The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

[miletus12]

Mar 26, 2022 10:17:53 GMT lordroel said:

Well what ever state the cruiser was in, at least it did not end up in Spanish hands.

There is the curious state of Spanish protected cruisers and American protected cruisers of the era. Both navies held design competitions for what we would call today a "heavy cruiser" or what the non-American navies of the era called a first-class cruiser.

The two competing designs that both nations looked at were of British origin. One design from W. Armstrong, Mitchell, and Company of Newcastle would become the USS Baltimore, but the ship was built by William Cramp and Sons of Philadelphia and while on the stocks was heavily modified with lessons from the previous British design plans which the Americans had used for the USS Texas and the USS Charleston (Builders fault, they would do better with USS Olympia.) which turned out to be terrible ships. The Spaniards went with a design, that on paper, looked far superior to the USS Baltimore, a J&G Thomson shipyard in Govan, United Kingdom design. This ship, the ARS Reina Regenta, became the prototype for an entire class of ships that the Spaniards eventually built at Ferrol and Cartagena. The lead ship was first built in the United Kingdom, though at the same shipyard which designed it.

The British bungled the flotation calculations, and the lead ship, the ARA Reina Regenta, turned turtle and sank with all hands in transit from Tangiers to Cadiz during a routine storm. The Spaniards concluded that the ship was lost because she was top-heavy with too heavy an armament for displacement. The Americans were also cognizant of the Reina Regina disaster. They cut down the USS Baltimore's existent sail rig and blistered her out, added keel bilges and reduced her superstructure considerably. The Spaniards, more or less, modified their own builds to follow the same general idea to fix roll-moment and to address the topweight issues. They reduced the gun armament, and rearranged the topside to reduce topweight, but it never worked satisfactorily. The renamed Alfonso XIII class ships were "unacceptable".

The takeaway, here, was that the Americans rapidly soured on British designs for seaworthiness, habitability and user operational reasons. For all that the Indianas were overbuilt, carried too many guns for displacement and were dangerous rollers, they did not catch fire or have main gun armament explosions and ship fires like the British Majestics and Royal Sovereigns. Never mind, also, that the USS Maine, designed by the incompetent Theodore J. Wilson, chief naval constructor of the United States Navy, from stolen British plans, blew up when her coal bunkers turned into dust bombs. The thing is, that it was not British designs in general which were poor. It was being smart about which British firm to pick! Barrow and Armstrong were pretty good. The others? Not so much.

[lordroel]

March 27th 1898

Spain

Segasta's government wins parliamentary elections in Spain.

Porto Rico

Parliamentary elections take place in Porto Rico.

[lordroel]

March 28th 1898

United States

Naval Board of Inquiry ("the Sampson Board") report presented to Congress. On the same day, the report of the Spanish Board of Inquiry into the loss of the Maine is received in Washington (see below):

Extract From The Report Of The Spanish Commission On The Maine Catastrophe

The report contains the depositions of eye witnesses and experts, and, by reproducing, by means of these depositions, the act of explosion, at each moment of its duration, in its external appearances, proves the absence of all the incidents which always necessarily accompany the explosion of a torpedo.

It is known, through these same depositions of witnesses very near the Maine, that there was only a single explosion; that no column of water was thrown up; that there was no movement of the water; that there was no dash of the water against the sides of the nearest vessel; that there was no shaking of the shore, and that no dead fish were seen subsequently. The deposition of the chief pilot of the port shows that there was a great abundance of fish in the bay after the explosion, and the same thing is asserted by the assistant engineer of the harbor works, who says that he has always found dead fish after many explosions (blastings) made for the works in the bay.

The divers, when examining the hull of the Maine, could not see its bottom, as it was buried in the mud, but they examined the sides and the rents in them outwards are an infallible sign that the explosion was internal.

When the bottom of the bay around the vessel was examined not a single sign of the action of a torpedo was found, and, moreover, the district attorney (fiscal) finds no precedents of the blowing up of the magazines of a vessel by torpedoes in any case.

The report states that the peculiar nature of the procedure followed and the thorough observance of the principle of the extraterritoriality of the Maine have prevented the making such investigations in the interior of the vessel as would furnish the means of deciding, at least hypothetically, the internal cause of the disaster; and this inability was increased by the unfortunate refusal which prevented the establishment of the necessary and appropriate cooperation between the Spanish commission on the one side, and the commander and crew of the Maine, the American officials commissioned to investigate the causes of the event, and those subsequently charged with the recovery (salvamento) on the other side.

Lastly, the report affirms that the internal and external examination of the Maine, when it can be accomplished, and provided the labors for the total or partial recovery of the wreck do not cause any change in it, and the examination of the spot in the bay where the vessel is sunk, will prove that, as has been said, the explosion was produced by an internal cause.

United States - Captain Colby M. Chester, Commander, South Atlantic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S.S.CINCINNATI, 2nd. Rate,

Key West, Fla. March 28, 1898.

