The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

[lordroel]

Day 99 of the Spanish–American War, July 27th 1898

Ponce, Puerto Rico

The US Navy gunboat USS Annapolis and the auxiliary cruisers USS Wasp and USS Dixie enter the undefended harbor at Ponce and threaten to bombard the town. With no Spanish official present, foreign diplomats must mediate between the US Navy and the city. These diplomats telegraph the US Navy's terms of surrender to the Spanish Governor-General of Puerto Rico, Manuel Macías. He reluctantly agrees to them.

Major general James H. Wilson's division arrived in Ponce, Puerto Rico.

[miletus12]

Jul 27, 2022 2:51:35 GMT lordroel said:

Day 99 of the Spanish–American War, July 27th 1898

Ponce, Puerto Rico

The US Navy gunboat USS Annapolis and the auxiliary cruisers USS Wasp and USS Dixie enter the undefended harbor at Ponce and threaten to bombard the town. With no Spanish official present, foreign diplomats must mediate between the US Navy and the city. These diplomats telegraph the US Navy's terms of surrender to the Spanish Governor-General of Puerto Rico, Manuel Macías. He reluctantly agrees to them.

Major general James H. Wilson's division arrived in Ponce, Puerto Rico.

You have got to be kidding me? 

James H. Wilson... the only Union general to consistently and repeatedly defeat Nathan Bedford Forrest. We will see him soon. To suggest that he was "deadly" was an understatement.  

[lordroel]

Day 100 of the Spanish–American War, July 28th 1898

Ponce, Puerto Rico

The Puerto Rican city of Ponce surrenders, and is invested with 12,000 US Army troops.

General Miles issued a public proclamation in Ponce stating that the purpose of the US invasion was to bring Puerto Rico a "banner of freedom."

Cuba

Duque de Almodóvar del Río called for the US annexation of Cuba.

US officials instruct General Shafter to return troops immediately to the United States to prevent an outbreak of yellow fever.

Malaria and yellow fever are rife among US Army troops garrisoned near Santiago de Cuba on the island of Cuba. Fifth Corps, to which the Rough Riders are attached has 4,270 men seriously ill (and dying), and corps commanders fear the unit can be wiped out if it stay in Cuba. The McKinley administration, however, plans to keep the corps in Cuba until peace negotiations with Spain are concluded. Public opinion is also against bringing home an army infected with yellow fever.

[miletus12]

Jul 28, 2022 2:57:51 GMT lordroel said:

Day 100 of the Spanish–American War, July 28th 1898

Ponce, Puerto Rico

The Puerto Rican city of Ponce surrenders, and is invested with 12,000 US Army troops.

General Miles issued a public proclamation in Ponce stating that the purpose of the US invasion was to bring Puerto Rico a "banner of freedom."

Banner of Freedom hunh?

Puerto Rico

In 1937, Puerto Rico enacted Law 116, the last eugenics sterilization law passed under United States territorial jurisdiction. It was not repealed until 1960. Yet the conditions for, and outcomes of, eugenics in Puerto Rico were established and assured not merely by Law 116, but by US colonialism. By 1925, owing to the 1898 US invasion and the subsequent devaluation of the peso and the dispossession of ranchers and farmers by US sugar interests, 70% of the Puerto Rican population was landless with 2% of the population owning 80% of the land. As they had elsewhere, US eugenicists seized on the resulting poverty, blaming overpopulation, and targeting poor women for sterilization and pharmaceutical experimentation. In 1976, the U.S Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reported that over 37% of women of childbearing age in Puerto Rico had been sterilized. The vast majority were in their twenties.



A prime mover of this outcome was Clarence Gamble, President of the Pennsylvania Birth Control Federation, founding member of the Human Betterment League and later of Birthright, heir to the Proctor & Gamble/Ivory Soap fortunes, and correspondent and colleague of Margaret Sanger. Through the years he was involved in initiatives in Israel, India, Hawaii, Egypt, Japan, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Pakistan, South Africa, and, in the US, Appalachia and the South, where he maintained that a reduction in the birthrate among African Americans was the solution to the region’s poverty.



In 1939, Gamble began flying Puerto Rican doctors to New York to learn the latest in sterilization techniques. Earlier in the decade he had staffed birth control clinics, established by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Puerto Rican Relief Administration, with his own fieldworkers and used them as sites for recruiting candidates for sterilization. Many of the women who submitted to tubal ligation were not made to understand that it was permanent. Some Gamble-supported facilities reported refusing admittance to women with who had given birth two or more times if they did not ‘consent’ to la operación. In 1968, roughly 30 years into Gamble’s involvement in Puerto Rico, women there had the highest sterilization rates in the world.



But sterilization was not Gamble’s only endeavor in Puerto Rico. He is equally notorious for his role in the subjection of poor women to medical experimentation. In the 1950s Doctors Gregory Pincus and John Rock began testing progesterone on women in Puerto Rico. Gamble expanded the distribution of oral progesterone, accepting donations from pharmaceutical companies who, unable to conduct trials in the US, bid for access to the women in his clinics. Visiting nurses and social workers were dispatched to housing projects in San Juan and to rural areas (Sanger referred to them as “your army of occupation”). The drug, which in considerably smaller doses would later come to be known simply as “The Pill,” was still experimental. Side effects, which included nausea, dizziness, headaches, were dismissed by researchers as psychological or blamed on Puerto Rican women themselves who were constructed as lacking the intellectual sophistication to follow directions. This particular racist and class-based trope was employed in almost every sterilization and population control campaign, either implicitly or explicitly. Deaths by pulmonary tuberculosis and congestive heart failure were likewise deemed irrelevant.



-Nancy Ordover

Of course Nelson Miles could not have known this attempted genocide would happen, but he did know the Sugar Interests wanted to remove the US and Spanish tariff walls and use Puerto Rico as one giant slave labor sugar plantation.   

Jul 28, 2022 2:57:51 GMT lordroel said:

Cuba

Duque de Almodóvar del Río called for the US annexation of Cuba.

US officials instruct General Shafter to return troops immediately to the United States to prevent an outbreak of yellow fever.

Malaria and yellow fever are rife among US Army troops garrisoned near Santiago de Cuba on the island of Cuba. Fifth Corps, to which the Rough Riders are attached has 4,270 men seriously ill (and dying), and corps commanders fear the unit can be wiped out if it stay in Cuba. The McKinley administration, however, plans to keep the corps in Cuba until peace negotiations with Spain are concluded. Public opinion is also against bringing home an army infected with yellow fever.

Support the troops? 

The Text of Theodore Roosevelt's "Round Robin" Letter


General:


The following is the text of the famous "round robin" letter, authored by Theodore Roosevelt, and provided to the Associated Press by Major General Shafter. The letter led to the troops of the 5th Corps being removed from Cuba. The action saved many lives among the the troops but angered the Secretary of War. The text includes the actual "round robin" section signed by the officers, including Roosevelt.



The Letter:



MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER -



SIR: In a meeting of the general and medical officers called by you at the Palace this morning we were all, as you know, unanimous in our views of what should be done with the army. To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire command North at once.



Yellow-fever cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in this division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe, contracted it.



But in this division: there have been 1,500 cases of malarial fever. Hardly a man has yet died from it, but the whole command is so weakened and shattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep, when a real yellow-fever epidemic instead of a fake epidemic, like the present one, strikes us, as it is bound to do if we stay here at the height of the sickness season, August and the beginning of September. Quarantine against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the toothache.



All of us are certain that as soon as the authorities at Washington fully appreciate the condition of the army, we shall be sent home. If we are kept here it will in all human possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die.



This is not only terrible from the standpoint of the individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the standpoint of military efficiency of the flower of the American army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The sick list, large though it is, exceeding four thousand, affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the army. Not twenty per cent. are fit for active work.



Six weeks on the North Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere where the yellow-fever germ cannot possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting-cocks, as able as we are eager to take a leading part in the great campaign against Havana in the fall, even if we are not allowed to try Porto Rico.



We can be moved North, if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country, although, of course, it would have been infinitely better if we had been moved North or to Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we faced bullets. But there is no object.



The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the sick-rate in our present weakened condition, and, anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the coast, as I have found by actual reconnoissance. Our present camps are as healthy as any camps at this end of the island can be.



I write only because I cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely and who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly, go to destruction without striving so far as lies in me to avert a doom as fearful as it is unnecessary and undeserved.



Yours respectfully,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.



We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of the Army of Occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the Northern sea-coast of the United States; that can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that yellow fever in the army at present is not epidemic; that there are only a few sporadic cases; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.



We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move into the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a move if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.



This army must be moved at once, or perish. As the army can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives.



Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, who understand the situation absolutely.



J. FORD KENT, Major-General Volunteers Commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.
J. C. BATES, Major-General Volunteers Commanding Provisional Division.
ADNAH R. CHAFFEE, Major-General Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.
SAMUEL S. SUMNER, Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Cavalry.
WILL LUDLOW, Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.
ADELBERT AMES, Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding Third Brigade, First Division.
LEONARD WOOD, Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding the City of Santiago.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.


Bibliography:


Roosevelt, Theodore, The Rough Riders. (New York: Review of Reviews Company, 1904), 295-299.

Support the troops.  Hah. Things never change...

Theodore Roosevelt captain followed in footsteps of ship’s namesake by writing bombshell letter

By Claire Barrett

Apr 3, 2020



Actions by Capt. Crozier were remarkably similar to those taken by his ship's namesake 122 years earlier.

Navy officials are finding themselves in controversial waters in the wake of Thursday’s announcement that the service was relieving Capt. Brett Crozier of his command of the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, a decision made following the leak of a four-page letter Crozier penned pleading for U.S. assistance to help stymie the spread of COVID-19 on the 4,800-person ship.



“This will require a political solution but it is the right thing to do,” Crozier wrote in the letter, which was first obtained by the San Francisco Chronicle. “We are not at war. Sailors do not need to die. If we do not act now, we are failing to properly take care of our most trusted asset — our Sailors.”



Crozier’s letter was sent via a “non-secure, unclassified” email that included at least “20 to 30” recipients in addition to the captain’s immediate chain of command, Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly told reporters Thursday.



It was an act that “raised alarm bells unnecessarily,” Modly said. “It undermines our efforts and the chain of command’s efforts to address this problem, and creates a panic and this perception that the Navy’s not on the job, that the government’s not on the job, and it’s just not true.”



Crozier’s firing sparked a maelstrom of criticism, with a mother of one Roosevelt sailor telling Navy Times she was “devastated” by the captain’s dismissal, adding that Crozier “risked his own livelihood. That is so hard to do. Not a lot of men, not a lot of women, not a lot of people out there who would do that for others.”



Perhaps it’s fitting, then, that the aircraft carrier’s namesake was once entangled in a similar conundrum, noted retired Navy commander Ward Carroll in Proceedings Magazine.



As the Spanish-American War drew to a close in the summer of 1898, the Santiago de Cuba-based men of the U.S. Army Fifth Corps — Colonel Theodore Roosevelt and his famed Rough Riders among them — encountered one of their toughest challenges yet: Malaria and yellow fever.


Lt Col. Theodore Roosevelt in the uniform of the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry Regiment (Rough Riders), 1898. (Alamy via Library of Congress)



In all, nearly 4,000 of the 4,270 men in Fifth Corps would contract severe illnesses. Many were on the verge of death.



“The soldier who storms the heights and wins them is a hero in the world’s eyes,” war correspondent Kit Coleman wrote from the troop transport ship SS Comal, a vessel tasked with ushering the ill soldiers to Florida. “Uncle Sam’s boys did that; but far more to the credit of the American soldier is the uncomplaining way in which he bore that which was inflicted by the blundering of his own people.”



Rife with disease, “the eight divisional commanders, including Roosevelt, were convinced that if they remained in Cuba, Fifth Corps would be wiped out,” Carroll writes.



The dire situation prompted senior officers to meet with Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, commander of the Fifth Corps, to recommend that troops be withdrawn from Cuba posthaste. That result of that meeting — whether Shafter agreed or not — remains unknown.



Regardless of the outcome, the commanders were compelled to put their request into writing –– a task that fell to Roosevelt because, as the only non-general among the senior officer group, had less to lose career-wise. The eventual U.S. president drafted what is now known as the infamous Round-Robin Letter:



MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER. SIR: In a meeting of the general and medical officers called by you at the Palace this morning we were all, as you know, unanimous in our views of what should be done with the army. To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands.



There is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire command North at once. Yellow-fever cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in this division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe, contracted it. But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial fever. Hardly a man has yet died from it, but the whole command is so weakened and shattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep, when a real yellow-fever epidemic instead of a fake epidemic, like the present one, strikes us, as it is bound to do if we stay here at the height of the sickness season, August and the beginning of September.



Quarantine against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the toothache. All of us are certain that as soon as the authorities at Washington fully appreciate the condition of the army, we shall be sent home. If we are kept here it will in all human possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die.



