The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

[lordroel]

Day 91 of the Spanish–American War, July 19th 1898

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron

TELEGRAM

Washington, July 19, 1898.

Dewey,

Care American Consul,

Hong Kong.

Avoid military occupation of the Caroline Islands or military interference with them (1).

LONG.

Footnote 2: This order was intended to prevent a possible conflict with German interests in the Pacific. As early as 14 May, the German Ambassador in England, Melchior Hubert Paul Gustav Graf von Hatzfeldt zu Trachenberg, approached the American Ambassador, John Hay, to discuss the possibility of Germany receiving a coaling station in the Philippines or a share of the Caroline Islands once the war was settled. Capturing any of the Carolina Islands might have further complicated peace negotiations with Spain and escalated tensions with Germany. Trask, War with Spain, 378. Moreover, as seen in a note from Sicard to Dewey on 31 July 1898, the War Board was concerned about the United States acquiring too many naval/coaling stations in the Pacific, where the American Navy was too weak to control them.

Day 92 of the Spanish–American War, July 20th 1898

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba - Major General Nelson A. Miles To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

Playa de Este, via Hayti - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

TELEGRAM

Playa de Este, via Hayti,

July 20, 1898.

All Camara’s squadron is proceeding westward. I respectfully urge that instead of sending two squadrons to the east, one to follow Camara and the other to escort Watson through the Straits of Gibraltar, that his squadron be increased by the addition of the “New York” or the “Brooklyn”, preferably the former, also the “Mayflower” and the “New Orleans”, if the ammunition for the last is now on its way to Guantanamo. Watson prefers this increase to his squadron instead, if he could not be escorted by the second squadron.

SAMPSON.

Headquarters of the Army,

On board U. S. S. Yale,

Guantanamo Bay, [Cuba]

July 20, 1898.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated July 19th, and to apprise you of the fact that there are now ten transports in this harbor and Daiquiri and Santiago ready to proceed immediately to Porto Rico. They are loaded with troops and munitions of war. The horses are suffering from close confinement on the transports, the men subjected to much discomfort, and I think it advisable to proceed immediately.

In addition to this there are transports loaded with troops and war material now en route from Tampa, Charleston, New York and possibly other points, whose destination is Porto Rico, some going there direct, and I think it highly important that there should be ample naval force at Pt. Fajardo, Cape de San Juan.1 I would also suggest the importance of keeping naval vessels at seaports from which Spanish gunboats might emerge and capture or destroy the transports en route; and I respectfully request that you give the necessary assistance for the landing of troops from all the transports and maintaining their landing on the Island of Porto Rico.

Very respectfully,

Nelson A. Miles

Major General Commanding U. S. Army.

[miletus12]

Jul 19, 2022 2:57:10 GMT lordroel said:

Day 91 of the Spanish–American War, July 19th 1898

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron

TELEGRAM

Washington, July 19, 1898.

Dewey,

Care American Consul,

Hong Kong.

Avoid military occupation of the Caroline Islands or military interference with them (1).

LONG.

Footnote 1: United States Consul at Hong Kong Rounsevelle Wildman.

Footnote 2: This order was intended to prevent a possible conflict with German interests in the Pacific. As early as 14 May, the German Ambassador in England, Melchior Hubert Paul Gustav Graf von Hatzfeldt zu Trachenberg, approached the American Ambassador, John Hay, to discuss the possibility of Germany receiving a coaling station in the Philippines or a share of the Caroline Islands once the war was settled. Capturing any of the Carolina Islands might have further complicated peace negotiations with Spain and escalated tensions with Germany. Trask, War with Spain, 378. Moreover, as seen in a note from Sicard to Dewey on 31 July 1898, the War Board was concerned about the United States acquiring too many naval/coaling stations in the Pacific, where the American Navy was too weak to control them. See: Sicard to Dewey on 31 July 1898.

Now that is interesting.

Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, To Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron

[Washington, D.C., July 31, 1898]

Please propose by telegraph a naval station for the United States to hold in the Philippine Islands after peace is made, remembering that a port in the northern part of the group would be preferable on account of temperature and nearness to Chinese coast.1 A small island having a good harbor, seems desirable, but Department is uncertain, and desires you to propose such small island, and as an alternative a good port on one of the large islands surrounded by moderate area of land, and sufficient laborers in vicinity to meet coaling and other needs. Department also expects to take a Spanish island for a naval station between Hawaii and China. Would you recommend Guam or some other. The Caroline Group must be excluded.2

This was not sent

M S.

Source Note: ALS, DLC-MSS, PGD. At top of page in the right-hand corner: “Dewey about last of July 98/MS/1898.” As the sign-off suggests, RAdm. Montgomery Sicard’s note was not sent to RAdm. George Dewey.

Footnote 1: The Naval War Board discussed the possibility of obtaining a coaling facility for the Asiatic Station in the Philippines, but never entertained acquiring the entire archipelago, or even part of it. By August the determination changed. For more information on this policy, see: Sicard to Long, 13 August 1898; and for the acquisition of the Philippines, see: Blockade and Siege of Manila.

Footnote 2: Guam surrendered on 20 June. See: Capture of Guam.

Montgomery Sicard was the senior office on the War Board and as such he often overruled Alfred Mahan and Arent Crowninshield. He was a "practical" man who wanted to avoid more war than the United States could chew at one time. 

One curious thing about our admiral... (You have seen this item before... M.)

ADMIRAL SICARD TOO ILL TO LEAVE KEY WEST.

Captain Taylor of the Massachusetts May Take Command of the Squadron. WASHINGTON, Feb. 23.— The noon mail brought to Secretary Long a letter from Admiral Sicard at Key West. The admiral wrote that he had not yet recovered his health, and would be unable to go to sea with the squadron. He will remain on shore at his hotel in Key West to retain command of the squadron from that place so long as it remains in harbor there, relinquishing it only when it becomes necessary for the vessels to go to sea. It will be remembered that the admiral has suffered an attack of malarial fever and had procured leave of absence of two weeks just before the explosion on the Maine. He got as far as Tampa, but returned immediately to his command, which for only one day he had left in the hands of Captain Sampson. Should the squadron be obliged to go to sea with the admiral ill at Key West, and the senior officer of his fleet, Captain Sampson, engaged in the investigation at Havana, probably the command of the squadron would devolve upon Captain Taylor, now commanding the battleship Massachusetts, and commonly regarded as one of the brightest officers in the service.

Malaria? It so happens that our good admiral was talking to imaginary people and holding discussions with plants at the time CAPT Sampson was bumped up to CMMDR to go on to screw up the naval war in Cuban waters. 

How did Sicard get that way originally?

USS Saginaw

This year, 2020, marks the 150th anniversary of the wreck and rescue of the USS Saginaw.

USS Saginaw launched in 1859 and saw service in various locations in the Pacific including China, Japan, Mexico, Central America, and Alaska before its famous fate.

In October 1870 Saginaw completed a dredging operation at Midway Atoll. Intending to look for shipwrecked sailors on Kure Atoll, Saginaw instead struck a reef there and the ship grounded and was broken apart by the surf. Luckily, the crew was able to offload the gear and provisions onto the atoll before the ship was destroyed.

On 18 November, after three weeks on Kure Atoll, five men set out to reach Honolulu, nearly 1,400 miles away, in a small gig boat to save their crewmates. After one month, breakers capsized the boat near Kauai and only one man survived. He made it to Kauai where the captain of the schooner Wainona took him to Honolulu and then the US Consulate, on 24 December 1870. The Consulate sent a sailing coaster Kona Packet and the King of Hawaii sent a steamer, Kilauea, on rescue missions. They reached Kure Atoll nine days later, on 4 and 5 January, respectively, and rescued the crew. After a brief stop on Midway Island to recoal, the two ships sailed back to Honolulu, arriving 14 January.

The Saginaw's gig boat survived being capsized in the breakers, and is part of the collection at the Castle Museum of Saginaw County in Saginaw, Michigan. The wreckage of USS Saginaw is under the jurisdiction of Naval History and Heritage Command.

The captain, who wrecked the USS Saginaw, was Montgomery Sicard.  It is my belief that he went "island happy" and never quite recovered as he suffered these bouts of "malaria".

=====================================================

As a consequence of these mistakes, and they were disastrous mistakes in maritime strategy and policy, we will see this...



Those were the wrong ships in Truk lagoon.

=================================================================

Jul 19, 2022 2:57:10 GMT lordroel said:

Day 92 of the Spanish–American War, July 20th 1898

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba - Major General Nelson A. Miles To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

Playa de Este, via Hayti - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

TELEGRAM

Playa de Este, via Hayti,

July 20, 1898.

All Camara’s squadron is proceeding westward. I respectfully urge that instead of sending two squadrons to the east, one to follow Camara and the other to escort Watson through the Straits of Gibraltar, that his squadron be increased by the addition of the “New York” or the “Brooklyn”, preferably the former, also the “Mayflower” and the “New Orleans”, if the ammunition for the last is now on its way to Guantanamo. Watson prefers this increase to his squadron instead, if he could not be escorted by the second squadron.

SAMPSON.

Notice that Sampson wants to get rid of Schley and will send him to Watson, thus fumble-dorking that command up as a consequence as Schley has date of rank on Watson (As he ironically had on Sampson until Long and McKinley inexplicably promoted that wretch above his Peter Principle limits. M.)

Now what does General Nelson Miles, who is on scene and still sorting out the mess Shafter and Sampson created at Santiago de Cuba, think about this situation and suggestion?

Jul 19, 2022 2:57:10 GMT lordroel said:

Headquarters of the Army,

On board U. S. S. Yale,

Guantanamo Bay, [Cuba]

July 20, 1898.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated July 19th, and to apprise you of the fact that there are now ten transports in this harbor and Daiquiri and Santiago ready to proceed immediately to Porto Rico. They are loaded with troops and munitions of war. The horses are suffering from close confinement on the transports, the men subjected to much discomfort, and I think it advisable to proceed immediately.

In addition to this there are transports loaded with troops and war material now en route from Tampa, Charleston, New York and possibly other points, whose destination is Porto Rico, some going there direct, and I think it highly important that there should be ample naval force at Pt. Fajardo, Cape de San Juan.1 I would also suggest the importance of keeping naval vessels at seaports from which Spanish gunboats might emerge and capture or destroy the transports en route; and I respectfully request that you give the necessary assistance for the landing of troops from all the transports and maintaining their landing on the Island of Porto Rico.

Very respectfully,

Nelson A. Miles

Major General Commanding U. S. Army.

General Miles has just told Sampson, Long, the Navy War Board, and anybody else who is involved in the Watson Expedition planning that it is no longer operative or even conjunctural. Target Number Two, Puerto Rico, is the next operation in play and that is the one the navy will undertake... period.

==========================================================================      

Was that good war planning at this point? I happen to think Puerto Rico could have been handled with light forces which did not forestall a fairly safe Canary Islands operation that could have been laid on (The Sims option. M.) if the Spanish had dragged the war out.  The Pacific war, at that present, was "touch and go" with too many Germans inside Manila Bay, the clever Filipino nationalists having not yet balkanized themselves into futility because of Aguinaldo's paranoia and factionalism, and with the various (Japanese, French, British) foreign meddlers stirring up the pot in the Philippine Islands. I personally would have preferred in that time and place to have made a deal for a lease right to Subic Bay and let the Philippine Republic sort itself out as history intended.  My interests would have been to go after the Bismarck Archipelago, the islands of Micronesia and especially the Mariannas Islands. Small, manageable, defendable, and inoffensive (at the time) step places along the trade route to China, would have been my preference. Sicard was correct about biting off more than could be chewed, but he was wrong, at that date, about the geography and the effort necessary to take and hold those places. 

How wrong?

       
   
That wrong. 

Or in numbers... 

11 aircraft carriers (10 American)
5 battleships (1 American + 4 repaired and returned to service)
25 cruisers (19 American)
84 destroyers and destroyer escorts (53 American)
63 submarines (49 American)
8000+ aircraft (~7,000 American)
4,000,000+ dead (1937–1945) (175,000 American)
Civilian deaths

26,000,000+ (1937–1945)
(About 1,000,000 Filipinos^1)
(About 1,000,000 Indonesians^2)
(About 1,000,000 Malays^3)
(About 1,000,000 Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians^4) 
(About 1,000,000 Burmese^5) 
(About 14,000,000 to 22,000,000 million Chinese^6).

^1. The postwar census puts a lower bound of 500,000 criminally murdered, but one must account for massacres and Japanese atrocities in such incidents as the Battle of Manila 1944 that escaped statistical accounting in the census, so I believe it was closer to Russian casualty levels of horror as the Filipino government concluded or about 1 in 10 murdered.
^2 Nobody knows how many slave laborers were murdered to make the submarine pens dug into the side of the Rabaul volcano. In similar situations, unlike the Germans, the Japanese kept sloppy records about their slave labor programs. The number of war criminals who escaped justice because of this sloppy record keeping, among other reasons, probably includes every wretch who wore a chrysanthemum on his shoulder boards. That includes the war criminal Hirohito. 
^3. Malays are a guesstimate. The British never did a postwar tally. It is like the great famine of 1944 in India. Incompetence and maladministration resulted in a "sweep it under the rug, footnote" in history. A proper census was never conducted, what with the postwar Malay natural inclination to throw the British out.    
^4 The French did try to conduct a census, but there was the Indochina War...
^5 British again.
 ^6 Guesstimate. The Chinese were not in control of half of their population and referring to ^2, the Japanese kept sloppy records as do the Chinese NOW.
  
That was worse than Europe, material wise, for the Americans. For the Japanese who were on the wrong end of a 2 to 1 Japanese / American exchange ratio in material and a 6 to 1 human casualty ratio it was simply awful. 

But for the victims of that huge 1898 miscalculation, especially the criminally murdered civilians of China, the Philippine Islands, Indonesia, the misruled parts of Asia held by Britain and France at the time, one wonders what the presence of Americans at Rabaul and at Chuuk (Truk) would have meant for a different history?      
 
It could not have been as horrible as the one that happened.
 

[miletus12]

Filler material for this date... The SPY WAR.

Americans did not have a reputation for espionage?

Spies during the Spanish-American War

American intelligence agents infiltrated a Spanish spy ring operating in Montreal during the Spanish-American War.
By Peter Kross

By the end of the 19th century, the United States had grown into one of the major players on the international stage. Americans had tamed a continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the mighty industrial engine of the country was making the nation increasingly self-sufficient and self-confident as it looked across the oceans toward the rest of the world.

In 1898 the United States rushed into war with Spain, which leaders in Washington saw as continuing to interfere in Cuba and other parts of Latin America. In hindsight, the Spanish-American War might have been avoided except for the jingoistic American press, which was clamoring for hostilities to start in the wake of the mysterious sinking of the USS Maine in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, an event that is still being debated today. (Most experts believe the ship was the victim of a boiler-room explosion, not deliberate Spanish sabotage.)

The war with Spain was fought on two different fronts. American troops gathered in convoys off the coast of Florida and stormed the beaches of Cuba, inflicting and taking casualties from Spanish troops as well as from indigenous tropical diseases that felled many more American troops than enemy bullets. In the Pacific theater, the U.S. Navy under Admiral George Dewey decisively bested the Spanish fleet near the Philippine Islands. They were aided by agents of the Office of Naval Intelligence who supplied the Navy with important information on Spanish maneuvers.