SIR:-

1. I have the honor to report the movements of the vessels of the South Atlantic Station, under my command, since the date of my #100, of March 22nd. reporting the arrival of the Squadron at Port Antonio, Jamaica.

2. As soon as practicable after our arrival at Port Antonio, the ships were coaled and the CASTINE was despatched to continue the search for the U.S.S.ANNAPOLIS, between Jamaica and Hayti, in accordance with the Department’s instructions in cipher despatch of the 16th. inst. The same day (the 23rd. inst.), the Department’s instructions to proceed with the Squadron to Key West, was received. This ship and the WILMINGTON left within three hours from the time of its receipt, and a course was taken to intercept the CASTINE.

3. The Squadron was reassembled off Cape Nicolas Mole, Hayti, ay 2.00 P.M. the following day, and from this point the best speed possible for the ships was maintained until arrival at Key West at 6.00 P.M. on the 26th. inst.

4. I have reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station.

Very respectfully,

C.M.Chester

Captain, U.S.Navy,

Commanding.

United States - Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief Of The Bureau Of Navigation, To Commodore Francis M. Bunce, Commandant, Brooklyn Navy Yard

March 28, 1898.

S i r:

The following names have been assigned to the vessels recently purchased by the Government, and now fitting out at the yard under your command:

Y a c h t s.

ALICIA, HORNET, ALMY, EAGLE,HERMIONE, HAWK,COLUMBIA and WASP

T u g s.

E.F. LUCKENBACK, TECUMSEH, W.A. LUCKENBACK, UNCAS, WINTHROP, OSCEOLA, P.H. WISE, SIOUX, EL TORO and ALGONQUIN

German Torpedo Boat. SOMMERS

The Hydrographic Office has been directed to send hydrographic outfits for them to the Brooklyn Navy Yard.

The Department directs that as soon as they are in all respects ready for sea, order the Commanding Officers to proceed with them to Key West, Florida and report to the Commander-in-Chief12 of the North Atlantic Station, for duty in the Squadron under his command.

Very respectfully,

A.S. Crowninshield

Chief of Bureau.

[lordroel]

March 29th 1898

United States - Commodore Winfield S. Schley, Commander, Flying Squadron, To Commanding Officers Of The Flying Squadron

[---]

U.S. FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN, 1st. Rate,

Newport News, Va.,

March 29th,1898.

Sir:-

1. Make full preparations for sea as rapidly as possible, completing with coal and provisions.

2. Report when fully ready.

Very respectfully,

W.S. Schley

Commodore, U. S. N.,

Commander-in-Chief of,

Flying Squadron.

United States - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S.Flagship New York,1st Rate,

Key West,Florida,

March 29th,1898.

My dear Mr.Secretary:-

1. Referring again to the Spanish Flotilla now on its way to Havana (1). A telegram received in Havana addressed to the Admiral in command at that place (2) states that the flotilla will be at Longitude 53-30,Latitude 18-30 between the 5th and 7th of April. This telegram sent from the Cannaries was taken in the Havana office by a man in the employ of General Lee (3) I send you a copy of the telegram which has not been entirely deciphered. You may be able to find some expert who can complete it. As read in Havana the officer in command of the flotilla4 requests that he be met at the above rendezvous and escorted to San Juan.

2. Permit me,Mr. Secretary,to again strongly urge that a sufficient force be sent to intercept this flotilla and any vessels sent to their assistance. I understand that such an act is war. But if the President (4) is convinced that war cannot be avoided this is the place to commence it with the greatest advantage to ourselves[.] If the three ships,BROOKLYN, COLUMBIA, and MINNEAPOLIS having great coal capacity,with possibility of smaller vessels,to assist in keeping lookout near San Juan,were sent from here,I think it would be easy work. This Flotilla is bound for Porto Rico beyond any doubt and it might be well to take possession of the Ports of the Island without further delay and instead of giving time to watching for these vessels. The only two ships on this side of the Atlantic which would have any chance against these three ships above named are now in Havana. The VISCAYIA and OQUENDO (5), and I hope they cannot get to sea without my knowledge. It is 1300 miles from Havana to the rendezvous and a less distance from Hampton Roads to Porto Rico. Our vessels sent there should not leave too much in advance for fear that if their destination were known the flotilla might receive warning and change its destination,although it would be difficult for them to do so.

3. These suggestions are made in case war is imminent and the President is willing to take such a step. If these torpedo boats are permitted to reach Havana without hindrance,they will cause us much more trouble than if stopped on the way.

4. I trust,Mr. Secretary,that you will give me several hours notice if war is declared. If I could have twelve of more hours I can be at Havana prepared to attack the place as soon as the declaration be comes public. I would expect to find Havana unprepared and not able to resist the three ships here. Should it prove otherwise I would not make a point of its immediate capture;but would be ready to capture Matanzas and other less important ports which we could hold without any assistance from the Army. I could blockade Havana and if the two armored cruisers were still there destroy them by torpedoes. I do not think you need fear any raid up the coast,either from vessels now on this side of the Atlantic or that may come from the other side. I consider it my first duty to destroy the two armored cruisers and treat all others which come in the same manner.