This is not only terrible from the standpoint of the individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the standpoint of military efficiency of the flower of the American army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The sick list, large though it is, exceeding four thousand, affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the army. Not ten per cent are fit for active work.



Six weeks on the North Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere where the yellow-fever germ cannot possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting-cocks, as able as we are eager to take a leading part in the great campaign against Havana in the fall, even if we are not allowed to try Porto Rico. We can be moved North, if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country, although, of course, it would have been infinitely better if we had been moved North or to Puerto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we faced bullets. But there is no object.



The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the sick rate in our present weakened condition, and, anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the coast, as I have found by actual reconnoissance.

Nothing changes, does it?


Miletus12 

[miletus12]

Jul 28, 2022 13:05:08 GMT miletus12 said:

Duque de Almodóvar del Río

Ever wonder who was the paid scoundrel in US employ in the Sagasta government?

Juan Manuel Sánchez and Gutiérrez de Castro

Biography



Sánchez and Gutiérrez de Castro, Juan Manuel. Duke of Almodóvar del Río (VIII). Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz), 15.XII.1850 – Madrid, 23.VI.1906. Jurisconsult and minister.

This Cadiz lived in the bosom of a family of the titled nobility, belonging to the Order of Alcántara. He was the son of Isabel Gutiérrez de Castro y Cossío and Antonio Sánchez Romate, who was a hero in the legislature of 1834-1835, although he did not swear because he was ill. He graduated in Law and combined his professional activities with politics. In fact, the figure of this liberal politician is crucial when it comes to understanding the Spanish political history of the last third of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. His presence in the upper echelons of politics since the beginning of the Restoration makes him a key piece of the history of Spain.

He married in Córdoba on February 10, 1872 with Genoveva de Hoces y Fernández de Córdoba, VIII Duchess of Almodóvar del Río and VIII Marchioness of Puebla de los Infantes (Córdoba, 1.III.1852 – 3.VI.1906), daughter of the first marriage of José Ramón de Hoces y González de Canales, IX Count and I Duke of Hornachuelos and IX Marquis of Santa Cruz de Paniagua (Villa del Río, Córdoba, 22.IX.1825 – Córdoba, 5.XI.1895), with Genoveva María Fernández de Córdoba y Pulido (Madrid, 14.XII.1827 – Córdoba, 2.XII.1853), daughter in turn of Romana Pulido Merino and Joaquín Rafael Fernández de Córdoba y Álvarez de las Asturias Bohórques, V Duke of Almodóvar del Río and V Marquis of Puebla de los Infantes, twice Grande de España.

The VIII Duke iure uxoris of Almodóvar del Río, thanks to which his wife succeeded when his first cousin died prematurely in August 1868, ran in the general elections of 1879, and was elected by the constituency of Córdoba, his wife's hometown. In that legislature he was vice president of the seventh section of Congress. In the general elections of 1881 he was elected with a large majority for the district of Priego de Córdoba (Córdoba) and represented the Cadiz town of Jerez de la Frontera, uninterruptedly, from 1886 to 1905. In the legislature of 1888-1889 he was appointed third vice president of Congress and acting president of the House, effective April 12, 1893. In those years the Spanish political situation was very complex. On December 9, 1892, Sagasta formed an Executive where all the liberal groups met, from those of Moret and Montero to those of Gamazo and Maura. However, the Republicans predicted a short life, thinking that the program of economic, military and administrative reforms would constitute the pretext, as it was in previous mandates, for the struggle between factions. And so it was. These changes shattered internal cohesion in the autumn of 1893. To the concern about the war in Melilla were added the news that came from the overseas provinces, which made us fear the unleashing of a new independence struggle. In fact, on February 24, 1895, the movement of the Cuban insurgents towards their emancipation from Spanish tutelage began. The ministerial crisis led to the resignation of Sagasta at the head of the executive.

In March 1898 general elections were held and Juan Manuel Sánchez retained the seat for the Cadiz district of Jerez de la Frontera. These elections took place in a political context in which colonial frustration influenced and magnified a latent internal crisis whose roots are previous and diverse in nature. Spain, due to its historical position – as a colonial power – and strategic position – in the control of the strait – was involved in the three major conflictive geographical areas of the moment: Caribbean (Cuba), China Sea (Philippines) and Alboran Sea (Morocco). The situation worsened for the conservatives when, on August 8, 1897, their leader was assassinated at the hands of the anarchist Angiolillo. The death of Cánovas, on the eve of the colonial disaster, exacerbated the political crisis. After the bridge government of Azcárraga, Sagasta assumed power on October 4, 1897. In the middle of the war, Sagasta required the services of Sánchez and Gutiérrez de Castro to assume the portfolio of State from May 24, 1898 to March 4, 1899. The war ended, as is well known, with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898. After the peace came the recriminations and the ordeal for the Government began. The war undermined the foundations of the Executive. It was an evicted government, presiding over a regime that many considered besieged and dying. The situation of the parties was one of uncertainty and discord. With the death of Cánovas and the consequent disintegration of the Conservative Party, the peaceful turn was broken. In March 1899 Sagasta tendered his resignation. Silvela, with his party already more cohesive, offered his services to the Crown, and the Queen Regent commissioned him to form a government. Little by little, the Executive was wearing out in this struggle with the daily problems and tensions of the different political groups, and the crisis arose at the end of October 1899. On December 23, Azcárraga received the royal commission to form a new government. Social tension was increasing, to the point of suspending constitutional guarantees throughout Spain.

The difficult situation that plagued the country in the last months of the regency was, perhaps, the prologue of the new reign. Again, Sagasta would assume the reins of the Executive and would call Sánchez and Gutiérrez de Castro to take charge of the Ministry of State, which would develop from March 6, 1901 to 19 of the same month of 1902; from 19 March to 17 May 1902; and from 15 November to 6 December 1902. After Sagasta's death, Segismundo Moret y Prendergast participated in the struggles for the leadership of the party. In December 1905 he assumed the presidency of government keeping Sánchez Gutiérrez in the portfolio of State. He assumed the presidency of the Ministry of State from 1 December 1905 to 9 June 1906 and from 9 to 23 June 1906. During this year, as a member of the diplomatic corps he represented Spain at the Conference of Algeciras, a town in Cadiz, which brought together the representatives of France, Germany and Great Britain, as well as Spain, on January 16, 1906, in order to decide the fate of Morocco.

In July 1906, the Cadiz Moret had to resign because he did not have a sufficient majority in the Cortes, although he briefly returned to that position in November of that same year. This time he could not count on the Duke of Almodóvar del Río, who had died a few months earlier. Despite the fact that the Duke of Almodóvar del Río had rejected in life any reward for the fulfillment of his duty, on December 31, 1906 the King addressed the following telegram to his mother: "By signing today the ratification of the International Treaty of Algeciras, I have decided to perpetuate the memory of his illustrious son, granting for you, on the same date, the title of Duchess of Algeciras. Alfonso."

===============================================

Sources and bibl.: Archive of the Congress of Deputies, Electoral Documentation Series, 83 No. 2, 90 No. 2, 100 No. 2, 105 No. 11, 107 No. 11, 109 No. 11, 111 No. 11, 113 No. 11, 115 No. 11, 117 No. 11 and 119 No. 11; Senate Archive, Personal Exps., HIS-0020-04.

A. Linares Rivas, La primera Cámara de la Restauración: retratos y semblanzas, Madrid, J. C. Conde y Cía., 1878; M. Sánchez Ortiz, Las primeros Cortes de la Regencia. Datos electorales, estadísticos y biográficos, Madrid, Imprenta de Enrique Rubiños, 1887; VV. AA., A la memoria del Excmo. Sr. D. Carlos Navarro Rodrigo: Patriotismo, Almería, Imprenta La Industria, 1904; Marqués de Lema, De la Revolución a la Restauración, Madrid, Voluntad, 1927; M. Fernández Almagro, Historia Política de la España Contemporánea, Madrid, Pegaso, 1956; E. Fedriani Fuentes, Jerezanos ilustres, Cádiz, Gráficas San Luis, 1967; M. Fernández Almagro, Cánovas. Su vida, Su política, Madrid, Tebas, 1972; J. A. Lacomba, La I República. El trasfondo de una revolución fallida, Madrid, Guadiana de Publicaciones, 1973; L. Díez del Corral, El liberalismo doctrinario, Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1973; M. Espadas Burgos, Alfonso XII y los orígenes de la Restauración, Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1975; J. Varela Ortega, Los amigos políticos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración, 1875-1900, Madrid, Alianza, 1977; G. Bleiberg, Diccionario de Historia de España, Madrid, Alianza, 1979; F. Aldeguer Jover and A. Martínez-Mena, Carlos Navarro Rodrigo, una vida dedicado al periodismo y la política, Alicante, Rema, 1984; M. Tuñón de Lara (dir.), La España de la Restauración.

Politics, economics, legislation and culture. I Coloquio de Segovia sobre Historia Contemporánea de España, Madrid, Siglo XXI de España, 1985; VV. AA., Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europea-Americana, t. I, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1988; M. Martínez Cuadrado, Restauración y crisis de la Monarquía, 1875-1931, Madrid, Alianza, 1991; A. Rull Sabater, Diccionario sucinto de ministros de Hacienda (s. xix-xx), Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1991; J. M. Cuenca Toribio, Parlamentarismo y antiparlamentarismo en España, Madrid, Publicaciones del Congreso de los Diputados, 1995; C. Seco Serrano, Cánovas y la Restauración, Madrid, Comisión Nacional Conmemorativa del Centenario de la muerte de Cánovas, Argentaria, 1997; C. Dardé, La Restauración, 1875-1902. Alfonso XIII and the regency of María Cristina, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 1997; J. M. Cuenca Toribio and S. Miranda García, El poder y sus hombres. By whom have we Spaniards been governed? (1705-1998), Madrid, Actas, 1998; C. Seco Serrano, Historia del conservadurismo español, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2000; F. Navarro (dir.), La Enciclopedia, vol. II, Madrid, Salvat, 2003.

Maria Jose Ramos Rovi

Now you know.

[lordroel]

Day 101 of the Spanish–American War, July 29th 1898

Philippines

US Army troops in the Philippines begin establishing an offensive line stretching from the beach at Manila Bay inland to the Calle Real (the inland road connecting Cavite with Manila).

Adjutant General

SANTIAGO, July 29, 1898-1.43 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:

There seems to be a great deal of fear on the part of Spanish and other permanent residents here that the city of Santiago is to be turned over to Cubans after the war, and many of them propose leaving; in fact, I am informed that the Philadelphia has full orders for its available room returning to New York. I have assured them that I did not believe the United States was going to relinquish their hold on Santiago or leave it without a stable and sufficient garrison and suitable government, but they seom to want other and higher assurances. Is the Government willing or pl'epared to give them it? Would do much to allay the alarm that is felt here.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

[miletus12]

Jul 29, 2022 6:16:20 GMT lordroel said:

Philippines

US Army troops in the Philippines begin establishing an offensive line stretching from the beach at Manila Bay inland to the Calle Real (the inland road connecting Cavite with Manila).

Refer to map. In a rough west to east by north line that ran through Pinade to anchor on the Pasig and the road that runs through Macah, Jaudines had established a line of blockhouses and gun pits with rather sketchy trench lines fronting them. These positions were sort of like the later "strongpoint" positions the French would adopt in early WWI when they went on defense just before the battle of the Marne. There might have been as many as 3,000 Spanish troops in that line initially though as the Filipinos began their own siege in earnest on the 27 July 1898, Jaudines would thin this force out and transfer about 1,500 men to face the Katipunans in a crescent that ran from Pacah to Calocan. The bulk of the Spanish garrison (~8,000 men) was north of the canal and facing off against some 15,000 to 20,000 Filipino troops arranged in four loose groupings under independent commands ostensibly answering to Aguinaldo. These were located approximately, south to north between San Juan Ana and Colocan. There were a few south of the canal, but not in any serious strength to constitute a contact line of confliction yet. 

The Americans had established a trench line north of Paranaque some 1000 meters with outposts. Greene was inshore, MacArthur was to his right just outside Pinade. Andersen was behind them both as a reserve. There were about 5,000 men on the line with 6,000 men back at Camp McKinley.    
-
The Americans have an interesting tactical problem. They have only one road to the east and the marshy and sandy coast from Mahbay to advancxe due north on a frontage less than 1 mile wide. The main line of Spanish defense will be met at Pasay along the Fort San Antonio Abad location, which is an outlier part of the Intramuros, or walled ring defenses. Manila was a classically Spanish town in that it had such a moated ring-wall in 1898. 

One is NOT going to breach those main walls with a three inch M1892 field gun. It took 8-inch howitzers at close range in 1944 and one remembers what happened when a few thousand defenders made a real fight of it, then? 