As the opposing armies and navies battled with conventional forces, Spain began a covert espionage operation in Montreal, Canada, in an effort to undermine American war efforts. Before the war was over and the ring was eventually shut down, the United States Secret Service would penetrate the operation, conduct “black bag” jobs against the Spanish in Montreal, spy on innocent American citizens, and write forged letters—purportedly authored by Spanish agents—whose sole aim was to create a war cry within the United States.

John Wilkie Takes on the Spy Ring

The man who would take on the job of investigating the Spaniards’ Montreal spy ring was John Elbert Wilkie, chief of the American Secret Service. Wilkie, born in Elgin, Illinois, in 1860, began his professional career as a police reporter and business columnist for the Chicago Tribune. After joining the Treasury Department, Wilkie’s first job was to stop a large counterfeiting ring that was changing $1 bills into $100 bills. In the wake of the scandal, the U.S. government was forced to recall all the bills then in circulation. Wilkie worked closely with a Pittsburgh man named William Burns to run a very convincing sting operation that was right out a Hollywood script. In time, they were able to arrest the entire forgery gang.

In the wake of Wilkie’s success in breaking up the counterfeiting ring, Treasury Secretary Lyman Gage promoted him from an ordinary agent making $7 per day to the chief of the Secret Service with a salary of $3,500 per year. With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Wilkie was tasked with the job of investigating Spanish covert actions in Montreal. The Spaniard at the center of the Montreal spy ring was Ramon de Carranza, a lieutenant in the Spanish Navy. When the war broke out, Carranza was assigned to the Spanish embassy in Washington, D.C., where he served as a naval attaché. Then and later, most nations assigned naval attachés as a cover for their true profession—that of spy. Carranza relished his new position as an undercover operative and took on the Montreal assignment with near-religious zeal.

Carranza’s Network of Assets

Carranza had a large number of assets he could use inside the United States, drawing on the immigrant Spanish communities in such cities as Tampa, Key West, New Orleans, and Mobile. The Secret Service received a report that pro-Spanish activists in those cities had obtained money to purchase a gunboat for Spain, as well as to carry out reconnaissance work targeting American naval facilities along the Atlantic coast. Secret Service operatives in the field also received information that Spanish spies had been seen as far west as San Francisco, scouting military facilities in the Bay Area. The intelligence service confirmed reports that the minister of the Spanish admiralty, Segismundo Bermejo, had given the order to destroy American naval facilities on both coasts.

Wilkie’s men knew the Spanish were up to no good when, only a few days before war was declared, the Spanish ambassador to Washington, Luis Polo y Bernabe, packed up and left abruptly for a presumably safer haven in Montreal, away from the prying eyes of American agents. Unbeknownst to him, U.S. Secret Service personnel were already watching closely as the ambassador and his entourage arrived in Montreal.

Montreal seemed like a perfect place to establish an elaborate espionage network. The city had a first-class rail system that allowed easy access into and out of town, and it also offered unrestricted ocean access across the Atlantic to Europe. In addition, the Spanish had a long-standing consulate-general office in Montreal from which they could conduct illegal affairs without unwanted interference from the scrupulously neutral Canadian government.

Carranza Places his Agents

After getting settled in the city, Carranza moved his headquarters to the Windsor Hotel, where he thought he would have a safe place to pursue his covert actions. He was unaware that a number of American Secret Service agents, as well as a few inquiring reporters, were also in residence at the Windsor and were literally tripping over each other in the halls.

To mislead the Americans, Carranza and a number of other high Spanish officials left Montreal, supposedly on their way to Liverpool, England. As their ship headed down the St. Lawrence River, however, a few men, including Carranza, got off the vessel and made their way back to Montreal. Carranza set up his new base of operations at a house on Tupper Street. Carranza was justifiably upset when inquiring Canadian newspaper reporters publicized his return to Montreal. Another person who saw Carranza at his Tupper Street address was an American Secret Service agent known only as “Tracer.”

Two Agents Captured

American intelligence agents infiltrated a Spanish spy ring operating in Montreal during the Spanish-American War.


John Elbert Wilkie.

The first undercover agent that Carranza sent to the United States for espionage purposes was an English immigrant named George Downing. Downing had previously served aboard the USS Brooklyn as a petty officer, but his true allegiance rested with the Spanish. When Carranza was giving Downing his orders, he did not know that an American agent was in the next room, listening to every word that was spoken. When Downing arrived in the United States, he was immediately arrested while sending a letter to his superiors concerning American naval strength. Downing was later found dead in his cell. When Carranza heard of Downing’s demise, he surmised that the agent “had hanged himself—or else they did it for him.”

In an effort to place spies within the American military, Carranza used the services of Frank Arthur Mellor, who was sent to him by a detective agency in Canada. Mellor, who came from Kingston, Ontario, convinced two men from his hometown to spy for Spain. This attempt at localized recruitment did not work out well. His first recruit, a man named Atkins, was supposed to head to San Francisco, join the U.S. Navy, and report back to Mellor on what he observed. Before Atkins could head across the border, however, he changed his mind and made his way to the U.S. consul general’s office in Kingston, where he told his improbable tale. When Mellor found out what Atkins had done, he beat him to a pulp. To avoid any other incidents, Atkins promptly boarded a ship bound for England.

Not to be dissuaded, Mellor tried to enlist himself at the American army base in Tampa, where troops were preparing to embark for Cuba. The Army refused to allow him to enlist, but Mellor, watching the disposition of troops and ships, sent messages by post to Carranza in Canada. Members of the British intelligence service operating in Canada alerted Wilkie to Mellor’s activities. They gave the Secret Service the phony name that Mellor was using, and more importantly, the number of the post office box where he sent his superiors his secret messages. American postal officials were able to seize one of the letters before it reached Carranza. With the incriminating evidence in hand, American authorities arrested Mellor. Like Downing, Mellor died in jail—supposedly of typhoid fever.

A Black Bag Job

To get the goods on Carranza, Wilkie’s men undertook a so-called black bag job targeting Carranza’s residence. The action was an illegal break-in, much like the Watergate affair 75 years later. On May 27, 1898, U.S. agents entered Carranza’s home at 42 Tupper Street while the Spaniard was out having breakfast. They took from his desk a letter supposedly written by Carranza to his cousin, Admiral J.B. Ymay. The letter was sent to Wilkie in Washington via a courier who took it as far as Vermont. One week after receiving the letter, Wilkie gave it to the New York Herald, while other copies were sent to the U.S. State Department and the British government.

Upon seeing the letter in print, Carranza immediately charged that its contents had been forged. Carranza was subsequently arrested and in turn sued Joseph Kellert, chief of the Metropolitan Detective Agency in Montreal, for false arrest. He accused Kellert of stealing the letter. The Carranza letter caused a large diplomatic stir involving Canada, Great Britain, the United States, and Spain. The letter was shown to the British ambassador in the United States, Sir Julian Paucefote, who in turn sent it to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain. All this took place amid legal haggling over whether or not to deport Carranza from Canada.

Ambassador Paucefote met with Wilkie along with another man named Calderon Carlisle, who was a legal adviser to the British embassy in Washington. Carlisle, who was fluent in Spanish, verified the authenticity of the letter. But the matter was far from over. On June 11, the governor-general of Canada, Lord Aberdeen, officially asked the Spanish government to recall Carranza to Spain. The Spanish government refused to go along with the request, saying that Carranza was an innocent victim of an American-Canadian plot. In the end, Carranza, as well as Captain Juan Du Bose, who had served as the chief attaché at Spain’s Washington embassy, quietly returned home.

A Nation Embarrassment and a Blueprint for Covert Affairs

In 1899, a year after the end of the Spanish-American War, the final chapter to the Carranza letter was finally revealed. It proved to be a huge embarrassment to both Wilkie and the Secret Service. The Montreal Star wrote an article on the activities of one George Bell, a Canadian citizen who made an incredible allegation. Bell said that he had broken into Carranza’s Tupper Street residence, stolen the letter, and given it to Wilkie. Bell said that Wilkie had used a forger to falsify the letter. Bell said he was telling his story because Wilkie had failed to pay him the full amount owed, giving him only $50 of the $1,000 he had promised to deliver.

The newspaper published both versions of the letters. The American press soon picked up the Montreal Star’s version; reaction was swift. Soon there was another unexpected twist. Ralph Redfern, who was employed by the Secret Service in its Boston office, said that he, not Bell, had pilfered the letter from Carranza’s residence. Redfern claimed the original letter, proving American allegations, was on file at Secret Service headquarters, but over the years it mysteriously disappeared.

In the wake of the Carranza affair, Wilkie and the Secret Service took a hit in the press for the way the agents had conducted themselves at the time of the Tupper Street break-in. The Secret Service was damaged even more when its agents failed to protect President William McKinley from an assassin’s bullet on September 6, 1901, at the hands of anarchist Leon Czolgosz while the president was attending a trade show in Buffalo, New York. The Montreal spy case was promptly forgotten, but over the years it would become apparent that the resourceful Wilkie had set the blueprint by which American intelligence agents would function, at home and abroad, in the modern age.

Two lessons can be learned. Never trust a hired foreign national to commit your burglaries, and make sure your captured spies are due processed or you will have your illegal secret tortures, interrogations and murders revealed to the world in the popular press.

In the first case, your own people will not sell you out. In the second case, a by the book legal approach will yield the same exact information you want from the wretches you capture through ordinary police investigative techniques, and you will not look like or be the criminal scum of the earth that you are for your own reprehensible criminal conduct.

The third lesson of never trusting the British^1 to keep your secrets secret when they can seize an own ephemeral advantage is forever obvious.

^1 or anyone... 

=========================================================

The Philippine Diary Project

20 July 1898; by James J. LoughreyJuly 20, 1898 (1st California Volunteers)

July 20, 1898
Sick call at 7 am. A native kid cut off his finger; none of his colleagues passed any remarks on it. 3rd Battalion together with Utah Battery and Colorado Regiment arrived, with four guns to each battery. There are now about 7,000 troops in the camp.

Merritt has 7,000 troops on hand near Manila. The situation can be best described as "extremely perilous" as there are at least 20,000 Filipinos and about 15,000 Spaniards nearby fighting each other. The Americans are hunkered down and laying low for the moment.

20 July 1898 John Henry Davenport.

Diary of John Henry Asendorf
Wednesday, July 20th, 1898

The weather is as pretty as ever. All night we listened to the cannonading and musketing of the Spanish and insurgents because they always fight at night. The natives say it is too hot to fight in the daytime. Today a British vessel came into the bay loaded with fresh meat and vegetables. We are all getting impatient to get ashore because we are tired of being kept like prisoners. Three men are sick, the rest are well. Most of us sleep on deck again.

10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiment, John Henry Asendorf, Manila, S.S. Zealandia

and...

Diary of Miguel Saderra Maso Miércoles 20 de Julio 1898

It is known in Manila with absolute certainty, although it is not public, that Camara’s squadron has received an order to return to Spain. (…) Since the day before yesterday, the “Boston” has been moored next to Parañaque, protecting the landing and encampment of Yankee troops on that beach. It is to be feared that they prepare a formal attack from that side.

Manila, Manuel de la Cámara y Libermoore, Parañaque, Society of Jesus,

See MAP...



Camp McKinley is where Paranaqua is.

If one picture can save a thousand words. Two pictures compared can save a MILLION.



Daquiri, Cuba.



Paranque, Manila Bay.

Notice the horses and artillery? Notice the ordered camp?

One gets the 'distinct impression' that west of the Mississippi (The Western Department), those army folks know how to conduct operations and a war.

[lordroel]

Day 93 of the Spanish–American War, July 21st 1898

Cuba: Battle of Nipe Bay

Nipe Bay had been designated as a rendezvous point for American naval forces delegated to attack Puerto Rico. Upon finding the harbor still occupied by Spanish forces, the American squadron, consisting of the gunboats USS Annapolis and USS Topeka, the armed tug USS Leyden and the armed yacht USS Wasp, maneuvered through a minefield to engage the Spanish forces. Spanish sloop-of-war Jorge Juan opened fire on Wasp and Leyden, but they quickly sank her with help from Annapolis. While the other three ships were engaging Jorge Juan, Topeka silenced the harbor forts and fired on other Spanish works in the harbor.

Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, the Spanish sailed the small gunboat Baracoa upriver and scuttled her to prevent her capture by the superior American force. Just as the fighting came to an end, U.S. Navy personnel boarded Jorge Juan's sinking hulk, stripping several items from it as trophies. One such trophy was the Jorge Juan's battle-flag, which was taken by one of the sailors from Annapolis

Puerto Rico

A convoy of 3,300 soldiers under the command of General Miles in nine transports escorted by the USS Massachusetts sail for Puerto Rico from Guantánamo, Cuba.

Off Gibara, Cuba - Commander Charles J. Train To Commodore John A. Howell, Commander, First Blockading Squadron

U. S. S. “PRAIRIE”.

Off Gibara, Cuba, July 21, 1898.

Sir;-

I have the honor to inform you that I have this morning received a visit from Mr. Jose Homobono Beola, the Vice Consul of the United States at this port until the declaration of war. He brought with him his appointment to identify him.

2. He informed me that he called at the request of the people of the town and with the consent of Gen. Luque, Commanding General of this district, whose Headquarters have been at Gibara, to say that orders had been issued by Gen. Luque for the withdrawal to Holguin of all the Spanish troops stationed at Gibara and other places in this Military District to the number of seven or eight thousand men. That the garrison of Gibara, numbering perhaps one thousand men with their property and families, would be all away from the town in three days, and the town left without any adequate security for the maintenance of order.

3. Mr. Beola asked, therefore, that a vessel might be stationed in the harbor to preserve the tranquility of the town, or that such as wished to leave or to send their wives and children away, might have permission to do so in two small schooners of about 200 tons each, that are at present laid up in the harbor. He seemed to have some apprehension lest in the interval between the withdrawal of the Spanish troops and the establishment of a new Government, some disorders might arise. Since the Officials of the town, Mayor, Judges, etc., hold their office by virtue of the Spanish authority, on the withdrawal of that authority the positions will become vacant unless the present incumbents are continued therein by some other power.

4. I advised him against any withdrawal of respectable the people from the town, and informed him that I would immediately communicate with you, and that in the meantime this vessel would look out for the security of the town.

5. He also informed me that the troops would be withdrawn from Port Nipe, and that there were no Gunboats there save one small launch.

6. As the Port of Gibara is too small for a vessel of this size to lie at anchor, I would suggest that some small vessel of this size to lie at anchor, I would suggest that some small vessel like the Maple be sent, and I forward this communication by the Topeka as her presence at Port Nipe is no longer necessary and her coal supply needs replenishing.

7. Mr. Beola also informed me that the Spanish troops would be unable to leave Holguin, on account of the impassability of the roads and the scarcity of provisions, and that it was thought they would surrender quickly to any American force, after a show of resistance, He also said that Gibara was healthy, save a few cases of Small Pox, which were isolated, and that a few of the Spanish soldiers, too ill to be moved, would be left at the Hospital under the Red Cross flag. Many of the Spanish civil authorities with their families will leave with the troops but the majority will remain. The town has a population of some six thousand, of which there are approximately one hundred xxxxxxxxx families of well-to-do people. Food was scarce although there was no suffering, a relief society looking out for the wants of the needy.

8. It will be necessary for this ship to return to Port for coal by the 28th of July.

Very respectfully,

C. J. Train.

Com’d’r. Com’d’g.

Port Nipe, Cuba - Commander John J. Hunker To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U. S. S. Annapolis, 3rd Rate,

Port Nipe, Cuba,

July 21, 1898.