Very sincerely,

W.T. Sampson

Captain, Comdr.-in-Chief,

U.S. Naval Forces on North Atlantic Station

Footnote 1: The “Spanish Flotilla” is the fleet commanded by RAdm. Pascual Cervera y Topete. At the time of this letter, it had not yet sailed from Spain. 

Footnote 2: RAdm. Don Vicente de Manterola y Tasconera.

Footnote 3: United States General Consul at Havana Fitzhugh Lee. The identity of his spy is not known nor is it known who sent the telegram from the Canary Islands, a colony of Spain off the coast of Africa.

Footnote 4: President William McKinley.

Footnote 5: Vizcaya and Almirante Oquendo, two of Spain’s most modern cruisers, are  in Havana harbor. 

United States - Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief Of The Bureau Of Navigation, To Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station

Navy Department, Bureau of Navigation

Washington, D.C. March 29th, 1898.

Sir:-

Commanding Officers are authorized in exceptional cases where men are specially well qualified to waive the time limit for advancements in ratings (1) Great care and judgment must be exercised in the use of this privilege.

Respectfully,

A.S. Crowninshield,

Chief of Bureau.

Footnote 1: the U.S. Navy has a rigid advancement system for officers and enlisted men based on seniority and length of service. This order gives commanding officers some long-sought-after leeway for promotion based on merit, specialty knowledge, and/or basic need. 

[miletus12]

Mar 28, 2022 2:56:54 GMT lordroel said:

A.S. Crowninshield

Just so one knows... Crowninshield was defacto Office of Naval Intelligence.

M.

[lordroel]

March 30th 1898

Spain

General Stewart L. Woodford, the United States minister to Spain, is instructed to submit President William McKinley demand to the Spanish government which says: 

The President's desire is for peace. He cannot look upon the suffering and starvation in Cuba save with horror. The concentration of men, women, and children in the fortified towns and permitting them to starve is unbearable to a Christian nation geographically so close as ours to Cuba. All this has shocked and inflamed the American mind, as it has the civilized world, where its extent and character are known.

It was represented to him in November that the Blanco government would at once release the suffering and so modify the Weyler order as to permit those who were able to return to their homes and till the fields from which they had been driven. There has been no relief to the starving except such as the American people have supplied. The reconcentration order has not been practically superseded.

There is no hope of peace through Spanish arms. The Spanish government seems unable to conquer the insurgents. More than half of the island is under control of the insurgents. For more than three years our people have been patient and forbearing; we have patrolled our coast with zeal and at great expense, and have successfully prevented the landing of any armed force on the island. The war has disturbed the peace and tranquility of our people.

We do not want the island. The President has evidenced in every way his desire to preserve and continue friendly relations with Spain. He has kept every international obligation with fidelity. He wants an honorable peace. He has repeatedly urged the government of Spain to secure such a peace. She still has the opportunity to do it, and the President appeals to her from every consideration of justice and humanity to do it. Will she? Peace is the desired end.

For your own guidance, the President suggests that if Spain will revoke the reconcentration order and maintain the people until they can support themselves and offer to the Cubans full self-government, with reasonable indemnity, the President will gladly assist in its consummation. If Spain should invite the United States to mediate for peace and the insurgents would make like request, the President might undertake such office of friendship.

Porto Rico

The entire Autonomy Council in Porto Rico resigns.

Philippines  - United States Consul At Manila Oscar F. Williams To Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station

From Consul Williams, Manila.

To Commander in Chief.

through Consul Hongkong.

Date Manila, March 30, 1898.

Subject Rebels, etc.

Received Hongkong March 31.

Five thousand rebels armed in camp near city.

Loyal to us in case of war.

Torpedoes not ready (1).

Castilla sent Cavite (2).

Governor told to stay.

Leaders in council.

Powder brought from Cavite.

Inform Washington.

Footnote 1: During the late 19th and early 20th century the words torpedoes and mines were often used interchangeably. In this case, Williams is referring briefly to the possible installations of electrically detonated mines in the channels of Manila Bay. See: Williams to Dewey, 25 March 1898.

Footnote 2: Castilla is a Spanish cruiser and Cavite is the location of the Spanish Navy Yard in Manila Bay.

United States - Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

U.S.Flagship New York,1st Rate,

Key West,Florida,

March 30th,1898.

Sir:-

1. I respectfully recommend that the MASSACHUSETTS be ordered to return to this Squadron at Key West.

2. I am convinced that the Country has nothing to fear from an attack along our Northern Coast. The only two vessels to undertake such a raid are the VISCAYA and OQUENDO now in the harbor of Havana. I dont think they will venture to leave that place except possibly to assist the flotilla. I shall keep a close watch upon them and,if necessary,send the New York to follow them in case they leave.