Merritt does not have the men, the scaling gear or the engineers, or the rather large fleet, the British used in 1762. 

Leslie Cheng
Fort San Antonio Abad Manila


Ironically, Fort was used by the British during 1762 Battle of Manila. Brigadier-General William Draper, occupied the fort and setup an artillery battery against Intramuros. the battle though did not begin immediately – bad weather prevented this. But when the sky cleared the battle commenced. The British attacked Intramuros from the sea with its ships commanded by and from the land via the battery. And after hours they had succeeded in silencing the guns of Intramuros, the very next day the British cannonade were able make a significant breach in the citadel of Intramuros.


(From the sea-face. M. The British found the Intramuros had gaps in the ring, no moat, no walls and no artillery in many places. It was "easy" for them to walk in and take over. M.)

In the light of this and subsequent failure of the Spanish forces to repel the British the acting-governor and Captain General Archbishop Manuel Rojo surrendered. Ten days passed between the arrival of British and the surrender of Manila. Some people say that the houses between Fort San Antonio Abad and Intramuros prevented the Spaniards from repulsing the British. Some say that the condition of the Spanish military forces was diminished that defeat was inevitable. Some pointed out that without a military leader also led to the defeat. Whatever the reason may have been Intramuros was in the hands of the British.

It was left to Vice-Governor Simon de Anda to form a new Spanish base in Bacolor, Pampanga and led the Spanish resistance against the British until 1764 when the 1763 Treaty of Paris returned the Philippines to the Spanish – by that time Rojo has died and Anda was a hero who eventually became Gover-General of the Philippines.

Years after the Fort became a storage house for gun powder and was called La Povorista.

The fort was again taken over by invaders in 13 Aug 1898, Lt. Col McCoy and his men from First Battalion of the First Colorado Regimen took possession of the fort and hoisted the American flag over it.

During World War II, the Japanese Imperial Forces made the fort into a bunker and installed a cannon.

This triangular fort is still standing between the Central Bank and the Metropolitan Museum. And like all things it has proven itself resilient. Restored and with an inward-looking cannon mounted on top -It is now a place where one holds cocktails and parties.

Going to the Fort is not hard, even without a party invitation, one just has to pass through the Metropolitan Museum or the Central Bank. Inside the fort is a manicured garden and where guards once stood there were roaming gardeners keeping everything trim and proper.

Merritt is going to have to think about it hard, because he does not have the local three to one numerical superiority to make a direct assault along that route work and he has to worry about a largish national liberation army sitting across the Pasig from him (40,000 Filipinos) as well as nearly numerically equal to him Spaniards in and around Manila. But he will come up with a rather simple plan to solve his dilemma, a la Julius Caesar, which we will see it shortly.

Manila Intramuros

The Walled City In Manila  

 Intramuros, or the ‘Walled City’, is one of the oldest districts of Manila, built on the south bank of the Pasig River around 1571. It was built by the Spaniards – more specifically by Miguel Lopez de Legaspi – and is bound on all sides by moats and thick, high walls, with some over 6 metres high.

While the district was originally home to an Indianized-Malayan-Islamic settlement, it became the centre of religious, political and military power in the 16th century, when the country was under the control of Spain. Only the elite Spaniards and Mestizos were allowed accommodation in Intramuros. That's obviously not the case now, but the historic buildings and features remain as testament to the Philippines' challenging past.  

The history of Intramuros

Within the vast walled enclosure of Intramuros lie 51 blocks, covering a total area of about 66 hectares. There are 7 fortified gateways around the walls, granting access in or out of the city. The moat was actually added to the main structure in 1603, 32 years after the city was built. The district contains many hospitals, military barracks, domestic accommodations, schools, 12 churches, and the Governor’s Palace.

Thanks to its massiveness and the well-planned strategic infrastructure, Intramuros defied and repelled numerous attacks throughout history. The Dutch, the Portuguese and the Chinese all failed in their attempts to penetrate the fortress city.

During World War II, Intramuros was used as a garrison and prison facility by the Japanese, but Allied bombings resulted in it, and other parts of Manila, being severely damaged and destroyed. At the end of the war, the US took charge of the city and filled in the moat to prevent disease. A golf course has now been built in the place where the moat once existed.

Highlights of Intramuros

Today, this is the only district in Manila that has been successful in keeping its old Spanish-era look. The old walls still defend the district, keeping its churches and streets untouched by the winds of modernisation. The star attractions still include San Agustin Church & Museum, Fort Santiago, Manila Cathedral, Casa Manila Museum and the Rizal Shrine.

What deserves special mention is how the Tourist Authority has been successful in maintaining a piece of history that otherwise would have been lost forever. The transformation of Intramuros into one of the Philippines’ most visited tourist destination has been remarkable, as you can now get a glimpse of the glory as well as sad past associated with this place, although the cobbled streets of Intramuros now house various modern cafés.

Fortunately, unlike Douglas MacArthur's dilemma of 46 years later, there is no baseball stadium to serve as a possible final strongpoint. Who knew a baseball stadium would make such a difficult fortification to take?     

Jul 29, 2022 6:16:20 GMT lordroel said:

Adjutant General

SANTIAGO, July 29, 1898-1.43 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:

There seems to be a great deal of fear on the part of Spanish and other permanent residents here that the city of Santiago is to be turned over to Cubans after the war, and many of them propose leaving; in fact, I am informed that the Philadelphia has full orders for its available room returning to New York. I have assured them that I did not believe the United States was going to relinquish their hold on Santiago or leave it without a stable and sufficient garrison and suitable government, but they seom to want other and higher assurances. Is the Government willing or pl'epared to give them it? Would do much to allay the alarm that is felt here.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

The fear was not just the Banditos, although Garcia's troops were not under discipline. It was also a fear of yellow fever. One remembers that General Linnares had sent 20,000 "Santiago citizenry useless mouths" into American lines to overburden American security and force protection, logistics and their food supply situations. Shafter, being rather ruthless, passed the Cuban civilians through his own lines and dumped them into the interior country to starve to death or make out as best they could. Both generals expected, that the infected among the Cuban refugees Linares expelled, would in turn infect the American troops. This happened without the useless infected mouths gambit, because the mosquitos got busy and fed on V Corps anyway. The result was a particularly nasty malaria outbreak. Yellow fever was still a main co9ncern, but the malaria was the real debilitator when added to the usual dysentery, chorea, and typhus that poor camp sanitation and incompetent medical practice among the V Corps medical staffing allowed. The Spanish locals were not stupid. They wanted to get away from the infected and sick Yankees.            

[lordroel]

Day 102 of the Spanish–American War, July 30th 1898

Adjutant general Office

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE

Washington, July 30,1898-12.30 a. m.

Replying to your telegram saying that there was great fear on the part of Spanish and other permanent residents that the city of Santiago is to be abandoned by our forces. I am directed by the Secretary of War to invite your attention to the President's proclamation. It is thought this makes the intentions of our Government quite clear.

H.C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

[miletus12]

Jul 30, 2022 6:12:15 GMT lordroel said:

Day 102 of the Spanish–American War, July 30th 1898

Adjutant general Office

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE

Washington, July 30,1898-12.30 a. m.

Replying to your telegram saying that there was great fear on the part of Spanish and other permanent residents that the city of Santiago is to be abandoned by our forces. I am directed by the Secretary of War to invite your attention to the President's proclamation. It is thought this makes the intentions of our Government quite clear.

H.C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

Actually, Shafter had received instructions on these matters.

Telegram ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

Washington July 18 1898 6.30 p m

General SHAFTER Santiago Cuba

The following is sent you for your information and guidance It will be published in such manner in both English and Spanish as will give it the widest circulation in the territory under your control.

The SECRETARY OF WAR

SIR The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the Province of Santiago and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation.

"The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants so long as they perform their duties are entitled to security in their persons and property and in all their private rights and relations It is my desire that the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligation in this regard It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the army of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba nor upon any party or faction among them but to protect them in their homes in their employments and in their personal and religious rights All persons who either by active aid or by honest submission cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants the municipal laws of the conquered territory such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime are considered as continuing in force so far as they are compatible with the new order of things until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent and in practice they are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation This enlightened practice is so far as possible to be adhered to on the present occasion The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may if they accept the supremacy of the United States continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American commander in chief.

The native constabulary will so far as may be practicable be preserved. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so.

While the rule of conduct of the American commander in chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind if unfortunately the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist or to create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary In the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience and a high sense of justice.

One of the most important and most practical problems with which it will be necessary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection and administration of the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and securities belonging to the government of the country in its own right and all arms and supplies and other movable property of such government may be seized by the military occupant and converted to his own use. The real property of the state he may hold and administer at the same time enjoying the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military necessity. All public means of transportation such as telegraph lines cables railways and boats belonging to the state may be appropriated to his use, but unless in case of military necessity they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences all schoolhouses are, so far as possible to be protected and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places of historical monuments or archives or of works of science or art is prohibited save when required by urgent military necessity.

Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected and can be confiscated only for cause. Means of transportation such as telegraph lines and cables railways and boats may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant but unless destroyed under military necessity, are not to be retained.

While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions upon the enemy in their seaports towns or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expense of the war; this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation. As the result of military occupation, the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of government under the military occupation; such as the salaries of the judges and the police and for the payment of the expenses of the Army.

Private property taken for the use of the Army is to be paid for when possible in cash at a fair valuation and when payment in cash is not possible receipts are to be given All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral nations as well as our own in articles not contraband of war upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY

By order Secretary of War

H.C. CORBIN Adjutant General.

Translating all of that into "political speak", Corbin tells Shafter, "You were telegraphed instructions on how to handle things on 18 July and told to publish it publicly as an issued presidential proclamation to be posted for the occupants of the occupation area to read, Shafter. Follow your orders.

MEANWHILE... in Manila Bay, where Merritt, ashore, has to figure out what to do, after a very busy night of shooting, between the Filipino army of national liberation and the Spanish inside the city of Manila... and now his own forces exchange brisk picket fire in response to this activity, believing the Spanish are about to move upon them...
 
Diary of John Henry Asendorf Sunday, July 31st, 1898

It is not raining in the morning but very cloudy. At promptly 8 a.m. the whole regiment was suddenly ordered out on outpost.

We were lined up in front of the Colonel’s tent; and, after receiving our orders and listening to a good prayer by our chaplain, we marched off taking our picks, shovels and axes. We marched to a place called Tambo. Here a road turns to the right and about 1/4 miles out on this road is a bridge across a stream. Company B occupied this position and the rest of the regiment moved up the road to relieve the First Nebraska Regiment at a place called Monastary. Here the Nebraska boys had already begun to build breastworks. There were 3 guns of the Utah Light Artillery stationed here.

The Second Battalion too [took] their [position] in these trenches and the First [Battalion] (3 companies) held their place about 1/2 miles back of us to the right. The lines of entrenchment extended from the beach to about 75 yards off the Monastery.

We were stationed as follows: Co. A on the beach with 2 guns of the Utah Battery, Co. H, then Co. C which closed the gap between the beach and the Monastery, then came one more gun of the Utah Battery and Co. D which closed the remaining trenches.

All day long we worked hard to strengthen our breastworks. We all took turns until night when the enemy began to fire on us at about 11:10 p.m. The firing began between the pickets and outposts along the road.

We all threw our shovels and picks aside and grabbed for our guns. By this time, Major Cuthbertson, who believed that the enemy was going to make a night attack, ordered Co. D, E and K to take position on out right. They had no sooner taken their positions when firing began and all along the line the artillery became engaged in death earnest and fired shell after shell. But, we soon ran out of ammunition because each of us only had 50 rounds. Corporal [Alexander] McCanch was detailed to camp to get more of the deathly stuff. Shortly after this we were reinforced by Batteries H and K of the regulars, about 180 men strong each armed with the Krag-Jørgensen Rifle. [We were] also reinforced by one battalion of the First California. By this time all ammunition and the rest of our regiment, which had been in camp on guard duty, had arrived and we all felt very much relieved.

The enemy had been firing right along without stopping ours. Now we all started [to return fire] with more vigor than ever which lasted about 3½ hours more. During this time we had a good opportunity to listen to the crack of the Mauser and the bursting of Spanish shells. All this time it rained in torrents continuously. Our trenches were like mud holes but in the morning we were relieved at 8 a.m. by the Colorados. [Jacob] Landis and Sergeant Martin are on the Sick List.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Domingo 31 de Julio, 1898, Fiesta de N.P.S. Ignacio

The fourth convoy from San Francisco (a part of it) has arrived.

(…) In the afternoon, 5 merchant ships full of Yankee troops entered. With the arrivals today, there will be twelve or fourteen thousand Yankee soldiers ready to attack Manila. It is said that the Yankee merchant steamer “City of Peking” that yesterday left for S. Fran. in California, carried many sick soldiers.