S I R :--

I respectfully report [t]hat in obedience to your order of the 18th inst.,I steamed into and took possession of the Bay of Nipe this forenoon in company with the Wasp, Leyden, and Topeka, the latter vessel I found on the blockade outside.

Before we entered Lieutenant Commander Cowles, Commanding the U.S.S.Topeka, reported that he had been informed by insurgents in the neighborhood that the Bay was held by eight hundred Spanish troops, that there was a battery on the bluff at the entrance the there were three spanish war vessels in the port, one 3rd class cruiser and two gun-boats and that the mouth of the harbor was closed by thirty mines, electrical and contact. As it turned out we were either lucky enough to avoid them or the mines were inefficient, for no explosion took place, although one contact mine was found floating in the channel by the Commanding Officer of the “DUPONT” when he entered the harbor a few hours later and two were seen by the Commanding Officers of the Wasp and Leyden3 while on our way out, moored from eight to ten feet below the surface; mines of the same pattern as those found in Guantanamo harbor.

3. Al[l] preparations being completed, I sent the Wasp and Leyden ahead to reconnoiter the batter on the bluff to the right of the channel. In a few moments they reached the turn in the entrance and the Wasp signaled “Enemy’s vessel in sight”, increasing the spedd and directing the Topeka to follow we pushed rapidly forward arriving inside we found the 3rd class cruiser Jorge Juan, at anchor about three miles from the mouth of the harbor, after returning the fire of our vessels for a short time she was struck in the bow by a four-inch shell from the forward gun of the Annapolis and began to sink; soon after the crew deserted her and escaped to the shore in boats. She now lies in six and one half fathoms the water reaching above her hammock rail. She could be easily raised.

4. The Wasp and Leyden were then sent on a scouting expedition, after a thorough search they returned and reported that there were no other vessels in the Bay.

5. Although the ships were exposed for some time to a sharp rifle fire from Spanish troops stationed on the bluff to the right of the entrance and to the fire of the guns of the Jorge Juan for about forty minutes, there were no casualties, none of the vessels were struck. We were unable to learn the extent of the enemy’s losses.

6. After the DUPONT sailed for Guantanamo, we were told by insurgents on shore that the Spaniards had upon our appearance in the harbor taken a small gun-boat or steam launch of about sixty tons armed with two Nordenfeldt guns up the Mayari River abreast the anchorage and sunk her.

7. The next morning the Mayor of Nipe informed me that a 1 the Spanish soldiers in the vicinity together with the crews of the two vessels had left the Bay the night before of our arrival and gone to Holguin. He told me also that he knew where fourteen of the mines were located.

8. Upon leaving the port this morning we could plainly see the buoys and connections and the signal ranges on the shore marking the position of the torpedoes. We counted twelve of them. These mines can be easily found and lifted. They lie in the centre of the entrance along the narrow part of the channel and are arranged zig-zag. By hugging the southernshore as we did in coming out they can be plainly seen and readily avoided.

9 I cannot too highly praise the spirit shown by the Commanding Officers of the Topeka, Wasp and Leyden, in taking their vessels through the mine fields into Nipe Bay, or the eagerness with which Lieutenant Ward, Commanding Wasp, and Ensign Crossly, Commanding Leyden, thanked me when I gave them the order to enter the harbor. Such zeal and courage cannot be too highly commended.

10. Although everybody on board the Annapolis behaved with the utmost coolness and courage and are equally deserving of praise I am particularly indebted to Lieut, G.W.Mentz, the Executive Officer for the effective manner in which he directed the gun-fire and Lieutenant C.J.Bousch, the Navigator, who skillfully conned the ship through the channel and into action.

11. I forward herewith the reports of the Commanding Officers of the Wasp and Leyden, the report of the executive officer of the Annapolis, a return captured on the Don Jorge Juan, showing her complement and the list of her crews off the Annapolis, and the Wasp. The Leyden’s list will be sent by her commanding Officer.

Very respectfully,

J. J. Hunker, Commander, U.S.Navy, Commanding.

United States - Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Navy Department,

Office of Naval War Board.

Washington, D. C., July 21,1898.


Sir:

In pursuance of the terms of your memorandum of the 20th instant, the Board begs leave to make the following reply:


_CEUTA._

The Board considers it inexpedient to attack Ceuta. It is believed to have been reinforced lately, and heavy modern guns mounted on the defences. Furthermore, its possession would not entail any advantage at all adequate to the expense of its reduction and maintenance. By reason of Gibraltar, and of its fleet, England dominates the Straits of Gibraltar, which, in any case, would be controlled by the most powerful navy, and in that sense we control it now as regards Spain.

CANARY ISLANDS.

The Canary Islands occupy towards our possessions the same relative position as did the Cape de Verde lately – that is, a hostile fleet at the Canaries menaces in about an equal degree, our ports, from Boston to the southward, and our new possessions in the West Indies to a somewhat greater degree. Nevertheless, as long as these islands remain in the possession of Spain, they do not seriously threaten us; they are reported to have been lately considerably reinforced, both by troops and heavy modern sea-coast guns, and therefore their reduction would require a considerable fleet and army, and would probably consume a considerable time, without apparent compensating advantage. The islands are understood to be about self-supporting, as regards food, and therefore their reduction by blockade would consume much time, and probably many ships, which we could now very illy spare.

It is therefore suggested that as long as they are in Spain’s possession, we do not attack them. The Board deprecates the further dispersal of our efforts, as we are already engaged at Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines.

AMERICAN LINERS.

The Board would much prefer to retain all four of the American liners for regular naval use, as they have been very useful already and would be especially so in case of any movement that would take our fleet across the ocean; nevertheless it is thought that two of them might be spared temporarily as troop ships, under the following conditions: The ships belong to the Navy Department and to retain their organization as men-of-war, being lent to the War Department for the express purpose of transporting troops, but to be subject to withdrawal, for naval use, on one week’s notice.

The above arrangement would of course be subject to the conditions of the ships’ charters, which, it is thought, provide for strictly naval use only. In view of this, it is doubtful whether they could be turned over to the absolute control of the War Depart-<ment, neither is it certain that they could be used as transports without infraction of the spirit of the charters.

Respectfully,

M. Sicard

Rear Admnl., Pres. of Board.>

[miletus12]

Jul 21, 2022 3:01:16 GMT lordroel said:

Day 93 of the Spanish–American War, July 21st 1898

Cuba: Battle of Nipe Bay

Nipe Bay had been designated as a rendezvous point for American naval forces delegated to attack Puerto Rico. Upon finding the harbor still occupied by Spanish forces, the American squadron, consisting of the gunboats USS Annapolis and USS Topeka, the armed tug USS Leyden and the armed yacht USS Wasp, maneuvered through a minefield to engage the Spanish forces. Spanish sloop-of-war Jorge Juan opened fire on Wasp and Leyden, but they quickly sank her with help from Annapolis. While the other three ships were engaging Jorge Juan, Topeka silenced the harbor forts and fired on other Spanish works in the harbor.

Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, the Spanish sailed the small gunboat Baracoa upriver and scuttled her to prevent her capture by the superior American force. Just as the fighting came to an end, U.S. Navy personnel boarded Jorge Juan's sinking hulk, stripping several items from it as trophies. One such trophy was the Jorge Juan's battle-flag, which was taken by one of the sailors from Annapolis

See chart.



Tactical commentary...

In the Philippines the Spanish East Indies squadron of unprotected cruisers and gunboats was concentrated to face the American Asiatic squadron, and was annihilated in one battle. It has been suggested they would have caused more difficulties if they had scattered throughout the islands (although the lack of supplies may have rendered this strategy equally futile). However, the Spanish in Cuba and Puerto Rico had a West Indies squadron of similar composition (three unprotected cruisers, at least one large gunboat/sloop and many medium to small gunboats) which was spread out across multiple harbors and was never combined with the armored cruisers of Cervera's ill-fated squadron. These scattered, weaker local ships were themselves involved in a number of skirmishes with American forces.

The Americans tended to confront these smaller Spanish ships not with armored ships or even protected cruisers (as was done in the Philippines) but with their third-tier ships--gunboats, armed yachts, and armed liners. It was apparently judged that these miscellaneous ships could enforce the blockade and handle any Spanish sorties. The US protected cruisers in the Atlantic would be freed to undertake longer range patrols if needed.

The battle of Nipe Bay is one case where a Spanish gunboat (sloop in British terminology, which the Americans just called a large gunboat) was neutralized by American gunboats.

One of the American ships, the USS Topeka, had an interesting connection to another navy. The ship was built in 1881 as the Diogenes and had a sister ship, the Socrates. These two ships were civilian ships converted to unprotected cruisers for the navy of Peru, which was in conflict with Chile. Unfortunately for Peru, these ships were not available in time to participate in the war, and only the Socrates (renamed Lima) was ever delivered. The Lima, after serving in the Pacific coast as a cruiser, later apparently became a hulk at the port of Iquitos--which means she had to have traveled up the Amazon river, through Brazil, to this isolated interior city on the other side of the Andes from the rest of Peru (demonstrating that fairly large ships can navigate the Amazon). Her sister ship the Diogenes languished until a new crisis--the looming Spanish-American War, where both sides scrambled to purchase ships to build up their navy or deny ships to the other. The Diogenes became the USS Topeka in 1898 and was classified as a gunboat despite her relatively large size (an unprotected cruiser in other navies' terminology).

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nipe_Bay

See the ships>



The expression "rinky-dink" does fit the ships and the action. But I will comment on that circus in a bit.

Jul 21, 2022 3:01:16 GMT lordroel said:

Puerto Rico

A convoy of 3,300 soldiers under the command of General Miles in nine transports escorted by the USS Massachusetts sail for Puerto Rico from Guantánamo, Cuba

Speaking of rinky-dink...

The General Who Turned the Spanish-American War into a 'Puerto Rican Picnic'

Military.com | By Bethanne Kelly Patrick



When the U.S. Army invaded Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898, it took 3,415 U.S. soldiers just 13 days to occupy 23 out of 70 Puerto Rican towns. By Aug. 13, the U.S. held more than half of "Porto Rico," and the American media had begun to refer to the Spanish-American War invasion as "Gen. Miles' Puerto Rican picnic."

Gen. Nelson Appleton Miles, "a brave peacock" in Teddy Roosevelt's words, entered the Army a mere private and emerged decades later as one of the service's most storied and controversial figures. Wounded four times during some of the Civil War's most crucial battles -- including Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and the Appomattox campaign -- he won promotion to major general of volunteers.

Miles also loomed large in the Army's campaigns against the tribes of the Great Plains. He scoured the northern plains after Gen. George Custer's defeat at Little Big Horn, forcing the Lakota onto reservations. He argued for years with Gen. Oliver Howard about which of them had actually captured Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce, although it is clear that Miles had an instrumental role in the incident. Clashing with Gen. George Crook, Miles refused to use Apache scouts in trying to capture Geronimo, a decision that cost him men, money and miles.

Self-schooled in military strategy and tactics, Miles never got over his belief that West Point graduates were given unfair advantage in promotions. Ironically, he became one of the Army's most ardent practitioners of influence peddling. In 1868, he made a political and career union by marrying Mary Hoyt Sherman, niece of both Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman and Ohio Sen. John Sherman. When Gen. Sherman became Army chief of staff, Miles lost no time in looking to him for favors. (Sherman refused.)

After commanding the "Puerto Rican Picnic" and causing trouble over U.S. policy in the Philippines, Miles stepped down in 1903 at the mandatory retirement age of 64. He was the last commanding general in the Army's history and the oldest surviving Civil War general.

While attending a circus performance with his grandchildren in 1925, Miles stood for the national anthem and dropped dead of a heart attack. Perhaps the finest moment of this colorful man's history was his burial at Arlington National Cemetery, attended by President Calvin Coolidge and accorded all the military pomp that had made his career soldier's heart glad.

Much as one may dislike him personally as an influence peddler, political charlatan and careerist, at least Miles knew how to organize a "picnic". 

Jul 21, 2022 3:01:16 GMT lordroel said:

Off Gibara, Cuba - Commander Charles J. Train To Commodore John A. Howell, Commander, First Blockading Squadron

U. S. S. “PRAIRIE”.

Off Gibara, Cuba, July 21, 1898.

Sir;-

I have the honor to inform you that I have this morning received a visit from Mr. Jose Homobono Beola, the Vice Consul of the United States at this port until the declaration of war. He brought with him his appointment to identify him.

2. He informed me that he called at the request of the people of the town and with the consent of Gen. Luque, Commanding General of this district, whose Headquarters have been at Gibara, to say that orders had been issued by Gen. Luque for the withdrawal to Holguin of all the Spanish troops stationed at Gibara and other places in this Military District to the number of seven or eight thousand men. That the garrison of Gibara, numbering perhaps one thousand men with their property and families, would be all away from the town in three days, and the town left without any adequate security for the maintenance of order.

3. Mr. Beola asked, therefore, that a vessel might be stationed in the harbor to preserve the tranquility of the town, or that such as wished to leave or to send their wives and children away, might have permission to do so in two small schooners of about 200 tons each, that are at present laid up in the harbor. He seemed to have some apprehension lest in the interval between the withdrawal of the Spanish troops and the establishment of a new Government, some disorders might arise. Since the Officials of the town, Mayor, Judges, etc., hold their office by virtue of the Spanish authority, on the withdrawal of that authority the positions will become vacant unless the present incumbents are continued therein by some other power.

4. I advised him against any withdrawal of respectable the people from the town, and informed him that I would immediately communicate with you, and that in the meantime this vessel would look out for the security of the town.

5. He also informed me that the troops would be withdrawn from Port Nipe, and that there were no Gunboats there save one small launch.

6. As the Port of Gibara is too small for a vessel of this size to lie at anchor, I would suggest that some small vessel of this size to lie at anchor, I would suggest that some small vessel like the Maple be sent, and I forward this communication by the Topeka as her presence at Port Nipe is no longer necessary and her coal supply needs replenishing.

7. Mr. Beola also informed me that the Spanish troops would be unable to leave Holguin, on account of the impassability of the roads and the scarcity of provisions, and that it was thought they would surrender quickly to any American force, after a show of resistance, He also said that Gibara was healthy, save a few cases of Small Pox, which were isolated, and that a few of the Spanish soldiers, too ill to be moved, would be left at the Hospital under the Red Cross flag. Many of the Spanish civil authorities with their families will leave with the troops but the majority will remain. The town has a population of some six thousand, of which there are approximately one hundred xxxxxxxxx families of well-to-do people. Food was scarce although there was no suffering, a relief society looking out for the wants of the needy.

8. It will be necessary for this ship to return to Port for coal by the 28th of July.

Very respectfully,

C. J. Train.

Com’d’r. Com’d’g.

Another converted ocean liner, she was. Along with her sisters of her class, she burned up a lot of coal, saw a lot of ocean and actually in her case did very little. The weird thing is that Charles F. Train, her current captain, after the previous one was relieved for incompetence, "should" have been still commanding the USS Massachusetts, but at this time, USS Massachusetts was currently having her after turret rebuilt as a result of that little fire that neutered her... *(More on this situation when we get to Sicard's letter. M.)   

Jul 21, 2022 3:01:16 GMT lordroel said:

Port Nipe, Cuba - Commander John J. Hunker To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U. S. S. Annapolis, 3rd Rate,

Port Nipe, Cuba,

July 21, 1898.

S I R :--

I respectfully report [t]hat in obedience to your order of the 18th inst.,I steamed into and took possession of the Bay of Nipe this forenoon in company with the Wasp, Leyden, and Topeka, the latter vessel I found on the blockade outside.