3. In this connection I trust you will send the MAYFLOWER or some other vessel to which I can transfer my flag in case of necessity or when heavy work does not require the use of armored vessels for the Commander-in-Chief.

4. The MASACHUSETTS is like the other battleships well adapted to silencing the new batteries at Havana,and after she has assisted in this operation she can be sent North if the Department desires.

5. I thank you for sending the PURITAN, TERROR, and AMPHITRITE, which will [be] of great service in the capture of Havana.

[Very] respectfully,

W.T. Sampson

Captain,Comdr.-in-Chief,

U.S.Naval Forces on North Atlantic Station

[miletus12]

Some remarks about this period of the quasi-peace before the outbreak of hostility.

a. Dewey is exercising his ships preparatory to the "surprise attack" on Manila Bay. It is an open secret in the South China Sea among the Spanish, French and English. The only ones who do not seem to have a clue are the Russians and Chinese.
b. HMG of the United Kingdom has played a side by this point, denying the Spaniards an option to buy specialized insulated copper marine telegraph wire in Hong Kong or locally in South China from British controlled naval stores of any such insulated wire cables and connectors that are needed as transmitter cable for the Bustamente Mines in service.





This seems to have handicapped but not deterred the Spanish admiral Montojo, who had the telegraph wires from Manila to Dagupan taken down to be used as substitutes. It would work as the Spaniards did command detonate mines in the Battle of Manila Bay. Why the mines laid at the entrance of the harbor and why the command detonated mines during the battle were ineffectual are interesting stories that will have to wait until that battle tale is told here.

c. The two Infanta Maria Teresa class cruisers, ARS Vizcaya and ARS Oquendo, were recalled and ordered to concentrate with the rest of the First Spanish Cruiser Squadron in the run up to hostilities. The imbecilic and incompetent Admiral Sampson, from his overwatch at Key West, lost them as they sortied out and these two cruisers were able to join Admiral Cervera to undertake the squadron workups. I will write more on how that exercise worked for Cervera when we cover the actual condition the Spanish ships were found to be; as he describes them in his letters to his sons and to the Spanish navy minister, Sigismundo Bermejo. I will give one a hint; The Russian performance in the Ukraine exhibits some of the same exact problems Cervera had.

[lordroel]

March 31st 1898

Spain

In responds to the United States demand send to the Spanish government on March 30th, the Spanish governments answers by offering to in trust the preparation of peace to the island's newly constituted parliament, which was to convene on the 4th of May, meanwhile, the insurgents might ask the captain-general for an armistice, to which the home Government would raise no objection. As for the reconcentration system-which, nominally ended by the decree of November 10, 1897, had practically continued, chiefly owing to the absolute helplessness both of the refugees and of the local authorities-Blanco at once (March 30) issued a proclamation declaring it abolished throughout the island, without any limitation or condition, and ordering all civil and military officials to assist the destitute in finding means of livelihood.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

From COM’D’R-IN-CHIEF

To Secretary of Navy.

Date March 31, 1898 Hongkong.

Subject Rebels near Manila.

5000 armed rebels are reported encamped near Manila and would assist our operations (1).

Footnote 1: United States Consul at Manila Oscar F. Williams is the source of this information.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

FLAGSHIP, OLYMPIA,

HONGKONG, MARCH 31, 1898.

Sir:

1. On receipt of your telegram of February 26th (1) the OLYMPIA, RALEIGH and PETREL were at this port, and the BOSTON and CONCORD were at Chemulpo Korea. The two latter vessels were ordered here at once and arrived five days later.

2. Since that time the vessels have been kept full of the best coal obtainable, provisioned and ready to move at twenty-four hours notice. From inspections made during the past month, I find the squadron in a high state of efficiency.

3. I have been in communication with reliable persons in Manila (2) and am able to give you what I believe to be a true account of the defenses of that place, which are as follows:

(a) The cruiser “RienaChristina” of 3520 tons.

(b) The wooden cruiser “Castilla”, of 3342 tons.

(c) The gun-boats “Don Juan de Austria” and “Isla de Luzon” of 1130 and 1030 tons respectively.

(d) About twelve armed tugs and launches for river service.

(e) A battery of five or possibly six VI-inch guns on Corregidor Island, at the entrance to Manila Bay, 27 miles from the city. These guns have only been mounted during the last month. There is a clear channel on each side of this island, one two and the other five miles in width.

(f) A small and weak battery at Kavite (2), the naval station, seven miles by water from the city.

(g) Batteries similar to the last along the water front of the city itself, and a small fort at the entrance to the Pasig River.

(h) About 15,000 soldiers of all arms in all the Islands, of which half are in the vicinity of Manila. The islands are now in a state of insurrection, and my informants state that even the Spanish soldiers, which constitute only a small part of the whole, are disaffected. Both ships and forts are in need of ammunition.

