser could besiege us all, surrendering us to hunger and thirst, trying to cut off all means of communication."

On May 1, the Americans took the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Cavite (Philippines). On July 3 they repeated with the ships of Cervera, resigned to a lost war, in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba. The "battle" thing is a saying.

On July 19, 1898, a high alert was declared in Lanzarote, an imminent invasion was expected for that same night. Volunteers were asked for help and a large number of trenches were dug. However, the North American troops did not get to step on the sand of Playa de las Cucharas or the future nudist beaches of Charco del Palo.

That same month, the president of the Spanish government, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, explained the need to capitulate in part because "the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands and the Spanish Peninsula were in danger." Although it was known that the American president Mc Kinley assured that he would not allow any landing in the Canary Islands "not even to take advantage of them as a base of operations against the Peninsula", this threat weighed on Spain during the peace negotiations that ended our, already at that time, captained empire.

As an epilogue

Did the Americans know from the beginning that they were not going to attack the Canary Islands but fed this fear to force weak Spain to distract efforts and resources that could have been employed in Cuba? What would have happened if the invasion had taken place? The Americans would have had to do with a nightmarish orography for any invading army that would have favored a possible anti-occupation guerrilla war / campaign.

Or would the Canaries have submissively accepted their new rulers? Would the Canary Islands today be a state associated (or seven) with the United States, like Puerto Rico? Would they speak Spanglish? Would they say things like "Blodel, I'm going on the bus pa' Santa Lucia a loncheal some wrinkled potatoes and a rum with honey, which tonight there is a stall in the Main Square".

Would the Canarian 'isa 'and the 'gomero whistle' have taken root in the US multicultural heritage? Would there be Guanche representation in the Columbus Day parade down New York's Fifth Avenue? Would Caco Senante sing "the delicius canarian sauce is called mouho picoun" instead of "the rich Canarian sauce is called mojo picón"? Would José Velez have been a bestseller on the 1976 Billboard with "Little Man from Canary Islands" ("Canarito") alongside "I love to love" or the "Hotel California".

Luckily, we'll never know.



With information from The War with Spain, Revista de Historia Canaria, Memoria Digital de Canarias, Casa de Colon and Wikipedia.

Header image by Agudeza Visual Creativos.

Jaime Noguera is a half-canarion and author of 'Spain: Zombie War'.

It is quite apparent that Sims was aware of what the War Board had on its collective minds and he was urging the seizure of Las Palmas and Tenerife as forward bases already fitted and supplied with the things useful for the USN to operate against the metro-Spanish waters.  

[miletus12]

Jul 17, 2022 6:29:43 GMT lordroel said:

Day 89 of the Spanish–American War, July 17th 1898

Cuba: Siege of Santiago

Spanish general Toral offers the surrender of the 12,000 men at Santiago de Cuba, the 12,000 men at Guantánamo, and six other small Spanish Army garrisons throughout Cuba. Leonard Wood, promoted to brigadier general, accepts the surrender and is named military governor of Santiago de Cuba. Land combat effectively ends in Cuba for the duration of the war.

That should be "eastern Cuba". There were not many American ground troops north of the Sierra Nuestra mountains to be fought by Spaniards. Ground combat between Banditos and Tercios still of course continued.

Jul 17, 2022 6:29:43 GMT lordroel said:

Off Nuevitas,Cuba - Commodore John A. Howell, Commander, Second Blockading Squadron, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U.S.Flagship San Francisco.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba.

July 17, 1898.

Sir:--

I have to report the following report in regard to the blockade of the north coast of the Island of Cuba:-

1. In obedience to your telegraphic order of the 9th instant forwarded to me through the Commander-in-Chief of the Key West Naval Base,I have extended the Cuban blockade through the entire northern coast of the island,as far as the number of vessel under my control will admit.

2. The vessels in question are at this date stationed as follows:-

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Gorda----Topeka and Maple.

Gibara and vicinity----Prairie.

Nuevitas and vicinity----Badger.

Cardenas2 and Matanzas----Pompey, Uncas and Hudson.