Before we entered Lieutenant Commander Cowles, Commanding the U.S.S.Topeka, reported that he had been informed by insurgents in the neighborhood that the Bay was held by eight hundred Spanish troops, that there was a battery on the bluff at the entrance the there were three Spanish war vessels in the port, one 3rd class cruiser and two gun-boats and that the mouth of the harbor was closed by thirty mines, electrical and contact. As it turned out we were either lucky enough to avoid them or the mines were inefficient, for no explosion took place, although one contact mine was found floating in the channel by the Commanding Officer of the “DUPONT” when he entered the harbor a few hours later and two were seen by the Commanding Officers of the Wasp and Leyden3 while on our way out, moored from eight to ten feet below the surface; mines of the same pattern as those found in Guantanamo harbor.

3. Al[l] preparations being completed, I sent the Wasp and Leyden ahead to reconnoiter the battery on the bluff to the right of the channel. In a few moments they reached the turn in the entrance and the Wasp signaled “Enemy’s vessel in sight”, increasing the speed and directing the Topeka to follow we pushed rapidly forward arriving inside we found the 3rd class cruiser Jorge Juan, at anchor about three miles from the mouth of the harbor, after returning the fire of our vessels for a short time she was struck in the bow by a four-inch shell from the forward gun of the Annapolis and began to sink; soon after the crew deserted her and escaped to the shore in boats. She now lies in six and one half fathoms the water reaching above her hammock rail. She could be easily raised.

4. The Wasp and Leyden were then sent on a scouting expedition, after a thorough search they returned and reported that there were no other vessels in the Bay.

5. Although the ships were exposed for some time to a sharp rifle fire from Spanish troops stationed on the bluff to the right of the entrance and to the fire of the guns of the Jorge Juan for about forty minutes, there were no casualties, none of the vessels were struck. We were unable to learn the extent of the enemy’s losses.

6. After the DUPONT sailed for Guantanamo, we were told by insurgents on shore that the Spaniards had upon our appearance in the harbor taken a small gun-boat or steam launch of about sixty tons armed with two Nordenfeldt guns up the Mayari River abreast the anchorage and sunk her.

7. The next morning the Mayor of Nipe informed me that a 1 the Spanish soldiers in the vicinity together with the crews of the two vessels had left the Bay the night before of our arrival and gone to Holguin. He told me also that he knew where fourteen of the mines were located.

8. Upon leaving the port this morning we could plainly see the buoys and connections and the signal ranges on the shore marking the position of the torpedoes. We counted twelve of them. These mines can be easily found and lifted. They lie in the centre of the entrance along the narrow part of the channel and are arranged zig-zag. By hugging the southernshore as we did in coming out they can be plainly seen and readily avoided.

9 I cannot too highly praise the spirit shown by the Commanding Officers of the Topeka, Wasp and Leyden, in taking their vessels through the mine fields into Nipe Bay, or the eagerness with which Lieutenant Ward, Commanding Wasp, and Ensign Crossly, Commanding Leyden, thanked me when I gave them the order to enter the harbor. Such zeal and courage cannot be too highly commended.

10. Although everybody on board the Annapolis behaved with the utmost coolness and courage and are equally deserving of praise I am particularly indebted to Lieut, G.W.Mentz, the Executive Officer for the effective manner in which he directed the gun-fire and Lieutenant C.J.Bousch, the Navigator, who skillfully conned the ship through the channel and into action.

11. I forward herewith the reports of the Commanding Officers of the Wasp and Leyden, the report of the executive officer of the Annapolis, a return captured on the Don Jorge Juan, showing her complement and the list of her crews off the Annapolis, and the Wasp. The Leyden’s list will be sent by her commanding Officer.

Very respectfully,

J. J. Hunker, Commander, U.S.Navy, Commanding.

See map. 



It seems to have been a straightforward Mobile Bay "Expletive deleted the mines and full speed ahead" type of evolution. Not much in the way of planning or common sense was  applied. 


View from the Nicaro shoreline looking North at Cape Saetia..
 
I am not sure that the Americans were not suffering from "hunter's disease" and had not properly accounted what a competent defender could do with that setup. It was lucky the Spaniards were in the middle of a withdrawal to Holquin, Cuba into the interior.

Jul 21, 2022 3:01:16 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

Navy Department,

Office of Naval War Board.

Washington, D. C., July 21,1898.

Sir:

In pursuance of the terms of your memorandum of the 20th instant, the Board begs leave to make the following reply:

_CEUTA._

The Board considers it inexpedient to attack Ceuta. It is believed to have been reinforced lately, and heavy modern guns mounted on the defences. Furthermore, its possession would not entail any advantage at all adequate to the expense of its reduction and maintenance. By reason of Gibraltar, and of its fleet, England dominates the Straits of Gibraltar, which, in any case, would be controlled by the most powerful navy, and in that sense we control it now as regards Spain.

CANARY ISLANDS.

The Canary Islands occupy towards our possessions the same relative position as did the Cape de Verde lately – that is, a hostile fleet at the Canaries menaces in about an equal degree, our ports, from Boston to the southward, and our new possessions in the West Indies to a somewhat greater degree. Nevertheless, as long as these islands remain in the possession of Spain, they do not seriously threaten us; they are reported to have been lately considerably reinforced, both by troops and heavy modern sea-coast guns, and therefore their reduction would require a considerable fleet and army, and would probably consume a considerable time, without apparent compensating advantage. The islands are understood to be about self-supporting, as regards food, and therefore their reduction by blockade would consume much time, and probably many ships, which we could now very illy spare.

It is therefore suggested that as long as they are in Spain’s possession, we do not attack them. The Board deprecates the further dispersal of our efforts, as we are already engaged at Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines.

AMERICAN LINERS.

The Board would much prefer to retain all four of the American liners for regular naval use, as they have been very useful already and would be especially so in case of any movement that would take our fleet across the ocean; nevertheless it is thought that two of them might be spared temporarily as troop ships, under the following conditions: The ships belong to the Navy Department and to retain their organization as men-of-war, being lent to the War Department for the express purpose of transporting troops, but to be subject to withdrawal, for naval use, on one week’s notice.

The above arrangement would of course be subject to the conditions of the ships’ charters, which, it is thought, provide for strictly naval use only. In view of this, it is doubtful whether they could be turned over to the absolute control of the War Depart-&lt;ment, neither is it certain that they could be used as transports without infraction of the spirit of the charters.

Respectfully,

M. Sicard

Rear Admnl., Pres. of Board.&gt;

1. Ceuta.



See that causeway neck of land from North Africa mainland to the port? Why not attack? Sicard has not looked at the ground or the vulnerable Spanish position. Relatively speaking, an amphibious assault would be expensive but doable. Once ashore, the Marines work the west sloping ground and neuter the defenses. It is far more doable than Gibraltar, which presents a similar geographic problem. One looks north to south in the engraving. M.

2. The British.

The British only operate at a tangent to American interests. As incidents in Manila Bay and in May and June in Montreal, Canada attested, the British could be American trusted about as far as you could throw one. Since so many of them were willing to spy for Spain for money, for example... Treachery was the default expectation. John Chichester was THE EXCEPTION to the rule in 1898.    

3. See maps about the Cape Verde islands.





That is where the First Spanish Cruiser Squadron hid out before they sortied to Cuba. 

4. Now look at the Canary Islands...



Looking at the situation from a naval perspective, one might want to have a coaling and cable station waypoint to Europe?

... they are reported to have been lately considerably reinforced, both by troops and heavy modern sea-coast guns, and therefore their reduction would require a considerable fleet and army, and would probably consume a considerable time, without apparent compensating advantage. The islands are understood to be about self-supporting, as regards food, and therefore their reduction by blockade would consume much time, and probably many ships, which we could now very illy spare.

It is therefore suggested that as long as they are in Spain’s possession, we do not attack them. The Board deprecates the further dispersal of our efforts, as we are already engaged at Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines.

5. Ocean liners make useful troop transports, but they make lousy scouts. For that the USN needs proper cruisers. In that day and age, reconnaissance and patrol was 99% of naval warfare. 

======================================================== 

Sicard is mindful now after Sampson's and Reye's tardy reports...
1. USS Massachusetts and USS Indiana are dockyard cases.
2. The monitors at Tampa are ruined until repaired for the next war. They are worthless unless used for coastal defense.   
3. There is a lot of blockade work still necessary around Cuba because the gunrunners out of the Bahamas and Jamaica have not stopped.
4. Sampson cannot pour water out of a boot even if you told him to look at the heel for the instructions. 
5. Sicard is very aware that Germany is an issue and it might not be wise for the United States to give Kaiser William II an excuse to start something. Morocco has been a European flashpoint (Rifs...).  The French would be nervous, the Spanish definitely nervous and the Germans eager to stir up trouble if the Americans and Spanish spilled their naval war as far east as the Canary Islands or into Morocco proper.

1-5 are the real reasons to postpone and not execute a Canary Islands operation as is also the case for Ceuta. The way that this war has been going, the "winning by the skin of our teeth" reportage from our military professionals was more accurate than the newspaper jingo accounts, and popular histories indicated 

Sicard may be talking to plants and imaginary friends, but he has a good cause to be cautious and so do his superiors.   

[lordroel]

Day 94 of the Spanish–American War, July 22nd 1898

Spain

The Spanish government through the French Ambassador to the United States, Jules Cambon, initiated a message to President McKinley to suspend the hostilities and to start the negotiations to end the war. Duque de Almodóvar del Río (Juan Manuel Sánchez y Gutiérrez de Castro), Spanish Minister of State, directs a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris charging him to solicit the good offices of the French Government to negotiate a suspension of hostilities as a preliminary to final negotiations.

Playa del Este, Cuba - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long.

TELEGRAM

Playa del Este, Cuba, July 22, 1898.

The expedition to Nipe has been entirely successful. Although the mines have not been removed for the want of time. The Spanish Cruiser Jorge Juan, defending the place, was destroyed without loss to our side. The “Annapolis” and the “Wasp” afterwards proceeded from Nipe to assist in the landing of the Commanding General of the Army (and) troops, on arrival at Cape San Juan. If the report of the “Prairie” made regarding the condition of affairs at Cibara and Holquin, dated the 21st instant, has not yet reached the Department through Commodore Howell, telegraph for it as it represents a state of affairs which should be known to the Navy and State Departments without delay.

SAMPSON.

[miletus12]

Jul 22, 2022 7:19:09 GMT lordroel said:

Day 94 of the Spanish–American War, July 22nd 1898

Spain

The Spanish government through the French Ambassador to the United States, Jules Cambon, initiated a message to President McKinley to suspend the hostilities and to start the negotiations to end the war. Duque de Almodóvar del Río (Juan Manuel Sánchez y Gutiérrez de Castro), Spanish Minister of State, directs a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris charging him to solicit the good offices of the French Government to negotiate a suspension of hostilities as a preliminary to final negotiations.

The Sagasta government had thoroughly mismanaged the war, the Spanish economy and Spain's international position, and it was on the ropes. Just as a indicator of the absurdity in the political logic behind the Spanish government's need to fight the war and lose it, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta had firmly fixed in his mind how his immediate predecessor, Antonio Cánovas had fared.

ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER CANOVAS.

The Murder of the Spanish Statesman Premeditated.

Golli Watched for an Opportunity to Fire the Fatal Shot. The Assassin Confesses That He Killed the Premier to Avenge the Death of the Barcelona Anarchists and the Insurgent Don Jose Rizal, Who Was Executed at Manila as the Instigator of the Philippines Revolution.

MADRID, Aug. 9.—The assassination of the Prime Minister of Spain, Senor Canovas del Castillo, who was shot and killed by an Italian anarchist, whose name is believed to be Michelo Augene Golli, at the baths of Santa Agueda yesterday afternoon, was undoubtedly cold-bloodedly premeditated. Golli watched for an opportunity to kill the Spanish statesman, and he only fired when he had no chance of missing. In fact, the assassin, who was arrested almost immediately after the Premier fell dead at the feet of his wife, has declared as much to the examining magistrate. The Prime Minister lingered for some time in coma and passed away with a cry of "Long live Spain!" Further details of the assassination show that Premier Canovas del Castillo and his wife were present yesterday morning at the celebration of mass in the chapel attached to the baths. After mass the Premier was reading and conversing with some reporters when the assassin approached and fired three shots at him with a revolver, hitting him in the forehead, chest and left ear. The wounded man fell to the ground crying: "Assassin! Long live Spain!" The Premier was carried to his room and expired at 1:30 p. m., after extreme unction had been administered him by a priest of the Dominican order. The murderer, who was immediately seized by people in the vicinity, was severely handled, and must have been killed had it not been for the protection of the civil guards. The prisoner, who declared he had killed the Premier "in the accomplishment of a just vengeance." gave tie name of Rinaldi. and claimed that the deed was the outcome of an extensive anarchist(?) conspiracy.*-. Later, however, the assassin confided/issued that his real name was Michelo Angelline Golli; that he was 20 years of age; a native of Boggi, near Naples, and that he left Italy and came to Spain in exile. After reaching Spain, Golli. according to his confession, resided at Barcelona and participated in the doings of the various anarchist societies of that pace and vicinity. After sojourning at Barcelona for some time Golli visited France and Belgium and returned to Spain in July last. After his return the anarchists seemed to have completed the plans for the assassination of the Prime Minister. He left Madrid for Santa Agueda at the same time as Senor Canovas del Castillo and awaited an opportunity to assassinate the statesman. In appearance Golli is of medium height, wears a full beard and spectacles, and his demeanor is that of a quiet, law-abiding citizen. He said he is satisfied with having done "his duty," and asserts that the has no personal grudge against the Premier and was merely obeying orders received from his superiors in the secret society of which he belonged. He frankly professes anarchist doctrine, says he was sentenced in absentia to eighteen months* imprisonment in the jail at Lucera, Italy, and claims that he escaped from there to Marseilles, from which port he made his way to Barcelona. Senora Canovas. wife of the Premier, who was but a short distance from her husband when the crime was committed, rushed to his side upon hearing the shots As the Premier lay dying on the ground she bitterly reproached the murderer for his crime. Golli. in reply to the agonizing words of the distracted wife, said: "I respect you because you are an honorable lady, but I have done my duty, and I am now easy in mind, for I have avenged my friends and the brothers of Montjuic." Montjuic is the fortress of Barcelona, outside of which the anarchists who have been sentenced to death for recent outrages have been executed by being shot in the back. The anarchists recently executed outside Montjuic were the last of the batch of fiends who were guilty of throwing a bomb on June 7. 180$, into a religious procession about to enter the church of Santa Maria de Lamar, upon the occasion of the Corpus Christi celebration. Twelve persons were instantly killed and about fifty others, several of whom died from their wounds, were injured. For this crime twenty-six anarchists were sentenced to death and many of them were executed. The condemned men shouted; "Long live anarchy." just before the orders to fire were given. The Spanish newspapers express great indignation at GoHi's crime. Even the journals that have republican leanings praise the service of the deceased statesman. The "Imparcial" "Yesterday will prove a black date for Spain. The crime will centuple the indignation of society against this would be destroyer." A number of new specials appeared this morning dressed in black. A post-mortem examination of the Premier's remains were made this morning previous to embalming them for shipment to this city. The funeral, the indignation expressed at the crime is shared by all parties in politics, and it is generally believed that the members of the colonial secret societies were concerned in this outrage.