4. I believe I am not over-confident in stating that with the squadron now under my command the vessels could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in one day.

5. There is every reason to believe that with Manila taken or even blockaded, the rest of the islands would fall either to the insurgents or ourselves, as they are only held now through the support of the Navy and are dependent upon Manila for supplies.

6. Information has just reached me that there are 5000 armed rebels encamped near Manila, who are willing to assist us

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

George Dewey

Commodore, U.S. Navy,

Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

Footnote 1: See: Theodore Roosevelt to Dewey, 26 February 1898.

Footnote 2: Dewey is referring to American and British ship captains and the United States Consul at Manila Oscar F. Williams. Williams sent coded cables and letters almost daily to Dewey throughout the month of March 1898, detailing the situation in Manila. For example see: Williams to Dewey, 11 March 1898.

Footnote 3: Cavite.

[miletus12]

Mar 31, 2022 2:47:12 GMT lordroel said:

March 31st 1898

Spain

In responds to the United States demand send to the Spanish government on March 30th, the Spanish governments answers by offering to in trust the preparation of peace to the island's newly constituted parliament, which was to convene on the 4th of May, meanwhile, the insurgents might ask the captain-general for an armistice, to which the home Government would raise no objection. As for the reconcentration system-which, nominally ended by the decree of November 10, 1897, had practically continued, chiefly owing to the absolute helplessness both of the refugees and of the local authorities-Blanco at once (March 30) issued a proclamation declaring it abolished throughout the island, without any limitation or condition, and ordering all civil and military officials to assist the destitute in finding means of livelihood.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

From COM’D’R-IN-CHIEF

To Secretary of Navy.

Date March 31, 1898 Hongkong.

Subject Rebels near Manila.

5000 armed rebels are reported encamped near Manila and would assist our operations (1).

Footnote 1: United States Consul at Manila Oscar F. Williams is the source of this information.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

FLAGSHIP, OLYMPIA,

HONGKONG, MARCH 31, 1898.

Sir:

1. On receipt of your telegram of February 26th (1) the OLYMPIA, RALEIGH and PETREL were at this port, and the BOSTON and CONCORD were at Chemulpo Korea. The two latter vessels were ordered here at once and arrived five days later.

2. Since that time the vessels have been kept full of the best coal obtainable, provisioned and ready to move at twenty-four hours notice. From inspections made during the past month, I find the squadron in a high state of efficiency.

3. I have been in communication with reliable persons in Manila (2) and am able to give you what I believe to be a true account of the defenses of that place, which are as follows:

(a) The cruiser “Riena Christina” of 3520 tons.

(b) The wooden cruiser “Castilla”, of 3342 tons.

(c) The gun-boats “Don Juan de Austria” and “Isla de Luzon” of 1130 and 1030 tons respectively.

(d) About twelve armed tugs and launches for river service.

(e) A battery of five or possibly six VI-inch guns on Corregidor Island, at the entrance to Manila Bay, 27 miles from the city. These guns have only been mounted during the last month. There is a clear channel on each side of this island, one two and the other five miles in width.

(f) A small and weak battery at Kavite (2), the naval station, seven miles by water from the city.

(g) Batteries similar to the last along the water front of the city itself, and a small fort at the entrance to the Pasig River.

(h) About 15,000 soldiers of all arms in all the Islands, of which half are in the vicinity of Manila. The islands are now in a state of insurrection, and my informants state that even the Spanish soldiers, which constitute only a small part of the whole, are disaffected. Both ships and forts are in need of ammunition.

4. I believe I am not over-confident in stating that with the squadron now under my command the vessels could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in one day.

5. There is every reason to believe that with Manila taken or even blockaded, the rest of the islands would fall either to the insurgents or ourselves, as they are only held now through the support of the Navy and are dependent upon Manila for supplies.

6. Information has just reached me that there are 5000 armed rebels encamped near Manila, who are willing to assist us

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

George Dewey

Commodore, U.S. Navy,

Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

Footnote 1: See: Theodore Roosevelt to Dewey, 26 February 1898.

Footnote 2: Dewey is referring to American and British ship captains and the United States Consul at Manila Oscar F. Williams. Williams sent coded cables and letters almost daily to Dewey throughout the month of March 1898, detailing the situation in Manila. For example see: Williams to Dewey, 11 March 1898.

Footnote 3: Cavite.

That is certainly a nice fairy tale Dewey sent to Roosevelt. 