Malaria casualties most likely, the Americans did not have enough quinine. Merritt will have to arrange additional supplies from Indonesia (The Dutch East Indies).  

Diary of James J. Loughrey July 31, 1898

Mass at 6.15 am. One of the wounded men died today. The 4th Expedition arrived at 3 p.m.

At 11.30 pm. we were called to arms which we achieved in 5 minutes and 18 seconds; we were quickly on the march to support the Pennsylvanians in the trenches.

The Spaniards had made flank attacks on our trenches and they were repulsed several times with terrible loss of life.

When we arrived in the trenches about 12.30 pm. the Pennsylvanians had only two rounds of ammunition left each and had fixed their bayonets ready to charge. Our cheers coming in the rear helped to check the Spaniards until we had an opportunity to check them with lead. Terrible fire was kept up for about three hours and then it eased off.

Their sharpshooters kept up a fire all night, with a few volleys now and then from our side. ‘A’ Company was the first in the trenches. Sergeant Justh was shot in the abdomen about fifty yards in the rear of the trenches. I was a couple of yards away from him when he dropped. Edwards was shot through the shoulder and Captain Richter. ‘I’ Company, was shot in the head. We remained in the trenches until next morning at 10 am. Our casualties totalled six men killed and sixteen wounded.

We experienced another typhoon and suffered very much from the wet and the cold, as we were wet to the skin in two minutes and were up to our knees in mud and slush. I was feeling pretty sick early in the night and took 20 grains of quinine. I thought the hardship would finish me if a bullet didn’t, but I got over it all right and felt fine afterwards, thank God.

As mentioned, quinine was in very short supply.  

[lordroel]

Day 103 of the Spanish–American War, July 31st 1898

United States

President McKinley gives the American terms for peace to French Ambassador Jules Cambon: Immediate independence for Cuba, and cession of Puerto Rico to the United States in compensation for its war costs.

Puerto Rico

Major General Theodore Schwan and his men landed in Guánica and moved west. Major General Brooke disembarked in Arroyo, Puerto Rico.

United States - Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, To Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron

[Washington, D.C., July 31, 1898]

Please propose by telegraph a naval station for the United States to hold in the Phillipine after peace is made, remembering that a port in the northern part of the group would be preferable on account of temperature and nearness to Chinese coast. A small island having a good harbor, seems desirable, but Department is uncertain, and desires you to propose such small island, and as an alternative a good port on one of the large islands surrounded by moderate area of land, and sufficient laborers in vicinity to meet coaling and other needs. Department also expects to take a Spanish island for a naval station between Hawaii and China. Would you recommend Guam or some other. The Caroline Group must be excluded.

This was not sent

M S.

[miletus12]

Jul 31, 2022 4:08:33 GMT lordroel said:

Day 103 of the Spanish–American War, July 31st 1898

United States

President McKinley gives the American terms for peace to French Ambassador Jules Cambon: Immediate independence for Cuba, and cession of Puerto Rico to the United States in compensation for its war costs.

Left up in the air was the question of the Philippine Archipelago. Also, the compensation cost of 400 MILLION dollars the United States demanded as monetary reparations, went a long way to line up the bulk of European nations as being far more sympathetic to Spain, where up to this moment, the bulk of them had been fairly wishy-washy on which side to support in a typical 19th century European colonial war. This was the first time the Europeans had been given a dose of their own reparations medicine by a non-European nation and they did not like it one bit. Defeat was one thing and it happened to Italy in 1896 at the hands of the Ethiopians, but paying extortion money to defray the enemy's expenses in his defeating you? Spain was being treated eaxctly like China or an African kingdom by the Americans.  This will be a thorny political mess, that American diplomats will have to finesse, and it will take months internationally and within the United States to sell the eventual settlement as "acceptable". Part of the solutions, we will discuss, when we enter the treaty phase of the war, but for now we are weeks, no months away from that torturous process.    

Jul 31, 2022 4:08:33 GMT lordroel said:

Puerto Rico

Major General Theodore Schwan and his men landed in Guánica and moved west. Major General Brooke disembarked in Arroyo, Puerto Rico.

Brigadier General Theodore Schwan was one of the American army's more competent administrators and Native American Wars veterans. He seems to have handled talk-talk as his preferred method of war-fighting more than shoot-shoot, though he was also good at massacring Comanches when he had to do so. His chief claim to fame prior to the Spanish American War was to recover General Custer's body from what had become a Lakota Sioux instant holy site and to make that outcome stick by using the Sioux's own religion against them. In background, he was one of those many Germans who had to flee Europe after the 1848 revolutionary movements collapsed. In 1857, being out of luck and options he joined the American army and hard-lucked his way up the ranks from private to colonel through the infantry and the adjutant's branch, alternating between field commands, the Indian Bureau, and staff billets to become a good professional.     

Major General John P. Brooke performed adequately in the American Civil War in that when he yelled "Hurrah!" his men followed him at will, then he was shot, and then he was promoted. Rinse and repeat a few times and he makes captain to colonel to BG. In my opinion, it was rather poor Confederate marksmanship that earned him his advancement in rank, because his leadership otherwise was "unacceptable".  He was a "Joe Hooker Man", which automatically made him suspect as regards to morals, leadership ability and to overall competence. He would later show these defects in the Ghost Dance of 1890. In marked contrast to Theodore Schwan, he was one of too many of American officers who did not understand or use their knowledge of Native American religion to keep the peace. He was not directly responsible for the atrocity of Wounded Knee, (That was James Forsyth.) but that nitwit, Brooke, was certainly administratively responsible for the mess that resulted afterward in the atrocity. Out of that debacle, he would become a Nelson Miles man. Birds of a feather they were. They had to stand by each other; or they would be held accountable for their actions in the murder of Spotted Elk and three hundred Lakota people, mostly women and children as well as twenty American soldiers killed by their own artillery fire ineptly poured into them by James Forsyth`. This could easily have been headed off at the time, but Brooke did not reign in the idiot, James McLaughlin, who murdered of all people... Sitting Bull. It was two weeks after that atrocity that Wounded Knee happened.   

I am not sure that he, Brooke, did not bungle his part of the Puerto Rico operations.

New Beachheads at Ponce and Arroyo and the Build Up of Forces

Once Guánica and the rail terminus of Yauco were secured, Miles determined that the city of Ponce was the next logical step towards an American victory in Puerto Rico. Miles decided to send a contingent to attack Ponce by sea and another overland from Yauco traveling east to Ponce. The 6th Illinois and 6th Massachusetts and six Regular Army artillery batteries had returned from Yauco to their camp in Guánica and rested from their long sea voyage. On July 30th the Illinois and Massachusetts troops broke camp to spearhead General Garretson's move eastward to Ponce. The 6th Massachusetts and 6th Illinois being unaccustomed to the tropical heat suffered greatly on the march. Many of the men fell out of the march from sunstroke and many others abandoned ammunition, extra clothing, pup tents, and even bayonets. The last of the volunteers struggled into Ponce on August 4th and less than half of these troops were fit for duty (Bunzey 1901:226-234; Rivero 1972:219-221).

On July 27th, the second group of the invasion force, Major General James H. Wilson's 1st Division of I Corps, containing about 4000 men consisting of the 16th Pennsylvania, 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin, and elements of the 1st Kentucky and the rest of the 6th Illinois arrived off Guánica by transport from Charleston, South Carolina. The 1st Division of I Corps came in the transports OBDAM, LA GRAND DUCHESSE, #21, #30, and MOBILE. In the field the 1st Division troops were commanded by Major General Oswald Herbert Ernst. General Miles ordered them not to debark, but redirected them east by sea to Ponce.

On the afternoon of 27 July, the American vessels DIXIE, WASP, and ANNAPOLIS entered the harbor of Ponce.

They met no resistance, for the regular Spanish forces there, under Lt.-Col. Rafael Martinez Illecas, had been pulled out, leaving behind 300 volunteers to hold the town. With the help of the British [Fernando Toro] and German consuls, the ship's skipper [Captain Charles H. Davis of the DIXIE] entered into prolonged negotiations with the commander . . . whose men were already drifting away (in fact the company stationed at the port of Ponce had flatly refused to take up arms). Finally, at about 1730 hours [5:30 PM] on the 28th, an agreement was reached that brought honor all around, and a detachment of marines and sailors landed to take control of the port. Brig. Gen. O. H. Ernst's brigade began landing at 0700 hours [7:00 AM] the next morning [July 29th], followed by Wilson and the staff of I Corps. Shortly afterward Miles and Garretson marched into Ponce [Nofi 1996:240].

At 5:30 AM of 28th of July, Lt. Greenleaf A. Merriam (Maryland naval militia), Lt. Henry C. Haines USMC, and Naval Cadet George Cabot Lodge (son of US Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and nephew of Captain Davis) debarked and took over the Spanish Custom House (Payne 1899:47-51). The American flag was raised over the nearby "Capitania del Puerto" (Harbor Master's Building). The Spanish Custom House, on the Beach of Ponce ("Playa de Ponce") became the American headquarters for the remainder of the conflict, and Miles' Headquarters. Although Miles lodged in the evenings at the Hotel Frances, up the road from the beach in the town of Ponce (Rivero 1972:229).

The taking of Ponce was a critical turning point in the Puerto Rican campaign. For the first time the Americans held a major port to funnel large numbers of men and quantities of war materiel into the island. Ponce had the convenience of underwater telegraph cable connections with Jamaica and the West Indies -- putting General Miles and US forces on the island in direct communication with Washington for the first time since they left Cuba on July 21st. Ponce was also a known center of anti-Spanish feeling which provided Miles with the opportunity to sway more Puerto Ricans to the American side (Nofi 1996:240). Regimental histories indicate that as the American troops, such as Cavalry Troop A of New York, debarked from their long sea voyages they often spent their first night ashore resting themselves and their horses next to the Cathedral at Playa de Ponce, before moving on to camps around the city (Herbert 1939:120).

On July 31st, a third component of the invasion force, Brigadier General Theodore Schwan's 2,896 strong Independent Regular Brigade, consisting of the 11th and 19th Regular Infantry, Company A, 5th Regular Cavalry, and a Gatling and artillery company arrived from Tampa, Florida, and elements were landed at both Guánica, and Ponce. The Regulars would remain in their camps until August 6th when General Miles, from his headquarters at the Port of Ponce Customs House (Casa del Rey), ordered Schwan to congregate his regular brigade at Yauco, in anticipation of a great westward swept through the island.

Willard McSherry, 4th Pennsylvania Volunteers Meanwhile, on the same day (July 31st) Major General John R. Brooke brought the four and last elements of I Corp to the Port of Ponce. Under Brooke was Brigadier General Peter G. Hains' brigade, consisting of the 3rd Illinois, 4th Ohio and 4th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiments, H squadron of the 6th Regular Cavalry, Troops A and C New York Volunteer Cavalry, Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry, and volunteer light artillery batteries from Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. Hains' Brigade remained two days on their transports before Miles ordered them to Arroyo, a small port 60 miles east of Ponce, to land between August 2nd and 5th. Arroyo was a coastal town that served the larger, nearby inland town of Guayama. On August 1st, the bloodless landing and capture of Arroyo, was led by marines and sailors from the GLOUCESTER (Nofi 1996:241)

A crowd had gathered on the beach in front of the [Arroyo] customhouse - the entire population apparently - watching the approach of the boat carrying a little white flag. The alcalde and the village priest stood out in front of the crowd on the beach and bowed low to the Americanos. Lieutenant Wood of the Gloucester informed them of the terms of surrender, and after a short parley went up to the customhouse and hoisted the American flag at 11:28. The crowd flocked around the officers and cheered the flag, and seemed to be glad it had come [Brown 1967:413].

As with his current mentor, Miles, at Guanica, who botched up operations after the Battle of Jaunica, there was no reason for Brooke to leave troops festering in troops transports for two days when the navy told him that there was no opposition at Arroyo, Puerto Rico. Sloppy recon and no interservice cooperation will lead to a future debacle shortly.   

Jul 31, 2022 4:08:33 GMT lordroel said:

United States - Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, To Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron

[Washington, D.C., July 31, 1898]

Please propose by telegraph a naval station for the United States to hold in the Phillipine after peace is made, remembering that a port in the northern part of the group would be preferable on account of temperature and nearness to Chinese coast. A small island having a good harbor, seems desirable, but Department is uncertain, and desires you to propose such small island, and as an alternative a good port on one of the large islands surrounded by moderate area of land, and sufficient laborers in vicinity to meet coaling and other needs. Department also expects to take a Spanish island for a naval station between Hawaii and China. Would you recommend Guam or some other. The Caroline Group must be excluded.

This was not sent.

M S.

Facts on the ground made it moot...We will see why on 1 August 1898 when those diaries entries appear to describe the mess Merritt is in.