It is reported that Senor A. Pidal, President of the Chamber of Deputies, will be appointed President of the Council of Ministers m succession to the late Premier at the expiration of the official nine days' mourning. The Ministers of the present Cabinet will meet in council daily. Golli stated in the examination before the magistrate to-day that he succeeded in firing two shots at the people who arrested him before be was overpowered. The assassin calls himself a "revolutionary anarchist." Senor Silvelva, the leader of the dissident Conservatives, has followed the example of Senor Sagasta, the Liberal leader, Marshal Martinez de Campos and others, in tendering their condolences to the Government while placing their services at the disposal of the Ministers. The Cabinet sat until 2 o'clock this morning and decided to publish in the official gazette to-day, which will appear with a black border, the appointment of Lieutenant-General Don Marcolo de Azcarnaga, the Minister of War, as Premier ad interim. Senor Sagasta has postponed his projected visit to this city. In anticipation of possible disturbances at Barcelona the police force of that city has been reinforced. Later in the day it was announced that highest military honors will be accorded to the deceased at his funeral. The court will, however, not return here from San Sebastian, the summer residence, to attend the funeral ceremonies. The Queen Regent will be represented at the funeral by the Duke of Soto. The remains will be brought here on Tuesday. An individual who was heard to express sympathy with the assassin of the Premier and with his crime has been arrested. The newspapers of this city in commenting on the crime say that while anarchists have no country, it is dreadful to contemplate that the last two murders of eminent men, that of President Carnot of France and of Premier Canovas del Castillo, were the work of Italians. Considerable activity was displayed to-day among the Republicans, who seem to believe that their opportunity has arrived. The Government is taking extreme precautions to preserve order in Madrid and the provinces. It is reported in officially this afternoon that Senor Pidal, President of the Chamber of Deputies, will only be charged to form an intermediate ministry. It appears this evening that Golli, the assassin, represented himself. *As explained by a correspondent of "El Pentico'; "The prisoner cannot be tried by the laws providing for the trial and punishment of anarchists, as this law is so framed that a person prosecuted under its provisions must have used or attempted to use explosives in the commission or attempt to commit the crime charged against him. However, there is no doubt Golli will be summarily tried and sentenced. The public demands the adoption of stringent measures against anarchists, and also against those who are in sympathy with them. Golli has confessed that he killed Senor Canovas to avenge the Barcelona anarchists and the insurgent leader, Don Jose Rizal. who was executed at Bagumbayan, Philippine Islands, on December last as the instigator of the Philippine revolution. Dr. Rizal denied that he was a rebel leader, but he admitted that he had drawn up the statutes of the Philippine League. In Golli's room the police found today a large double-barreled pistol. It appears that when he left the house yesterday, he carried a parcel which is believed to have contained a bomb. The theory is that he hid this somewhere in the fields. A dispatch from Barcelona says that Golli arrived there in December 1895, coming from Marseilles. He was employed in the printing office of the "Review of Social Science," managed toy the anarchist engineer Tarrida Marmet. formerly imprisoned In Montjuic fortress at Barcelona. Golli was implicated in the terrible crime of the celebration of Corpus Christi. although he left Barcelona a few days before it occurred. He was denounced to the police for complicity, but he had already disappeared.

FOREWARNED OF DANGER. LONDON. Aug. 9.—A special dispatch j from Madrid received here to-day says i the Spanish Government was aware that a meeting of anarchists was held early in July, and it was ordered to murder Senor Canovas del Castillo before August fourth and to assassinate Senor Sagasta before August 30th.

THE FEELING AT ROME. ROME, Aug. R—The assassination of the Prime Minister of Spain, Senor Canovas del Castillo, has caused a feeling of horror here. Many flags are half-masted. The Premier, the Marquis Di Rudini and the Cabinet Ministers paid personal visits to-day to the Spanish Embassy. King Humbert has telegraphed his condolences to the Queen Regent, and it is expected that the Crown Prince Vittorio-Emanuel, Prince j of Naples, who is now cruising on his yacht, will proceed to Madrid. The Pope is greatly upset over the news of the assassination, and upon receipt of the news immediately sent to the Spanish Emlassy for details of the crime. His Holiness also telegraphed on the subject to Madrid.

GOLLI A PRINTER. BARCELONA. Aug. 9.—Gobi, the assassin of Senor Canovas del Castillo, was known here under the name of Achillolli. He formerly worked as a compositor and was also known under the alias of Jose Sonto. He was classed as a militant anarchist and was an intimate friend of Ascheri, the pereperator of the outrage in the Calle de Cambesos. Golli fled from Barcelona after that outrage.

A GYPSY'S PREDICTION. MALAGA. Aug. 9—Old inhabitants of this city relate that when Canovas del Castillo was a young assistant master at a school here a gypsy woman told his fortune. She predicted that he would become great and would meet with a violent death.

EFFECT ON SECURITIES. LONDON. Aug. 9.—On the stock exchange to-day Spanish securities fell one-half point on the news of the assassination of Premier Canovas del Castillo. Later in the day Spanish securities recovered three-eighths of the point.

PALMA BLAMES CANOVAS. TURNERS (N. V.). Aug. 9.— Estrada Palma. who is at the head of the Cuban Junta in this country, in an interview commented upon the assassination of Canovas as follows: "While I have no sympathy with the assassin, I cannot help but feel that the action was one of retribution. Canovas, ■lore than Weyler. has been responsible for the cruelties practiced by the Spanish troops in Cuba. It was by his orders that women and children were murdered and wronged. He deserved no better fate. "His death will be to Cuba's benefit, for it complicates political affairs in Spain. As the leader of the majority; he was sponsor for Weyler. His great rival is Silvela, the leader of the Conservative minority. Should the Queen Regent choose to continue the Conservatives in power, Silvela will be Premier, and that would mean that Weyler would be succeeded by General Polavieja, who is now in the Philippine Islands and belongs to the Weyler school of warfare. "It is true that Silvela recently suggested that Cuba be given autonomy, but he cannot maintain that position as a Conservative leader. The Liberals under Sagasta would indeed grant autonomy, but we will accept nothing less than absolute independence. For that we have sacrificed everything. In any case the war must continue, and as long as it continues under Spanish methods the sympathy of the world will be with us. In the meantime, the political confusion in Spain cannot but give us an advantage. "It should be distinctly understood that the assassination of Canovas is not the work of the Cuban party. We do not resort to such methods. The anarchists of Spain are for the most part in the northern part of the country, and they are intimately associated with the anarchists of France. They had long threatened Canovas, who caused many of them to be executed. Only a few days ago several anarchists were executed in Barcelona, and I suppose the assassination was the outcome. I do not think the killing of Canovas was due at all to any question of policy, but merely as a vague outbreak on the part of some member of a dangerous party of men. We Cubans have no sympathy with such an act. "As a man I deplore such a misfortune, but as a Cuban I cannot help but feel that I am benefited by it."

COMMENT ABROAD. LONDON. Aug. !).—The afternoon papers in the comment upon the assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister express themselves on the same lines as the morning papers upon the incomprehensible idiocy of the murder of the man who was mainly responsible for giving universal suffrage to Spain. They also advocate the suppression of anarchy by force, pointing out that the history of nihilism in Russia proved that force consistently and steadily applied is the remedy for clearing out the pestilent fang. The "St. James Gazette" regards the death of Senor del Castillo as being a heavy disaster for Spain, adding: "Canovas was not great, but he was a statesman. During the Cuban crisis he governed with energy, and if he had been a very great man he might have told his countrymen that they must alter (find) other ways of dealing with the colonies or be prepared for evil times. But the Spaniards would hardly listen to such a lesson even from the tongue of an angel. Maybe, if he had had the choice, Canovas would have preferred the martyrdom which has overtaken him rather than to have seen the collapse which is only more threatening to Spain.

"In the meantime, the murder will destroy the already unstable administration, and, in the pick of a successor to the late Premier, the Queen Regent's position is most difficult. She may be driven to call upon some soldier, Campos or Foiavieja, which would be a misfortune to Spain abroad. The crime must have one consequence—to make the Kaiser and his brother sovereigns less disposed to adopt gentle methods with socialism."

MAY BE HURTFUL TO CUBANS. PARIS. Aug. this dare. The French newspapers do not anticipate any political complication in Spain as an outcome of the assassination of the Spanish Premier, and they do not think the conservative Government will be displaced. Senator Belancosa, a representative of Cuban insurgents, in an interview on the subject just printed here, expresses the opinion that the political situation in Spain will become critical, and greatly to the advantage of the Cuban Insurgents. That the agitation against Senor Canovas del Castillo was widespread is further evidenced by the fact that the police of this city recently tore down from the lavatories of Paris placards inscribed "Down with Canovas—The martyrs will be avenged—Long live anarchy." and other expressions in Spanish grossly insulting the Government and Premier Canovas. In addition, the officers of the Spanish Embassy here have recently received many threatening letters. It is stated that at a meeting of Spanish refugees at Grenoble, Capital of the Department of Isere. one of the speakers declared that the anarchists would soon be avenged, and that Senor Canovas would pay his debt to them with his blood.

The "Matin" to-day publishes interviews between its reporters and a number of Spanish anarchists, in which the latter are quoted as declaring they had no previous knowledge of the crime which has just startled the world. The persons interviewed also claimed, that the assassination of the Spanish Premier was provoked by his persecution of anarchists. One of the latter, however, said: "It had to come. We have been expecting it daily. We knew a high person was going to be attacked. but it might have been any other than Canovas." The police are watching the anarchists' resorts, and three arrests were made today. Other arrests are expected to follow. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. I. Hanotaux, has telegraphed, the condolences of the French Government to the Queen Regent and to the Government of Spain, expressing the indignation felt in France at the crime Just committed, and referring to the sympathy in this matter of the French people with Spain. All the French newspapers deplore the ■ crime, and the socialist organs, while \ reprobating the assassination of the Spanish Premier, refer to the severity exercised by Canovas toward the anarchists. intimating that such action ' upon his part pointed him out for attack.'

As can be seen, the political situation in Spain and across the globe at the time was ... "unstable". 

Kind of reminds me of today? (Will be posted in US News thread. M.)

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At any event, the request for a truce will begin a long torturous process for Madrid that awaits further developments from the field among and between the US forces as they communicate their shenanigans with the USG. 

Jul 22, 2022 7:19:09 GMT lordroel said:

Playa del Este, Cuba - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long.

TELEGRAM

Playa del Este, Cuba, July 22, 1898.

The expedition to Nipe has been entirely successful. Although the mines have not been removed for the want of time. The Spanish Cruiser Jorge Juan, defending the place, was destroyed without loss to our side. The “Annapolis” and the “Wasp” afterwards proceeded from Nipe to assist in the landing of the Commanding General of the Army (and) troops, on arrival at Cape San Juan. If the report of the “Prairie” made regarding the condition of affairs at Cibara and Holquin, dated the 21st instant, has not yet reached the Department through Commodore Howell, telegraph for it as it represents a state of affairs which should be known to the Navy and State Departments without delay.

SAMPSON.

Further evidence of Sampson's continued misrepresentations and bungling. The rinky-dink operation was still very much in confusion as US troops and the local banditos had a jurisdictional dispute as to who would chase the disorganized Spanish out of Mayari. The banditos were very much "uncooperative".

[lordroel]

Day 95 of the Spanish–American War, July 23rd 1898

Cuba: Battle of Manimani

United States Army Lieutenant John Heard anchored his force at the mouth of the Mani-Mani River and began unloading supplies intended for the Cuban insurgents operating in northwestern Cuba, unaware that the Spanish had discovered his presence and assembled a large force of cavalry in the environs.

Catching the Americans off guard, Spanish cavalry advanced out onto the beach and opened fire upon the landing parties. Heard ordered his men to take cover and return fire. Pounded by accurate American volleys, the Spanish withdrew back into the jungle.

Lieutenant Heard used the temporary respite to order an immediate retreat, evacuating his wounded into the USS Wanderer and preparing to lift anchor just as the Spaniards reappeared, unleashing a hail of fire at those on the deck.

Cartagena, Spain

Spanish Navy's 2nd Squadron, under the command of Rear Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Libermoore arrives at Cartagena, Spain and with it Spain's two most powerful warships, battleship Pelayo and armored cruiser Emperador Carlos V.

[miletus12]

Jul 23, 2022 7:15:48 GMT lordroel said:

Day 95 of the Spanish–American War, July 23rd 1898

Cuba: Battle of Manimani

United States Army Lieutenant John Heard anchored his force at the mouth of the Mani-Mani River and began unloading supplies intended for the Cuban insurgents operating in northwestern Cuba, unaware that the Spanish had discovered his presence and assembled a large force of cavalry in the environs.

Catching the Americans off guard, Spanish cavalry advanced out onto the beach and opened fire upon the landing parties. Heard ordered his men to take cover and return fire. Pounded by accurate American volleys, the Spanish withdrew back into the jungle.

Lieutenant Heard used the temporary respite to order an immediate retreat, evacuating his wounded into the USS Wanderer and preparing to lift anchor just as the Spaniards reappeared, unleashing a hail of fire at those on the deck.

John Heard won a medal of honor. He was not United States Navy and neither was his ship, so it was no wonder (pun);.that he bungled the battle.

Medal of Honor

AWARDED FOR ACTIONS

DURING Spanish-American War

Service: Army

Division: 3d U.S. Cavalry

GENERAL ORDERS:

Date of Issue: June 21, 1899



CITATION:

The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pleasure in presenting the Medal of Honor to First Lieutenant John William Heard, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism on 23 July 1898, while serving with 3d U.S. Cavalry, in action at Bahia Honda, Cuba. After two men had been shot down by Spaniards while transmitting orders to the engine-room on the Wanderer, the ship having become disabled, First Lieutenant Heard took the position held by them and personally transmitted the orders, remaining at his post until the ship was out of danger.

This is the best photo I could find of what the army transport ship might have looked like. 

 

WANDERER


Capacity



Transport Number

Vessel class

Displacement..................................1019
# Officers..........................................45
# Men.............................................800
# Horses.............................................?

This was chartered from the New Orleans Belize Royal Mail Steamship Company from July 5 to September 10, 1898 at a rate of $220 a day. 

To land supplies to the banditos at Bahia Hondo, Cuba (see map) was still plainly lunatic at that stage of the war.  The place was still lousy with Spanish cavalry.



Green island is just north of the landing spot. Yikes, the stupidity of this evolution is stupendous in conception and execution.  

Jul 23, 2022 7:15:48 GMT lordroel said:

Cartagena, Spain

Spanish Navy's 2nd Squadron, under the command of Rear Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Libermoore arrives at Cartagena, Spain and with it Spain's two most powerful warships, battleship Pelayo and armored cruiser Emperador Carlos V.

At this point the USN Mediterranean can come out of hiding.

[lordroel]

Day 96 of the Spanish–American War, July 24th 1898

Guantanamo Bay - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

GUANTANAMO BAY, JULY 25th,1898.