Here is what the Far East Asia Squadron condition was.

a. They were loaded with 60% of their authorized war-shots. Dewey would reduce that amount to 40% with target practice at Mirs Bay. While there he waited for the tardy USS Baltimore to arrive from Hawaii with the extra ammunition he would need for his 6 inch, 5 inch and 4 inch guns. The USS Baltimore was crammed to the gunwales with shells and was a floating BOMB. She carried the entire national reserve war stocks of 4, 5. 6 inch naval shells west of the Rockies. If she went down or blew up in transit, then Dewey was screwed.  As mentioned she arrived LATE which meant that when she arrived the fleet was already overworked trying to prepare for battle. The offloading of ammunition and redistribution from her was "exciting". This evolution happened amidst the last of the target practice and repainting of the entire fleet from buff-white and tan to war gray. Whilst in the doing, anything wood fixtured and flammable was either fireproofed or removed from the ships. To claim the ships were in an excellent state of readiness was not even close to the truth.  The crews were overworked to exhaustion. The commander of the USS Olympia was about to die from terminal heart disease and there was a serious question about whether he would live long enough to command his ship during the battle. Gridley was more than Olympia Actual, he was Dewey's fleet tactician. He had to last long enough to plan the action!
b. Oscar Williams, US consul, and through a hired unnamed Spanish merchant turned traitor were Dewey's primary intelligence sources. They were unaware that Montojo had planted mines in the approach channel to Cavite or between Corregidor and El Fraille. Nor were they aware that the Castille's 8.2 inch guns portside battery had been landed to reinforce Cavite and that in Montojo's line of battle, the offside portside guns except the ARS Reina Cristina's had been dismounted and placed in other shore batteries. Nor was Dewey told about the 9.4 inch gun batteries at Fort San Antonio Abad that fronted the City of Manila. These were six rather old British Armstrong guns, but they had the reach and punch to blow USS Olympia and USS Baltimore apart with just a couple of shots.  
c. Dewey had to do some last minute under the table bribery to buy up additional coal and to secure a pair of British-Chinese steamers, the SS Nanshan and SS Zafiro. These two ships would carry surplus naval stores, spare parts, additional personnel and coal and ammunition. This was a Dewey idea; "the fleet train"; because he had no idea if he could take Cavite intact and use its stores to support his baseless and far from home fleet. 

That was the Asiatic Squadron's true condition as of 22 April 1898.          

[lordroel]

Mar 31, 2022 4:44:20 GMT miletus12 said:

Mar 31, 2022 2:47:12 GMT lordroel said:

March 31st 1898

Spain

In responds to the United States demand send to the Spanish government on March 30th, the Spanish governments answers by offering to in trust the preparation of peace to the island's newly constituted parliament, which was to convene on the 4th of May, meanwhile, the insurgents might ask the captain-general for an armistice, to which the home Government would raise no objection. As for the reconcentration system-which, nominally ended by the decree of November 10, 1897, had practically continued, chiefly owing to the absolute helplessness both of the refugees and of the local authorities-Blanco at once (March 30) issued a proclamation declaring it abolished throughout the island, without any limitation or condition, and ordering all civil and military officials to assist the destitute in finding means of livelihood.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

From COM’D’R-IN-CHIEF

To Secretary of Navy.

Date March 31, 1898 Hongkong.

Subject Rebels near Manila.

5000 armed rebels are reported encamped near Manila and would assist our operations (1).

Footnote 1: United States Consul at Manila Oscar F. Williams is the source of this information.

Hong Kong - Commodore George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long

United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

FLAGSHIP, OLYMPIA,

HONGKONG, MARCH 31, 1898.

Sir:

1. On receipt of your telegram of February 26th (1) the OLYMPIA, RALEIGH and PETREL were at this port, and the BOSTON and CONCORD were at Chemulpo Korea. The two latter vessels were ordered here at once and arrived five days later.

2. Since that time the vessels have been kept full of the best coal obtainable, provisioned and ready to move at twenty-four hours notice. From inspections made during the past month, I find the squadron in a high state of efficiency.

3. I have been in communication with reliable persons in Manila (2) and am able to give you what I believe to be a true account of the defenses of that place, which are as follows:

(a) The cruiser “Riena Christina” of 3520 tons.

(b) The wooden cruiser “Castilla”, of 3342 tons.

(c) The gun-boats “Don Juan de Austria” and “Isla de Luzon” of 1130 and 1030 tons respectively.

(d) About twelve armed tugs and launches for river service.

(e) A battery of five or possibly six VI-inch guns on Corregidor Island, at the entrance to Manila Bay, 27 miles from the city. These guns have only been mounted during the last month. There is a clear channel on each side of this island, one two and the other five miles in width.

(f) A small and weak battery at Kavite (2), the naval station, seven miles by water from the city.

(g) Batteries similar to the last along the water front of the city itself, and a small fort at the entrance to the Pasig River.

(h) About 15,000 soldiers of all arms in all the Islands, of which half are in the vicinity of Manila. The islands are now in a state of insurrection, and my informants state that even the Spanish soldiers, which constitute only a small part of the whole, are disaffected. Both ships and forts are in need of ammunition.

4. I believe I am not over-confident in stating that with the squadron now under my command the vessels could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in one day.

5. There is every reason to believe that with Manila taken or even blockaded, the rest of the islands would fall either to the insurgents or ourselves, as they are only held now through the support of the Navy and are dependent upon Manila for supplies.