Havana,Mariel, and Bahia Honda----I left Havana on July 11,leaving Captain Ludlow of the Terror in charge there, so that I cannot give the exact distribution of the vessels in that vicinity.

3. In my opinion this distribution is not sufficient to give a thorough blockade of the coast, and if possible ships should be assigned as follows:

In vicinity of Baracoa----------------------------------1.
Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Godra-------------1.
Gibara and vicinity-------------------------------------1.
Porto Padre,Porto Malagasta and Port Manati--------1.
Nuevitas and vicinity-----------------------------------1.
Boca de Caravela and Boca de Guajaba--------------1.
From Santa Maria Cay to Frageso Cay----------------1.
From Frageso Cay to Dromedary Cay-----------------1.
From Bahia de Cadiz Cay to Piedras Cay--------------1.
Matanzas and vicinity-----------------------------------2.
Havana-------------------------------------------------10.
Mariel and vicinity---------------------------------------1.
Bahia Honda and vicinity--------------------------------1.
Pass of Jutlas to Pass of Buena Vista-------------------1.
Pass of Buena Vista to Cape San Antonio--------------1.

Total--------------------------------------------------27.

4. Of the vessels off Havana four should have a draft of not more than ten feet,if possible, two or more should be heavy ships, and the remainder should be vessels of good speed. All present efforts seem to be towards running the blockade at this port by creeping along the shore, especially from westward, and small, light draft vessels are necessary to detect and stop this, while some ships of higher speed should be on hand to take up the chase. The heavy ships should be kept there because of the moral effect, to serve as a rallying point for the lighter ships, to run under the batteries, to destroy blockade runners if necessary, and to respond to the fire of the batteries if desired.

5. At least six small vessels of not more than six feet draft and of considerable size, similar to those used on the rivers during our civil war, should be kept inside the keys between Cardenas and Nuevitas, and two or three more inside the keys to the westward of Bahia Honda.

6. I find that ships can be on their stations for a really greater length of time if they are able to go into Key West or some other port where they can get water for their boilers about once in three weeks, than they can if coaled inside the Keys, and I am in favor of that method of coaling and watering wherever it is possible. The better condition of the machinery resulting from the use of fresh water in the boilers makes the ships more serviceable where this method can be followed. To do this would of course call for about a third more ships than those actually on station, so that they could be relieved in turn.

7. Thus a force of forty ships and twelve of the craft for work inside the keys would make a complete and perfect blockade possible, keeping twenty-seven ships on station all the time.

8. Realizing that probably this number of vessels cannot be sent to the duty and that some parts of the coast will therefore probably have to be neglected, I have to recommend as specialy worthy of care the following:-

--Havana and vicinity, including Mariel and Bahia Honda.
--Cardenas to Nuevitas,
--Nuevitas to Porto Tanano. The importance of this last section will be very largely diminished after the conquest of the Province of Santiago, and the blockade could probably be discontinued there before very long.

9. Assuming that the main object of the blockade is to facilitate the fall of Havana by preventing the ingress of stores into that city, there are two sections of the north coast to be considered. Blockade running at Bahia Honda and Mariel can be easily prevented, especially as lack of railroad connections with Havana makes the transportation of stores from these points difficult. Havana itself is easily closed if only ten vessels of proper description can be kept there. Two ships at Matanzas will fully close that port. Thus; the ships in hand can easily guard this first section.

10. The section section, from Piedras City Cay to Nuevitas is much more difficult to handle, and at present is the principal source of supplies to Havana. According to our best information there is rail connection to the eastward from Havana as far as San Juan de los Raemedios. Cargo landed anywhere inside these keys can be readily transshipped by boat and rail to Havana, and my reports show that much of this traffic has been going on. I have as yet been able to do nothing to stop it, from lack of ships, but I will give my attention to the matter as soon as possible. It is here that the very light draft vessels are needed, and this matter is of prime importance if the supply of provisions to Havana is to be stopped. Nuevitas should be blockaded for the same reason.

11. I do not fear that supplies introduced to the eastward of Nuevitas or to the westward of Bahia Honda, on the north coast, can be gotten into Havana.