THERE ARE ABOUT FIVE THOUSAND SPANISH SOLDIERS IN GUANTANAMO AND CAIMANERA SEVENTEEN HUNDRED OF THEM SICK. THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN CONGREGATED IN ONE ENCAMPMENT AS SUGGESTED BY US BETWEEN TWO RIVERS ON THE NORTH AND WEST AND POINT MANATI ON AND WEST SIDE OF JOA. THERE ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS STILL IN JAIL IN GUANTANAMO KEPT THERE BY ORDER OF GENERAL PAREJA FOR THEIR SAFETY FROM THE VIOLENCE OF THE SPANISH VOLUNTEERS WHO HAVE ALREADY IT IS SAID BY CONSUL BROOKS ATTEMPTED TO TAKE THEM FROM JAIL BEING PREVENTED ONLY BY A FORCE OF CAVALRY IN THE STREETS BY PAREJA’S ENERGY. THESE POLITICALS ARE STILL UNDER SPANISH CONTROL AND CANNOT WITH SAFETY BE REMOVED UNTIL THE CITY IS OCCUPIED BY OUR FORCES OR CUBAN AUTHORITIES. STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN INTEREST OF SANITATION AND HUMANITY, AND GARRISON BE PLACED IN GUANTANAMO SO THAT THE PROSPERITY OF THE DISTRICT MAY BEGIN WITH THE REOPENING OF THE PORT. TWO LINES OF TORPEDOES HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE CHANNEL IN FRONT OF FORT AND COMMERCIAL VESSELS MAY NOW PASS TO CAIMANERA, BUT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN FOR ORGANIZATION.

160.000 RATIONS ARRIVED THIS MORNING FROM SANTIAGO, BUT THE MASTER OF THE TRANSPORT COMES TO ME FOR ORDERS NOT KNOWING WHAT TO DO WITH THEM. I HESITATE TO TAKE ANY STEPS IN THESE MATTERS WITHOUT REQUEST FROM THE ARMY THOUGH MOST READY TO ASSIST IF DESIRED.

SENT FOLLOWING TO SHAFTER:

TRANSPORT 51 ARRIVES WITH 160.000 RATIONS AND RESQUESTED DIRECTIONS. HAVE SENT IT TO CAIMANERA. IS THIS WHAT WAS DESIRED AND CAN I DO ANYTHING TO AID YOUR WORK IN THIS VICINITY.

SAMPSON.

[miletus12]

Jul 24, 2022 6:37:56 GMT lordroel said:

Day 96 of the Spanish–American War, July 24th 1898

Guantanamo Bay - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

GUANTANAMO BAY, JULY 25th,1898.

THERE ARE ABOUT FIVE THOUSAND SPANISH SOLDIERS IN GUANTANAMO AND CAIMANERA SEVENTEEN HUNDRED OF THEM SICK. THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN CONGREGATED IN ONE ENCAMPMENT AS SUGGESTED BY US BETWEEN TWO RIVERS ON THE NORTH AND WEST AND POINT MANATI ON AND WEST SIDE OF JOA. THERE ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS STILL IN JAIL IN GUANTANAMO KEPT THERE BY ORDER OF GENERAL PAREJA FOR THEIR SAFETY FROM THE VIOLENCE OF THE SPANISH VOLUNTEERS WHO HAVE ALREADY IT IS SAID BY CONSUL BROOKS ATTEMPTED TO TAKE THEM FROM JAIL BEING PREVENTED ONLY BY A FORCE OF CAVALRY IN THE STREETS BY PAREJA’S ENERGY. THESE POLITICALS ARE STILL UNDER SPANISH CONTROL AND CANNOT WITH SAFETY BE REMOVED UNTIL THE CITY IS OCCUPIED BY OUR FORCES OR CUBAN AUTHORITIES. STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN INTEREST OF SANITATION AND HUMANITY, AND GARRISON BE PLACED IN GUANTANAMO SO THAT THE PROSPERITY OF THE DISTRICT MAY BEGIN WITH THE REOPENING OF THE PORT. TWO LINES OF TORPEDOES HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE CHANNEL IN FRONT OF FORT AND COMMERCIAL VESSELS MAY NOW PASS TO CAIMANERA, BUT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN FOR ORGANIZATION.

160.000 RATIONS ARRIVED THIS MORNING FROM SANTIAGO, BUT THE MASTER OF THE TRANSPORT COMES TO ME FOR ORDERS NOT KNOWING WHAT TO DO WITH THEM. I HESITATE TO TAKE ANY STEPS IN THESE MATTERS WITHOUT REQUEST FROM THE ARMY THOUGH MOST READY TO ASSIST IF DESIRED.

SENT FOLLOWING TO SHAFTER:

TRANSPORT 51 ARRIVES WITH 160.000 RATIONS AND RESQUESTED DIRECTIONS. HAVE SENT IT TO CAIMANERA. IS THIS WHAT WAS DESIRED AND CAN I DO ANYTHING TO AID YOUR WORK IN THIS VICINITY.

SAMPSON.

(Sarcasm). Since General Miles is now on his way to his Puerto Rico "picnic" and has taken his headquarters staff and his command authority with him, things have reverted to normal between the two nitwits, Sampson (North Atlantic Squadron Actual) and Shafter.(Fifth Corps Actual). They are not talking to each other in concert despite: 

TRANSPORT 51 ARRIVES WITH 160.000 RATIONS AND RESQUESTED DIRECTIONS. HAVE SENT IT TO CAIMANERA. IS THIS WHAT WAS DESIRED AND CAN I DO ANYTHING TO AID YOUR WORK IN THIS VICINITY.

SAMPSON.

As for army transport Number 51... that hulk could be anyone of sixty leased for the war. It was most likely the Army Transport "McClellan".

For a brief review of how miserably the American army handled the transport problem and another reason why Russell Alger and the army bureau chiefs, en masse, should have been sent to Leavenworth to break big stones into pebbles...   

Sealift in the Spanish American War

"A splendid little war!" That was how John Hay, the ambassador to Great Britain, described the Spanish-American War of 1898. During the Spanish-American War, the Army faced the entirely new challenge of transporting a force over a body of water, a challenge that was to come to define American military power projection during the following century. After spending the 19th century dealing with internal continental challenges - confirming its independence from Britain, civil war, and westward expansion - the United States made its appearance on the world stage.

During the Revolutionary War General George Washington used animal-driven transportation to move American and French forces from the Hudson Valley to Yorktown, more than 450 miles away. So important was transportation in the American Revolution that Washington advised Congress to establish the position of Wagonmaster General to provide the Army's essential mobility. With the Civil War came the extensive use of the military railway service in moving troops to battle.

The Army's only previous large-scale ocean movement had been during the Mexican War in 1847. The decisive campaign of the Mexican War was Winfield Scott's overland offensive designed to capture Mexico City and end Mexican resistance. In one of the great achievements in US military history, Winfield Scott's forces staged an amphibious landing at Vera Cruz that captured the port on 9 March 1847. The Mexican commander chose not to oppose the landing, so over 8,600 men were landed without a single loss in just over 4 hours. This was an unprecedented military achievement for the time. Following a brief siege, Vera Cruz surrendered on 29 March 1847.

The importance of water transportation for the military increased rapidly during the Spanish American War, as the US Army Transport Service appeared. The Regular Army on the eve of the war had only 28,183 soldiers. Once war was declared, there was an enthusiastic rush of men to enlist. By the end of May 1898, 163,626 enlisted men had been mustered into service. By the end of the war in August 1898, the Army had 274,717 soldiers on duty, including 58,688 in the Regular Army and 216,029 volunteers. But no one in the Army was experienced in large overseas movements.

The military's lack of experience in this type of operation proved to be a more serious obstacle than the Spanish Army. Congress was opposed to granting U.S. registry to foreign vessels, so for the Cuba expedition the Army was limited to chartering U.S. vessels involved in the Atlantic and Gulf coastal trade. By 1 July, the Quartermaster Department had chartered 43 transports, 4 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 2 ocean tugs, and 3 decked barges for Cuba; another 14 transports were chartered on the Pacific coast for the Philippines expeditions. More were chartered in July and August. When enough vessels could not be chartered, the Army purchased 14 steamships and quickly outfitted them to carry troops to Cuba and Puerto Rico.

Even the relatively short move to Cuba required the creation of a port of embarkation, coordinated movements of troops and supplies to the port, and placement of units on ships. The War Department selected Tampa as the port of embarkation, despite limited rail lines. Failure to establish priorities on shipments or to ensure that shipments were labeled properly compounded the transportation problems. Unloaded rail cars filled the sidings from Tampa to Columbia, South Carolina, and important shipments were detained while unnecessary supplies were unloaded. Between 18 May and 31 August, the depot at Tampa handled 13,239 carloads of supplies and equipment, as well as railcars transporting 66,000 soldiers (with baggage) and over 15,000 animals.

Spanish Adm. Cervera's fleet had taken refuge (29 May 1898) in Santiago Bay, and the American Navy had asked the Army to reduce the defenses guarding the entrance. The War Department, eager to get the Army into action, directed Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter to embark his loosely organized V Corps, which had been assembled around Tampa, and sail for Cuba. The expedition for Cuba was reduced to utter chaos as uncontrolled units rolled down the single-track railway to become hopelessly entangled at the ill-equipped port of embarkation at Tampa.

After many delays, and in an atmosphere of the utmost confusion, the embarkation of some 17,000 men began on 11 June 1898, lasting four days. Those who remained on the ships that rode at anchor in the harbor until 13 June suffered because of the heat and poor ventilation, uniforms not designed for extremely hot weather, a monotonous travel ration, and an inadequate water supply.^1 Although Shafter allowed the men off the ships in detachments for exercise, they were not permitted to remain on shore because no satisfactory campsite could be found near the harbor.^2 By the time the Cuban expedition sailed from Tampa on 14 June, it was loaded aboard 38 vessels and accompanied by Navy ships. However, poor estimates of carrying capacity meant that the transports could move only about 17,000 soldiers, not the 25,000 originally planned.

The vessels upon which the V Corps embarked had been obtained under the assumption that the landing would be at Mariel, less than two days away, rather than at the southeastern tip of the island, 1,000 miles and almost a week's voyage from Tampa. Matters were further complicated when authorities adopted a British formula for space per man intended for troop transports rather than the converted freighters and passenger vessels available to Shafter's force. As a result, many more soldiers were placed aboard each vessel than it could carry without endangering their health, especially if they were on it for many days. Conditions on board were cramped, uncomfortable, and unsanitary, and the lack of cooking facilities led to the unfortunate overreliance on canned beef.

On 20 June 1898 the convoy reached a point off Santiago, but it was two days before Shafter could make up his mind where to land the troops. Rear Adm. William T. Sampson wanted them to land near the entrance of the bay, where a powerful fort dominated the area, and to storm the positions guarding the sea approaches. Shafter considered this plan too dangerous and followed the advice of Gen. Calixto Garcia, a Cuban insurgent leader, who recommended Daiquiri, 18 miles east of Santiago Bay, as a landing site.

Unloading the troops at Daiquiri was a fairly smooth operation. The Navy landed some men, but most came ashore on small boats (the transports' lifeboats) that they manned themselves. By contrast, landing supplies was a slow and laborious operation, mainly because there was only one small dock at Daiquiri and because only one of the expedition's lighters had reached Cuba. To relieve unloading problems in Cuba, the Army contracted with a New York firm to send workers to Cuba to build lighters, barges, and docks, as well as repair railroads and engines. These workers arrived on 23 July, after the surrender of Santiago.

On 1 May 1898 a small American squadron under Comdr. George Dewey completely destroyed a Spanish naval force in Manila Bay. The Manila campaign was a sequel to the first naval engagement of the war. Having won the Battle of Manila Bay, Commodore Dewey immediately recognized that, while he could now compel Manila's surrender, the city could not be occupied without a strong force of soldiers. He also soon became aware of the dual risks of a Spanish relief expedition and intervention by another power. Responding quickly to his cabled request for reinforcements, the U.S. Government made arrangements to dispatch Army forces and additional warships.


City of Peking

By this time Washington was planning to take control of the Philippines. The War Department responded eagerly to the request for ground forces, and sent about 11,300 troops to Manila under the command of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt by 25 July 1898. Three groups of soldiers were sent as rapidly as they could be gathered and trained. The first contingent of 2,500 men left San Francisco in the transport City of Peking and two other transports on 25 May and arrived in Manila Bay at the end of June. Another four transports with 3,500 men steamed through the Golden Gate on 15 June, arriving on 17 July. The third group, with 4,800 men embarked in six ships, departed on 27 June and reached Manila Bay at the end of July. More soldiers and Marines were sent after the war's conclusion.

Managing the men and materiel converging on San Francisco was a smoother process than at Tampa. The numbers involved were smaller, but San Francisco also was a better embarkation site: it had better rail connections and harbor facilities. The San Francisco depot was able to expand quickly to accommodate over 30,000 soldiers. The only serious problem was obtaining enough transports to carry the Army to the Philippines, and the Quartermaster Department solved that by procuring (mostly by charter, in a few cases by purchase) all available vessels on the Pacific coast.

The transports bound for the Philippines were better fitted for a long voyage than those going to Cuba. The accommodations generally were more comfortable, and, most importantly, there were galleys for cooking. However, there were unloading problems in the Philippines and problems moving supplies between the two bases, Camp Dewey and Cavite. Many men and supplies went ashore on cascos-the native lighter of the Philippines-towed by captured Spanish tugs or Navy launches; each casco could carry 200 men with tents, packs, and 10 days of rations.

See photo.


(Philippine barge, circa, 1898. George Dewey used these vessels and their expert crews willy-nilly to get Merritt's troops ashore at Camp McKinley and to transport supplies between Sangley Point and Paranaque, where Camp McKinley was located. These lighters were "invaluable".  The similarity to a Chinese "junk" is no accident. M.)

After the fall of Santiago General Miles took personal charge of an expedition to Puerto Rico. His force of about 3,000 men on 9 transports landed at Guanica on 25 July 1898, and an additional force under Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke landed at Guayama. Four columns of American troops quickly overran the island. There was some light skirmishing in which a few Americans were wounded, but the population as a whole received the Americans with enthusiasm.

(Lie. The Puerto Ricans were less than enthusiastic. We will find out about how unenthusiastic they were in a few days, but here is a hint. Americans were shot, but not by the Spaniards in Puerto Rico. M.)

The acquisition of island territories following the Spanish-American War prompted the Army to develop its own fleet of sea-going ships to support Army forces overseas. This operation became known as the Army Transport Service, and operated under the direction of the Quartermaster General. The ships operated a line from the Pacific Coast to the Philippines, an inter-island service in the Philippines, and other support to overseas stations. They maintained this fleet until World War II, except during World War I when the Navy Department assumed responsibility for water transportation.