[lordroel]

Day 104 of the Spanish–American War, August 1st 1898

Puerto Rico

Under threat of bombardment by the US Navy auxiliary cruisers USS Gloucester and USS Wasp, the port of Arroyo, Puerto Rico, surrenders without a fight. 

The monitors USS Puritan, USS Amphitrite, armed tug USS Leyden, and collier USS Hannibal were sailing off the coast of Fajardo on the northeast corner of Puerto Rico, when Captain Frederick W. Rodgers, Puritan's commanding officer and senior officer afloat, spotted the "Faro de Las Cabezas de San Juan" (Cape San Juan Lighthouse) that had been designated the landing site for the US Army's invasion of Puerto Rico. Rodgers ordered a reconnaissance landing party ashore, including Puerto Rican volunteers. The sailors advanced to within a one-half mile (0.80 km) of Fajardo, about five miles (8.0 km) from the coast, but withdrew when they encountered Spanish troops.

[miletus12]

Aug 1, 2022 2:52:02 GMT lordroel said:

Day 104 of the Spanish–American War, August 1st 1898

Puerto Rico

Under threat of bombardment by the US Navy auxiliary cruisers USS Gloucester and USS Wasp, the port of Arroyo, Puerto Rico, surrenders without a fight. 

The monitors USS Puritan, USS Amphitrite, armed tug USS Leyden, and collier USS Hannibal were sailing off the coast of Fajardo on the northeast corner of Puerto Rico, when Captain Frederick W. Rodgers, Puritan's commanding officer and senior officer afloat, spotted the "Faro de Las Cabezas de San Juan" (Cape San Juan Lighthouse) that had been designated the landing site for the US Army's invasion of Puerto Rico. Rodgers ordered a reconnaissance landing party ashore, including Puerto Rican volunteers. The sailors advanced to within a one-half mile (0.80 km) of Fajardo, about five miles (8.0 km) from the coast, but withdrew when they encountered Spanish troops.

Nelson Miles' "picnic" continues...

Meanwhile...

Diary of James J. Loughrey

Colonel Smith gave us a bottle of whisky in the trenches, which saved our lives. Sergeant Justh was buried at 3 p.m. 350 Spaniards were reported dead and 11,000 wounded. O’Neill, ‘I’ Company, was shot through the back, the bullet passing through his belt and haversack. He recovered quickly. There was great gloom in camp when the funerals were taking place. They were all buried with military honours.

For a mere skirmish action north of Camp McKinley at Paranaque, things were getting exciting.

Diary of Lieutenant X (Aime Ernest Motsch)

Monday, August 1, 1898
This is the situation on the 1st of August.

Admiral Dewey can no longer delay taking action against Manila. Yesterday, the third expedition of American troops arrived in the bay on five transport ships: Indiana (with Brigadier General MacArthur on board), Ohio, Morgan City, City of Peru and Valencia. Granting that this convoy that arrived carried 5,000 men, the American troops present would total 11,000. Of the warships in the bay, 26 are American, four English, two French and one Japanese. Day by day, both the wind and the sea get increasingly worse. The only means of communicating with the mainland is by sending a dinghy across.

The Union’s troops occupy four different points on the battle front: in the north beyond Caloocan, in the northeast from LaLoma to San Juan del Monte, and in the south between Malabon and Fort San Antonio. The commandant of the Kaiser estimated that the American forces have 12,000 men. He confirms that the commander-in-chief, General Merritt, who arrived on a separate ship on the 25th, hastened his trip, thinking that Camara’s squadron would be diverted towards Manila. The unnecessary installation of this squadron in the Suez Canal, costing Spain over one million francs, is a deplorable example of indecisive naval strategy.

The battle fought last night lasted 11 hours, and took place in Malate, southeast of Manila. This first serious encounter between the Spaniards and the Americans must have been a bloody one. The Spaniards attempted an attack against the front and the right flank of the 10th regiment of the Pennsylvania volunteers positioned in trenches in Malate. The battle continued until dawn and took place in the midst of torrential rain and high winds. Now it is certain that the Spaniards have lost. They allegedly lost 300 men, while the Americans lost only seven. It is a fact that the Americans put the insurgents in the line of fire as human shields to protect themselves. How long will the Filipinos accept this demeaning role?

At 10 o’clock tonight, gunfire was resumed near San Antonio when the insurgents armed with rifles forced Spanish troops to retreat.

According to the Americans, their fighting force here will number 20,000 at the end of the month.

This man is incredibly important in cutting through the American propaganda.

About Aime Ernest Motsch (“Lieutenant X”)

About the author (of this diary): Aime Ernest Motsch (January 1, 1867 — April 30, 1911). Wrote under the pseudonym, “Lieutenant X.” The Philippine publication of his Philippine diary contains the following information:

He was squadron leader in charge of torpedoes on the sole French battleship, the Bruix, anchored then in Manila Bay.

Born in Cernay, a small town of Alsace, on January 1, 1867, Motsch entered the navy at the age of 18 and rose quickly through the ranks. His superiors rated him highly, and found him an excellent and intelligent officer, always exceeding the tasks defined for him…

After commanding a destroyer in Dunkirk from 1899 to 1900, Lieutenant Motsch spent the last ten years of his life commanding destroyers and attending several staff colleges. On April 30, 1911 Motsch, then commander of the frigate Danton, died of typhoid fever in a military hospital in Brest.

About the diary: Published as The Diary of a French Officer on the War in the Philippines 1898, by “Lieutenant X” (Aime Ernest Motsch) Translated from the French by Marietta Enriquez-de La Haye Jousselin, National Historical Institute, Manila, 1994. From the introductory material of the book:

…[Using] the pseudonym “Lieutenant X,” [Motsch] wrote this unofficial account of the battle of Manila, covering the period from April 28 to August 31, 1898…

His keen observation, along with his fluency in English and German, facilitated interviews with the officers of the other ships as well as with important figures and witnesses of this battle…

His official account was published in Paris in 1904, and entitled La Guerre Hispano-Americaine aux Philippines: du 21 avril au 16 aout 1898, par E. Motsch.

The same edition in its bibliography cites the sources of the translated diary as:

Lieutenant X (Aime Ernest Motsch). “La Guerre aux Philippines.” Revue de Paris. 5e anne, tome 4 (Aug. 1, 1898): pp. 512-540; (Aug. 15, 1898); pp. 861-894.

Lieutenant X (Aime Ernest Motsch). “Le Siege de Manille.” Revue de Paris. 6e anne, tome 4 (Oct. 15, 1898): pp. 802-832; “Les Americaines a Manille.” tome 6 (Nov. 15, 1899); pp. 358-394.

That is a little bit misleading. LT Aime Motsch was a weapons officer in charge of torpedoes on the French armored cruiser MNS Bruix:

General characteristics

Class and type....................................... Amiral Charner-class armored cruiser
Displacement..........................................4,748 t (4,673 long tons)
Length......................................................110.2 m (361 ft 7 in)
Beam..........................................................14.04 m (46 ft 1 in)
Draugh......................................................... 6.06 m (19 ft 11 in)
Installed power..............................................16 × Belleville boilers of 8,300–9,000 PS (6,105–6,619 kW)
Propulsion......................................................2 screws; 2 × triple-expansion steam engines
Speed..........................................................17 knots (31 km/h; 20 mph)
Range.....................................................4,000 nmi (7,400 km; 4,600 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph)
Complement.................................................16 officers and 378 enlisted men
Armament......................................................2 × single 194 mm (7.6 in) guns
.....................................................................6 × single 138 mm (5.4 in) guns
.....................................................................4 × single 65 mm (2.6 in) guns
.....................................................................4 × single 47 mm (1.9 in) Hotchkiss guns
.....................................................................8 × single 37 mm (1.5 in) 5-barreled revolver guns
.....................................................................4 × 450 mm (17.7 in) torpedo tubes
Armour..................................................Waterline belt: 60–90 mm (2.4–3.5 in)
............................................................Deck: 40–50 mm (1.6–2.0 in)
............................................................Gun turrets: 92 mm (3.6 in)
............................................................Conning tower: 92 mm (3.6 in)

She had modern rapid-fire guns and a pair of white powder propellant breech loaders as chasers, but despite her paper stats, the USS Olympia would have torn her apart. The USS Baltimore would have been a handful for her. But that is not what concerns us this 1 August 1898. The chances that the Europeans would join together to interfere with American operations was only a paper worry for Dewey and Merritt. The real headache they had was the treacherous Jaudenes, the oafish Otto Diederichs and the wily Emilio Aguinaldo. 

In the respect of where the Americans are 1 August 1898... (See Map).

    

Not too good. More observations.

Diary of Miguel Saderra Maso

From 11:30 last night until 1:00 this dawn, firing along the defense line from San Antonio Abad to Mandaluyong was the heaviest so far heard since there have been Yankees in these islands. Cannons, machine guns, rifles exploded without let-up on both sides. Many people from Ermita escaped their houses, seeking refuge in the Normal School where more than 2,000 refugees spent the night. We had one dead and several wounded in the trenches. Recovered grenade shells in the Observatory bear the trade mark of an arsenal in the United States.From 11:30 last night until 1:00 this dawn, firing along the defense line from San Antonio Abad to Mandaluyong was the heaviest so far heard since there have been Yankees in these islands. Cannons, machine guns, rifles exploded without let-up on both sides. Many people from Ermita escaped their houses, seeking refuge in the Normal School where more than 2,000 refugees spent the night. We had one dead and several wounded in the trenches. Recovered grenade shells in the Observatory bear the trademark of an arsenal in the United States.

Those would be Ketchum grenades. With the Rains detonator. They were thrown like lawn darts. 



The Spanish used a ball like grenade which they threw with a sling rope. Both types were almost suicidal to use.

==========================================================================

Another diary entry...

Diary of John Henry Asendorf

It is raining steadily. We arrived at camp at 10 o’clock very tired and hungry. After breakfast, or rather dinner, we tried to find rest in our tents. In the evening we were informed that six of our regiment were killed and 32 wounded. Everything remained very quiet in the camp. The killed were laid to rest in a church yard about one and a half miles from our camp and the wounded were cared for at the general hospital. Sick: [Jacob] Landis and Sergeant Martin.

And more bad news...is to come.

[lordroel]

Day 105 of the Spanish–American War, August 2nd 1898

At Sea, Off South Coast,Haiti - Captain Francis J. Higginson To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U. S. S. Massachusetts, 1st Rate,

Copy. At Sea, Off South Coast,Haiti,

August 2, 1898.

Sir:-

1. In obedience to your orders of July 21st, I left Guantanamo on the afternoon of the same day with the Massachusetts, Columbia, Yale, Dixie and Gloucester under my command to convoy General Miles and troops to Porto Rico.

2. While off Mole St.Nicholas, General Miles asked permission to send a telegram to Washington. The Columbia was ordered to deliver the dispatch and to rejoin the Squadron. She left the Squadron at 9.15 a.m., July 22nd, and rejoined at 2.00 p.m. the same day.

3. General Miles having expressed a desire for a consultation with me, I invited him aboard on the afternoon of Saturday the 23rd. He accepted the invitation and came aboard with his Adjutant-General, General Gilmore. During the interview he stated that he desired to land at Guanica on the south side of Porto Rico instead of at Cape San Juan as originally designed, giving as his reasons that the enemy were already well advised through the Public Press of the intended landing at the latter place and consequently that they would probably concentrate troops there to oppose him. He stated that, through information derived from Captain Whitney of the Army, there were no defenses or troops on the south side of the Island either at Guanica or Ponce; that we would find there a large amount of sugar lighters which would be invaluable for the landing of the Army; and that with the capture of the city of Ponce, the largest city on the Island, he would be in a position to operate along a fine military road built by the Spaniards,reaching across the Island from Ponce to San Juan. He also stated that in the southern portion of the Island the people were large[ly] disaffected and would in all likelyhood rally to our Flag. To this disposition I objected on the grounds that from a naval point of view I could not so effectually cover his landing or protect his base at Guanica as I could at San Juan; the depth of water in the harbor of Guanica did not permit of the Massachusetts, Columbia, or Dixie entering and in case of heavy weather I might not even be able to lie off the entrance; that the south coast of Porto Rico was imperfectly surveyed, and lined with reefs, whereas on the east coast from Cape San Juan to Point Algodon I could approach close to the shore and cover with the guns of the fleet any position he wished to occupy; and that, moreover, by placing a vessel on the north coast of Porto Rico just west of Cape San Juan I could obtain a cross fire over the land as far as Fajardo. I stated,moreover,that at Cape San Juan we were 30 miles from St. Thomas,where in the absence of colliers we could coal our ships and communicate with the Government.

I recommended that we proceed to our destination at Cape San Juan and keep Guanica in reserve in case we found insurmountable obstacles at the former place. The General then took his departure and received a salute of fifteen guns.