12. While off Port Nipe I communicated with some Cuban insurgents at Port Banes. There were about twenty-five of them there, and no Spaniards, but they reported about one thousand Spanish troops at Port Nipe. There is a small gunboat at Nipe, but I could not find out whether there were any batteries of not. Apparently there was one, but it would not open fire, although the Topeka stood in close enough to exchange shots with the gunboat but without effect.

13. I have endeavored to find some ports of refuge to be used in case of hurricanes, especially for the smaller craft. Port Banes is available for the small vessels, but that is the only one I have been able to find. There seems to be absolutely nothing of the sort in the vicinity of Havana.

14. The Cubans at Banes offer to furnish pilots to take vessels into that port, and I have directed the Commanding Officer of the Topeka ascertain whether that port is available for larger vessels, and whether it is possible to coal there from a collier.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) J. A. Howell,

Commodore, U.S.Navy,

Commanding North Cuba Blockade.

To be blunt... CMMDR Howell may have been great when it came to designing flywheel powered torpedoes, but he knew Jack-Diddly about how to blockade his assigned areas. See MAP. 

The area in red is Banes Cuba and its hinterland. The area in yellow is what has passed into Bandito control after the US victory at Santiago de Cuba.  Now look...

  
The only viable Spanish controlled supply route to Havana, where most of the Spaniards are, is from Cienfuegos, passing supplies along the patrolled railroad. That port access can be blocked off as soon as Sampson posts a few cruisers in the Gulf of Batabano between Juventud Island and the Zapato Peninsula and a few cruisers off Cienfuegos proper. Jamaica sourced blockade runners have nowhere else they can land that is not US controlled now. The coastwise traffic along the Archipelago de Camagüey in the north, which is supplied from the Bahamas, can be intercepted from the Bahamas by a cruiser patrol line in the Old Bahama Channel. What leaks through Cuba to Cuba along the coast is a Bandito problem, that they can handle and should.      

[miletus12]

Jul 18, 2022 2:51:19 GMT lordroel said:

Day 90 of the Spanish–American War, July 18th 1898

Cuba: Third Battle of Manzanillo

At 07:00am, the gunboats USS Wilmington, USS Helena, auxiliary cruisers USS Hist, USS Scorpion and armed tugboats USS Osceola and USS Wompatuck enter the harbor at Manzanillo, Cuba, having rendezvoused at Guayabal the night before. Just four minutes later the battle began when Spanish shore batteries noticed the approaching Americans and began firing at them, although they scored no hits. Some fifteen minutes later, the Scorpion and Osceola replied by opening fire on the shore batteries, although they likewise were unable to score any hits. At 07:50am, the Americans sighted the three Spanish transports lying at anchor, these being the El Gloria, Jose Garcia and El Purísima Concepción. El Gloria and Jose Garcia were merchant steamers used for transporting troops while the El Purísima Concepción was a blockade runner. All three vessels were destroyed over a two and a half hour period by the Americans, who were careful to remain out of the range of the Spanish batteries.

Upon seeing the plight of their fellow vessels, several Spanish gunboats set sail and moved to repulse the American warships, however they found themselves being repulsed and forced to retreat further inside the harbor due to being outgunned. Hist, Hornet, and Wompatuck pursued the gunboats to their moorings and engaged them. The American vessels continued their advance into the harbor, but they soon ran into issues with the shallow depth of Manzanillo's bay, forcing them to reconnoiter passages so that the deeper-drafted gunboats, the Wilmington and the Helena, would not beach themselves accidentally. Advancing upon the Spanish positions, Todd realised that his forces were focusing too much of their fire upon transports taking refuge in the harbor alongside the immobile pontoon present, the hulk and storeship Maria, and ordered the Helena to switch to targeting the cornered gunboats instead of assisting the Willmington with finishing the transports and pontoon off.