1. The appalling conditions aboard the transports were due to three primary causes:
a. The troops, because there was no potable water condenser system designed into these combination ships above crews and rated civilian passenger capacity, had to be supplied water from the steam engine water condenser circuit. Whether one has ever drunk rust contaminated water, or has drunk water from a locomotive boiler, one gets the idea, that dysentery and diarrhea and heavy metals (lead) poisoning was a "slight problem".
b. What goes for potable water goes for the toilets. The necessity to use buckets and "over the side" added to the stench and the health woes.
c. Shafter was an immoral idiot. While his staff and fatso he rode south in refrigerated and air-conditioned comfort, he condemned 17,000 soldiers to an utter Hades of a voyage, in temperatures over 35 degrees centigrade and to seasickness and to crowded conditions aboard the transports that not even the Japanese of WWII would accept as doable for an across the ocean troop transport evolution. The British transport space allotment per trooper was supposed to be 8 by 8 x 8 or 512 cubic feet for the trooper and his personal supplies needed for him to campaign. That was on a British specially designed troop transport which was little better than a cattle ferry for their poor soldier wretches. The combination freighter / passenger ships which was the American army ideal, they in practice, allotted about 80 to 100 cubic feet to an American soldier and his supplies. Prisoners got more cell space by law in that era (384 cubic feet or what a modern American submariner is allotted.).
2. The arrival off Santiago was bungled multiple ways. Let us count them together:
a. Shafter's incompetent staff had not created a plan of disembarkation upon arrival in the Bahia de Santiago. Nor did they bring along the physical means to move troops and equipment from ship to shore (Specialist bow ramp, flat bottomed, shallow draft landing craft that is. If they needed the plans to make some, they could have gone into the dusty forgotten War Department files and whiffed off the musty plans that General Winfield Scott of Mexican American War fame left them. These were detailed plans he created and used for his landing craft. He had his troops BUILD THEM and then the required the navy to have hoisted the barges aboard their ships in lieu of longboats and he used them to land at Vera Cruz, Mexico; 6000 men, 300 horses and 40 field guns in 6 hours over a beach with no piers or docks in sight. Sheesh, how could the Americans forget that they knew how it was supposed to be done? M.)    
b. The army did not listen to Sampson, that nitwit, fortunately, but they had not bothered to ask the Marines for advice either; nor did they talk to anybody competent about the local conditions expected ashore. Garcia was a rather poor source of information, but at least he had some. Daquiri and Siboney were open front fishing villages and offload points for sugar exporters. The New York based Sugar Cartel, in whose name, this war was actually being fought, knew quite a lot about how ramshackle things were in Santiago Province and they could have been a source of good pre-invasion information themselves as well as a source of operational planning (railroads and road-net) as they would finally prove to be when the War Department finally talked to those idiots in later June. Their belated information was used to plan the assault on the Santiago water supply and to move onto San Juan Heights. 
c. Getting the stevedores and harbor rats from New York City down to Siboney to straighten that Shafter created mess out, was a post San Juan Hill debacle tack-on. We can credit that one to the Navy and John Long.   
d. Guantanamo Bay was sitting there in Marine hands since 10 June 1898. They had the fresh water wells on 15 June 1898. Did it not occur to anybody at V Corps that here was a spot where Americans could come ashore and organize some semblance of an advanced beachhead camp for V Corps as a rest and refit area to get the troops, sick and DYING aboard those transports, ashore for fresh air and open spaces?  "Pecos Bill" Shafter and "Braindead" Sampson failed to cooperate on that one, though I notice with SARCASM, that General Miles used Guantanamo Bay as his chosen waypoint onto his Puerto Rico "picnic".                     

[lordroel]

Day 97 of the Spanish–American War, July 25th 1898

Puerto Rico

Originally intending to land at Fajardo, Puerto Rico, on July 24, the US Army invasion force led by General Miles changes course overnight after learning that the American press has revealed the Fajardo destination. Instead, the auxiliary cruiser USS Gloucester secures the port at Guánica, Puerto Rico, and US troops come ashore there.

US troops under the command of General Nelson Miles disembarked in Guánica on the southern coast of Puerto Rico.

Philippines

US General Merritt reaches Manila in the Philippines. American troops there now number 10,000, and Merritt begins military operations from Cavite to capture the city.

Guanica,Porto Rico - Lieutenant Harry P. Huse To Captain Richard Wainwright

Lieutenant Harry P. Huse To Captain Richard Wainwright

“B” U. S. S. Gloucester,

Guanica,Porto Rico,July 25,1898.

Sir:

I have the honor to report as follows on the landing party sent this morning to capture the village of Guanica.

The force under my command consisted of twenty-eight men and Lieut.T.C.Wood, embarked in the cutter. We landed without meeting with any opposition at a little wharf,and the men were at once deployed to cover the beach. The Spanish flag was hauled down and our colors hoisted in their place. An irregular fire increasing in strength opened on our right flank and center. This was answered with a slow fire on our part/backed up by the Colt automatic in the cutter,that had taken up a position at the foot of the highway that leads up into the country. I sent Lieut.Wood to take charge of the right flank with some eight men,while Chief Yeoman Lacy with four completely covered the left flank from the ruins of a stone house excellently situated for the purpose. From a countryman,I learned that the local military force consisted of about thirty regulars/but that reinforcements had already started from Yanco,about ten miles away. I signaled to you for reinforcements and pushed forward our centre along the highway. The enemy’s fire was well sustained but high and no casualties resulted from it. At the northern limit of the village we built a wall across the road and placed there the new Colt 6 m/m automatic gun you had sent ashore/and strung two barbed wire fences fifty and one hundred yards to the front across the road. The first Colt automatic gun was jammed. Presently the Gloucester opened fire from her 3 pdrs. and 6 pdrs. firing over our heads,and the enemy retreated.

A little later the first contingent of the invading army,under General Gilmore,U.S.A.,landed and pushed forward beyond our limits. In obedience to your orders the landing party then returned to the ship. At the special request of General Gilmore I left Lieut.Wood and party ashore with the Colt gun. They returned to the ship an hour later.

I wish to specially mention the gallant conduct of Lieut.Wood and of Chief Yeoman Lacy. All the men under my command behaved splendidly. The navy rifle behaved abominably,the majority jamiing [i.e., jamming] at inopportune moments,and several being rendered useless when we appeared to be in considerable danger of defeat.

Very respectfully,

Harry P. Huse,

Lt. and Executive Officer.

[miletus12]

Jul 25, 2022 2:49:44 GMT lordroel said:

Day 97 of the Spanish–American War, July 25th 1898

Puerto Rico

Originally intending to land at Fajardo, Puerto Rico, on July 24, the US Army invasion force led by General Miles changes course overnight after learning that the American press has revealed the Fajardo destination. Instead, the auxiliary cruiser USS Gloucester secures the port at Guánica, Puerto Rico, and US troops come ashore there.

US troops under the command of General Nelson Miles disembarked in Guánica on the southern coast of Puerto Rico.

There is some confusion about what happened in respect to Fajardo, Puerto Rico. 

The American Army Moves on Puerto-Rico

Part 1

by Mark R. Barnes, Ph.D., Senior Archeologist, National Park Service, Southeast Regional Office

General:

This paper will discuss the U.S. Army's campaign on the island of Puerto Rico during the Spanish American War, including the battle of Fajardo, the skirmish at Guanica, and the battles of Yauco and Coamo. The article also includes a study of Miles's strategy, and the movements of each of his four prongs of attack.

The American Army Moves on Puerto Rico

About the time Admiral Sampson's fleet was bombarding San Juan (May 12th) the American army began to see the need to increase to its forces, as the most of the Regular Army forces were rapidly being committed to the Cuban campaign and the occupation of the Philippines. All throughout May and June of 1898 volunteer state militia units were mustered into the United States Army. By June President McKinley was ready to order General Miles to invade Puerto Rico mainly with these fresh troops (Long 1923:200). The increase in available and trained troops would allow for greater speed in the engagement of the Spanish on that island.


General Nelson Miles

However, Miles and his invasion force could not leave directly from the United States for Puerto Rico because of the military situation in Cuba in early July. General Shafter had telegraphed the President that he had taken heavy causalities in the attack on San Juan Hill and he was not sure he could hold his position, particularly with the recent outbreak of yellow fever in his camp. As a result, the administration detoured Miles to Santiago to booster Shafter, who upon being told Miles was coming with reinforcements, commenced to demand the surrender of General Toral's Spanish forces in Santiago.

With the end of the Santiago de Cuba campaign, on July 17th, General Miles shifted the seat of the war to Puerto Rico (Porter 1904:32). The Puerto Rican campaign was now the highest priority of the McKinley administration as the Spanish government of Prime Minister Sagasta had approached the French government to serve as a go-between to initiate peace negotiations with the United States (Millis 1931:336).

If the United States were to claim Puerto Rico in peace talks it was vital to land troops on the island immediately. However, Miles and his troops were delayed in Cuba by Admiral Sampson's refusal to detach armored cruisers and battleships to escort Miles' expedition to Puerto Rico, until July 21st. While Miles had sufficient transport vessels for moving his troops to Puerto Rico, he was concerned about not having enough armored battleships to protect the troop transports in the event of an attack by Spanish torpedo boats, which had already sallied out of San Juan to attack American warships twice before. Miles cabled his concerns about Sampson to the Secretary of War on July 20th.

The NUECES and LAMPASAS came in [to Guantanamo, Cuba] last night with engineer corps, artillery train, and 600 troops. There are now ten transports here, ready to move to Porto Rico, including four batteries, light artillery and siege artillery, and other en route. The horses are suffering and some dying from long and close confinement, and the troops are subjected to much discomfort. I have been waiting for Admiral Sampson to furnish proper naval assistance . . . [U.S. Government 1902:293]

Sampson was preparing for an attack on the Canary and Balearic Islands, and a possible bombardment of coastal Spanish towns if the war was to drag on and he was loath to part with his big ships (Nofi 1996:168). However, a telegram from the President released the ships and the Miles expedition departed Santiago de Cuba for Puerto Rico on July 21st with a mostly volunteer force that had been waiting and training for three months to see action.

The strategy Miles had developed for the Puerto Rico campaign would not have mattered without sufficient military force, which he did not yet have. Miles was under orders to return to the United States after the surrender of the Spanish in Cuba, and possibly he feared that he would not be permitted to lead the invasion. So with only 3500 troops, but sufficient naval support he decided to depart from Guantanamo, Cuba for Puerto Rico. Other elements of the invasion force would simply have to follow Miles' lead (Trask 347-349).

As previously discussed with President McKinley and Secretary of War Alger, General Miles was to coordinate his personal arrival off Puerto Rico, with a few thousand volunteer troops, mainly the 6th Massachusetts and the 6th Illinois regiments, who accompanied him to Cuba to reinforce Shafter. The 11th and 19th Regular Infantry Regiments jumping off from Tampa, and more volunteers leaving from Charleston, South Carolina, and Newport News, Virginia would all land simultaneously at Cape San Juan, near the Fajardo Lighthouse, with Miles, on the northeastern point of Puerto Rico. From there, over 25,000 American troops would march west for sixty miles overland to capture the fortified city of San Juan with the assistance of the US Navy. This was the plan approved by the President and Secretary, before Miles left Washington for Cuba, on 26 June (Nofi 1996:232).

The departure of the troops from the United States for the Puerto Rican campaign experienced much less trouble than Shafter's forces in the Cuban campaign that left from Tampa, as they left from several ports usually with good shipping facilities. Rather then concentrating all the troops at a port like Tampa whose facilities could only sustain relatively small numbers of troop movements. The first elements of I Corps, about 3500 men, accompanied by Miles, included General Henry Garretson's Brigade, consisting mainly of the 6th Massachusetts and 6th Illinois Volunteers, and a few Regular Artillery Batteries and Engineers left Charleston, South Carolina on July 7th, on the transport USS YALE and the cruiser USS COLUMBIA and arrived off Cuba to reinforce Shafter's V Corps on July 11th, where they were met with additional elements of Miles' I Corps (Trask 1996:346; Nofi 1996:232).

The landing of these troops on Cuba was rendered unnecessary by the surrender of Spanish forces a few days later. General Toral was overawed by the size of the reinforcements Miles had with him - not realizing they were intended for Puerto Rico. By protecting his troops from exposure to fevers, which was already infecting large numbers of Shafter's V Corps and would ultimately account for a larger number of deaths than that suffered in Cuban combat, Miles could land in Puerto Rico with a strong force, but one that had been sitting on ships in the tropical climate for over two weeks (Nofi 1996:233).

Of concern to Miles was the length of time his troops would have to remain on the crowded and make-shift transports. As noted in the official history of Battery A of St. Louis, transport by ship could be very difficult indeed,

After arriving in Newport News, [Virginia, from Chickamauga, Georgia] the battery was loaded on the "ROUMANIAN" and sailed for Puerto Rico. The sleeping quarters were at the bottom of the "black hole", reached by a crude ladder that ran down through the port hatches, past two decks of houses, into the darkness. Hammocks were hung at night in double tiers between rows of upright posts, and so close together that elbows touched. The air was hot and stifling and the sight of the mass of legs and arms protruding in all directions, in the dismal half gloom from the lantern, recalled Dore's pictures of the Inferno. The ship having been used for years as a cattle boat, the reminiscent odor combined with the smell of bilge water and stale provisions can convey no adequate appreciation by mere description. From the cracks in the boards that covered temporarily the rough bottom a dark slime oozed and made the footing insecure. One could hardly stay there without feeling giddy, but that is where the men were expected to sleep and eat. A soldier found on deck after taps had sounded was summarily ordered below, on penalty of arrest . . . Only the guard relief and the sick men were allowed to sleep on deck . . . The ship being shorthanded, soldiers were asked to volunteer for stoker duty. The reward was food: three portions of sailor's stew a day. The temptation to get something beside weevily hard-tack, spoiled canned beef and rotten tomatoes, drew many a sturdy lad to the fire-room . . . Few of the soldiers could stand the test for more than one shift, although the promise of food was hard to resist . . . The water supply provided for the men was warm and polluted. The steward of the boat made a nice profit selling ice water at ten cents a glass and warm beer at half a dollar a bottle, till stopped by the commanding officer . . . The sanitary arrangements of disarrangements of the ship transcend all description. Let it be said in short that the "ROUMANIAN" was considered the very worst transport that ever went out, and its faults were added to by the incompetence of the captain-quartermaster in charge, who it is a pleasure to say afterward went to jail, and by the indifference, to put it mildly, of a regular army martinet, who confessed no love for volunteers, but might have, if he chose, somewhat ameliorated their condition . . . When the "ROUMANIAN" rounded the southwestern corner of Puerto Rico, she ran aground on a coral reef. Full tide considerately released her [Porter 1904:32-37].

This particular experience illustrates the lack of control that was occurring in the United States Army during the war. While the ROUMANIAN might be considered a particularly lurid example of the difficulty of transporting large numbers of troops caused in 1898, a reading of other volunteer accounts shows that Battery A, of St. Louis were not the only American troops exposed to these types of conditions.

Delay encountered in Cuba - securing proper naval escort, and treating with General Toral - caused General Miles to move his transports to Guantanamo Bay. But, it was imperative that Miles leave Santiago soon in order to rendezvous with Major General James Harrison Wilson's force of 3,571 men of General Enrst's Brigade. This brigade consisted of the 16th Pennsylvania, 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin, and the remaining elements of the 6th Illinois Volunteer Regiments, and had departed Charleston, South Carolina, on the 20th of July, bound for Cape Fajardo (Rivero 1972:223). Miles' command as he left Cuba consisted of 3,145 troops from the 6th Illinois and 6th Massachusetts, plus small units of combat and telegraph engineers, artillery, and a sanitation unit. These men were transported mainly on the USS YALE and USS DIXIE, with the battleship USS MASSACHUSETTS, cruiser USS COLUMBIA, and gunboat USS GLOUCESTER providing protection against Spanish torpedo boats in Puerto Rican waters. Overall command of the naval force was under Captain Francis J. Higginson, captain of MASSACHUSETTS, which served as the flagship for the Puerto Rican expedition. The bulk of Miles' troops were on the transports LAMPASAS, CITY OF MACON, NUECES, COMANCHE, UNIONIST, STILLWATER, RITA, and SPECIALIST (Rivero 1972:181-182).

However, sometime between the 21st and 24th of July, General Miles did something for which he was well known in military circles - he changed his mind about landing at Fajardo. Without consulting the President or the Secretary of War he ordered Captain Higginson to change course and sail for Guánica on the southwest side of the island, probably based to a large extent on the information supplied by newly promoted Captain Henry F. Whitney fresh from his espionage in Puerto Rico, who was now with Miles' expedition. Miles determined that a landing on Guánica would have the benefits of surprise and a more welcoming population (Trask 1981:353).