6. Information has just reached me that there are 5000 armed rebels encamped near Manila, who are willing to assist us

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

George Dewey

Commodore, U.S. Navy,

Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

Footnote 1: See: Theodore Roosevelt to Dewey, 26 February 1898.

Footnote 2: Dewey is referring to American and British ship captains and the United States Consul at Manila Oscar F. Williams. Williams sent coded cables and letters almost daily to Dewey throughout the month of March 1898, detailing the situation in Manila. For example see: Williams to Dewey, 11 March 1898.

Footnote 3: Cavite.

That is certainly a nice fairy tale Dewey sent to Roosevelt. 

Here is what the Far East Asia Squadron condition was.

a. They were loaded with 60% of their authorized authorized war-shots. Dewey would reduce that to 40% with target practice at Mirs Bay. While there he waited for the tardy USS Baltimore to arrive from Hawaii with the extra ammunition he would need for his 6 inch, 5 inch and 4 inch guns. The USS Baltimore was crammed to the gunwales with shells and was a floating BOMB. The offloading of ammunition and redistribution was "exciting". This evolution happened amidst target practice and repainting the entire fleet from buff-white and tan to war gray. Whilst in the doing, anything wood fixtured and flammable was either fireproofed or removed from the ships. To claim the ships were in an excellent state of readiness was not even close to the truth.  The crews were overworked, The commander of the USS Olympia was about to die from terminal heart disease and there was a serious question about whether he would live long enough to command during the battle. 
b. Oscar Williams, US consul, and through a hired unnamed Spanish merchant turned traitor were Dewey's primary intelligence sources. They were unaware that Montojo had planted mines in the approach channel to Cavite or between Corregidor and El Fraille. Nor were they aware that the Castille's 8.2 inch guns portside battery had been landed to reinforce Cavite and that in Montojo's line of battle, the offside portside guns except the ARS Reina Cristina's had been dismounted and placed in other shore batteries. Nor was Dewey told about the 9.4 inch gun batteries at Fort San Antonio Abad that fronted the City of Manila. These were six rather old British Armstrong guns, but they had the reach and punch to blow USS Olympia and USS Baltimore apart with just a couple of shots.  
c. Dewey had to do some last minute under the table bribery to buy up additional coal and to secure a pair of British-Chinese steamers, the SS Nanshan and SS Zafiro. These two ships would carry surplus naval stores, spare parts, additional personnel and coal and ammunition. This was a Dewey idea; "the fleet train"; because he had no idea if he could take Cavite intact and use its stores to support his baseless and far from home fleet. 

That was the Asiatic Squadron's true condition as of 22 April 1898.          

Well this is what the United States toughed the Spanish fleet condition was, but now we no more in Han they did.

Also can we not go to far ahead with what is going to happen , it spoils the timeline.

[miletus12]

Mar 31, 2022 4:49:27 GMT lordroel said:

Mar 31, 2022 4:44:20 GMT miletus12 said:

That is certainly a nice fairy tale Dewey sent to Roosevelt. 

Here is what the Far East Asia Squadron condition was.

a. They were loaded with 60% of their authorized authorized war-shots. Dewey would reduce that to 40% with target practice at Mirs Bay. While there he waited for the tardy USS Baltimore to arrive from Hawaii with the extra ammunition he would need for his 6 inch, 5 inch and 4 inch guns. The USS Baltimore was crammed to the gunwales with shells and was a floating BOMB. The offloading of ammunition and redistribution was "exciting". This evolution happened amidst target practice and repainting the entire fleet from buff-white and tan to war gray. Whilst in the doing, anything wood fixtured and flammable was either fireproofed or removed from the ships. To claim the ships were in an excellent state of readiness was not even close to the truth.  The crews were overworked, The commander of the USS Olympia was about to die from terminal heart disease and there was a serious question about whether he would live long enough to command during the battle. 
b. Oscar Williams, US consul, and through a hired unnamed Spanish merchant turned traitor were Dewey's primary intelligence sources. They were unaware that Montojo had planted mines in the approach channel to Cavite or between Corregidor and El Fraille. Nor were they aware that the Castille's 8.2 inch guns portside battery had been landed to reinforce Cavite and that in Montojo's line of battle, the offside portside guns except the ARS Reina Cristina's had been dismounted and placed in other shore batteries. Nor was Dewey told about the 9.4 inch gun batteries at Fort San Antonio Abad that fronted the City of Manila. These were six rather old British Armstrong guns, but they had the reach and punch to blow USS Olympia and USS Baltimore apart with just a couple of shots.  
c. Dewey had to do some last minute under the table bribery to buy up additional coal and to secure a pair of British-Chinese steamers, the SS Nanshan and SS Zafiro. These two ships would carry surplus naval stores, spare parts, additional personnel and coal and ammunition. This was a Dewey idea; "the fleet train"; because he had no idea if he could take Cavite intact and use its stores to support his baseless and far from home fleet. 