With the transports and pontoons destroyed, all the American efforts were switched to finishing off the badly damaged gunboats. One by one, the four gunboats were finished off, with three being destroyed, one being sunk and another beaching itself before sinking later. At 10:22am, just three hours after initiating the engagement, Todd gave the order to withdraw from the harbor. On their way out, much as they had done on their way in, they made sure to keep out of the range of the Spanish batteries, who had helplessly watched the battle unfold.

Battle.

The American commander split his force into three sections so as to prevent any Spanish forces from escaping the harbor. The two gunboats Wilmington and Helena entered via a channel on the northern side of the bay attacking from the left, Osceola and Scorpion attacked from a channel directly opposite the city, and the other three American vessels moved in from the right through one of the bays southern channels. All three of the American squadrons timed their passages through the channels to enter the bay concurrently. At 7:04 the battle began when Spanish batteries in the city sighted the Americans and opened fire, some 15 minutes later Scorpion and Osceola replied by attacking the shore batteries. As soon as they were in range Wilmington and Helena began attacking the merchant steamers El Gloria and Jose Garcia as well as the blockade runner El Purísima Concepción. Several of the Spanish gunboats in the harbor sailed out to challenge the American fleet but were repulsed by heavy fire. Hist, Hornet, and Wompatuck pursued the gunboats to their moorings and engaged them.

The American vessels continued to advance on the harbor but were hampered because of the shallow depth of Manzillio's bay forcing them to reconnoiter passages so that the deeper drafted gunboats would not beach themselves. Advancing upon the Spanish positions, Commander Todd realized that his forces were focusing to much of their fire upon transports taking refuge in the harbor as well as the hulk Maria which had been converted to an armed immobile pontoon, he ordered the Helena to engage the more dangerous gunboats instead of assisting the Wilmington in engaging the targets of lesser importance. Helena then changed targets and began to systematically engage the Spanish gunboats. Three of these caught fire and exploded while one grounded on the beach and sunk while another grounded and was thought to have been disabled, she was later scuttled. By the end of the battle the entire Spanish flotilla at Manzanillo had been destroyed or disabled. At 10:22 Todd gave the order for the American forces to withdraw and had the Helena lay down suppressing fire while the rest of the squadron sailed out of the harbor.

One can see the American commander's problems. That is a big shallow shelf of a bay with many terrain features the Spanish defenders can exploit.    

Jul 18, 2022 2:51:19 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

LETTER

NAVAL WAR BOARD,

Washington, July 18, 1898.

Memorandum for the Naval War Board.

Assuming that the Spanish force in the ports of Spain ought to be considered as more than a match for Watson’s two battleships; and that if another armored ship were added to his squadron, the said Spanish force, when properly handled, must be considered as able to inflict serious damage upon the squadron thus augmented; a plan of campaign in which the covering squadron figures is, of course, the ideal one; because this plan provides against all the contingencies that can be reasonably imagined to occur. Therefore, the only valid reason for advocating the omission of the covering squadron from our plans would be, because it was thought that Watson with three armored ships would certainly, without material damage, be able to beat off the strongest force that the enemy could at the time concentrate against him. And this view would rest upon two principal assumptions :

1st. The inherent superiority of our ships and their personnel, as compared with the Spaniards.

2nd. The comparative speed with which our three armored ships would pass these xxxxxxx regions, within which it is reasonable to expect that a Spanish attack might be delivered.

It will thus be seen that the advocates of the single squadron do not base their opinion upon any of the absolute rules of war, but upon their professional judgment as to the condition of affairs, the correctness of which depends entirely upon the correctness of their said judgment, which, of course, might possibly be at fault, in one or more respects.

While the plan of sending the three ships is not the safer, or the more correct one; I feel personally so satisfied of the inferiority of our enemy, in the matter of ships and men, as demonstrated in the late operations against him, that I am willing to assume that the risk of passing Watson’s squadron through the Straits, and through the enemy’s waters, is not one which need be seriously regarded by the Department in considering its plans; though I wish distinctly to admit that it is not the ideal campaign, as is the first one above mentioned.

M. SICARD,

I concur in the above statement,

A.S.CROWNINSHIELD.

Someone got into the liquor cabinet again (Long?). I am glad Sicard and Crowninshield squelched it.