Instead of marching upon San Juan by the short route from Cap Fajardo, the General had decided to sweep triumphantly through the island, beginning at the most distant point and spreading his conquering armies throughout its entire area. The General later advanced a number of reasons for this change of plan. One was that, since the press had of course announced the original destination to the world, he would probably find it easier to land somewhere else [Millis 1931:336-7].

(This was the New York times. M.) 

Regardless of the tactical advantage that Miles reported, this action was not popular with Secretary of War Alger, Captain Alfred T. Mahan or Captain Francis Higginson, commander of the USS MASSASSACHUSETTS.^1  Considering Miles' change of landing sites indefensible, Mahan wrote to Secretary Long,

The Porto Rico landing I once told you, at Guanica, and the initiation of operations there, appears to me a military stupidity so great, that I can account for these acts only by a kind of obsession or vanity, to do a singular and unexpected thing [Trask 1981:355].

It has been suggested that Mahan's reaction to Miles Guánica plan stemmed from Mahan's over confidence in dealing with the Spanish military (Trask 1981:355), and his possible suspicion that Miles did not intend to share the glory of the campaign with the Navy (Millis 1931:337). Captain Higginson, however, had more practical reasons for his objection to the plan. The harbor at Guánica was not deep enough for the MASSACHUSETTS, COLUMBIA, and DIXIE to enter and so could not give proper naval support for debarking troops. Captain Higginson was not convinced that he could provide adequate offensive support in an operation on Guánica (Trask 1981:355). Should troops landing at Guánica come under fire they could only be supported by the shallow draft gunboat GLOUCESTER, formerly J. Pierpont Morgan's yacht the CORSAIR, now armed with four 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, and two Colt automatic machine guns and commanded by Captain Richard Wainwright, the former executive officer of the USS MAINE.

(I am convinced that Higginson and Mahan were on the same page as regards the hydrography. Mahan was correct about Miles' vainglory and ego. I am not sure that Mahan was wrong about the decrepitude and incompetence within the Spanish Armada. He was wrong about the Esercito which he badly underestimated. M.) 

^1 Remember that USS Massachusetts is still down one after turret and is scheduled for a visit to Cramp and Sons for postwar repairs. M.

Accepting General Miles overall authority for the Puerto Rican campaign, Captain Higginson ordered a change in the course of the fleet south through the Mona Channel and dispatched the DIXIE to meet the NEW ORLEANS, then on blockade duty off San Juan on the evening of July 24th. The DIXIE conveyed orders from Captain Higginson to Captain W.H. Folger of the NEW ORLEANS to proceed to Fajardo to direct American ships that would soon be arriving at the original landing point to Guánica. The DIXIE turned around and pursued the main invasion fleet, which was navigating the Mona Channel with its running lights off, arriving before Guánica at 5:20 AM on July 25th, 1898 (Rivero 1972:184).

In a serious breach of professional courtesy, Miles did not see fit to inform either of his civilian superiors -- the President of the United States or the Secretary of War Alger -- of the change in landing site. On July 26th, a dumbfounded Secretary of War Alger learned of the change in the landing site from the Associated Press "that General Miles had suddenly changed his whole plan of campaign while in mid-passage" to Puerto Rico, landing at the small port of Guánica on the southwest coast of the island (Millis 1931:336). Miles appears to have based his change of landing site on a variety of reasons 1) the Spanish had prior knowledge of the intended landing at Fajardo from American newspaper articles; 2) Whitney's spy mission and intelligence from Puerto Rican exile alerted Miles to strong anti-Spanish attitude among the people in the southern part of the island; 3) a landing far from strong Spanish forces would provide Miles' volunteer forces time to organize and prepare themselves for combat; and 4) lighters to transport troops and supplies from the transports were readily available at Guánica (Picó 1987:56).

Three days after landing (July 28th), Miles finally communicated with Secretary Alger and sent the following reassuring cable after the landings were secured and once he had establish communication links with Washington via the underwater telegraph lines in St. Thomas, Danish Virgin Islands.

Spanish troops are retreating from southern part of Porto Rico . . . This is a prosperous and beautiful country. The Army will soon be in mountain region; weather delightful; troops in the best of health and spirit; anticipate no insurmountable obstacles in future results. Results thus far have been accomplished without loss of a single life [U.S. Government 1902:330].

We will break off here as this is where the date stops.

The highlights one should notice are:
a. the American army and navy are at loggerheads.
b. military campaigns are political footballs not only among politicians in pinstripes but among the uniformed types as well. The disgraceful disclosure of the landing site at Fajardo would not have been disclosed by the New York newspapers if proper op-sec had been maintained at Miles' HQ. There is a slight chance that Miles engineered the news leak to sabotage the preferred USN campaign model for his own idea of invading south Puerto Rico.   This news leak would also give him political cover in that he could point to the newspapers and blame the NAVY and the reporters for why he had to change plans. 
c. One can still see Sampson's insubordination, incompetence and general tendency to not play well with others. No less than President McKinley has to order Sampson to cough up battleship support to Miles. This Sampson grudgingly gives in the shape of the damaged USS Massachusetts. Later, he will send more damaged ships to support operations around Puerto Rico. I MEAN THE MONITORS.     
d. Miles does several things mentioned in passing as he lays over at Guantanamo. He makes Toral pack it in at Santiago and save the McKinley administration the headache of explaining to the public the estimated 3,000 to 5,000 dead that would have resulted from storming Santiago de Cuba. Shafter is still going to manage to get 2,000 men of his command dead as a result of his bungled efforts to quarantine against Yellow Fever.^1  He does stuff Sampson's idea of using the army in some of Sampson's further nitwit ideas of more coastal assaults. Instead, he thumbscrews Toral, with the old Shakespeare MacBeth trick and bags the Spanish garrison. 

(^1 It was not as if the Americans had no idea about how to combat Yellow Fever.  They had read what little work the French had done in their bungled efforts to dig a canal in Central America. M.)

Jul 25, 2022 2:49:44 GMT lordroel said:

Philippines

US General Merritt reaches Manila in the Philippines. American troops there now number 10,000, and Merritt begins military operations from Cavite to capture the city.

Merritt is really an underrated American general. As soon as he lands at Paranaque at Manila Bay across from Sangley Point, he counts Filipino and Spanish noses and takes a quick look at Manila, the city as a tactical objective. He is outnumbered five to one. Storming the city is physically out of the question. Temporary "cooperation" with Aguinaldo's generals to invest the city might be an option.  He can use the Filipino Republic army to scare the Spaniards. Jardenes and Augustin are easily influenced and under a lot of psychological pressure. All Merritt has to do, is follow the previous Dewey line and Dewey's advice and turn the thumbscrews.  Merritt and Dewey work well together. They LIKE each other.     

Jul 25, 2022 2:49:44 GMT lordroel said:

Guanica,Porto Rico - Lieutenant Harry P. Huse To Captain Richard Wainwright

Lieutenant Harry P. Huse To Captain Richard Wainwright

“B” U. S. S. Gloucester,

Guanica,Porto Rico,July 25,1898.

Sir:

I have the honor to report as follows on the landing party sent this morning to capture the village of Guanica.

The force under my command consisted of twenty-eight men and Lieut.T.C.Wood, embarked in the cutter. We landed without meeting with any opposition at a little wharf,and the men were at once deployed to cover the beach. The Spanish flag was hauled down and our colors hoisted in their place. An irregular fire increasing in strength opened on our right flank and center. This was answered with a slow fire on our part/backed up by the Colt automatic in the cutter,that had taken up a position at the foot of the highway that leads up into the country. I sent Lieut.Wood to take charge of the right flank with some eight men,while Chief Yeoman Lacy with four completely covered the left flank from the ruins of a stone house excellently situated for the purpose. From a countryman,I learned that the local military force consisted of about thirty regulars/but that reinforcements had already started from Yanco,about ten miles away. I signaled to you for reinforcements and pushed forward our centre along the highway. The enemy’s fire was well sustained but high and no casualties resulted from it. At the northern limit of the village we built a wall across the road and placed there the new Colt 6 m/m automatic gun you had sent ashore/and strung two barbed wire fences fifty and one hundred yards to the front across the road. The first Colt automatic gun was jammed. Presently the Gloucester opened fire from her 3 pdrs. and 6 pdrs. firing over our heads,and the enemy retreated.

A little later the first contingent of the invading army, under General Gilmore, U.S.A.,landed and pushed forward beyond our limits. In obedience to your orders the landing party then returned to the ship. At the special request of General Gilmore I left Lieut.Wood and party ashore with the Colt gun. They returned to the ship an hour later.

I wish to specially mention the gallant conduct of Lieut.Wood and of Chief Yeoman Lacy. All the men under my command behaved splendidly. The navy rifle behaved abominably, the majority jamming [i.e., jamming] at inopportune moments, and several being rendered useless when we appeared to be in considerable danger of defeat.

Very respectfully,

Harry P. Huse,

Lt. and Executive Officer.

The malfunctioning firearms in question. 



The Browning "Potato Digger" was the world's SECOND gas operated machine gun, but the first to be adopted (by the United States Navy). In its Spanish American War version it operated off the USN 6mm bullet  The M1895 had the same exact problem as the unreliable Maxim machine gun. It used a cloth belt to hold the ammunition. If the belt (made of canvas) stretched or unstitched, the space between bullets would spread apart and the sprockets on the pickup pawl inside the machine gun would grab a bullet wrong and one could get misfeeds and jams and fail to functions. Also, the US Navy ammunition had a large number of duds. This was not a problem with the Browning, because a yank on the tab or a pull through and the machine gun would resume to operate. If one got a jam in the "knuckle buster" (the Maxim), one had to tear the whole gun apart to get at the stove-piped bullet.  This was one of the many reasons the British went on to reinvent the Maxim as the Vickers.       

The Lee Navy rifle adopted the same year as the potato-digger had its own problems.



This goofed up rifle was the victim of hotted up ammunition and a jam happy straight pull operating cyclic. The extractor was the main culprit.  

[lordroel]

Day 98 of the Spanish–American War, July 26th 1898

United States

Having finally decrypted the Spanish government's message to him, French Ambassador Cambon passes on Spain's request for peace terms to US President McKinley.

Puerto Rico

Brigadier general George Garretson and Guy V. Henry arrived at Yauco and gained control of the key railroad line connecting it with Ponce, the largest city on the island.

[miletus12]

Jul 26, 2022 2:50:59 GMT lordroel said:

United States

Having finally decrypted the Spanish government's message to him, French Ambassador Cambon passes on Spain's request for peace terms to US President McKinley.

Jules Cambon is not to be confused with his brother, Paul Cambon. It is rather easy to determine that he was pro-Spanish, and he was definitely not America's friend in his actions as an intermediary.   "Backstabber" is what I believe William Day called him. 

Jul 26, 2022 2:50:59 GMT lordroel said:

Puerto Rico

Brigadier general George Garretson and Guy V. Henry arrived at Yauco and gained control of the key railroad line connecting it with Ponce, the largest city on the island.

BG George Garretson was another one of those "political generals" like the incompetent Duffield. A "friend" of McKinley, he was responsible for the shambles at Yauco   

Jul 26 1898


Battle of Yauco

After Rivera, the keeper of the Guánica lighthouse, notified Atilio Gaztambide, the mayor of the town of Yauco, located six miles (10 km) north of Guánica, of the American invasion of Guanica, the mayor in turn notified Governor Macías via telegraph. Governor Macías ordered Captain Salvador Meca and his 3rd company of the 25th Patria Battalion from Yauco to head for Guánica. Meca and his men were joined by Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Puig, who assumed command of the Spanish forces at Hacienda Desideria two miles (3 km) from Guánica. Puig arrived with two companies known as "Cazador Patria Battalion", and they were joined by Puerto Rican volunteers, the Civil Guards, and mounted guerrillas from the towns of Yauco and Sabana Grande. Puig had the men positioned on both sides of the road that ran from Guánica to Hacienda Desideria and Yauco, as well as an infantry company positioned on a hill south of the hacienda.

In the meantime, U.S. Brigadier General George A. Garretson, set out of Guánica with his men towards Yauco with the intention of capturing the Yauco rail terminus that ran between that town and the City of Ponce, the largest city in the southern region of the island. Garretson and his men arrived in the darkness of night and was informed by his scouts of the possibility of a hostile situation at the Hacienda Desideria. He ordered the Illinois company and two companies (companies L and M) of the 6th Massachusetts to occupy a small hill on his right that overlooked the hacienda.

Captain San Pedro detected the movements of the American troops from his positions on a nearby hill and ordered his men to open fire. Garretson then ordered a direct attack on the Spanish and Puerto Rican forces in the hacienda. At daybreak, the 6th Massachusetts overran the Spanish forces and suffered four casualties. Puig was expecting reinforcements from Yauco which did not arrive and was ordered to disengage and retreat. Before retreating the right wing of the Spanish force, which was not overrun, initiated a flanking attack against two positions held by the Illinois and Massachusetts companies. The unexpected strength of the Spanish force caused some of the 6th Massachusetts troops to momentarily panic, but the Spanish forces were eventually driven off. Puig and his forces suffered two officers and three soldiers wounded and two soldiers dead.

Puig and his men retreated towards Yauco, but failed to destroy the rail terminus which connected the town to the city of Ponce, and proceeded to march towards the town of Peñuelas. Garretson's troops entered Yauco in the afternoon of July 26 and on July 27 Puig's men continued their march, leaving their artillery and heavy equipment behind, passing the towns of Adjuntas and Utuado and finally arriving at the town of Arecibo on the northern coast of the island on July 29. Col. Puig, believing that he would be dishonored and accused by the Spanish Government of abandoning military equipment during his retreat, committed suicide on August 2.

Major General Nelson A. Miles, upon learning about the lack of discipline of the 6th Massachusetts during the battle, ordered an investigation. The 6th Massachusetts was sent on a hard march from Guánica to Ponce as punishment and the regimental commander, a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a captain resigned upon request.

Read More

Source: Wikipedia Added by: Rob Brent


By the evening of July 25th the Spanish military command of Puerto Rico had been alerted to the landings at Guánica, by the keeper of the Guánica lighthouse who from his post at the eastern side of the entrance to Guánica harbor must of had a panoramic view of the thirteen warships and transports of the American invasion fleet. He promptly notified the mayor of Yauco, a town a six miles north of Guánica, who in turn telegraphed Governor Macías. Macías ordered Captain Salvador Meca and his infantry company to proceed from Yauco to Guánica. Captain Salvador Meca led the 3rd company of the 25th Patria Battalion from Yauco to Hacienda Desideria (today known as Hacienda Santa Rita) just two miles outside Guánica with his company, some Puerto Rican volunteers, a few civil guards, and a mounted guerrilla. By 11:00 PM on July 25th Captain Meca was joined by two companies (Cazador Patria Battalion), additional mounted guerrillas under Lieut. Col. Francisco Puig, who assumed command of the Spanish forces, and some volunteers from the towns of Yauco and Sabana Grande.

See that stupid hill? Guess which yahoo, who was supposed to be a trained West Pointer and artillerist, did not have his two field guns take it initially under fire and then allowed the Spaniards to circle around and poke from behind it from the west to route the 6th Massachusetts, who sat on TOP of it, (Who failed to dig in, and anticipate a counterattack, when they first took it against Garretson's orders. M.) 

I always thought Nelson Miles was a bit unfair about the 6th Massachusetts. It is true, their officers were ninnies and incompetents, but they did originally take that stupid hill and then they retook it in their own counterattack against the Spaniards after their panic wore off. I really think that forced march that Miles imposed on them was a bit of a Miles personal pique. The Yauco fiasco made HIM look bad.

M.