4. On the morning of the 24th at 9.50 a.m. General Miles sent by wigwag the following message:--

“To Captain Higginson – General Miles desires,if possible,to send in advance any Naval vessels you can spare to Port Guanica and report quickly to us. It is supposed to be without fortifications or torpedoes. If strong,hold and report quickly to us at Cape San Juan. It is more important to land at Guanica than at San Juan. If we can land there he has troops enough to take the harbor of Ponce, and let your fleet in. This can be accomplished by landing by the south side. Can send Captain Whitney,who was at Ponce in June, to you if you desire.”

I then determined to waive my objections to landing at Guanica,to take the General to that place,and to cooperate with him in landing as far as the conditions would admit.

5. We were then off the Mona Passage,and detaching Commander Davis with the Dixie under orders,a copy of which is herewith attached, marked “ A ”,5I proceeded with the convoy through the Mona Psaage [i.e., Passage] and arrived off Port Guanica at 5.20 a.m., July 25th, and standing in with the Gloucester in advance,came to an anchor at 8.45 a.m.

( 2 ) LANDING AT GUANICA.

1. Finding no batteries bearing upon the entrance,the Gloucester approached the mouth of the harbor and Lieut.Comdr.Wainwright6 asked permission to enter. This I granted with some hesitation not knowing of course what mines or torpedoes might be in the channel,or what batteries might be concealed inside the harbor out of sight from our view; and knowing that I would be powerless to render the Gloucester any assistance after she had penetrated the harbor and was lost to sight. The Gloucester as she entered fired several shots and soon disappeared from my view. I listened attentively however and found that she was not being opposed by any battery. Without waiting for her to return and report,I directed the transports to enter the harbor which they did,and,hoisting out all the boats and launches from the Massachusetts,I sent them in at about 10.00 a.m. in charge of Cadet Evans and the landing of the Army commenced immediately. I learned later,as will be seem from Lt.Comdr.Wainwright’s report/ herewith enclosed marked “B”,that he landed a company of sailors under the command of Lt.Huse and Lt.Wood, and drove back a small force of Spanish troops,and hauled down the Spanish flag. In fact,the Gloucester captured the place single handed and I take pleasure in commending Lt.Comdr.Wainwright and his officers and men for their gallantry and daring. The troops on the Columbia were landed by her boats and those on the Yale were landed by transports which came alongside and took them on board.

2. At 12.30 a.m.,July 26th the Columbia was sent to St.Thomas with despatches and orders to fill up with coal. The Yale left at noon,July 26th,for Hampton Roads to fill up with coal,and the Dixie rejoined us at about 2.00 p.m. July 26th. A report of her voyage is herewith enclosed marked “C” and is accompanied by a letter relating to a prize which Commander Davis seized and sent in for adjudication. On July 27th,at 8:00 a.m.,the Wasp,and at 11:00 a.m.,the Annapolis joined the squadron[.] During the forenoon of the same day General Wilson on the transport Obdam and General Ernst on the Grand Duchesse arrived,but the troops were not disembarked at Guanica.

( 3 ) LANDING AT PONCE.

1. Having now a sufficient force at my command and General Miles being anxious to transfer the place of disembarkation to the harbor of Ponce,I directed Commander Davis of the Dixie,with the Annapolis,Wasp and Gloucester under his command,to proceed to the harbor of Ponce to reconnoitre,capture all the lighters that could be found at that place,and occupy such positions as he thought necessary for holding the port until the arrival of the Army. The Dixie left Guanica with the Annapolis and Wasp at 1.45 p.m.,July 27th,and the Gloucester followed at 4.30 p.m.

2. The report of Commander Davis is herewith enclosed marked “D”. He found no opposition,captured a large number of lighters,and received the surrender of the City of Ponce. I cannot too highly commend the very able and efficient manner in which Commander Davis executed his orders and cleared the way completely for an immediate peaceful possession of the City of Ponce by the Army. He was ably assisted by Commander Hunker,Lieut. Ward, and Lt.Comdr.Wainwright. The latter officer during the night collected the lighters,and moored them alongside of his ship and,when the first transport anchored the next morning,the lighters were put alongside of her and an immediate disembarkation commenced. Commander Davis captured in the harbor 3 Spanish brigantines,a number of smaller sailing vessels and a large number of lighters. I placed a guard of men from the Massachusetts on board the Spanish brigantines,and it was my intention,as soon as they could have been gotten ready,to send them with prize crew to Charleston for condemnation,but as I came away before this could be accomplished I directed Captain Chester to carry out my intention. The sugar lighters and other vessels captured that could not be sent to the United States for condemnation,I directed to be appraised and sold at Ponce.

3. – I left Guanica with the Massachusetts,General Miles, General Wilson, and transports at 4.00 a.m. on the 28th for Ponce and anchored there at 6.40 a.m. On our way to Ponce we met two more transports with troops,and the Cincinnati,Captain Chester,who entered Ponce with us. We found everything ready for the immediate disembarkation of the troops,and the Army landed and took possession. All the steam launches of the squadron were placed at the disposal of the Army. The harbor of Ponce is of ample dimension,good water,and a fine place for disembarkation of troops[.] At 4.30 p.m. on the 28th,the Annapolis returned to Guanica to guard that place until the arrival of the Terror, and at 4.50 p.m. of the same day the Dixie left for St.Thomas with dispatches. Captain Chester of the Cincinnati was appointed Captain of the Port,Lieutenant Hoogewerff was appointed Beachmaster,Lieut.Badger was appointed Harbor-master,and Surgeon Byrnes was appointed Quarantine Officer. The Annapolis returned from Guanica on the afternoon of the 29th and reported that the Terror had arrived at that port,the latter vessel having coaled at St.Thomas before leaving for Guanica. On the 30th the Annapolis was dispatched to Cape San Juan to remain there until further orders and to send to Ponce all vessels arriving. The lighthouse on Cardona Island was relighted on the evening of the 29th following.

4. The Columbia, returning on the 30th from coaling at St.Thomas,exchanged numbers with the Massachusetts at 6.30 p.m. At 7.30 p.m. the Columbia sent signal “we are aground”. I immediately ordered the Cincinnati to get under way to assist in hauling her off and sent the Navigator of the Massachusetts,Lieut. Potts to examine her position and see if we could safely render her any assistance with this vessel. It was found that she was grounded on the southern edge of a coral reef <projecting from Cardona Island and was lying broadside on the reef> heading eastward. She seemed to be aground on her port bilge, about abreast of her second smokestack,in 21 feet of water. At 12.30 <a.m.>, July 31st,I got underway with the Massachusetts,and went out and took a position on her starboard bow and ran hawsers to her. The Cincinnati took a position on her starboard quarter, but our endeavors to pull her off resulted only in parting all the hawsers. I then procured some lighters from the harbor and directed her Commanding Officer to hoist out ammunition and coal. General Miles kindle [i.e., kindly] offered to send me any of his vessels that could be of any use,and I am much indebted to the Master of the tug Hercules for assistance rendered in towing lighters. The Cincinnati then made fast again to the Columbia’s starboard quarter and at 6.55 p.m. of the 31st we succeeded in pulling her off the reef. Captain Sands was on the list at the time of the accident,but I was informed by Lieut.Comdr.J.H. Moore,her Executive officer, that the ship was not making water and was not seriously damaged. I directed Captain Chester to order a Court of Inquiry upon her grounding.

5. The Dixie arrived on the afternoon of the 31st and reported that the Montgomery and Puritan had arrived at San Juan and the New Orleans had gone to St.Thomas for coal. On the evening of the 31st the St.Louis and transport Cherokee arrived with troops. On the same evening General Miles informed me that he desired to land the troops on board the St.Louis and Cherokee at the Gulf of Jobos,30 miles east of Ponce,and requested that I send two vessels to recconoitre,capture lighters,and ascertain the depth of water,there being no charts of this place. I therefore directed the Gloucester and Wasp to leave at 5.30 a.m.,Aug. 1st,to reconnoitre the Gulf of Jobos,for the Gloucester to remain there in possession guarding any lighters they might capture,and for the Wasp to return and report. Captain Goodrich of the St.Louis accompanied the expedition to ascertain the soundings. At the time of my leaving Ponce,at 1.00 p.m. on the 1st,the Wasp had not returned. On the 1st the Prairie and St.Paul arrived.

6. Having received orders from you on the 31st to return to Guantanamo at once,I turned over as soon as possible all the business under my charge to Captain Chester,and left at 1.00 p.m. for Guantanamo.

( 4 ) SURVEY, LIGHTING, AND BUOYAGE OF COAST OF PORTO RICO.

1. If the operations on the coast of Porto Rico are to be continued,I would recommend that two surveying vessels be sent to that Island as soon as possible and a survey of the coast and harbors on the south side be commenced. In the present uncharted condition of that coast the Government runs great risks of losing its vessels. In standing in to the port of Guanica the Massachusetts came near running upon an uncharted shoal upon which we found 19 feet in a spot where the chart shows 11 fathoms. This shoal bears S S W (mag) 1 mile from Mesita Point lighthouse. There is a passage on each side of it,although it is advisable to keep to the northward of it. A red and black horizontal striped buoy was placed on this shoal which is about 50 yards in extent.

2. There seemed to be no trouble at Ponce in relighting the lights as all the apparatus and oil were ready at hand,and the old lightkeepers were willing to resume work under the same terms as under the Spanish Government. I would also recommend that a buoy tender with a good supply of buoys be sent down in order that all the harbors used by the Army may be properly buoyed. A buoy is very much needed south of Cardona Island, outside the reef where the Columbia went ashore.

( 5 ) General Review of Plan of Operations of General Miles.

1. General Miles proposes to advance from Ponce to San Juan over a military road built by the Spaniards at a cost of $1,000,000. The road is good and can be traversed at all seasons,but it runs through a mountainous country. There are many strong positions that can be occupied by the enemy but, having command of the sea,these can all be flan[k]ed by making landings at ports on the right or left flanks,and the enemy made to evacuate any position by flanking rather than by direct assault. When I left Ponce the enemy were reported to be concentrating at Aibounito,which is a military sanitarium for the Spaniards; one of the objects of landing troops at port Jobos was to flank this position. If the Spaniards retreat to the northwest from Caey,landing troops on the east coast will flank any position which they may occupy. Along the south and west coasts there are a few troops and all we have to do is to appear there,and I have not the slightest doubt that it will be cordially welcomed.

2. General Miles offered to send 1000 troops with me to Mayagua and I intended to move on that place as soon as I conveniently could. I recommend that the port of Arecbo be blockaded and captured as it is in direct railroad communication with San Juan and it is said to be a resort for blockade runners. The railroad from Ponce to Yauco is in possession of the Army,and a march of 18 miles through Sabana Grande and St.German brings you to the terminus of a railroad connecting with roads leading to Mayagua,Rincon, and Aguadilla on the west coast and connecting with roads leading into the interior. The whole Island except San Juan will be easy to capture, and I would respectfully recommend that a sufficient force be kept there to render an efficient and cooperation with the army wherever they wish to move. There is more reason to move quickly because as at Ponce the Spanish authorities had commenced a political persecution and had begun to imprison persons suspected of sympathizing with the United States, and will not doubt do it at other places the more their fortunes are on the wane. It would therefore be policy on our part to scour the coasts and drive away the Spanish authorities. The torpedo-boat destroyer Terror, I have been informed is so seriously damaged as to be unable to move about.

3. From my experience in landing troops, I would respectfully recommend that on every transport at least one steam launch should be carried, with proper force to run her. Both at Guanica and at Ponce a constant demand by the army was for steam launches to tow boats or to carry officers from one ship to another. As long as they are afloat they require transportation by water, as many of our vessels like the Gloucester, Wasp and Dixie do not carry steam launches, our ability to supply this demand is limited, and therefore if every transport had its own launch the time occupied in landing an army and all its stores and ammunition would be very much diminished. I would recommend also that two small steam tugs accompany each expedition of the army, for the purpose of towing lighters. Probably this will be done in the future, as the army officers with whom I conversed on this matter seemed quite impressed with the necessity of it.

4. The health at Ponce is good, there is no yellow fever; fresh water can be obtained from the boilers of vessels.

5. I also recommend that the island of Celebra be taken by the Navy. I doubt if there is any defences there and it could be easily captured and held. The Marines now stationed at Camp McCalla might be transferred to this place to capture and hold it for the use of the Navy as a coaling station and dock yard. The harbor of Ponce is quite open and is not a safe anchorage during SouthWest gales, but the English Consul there informed me that they had not had a hurrycane since ’76. By building breakwaters I think the harbor could be rendered quite safe. Guanica harbor is good for vessels of 18 feet draught and is quite well protected. I think a survey of Jobos,however,will probably disclose a very valuable anchorage for Naval vessels.

6. Commander Davis captured at Ponce about 70 tons of bituminous coal belonging to the Spanish Government,with which I was enabled to replenish the bunkers of the Wasp and the Gloucester.