That was the Asiatic Squadron's true condition as of 22 April 1898.          

Well this is what the United States toughed the Spanish fleet condition was, but now we no more in Han they did.

Also can we not go to far ahead with what is going to happen , it spoils the timeline.

True, but the British were reading Montojo's cable traffic to Madrid since they owned the undersea cable that Montojo used. All this Spanish fleet information Montojo dutifully reported and the British in turn told London. All Dewey had to do was meet with his British counterpart (Wilson Black, British army, Hong Kong) over drinks or with John Chichester and the British could have handed over the Spanish cable traffic. 

Some historians think this might have happened, because of the way Dewey exploited gaps in the Spanish minefields and how he maneuvered to stay out of Spanish coastal guns' ranges inside the bay, but I have never seen anything written or even mentioned that it occurred. Whatever rabbits Dewey pulled from the hat, on paper Montojo should have won. He should have. The British thought Dewey was doomed.  They were not exactly that wrong, in the estimates. 

[miletus12]

Mar 31, 2022 4:44:20 GMT miletus12 said:

That was the Asiatic Squadron's true condition as of 22 April 1898. 

Mar 31, 2022 4:49:27 GMT lordroel said:

Also can we not go to far ahead with what is going to happen , it spoils the timeline.

If one wants it for strictly for 31 March 1898, Dewey's bursar was trying to buy coal, the shore patrols were trying to round up people who had jumped ship and then Dewey was trying to buy those two steamers before he had any money or authorization to make such purchases.

[lordroel]

Mar 31, 2022 5:18:31 GMT miletus12 said:

Mar 31, 2022 4:44:20 GMT miletus12 said:

That was the Asiatic Squadron's true condition as of 22 April 1898. 

Mar 31, 2022 4:49:27 GMT lordroel said:

Also can we not go to far ahead with what is going to happen , it spoils the timeline.

If one wants it for strictly for 31 March 1898, Dewey's bursar was trying to buy coal, the shore patrols were trying to round up people who had jumped ship and then Dewey was trying to buy those two steamers before he had any money or authorization to make such purchases.

The steamers will be mentioned in the future.

[lordroel]

April 1st 1898

United States - Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief Of The Bureau Of Navigation

U.S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate,

Key West, Florida,

April 1, 1898.

My dear Crowninshield:--

Replying to your question contained in your letter of the 25th instant, which was long on the way, regarding Commanding Officer of Torpedo Boats, I think such a person is very useful here as things are now arranged. If the Torpedo Boats were scattered as on a blockade it would undoubtedly increase the red-tape to have one officer in command of them. Now they are assembled here, and it is convenient to have one person who can arrange for a night attack upon big ships outside, and to arrange the detail for patrol duty to the southward at night. In case there is any temporary derangement of one boat on the detail he can substitute another without sending outside the reef to have the detail changed.

In the same manner the senior officers in command of the cruisers has authority to make minor changes in the detail for coaling, receiving stores or ammunition, etc., without sending outside to the Flagship.

Just at present the weather is smooth and fine, but for a long time the boating has been abominable.

I am glad the monitors are coming, for we have only two fighting ships, as you know. I have written the Secretary to send the “Massachusetts”. If there is to be war she should be here; if there is no war she is just as well here as where she is.

The “Indiana” finishes her boilers tomorrow.-- It has been a big job, and has been quickly and well done.

Yours truly,

WT Sampson

[miletus12]

Apr 1, 2022 4:56:06 GMT lordroel said:

April 1st 1898

United States - Captain William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Station, To Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief Of The Bureau Of Navigation

U.S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate,

Key West, Florida,

April 1, 1898.

My dear Crowninshield:--

Replying to your question contained in your letter of the 25th instant, which was long on the way, regarding Commanding Officer of Torpedo Boats, I think such a person is very useful here as things are now arranged. If the Torpedo Boats were scattered as on a blockade it would undoubtedly increase the red-tape to have one officer in command of them. Now they are assembled here, and it is convenient to have one person who can arrange for a night attack upon big ships outside, and to arrange the detail for patrol duty to the southward at night. In case there is any temporary derangement of one boat on the detail he can substitute another without sending outside the reef to have the detail changed.

In the same manner the senior officers in command of the cruisers has authority to make minor changes in the detail for coaling, receiving stores or ammunition, etc., without sending outside to the Flagship.

Just at present the weather is smooth and fine, but for a long time the boating has been abominable.

I am glad the monitors are coming, for we have only two fighting ships, as you know. I have written the Secretary to send the “Massachusetts”. If there is to be war she should be here; if there is no war she is just as well here as where she is.

The “Indiana” finishes her boilers tomorrow.-- It has been a big job, and has been quickly and well done.

Yours truly,

WT Sampson

USS Oregon has started her Speed Run around South America. Her departure date from San Francisco was 19 March 1898 after she loaded up on ammunition and coal.