Very respectfully,

Francis J. Higginson,

Captain, U.S.Navy, Commanding.

Key West - Commodore George C. Remey, Commandant, Key West Naval Base, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

NAVAL BASE, KEY WEST [FL]

U. S. Flagship Lancaster, August 2, 1898

My dear Admiral:

For several days past the BADGER has been at Dry Tortugas, arranging for the disposal of three prize Spanish vessels, with a number of sick and wounded on board. Last night I transmitted to her Commanding Officer instructions from the Department, to send the prisoners into Havana in one of the least valuable of the prizes, or two of them, if necessary, and to use his discretion in sending the remaining vessel to New York or Havana. The BADGER ought soon to arrive in Key West: she has not been in here since she went over to the blockade on July 3d. I have had no orders about her since then.

(2) I have kept your telegram of July 23d in mind, about sending boats for the Indiana, New York, and Iowa by the Yosemite and BADGER. The heavier boats have been loaded aboard the coal schooner AUGUSTUS PALMER, and will go to Guantanamo probably today.

(3) Commodore Howell makes urgent request for more vessels, I think very properly. The MIANTONOMOH will go over to Havana tomorrow, and at his request the small torpedo boats and the CUSHING are going to Sagua la Grande and vicinity to operate. The BANCROFT, MAPLE, AND EAGLE are on station between the Isle of Pines and Cape Frances. It was in that locality that the Santo Domingo was run ashore and burned. The NASHVILLE is still at Gibara; so far the Department has taken no action on Commander Maynard’s report on the situation there.

(4) The LEBANON will get off probably today, with a schooner in tow. She has been loaded with all the stores and private matter and mail (not already sent by the FROLIC) accumulated up to the present day. It is very difficult to find out about many of the vessels, in regard to sending matter for them; and I request that you will send me all the information possible that will be of assistance in making shipments from this point to vessels acting to the eastw’d I am in the main cognizant of the vessels that are down on the south side of Cuba or to the eastward; but if they are sent north or back to Key West, the only information I can have of such movement, unless word is sent me, is by hearing of such vessel’s arrival at some northern port.

(5) When the YANKEE was here about the beginning of July, she was loaded with a large accumulation of stores, government and private, and mail; but she took it all north when she went by the Department’s order to New York, July 3d. On account of a suspected case of yellow fever the Department forbade anything to be removed from the vessel before sailing to this incident is principally due the non-receipt of certain stores, which has caused complaint.

Very truly yours,

Geo. C. Remey

Commodore Commanding

[miletus12]

Aug 2, 2022 2:47:59 GMT lordroel said:

Day 105 of the Spanish–American War, August 2nd 1898

At Sea, Off South Coast,Haiti - Captain Francis J. Higginson To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U. S. S. Massachusetts, 1st Rate,

Copy. At Sea, Off South Coast,Haiti,

August 2, 1898.

Sir:-

1. In obedience to your orders of July 21st, I left Guantanamo on the afternoon of the same day with the Massachusetts, Columbia, Yale, Dixie and Gloucester under my command to convoy General Miles and troops to Porto Rico.

(Higginson left under protest. M.)

2. While off Mole St. Nicholas, General Miles asked permission to send a telegram to Washington. The Columbia was ordered to deliver the dispatch and to rejoin the Squadron. She left the Squadron at 9.15 a.m., July 22nd, and rejoined at 2.00 p.m. the same day.

(This was the telegram where Miles told Alger and Long of his change in plans to forego Fajardo for Guanica. M.)

3. General Miles having expressed a desire for a consultation with me, I invited him aboard on the afternoon of Saturday the 23rd. He accepted the invitation and came aboard with his Adjutant-General, General Gilmore. During the interview he stated that he desired to land at Guanica on the south side of Porto Rico instead of at Cape San Juan as originally designed, giving as his reasons that the enemy were already well advised through the Public Press of the intended landing at the latter place and consequently that they would probably concentrate troops there to oppose him. He stated that, through information derived from Captain Whitney of the Army, there were no defenses or troops on the south side of the Island either at Guanica or Ponce; that we would find there a large amount of sugar lighters which would be invaluable for the landing of the Army; and that with the capture of the city of Ponce, the largest city on the Island, he would be in a position to operate along a fine military road built by the Spaniards, reaching across the Island from Ponce to San Juan. He also stated that in the southern portion of the Island the people were large[ly] disaffected and would in all likelihood rally to our Flag. To this disposition I objected on the grounds that from a naval point of view I could not so effectually cover his landing or protect his base at Guanica as I could at San Juan; the depth of water in the harbor of Guanica did not permit of the Massachusetts, Columbia, or Dixie entering and in case of heavy weather I might not even be able to lie off the entrance; that the south coast of Porto Rico was imperfectly surveyed, and lined with reefs, whereas on the east coast from Cape San Juan to Point Algodon I could approach close to the shore and cover with the guns of the fleet any position he wished to occupy; and that, moreover, by placing a vessel on the north coast of Porto Rico just west of Cape San Juan I could obtain a cross fire over the land as far as Fajardo. I stated, moreover, that at Cape San Juan we were 30 miles from St. Thomas, where in the absence of colliers we could coal our ships and communicate with the Government.

(The Navy favored Fajardo, Puerto Rico for the reasons given in the paragraph above. M.) 

I recommended that we proceed to our destination at Cape San Juan and keep Guanica in reserve in case we found insurmountable obstacles at the former place. The General then took his departure and received a salute of fifteen guns.

(SARCASM. Higginson probably wanted to honor Miles in the Imperial Japanese Navy fashion. With live ammunition and a Bronx cheer.  Incidentally Miles lied to the Navy about that road and how he intended to conduct the campaign. M.)  

4. On the morning of the 24th at 9.50 a.m. General Miles sent by wigwag the following message:--

“To Captain Higginson – General Miles desires,if possible, to send in advance any Naval vessels you can spare to Port Guanica and report quickly to us. It is supposed to be without fortifications or torpedoes. If strong, hold and report quickly to us at Cape San Juan. It is more important to land at Guanica than at San Juan. If we can land there he has troops enough to take the harbor of Ponce, and let your fleet in. This can be accomplished by landing by the south side. Can send Captain Whitney, who was at Ponce in June, to you if you desire.”

(See chart.



The shaded deep blue areas are less than 20 feet deep. The keels of the US warships are riding as follows:

USS Massachusetts => 27 feet. 
USS Columbia =>        22 feet. 
USS Yale =>                19 feet
USS Dixie =>              20 feet  
USS Gloucester =>       12 feet. 

I foresee a problem. M)

I then determined to waive my objections to landing at Guanica,to take the General to that place, and to cooperate with him in landing as far as the conditions would admit.

("You are a Navy captain and I am an army general. We do it my way." Nelson Miles pulled rank on Higginson. M.)

5. We were then off the Mona Passage,and detaching Commander Davis with the Dixie under orders, a copy of which is herewith attached, marked “ A ”,5I (the garble reads "As ordered" )proceeded with the convoy through the Mona Psaage [i.e., Passage] and arrived off Port Guanica at 5.20 a.m., July 25th, and standing in with the Gloucester in advance, came to an anchor at 8.45 a.m.

(The Gloucester was the only shallow draft vessel that could close the harbor. Not even the transports could work inside the harbor up to the wharf docks . Hence the sugar lighters would be needed to transfer troops and equipment.

M.)

( 2 ) LANDING AT GUANICA.

1. Finding no batteries bearing upon the entrance, the Gloucester approached the mouth of the harbor and Lieut.Comdr.Wainwright6 asked permission to enter. This I granted with some hesitation not knowing of course what mines or torpedoes might be in the channel, or what batteries might be concealed inside the harbor out of sight from our view; and knowing that I would be powerless to render the Gloucester any assistance after she had penetrated the harbor and was lost to sight. The Gloucester as she entered fired several shots and soon disappeared from my view. I listened attentively however and found that she was not being opposed by any battery. Without waiting for her to return and report, I directed the transports to enter the harbor which they did, and,hoisting out all the boats and launches from the Massachusetts,I sent them in at about 10.00 a.m. in charge of Cadet Evans and the landing of the Army commenced immediately. I learned later,as will be seem from Lt.Comdr.Wainwright’s report/ herewith enclosed marked “B”,that he landed a company of sailors under the command of Lt.Huse and Lt.Wood, and drove back a small force of Spanish troops,and hauled down the Spanish flag. In fact,the Gloucester captured the place single handed and I take pleasure in commending Lt.Comdr.Wainwright and his officers and men for their gallantry and daring. The troops on the Columbia were landed by her boats and those on the Yale were landed by transports which came alongside and took them on board.



(Better than at Daquiri, but still a fiasco. Notice no horses? M.) 




(*Notice the jackasses...  and the horses and mules. Miles' men may have requisitioned some of the horses and the mules from the local residents as well as landed their own along with the wagons seen by sugar lighter from the transports. The jackasses... well...  M.)

2. At 12.30 a.m.,July 26th the Columbia was sent to St. Thomas with despatches and orders to fill up with coal. The Yale left at noon, July 26th, for Hampton Roads to fill up with coal, and the Dixie rejoined us at about 2.00 p.m. July 26th. A report of her voyage is herewith enclosed marked “C” and is accompanied by a letter relating to a prize which Commander Davis seized and sent in for adjudication. On July 27th, at 8:00 a.m., the Wasp, and at 11:00 a.m., the Annapolis joined the squadron[.] During the forenoon of the same day General Wilson on the transport Obdam and General Ernst on the Grand Duchesse arrived, but the troops were not disembarked at Guanica.

(They were left on the transports for no good reason ever given for two days to become seasick and food poisoned by swelling seas and tainted tinned beef. M.)

( 3 ) LANDING AT PONCE.

1. Having now a sufficient force at my command and General Miles being anxious to transfer the place of disembarkation to the harbor of Ponce, I directed Commander Davis of the Dixie, with the Annapolis, Wasp and Gloucester under his command, to proceed to the harbor of Ponce to reconnoitre, capture all the lighters that could be found at that place, and occupy such positions as he thought necessary for holding the port until the arrival of the Army. The Dixie left Guanica with the Annapolis and Wasp at 1.45 p.m.,July 27th,and the Gloucester followed at 4.30 p.m.

*(The aforementioned sugar lighters were "requisitioned' (stolen) and promptly put to work. M.)

2. The report of Commander Davis is herewith enclosed marked “D”. He found no opposition, captured a large number of lighters, and received the surrender of the City of Ponce. I cannot too highly commend the very able and efficient manner in which Commander Davis executed his orders and cleared the way completely for an immediate peaceful possession of the City of Ponce by the Army. He was ably assisted by Commander Hunker, Lieut. Ward, and Lt.Comdr. Wainwright. The latter officer during the night collected the lighters, and moored them alongside of his ship and, when the first transport anchored the next morning, the lighters were put alongside of her and an immediate disembarkation commenced. Commander Davis captured in the harbor 3 Spanish brigantines, a number of smaller sailing vessels and a large number of lighters. I placed a guard of men from the Massachusetts on board the Spanish brigantines, and it was my intention, as soon as they could have been gotten ready, to send them with prize crew to Charleston for condemnation, but as I came away before this could be accomplished. I directed Captain Chester to carry out my intention. The sugar lighters and other vessels captured that could not be sent to the United States for condemnation, I directed to be appraised and sold at Ponce.

(As per previous... all of those ships and lighters were stolen. M)  

3. – I left Guanica with the Massachusetts, General Miles, General Wilson, and transports at 4.00 a.m. on the 28th for Ponce and anchored there at 6.40 a.m. On our way to Ponce we met two more transports with troops, and the Cincinnati, Captain Chester, who entered Ponce with us. We found everything ready for the immediate disembarkation of the troops, and the Army landed and took possession. All the steam launches of the squadron were placed at the disposal of the Army. The harbor of Ponce is of ample dimension, good water, and a fine place for disembarkation of troops[.] At 4.30 p.m. on the 28th,the Annapolis returned to Guanica to guard that place until the arrival of the Terror, and at 4.50 p.m. of the same day the Dixie left for St. Thomas with dispatches. Captain Chester of the Cincinnati was appointed Captain of the Port, Lieutenant Hoogewerff was appointed Beachmaster, Lieut.Badger was appointed Harbor-master, and Surgeon Byrnes was appointed Quarantine Officer. The Annapolis returned from Guanica on the afternoon of the 29th and reported that the Terror had arrived at that port, the latter vessel having coaled at St. Thomas before leaving for Guanica. On the 30th the Annapolis was dispatched to Cape San Juan to remain there until further orders and to send to Ponce all vessels arriving. The lighthouse on Cardona Island was relighted on the evening of the 29th following.

(USS Terror, a monitor, drew 19 feet. She had to stand off the shallows exposed to the open ocean weather. That was a stupid and unnecessary risk. M.)   

4. The Columbia, returning on the 30th from coaling at St.Thomas, exchanged numbers with the Massachusetts at 6.30 p.m. At 7.30 p.m. the Columbia sent signal “we are aground”. I immediately ordered the Cincinnati to get under way to assist in hauling her off and sent the Navigator of the Massachusetts, Lieut. Potts to examine her position and see if we could safely render her any assistance with this vessel. It was found that she was grounded on the southern edge of a coral reef <projecting from Cardona Island and was lying broadside on the reef> heading eastward. She seemed to be aground on her port bilge, about abreast of her second smokestack, in 21 feet of water. At 12.30 <a.m.>, July 31st, I got underway with the Massachusetts, and went out and took a position on her starboard bow and ran hawsers to her. The Cincinnati took a position on her starboard quarter, but our endeavors to pull her off resulted only in parting all the hawsers. I then procured some lighters from the harbor and directed her Commanding Officer to hoist out ammunition and coal. General Miles kindle [i.e., kindly] offered to send me any of his vessels that could be of any use, and I am much indebted to the Master of the tug Hercules for assistance rendered in towing lighters. The Cincinnati then made fast again to the Columbia’s starboard quarter and at 6.55 p.m. of the 31st we succeeded in pulling her off the reef. Captain Sands was on the list at the time of the accident, but I was informed by Lieut. Comdr. J.H. Moore, her Executive officer, that the ship was not making water and was not seriously damaged. I directed Captain Chester to order a Court of Inquiry upon her grounding.

*(As expected, the shallows encountered, was a problem. But Higginson handled it as best he could. USS Columbia can be blamed on Sampson. It was his job as admiral; to impress on Miles that there were places the navy could not go because of shallow reefs. Miles bowled Higginson over because of that rank thing. M.)  

5. The Dixie arrived on the afternoon of the 31st and reported that the Montgomery and Puritan had arrived at San Juan and the New Orleans had gone to St. Thomas for coal. On the evening of the 31st the St. Louis and transport Cherokee arrived with troops. On the same evening General Miles informed me that he desired to land the troops on board the St. Louis and Cherokee at the Gulf of Jobos,30 miles east of Ponce, and requested that I send two vessels to recconoitre, capture lighters, and ascertain the depth of water, there being no charts of this place. I therefore directed the Gloucester and Wasp to leave at 5.30 a.m., Aug. 1st, to reconnoiter the Gulf of Jobos, for the Gloucester to remain there in possession guarding any lighters they might capture, and for the Wasp to return and report. Captain Goodrich of the St. Louis accompanied the expedition to ascertain the soundings. At the time of my leaving Ponce, at 1.00 p.m. on the 1st,the Wasp had not returned. On the 1st the Prairie and St. Paul arrived.

(See chart. 



(Same as before, the shaded blue is the twenty foot or shallower areas.  Notice that this evolution occurs because nobody had done any hydrographic soundings or prepared charts? The poke at it and see what happens nature of this operation should have raised alarms in Washington and resulted in reliefs of command due to incompetence. M.) 

6. Having received orders from you on the 31st to return to Guantanamo at once, I turned over as soon as possible all the business under my charge to Captain Chester, and left at 1.00 p.m. for Guantanamo.

(At this moment in the operation, during the middle of the landings, that imbecile Sampson recalls the naval commander of the Puerto Rico operation, Higginson. Think about that for a minute. The naval commander is called away from duty and away from his mission responsibility, which is the equivalent of yanking him away while he is in the middle of engaging the enemy. How utterly insane and stupid is this recall? But it gets more stupid. Get a load of the hydrographic survey.  M.)   

( 4 ) SURVEY, LIGHTING, AND BUOYAGE OF COAST OF PORTO RICO.

1. If the operations on the coast of Porto Rico are to be continued, I would recommend that two surveying vessels be sent to that Island as soon as possible and a survey of the coast and harbors on the south side be commenced. In the present uncharted condition of that coast the Government runs great risks of losing its vessels. In standing into the port of Guanica the Massachusetts came near running upon an uncharted shoal upon which we found 19 feet in a spot where the chart shows 11 fathoms. This shoal bears S S W (mag) 1 mile from Mesita Point lighthouse. There is a passage on each side of it, although it is advisable to keep to the northward of it. A red and black horizontal striped buoy was placed on this shoal which is about 50 yards in extent.

(Good grief. When Mahan read that he must have blown his stack. M.)

2. There seemed to be no trouble at Ponce in relighting the lights as all the apparatus and oil were ready at hand, and the old lightkeepers were willing to resume work under the same terms as under the Spanish Government. I would also recommend that a buoy tender with a good supply of buoys be sent down in order that all the harbors used by the Army may be properly buoyed. A buoy is very much needed south of Cardona Island, outside the reef where the Columbia went ashore.

(Ran aground and dented her keel plates, a half year to repair her. Blame Sampson for it. Higginson is being subtly sarcastic, but he is correct. He is kind of blaming the army and Sampson for all the damage and hazards incurred for which he, Higginson, could properly be blamed as naval commander of the expedition. But for real hilarity, read Higginson's commentary on Miles' "picnic". M.)    

( 5 ) General Review of Plan of Operations of General Miles.

1. General Miles proposes to advance from Ponce to San Juan over a military road built by the Spaniards at a cost of $1,000,000. The road is good and can be traversed at all seasons, but it runs through a mountainous country. There are many strong positions that can be occupied by the enemy but, having command of the sea, these can all be flan[k]ed by making landings at ports on the right or left flanks, and the enemy made to evacuate any position by flanking rather than by direct assault. When I left Ponce the enemy were reported to be concentrating at Aibounito, which is a military sanitarium for the Spaniards; one of the objects of landing troops at port Jobos, was to flank this position. If the Spaniards retreat to the northwest from Caey, landing troops on the east coast will flank any position which they may occupy. Along the south and west coasts there are a few troops and all we have to do is to appear there, and I have not the slightest doubt that it will be cordially welcomed.

*(Note how Higginson suggests that Miles' stupid proposed plan to run up the middle along the road can actually be worked the "navy way"? I am not giving anything away when I note that the Spanish were about to meet Miles push right where Higginson said they would in the central mountain range when the fighting stops. M.)

2. General Miles offered to send 1000 troops with me to Mayagua and I intended to move on that place as soon as I conveniently could. I recommend that the port of Arecbo be blockaded and captured as it is in direct railroad communication with San Juan and it is said to be a resort for blockade runners. The railroad from Ponce to Yauco is in possession of the Army, and a march of 18 miles through Sabana Grande and St. German brings you to the terminus of a railroad connecting with roads leading to Mayagua, Rincon, and Aguadilla on the west coast and connecting with roads leading into the interior. The whole Island except San Juan will be easy to capture, and I would respectfully recommend that a sufficient force be kept there to render an efficient and (blank?) cooperation with the army wherever they wish to move. There is more reason to move quickly because as at Ponce the Spanish authorities had commenced a political persecution and had begun to imprison persons suspected of sympathizing with the United States and will not doubt do it at other places the more their fortunes are on the wane. It would therefore be policy on our part to scour the coasts and drive away the Spanish authorities. The torpedo-boat destroyer Terror, I have been informed is so seriously damaged as to be unable to move about.

(ARS Terror, which was supposed to join Cervera. It was worth taking if for no other reason, that it could be a blueprint for better US destroyers.

Class and type........................ Furor-class destroyer

Displacement......................... 370 tons

Length ..................................220 ft 0 in (67.06 m)

Beam..................................... 22 ft 0 in (6.71 m)

Draft.........................................5 ft 6 in (1.68 m)

Installed power ...................6,000 ihp (4,500 kW)

Propulsion................................. 2-shaft, 4-cylinder triple expansion, 4 Normand boilers

Speed..................................... 28 knots (52 km/h; 32 mph)

Complement............................ 67 officers and enlisted

Armament..................................2 × 14 pdr quick-firing guns

................................................8 × 6 pdr quick-firing guns

................................................2 × 1 pdr Maxim guns,

................................................2 × torpedo tubes
Notes 100 tons coal (normal))

As for the suggestion of a land campaign as Higginson describes, well.... Miles might have cribbed Higginson's notes. M.) 

3. From my experience in landing troops, I would respectfully recommend that on every transport at least one steam launch should be carried, with proper force to run her. Both at Guanica and at Ponce a constant demand by the army was for steam launches to tow boats or to carry officers from one ship to another. As long as they are afloat they require transportation by water, as many of our vessels like the Gloucester, Wasp and Dixie do not carry steam launches, our ability to supply this demand is limited, and therefore if every transport had its own launch the time occupied in landing an army and all its stores and ammunition would be very much diminished. I would recommend also that two small steam tugs accompany each expedition of the army, for the purpose of towing lighters. Probably this will be done in the future, as the army officers with whom I conversed on this matter seemed quite impressed with the necessity of it.

(*One sees that "steam launch" and is reminded of Winfield Scott's sailm ketches that he used to tow lighters about at Vera Cruz. Those who do not learn from history rediscover it. M.)

4. The health at Ponce is good, there is no yellow fever; fresh water can be obtained from the boilers of vessels.

(I think Higginson means that fresh water can be obtained "for" and not "from" the steam ship condenser circuits for their boilers. M.)

5. I also recommend that the island of Celebra be taken by the Navy. I doubt if there is any defences there and it could be easily captured and held. The Marines now stationed at Camp McCalla might be transferred to this place to capture and hold it for the use of the Navy as a coaling station and dock yard. The harbor of Ponce is quite open and is not a safe anchorage during Southwest gales, but the English Consul there informed me that they had not had a hurricane since ’76. By building breakwaters I think the harbor could be rendered quite safe. Guanica harbor is good for vessels of 18 feet draught and is quite well protected. I think a survey of Jobos, however, will probably disclose a very valuable anchorage for Naval vessels.

(He means Culebra Island.


The US grabbed everything between Puerto Rico and St Thomas. M.)

6. Commander Davis captured at Ponce about 70 tons of bituminous coal belonging to the Spanish Government, with which I was enabled to replenish the bunkers of the Wasp and the Gloucester.\

(Righteous theft. M.)

Very respectfully,

Francis J. Higginson,

Captain, U.S.Navy, Commanding.

See my assorted embedded comments in italics for the assorted US mistakes and comedies to date concerning Nelson Miles' "picnic". 

Aug 2, 2022 2:47:59 GMT lordroel said:

Key West - Commodore George C. Remey, Commandant, Key West Naval Base, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

NAVAL BASE, KEY WEST [FL]

U. S. Flagship Lancaster, August 2, 1898

My dear Admiral:

For several days past the BADGER has been at Dry Tortugas, arranging for the disposal of three prize Spanish vessels, with a number of sick and wounded on board. Last night I transmitted to her Commanding Officer instructions from the Department, to send the prisoners into Havana in one of the least valuable of the prizes, or two of them, if necessary, and to use his discretion in sending the remaining vessel to New York or Havana. The BADGER ought soon to arrive in Key West: she has not been in here since she went over to the blockade on July 3d. I have had no orders about her since then.

(2) I have kept your telegram of July 23d in mind, about sending boats for the Indiana, New York, and Iowa by the Yosemite and BADGER. The heavier boats have been loaded aboard the coal schooner AUGUSTUS PALMER, and will go to Guantanamo probably today.

(3) Commodore Howell makes urgent request for more vessels, I think very properly. The MIANTONOMOH will go over to Havana tomorrow, and at his request the small torpedo boats and the CUSHING are going to Sagua la Grande and vicinity to operate. The BANCROFT, MAPLE, AND EAGLE are on station between the Isle of Pines and Cape Frances. It was in that locality that the Santo Domingo was run ashore and burned. The NASHVILLE is still at Gibara; so far the Department has taken no action on Commander Maynard’s report on the situation there.

(4) The LEBANON will get off probably today, with a schooner in tow. She has been loaded with all the stores and private matter and mail (not already sent by the FROLIC) accumulated up to the present day. It is very difficult to find out about many of the vessels, in regard to sending matter for them; and I request that you will send me all the information possible that will be of assistance in making shipments from this point to vessels acting to the eastw’d I am in the main cognizant of the vessels that are down on the south side of Cuba or to the eastward; but if they are sent north or back to Key West, the only information I can have of such movement, unless word is sent me, is by hearing of such vessel’s arrival at some northern port.

(5) When the YANKEE was here about the beginning of July, she was loaded with a large accumulation of stores, government and private, and mail; but she took it all north when she went by the Department’s order to New York, July 3d. On account of a suspected case of yellow fever the Department forbade anything to be removed from the vessel before sailing to this incident is principally due the non-receipt of certain stores, which has caused complaint.

Very truly yours,

Geo. C. Remey

Commodore Commanding

In other words the blockade off north Cuba has been reduced to a shambles and Remey has lost control of the logistics... again. Whose real fault is it for not concentrating the fleet? Admiral Sampson. 

M.